Anna Nadibaidze's research while affiliated with University of Southern Denmark and other places

The gap between Russia’s aspirations to become a global leader in artificial intelligence (AI) and its potential to do so has become increasingly more visible, especially following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. I examine the mismatch between the Russian leadership’s AI narrative and the country’s technological capabilities via the lens of Russia’s quest for great power status and ontological security. Connecting literatures on status-seeking, ontological security, and narratives in International Relations, I show the need to scrutinise narratives surrounding technology, especially AI technologies and their associated ambiguities, as part of how states deal with the constant uncertainty about recognition of their self-perceived identity. Based on an analysis of textual and visual documents collected via open-access sources, I find that the Russian official AI narrative embeds three of the elements forming Russia’s conception of a great power, namely the ability to compete, modernise, and attain technological sovereignty. It features a plot where the state is the main protagonist leading Russia towards AI leadership despite the obstacles it is facing. Although the official rhetoric does not match the reality of Russian capabilities, the narrative is used as a cognitive tool in the quest for identity during times of uncertainty.

AI and the bomb explores a very timely topic: the implications of the ongoing militarization of artificial intelligence (AI) for strategic stability and nuclear risk, or what James Johnson calls the ‘AI–nuclear dilemma’ (p. 4). Armed forces around the world are visibly interested in taking advantage of what they perceive to be strategic benefits of AI technologies. This is especially the case in the context of global great power competition. In the introduction, Johnson outlines how these technologies are being applied in the nuclear sphere, including in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, early warning systems, missile delivery systems and also command and control. On the last point, it is worth mentioning that there is a current consensus to keep nuclear decision-making under human control. Yet, as the author emphasizes throughout the book, there are many uncertainties about how exactly the emerging AI–nuclear nexus will play out. Johnson's objective is therefore not ‘to make predictions or speculate on the timescale of AI technological progress’, but to investigate the potential strategic impacts of military AI (p. 6). The book makes two main arguments: first, that recent advances in the sphere of AI are changing our conceptions of nuclear risk, and second, that digital technologies including AI might exacerbate existing uncertainty and inadvertently escalate tensions between nuclear powers. Each chapter explores how technological developments intersect with a key concept in the field of nuclear strategy, namely strategic stability; nuclear deterrence; inadvertent escalation; the security dilemma and arms racing; and catalytic nuclear war. Johnson's analysis goes beyond the literature's existing focus on the integration of AI into weapons systems, highlighting the risks associated with the overall complexity of the digital age, including disinformation and cyber attacks. The author also brings together strategic studies, psychology and social constructivism, with the objective of putting forward ‘an innovative theoretical framework to consider AI technology and nuclear risk’ (p. 5).

Military applications of artificial intelligence (AI) are said to impact strategic stability, broadly defined as the absence of incentives for armed conflict between nuclear powers. While previous research explores the potential implications of AI for nuclear deterrence based on technical characteristics, little attention has been dedicated to understanding how policymakers of nuclear powers conceive of AI technologies and their impacts. This paper argues that the relationship between AI and strategic stability is not only given through the technical nature of AI, but also constructed by policymakers’ beliefs about these technologies and other states’ intentions to use them. Adopting a constructivist perspective, we investigate how decision-makers from the United States and Russia talk about military AI by analyzing US and Russian official discourses from 2014–2023 and 2017-2023, respectively. We conclude that both sides have constructed a threat out of their perceived competitors’ AI capabilities, reflecting their broader perspectives of strategic stability, as well as the social context characterized by distrust and feelings of competition. Their discourses fuel a cycle of misperceptions which could be addressed via confidence building measures. However, this competitive cycle is unlikely to improve due to ongoing tensions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Technological developments in the sphere of artificial intelligence (AI) inspire debates about the implications of autonomous weapon systems (AWS), which can select and engage targets without human intervention. While increasingly more systems which could qualify as AWS, such as loitering munitions, are reportedly used in armed conflicts, the global discussion about a system of governance and international legal norms on AWS at the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW) has stalled. In this article we argue for the necessity to adopt legal norms on the use and development of AWS. Without a framework for global regulation, state practices in using weapon systems with AI-based and autonomous features will continue to shape the norms of warfare and affect the level and quality of human control in the use of force. By examining the practices of China, Russia, and the United States in their pursuit of AWS-related technologies and participation at the UN CCW debate, we acknowledge that their differing approaches make it challenging for states parties to reach an agreement on regulation, especially in a forum based on consensus. Nevertheless, we argue that global governance on AWS is not impossible. It will depend on the extent to which an actor or group of actors would be ready to take the lead on an alternative process outside of the CCW, inspired by the direction of travel given by previous arms control and weapons ban initiatives.

This article proposes an identity-based analysis of the Russian position in the global debate on autonomous weapons systems (AWS). Based on an interpretation of Russian written and verbal statements submitted to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) meetings from 2014 to 2022, I find that two key integral elements of Russian great power identity—the promotion of multipolarity and the recognition of Russia’s equal participation in global affairs—guide its evolving position on the potential regulation of AWS. The analysis makes an empirical contribution by examining one of the most active participants in the CCW discussion, an opponent to any new regulations of so-called “killer robots,” and a developer of autonomy in weapons systems. It highlights the value of a more thorough understanding of the ideas guiding the Russian position, assisting actors who seek a ban on AWS in crafting their responses and strategies in the debate.