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Binding of Multidimensional Context Information as a Distinctive Characteristic of Remember Judgments

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Abstract

This research investigated the cognitive processes underlying remember-know judgments in terms of contextual binding in multidimensional source memory. Stochastic dependence between the retrieval of different context attributes, which formed the empirical criterion of binding, was observed for remembered items but not for known items. Experiment 1 showed that the qualitative difference in the stochastic relation holds even if quantitative source-memory performance is equated for items with remember and know judgments. Experiment 2 generalized the findings to context information from different modalities, and Experiment 3 ruled out a spurious stochastic dependence due to interindividual differences. Supporting recent dual-process models of remember-know judgments, the findings show that remember and know judgments differ with respect to binding processes that correspond to episodic recollection.
Binding of Multidimensional Context Information as a Distinctive
Characteristic of Remember Judgments
Thorsten Meiser
Jena University Christine Sattler
Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Science
Kerstin Weißer
Jena University
This research investigated the cognitive processes underlying remember–know judgments in terms of
contextual binding in multidimensional source memory. Stochastic dependence between the retrieval of
different context attributes, which formed the empirical criterion of binding, was observed for remem-
bered items but not for known items. Experiment 1 showed that the qualitative difference in the stochastic
relation holds even if quantitative source-memory performance is equated for items with remember and
know judgments. Experiment 2 generalized the findings to context information from different modalities,
and Experiment 3 ruled out a spurious stochastic dependence due to interindividual differences.
Supporting recent dual-process models of remember–know judgments, the findings show that remember
and know judgments differ with respect to binding processes that correspond to episodic recollection.
Keywords: binding, remember–know paradigm, multidimensional source memory, multinomial model-
ing
Recognition of an event from the past as “old” may be based on
experienced familiarity with the event or on conscious recollection of the
event’s prior occurrence. The distinction between familiarity and recol-
lection forms the core assumption of several dual-process models of
recognition memory (Gardiner, 1988; Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby, Kelley, &
McElree, 1999; Mandler, 1980; Tulving, 1985; Yonelinas, 1994; see
Yonelinas, 2002, for an overview). According to these models, familiarity
is based on item-specific memory strength, whereas recollection includes
the retrieval of details of the learning situation.
The theoretical distinction between familiarity and recollection has
gained support in numerous studies using a variety of methodological
approaches. For example, investigations of the time course of
familiarity-based and recollection-based memory judgments showed
that the influence of familiarity precedes that of recollection and that
memory errors triggered by early familiarity can be corrected by
subsequent recollection (Dosher, 1984; Gronlund & Ratcliff, 1989;
McElree, Dolan, & Jacoby, 1999; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1994). Further
evidence for the distinct roles of familiarity and recollection has
stemmed from dissociations between recollection-based and
familiarity-based responses by experimental manipulations (e.g.,
Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999; Gardiner, Gawlik, & Richardson-Klavehn,
1994; Jacoby, 1996; Ma¨ntyla¨ & Raudsepp, 1996; Rajaram, 1993; Ra-
jaram & Geraci, 2000; Toth, Reingold, & Jacoby, 1994) or quasi-
experimental analyses of different age groups (Jennings & Jacoby, 1993)
and amnesic patients (e.g., Huppert & Piercy, 1978; Knowlton & Squire,
1995; Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara, & Knight, 1998).
The distinction between recollection and familiarity was also
substantiated in studies of brain activity using event-related poten-
tials (Curran, 2000; Mecklinger, 2000; Rugg, Schloerscheidt, &
Mark, 1998) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (Brewer,
Zhao, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1998; Eldridge, Knowlton,
Furmanski, Bookheimer, & Engel, 2000; Henson, Rugg, Shallice,
Josephs, & Dolan, 1999; Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw, & Rugg, 2005).
These studies revealed a differential time course and topographic
distribution of brain activity corresponding to familiarity and rec-
ollection, with a specific involvement of the hippocampus and
prefrontal regions in the creation and retrieval of memories that
comprise the recollection of episodic details. Moreover, it has been
shown that different regions in the medial temporal lobe are related
to recollection and familiarity and that these regions can indepen-
dently contribute to recognition memory (Aggleton & Brown,
1999; Ranganath et al., 2003). In line with this functional differ-
entiation of the medial temporal lobe, patients with lesions of the
hippocampus show selective impairments of recollection, whereas
patients with lesions that extend to regions surrounding the hip-
pocampus, including the parahippocampus and perirhinal cortex,
also show deficits in familiarity (Yonelinas et al., 2002).
Cognitive Processes Underlying Remember and Know
Judgments
A commonly used approach to assess whether an event is
recognized on the basis of conscious recollection or familiarity is
the remember–know paradigm (Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Java,
Thorsten Meiser and Kerstin Weißer, Department of Psychology, Jena
University, Jena, Germany; Christine Sattler, Max Planck Institute for
Human Cognitive and Brain Science, Leipzig, Germany.
This research was supported by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft to Thorsten Meiser (DFG, ME 1918/1).
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Thorsten
Meiser, who is now at the Department of Psychology, Marburg University,
Gutenbergstraße 18, D-35032 Marburg, Germany. E-mail:
meiser@staff.uni-marburg.de
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association
Learning, Memory, and Cognition
2008, Vol. 34, No. 1, 32–49 0278-7393/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0278-7393.34.1.32
32
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... When aggregating over R and K responses separately, R responses usually show higher overall source memory than K responses, which might indicate that differences in stochastic dependence actually result from general source memory strength rather than subjective R and K memory states. However, Meiser, Sattler, and Weisser (2008) showed that stochastic dependence persisted only in R responses but not in K responses even when memory performance for R and K responses was equated experimentally. Boywitt and Meiser (2012a) further tested implications of the context-context binding assumption of stochastic dependence and suggested that the encoding process is crucial for context-context binding because the context features must be integrated into one memory trace to be bound together. ...
... According to this alternative explanation, some participants have better memory for both context features than other participants, in which case aggregating over participants (and items) leads to spurious stochastic dependency. This point was initially addressed by Meiser et al. (2008) by analyzing subgroups of participants with similar levels of overall source memory. Here, we apply a hierarchical version of the multinomial model that we describe in more detail in the next section. ...
... The aim of the study is twofold: First, we want to replicate the result by Meiser et al. (2008) that stochastic dependence in multidimensional source memory is not an artifact due to aggregating across individual respondents. To rule out an artifact of aggregation, we apply a hierarchical version of the MPT model by Meiser (2014). ...
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In experiments on multidimensional source memory, a stochastic dependency of source memory for different facets of an episode has been repeatedly demonstrated. This may suggest an integrated representation leading to mutual cuing in context retrieval. However, experiments involving a manipulated reinstatement of one source feature have often failed to affect retrieval of the other feature, suggesting unbound features or rather item-feature binding. The stochastic dependency found in former studies might be a spurious correlation due to aggregation across participants varying in memory strength. We test this artifact explanation by applying a hierarchical multinomial model. Observing stochastic dependency when accounting for interindividual differences would rule out the artifact explanation. A second goal is to elucidate the nature of feature binding: Contrasting encoding conditions with integrated feature judgments versus separate feature judgments are expected to induce different levels of stochastic dependency despite comparable overall source memory if integrated representations include feature-feature binding. The experiment replicated the finding of stochastic dependency and, thus, ruled out an artifact interpretation. However, we did not find different levels of stochastic dependency between conditions. Therefore, the current findings do not reveal decisive evidence to distinguish between the feature-feature binding and the item-context binding account.
... We expected to replicate findings of a stochastic dependency of the retrieval of event elements (Hypothesis 1). In the source memory literature, a stochastic dependency of the retrieval of event elements has only been found for remember responses but not for know responses (Boywitt & Meiser, 2012a, 2012bMeiser & Bröder, 2002;Meiser et al., 2008;Starns & Hicks, 2005). Remember and know responses are subjective ratings of memory quality, intended to tap into feelings of conscious recollection and experienced familiarity, respectively. ...
... These factors may have contributed to an increased awareness regarding event structures in the experiments by Horner and Burgess (2014) and Horner et al. (2015) compared with Experiment 2. We also investigated how the binding of event elements differs regarding different recollection judgements. Whereas past research has only observed stochastic dependencies of the retrieval of event elements for remember responses but not for know responses (Boywitt & Meiser, 2012a, 2012bMeiser & Bröder, 2002;Meiser et al., 2008;Starns & Hicks, 2005), the present study did not find a consistent pattern across different recollection judgements, and dependencies were mostly unexpectedly negative. There is thus no support for Hypothesis 2. However, the remember-know paradigm (Gardiner, 1988) was usually used in the context of item-based representations and targets only specific cue elements. ...
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Experienced events consist of several elements which need to be bound together in memory to represent the event in a coherent manner. Given such bindings, the retrieval of one event element should be related to the successful retrieval of another element of the same event, thus leading to a stochastic dependency of the retrieval of event elements. The way in which bindings are structured is not yet clearly established and only few moderators of the binding of event elements have been identified. We present results from three experiments aiming to distinguish between an integrated binding structure, in which event elements are bound into a unitary representation, and a hierarchical binding structure, in which event elements are preferentially bound to specific types of elements. Experiments 2 and 3 were additionally designed to identify animacy, an entity's property of being alive, as a potential moderator of the binding of event elements. We also offer a new approach for modelling dependencies of the retrieval of event elements which mitigates some limitations of previous approaches. Consistent with previous literature we found dependencies of the retrieval of event elements if all of an events' constituent associations were shown. We found mixed evidence for integrated or hierarchical binding structures but found dependency of the retrieval of event elements to be sensitive to the presence of animacy in an event. The results suggest that binding structures may vary depending on moderators such as animacy or event structure awareness. Theoretical implications and directions for future research are discussed.
... Importantly, Meiser and Bröder (2002) hypothesized that both the level of consciousness and attention may moderate the degree of stochastic dependence among source attributes. However, only the former (level of consciousness) has been assessed (e.g., Meiser et al., 2008;Meiser & Bröder, 2002), using remember/know procedures which theoretically tap into recollective-and familiaritybased processes in human memory (Gardiner, 1988;Tulving, 1983). Thus, a primary aim of the present study was to fill this important gap in the literature. ...
... Several theories of episodic memory suggest that retrieval of the components of an episode SOURCE MEMORY AND DIVIDED ATTENTION 1883 involves mutual cuing among the constituent components of an episode that triggers the reactivation of all components of the episode (Jones, 1976;Tulving, 1983;Tulving & Thomson, 1973). In the context of studies on multidimensional source memory, some research has shown that source dimensions are retrieved in a dependent manner, but this may be restricted to when remembering is accompanied by recollective phenomenology of the encoding context (Meiser et al., 2008;Meiser & Bröder, 2002). Meiser and Bröder (2002) argued that attention may moderate the degree of stochastic dependence among source dimensions, but this has not been thoroughly investigated in the literature. ...
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Dividing attention (DA) between a memory task and a secondary task results in deficits in memory performance across a wide array of memory tasks, but these effects are larger when DA occurs at encoding than at retrieval. Although some research suggests the effects of DA are equal for item and associative memory, thereby suggesting that DA disrupts all components of an episode to the same extent, there have been relatively few studies directly examining the effects of DA on multiple features of the same episode. In addition, no studies have examined how DA may affect the stochastic dependency between multiple source dimensions of a given episode, which is central to theories of source memory, and episodic memory in general. Thus, in two experiments, we used a multidimensional source memory task-examining memory for items and multiple source features-and separately investigated how DA at encoding or at retrieval affects item memory, source memory, and joint source retrieval. DA was manipulated at encoding in Experiment 1 and at retrieval in Experiment 2. Whereas DA at encoding disrupted item memory, as well as source memory and source-source binding, though to a lesser extent, DA at retrieval did not affect any of these outcomes. Results are discussed in terms of levels of binding and the role of attention in encoding and retrieval of bounded episodic representations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
... Conversely, the OAs displayed a response pattern in which the WWWhich questions demonstrated to only make use of episodic strategies for their correct execution, where only the proportion of correct answers associated with a "remember" response were above chance levels of accuracy. This finding is in line with other studies, which showed that responses based on recall processes are related with bindingdependent EM tasks (Meiser et al., 2008), as in the case of the WWWhich questions. In addition, these results were unchanged when only responses with high-confidence levels of confidence (values 4 or 5) were selected, demonstrating that these findings were not due to the influence of memory trace decay. ...
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Episodic memory (EM) is a subsystem responsible for storing and recalling information about the basic elements of an event in a binding manner. Some approaches consider the temporal element to be one of the basic components of EM (WWWhen paradigm), while others consider that the contextual component is able in practice to better represent this cognitive ability (WWWhich paradigm). The relationship of both paradigms simultaneously with other instruments for measuring EM has not been investigated in healthy older adults. Thus, the present study examined the performance of young and older adults on questions based on the WWWhen and WWWhich paradigms, investigating the relationship of these questions with episodic (Remember) and non-episodic (Know) strategies. The results showed that for the younger adults both the questions demonstrated to only be significantly related with the "remember" strategy. On the other hand, older adults presented a response pattern in which the "WWWhich" questions used only episodic strategies for their correct resolution. Aging appears to promote a substantial reduction in both "Remember" and "Know" strategies, mainly those associated with solving tasks based on the temporal element of EM.
... Une étude récente a mis en cause l'activité de l'hippocampe humain avec des souvenirs holistiques d'événements multiéléments basés sur des repères (Horner et al., 2015). Ceci apparait congruent avec nos résultats de l'étude A2, qui démontre (Bröder & Meiser, 2007;Meiser et al., 2008). Or, il apparaît que nos résultats des études de l'Axe A sont particulièrement conformes à ces conceptions et qu'il s'agirait là de la stratégie anatomo-fonctionnelle principalement mise en oeuvre dans le processus de rappel des épisodes mnésiques dans les paradigmes R/K et mémoire Source. ...
Thesis
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Chez l'homme, la mémoire épisodique est l'aptitude cognitive qui lui permet de récupérer une expérience passée vécue, ou épisode, selon un état de conscience spécifique. La particularité de ce système de mémoire est la construction de liens entre les dimensions contextuelles constitutif de l'épisode mnésique : l'évènement « Quoi ? », le moment « Quand ? », et l'endroit « Où ? ». Les études classiques de la mémoire épisodique indiquent que ces dimensions sont traitées et intégrées dans les structures corticales comprenant principalement le lobe temporal médian et le cortex préfrontal. Des études récentes de la mémoire en IRMf faisant usage de matériaux expérimentaux plus naturelles et écologiques ont ouvert la perspective de réseaux corticaux sous-jacents de la mémoire épisodique s'étendant au-delà de ces structures. En effet, ces études suggèrent l'idée que le lobe pariétal joue un rôle important dans la constitution d'un épisode mnésique au contexte enrichi. Cependant les mécanismes et structures relatives aux traitements des caractéristiques contextuelles d'un évènement restent débattues, et les interactions induites entre les différentes dimensions contextuelles d'un épisode mnésique, lors de son rappel, sont mal compris. Cette thèse présente 3 objectifs principaux : 1) développer de nouveaux protocoles expérimentaux pour étudier la mémoire des épisodes mnésiques encodés dans des situations comprenant un contexte riche et écologique ; 2) évaluer l'influence du contexte temporel et spatial sur la performance de rappel des épisodes encodés dans ces situations hautement écologiques ; et 3) élucider les structures corticales sous-jacentes aux traitements de ces dimensions contextuelles. Avec ces objectifs en vue, j'ai développé des protocoles d'études faisant usage de films, de réalité virtuelle et d'une application mobile géolocalisée lors de la phase d'encodage. J'ai étudié les performances de rappel comportementale, et sous IRMf, par le moyen de 2 tâches : une tâche hybride Rappel/Familier et de Mémoire source ; et une tâche de jugement de l'ordre temporel. Mes résultats comportementaux de la première tâche démontrent que le rappel correct et confiant de l'endroit « Où ? » et du moment « Quand ? » prédit la probabilité du choix rappel, et non familier, du « Quoi ? » ; et cela, dans l'ensemble des modalités d'encodage. L'étude IRMf a mis en évidence une activité accrue du Précuneus concomitante. Dans la tâche de jugement de l'ordre temporel j'ai observé une modulation des temps de réaction et de l'activité du Précuneus en fonction de la distance temporelle entre les épisodes pendant la phase l'encodage. Plus important, à travers les études, j'ai constaté que ces effets comportementaux et d'imagerie sont modulés en fonction d'autres facteurs contextuels associés aux épisodes écologiques (p. ex. facteurs spatiaux, contenu sémantique, modalité d'encodage), ce qui démontre que l'information épisodique traitée par le Précuneus dépasse les dimensions classiques "quoi, où, quand". Ces résultats mettent en avant l'implication du lobe pariétal médian pour le rappel des épisodes mnésiques écologiques et suggérant son implication dans le rappel conscient et subjectif d'un épisode. J'interprète ces résultats à la lumière des théories reconstructives de la mémoire épisodique et je propose que le Précuneus soit impliqué dans l'intégration multidimensionnelle des épisodes mnésiques enrichis selon une perspective subjective/personnelle accrue. Plus généralement, mes études appuient l'importance d'étudier la cognition humaine dans son milieu écologique, en démontrant ici le rôle crucial du Précuneus, qui est une structure éloignée du réseau classique temporo-frontale de la mémoire épisodique
... color, shape, word) into a complex memory unit (Tulving, 2002). It represents a core feature of episodic memory (Meiser et al., 2008;Sperduti et al., 2017). Several previous studies have suggested that the hippocampus and the adjacent medial temporal lobe (MTL) structures play a crucial role in binding memory (Konkel et al., 2008;Mayes et al., 2007;Pertzov et al., 2013). ...
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Background Episodic memory starts to decline very early in the development of Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Subtle impairments in memory binding may be detected in mild cognitive impairment (MCI). This study aims to examine the psychometric properties of the Chinese version of the memory binding test (MBT). Methods One hundred and sixty-four subjects (26 individuals with AD, 67 individuals with amnestic MCI (aMCI), 30 individuals with subjective cognitive impairment (SCI), and 41 cognitively normal elderly individuals (NC)) participated in the study. Twenty-two subjects repeated the assessment of the MBT within 6 weeks (± 2 weeks). Pearson correlation was used to calculate the convergent validity. The test––retest reliability was determined by the calculation of the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). Discriminative validity was calculated to evaluate the receiver–operating characteristic curves. The optimal index was chosen by comparing the area under the curve for specificity and sensitivity ≥ 0.80. The optimal cutoff score of the index was chosen to maximize the sum of sensitivity and specificity. Results The absolute value of the convergent validity of the direct indexes of MBT ranged from 0.443 to 0.684. The ICC for each of direct indexes was 0.887–0.958. Total delayed paired recall (TDPR) was the optimal index for discriminating aMCI from NC. The cutoff score for TDPR was ≤25 to distinguish aMCI from NC (sensitivity = 0.896, specificity = 0.707). Conclusion The Chinese version of MBT is a valid and reliable instrument to detect MCI.
... The retrieval of all event elements is consistent with the idea that recollection (as opposed to familiarity) is associated with allor-none, or holistic, retrieval (Yonelinas, 1994), and provides evidence for all-or-none retrieval occurring via pattern completion; the complete retrieval of a representation (i.e., pattern) in the presence of a partial or ambiguous cue (Gardner-Medwin, 1976;Hopfield, 1982;Marr, 1971;McClelland, McNaughton, & O'Reilly, 1995;Treves & Rolls, 1992; for reviews, see Horner & Doeller, 2017;Hunsaker & Kesner, 2013). Consistent with this, Meiser, Sattler, & Weisser (2008) showed that dependency for source details (i.e., location and size), associated with words, is observed when participants report subjective experiences of recollection, but not when reporting feelings of familiarity. ...
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