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The use of verbal protocols as data: An analysis of insight in the candle problem
Abstract
In the present study, we examined the use of verbal protocols as data in the study of the cognitive processes underlying insight. Fifty-eight Temple University undergraduates attempted to solve Duncker's (1945) candle problem either silently or while thinking aloud. Solution rates, solving times, and solution types were comparable between conditions, suggesting that verbal overshadowing (Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993) did not occur when the participants attempted to solve the candle problem. Subsequent analysis of verbal protocols provided a catalogue of solutions generated by the participants, as well as empirical support for the occurrence of impasse and restructuring. Although restructuring was present in the majority of protocols, including those of the participants who later produced the box solution, the presence of impasse occurred with less frequency and was not associated with production of the box solution. These results provide information concerning how the candle problem is solved and suggest that verbalization can be used to examine how individuals solve insight problems and to evaluate existing theories of insight.
... An impasse is a mental state that individuals reach when they cannot make any further progress in their problem solving process (Ohlsson, 1992). An impasse can be not only a feeling reported by the individual (e.g., Segal, 2004), but can also be observed in various ways, such as through behavior (e.g., Ohlsson, 1992), protocol (e.g., Fleck and Weisberg, 2004) and eye movement (e.g., Tseng et al., 2014). An impasse is considered to be vital, and it is described as one of the fundamental stages in an insight sequence for solving insight problems (Ohlsson, 2011). ...
... Further, being fixated is argued to be a cognitive state that is prior to an impasse (Beeftink et al., 2008). In the investigation of an effective defixation approach, given that reaching an impasse is not an essential condition for solving insight problems (Fleck and Weisberg, 2004;Tseng et al., 2014) and a longer impasse might produce more fixation (Lu et al., 2017), studies were conducted to examine the defixation effect of reducing impasses. For instance, instructing individuals to switch task before reaching an impasse is found to contribute to enhancing solution rates (Lu et al., 2017). ...
... Importantly, reaching the status of an impasse is also crucial in defixation, since it is considered to be a factor which triggers a new search (Seifert et al., 1995;Segal, 2004;Moss et al., 2011). Moreover, it relates to a failure experience which encourages individuals to reflect (Fleck and Weisberg, 2004). Reflection, which is a well-studied topic in research of education, is not only shown to be effective in defixation (e.g., Neroni and Crilly, 2021), but also significantly related to creative thinking (Akpur, 2020), and a higher level of reflection involves double-loop learning (Greenwood, 1998), which is a transformative learning that involves the modification of habituated action (Argyris, 1994). ...
As a cognitive state that impedes idea generation, fixation has been well studied across various domains in relation to the cultivation of creativity. With the aim of contributing to the development of an effective approach to overcoming fixation in order to enhance creativity, a systematic review is conducted of 53 experimental studies concerning the source of fixation and the problem type, which are two critical factors influencing the effectiveness of defixation approaches. Based on the results, it is indicated that an enhancement of the search beyond the frame, constructed by either information that is externally provided or memory that is internally activated by information about the problem, is essential in overcoming fixation. Further, the elimination of fixation leads to an increase in solution rates of closed-ended problems. However, in open-ended problem solving, defixation does not necessarily lead to an improvement in the performance of problem solving, and an advancement can still be achieved by enhancing the search within the constructed frame even when there is no search beyond the frame. Accordingly, an examination of both beyond-frame searches and within-frame searches is essential for an effective defixation approach to enhance creativity in open-ended problem solving.
... For example, researchers have found lowered insight when solvers talk aloud while solving Schooler et al., 1993) or while wearing a white lab coat associated with analytical thinking (Van Stockum & DeCaro, 2014). However, other studies contradict these findings (e.g., Ball & Stevens, 2009;Chein & Weisberg, 2014;Chein et al., 2010;Fleck & Weisberg, 2004, 2013Gilhooly, Fioratou, & Henretty, 2010). ...
... It is also possible that relying on controlled attention processes leads individuals to overshadow associative processing, hindering insight (Table 20.2; Beilock & DeCaro, 2007;DeCaro et al., 2016;Fleck & Weisberg, 2004;Weisberg, 2006). If a problem is best solved by "letting go," or letting the mind wander across semantic associations in long-term memory, then relying on controlled processes instead may impede this process. ...
... Alternatively, individuals may begin this process in the solution phase instead. When encountering new information during the solution phase, solvers may begin a new search and restructuring process without encountering impasse at all (Chein & Weisberg, 2014;Fleck & Weisberg, 2004, 2013Weisberg, 2015). This description is consistent with the business-as-usual view of insight. ...
To better understand and predict creativity and innovation, researchers have examined the cognitive mechanisms underlying insight problem-solving. The role of working memory (WM) in insight, in particular, has been the subject of numerous studies. However, these studies have led to widely conflicting results. Some studies show a positive relationship between insight and WM, whereas others show null or even negative effects. We propose that these seemingly contradictory results indicate a more nuanced relationship between WM and insight: WM can both help and hinder insight. In reviewing prior research, we theorize that results diverge due to differences in how insight and WM are measured. WM likely has different effects across the phases of problem-solving, and insight tasks vary in their reliance on each phase. In addition, WM is a multifaceted construct, and different WM processes may support or hinder insight. By delineating the moderating roles of these factors across studies, we will better understand when and why insight will be supported versus hindered.
... Available models mostly focused on the interaction between idea generation and idea evaluation processes (e.g., [61,111,133]). Empirical work further highlighted the relevance of cognitive strategies [63,76] and more generally of cognitive control [26,42] in creative task performance. Notably, creative problems are typically ill-defined and often have no single correct solution, which undermines the use of straightforward, analytical approaches and instead implies an evaluation of ambiguous solution criteria [175,176]. ...
... Regarding MC control of task performance (control of task strategies), think-aloud studies have revealed specific strategies used in divergent thinking [76,126], creative problem solving [63,180], visual production [85,94], and design [150,198]. For example, a detailed analysis of verbal protocols during performance of the alternate uses task showed that participants engage in task-unspecific strategies, such as trying to recall solutions from memory or self-cuing, as well as in task-specific strategies, such a focusing on specific object properties or object parts [76]. ...
... In a similar way, people have been asked to anticipate or reflect on task performance in a more time-sensitive way (e.g., consider five time periods within the task; [122]). Think aloud protocols represent a more direct approach to examine ongoing thinking processes and have shed light on the type and prevalence of specific tasks strategies in creative ideation and creative problem solving [63,76,150,181]. While they offer particularly intimate qualitative insights, findings depend on people's reflection capacity and thus are moderated by their metacognitive skills. ...
Creative cognition does not just involve cognitive processes in direct service of the main task objective (e.g., idea generation), but also metacognitive processes that monitor and regulate cognition adaptively (e.g., evaluation of ideas and task performance, or development and selection of task strategies). Although metacognition is vital for creative performance, relevant work is sparse, which may be partly due to persistent ambiguities in the theoretical conceptualization of creative metacognition. Therefore, this article proposes a systematic framework of creative metacognition (CMC), which builds on recent advancements in metacognition theory and extends them to meet the specifics of creative cognition. The CMC framework consists of two dynamic components-monitoring and control-and a more static component of metacognitive knowledge, each subsuming metacognitive processes applying to the level of task, performance, and responses. We describe the presumed function of these metacognitive components in the creative process, present evidence in support of each, and discuss their association with related constructs, such as creative self-beliefs. We further highlight the dynamic interplay of metacognitive processes across task performance and identify promising avenues for future research.
... This "special process" view of insight problem-solving (Ash et al., 2009;Knoblich et al., 2001;Ohlsson, 1992) contrasts with a "business-as-usual" view, which proposes that the underlying cognitive processes are rather similar across both problem types, as both may occur through incremental reasoning (Chronicle et al., 2004;Fleck & Weisberg, 2004;Weisberg, 2006). Impasse would then merely result from problem difficulty, which might be due to the large size of problem space or the circumstance that the more available actions lead to failure (Kounios & Beeman, 2014;MacGregor et al., 2001;Ormerod et al., 2002); the Aha-experience may then be understood as an experience of relief (Chu & Macgregor, 2011). ...
... In the study of problem-solving, externalization methods such as verbalization or thinking aloud are frequently used (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004;Ohlsson, 1992). Ericsson and Simon (1984) distinguished verbalization procedures in which retrospective explanations of thoughts and reasons for choosing specific solving methods were being reported and ones that aim to capture participants' focal attention in concurrent verbal protocols. ...
... Schooler et al. (1993) reported that while concurrent verbalization had no effect on solving their four noninsight problems, it was disruptive in three insight problems. On the other hand, Fleck and Weisberg (2004) found no such effect in a typical insight problem such as Duncker's (1945) candle problem. ...
We compared problem‐solving in four sets of classical insight and analytic problems in the verbal and spatial domains, and examined the impact of externalization (verbalization or sketching). In a within‐participants factorial design, we presented 24 classical insight and analytic problems, half verbal and half spatial. Participants solved these problems either while thinking aloud, while sketching, or in a baseline condition where neither was allowed. Higher solving accuracy was found in the analytic problems than in the insight ones as well as in the verbal problems than in the spatial ones. The verbal problems were also found to be solved faster than were spatial ones; in particular, verbal‐insight problems were solved faster than spatial‐insight and verbal‐analytic ones. Therefore, spatial‐insight problems stand out as particularly hard among the ones typically found in the literature. Surprisingly, no effects of externalization were found on problem‐solving speed or accuracy. We discuss the implications of our results for the theses that insight problems involve special processes.
... Although studies have shown that a problem can be a catalyst for creativity (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004;Osborn, 1953;Thorndike, 1911, cited in Mayer, 2013, the three views of creativity have not explained how previous solutions and experiences can be used to solve a novel problem (Associationist view), how novel solutions can be generated through breaking conventional notions (Gestalt's view), and how systematic procedures can be applied in solving a new, ill-defined problem (information processing view). In view of the lack of clarity in these views, there is a need to understand the creative problem-solving process, particularly strategies that individuals use to generate solutions. ...
... The "aha" or "eureka" moment usually occurs when the correct solution is formed (Fedor et al., 2015;Webb et al., 2016). This claim is supported by evidence involving individuals who experienced failure in problem solving but restructured their mental representation i.e., using productive thinking, to finally address the issue (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004;Weisberg & Suls, 1973). Recent studies discover that productive thinking can usually be facilitated by individuals' high working memory capacity (Chuderski & Jastrzebski, 2018;Xing et al., 2019), personality traits such as openness to experience (Chamorro-Premuzic & Reichenbacher, 2008;Yeh et al., 2020), persistence (Yeh et al., 2020) as well as contextual conditions such as the existence of priming (Mikulincer et al., 2011;Yeh et al., 2020). ...
... To date, there have still been arguments on whether a creative insight is an outcome of a sudden process (Scheerer, 1963) or is led by a different set of underlying thinking process (Ash et al., 2009;Kounious & Beeman, 2015;Wiley & Jarosz, 2012). Findings have reported that problems could be solved using both reproductive and productive thinking (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004;Perkins, 1981). Reproductive thinking is required for making association with existing ideas and experiences, whereas productive thinking is required for breaking away from past knowledge to seek new possibilities. ...
Creativity has been recognised as one of the most important skills in the 21st century. Although creativity has been advocated in the context of education, there still seems to be a lack of understanding of the concept of creativity, leading to teaching and learning practices that still encourage uniformity and conformity. The current literature on creativity is insufficient for understanding creativity from a more comprehensive manner, as frameworks and taxonomies for creativity largely focus on either listing a set of components relevant to creativity without explaining strategies that invoke creativity or categorising creative strategies without explaining the factors that support the use of these strategies, and the result of applying these strategies. More importantly, these frameworks are largely theoretical without empirical evidence. While there have been studies that investigate approaches for developing creativity, the effectiveness of these approaches is measured based on the improvement demonstrated through the creative outputs produced by the participants, by mainly looking at the number of solutions being produced and the originality of the solutions. They do not examine the use of strategies in the creative processes. As such, the understanding of how creativity can be supported by the use of set of strategies remains insufficient. In view of these situations, this study aimed to develop a taxonomic framework that could facilitate the understanding and development of creativity, which could serve as a foundation for teaching, learning and assessment. This study viewed creativity from the problem-solving perspective, where problems act as a catalyst for creative thinking. The sample for this study was lecturers and students across various disciplines from an international university in Malaysia. This study aimed at (i) developing a prototype taxonomic framework for creativity through a synthesis of literature on theories, frameworks and research on creativity, (ii) exploring and understanding the meaning of creativity from the higher education lecturers and students’ perspectives, (iii) examining the creativity features and usability of the taxonomic framework based on the perceptions of creativity and the relevance of the framework among a group of higher education lecturers and students, and (iv) examining the use of the creative strategies in the prototype taxonomic framework for creativity through a problem-solving task. The methodology for this study involved a mixed-methods, multiphase design. This study comprised four phases i.e., (i) a systematic synthesis of the literature on creativity through a thematic analysis to develop a prototype taxonomic framework for creativity, (ii) data collection from general higher education lecturers and students through a survey, (iii) data collection from the participant-nominated creative students and lecturers through a series of interviews, and (iv) data collection from higher education students through a problem-solving task. Findings revealed that the prototype taxonomic framework for creativity consisted of 24 features of creativity. Findings gained from the survey and interviews showed that creativity was generally perceived as an ability related to the mental processes and the ability to produce something that has a value – usually innovativeness and originality. Additionally, the taxonomic framework was generally perceived to be relevant for teaching, learning and assessment. Findings from the problem-solving task revealed that the taxonomic framework was able to facilitate creativity, by allowing students to use a wider range of strategies, produce more solutions, provide greater detail to their solutions and generate solutions that are novel, useful and ethical. In general, the overall findings from the study have demonstrated that creativity is a skill that can be taught and learned. The implications of the study offered several contributions of the framework for educational purposes.
... Современные последователи С. Олссона, как и он сам, предполагают, что тупик преодолевается именно благодаря переструктурированию ментальной репрезентации. При этом различные варианты решения задач могут различаться по типу (Ohlsson, 1992), количеству (Knoblich et al,, 1999), направлению (Fleck, Weisberg, 2004) и уровню необходимых переструктурирований (MacGregor, Cunningham, 2009). И наконец, попытки ответить на третий вопрос связаны с пересмотром классического гештальтистского представления о том, что переструктурирование всегда приводит к лучшему пониманию проблемной ситуации. ...
... Следующий, один из наиболее надежных критериев, -связан с классическим для психологии мышления методом -рассуждением вслух. Яркая демонстрация его возможностей была произведена Д. Флек и Р. Вейсбергом (Fleck, Weisberg, 2004). В своей работе они опирались на две теоретических модели инсайта. ...
... 3) неадекватная идея (отказ решателя от идеи еще до ее реализации из-за нахождения ошибки в своих рассуждениях) (Fleck, Weisberg, 2004). ...
Цель настоящей статьи-проанализировать современные подходы к пониманию инсайта и выделить те теоретические и экспериментальные новации, которые отличают современное положение дел от классического. Первые теоретические постгештальтистские новации связаны с работами С. Олссона и переопределением понятия инсайта не столько как момента возникновения решения в сознании, сколько как момента преодоления тупика в решении. Подобное уточнение понятия инсайта позволило С. Олссону сформулировать принципиально новые исследовательские вопросы для этой области, которыми не интересовались гештальтпсихологи. Каждый из этих вопросов привел к появлению новых объяснительных моделей в психологии мышления: от моделей источников сложности задачи до моделей механизмов переструктурирования. Помимо теоретического прогресса в исследованиях инсайта, со времен гештальтпсихологов появилось и большое количество новаций в области методов экспериментального изучения этого феномена. С одной стороны, эти новации вызваны необходимостью более теоретически обоснованного выбора стимульного материала (инсайтных задач) для исследования, а с другой - с отходом от представлений о том, что инсайтные задачи всегда решаются инсайтно, и последующей необходимостью развивать методы измерения инсайтных решений. Также можно указать еще две линии исследований, которые были вдохновлены преимущественно развитием методов. Первая из них связана с экспериментальными ситуациями, в рамках которых исследователи не просто подбирают особые задачи, а дополнительно формируют у испытуемых установку, мешающую решению. Вторая линия исследований, связанная с методом подсказки, породила колоссальное количество разрозненных экспериментальных фактов по поводу того, что помогает и что мешает решать инсайтные задачи.
... After each solved CRAT, participants indicated how the solution was found (i.e., with insight or non-insight) based on their subjective experience. Participants' verbal protocols showed no difference in the experienced impasse between solutions found with insight and non-insight (see also Fleck & Weisberg, 2004;Webb et al., 2016). These findings are generally in line with the assumption of the integrated theory of insight that impasse is not a necessary prerequisite of insight, although some more indirect measures seem to indicate that, in some cases, insight is preceded by impasse. ...
... With regards to the role of restructuring, studies using verbal protocols showed that restructuring happening immediately before the solution was retrieved occurred more often for insight than for non-insight (Cranford & Moss, 2012;Fleck & Weisberg, 2004). Furthermore, Danek et al. (2020) requested participants to determine how a magic trick worked. ...
... Finally, the integrated theory of insight assumes that insight solutions obtained via the impasse-insight sequence are rare (Weisberg, 2015). Although many experiments included the experience of impasse and/or restructuring as a subject of study (e.g., Cranford & Moss, 2012;Danek et al., 2020), only a few studies (e.g., Fleck & Weisberg, 2004 examined this proposed impasse-insight sequence. For example, Fleck and Weisberg (2013) studied this sequence by analyzing the verbal protocols of participants solving classical insight problems (i.e., a problem type assumed to be solved with insight). ...
In everyday life, we mainly solve problems with a conscious solution search (non-insight). However, sometimes a perplexing problem is resolved by a quantum leap in understanding. This phenomenon is known as the Aha! experience (insight). Although insight has a distinct phenomenological and behavioral signature, its driving mechanism remains debated. Weisberg (2015) proposed an integrated theory of insight arguing that insight, like non-insight, mainly depends on conscious, cognitive operations with restructuring as a distinguishing feature of insight. However, only if those operations lead to an impasse, insight is achieved through unconscious processes. We assessed some of the premises of this theory by asking participants (N = 42) to solve 70 word puzzles (CRAT) that can either be solved with insight or non-insight. For each puzzle, participants indicated word puzzle difficulty, solution confidence, solution suddenness, and the experiences of impasse and restructuring. As expected, participants reported higher suddenness of and confidence in insight solutions than non-insightful ones. Surprisingly, we could not corroborate the otherwise consistently reported higher solution accuracy and faster solution speed for insight. Crucially, as suggested by the integrated theory of insight, impasse was not a prerequisite for insight to occur. Although restructuring, indeed, preceded insight solutions more often, it seemed a more general problem-solving skill also applied for non-insight solutions. Moreover, early on, participants reported an increased experience of problem difficulty for puzzles later solved with insight. This ability to report on the solution search of insight demonstrates that, as proposed by the theory, insight involves conscious, cognitive operations.
... It should be noted, however, that there is also evidence from participants' phenomenological reports that CRAT and RAT problems may be solved by a more analytic process (e.g. Salvi et al., 2016), which involves conscious, explicit thinking that takes the solver closer to a solution in an incremental, step-by-step manner (see also Ball & Stevens, 2009;Fleck & Weisberg, 2004). In addition, it is also possible that the solution to CRAT and RAT problems may at times involve a mix of both conscious analysis and non-conscious insight (Barr et al., 2015; for theoretical arguments concerning the interplay between implicit and explicit processes in creative problem solving see Barr, 2018;Gilhooly et al., 2015;Sowden et al., 2015;Weisberg, 2015Weisberg, , 2018. ...
... We suggest that the deployment of the think-aloud technique (e.g. Ball & Stevens, 2009;Chein et al., 2010;Fleck & Weisberg, 2004;Gilhooly et al., 2010;Schooler et al., 1993;Schooler & Melcher, 1995) is likely to afford a deeper understanding of the roles of generate-and-test processes in solving CRAT problems as well as the susceptibility of these processes to disruption via the acoustic or semantic properties of task-irrelevant sound. Necessarily, articulatory suppression requires the use of the vocal-motor production system, thereby preventing the overt report of candidate items. ...
... Although self-report ratings for CRAT problems demonstrated that they were mostly solved via insight, whether the occurrence of insight is criterial for classifying a response as creative, as suggested by some researchers (Ohlsson, 2011;Perkins, 2000; has been debated (Weisberg, 2015). Moreover, multiple paths may give rise to insight (Cranford & Moss, 2012;Fleck & Weisberg, 2004, 2013, suggesting that the proposed sequence to an insight solution (problem presentation → repeated failure → impasse → incubation → restructuring → Aha! + solution) also cannot be criterial or definitive for a creative solution. ...
Controversy exists regarding the processes involved in creative thinking with the Remote Associates Test (RAT) and the Compound Remote Associates Test (CRAT). We report three experiments that aimed to shed light on the component processes underpinning CRAT
performance by using the mere presence of task-irrelevant sound as a key theoretical tool. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that CRAT performance was impaired relative to a quiet condition by the presence of sequences of changing letters and tones, respectively. In both experiments a non-changing sound (a repeated letter or a repeated tone) produced no disruption relative to quiet. Experiment 3 established that additional disruption was engendered by having to ignore meaningful speech as compared to meaningless speech. These experiments demonstrate that both semantic activation and subvocalisation are important determinants of successful creative thinking with CRAT problems. We suggest that semantic activation underpins solution-generation processes whereas subvocalisation underpins solution-evaluation processes.
... Previous studies have examined whether verbalization disrupts insight problem solving (Ball et al., 2015;Fleck & Weisberg, 2004;Gilhooly, Fioratou, & Henretty, 2010;Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993). Schooler et al. (1993) used verbal and visuospatial tasks to examine the effects of retrospective verbalization (Experiments 1 and 2), wherein participants reflected on how they approached the problem and concurrent verbalization (Experiments 3 and 4), which occurred during problem solving. ...
... However, some findings support the business-as-usual view that verbalization does not disrupt insight problem solving. Fleck and Weisberg (2004) examined the effect of concurrent verbalization on insight problem solving using the candle problem, and found no difference between the thinkaloud and silent conditions. ...
We examined the effect of verbalization on problem solving using mathematical insight and non-insight problems. A total of 321 participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (verbalization toward self, verbalization toward others or control). A one-minute problem solving phase was followed by a one-minute verbalization phase; afterward, the participants were asked to work on the same problem again for two minutes. Each participant worked on three insight and non-insight problems each. A generalized linear mixed model analysis showed that the solution rate was significantly higher in the verbalization toward others condition than the other two conditions. There was no interaction with the problem type. When examining the effect of verbalization on insight problem solving, the type of insight problem (verbal, spatial or mathematical) and the verbalization addressee (self or others) should be considered.
... As mentioned previously, according to Sheth et al. (2009), insight can be identified in two ways: by relying on the feeling of "aha!" personal or subjective nature of the individual solving the problem or by objectively classifying a solution based on cognitive processes. To identify insight from a cognitive process and not based on the subjectivity of the individual, the focus can be established on the following elements: a mental deadlock or impasse, where the participant is "stuck" and unable to continue (Fleck and Weisberg, 2004); and a construction or creation of a new or hitherto unobvious representation (Ohlsson, 2008). From the psychophysical point of view, in the 4 s prior to the indication of insight by the participants in the nondirective condition, we found significant differences that were observed in terms of the increase in power in the alpha and theta frequencies of the right temporal region. ...
... No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. it is important to focus on the following elements: a mental deadlock or impasse in which the subject is subjected to a situation in which he/she feels "stuck" and unable to continue (Fleck and Weisberg, 2004), and a restructuring or creation of a cognitive representation that was new or not obvious until then (Ohlsson, 2008). Regarding the psychophysiology of the cognitive process of insight, previous studies have identified local patterns of neural activity associated with "Aha!" experience based on electroencephalographic recording and event-related potential techniques (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004;Mai et al., 2004;Sheth et al., 2009). ...
Increasing numbers of students around the world are suffering from mathematics anxiety. The main objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between mathematics anxiety and gender, grade, career choices, and academic achievement in Grade 10, 11, and 12 students. This study used the Revised Version of the Mathematics Anxiety Rating Scale to survey 1,548 high school students (570 males and 978 females) from high schools in Vietnam. A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) test, Pearson correlation and multiple linear regression were used to analyze data. The results show that there are significant differences in the influence of grade, academic achievement, and students’ career choices on mathematics anxiety. Academic coping strategies, gender, grade, and career choices are significant predictors of mathematics anxiety. Grade 12 students have higher levels of mathematics anxiety than others. Students with high average mathematics scores (9.0–10.0) have higher levels of mathematics anxiety than students with lower scores. Besides, students choosing finance and economics or industrial engineering to pursue into higher education also experienced higher levels of mathematics anxiety than others. This study contributes to the general discussion about the nature of mathematics anxiety and the relationship between mathematics anxiety and academic achievement.
... The other way is to objectively classify a solution on the basis of cognitive processes. In order to identify insight from a cognitive process and not based on the individual subjectivity, it is important to focus on the following elements: a mental deadlock or impasse in which the subject is subjected to a situation in which he/she feels "stuck" and unable to continue (Fleck and Weisberg, 2004), and a restructuring or creation of a cognitive representation that was new or not obvious until then (Ohlsson, 2008). Regarding the psychophysiology of the cognitive process of insight, previous studies have identified local patterns of neural activity associated with "Aha!" experience based on electroencephalographic recording and event-related potential techniques (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004;Mai et al., 2004;Sheth et al., 2009). ...
... As mentioned previously, according to Sheth et al. (2009), insight can be identified in two ways: by relying on the feeling of "aha!" personal or subjective nature of the individual solving the problem or by objectively classifying a solution based on cognitive processes. To identify insight from a cognitive process and not based on the subjectivity of the individual, the focus can be established on the following elements: a mental deadlock or impasse, where the participant is "stuck" and unable to continue (Fleck and Weisberg, 2004); and a construction or creation of a new or hitherto unobvious representation (Ohlsson, 2008). From the psychophysical point of view, in the 4 s prior to the indication of insight by the participants in the nondirective condition, we found significant differences that were observed in terms of the increase in power in the alpha and theta frequencies of the right temporal region. ...
Coaching as a human development methodology has been demonstrating its results for more than four decades. Even so, the level of confusion about its essence and its lack of a definitive theoretical and methodological framework has caused its effectiveness to be questioned. Although studies on coaching with neuroimaging methodologies have been developed, there is no recent evidence about the brain changes in electroencephalographic (EEG) activity during a coaching session. The present research aims to make a comparison between EEG measurements of three different conditions, namely, rumination (R), directive (DC), and non-directive coaching (NDC), during the process of problem solving and goal achievement. Our hypothesis was that the use of the meta-competencies of NDC should induce a higher activation of brain mechanisms that facilitate the insight process, therefore causing an improvement in creative capacity. Results showed significant changes in alpha and theta frequencies in the right temporal region, and alpha, theta, and gamma in the right parietal region in the NDC condition compared to other experimental conditions. The correct use of the meta-competencies of NDC facilitates the rise of insight and the generation of creativity processes at the brain level. Thus, the application of the methodological framework of the NDC was related, in a specific way, to the creativity and the development of human knowledge.
... Akin and Akin (1996)) The acquisition of aha-experiences is possible by different examination methods. Besides the possibility to let participants self-report on aha-experiences, there is the possibility of identifying aha-experiences ICED21 by independent evaluators using concurrent think aloud protocols (Ericsson and Simon, 1993 Ash et al., 2012;Cranford and Moss, 2012). Akin and Akin (1996) have already demonstrated the principle transferability of insight problems that trigger aha-experiences in the field of architectural design. ...
... To capture the approach of the participants, they were instructed to use the concurrent think aloud method while working on the task. This method, in which all thoughts should be spoken out aloud, has already been successfully used in earlier studies of aha-experiences (Fleck and Weisberg, 2004). To introduce the participants to the use of the method, they were given a short training video before the actual task started and then a short exercise on how to use it. ...
The functional analysis of technical systems is an important part of the design process. To further improve the design process, especially the functional analysis, it must not be viewed as a monodisciplinary process. To this end, cognitive factors such as the aha-experience must also be included in studies of analysis processes to a greater extent. This paper investigates the relationship between the occurrence of aha-experiences and the correctness of solutions in the analysis of a technical system. An aha-experience is a strong feeling of subjective certainty that accompanies the cognitive process of suddenly finding a previously unknown solution. For this purpose, a study on the functional analysis was evaluated. The results show that many identified subfunctions of the system under investigation were identified with an aha-experience and that these subfunctions are more often correct. The results also suggest that aha-experiences occur more often among students than among experienced design engineers. Especially among students, a positive relation of aha-experiences on the correctness of the identified subfunction can be seen. This offers potential for further investigations to make aha-experiences useful in design methods.
... Even though there are non-linguistic creative pathways related to vision (Chamberlain & Wagemans, 2016), emotion (Averill, 1999), and bodily movement (Fink et al., 2009), language is implicated in most human creative activities. Language acts as a mediator for creativity, especially when solving a problem (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004) and often in the form of storytelling and metaphor (Turner, 1996) and the blending of concepts (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). Language transforms abstract ideas and feelings into tangible expressions and clarifies thinking in spiraling feedback loops. ...
Large Language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT are tools poised to revolutionize knowledge work and democratize communication internationally for all languages but especially for L2 English users. But proficient tool use requires knowledge of tool-how it works, as well as its strengths and weaknesses. LLMs create language that is both similar to but also very different from human language production. The human model of communicative competence appears to partially overlap with LLM language "capacity", at least for real-time spoken language production. For certain kinds of language production, though, human cognition and processing radically diverge from LLMs' in ways that highlight human creativity, value, and wisdom. These differences suggest a complementarity where the strengths of one side can make up for the weaknesses of the other in hybrid workflows. In a human-first workflow, LLMs and generative AI tools can be deployed as a "strategic competence" to complement and enhance both human communicative competence and creative competence. (155 words)
... Pertinent research, so far, has been especially interested in how well people recognize the creativity of their ideas and if they can accurately discern creative from less creative ones (Karwowski, Czerwonka, & Kaufman, 2020;Kenett, Gooz, & Ackerman, 2023;Rominger et al., 2022;Runco & Smith, 1992;Sidi, Torgovitsky, Soibelman, Miron-Spektor, & Ackerman, 2020;Urban & Urban, 2021). Other works identified individual differences in task strategies across various forms of creative performance such as creative problemsolving, creative ideation, and creative writing (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004;Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007;Urban & Urban, 2024). Importantly, various aspects of self-reported metacognitive skills (e.g., conditional knowledge, regulation of cognition, monitoring) were found to predict creative performance and to moderate effects of creative potential on creative behavior (Puente-Diaz, Cavazos-Arroyo, & Vargas- Barrera, 2021;Puryear, 2015). ...
... From the businessas-usual perspective, insight problem solving is not fundamentally different from non-insight problem solving. This is because the process of restructuring in insight problem solving occurs gradually (incremental) through mechanisms that share similarities with those involved in non-insight problem solving (i.e., Chein et al., 2010;Cinan et al., 2013;Durso et al., 1994;Fleck & Weisberg, 2004Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005;MacGregor et al., 2001). Conversely, the special-process perspective posits that the act of solving insight problems is distinguished by a unique process that differs from the processes involved in solving non-insight problems. ...
Previous research on how problem-difficulty affects solution-types of insight-problems has yielded contradictory findings. Thus, we aimed to examine the impact of problem-difficulty on solution-types in both inter- and intra-problem-difficulty contexts. For this, we employed the original 8-coin, and 9-dot problems and four hinted-versions of those that were manipulated by using hints-to-remove-sources-of-difficulty to alter their difficulty level. Those manipulations were executed based on the assumptions of constraint-relaxation and chunk-decomposition as posited by representational change theory. The study involved a total of 165 participants who were tested in five groups (33 per se), with each group receiving an original or hinted problem. Following their correct solutions, problem-solvers classified their solution-types (insight or non-insight solutions) by whether they had an Aha!-experience during the solution. Across all groups, 56.1% of correctly solved insight problems were solved with Aha!-experience, based on participants' self-reports, implying that correct solutions should not be equated with insight. Subsequently, the solution-type rates were compared for both original problems (inter-problem-difficulty) and hinted versions of those at each difficulty level (intra-problem-difficulty). Inter-problem-difficulty comparisons demonstrated that the easier 8-coin problem was more likely to be solved with insight than the harder 9-dot problem. In contrast, intra-problem-difficulty comparisons revealed that harder problems were more likely to be solved with insight. These findings suggest that problem-difficulty should be considered in future studies of insight. Finally, separate analyses on the predictive values of the cognitive-affective-dimensions on solution-types revealed that, after adjusting for problem-difficulty, problem-solvers with higher suddenness scores in both problems exhibited a significantly higher probability of generating insight solutions.
... Several studies have employed think-aloud protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 1993) to understand the creative process Fayena-Tawil et al., 2011;Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007;Khandwalla et al., 1993;Schooler et al., 1993). We believe that our use of post-task interviews did not influence students' natural flow of thinking and interfere with performance, unlike that of think-aloud protocols (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004;Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007;Schooler et al., 1993). Yet, solving or generating ideas for creativity tasks requires individuals to set goals, strategies, and criteria for success (Urban & Urban, 2023). ...
Despite decades of research, the creative process remains to be fully understood, and most theories and empirical evidence focus on adults’ creativity. Without understanding children’s creative processes, the generalizability of these theories is questionable, which is crucial for teaching, learning, and parenting. However, studying children’s creative processes is challenging because of their still-developing meta-cognition, which is an essential component of the creative process. In this study, we conducted interviews with middle childhood-aged students (n = 30) after they completed four different types of divergent thinking tasks, examining the creative process during and beyond idea generation. Using inductive thematic analysis, we identified four main themes with associated subthemes, with Memory (experiences, knowledge, references, and personal and social interests) and Cognitive Strategies (evaluative processes and hypothetical thinking) as the primary themes. These data offer insight into how the main themes Memory and Cognitive Strategies reflect associative and executive processes, respectively, and the interplay between these in children’s divergent thinking. Findings from this study revealed that children were able to explain their process of generating an idea in the vast majority of responses. Additionally, this work provides insight into improving creativity, methods of assessment, and our understanding of creativity development.
... The experience of suddenly restructuring or reconfiguring how one is conceptually approaching a problem is commonly taken to be a key aspect of the phenomenon of insight problem solving (Debarnot et al., 2019;Kounios & Beeman, 2014) or of problem solving generally (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004;Weisberg, 2015)-and shifts in how one construes a perceptually presented object seem analogous to such alternative perspectives. This might be characterized as "an absence of perceptual rigidity" (Riquelme, 2002, p. 107). ...
Perceptual flexibility—adopting varied construals and perspectives of ambiguous shapes or forms—has long been recognized by artists and designers as a source of creative inspiration. Despite this, the ways in which perceptual flexibility contributes to creative thought and making has only sporadically been empirically examined by researchers. To address this gap, this study offers a schematic framework that integrates apparently disparate concepts such as representational restructuring (“seeing as”), conceptual connectivity, and openness to experience as interrelated constructs that collectively shape the flexibility of perceptual interpretation. Guided by this framework, a new measure of perceptual flexibility (the Figural Interpretation Quest, or FIQ) is systematically assessed to evaluate its relations to creative ideation and innovative problem solving. Across six experiments, ambiguous irregular shapes of various colors were visually presented to more than 550 participants, and the originality and flexibility of participants’ interpretations of those shapes were compared with their performance on creative thinking, design, and individual difference measures. As hypothesized, originality scores on the FIQ significantly positively correlated with originality on lab-based assessments of divergent thinking—encompassing several predominantly conceptual tasks and a predominantly perceptual task. Further demonstrating construct validity, FIQ originality and FIQ flexibility significantly positively correlated with multiple measures of openness to experience, and with creative performance on two open-ended product ideation tasks. The FIQ offers a novel assessment of perceptual flexibility, opening new opportunities for systematically deepening our empirical and theoretical understanding of how ambiguity stimulates creative ideation at the dynamic intersections of perceptual and conceptual exploration.
... Although it is a matter of discussion (Fleck and Weisberg, 2013;Danek et al., 2014;Webb et al., 2016), several models point to the existence of a period of stagnation that precedes the occurrence of an insight (Wallas, 1926;Ohlsson, 1992;Öllinger et al., 2014). Misrepresenting a problem would generate that impasse, usually associated with negative emotions (Fleck and Weisberg, 2004). The impasse is reflected in a cessation of the resolution activity and by repeating unsuccessful attempts (Beeftink et al., 2008). ...
Insights, characterized by sudden discoveries following unsuccessful problem-solving attempts, are fascinating phenomena. Dynamic systems perspectives argue that insight arises from self-organizing perceptual and motor processes. Entropy and fractal scaling are potential markers for emerging new and effective solutions. This study investigated whether specific features associated with self-organization in dynamical systems can distinguish between individuals who succeed and those who fail in solving insight tasks. To achieve this, we analyzed pupillary diameter fluctuations of children aged 6 to 12 during the 8-coin task, a well-established insight task. The participants were divided into two groups: successful (n = 24) and unsuccessful (n = 43) task completion. Entropy, determinism, recurrence ratio, and the β scaling exponent were estimated using Recurrence Quantification and Power Spectrum Density analyses. The results indicated that the solver group exhibited more significant uncertainty and lower predictability in pupillary diameter fluctuations before finding the solution. Recurrence Quantification Analysis revealed changes that went unnoticed by mean and standard deviation measures. However, the β scaling exponent did not differentiate between the two groups. These findings suggest that entropy and determinism in pupillary diameter fluctuations can identify early differences in problem-solving success. Further research is needed to determine the exclusive role of perceptual and motor activity in generating insights and investigate these results’ generalizability to other tasks and populations.
... En la actualidad, ambas concepciones coexisten conformando un modelo híbrido del insight lo que, a su vez, también complica su definición e identificación. En algunas ocasiones, la resolución del problema puede producirse de arriba hacia abajo, sin un punto muerto, como resultado de la nueva información que surge de los intentos fallidos de solucionarlo; en otras, puede existir una reestructuración de abajo hacia arriba en respuesta a un punto muerto, aunque ese fenómeno parece ocurrir con poca frecuencia (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004). La experiencia Aha! es lo que ambas concepciones comparten. ...
La resolución de problemas es un proceso clave para la supervivencia y el éxito
reproductivo ya que influye en la obtención de alimento, pareja sexual o refugio.
Asimismo, es un proceso central para el área de la innovación en el estudio de la
adaptación a cambios del ambiente. Sin embargo, la investigación de los factores y
procesos que influyen en este es escasa e incluso contradictoria, en especial, a nivel ontogenético. En este estudio, se propuso una unificación metodológica entre el área de la innovación y el Análisis de la Conducta proponiendo una nueva tarea Detour y siguiendo un procedimiento innovador. Además, se evaluó el efecto de cuatro factores (motivación, exploración, interacción entre exploración y resolución, y experiencias previas de enriquecimiento social y físico) en cinco variables relevantes de procesos de resolución (frecuencia y latencia de resolución, variabilidad, direccionalidad y flexibilidad conductual). Los resultados sugirieron que el enriquecimiento social y físico relacionado con los elementos de la tarea es la experiencia que propicia la obtención de mejores puntajes en las variables propuestas, en comparación con un enriquecimiento social y físico no relacionado, conductual, solo social o de ningún tipo. Se encontraron diferencias estadísticamente significativas entre las experiencias. Cuando la motivación
fue de tipo extrínseco, la frecuencia de resolución fue alta, rápida y mantenida en el
tiempo, al contrario de la intrínseca. La exploración previa tuvo un efecto facilitador,
mientras que la resolución previa redujo la variabilidad conductual posterior. Se
discuten sus implicaciones en el área en conjunto con la innovación y se proponen
futuros estudios y análisis que aportarían grandes avances a través del discernimiento de las causas directas e indirectas de los factores relevantes para resolver problemas.
Palabras clave: resolución de problemas, enriquecimiento ambiental, motivación,
exploración, flexibilidad conductual, ratas.
... However, insight problem solving was defined as a process in which individuals reached an impasse in the initial problem representations and formed new problem representations through an active search process (Knoblich et al., 1999). Researchers held the view that there were no fundamental differences between insight and general problem solving, which referred to a "Type 2" thinking process (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004;Kaplan & Simon, 1990;Weisberg & Alba, 1981). Relevant evidence has demonstrated that insight requires the support of working memory and cognitive resources to activate relevant information in memory and maintain attention to suppress interference from irrelevant information (Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009;Byrne & Murray, 2005;Ash & Wiley, 2006). ...
Cognitive control is a key factor in insight generation. However, the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the generation of insight for different cognitive control remain poorly understood. This study developed a parametric fMRI design, wherein hints for solving Chinese idiom riddles were gradually provided in a stepwise manner (from the first hint, H1, to the final hint, H4). By classifying the step-specific items solved in different hint-uncovering steps/conditions, we could identify insightful responses for different levels of spontaneous or controlled processing. At the behavioral level, the number of insightful problem solving trials reached the maximum at a intermediate level of the cognitively controlled processing and the spontaneously idea generating in H3, while the bilateral insular cortex and thalamus showed the robust engagement, implying the function of these regions in making the optimal balance between external hint processing and internal generated ideas. In addition, we identified brain areas, including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), angular gyrus (AG), dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), and precuneus (PreC), whose activities were parametrically increased with the levels of controlled (from H1 to H4) insightful processing which were increasingly produced by the sequentially revealed hints. Further representational similarity analysis (RSA) found that spontaneous processing in insight featured greater within-condition representational variabilities in widely distributed regions in the executive, salience, and default networks. Altogether, the present study provided new evidence for the relationship between the process of cognitive control and that of spontaneous idea generation in insight problem solving and demystified the function of the insula and thalamus as an interactive interface for the optimal balance of these two processes.
... 与常规问题的过程不同，顿悟是个体对事物根本、直接而又深刻的理解(MacGregor, Ormerod, & Chronicle, 2001)；是放弃旧的、无效的问题解决思路，打破心理定势并形成新异联系的认知加工过程(罗劲，2004)。 ② 常规处理说(Business-as-usual)。认为顿悟问题与常规问题的解决并无本质的不同，两者都征用了诸如 爬山法、手段-目的分析法等共同的策略(尤其是分析性思维)来获得问题的解决方案 (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004;Weisberg, 2006, chap. 6)。两种理论关于顿悟能力培养的观点也相互对立："特殊加工说"认为顿悟 能力主要依赖于问题解决者的天赋特质(即所谓的"悟性")，或偶然的环境刺激(如"牛顿被掉下来的苹 果砸中而发现万有引力规律")，顿悟的过程类似宗教的"开悟"，难以在日常教学中培训与传播；"常 规处理说"认为顿悟能力能够通过学习与训练加以提升，其过程与其他常规问题的解决过程相同，均发 生在外显的、意识的层面，可以计划、监控并用言语报告 (Ormerod et al., 2002)。 "特殊加工说"强调顿悟过程的直觉性、内隐性与跳跃性；"常规处理说"强调顿悟的分析性、外 显性及与其他问题解决过程的一致性。两种观点都有一定的正确性，应有多种方法来促进顿悟的发生 (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005)；经典的"僵局-重组-顿悟"模式只是在少数情况下会 出现，大部分顿悟问题的解决与知识的直接应用、多种启发式策略以及失败经验的反思密切关联 (Fleck, Beeman, & Kounios, 2013;Fleck & Weisberg, 2013)。因此，要完整理解顿悟，就应该把这两种观点整合起 来 (Jones, 2003;Weisberg, 2015)。但是，两种理论整合起来就真的能完整解释顿悟现象的发生吗？那些看 似神秘的、"特殊加工"的顿悟能力，能否像"常规处理"的认知过程那样适于训练？新近兴起的具身 认知理论，为跳出两者对立的框架与维度，从另一视角为两种理论的整合、训练顿悟能力提供了可供选 择的方案。 具身认知理论强调身体(包括生理结构、活动方式、感觉运动经验等)对认知的塑造与影响 (Anderson, 2003;Gibbs, 2006 Figure 3. ...
... Respondents were given a maximum of 10 min to go through the financial statements per task. This time restriction is recommended in the think aloud literature (e.g., Fleck & Weisberg, 2004), in order to not strain the respondents' ...
Worldwide, open data initiatives aim at making information publicly available and transparent. Increasingly, local governments (LGs) are publishing financial statements in order to inform citizens, in their function as both service recipients and resource providers, about the LGs’ financial situation. However, it remains questionable as to whether LG financial statements are appropriate mechanisms of public accountability: it is debated, on the one hand, whether citizens are interested in accounting information, and on the other hand, if they are able to understand the information presented in financial statements. This study is the first of its kind applying the think aloud method to analyze citizens’ perceptions of LGs’ financial statements in a sample of 30 German citizens with diverse socio-demographic characteristics. The paper explores citizens’ general interest in accounting information and their ability to extract basic financial information from these statements so that increased transparency can be assumed. This explorative study reveals that although citizens demand transparency and financial information, they find it challenging to understand financial statements. Citizens seem to be overwhelmed by the information and call for delegation of the tasks or simplified reporting formats.
... Problem representation contains relations among elements of a problem. CPS is a dynamic process during which one's initial problem representation changes actively in a few small, incremental steps, defined as "interpreters," with the involvement of cognitive resources (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004). By investigating how the cognitive sources are applied in altering problem representation, the present study aspires to facilitate CPS by consciously using cognitive sources to construct initial problem representation and activate interpreters more effectively. ...
Meetings are one of the most common collaboration formats for complex problem-solving (CPS). This research aims to formulate cognitive-oriented guidelines for productive synchronous CPS discussions. The study proposes a method to analyze the cognitive process and identifies the cognitive process associated with better CPS discussions. A conversation-analysis method was developed. Two indicators—source–outcome retrieval ratio and count of overlapped solution utterances—were proposed to evaluate the CPS discussion’s efficiency and effectiveness. Sixteen experimental CPS discussions were analyzed using this method. Correlation coefficients were applied to ascertain the cognitive features in CPS discussions with different levels of effectiveness and confirmed the applicability and reliability of the proposed methods. The results revealed that a good CPS discussion includes a regular progress summary, discussion conclusion, and high utilization of cognitive sources.
... Insight learning is a sudden and permanent change in behavior, usually investigated in problem-solving tasks (Duncker, 1945;Simon and Newell, 1971;Kounious & Beeman, 2014). The hat rack problem (Burke & Maier, 1966;Jacobs & Dominowski, 1981;Maier, 1933), the flower stand test (Pelton & Esposito, 1968), the box-candle test (Duncker, 1945), the two-string test (Maier, 1931;Landrum, 1990), the marble transfer task (Saugstad & Raaheim, 1957), the truck retrieval test (Saugstad & Raaheim, 1957), and the candle problem (Duncker, 1945;Weisberg & Suls, 1973, Fleck & Weisberg, 2004 were all tasks used to investigate insight in problem-solving. however, insight was never in the problem (Webb et al., 2016), but in a continuous scale that go from incremental solutions (i.e., derived from trial and error or analytical solutions) to insightful solutions (i.e., compatible with sudden drops and permanent changes in learning curves). ...
A popcorn popping is almost magical. And yet, the science of popcorn is safe and clear about the steps until the pop: the components, processes, and results of making popcorn. Nature has its own way to produce surprise in the form of “pops” (i.e., emergence, qualitative shifts). Emergent features spread throughout the life of taxa and individuals. A pop can be sudden and chaotic. And so is creativity. There is no incompatibility between creativity and naturalistic endeavors in science. Creativity is no god given gift blown inside humans. When creativity is defined by originality and spontaneity, it describes a feature with no past or present. I briefly summarize how one can see non-random innovation, no free occurring spontaneity, and non-heuristic effectiveness as features of behaviors that are not necessarily considered creative. Those three features reveal how traditional views of creativity undermine its real determiners and how it can be objectively defined and observed.
... This is perhaps most famously illustrated by Duncker's candle problem, in which participants were presented with a matchbox, a box of thumb tacks, and a candle, and were tasked with mounting the candle on a corkboard. About 75% of middle-class U.S. adults failed, unable to use the matchbox and thumbtacks as tools (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004). Tool innovation tasks that are appropriate for adolescents and adults should be developed to assess the extent to which these skills continue to improve beyond childhood and which cognitive processes underpin this development. ...
A decade ago, now‐seminal work showed that children are strikingly unskilled at simple tool innovation. Since then, a surge of research has replicated these findings across diverse cultures, which has stimulated evocative yet unanswered questions. Humans are celebrated among the animal kingdom for our proclivity to create and use tools and have the most complex and diverse technology on earth. Our capacity for tool use has altered our ecological environments irrevocably. How can we achieve so much, yet tool innovation be such a difficult and late‐developing skill for children? In this article, I briefly summarize what we know about the development of tool innovation, then discuss five outstanding questions in the field. With a focus on different empirical and theoretical perspectives, I argue that addressing these questions is crucial for understanding fully the ontogeny of one of humans’ most notable skills.
... They followed a think-aloud protocol while solving the items. Think-aloud protocols can provide useful data on how subjects approach problem-solving (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004). The researchers built a system with mutually exclusive categories to analyze the participants' solving-process, designing a first set of categories that was redefined going back and forth from the system to the available data. ...
This study describes the development and validation process of a computational thinking (CT) test for adults. The team designed a set of items and explored a subset of those through two qualitative pilots. Then, in order to provide validity evidence based on the test content, a team of 11 subject-matter experts coded the initial pool of items using two different systems of categories based on CT components and contents. Next, the items were piloted on a sample of 289 participants, 137 experts in CT, and 152 novices. After a series of confirmatory factor analyses, a unidimensional model that represents algorithmic thinking was adopted. Further analyzing the psychometric quality of the 27 items, 20 of them with excellent reliability indices were selected for the test. Thus, this study provides a tool to evaluate adults’ CT: the Algorithmic Thinking Test for Adults (ATTA), which was developed according to psychometric standards. This article also reflects on the nature of CT as a construct.
... С одной стороны, есть данные о негативном влиянии вербализации, проявляющемся в замедлении времени решения (Schooler et al., 1993). С другой стороны, есть исследования, свидетельствующие о положительной (Ball et al., 2015) или нейтральной роли вербализации (Cranford, Moss, 2012;Fleck, Weisberg, 2004). Подробный анализ различной роли вербализации в процессе решения задач, а также ее видов, сопутствующих решению вербальных и невербальных задач, приводится в статье М. Фокса, А. Эриксона и Р. Беста (Fox et al., 2011). ...
В данной статье представлены обзор существующих подходов к исследованию феномена инсайта и экспликация его критериев. Авторами выделено два исследовательских подхода к инсайту: детекция инсайтности до решения и после решения мыслительных задач. Первый подход основан преимущественно на использовании формально инсайтных задач, включающих необходимость изменения репрезентации; всякое решение этих задач квалифицируется как инсайтное. Второй подход основан на использовании самоотчетов решателей при оценке решения различного типа задач, которые могут решаться инсайтно и неинсайтно (анаграмм, ребусов, пазлов, тестов отдаленных ассоциаций). Рассмотрены примеры исследований в рамках каждого подхода, проанализированы их преимущества и ограничения. Описаны объективные и субъективные параметры инсайта. Под субъективными параметрами понимаются различные формы самоотчетов решателей об их опыте инсайтного решения. Под объективными параметрами понимаются различные виды поведенческих и физиологических паттернов, сопровождающих инсайтное решение, но не зависящих от самоотчетов решателей. Было показано, что использование только одной группы параметров не позволяет однозначно квалифицировать инсайтность решения. На сегодняшний день в исследованиях чаще используются смешанные форматы, включающие объективные и субъективные параметры инсайта. В качестве перспектив исследования инсайта авторы предлагают подход самостоятельного формулирования критериев инсайта решателем; учет индивидуальных особенностей решателя как фактора детекции инсайтности решения; обучение испытуемых детекции инсайта и выработка у них генерализованных представлений об инсайтности решения вне зависимости от конкретной процедуры измерения.
... However, we also found that solution accuracy predicted aha experience in non-insight problems. We therefore emphasise the importance of not assuming aha experience (or lack thereof) through solution accuracy alone and direct attention to the discussions of Danek and Wiley (2017), as well as those of Fleck and Weisberg (2013), and the data of Fleck and Weisberg (2004), Cushen and Wiley (2007), and Webb et al. (2017). ...
The current paper investigates the individual differences underlying the ability to solve classic and contemporary insight problems along the subjective phenomenology of insight in the solution of these problems. We investigate fluid reasoning, divergent thinking and schizotypy. Experiments 1–3 (total N = 434) investigated the association between schizotypy, divergent thinking, reasoning abilities, and participants’ tendencies to report feelings associated with insight (e.g. aha experience) in the solution of classic insight, classic non-insight problems, and compound remote associates. We found that both positive schizotypy (particularly the subscale Unusual Experiences) and originality (uncommon responses in a creativity task) were positive predictors of aha experiences, though not of problem solving. These results highlight important individual differences in the tendency to perceive meaning in problem solving and the implications for our metacognitive judgments of truth in our problem-solving processes.
... The question arises whether other strategies could yield similar positive motivational outcomes in an experimental study. Furthermore, there are several studies showing that insight problems can be solved in various ways other than through sudden insight (Ash et al., 2009;Chein & Weisberg, 2014;Danek et al., 2014;Fleck & Weisberg, 2004, 2013. In a recent study, Skaar and Reber (2019b) used a questionnaire and survey design to test the fluency account. ...
In an experiment (n = 430), grounded in an integrative fluency account of the phenomenology of the Aha-experience, we tested the assumption that problem solving through insight is distinct from other strategies of problem-solving in that the affective response invoked by Aha-experiences is more influential than other solution strategies on motivational processes. Results indicated that insight tasks, compared to non-insight tasks, had the strongest affective and motivational outcomes both during and after task solution. Moreover, for insight tasks, sudden insight was the strongest predictor of correct solutions. Interestingly, step-by-step and guessing strategies were positive and negative predictors, respectively, of correct solutions. Finally, only trial and error significantly predicted correct solutions for non-insight tasks. We argue that solution strategies are not mutually exclusive. However, some strategies are more frequently used and possibly more adapted to different types of tasks. The study supports the integrative fluency account and motivational outcomes of Aha-experiences.
... Although a number of studies analyzed unstructured verbal protocols during insight problem solving (e.g. Fleck & Weisberg, 2004, 2013Schooler et al., 1993), of particular interest here are more structured reports in the form of questionnaires. A pioneer of this method, (Metcalfe 1986;Metcalfe & Weibe, 1987) examined a unidimensional index of subjective experience: the feeling of warmth indicating the perceived distance to a solution. ...
Participants rated Intuition, Suddenness, Pleasure, and Certainty accompanying their solutions to items of a popular fluid intelligence test – Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM) – that varied from easy (around 80% correct) to difficult (around 20% correct). The same ratings were collected from four insight problems interleaved with RAPM. Suddenness and Certainty substantially decreased from easy to difficult matrices (Pleasure strongly overlapped with Certainty). In easy matrices, subjective experience matched that observed during insight problems, suggesting the highly fluent processing resulting in vivid and univocal solutions. By contrast, processing difficult matrices seemed to involve effortful incremental combination of complex information that yielded uncertain outcomes, resembling full-blown analytic problems. Only Intuition, generally rated low, was unaffected by RAPM difficulty. These results suggest that RAPM constitutes a heterogeneous test, with easy vs. difficult items involving relatively distinct types of processing. This novel knowledge can help in understanding the processes underlying solving Raven’s matrices. The study also contributes to the understanding of the validity of subjective ratings as measures of metacognition.
... Creative output usually comes to a mental impasse after contemplation and then suddenly and unexpectedly results in a solution, which is generally referred to as insight problem solving (Fleck and Weisberg, 2004;Öllinger and Knoblich, 2009). Insight problem solving involves conceptual re-organization, mental set breaking, and the formation of new associations (Luo and Niki, 2003;Sakaki and Niki, 2011). ...
Recently, some studies have reported that the joint effects of different processing types and emotions can lead to different task outcomes, but it remains unclear how they affect insight problem solving. In this study, we used event-related potentials (ERP) to examine the joint effect and neural mechanism of processing type and emotional valence on insight problem solving. Behavioural results found that, compared to positive emotion, negative emotion improved insight problem solving in the global processing condition. In contrast, in the local processing condition, positive emotion improved insight problem solving compared the negative emotion. ERP results further found that local processing elicited larger N1 compared with global processing, indicating more focused visual processing. Importantly, negative emotion in global processing and positive emotion in local processing elicited more negative N450 amplitudes and N600–1200 amplitudes. The findings suggest that negative emotion in global processing and positive emotion in local processing facilitated insight by promoting the breakage of mental impasses and forming novel associations. The findings contribute to a new understanding of the relationship between emotional valence and insight problem solving.
This book was the first handbook where the world's foremost 'experts on expertise' reviewed our scientific knowledge on expertise and expert performance and how experts may differ from non-experts in terms of their development, training, reasoning, knowledge, social support, and innate talent. Methods are described for the study of experts' knowledge and their performance of representative tasks from their domain of expertise. The development of expertise is also studied by retrospective interviews and the daily lives of experts are studied with diaries. In 15 major domains of expertise, the leading researchers summarize our knowledge on the structure and acquisition of expert skill and knowledge and discuss future prospects. General issues that cut across most domains are reviewed in chapters on various aspects of expertise such as general and practical intelligence, differences in brain activity, self-regulated learning, deliberate practice, aging, knowledge management, and creativity.
This study reports findings across four preregistered experiments (total N = 856) that establish the multi-dimensional nature of impasse and resolve two paradoxes implicit in the problem-solving literature: how a state of impasse can be at once necessary to solve a problem with insight yet also have appear to have a catastrophic effect on solution rates, and why individuals such as problem-solving and gaming enthusiasts seem to seek out this apparently aversive state. We introduce a new way of measuring impasse based on qualitative reports and subsequently confirmed through quantitative analysis that exploits two aspects of impasse: its dynamic and unstable nature (it can be resolved or unresolved) and its multidimensionality in terms of feelings of cognitive speediness, motivation, and affect. The feeling of being stuck varies between resolved and unresolved impasse in terms of feelings of speediness and positive affect, but not motivation, which remains constant. We demonstrate that the feeling of insight can be reliably elicited by experiencing and resolving impasse but also in the absence of impasse, which suggests that there is more than one path to an insight experience. This adds depths to current proposals of the cognitive mechanisms underlying both insight problem-solving and impasse. Our findings are robust across a range of problem types. The novel conception of impasse in this paper as dynamic and multi-dimensional has implications for theories of insight problem solving, and also wider implications for understanding how impasse can be resolved across different domains such as education and design.
This book was the first handbook where the world's foremost 'experts on expertise' reviewed our scientific knowledge on expertise and expert performance and how experts may differ from non-experts in terms of their development, training, reasoning, knowledge, social support, and innate talent. Methods are described for the study of experts' knowledge and their performance of representative tasks from their domain of expertise. The development of expertise is also studied by retrospective interviews and the daily lives of experts are studied with diaries. In 15 major domains of expertise, the leading researchers summarize our knowledge on the structure and acquisition of expert skill and knowledge and discuss future prospects. General issues that cut across most domains are reviewed in chapters on various aspects of expertise such as general and practical intelligence, differences in brain activity, self-regulated learning, deliberate practice, aging, knowledge management, and creativity.
This research studies the relationship between figure and ground, which is a concept introduced by Gestalt theory. There has been much research done in
capturing a figure image against a background and used in applications such as artificial image perception. However, little has been done to understand their
relationship. For our investigation we studied double image illusion, which allows us to analyze images with more than one figure-ground interpretation. Rough set derived lattices are introduced to reflect the differing figure-ground contrasts. The two types of indiscernibilities of rough set theory let us consider the two different interpretations of double image illusions. The resulting logical structures are considerably original for those generated by such images.
The associative theory of creativity has long held that creative thinking involves connecting remote concepts in semantic memory. Network science tools have recently been applied to map the organization of concepts in semantic memory, and to study the link between semantic memory and creativity. Yet such work has largely overlooked the domain of convergent thinking, despite the theoretical importance of semantic memory networks for facilitating associative processes relevant for convergent problem solving (e.g., spreading activation). Convergent thinking problems, such as the Compound Remote Associates (CRA) test, can be solved with insight (the sudden “aha” experience) or analysis (deliberately and incrementally working towards the solution). In a sample of 477 participants, we adopted network science methods to compare semantic memory structure across two grouping variables: 1) convergent thinking ability (i.e., CRA accuracy), and 2) the self-reported tendency to solve problems with insight or analysis. Semantic memory networks were constructed from a semantic fluency task, and problem solving style (insight or analysis) was determined from judgments provided during solving of CRAs. We found that, compared to the low-convergent thinking group, the high-convergent thinking group exhibited a more flexible and interconnected semantic network—with short paths and many connections between concepts. Moreover, participants who primarily solved problems with insight (compared to analysis) showed shorter average path distances between concepts, even after controlling for accuracy. Our results extend the literature on semantic memory and creativity, and suggest that the organization of semantic memory plays a key role in convergent thinking, including insight problem solving.
Much modern laboratory research on creative thinking, or in vitro research, is based on the “remote-associates” perspective, which assumes that creative advances arise through bringing together ideas which were previously “remotely associated,” that is, not directly linked. That view has provided the foundation for modern theorizing across a broad range of areas, including the role of associative processes in creativity, divergent thinking in creativity, attention in creativity, genius and madness, and the neuroscience of creativity. However, contrary to the remote-associates view, analyses of real-life – in vivo – creative thinking indicate that new ideas arose as variations on or extensions of old ideas, rather than through bringing together unrelated ideas in a far-ranging creative leap. This conflict between the in vitro and in vivo perspectives has resulted in a theoretical quandary for creativity studies – a “creativity quandary.” This article examines that quandary. The first section demonstrates the wide reach of the remote-associates view in laboratory research on creativity. The second section examines in vivo creative advances that raise questions for the remote-associates view. The third section presents an alternative conception of creative thinking, based on executive functioning, as a potential resolution of the creativity quandary. Similarities and differences between the present proposal and other recent theoretical analyses of creative thinking are discussed.
To what extent do creativity and imagination decline in childhood? What factors might influence a decline? Theories of cognitive development show only uni-directional progress (although theorists may disagree whether such progress occurs steadily in small continuous improvements or comes in stages separated by plateaus during which developmental gains are consolidated). Declines in levels of skill are quite uncommon, yet many have observed just such an unusual pattern with regard to the development of creativity and of the imagination. Is there something about the development of one kind of thinking that undermines imaginative and creative thinking? Is it perhaps the process of schooling itself, with its focus on the acquisition of knowledge and the production of correct (rather than imaginative) answers, which promotes this decline? This book explores these questions from a variety of perspectives. Essays from psychologists and educators from diverse backgrounds discuss the relationships among creativity, reason, and knowledge.
This paper explores the effect of different types of incubation task (visual, numerical and verbal) with various levels of attentional focus and cognitive effort (non-demanding, low-demanding and high-demanding) on the resolution of insight problems. The most effective was found to be the low-demanding task (regardless of its nature), which although requiring attentional focus, leaves resources available for the unconscious analytical restructuring process, obtaining a high percentage of success in solving the problem shortly after completion of the incubation task. Overall findings support the hypothesis of Unconscious Analytic Thought (UAT), according to which the restructuring required in insight problem solving implies a covert thinking process that includes a relevant, analytic and goal-oriented search. The findings are discussed in the light of UAT and are compared with the main theories of insight in problem solving.
Классическая статья Карла Дункера «Качественное (экспериментальное и теоретическое) исследование продуктивного мышления» впервые увидела свет на английском языке в 1926 г., а на русском – в 1965 г. и сейчас она в силу почтенного возраста требует развернутых пояснений, позволяющих современному читателю оценить новизну и смелость, содержащихся в ней теоретических утверждений и масштаб личности их автора. Решению такой задачи и посвящен настоящий комментарий, в котором кратко обсуждаются теоретические идеи Дункера, лишь намеченные им в этой статье, а разработанные в более поздних публикациях, но сохраняющие свою актуальность до сих пор.
Remote association is the ability to combine seemingly unrelated components into new concepts and is evaluated via the Remote Associates Test (RAT). The RAT has generally been used to examine brain activation during insight problem solving but not remote association. Moreover, little is known about the neural correlates of remote association and close association. To address this issue, we used the associative distance in the development of the RAT and designed remote associated items and close associated items. We collected brain images during observation of remote and close associated items from 30 adult participants and analyzed the activation of brain regions involved in remote and close associations. The results showed that processing of remote and close association occurred in the posterior cingulate cortex. After controlling for the influence of other associations, we found that the rostromedial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, and middle temporal gyrus were involved exclusively in remote association. These results showed that remote association has conjunctive and disjunctive neurocognitive mechanisms. Our results contribute to the understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms of different associations and provide empirical support for the associative theory of creativity.
Teaching concept-salient gestures to children leads to learning gains
Increasingly, research has demonstrated that gestures are a route into children’s unspoken thoughts. Encouraging children to gesture, therefore, may make their implicit understanding of a concept more explicit and bring about cognitive gains. This study tests the effects of encouraging children to incorporate specific gestures associated with a concept into their explanations. In a pre-test, intervention, post-test design 63 children experienced one of three interventions; a lesson without gestures, a lesson where they observed gestures or a lesson where they observed and also imitated gestures. The gestures used in the lessons mimicked those that children who have acquired the concept typically produce when explaining this task. Improvement was measured as change in performance on the task and increased explictness of understanding of the concept. Children who reproduced the concept-relevant gestures during the intervention improved significantly more than children who simply observed those gestures, who improved more than children whose training did not include gestures. These results show that gesture production, even when taught by another, can activate implicit knowledge and bring about learning.
This is one of two chapters on "A cognitive neuroscience perspective on insight as a memory process" to be published in the "Routledge International Handbook of Creative Cognition" by L. J. Ball & F. Valleé-Tourangeau (Eds.). In this chapter, we will describe cognitive and brain processes that lead to an insight. Inspired by cognitive theories, we translate some of insight's main cognitive subprocesses (problem representation, search, representational change, solution) into related neurocognitive ones and summarize them in a descriptive framework. Those described processes focus primarily on verbal insight and are explained using the remote associates task. In this task, the solver is provided with several problem elements (e.g. drop, coat, summer) and needs to find the (remotely related) target that matches those cues (e.g., rain). In a nutshell, insight is the consequence of a problem-solving process where the target is encoded in long-term memory but cannot be retrieved at first because the relationship between the problem elements and the target is unknown, precluding a simple memory search. Upon problem display, the problem elements and a whole network of associated concepts are automatically activated in long-term memory in distinct areas of the brain representing those concepts (=problem representation). Insight is assumed to occur when automatic processes suddenly activate the target after control processes associated with inferior frontal gyrus and anterior cingulate cortex activation manage to overcome prior knowledge and/or perceptual constraints by revising the current activation pattern (=representational change). The next chapter (https://psyarxiv.com/bevjm) will focus on the role of insight problem solving for long-term memory formation.
The relationship between language and thinking has long been a matter of debate and a research focus in studies on thinking and problem solving, including creativity. Previous behavioral studies have found that verbalization of one's internal thoughts does not participate in or even interfere with the creative insight process, thus suggesting that insight may take place nonverbally. In contrast to this hypothesis, the present study proposes a new one. That is, given that the basic categories or fundamental functions of key concepts or objects are critically changed or expanded during insightful thinking, the linguistic processing accompanying insight can be reflected as category‐related representation and recategorization processes, which can be critically mediated by the posterior middle temporal gyrus and the angular gyrus (pMTG/AG). Using constraint‐relaxation insight riddles as materials in a guided‐insight experimental design with external hints to trigger the insightful representational change, this preliminary neuroimaging study of 11 participants found the involvement of pMTG/AG during moments of induced insight, but did not find the activation of left ventral frontal areas which are typically involved in verbalizing of one's internal thoughts. Although this observation still cannot exclude the possibility of internal verbalization in insightful restructuring, it implies that linguistic processing in insight may take the more fundamental form of category‐related processing.
Three experiments explored the role of perceptual expertise in mediating the finding (termed verbal overshadowing) that describing a face can impair later recognition. In Experiment 1, verbalization impaired White participants' recognition of White faces (expert domain) but not African American faces (novice domain). In Experiment 2, judges attempted to identify targets on the basis of the verbal descriptions generated in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 revealed a significant relationship between verbalization participants' recognition performance and yoked judges' identification performance for other-race but not own-race faces, suggesting that other-race recognition may involve a unique reliance on “verbalizable” information. In Experiment 3, the interaction between verbalization and race of face was replicated with upright faces but was attenuated with inverted recognition arrays (a manipulation that reduces the influence of configural information). Collectively, these findings suggest that verbalization may disrupt the nonreportable configural processes associated with recognizing stimuli with which one is an expert.
This article reports 2 experiments that investigated performance on a novel insight problem, the 8-coin problem. The authors hypothesized that participants would make certain initial moves (strategic moves) that seemed to make progress according to the problem instructions but that nonetheless would guarantee failure to solve the problem. Experiment I manipulated the starting state of the problem and showed that overall solution rates were lower when such strategic moves were available. Experiment 2 showed that failure to capitalize on visual hints about the correct first move was also associated with the availability of strategic moves. The results are interpreted in terms of an information-processing framework previously applied to the 9-dot problem. The authors argue that in addition to the operation of inappropriate constraints, a full account of insight problem solving must incorporate a dynamic that steers solution-seeking activity toward the constraints.
Insight problem solving is characterized by impasses, states of mind in which the thinker does not know what to do next. The authors hypothesized that impasses are broken by changing the problem representation, and 2 hypothetical mechanisms for representational change are described: the relaxation of constraints on the solution and the decomposition of perceptual chunks. These 2 mechanisms generate specific predictions about the relative difficulty of individual problems and about differential transfer effects. The predictions were tested in 4 experiments using matchstick arithmetic problems. The results were consistent with the predictions. Representational change is a more powerful explanation for insight than alternative hypotheses, if the hypothesized change processes are specified in detail. Overcoming impasses in insight is a special case of the general need to override the imperatives of past experience in the face of novel conditions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Examined the effect of Ss' feeling of knowing (FOK) on problem solving and memory. In Exp I, 44 undergraduates judged their FOK of trivia questions they had been unable to answer and performed a multiple-choice recognition test. In a second task, Ss gave FOK judgments for insight problems to which they did not immediately know the answers and were later given 5 min to solve each problem. Results indicate a positive correlation with regard to FOK and performance in the memory task but not with regard to FOK and problem solution in the insight task. Exp II involved a replication of Exp I with 60 undergraduates, using a generation memory technique rather than a multiple-choice recognition test. Combined results indicate that, although Ss could predict memory performance reasonably well, predictive metacognitions were nonexistent for problems. The data are interpreted as implying that insight problems do involve a sudden illumination and that illumination cannot be predicted in advance. A description of problems used in Exps I and II is appended. (31 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Five experiments with approximately 266 college students explored the dynamic metacognitions that accompany the problem- and anagram-solving processes. Ss repeatedly rated how warm or close they were to solution. High feelings of warmth before an answer indicated that the answer would be incorrect. Moderately low warmth ratings characterized correct responses. The data suggest that the high warmth ratings may result from a process wherein Ss convince themselves that an inelegant but plausible (wrong) answer is correct. No gradual rationalization process precedes the correct response to insight problems. The warmth-rating data also indicate that when the correct answer was given to the problems and anagrams used in this study, there was usually a subjectively catastrophic insight process. (29 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Conducted 7 experiments with 353 undergraduates to examine the purported role of fixation in the solution of several insight problems, such as the 9-dot and triangle problems. It has been commonly accepted in psychology that such problems are difficult because Ss are fixated on unwarranted assumptions concerning how problems are to be solved. In the present studies, Ss were disabused of these allegedly fixating assumptions to see whether quick and direct solution of the problem would then follow. The basic finding was that removing the alleged fixation did not result in sudden and direct solution of the problems, indicating that fixation was not an important factor in making these problems difficult. It was also found that significant facilitation of solution in these problems could be brought about only by giving Ss relatively detailed information about the solution. It is concluded that the terms "fixation" and "insight" are not useful in describing the processes involved in the solution of these problems, and the role of problem-specific knowledge in the solution of insight problems is emphasized. (26 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Four experiments examined whether verbalization can interfere with insight problem solving. In Exp 1, Ss were interrupted during problem solving and asked either to verbalize their strategies (retrospective verbalization) or engage in an unrelated activity (control). Ss in the retrospective verbalization condition were significantly less successful than control Ss at solving the problems. Exp 2 replicated the finding of Exp 1 and demonstrated that the control Ss' advantage was not due to any beneficial effect of the interruption. In Exp 3, concurrent, nondirective verbalization impaired the solving of insight problems but had no effect on noninsight problems. In Exp 4, the effect of concurrent verbalization on insight was maintained even when Ss were encouraged to consider alternative approaches. Together, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that verbalization can result in the disruption of nonreportable processes that are critical to achieving insight solutions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Examined the impact of verbal overshadowing (VO; i.e., a memory illusion in which a recently generated verbal representation is emphasized at the expense of the perceptual memory itself) on the wine recognition of individuals of 3 categories of wine tasting expertise. Participants (aged 21–78 yrs) included 39 novice wine drinkers, 43 intermediate wine drinkers (little or no training), and 25 trained wine experts. Ss tasted a red wine, engaged in either verbalization or an unrelated verbal activity, and then attempted to identify the target wine from among 3 foils. The negative effects of verbalization on wine recognition were exclusively limited to intermediate wine drinkers. Results indicate that memory for taste can, at least under some circumstances, be disrupted by attempts at committing it to words and support the claim that VO occurs when there is a marked discrepancy between perceptual expertise and verbal expertise. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Administered the 9-dot problem with standard or strategy instructions and with or without practice on other dot-connecting problems to 128 undergraduates (32 in each condition). Strategy instructions emphasized extending, intersecting, and starting lines beyond the dots. Six practice problems differed in number and arrangement of dots and solution-line pattern, but all required lines extended/intersected beyond the dots. Both instructions and practice facilitated 9-dot performance, supporting the proposal that the 9-dot problem belongs to a class of problems with similar strategic requirements and contradicting the proposal of R. W. Weisberg and J. W. Alba (see record
1982-02568-001) that facilitation requires knowledge of specific solution lines. Further analyses indicated that both the square shape of the dot pattern and the presence of a center dot contributed to difficulty, that extending (even wrong) lines early and persistently was important for solving the problem, and that self-evaluation of solution attempts required theoretical attention. (13 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Recent studies have demonstrated that requesting individuals to produce a verbal description of a previously seen face can hinder subsequent attempts at identification. This phenomenon, termed ‘verbal overshadowing’, has been studied rather extensively in the face-identification paradigm; however, studies have not always replicated the general effect. Based upon both practical and theoretical interests in the phenomenon, a meta-analysis of 29 effect size comparisons (N = 2018) was conducted. Across the sample of studies there was a small, yet significant, negative effect (Fisher's Zr = −0.12), indicating some degree of verbal impairment or overshadowing. A fixed-effects analysis of several moderating variables demonstrated a significant effect of post-description delay and type of description instruction. The pattern of means indicated that overshadowing effects were more likely to occur when the identification task immediately followed the description task, and when participants were given an elaborative, as opposed to a standard (free recall), instruction during the description task. Inconsistencies in the literature are discussed, as well as various theoretical and applied issues regarding the verbal overshadowing effect. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
People’s metacognitions, both before and during problem solving, may be of importance in motivating and guiding problem-solving
behavior. These metacognitions could also be diagnostic for distinguishing among different classes of problems, each perhaps
controlled by different cognitive processes. In the present experiments, intuitions on classic insight problems were compared
with those on noninsight and algebra problems. The findings were as follows: (1) subjective feeling of knowing predicted performance
on algebra problems but not on insight problems; (2) subjects’ expectations of performance greatly exceeded their actual performance,
especially on insight problems; (3) normative predictions provided a better estimate of individual performance than did subjects’
own predictions, especially on the insight problems; and, most importantly, (4) the patterns-of-warmth ratings, which reflect
subjects’ feelings of approaching solution, differed for insight and noninsight problems. Algebra problems and noninsight
problems showed a more incremental pattern over the course of solving than did insight problems. In general, then, the data
indicated that noninsight problems were open to accurate predictions of performance, whereas insight problems were opaque
to such predictions. Also, the phenomenology of insight-problem solution was characterized by a sudden, unforeseen flash of
illumination. We propose that the difference in phenomenology accompanying insight and noninsight problem solving, as empirically
demonstrated here, be used to define insight.
3 differently labeled illustrations of Duncker's candle problem were exposed to Ss as they worked on that problem. In the 1st of 3 experiments, the picture which elicited the name of the functionally fixed object also elicited correct initial solutions in a verbal form of the problem. In Exp. II and III, Ss were given manipulative forms of the same problem. Time to achieve criterion solution, choice of initial solution object, and within-group variability were each a function of the labeling procedures. The functional fixedness effect in the problem used was attributed to the inability of Ss to respond specifically to the functionally fixed object, either in terms of labeling or attending.
Three experiments explored the role of perceptual expertise in mediating the finding (termed verbal overshadowing) that describing a face can impair later recognition. In Experiment 1, verbalization impaired White participants' recognition of White faces (expert domain) but not African American faces (novice domain). In Experiment 2, judges attempted to identify targets on the basis of the verbal descriptions generated in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 revealed a significant relationship between verbalization participants' recognition performance and yoked judges' identification performance for other-race but not own-race faces, suggesting that other-race recognition may involve a unique reliance on "verbalizable" information. In Experiment 3, the interaction between verbalization and race of face was replicated with upright faces but was attenuated with inverted recognition arrays (a manipulation that reduces the influence of configural information). Collectively, these findings suggest that verbalization may disrupt the nonreportable configural processes associated with recognizing stimuli with which one is an expert.
Five experiments showed that interference resulting from verbalizing visual stimuli (verbal overshadowing) can be reduced by reintroducing visual cues present at encoding. Object color and background color were used as cues. Participants learned either easy- or hard-to-name figures and then performed an image rotation task. Before performing the imagery task, participants were re-presented with the color patch associated with each figure. Color re-presentation attenuated the impairment associated with easy-to-name stimuli (Experiment 1) as well as labeled hard-to-name stimuli (Experiment 2). However, background color cues had no effect on imagery performance (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 showed that naming the object colors at encoding makes color retrieval cues ineffective. Finally, Experiment 5 showed that object color cues can help participants to overcome previously exhibited impairment resulting from covert verbalization.
If, as suggested, creative (insight) problem solving is less systematic and employs less planning than analytical problem solving, the former requires substantially less working memory (WM) than the latter. Subjects simultaneously solved problems and counted auditory stimuli (concurrent WM task), in response to which ERPs were recorded. Counting disrupted analytical, but not creative performance. Peak and time-window average P300 were more frontal during analytical problem solving as compared to insight or counting tones only (control). A PCA extracted two factors in the P3 range, one frontal and one broad left-lateralized, which distinguished analytical from creative problem solving. The findings indicate distinct processing pathways for the two types of tasks with more WM involvement in analytical tasks.
Recent studies of eyewitness memory have observed deleterious effects of producing a verbal description on later identification accuracy of a previously viewed face, an effect termed verbal overshadowing (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). The present research investigated whether the phenomenon of verbal overshadowing may be constrained by variation in participants' initial retrieval processes, such that verbalization of a previously viewed stimulus could produce either positive or negative influences on subsequent attempts at recollection. To assess the validity of this hypothesis, we manipulated participants' response criterion during the verbal description task. As predicted, variation in response criterion significantly influenced not only the quality of the description generated but also accuracy on a subsequent identification task. This retrieval-based effect was found to persist despite either a postdescription delay (Experiment 1) or source-monitoring instructions at the time of the identification task (Experiment 2). We conclude that retrieval-based processes exert a powerful influence over the accuracy of verbalization and subsequent identification of a target face.
The representational change theory of insight claims that insight problems cause impasses because they mislead problem solvers into constructing inappropriate initial representations. Insight is attained when the initial representation is changed. In the present study (N = 24), we tested three specific implications of these hypotheses against eye movements recorded while participants solved matchstick arithmetic problems. The results were consistent with the predictions, providing converging evidence with prior findings using solution rates and solution times. Alternative theories of insight can explain individual findings, but only the representational change theory accounts for both the performance data and the eye movement data. The present study also suggests that eye movement recordings provide an important new window into processes of insight problem solving.
This article reports 2 experiments that investigated performance on a novel insight problem, the 8-coin problem. The authors hypothesized that participants would make certain initial moves (strategic moves) that seemed to make progress according to the problem instructions but that nonetheless would guarantee failure to solve the problem. Experiment 1 manipulated the starting state of the problem and showed that overall solution rates were lower when such strategic moves were available. Experiment 2 showed that failure to capitalize on visual hints about the correct first move was also associated with the availability of strategic moves. The results are interpreted in terms of an information-processing framework previously applied to the 9-dot problem. The authors argue that in addition to the operation of inappropriate constraints, a full account of insight problem solving must incorporate a dynamic that steers solution-seeking activity toward the constraints.
The Nature of Insight brings together diverse perspectives, including recent theories and discoveries, to examine the nature and origins of insightful thinking, as well as the history of theory and research on the topic and the methods used to study it. There are chapters by the leading experts in this field, including Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Ronald Finke, Howard Gruber, Marcel Just, David Meyer, David Perkins, Dean Simonton, and Robert Weisberg, among others.
The Nature of Insight is divided into five main parts. Following an introduction that reviews the history and methods of the field, part II looks at how people solve challenging puzzles whose answers cannot be obtained through ordinary means. Part III focuses on how people come up with ideas for new inventions, while part IV explores the thinking of some of the most insightful people in the history of civilization. Part V considers metaphors such as evolution and investment as bases for understanding insight. An epilogue integrates all these approaches.
Contributors R.E. Mayer, R.L. Dominowsk, P. Dallob, C.M. Seifert, D.E. Meyer, N. Davidson, A.J. Patalano, I. Yaniv, J.E. Davidson, R.W. Weisberg, M.L. Gick, R.S. Lockhart, S.M. Smith, R.A. Finke, M.I. Isaak, M.A. Just, M. Csikszentmihalyi, K. Sawyer, K. Dunbar, H.E. Gruber, M.F. Ippolito, R.D. Tweney, D.K. Simonton, D.N. Perkins, R.J. Sternberg, T.I. Lubart
Bradford Books imprint
Since the publication of Ericsson and Simon's ground-breaking work in the early 1980s, verbal data has been used increasingly to study cognitive processes in many areas of psychology, and concurrent and retrospective verbal reports are now generally accepted as important sources of data on subjects' cognitive processes in specific tasks. In this revised edition of the book that first put protocol analysis on firm theoretical ground, the authors review major advances in verbal reports over the past decade, including new evidence on how giving verbal reports affects subjects' cognitive processes, and on the validity and completeness of such reports.
In a substantial new preface Ericsson and Simon summarize the central issues covered in the book and provide an updated version of their information-processing model, which explains verbalization and verbal reports. They describe new studies on the effects of verbalization, interpreting the results of these studies and showing how their theory can be extended to account for them. Next, they address the issue of completeness of verbally reported information, reviewing the new evidence in three particularly active task domains. They conclude by citing recent contributions to the techniques for encoding protocols, raising general issues, and proposing directions for future research.
All references and indexes have been updated.
Bradford Books imprint
The effects of overt verbalization anti practice on problem solving ability were examined. The 100 secondary school students who served as Ss were divided into four groups: (1) those who received practice word problems and solved problems while thinking aloud, (2) those who did not practice but solved problems while thinking aloud, (3) those who practiced but did not verbalize, and (4) those who received no practice and did not verbalize. Analysis of variance revealed that neither overt verbalization nor practice significantly influenced problem solving scores. However, Ss who were required to think aloud made significantly more computational errors than those who worked without verbalizing.
The first sentence in the preface to Kohler's The Place of Value in a World of Facts proclaims boldly that the purpose of the book is philosophical. It is dedicated to Ralph Barton Perry, and ranges widely over areas which at the time most American psychologists would have feared to tread, perhaps because during their student days they had become infected by Titchener's pontifical proclamation that science has nothing to do with values or by the behaviorists' thumping insistence on facts, facts, facts, nothing but facts. Some twenty years earlier Kohler had published Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationiiren Zustand (1920), dedicated to Carl Stumpf, a brilliant work full of new facts which he and the other members of the triumvirate, Wertheimer and Koffka, and their students were bringing to light, all set in relation to a rigid framework of physical field theory. Gestaltpsychologie was already on the way to becoming Gestalttheorie, for Kohler insisted throughout his life that the phenomenal world is for science the only world open to inspection and that the initial data of this world are Gestalten no matter from what angle or branch of science they may be reported.
To study productive thinking where it is most conspicuous in great achievements is certainly a temptation, and without a doubt, important information about the genesis of productive thought could be found in biographical material. A problem arises when a living creature has a goal but does not know how this goal is to be reached. Whenever one cannot go from the given situation to the desired situation simply by action, then there has to be recourse to thinking. The subjects ( S s), who were mostly students of universities or of colleges, were given various thinking problems, with the request that they think aloud. This instruction, "Think aloud", is not identical with the instruction to introspect which has been common in experiments on thought-processes. While the introspecter makes himself as thinking the object of his attention, the subject who is thinking aloud remains immediately directed to the problem, so to speak allowing his activity to become verbal. It is the shift of function of the components of a complex mathematical pattern—a shift which must so often occur if a certain structure is to be recognized in a given pattern—it is this restructuration, more precisely: this transformation of function within a system, which causes more or less difficulty for thinking, as one individual or another tries to find a mathematical proof.
Contends that the central concept of the information processing theory of problem solving is "search," while the central concept of the gestalt theory of problem solving is "restructuring." Both concepts express important aspects of human thinking. It is hypothesized that restructuring is a change in mental representation that affects the applicability of problem solving operators. Insight is hypothesized to occur when restructuring of the search space brings the goal state within the horizon of mental look-ahead. Deciding whether or not a problem-solving operator is applicable to a particular state in the search space may involve nontrivial computations. Internal search is restricted by capacity limitations. According to this theory, there is difficulty in knowing when to restructure and how to search for new representation. It is concluded that the present theory builds on already known cognitive principles extended by the postulation of the description space. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Kohler's work first appeared in 1917, under the title
Intelligenzprufen an Anthropoiden. The English translation of the second revised edition, under the title given above, was first published in 1924 and is adapted for this chapter. Two sets of interests lead us to test the intelligence of the higher apes. We are aware that it is a question of beings which in many ways are nearer to man than to the other ape species; in particular it has been shown that the chemistry of their bodies, in so far as it may be perceived in the quality of the blood, and the structure of their most highly-developed organ, the brain, are more closely related to the chemistry of the human body and human brain-structure than to the chemical nature of the lower apes and their brain development. These beings show so many human traits in their "everyday" behaviour that the question naturally arises whether they do not behave with intelligence and insight under conditions which require such behaviour. This question expresses the first, one may say, naive, interest in the intellectual capacity of animals. We wished to ascertain the degree of relationship between anthropoid apes and man in a field which seems to us particularly important, but on which we have as yet little information. The second aim is theoretical. Even assuming that the anthropoid ape behaves intelligently in the sense in which the word is applied to man, there is yet from the very start no doubt that he remains in this respect far behind man, becoming perplexed and making mistakes in relatively simple situations; but it is precisely for this reason that we may, under the simplest conditions, gain knowledge of the nature of intelligent acts. In the field of the experiments carried out here the insight of the chimpanzee shows itself to be principally determined by his optical apprehension of the situation; at times he even starts solving problems from a too visual point of view, and in many cases in which the chimpanzee stops acting with insight, it may have been simply that the structure of the situation was too much for his visual grasp (relative "weakness of form perception"). It is therefore difficult to give a satisfactory explanation of all his performances, so long as no detailed theory of form (Gestalt) has been laid as a foundation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Several problems, all solvable by one somewhat complex procedure, are presented in succession. If afterwards a similar task is given which can be solved by a more direct and simple method, will the individual be blinded to this direct possibility (
Einstellung)? If a blinding effect does result, will it be of characteristically different strength in groups that differ in educational level, age, etc.? Moreover, if we introduce means to save the subjects or to rescue them from such blindness, will these means readily work? Will they operate differently in various groups? And what may be the real cause for the blinding effect? How are we to understand this phenomenon? (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The reactive effects of verbal overshadowing are discussed within Ericsson and Simon's (1980, 1984/1993) theoretical framework, which guided the design of procedures that elicit valid and non-reactive verbal reports. These procedures encourage participants to give free verbal expression to their thoughts. In contrast, the procedures in the verbal overshadowing paradigm require participants to produce prescribed types of verbalizations. Participants are explicitly told how to verbally describe the face, namely ‘to describe each facial feature in as much detail as possible’ and to continue doing so for the full 5 minutes. The reactive effects of ‘verbal overshadowing’ can be linked to the requirement of producing prescribed types of verbalizations and are thus not caused merely by spontaneous verbal expression of one's thoughts. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
This paper describes the process of attaining the insight required to solve a particular problem—the Mutilated Checkerboard (MC) problem. It shows that attaining insight requires discovering an effective problem representation, and that performance on insight problems can be predicted from the availability of generators and constraints in the search for such a representation. To test these claims we varied the salience of features leading to the critical concept of parity in the MC problem. Using chronometric measures, verbal protocols, and computer simulations, we explored first why it is difficult to find a representation for the Checkerboard problem, and then tested four potential sources of search constraint for reducing the difficulty: cue salience manipulations, prior knowledge, hints, and heuristics. While subjects used each of these four sources of constraint, a particular heuristic—noticing properties of the situation that remained invariant during solution attempts (the Notice Invariants heuristic)—proved to be a particularly powerful means for focusing search. In conjunction with hints and independently, it played a major part in producing the insight that yielded an effective problem representation and solution.
An information-processing analysis was applied to Duncker's Candle Problem. Six experiments tested the model. The model accounted for (a) infrequent use of the tack box in solutions, (b) facilitation of Box solutions by labeling the box or presenting it empty, (c) individual Ss' sequences of solutions, (d) solution latencies, (e) solutions produced by changes in instructions, and (f) solutions produced by presentation of different objects.
The Greeks had a ready answer for what happens when the mind suddenly finds the answer to a question for which it had been searching: insight was regarded as a gift of the Muses, its origins were ‘divine’. It served to highlight the Greeks' belief that there are some things which are not meant to be scientifically explained. The essence of insight is that it comes from some supernatural source: unpredicted and unfettered. In other words, the origins of insight are unconscious, and hence, unexplainable. Wittgenstein felt that, as long as there continues to be a noun expression like ‘to have a moment of insight’ which functions in the same way as the expression ‘to have a hunger pang’, thereby inducing us to treat ‘moment of insight’ as the name of an experience, then “people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up.” To the founders of AI, this argument reeked of obscurantism. The moment of insight, they felt, is indeed a mystery, but it is one that begs to be explained in causal terms. Indeed, the problem of insight served as one of the leading problems in the evolution of AI. Hence anyone interested in the foundations of AI is compelled to examine the manner in which the early pioneers of the field sought to explain the ‘eureka experience’. In this paper I will look at some of the key conceptual developments which paved the way for Newell and Simon's theory of GPS: the fundamental changes in the notion of the unconscious — the emergence of the ‘cognitive unconscious’ — which took place in the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century. In so doing, I hope to clarify what Wittgenstein may have had in mind in his strictures against mechanist attempts to analyse the nature of insight.
It is widely believed that verbal processing generally improves memory performance. However, in a series of six experiments, verbalizing the appearance of previously seen visual stimuli impaired subsequent recognition performance. In Experiment 1, subjects viewed a videotape including a salient individual. Later, some subjects described the individual's face. Subjects who verbalized the face performed less well on a subsequent recognition test than control subjects who did not engage in memory verbalization. The results of Experiment 2 replicated those of Experiment 1 and further clarified the effect of memory verbalization by demonstrating that visualization does not impair face recognition. In Experiments 3 and 4 we explored the hypothesis that memory verbalization impairs memory for stimuli that are difficult to put into words. In Experiment 3 memory impairment followed the verbalization of a different visual stimulus: color. In Experiment 4 marginal memory improvement followed the verbalization of a verbal stimulus: a brief spoken statement. In Experiments 5 and 6 the source of verbally induced memory impairment was explored. The results of Experiment 5 suggested that the impairment does not reflect a temporary verbal set, but rather indicates relatively long-lasting memory interference. Finally, Experiment 6 demonstrated that limiting subjects' time to make recognition decisions alleviates the impairment, suggesting that memory verbalization overshadows but does not eradicate the original visual memory. This collection of results is consistent with a recording interference hypothesis: verbalizing a visual memory may produce a verbally biased memory representation that can interfere with the application of the original visual memory.
3 of Duncker's experiments on functional fixedness were repeated by giving the experimental Ss each problem (the "box", "gimlet," and "paperclip") after first having used the solution objects for that problem in a function dissimilar to that demanded for solution. Control Ss were presented the problems without such pre-utilization. "Functional fixedness was shown to result from the pre-utilization of solution objects. Duncker's results were confirmed in a study using a larger n and having more carefully specified experimental conditions."
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