Emilios Avgouleas's research while affiliated with The University of Edinburgh and other places

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Publications (66)


How Should Crypto Lending Be Regulated Under EU Law?
  • Article
  • Full-text available

July 2023

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84 Reads

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3 Citations

European Business Organization Law Review

Emilios Avgouleas

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Alexandros Seretakis

The collapse of Genesis is the latest in a cascade of failures of crypto lenders. The last year has seen numerous major crypto lenders, such as Celsius, Voyager and BlockFi, going out of business in domino-like fashion. The failures have revealed the vulnerabilities of crypto-market lenders’ business model, most notably the liquidity and maturity mismatches in their loan portfolios, and their markedly weak corporate governance. The present article explores avenues to regulate crypto lending within the framework of EU financial services regulation. It argues that crypto lenders should be taken as falling within the definition of credit institutions under EU law, and thus, as a result, should be subject to the stringent licensing and prudential requirements introduced by the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation. Prudential regulation is one of the ways that have been suggested for the regulation of crypto-market operators, alongside the investor protection framework. Taking into account that crypto lenders easily operate on a cross-border basis and that prudential regulation is fully harmonized in the EU, we take an EU-wide perspective and focus our analysis on EU law, rather than member state laws. In addition, prudential regulation can deal with any systemic risk issues with which investor protection regulation cannot deal. However, in order to avoid moral hazard and not give investors the false impression that crypto lenders are safe too-big-to fail institutions, we suggest that crypto lenders should not enjoy the full protection of prudential regulations. In particular, they should not be offered lender of last resort support and they should not be allowed to subscribe into a deposit insurance scheme. Even though it is often said that crypto markets pose no risk to the regulated sector due to limited interconnectedness, it should be noted that due to the high leverage of crypto investors, the real risk to the regulated sector comes from the possibility of crypto investors massively liquidating their positions in other asset markets.

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COVID-19, Macroeconomic and Sustainability Shocks, Moral Hazard and Resolution of Systemic Banking Crises: Designing Appropriate Systems of Public Support

August 2022

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32 Reads

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1 Citation

European Business Organization Law Review

Banks have so far weathered well the financial turbulence caused by COVID-19 while at the same time being central in the economic and financial response. As the crisis moves from its initial phase as a short-term liquidity shock, the financial sector is facing increasing volumes of non-performing loans, raising the spectre of a banking solvency crisis. In economies already burdened with low-quality assets, the COVID-19 fallout is intensifying existing problems with legacy loans heightening the risk of a banking crisis. These issues are now being worsened by the impact of inflation and the invasion of Ukraine. Thus, addressing increasing volumes of bad loans, while supporting the proper functioning of the financial system, is a major challenge with systemic repercussions for a range of economies. This paper identifies a great paradox: since the bank rescues of the 2008–9 Global Financial Crisis there has been a disproportionate focus on the liability side of bank balance sheets through resolution measures such as bail-in and the accumulation of bail-inable debt. Post-crisis bank resolution regimes have overlooked solutions lying within the asset side of bank balance sheets. This paper analyses historical evidence to argue that concentrating on a liability-focused approach to the exclusion of asset-side solutions is ill-conceived. An excessive accumulation of non-performing loans on the asset side of bank balance sheets inevitably renders resolution interventions on the liability/equity side ineffective or at the very least insufficient to maintain banking system viability and financial stability. Bank asset restructuring involving the use of asset management companies, asset protection schemes and even capital injections can play a critical role in achieving an expeditious restoration of banking systems’ health following a major macroeconomic, sustainability or financial crisis.



Phases of AMC creation in Europe
Selected European AMCs -ownership structure
Selected European AMCs -size and portfolio
Selected European AMCs -net profit/losses (EUR million)
5. Non-Performing Loans: New Risks and Policies *

June 2021

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304 Reads

Emilios Avgouleas

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[...]

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Willem Pieter De

Non-Performing Loans: New Risks and Policies ToC: 1. Introduction. – 2. Advantages and disadvantages of AMCs. – 3. Design and organisational structure of AMCs. – 4. Comparison of national AMCs. – 5. Concluding remarks and policy lessons.







Citations (44)


... The starting point of the narrative was the low economic growth in the EU in the aftermath of the international financial and sovereign debt crises and the limited amount of (bank-intermediated) funding available to the real economy. On its webpages and in regular communications on CMU, the Commission argued that bank lending in the EU accounted for an excessively large percentage of total funding to the real economy (75-80 per cent), which was the reverse of the United States (US), 4 where banks provided only 20 per cent (Commission 2015a) and exposed large parts of the EU economy to a credit Hill (2015cHill ( , 2015dHill ( , 2015e, 2016a. b Hill (2015c);Singh (2015). ...

Reference:

The policy narratives of European capital markets union
Capital Markets Union in Europe
  • Citing Article
  • March 2018

... Ferran (2015), pp 101-102 notes that the focus on the clear supervisory objectives of the Twin Peaks model is typically associated with more uniform and responsive supervisory practices than other possible institutional frameworks, namely sector-based systems (such as the ESFS) or single supervisory authorities for any given jurisdiction. 366 Colaert (2015), pp 1611-1613; Schoenmaker and Véron (2017), pp 5-9; Avgouleas and Ferrarini (2018), pp 69-72. centralisation of supervisory tasks is possible only after an agreement on loss mutualisation. ...

A Single Listing Authority and Securities Regulator for the CMU and the Future of ESMA: Costs, Benefits, and Legal Impediments
  • Citing Chapter
  • March 2018

... As a result, the 'CMU-inspired revival' of securitisation and the new comprehensive regulatory framework is a product of collaboration between the EC and the industry: In the wider context of the CMU, the regulator prioritised market-driven solutions, 259 by asking the market and listening to its concerns. 260 The detailed responses made by various industry bodies called for a fundamental reconsideration and adoption of a different, positive approach towards the technique. These responses have clearly influenced the regulatory approach taken in the new framework. ...

Capital Markets Union after Brexit
  • Citing Chapter
  • March 2018

... Moreover, Ethereum's composable software stack ensures that DeFi applications (dapps) are built to integrate and complement one another. See Avgouleas and Seretakis (2022), p 17. locked in DeFi reached an all-time high of $253 billion in December 2021. 10 DeFi is a term used to describe an ecosystem comprising financial applications built on top of blockchain networks which do not rely on traditional financial intermediaries such as brokerages, exchanges, or banks. ...

Governing the Digital Finance Value-Chain in the EU: MIFID II, the Digital Package, and the Large Gaps between!

... Another proposal is that of Avgouleas and Micossi (2021) and Micossi (2021), which suggest to transfer a substantial part of the sovereign bonds purchased by the Eurosystem, both during the COVID-19 crisis and before, to the ESM. This would not only avoid, according to these authors, the potentially disruptive effect on the bond markets of having the ECB release these sovereign bonds rapidly once the monetary policy justification for holding them in its books disappears but could also have a salutary impact on the availability of euro-denominated safe assets, thus supporting the euro's international status. ...

On selling sovereigns held by the ECB to the ESM: institutional and economic policy implications

SSRN Electronic Journal

... Positive significant coefficients of the dummy variables Y_2015 and FREQ suggest that CAR is higher after 2015 (i.e., the post-coup period) and for the bank with the most frequent sales. In a period of fragility in the banking sector due to an excessive level of structural changes, sales of distressed assets can mitigate financial risks (Arner et al., 2020). Being a frequent seller in the NPL market can also be perceived as a signal of active portfolio management (Rubio et al., 2017). ...

Financial Stability, Resolution of Systemic Banking Crises and COVID-19: Toward an Appropriate Role for Public Support and Bailouts
  • Citing Article
  • January 2020

SSRN Electronic Journal

... Decentralised finance is a type of blockchain-based digital finance. Decentralised finance transforms traditional financial products into products that operate without an intermediary through smart contracts on a blockchain (Avgouleas and Kiayias, 2020). Decentralised finance is financial services offered on a public blockchain over the internet. ...

The Architecture of Decentralised Finance Platforms: A New Open Finance Paradigm
  • Citing Article
  • January 2020

SSRN Electronic Journal

... As a result, it did not just become a health crisis; the world economy suffered a significant scale shock (Sohrabi et al., 2020). At least three other pecuniary shocks preceded Covid-19 in the late 1990s (Buckley et al., 2020). Among these were: Asian fiscal shocks (Sayaseng, 2020) and the European debt crisis (Buckley et al., 2020). ...

Three Decades of International Financial Crises: What Have We Learned and What Still Needs to be Done?
  • Citing Article
  • January 2020

SSRN Electronic Journal

... Em trabalhos como (Pennino et al., 2021;Hasan et al., 2020;Avgouleas and Kiayias, 2019;Moura et al., 2020;Tan et al., 2022;Silva and Marques, 2021;Čučko and Turkanović, 2021;Stockburger et al., 2021), evidencia-se como aplicativos e sistemas podem se beneficiar da arquitetura P2P descentralizada oferecida pela Blockchain. Em geral, estes trabalhos apresentam protótipos de prova de conceito, prontamente escaláveis, aplicáveis genericamente e, com efeito, 'pronto para prosperar' em diversas áreas, além de abordarem questões éticas importantes. ...

The Promise of Blockchain Technology for Global Securities and Derivatives Markets: The New Financial Ecosystem and the ‘Holy Grail’ of Systemic Risk Containment

European Business Organization Law Review