Insinuating: The Seduction of Unsaying

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Pragmatics
6:2.19 1
-204.
International Pragmatics
Association
INSINUATTNG:
THE SEDUCTION OF UNSAYTNG
Marcella
Bertuccelli Papi
0. Introduction
Insinuation can be one
of the most contemptible and despicable
forms of verbal
communication.
It is a spitefully
veiled accusation.
According to most
dictionaries.
to insinuate is to penetrate
furtively
into the interlocutor's
mind, allusively and
perfidiously
implanting
a thought within it - generally with provocative
intent -
through beguiling
suasion and seduction,
ofien laced
with a liberal sprinkling
of
contidential
and flattering ways. These definitions (admittedly somewhat
over-dramatized)
are well suited to give
a description of the most notable
properties
of insinuation,
and capture
particularly vividly
the essential
aspects of that which
in
my
view
represents the highest fictional embodiment of this
communicative mode,
namely the 'poisonous
insinuation' that Iago
pours
into the ear of the Moor in
Shakespeare's
Othello,
to which
I will turn shortly.
In this
paper,
however,
I would like to focus on the analysis of insinuation
from a more specific
angle, considering
it not so much - or not only - as a
rhetorical-literary operation,
but rather as
a linguistic
phenomenon
that properly
belongs to what
may be termed discourse semantics, a domain that, for reasons I
will
soon discuss, is to be viewed
as conceptually, logically and concretely linked
to
the sphere of linguistic
pragmatics,
within
the overarching tramework of a semiotics
of verbal communication
that conceives of human actions as signifying
functions
acting as both the bearers
and generators of meaning.
In this context,
insinuation is of specific interest first
and
foremost on
account
of the indirect
nature of the statements of which it is composed,
and secondly
because the unsaid meaning is nevertheless
perceived
as the final act of an
interpretive process that
cannot fail to recognize in the
verbal production
a "sign
of
something else" that the speaker intends to convey.
The present paper will therefore be divided
into
three sections. The first will
focus synthetically
on the problem
of the unsaid;
the second
will be devoted,
with
equal brevity, to the key concept
of speaker
attitude, while
the third will deal with
an analysis of the Shakespearian
dialogue in the
above-mentioned play.
1.
The
said and the unsaid
The
problem
of
the unsaid is
notoriously
one of the
hot spots of debate on
relations
between semantics and pragmatics. Frorn the theory of speech acts to studies
on
discourse
implicitness,
the dichotomy said/unsaid tends
to be taken
as
a criterion
to discriminate
between
acontextual and
truth-conditional semantics on one side.

192 Marcella Berruccelti Papi
and on the other side pragmatics,
with its emphasis on contextualization
and
inf-erence. Several
papers by Grice (now in Grice 1989)
have
provided
the most
extensive
systematic
theoretical account
of the
relations between
the two members
of this opposition. In Grice's
framework,
four main levels of meaning
describe
the
notion of "saying
that p":
1) timeless
meaning
of an utterance type
2) applied
timeless meaning
of an
utterance type
3) utterance type
occasion meaning
4) uttcrcr's occasion
meaning.
Stated
slightly
ditterently,and simplifying
a little,
it is hypothesized
that what is
said
is composed
of the sentence meaning integrated by several
contextual ingredients,
the quantitative
and
qualitative
limits of
which are
clearly marked
out.
In contrast,
what is communicated includes
what is said and what is implicated,
i.e. unsaid,
whether conversationallv
or conventionally.
WHAT IS COMMUNICATED
SAID
-/
sentence meaning contextual
UNSAID
(IMPLIE,D)
//-\
conversationally conventionally
ingredients
Grice's
attention focused above all on the relation between
what is said
and what
is communicated.
The entire apparatus
of the implicatures
was specifically set up
to account for this relation
while maintaining
the respective
fields
of operation
of
logical semantics and inferential pragmatics
distinct. Logical semantics is thus
entrusted
with analysis
of the said, i.e.
of the
propositional content
expressed
by a
sentence
supplemented
with contextual
information
clarifying deictic reference and
eliminating
any ambiguity
of meaning,
while inferential
pragmatics,
on the other
hand,
is presumed to be responsible for defining the principles
and
procedures
for
identification
of the meaning that is conveyed
above and beyond,
and at times
in
spite of, what is actually
said. Formulation
of the Cooperative Principle and its
subdivision
into the maxims of quality, quantity, manner and relation,
which are
jointly responsible
for generating implicature,
are, I believe,
sufficiently
well known
as
to need any specific
description here.
I would
simply underline
that
Grice admits
the existence
of a contextual component
in the
determination of the propositional
content expressed
by a sentence: In other words, he admits
the presence
of an
unsaid
part functioning as
a component
of the said,
but limited to saturating the
sentence meaning
with what is necessary for the utterance
to express a complete
proposition, i.e. one
that can be evaluated
in terms
of truth conditions.
1.1. Grice's
hypothesis has recently
been called into question
by linguists
and
philosophers
of language
who
have revised
the subdivision
of
fields whereby
the said
was assigned
to semantics
and the unsaid to pragmatics,
proposing
in its place
a

Insinuaring 193
"pragmatics
of the said" that considerably reduces
the operational domain of
semantics.
"What is said" has
been claimed by a number of writers, starting with
Sperber and
Wilson 1986, and later Blakemore
1987, Carston 1988, Recanati 1989,
Bach 1994, to be largely
determined
pragmatically because it requires much
greater
reference to the
context
of utterance than
was previously
assumed
by Grice.
Deictic
reference
and disambiguation of possible semantic ambiguities
are no longer
regarded as the only contributions
context can make to the determination of
propositional content.
Sentence meaning underdetermines
what is said in other
ways,which
cannot strictly be reduced to the concept of implicature
yet
do depend
on the
context of utterance
in ways
that are essential for reciprocal understanding
by interlocutors.
Some of the
clearest exampes are found in cases
of ellipsis such as in:
(1) He picked up the pistol,
went
into
the bedroom and killed her
where it is obvious that the victim
was killed in the bedroom and presumably
with
the
pistol.
although
this
is not stated in the final
proposition. Recovery of elided
material,
in such
cases, cannot be considered
an implicature, since
we would
otherwise
have to admit that implicatures
hold a relation of entailment
or
implication
with
the
elliptical propositions.(For
a more detailed discussion,
I refer
the
reader
to Carston 1988).
Equally
problematic
are cases like
(2) It takes
some time to get there
(3) They're all going
to Paris
where
it is clear
that "some"
stands for "a considerable quantity" and
"all"
is
not the
universal
quantifier
of logic.
Certainly, these
phenomena can be considered as particular cases
of the
fixation of
referential parameters, but it is
undeniable that they extend the
spectrum
of the pragmatic
features incorporated
within the unsaid thereby requiring the
saturation
of a fair number of empty slots
in the propositional form underlying the
utterance. (I leave it to the reader
- for lack of space to discuss
this
issue
- to solve
the
problem we would
face
in analyzing the brilliant
quip produced
by Portia
tn The
Merchant of Venice, when
she
saves Antonio
trom being deprived
of a pound
of his
flesh
because it li rtot
said in the contract that together with the latter Shylock is
also
entiled to take the blood that
would also be shed:
"This
bond
doth give
thee
here no
jot of blood").
But
let us
return
to the theoretical debate. The
problem
is
complex (see also
Bertuccelli Papi 1996):
For once
it has
been recognized
that the variables
to be
filled in are not merely
those pertaining to deixis,
and
that their
instantiation is not
always linguistically
controllable, it might seem that Grice's hypothesis
could
preserve
a basic validity, though
perhaps it would need revising
with appropriate
modifications
achievable by working cln the concept
of context.
In actual fact,
however, this does not seem to be the case:
Its fallaciousness
lies precisely
in
underestimating the gap between sentence meaning and
utterance
meaning
in other,
more fundamental, respects. As a matter of fact, even
if one concedes that the
presence, in the propositional form, of a high number of empty boxes awaiting

194 Marcella Benuccetti Papi
saturation need not raise serious
problems
for logical
semantics, the fact still
remains
that the implicit component
of the said does not concern
propositional
content alone. The discussion that follows
will put forward the hypothesis
that the
propositional content of the utterance is not fully identifiable
unless
another
category
is taken into account.
I am referring to the notion of speaker
attitude,
which I believe has been underestimated
in linguistic
research, but which is stated
very incisively in the cognitive
sciences and is also
extensively
utilized, albeit not
very
rigorously, in pragmatics.
2. The concept of attitude
It is by now generally
accepted
in the cognitive sciences that the mind does
not
construct or embrace pure logical
forms:
Representations are
processed
and stored
in different ways,
becoming the object of predicates
such
as
believe,
htow, desire,
which in philosophical terms are designated as "propositional attitudes".
The
linguistic tradition encompasses
a
more
extensive
category
of "speaker attitudes" (for
a possible
reconciliation of the two points
of view,
see
Kiefer 1987).
Athough there is, as far as I know, no univocal detinition of the term
"attitude"
or a closed list of the predicates
and elements that should belong to this
category, it is widely believed,
both in semantics
and pragmatics,
that utterances
contain
and communicate
attitudes concerning the propositions they express.
Certain
fundamental attitudes are embodied in
syntax
- for instance,
the
indicative mode and
the declarative form are thought to correspond to the line of attitudes
reflecting
doxastic-epistemic modality, while the imperative mode is usually regarded as
expressing boulomaic-desiderative attitudes. Other
attitudes are expressed by lexical
elements and discourse
particles,
other still by prosody.
In addition,
in face to face
communication a broad
range
of attitudes is certainly
conveyed by
gesture,
mimicry
and in general by extra-
and paralinguistic
behaviour.
In other
words,
in verbal
interaction it is not only
content identifiable in one
way or another as propositions
and logical forms that is transmitted. Verbal
interaction also conveys
- indeed, I would
argue that it mainly conveys
- implicit and
explicit information concerning the position
assumed by the speaker, both with
regard to his/her own utterance and to the interlocutor. The passage
of this
information weaves
a dense web of hypotheses, evaluations, anticipations
and
corrections that have long been known from neurophysiological
studies on the
functional systems underlying
all forms
of human behaviour (see
Bertuccelli Papi
and Perfetti 1987),
and hence
of language as well, and which have been partly
codified in the theory of speech
acts. (For semantics, the most complete treatment
is
perhaps
M. Doherty
1986).
That the notion of speaker attitude is crucial for identification of the
illocutionary force of an utterance, and also contributes to definition of its
perlocutionary
aim, has been extensively demonstrated
in speech act theory. I
contend,
however,
that neither the degree of informativeness
nor even the truth
value of an utterance can
be established
independently of the nature
and type of
attitudes
expressed. This should
be no cause
for surprise
if one reflects that in
verbal
interaction
the exchange
of information unsettles the dynamic equilibrium
of
the entire network of knowledge
possessed
by an individual, impinging on that
"cognitive
environment"(Sperber
and Wilson 1986) in which representations are

Insinuating 195
entertained
according to their
greater or lesser degree of probability
or likelihood.
If the
impact of a
piece
of infbrmation on the
listener's mind is measurable in terms
of confirmaticln, weakening,
erasure
or modification of
pre-existing
knowledge, then
it is clear
that acquisition of new data during the interaction can trigger chain
reactions, to the point
of provoking
a cognitive catastrophe
in
the
interlocutor. My
hypothesis is that
the
whole process
of
discourse understanding
occurs only ttrrough
the
medium clf perceived
and communicated
attitudes,
and I hope
the analysis
of
insinuation will
demonstratc it.
Given
this ftamework, it is obvious that the problem
of the detjnition and
representation
clf the various
types of attitude cannot
be disregarded
by the
disciplines
that
elect to analyze meaning
within
the communicative process, under
pain
of drifting the debate
towards
Neoplatonizing transcendency
of dubious
scientific
usefulness.
It cannot
be denied.
however,
that the question
is complex, and attempting to deal
wrth
all its theoretical
implications in any depth
would
be
beyond the
scope of this
paper.
I will therelbre
restrict myself to outlining some of the points of the
theoretical
hypoihesis underpinning
my arguments.
1. The minimum unit of utterance
meaning, i.e. of what is said - excluding,
obviously, the citation
meaning of 'say'
- is not the
minimum logical
proposition
p
that
can
be expressed in complete form by the utterance, but
rather
the
indivisible
formula
ATT(p),
where
"indivisible"
means
that the propositional
content p, taken
by
itsell is a theoretical abstraction that has no independent existence
trom the
cognitive
point
of
view
and
has no operational
value
from
the
communicative
point
of view.
2. The category
ATT will not be considered here in the
reductive
sense
adopted in
logic, which identifies
its contents in terms of modal predicates that can be projected
into
possible
worlds.
On the contrary, it focuses
inalienably
on the speaker,
thereby
representing
the conceptual
interface between a linguistic semantics and a
pragmatics
capable of entering into a constructive
relation
with the cognitive
sciences
cln the one
hand, and
with
the
social
sciences on the other.
3. In the
specific
acceptation
of the term adopted here, ATT is a categorial
complex
that encompasses within
it expressions
not only
of the
epistemic position, but also
of the
speaker's emotive and evaluative attitudes
(the latter inspired by ethical,
aesthetic, social and
in
general
behavioural criteria) towards both
his own utterance
and the
interlocutor. It tollows that each utterance
minimally contains:
an att of the speaker towards p: Att (rp, p)
an
att
of
the speaker towards
the listener: Att (sp, list)
an
att of the speaker towards the
relation between p and listener: Att ( sp (p, list))
The catecory
ATT therefore does
not contain
attitudes that are all of one single
type: On the contrary, it may be distinguished into alethic epistemic, deontic
or
boulamaic
modality, and it may be extended to cover aesthetic, ethical
or emotive
evaluations
that cluster
around
the
two
poles
of positive and
negative,
which will
be
specified
as good/bad.
or beautiful/ugly, censurable/admirable
ecc., as the case may

196 Marcella Berruccetli Papi
be. But the greater
part of research
in this direction
is
yet
to be done.
In
this perspcctive, the
concept of speaker attitude
presented
here is
perhaps
closer
to Bally's modality than
to lo_eical
modality or the
notion of attitude utililized
by
Bach
and Harnish (1979).
Furthermore, if it is
true, as claimed
by
Bally,
that
"la
modalit6
c'est
I'dme de la phrase", then it would
not
be
out of place
for a linguistic
semantics
to shoulder the burden of exploring
its explanatory power.
If studies
in
this area were
undertzrken,
then it would
in my
view
be possible to say
that
to the
extent to which such attitudes are not always
explicit, there may well be a
considerable amount of pragmatics
in
what
is
said, but
there
is
certainly
an
equally
large amount of semantics
in the unsaid. This is equivalent
to saying that the
division ot'the tlelds into semantics
and
pragmatics cannot be carried out on the
basis
of the dichotomy between the said and unsaid.
The
reason for this, as
pointed
out by Verschueren
(1995),
who advocates a return to linguistically
explorable
meaning
in its full human complexity
and
not merely intentional, is that in no case
is
it possible
for a language to sav everything that the speaker wishes to say. In a
linguistic
semantics,
said and unsaid are thus not two absctlute
values,
but rather the
extreme poles
of a continuum
that stretches over a range
of meaning
of which the
proposition
constitutes
the lclwer limit. and attitudes, defined as above, the upper
limit. Within this range, the semiotic
gradient
of the
relation
between explicit and
implicit determines the width of oscillation
of the degree of responsibility of the
interpretation from spezrker to listener. It is in this range that insinuation is to be
tound, together
with other forms of "saying
and not saying",
such as hinting,
suggesting, alluding.
3. The nature of insinuation
In a recent
paper
entitied
"lndirections,
manipulation and seduction in discourse".
H. Parret
proposes
a definition of
"insinuating"
in relation to hinting
and suggesting
(Parret
1993).
For Parret. hinting is
"to
overtly display one's intention to let
speaker
B know
that the proposition expressed cclntains information
that will allow B to tlnd an
answer
to the pnlblem he is tzrcing, :rssuming that B has
access
to additional
information"(Parret 1993: 232).'l'hus when
a speaker
A hints, he or she gives
an
indication concerning
the
relevance clf a given piece
of information
for the solution
of a particular prclblem.
Here no intcntion is concealed
or camouflaged, and the
intbrmation gap between
A and B is only
temporary,
for the expectation
is
that B
will succeed in achieving a complete
picture
of what A intended to say. The
ditference between hinting and
suggesting,
Parret claims, is subtle
but important:
Someone
who mzrkes
a hint is unconditionally
bound
to the TRUTH of his/her
Lltterance. whereas
a person
who makes
a suggestion is bound only to the
PROBABLE TRUTH. In the former case there is a good chance
that B may
recognize
the final pnrposition. whereas
in the case
of a suggestion,
what is
suggested stands purely in a relation of probability
to what is said, and it is not
unreasonable to think that the
inference
may
not lead
to the expected
results.
Insinuation, on the other hand,
is in Parret's framework
closely
akin to
rnanipulzrtion. Like manipulation, it cannot
be explicit or declared.
A already
pointed
out by Austin in lecture VIII of How to
Do Tlings with Words, a speaker A

Insinuating 197
cannot
reveal his intentions by adding, for instance,
"l hereby insinuate". On the
contrary.
by insinuating, the speaker's attcmpt to make the interlocutor grasl)
something
is
deliberately
concealed,
or veiled.
The
uct of insitttating
- trccording to the definition proposed
- occurs
wlrcn
A
wonts
B to krtotu p bttt does
rtot wttttt
B to
jttdge
that
A wanted to tell him p.
I a-[ree
with Parret concerning
the nature of insinuation as a form of
manipulation
of the interlocutor, and it is also true that not every form of
manipulation
can be considered as an insinuation.
There erre other types of
manipulation which dift-er
from
insinuation in
that they introduce a cluster of
further
sub-intentions
thnt are not explicitly declared.
Howevcr it seems to me that the
proposed
definition
accounts for only part of the semantics and pragmatics of
insinuating.
As an alternative, ur rather,
perhaps,
as an extension, I will theretbre
sketch a definition
in line
rvith
the theoretical
premises
outlined
above:
"lnsinuation,
in micro or macrotextual
form, is a linguistic opcratlon that aims to
communicate
a propt'rsition by discngaging
it from the opcrator ATT that is presumed to
be associatcd with it in the interlocutor's mind. This aim is pursucd try the insinuator
through introduction of onc or more propositions that act as thc premises of a logical
process
of infcrential reasoning, during which the deduction
of p is left entirely up to the
interlocutor. This is
bccausc the speakcr A knows (and the listencr
knows
that the speaker
knclws or presumes (cf. Austin 1962,
lecture VI )) that the listencr's ATT rcgarding p is
cmotively or cvaluatively negativc:
Consequently, the spcakcr
wants
B to know p but does
not \\'ant thc $'ocation of thc representation ATT(p) to be attributed to himrher, on
account of the social
conscquences
that would ensuc
(for the contcnt
of thc insinuation
could be offcnsive or lacc threatening)."
In other
words,
the
crucial
point about insinuation is
not
the
nature
of p but
rather the
attitude
the speaker assumes the
listener
to associate
with p, either
out
of support tor some social conviction
or else
out
of personal conviction.
T'he entire
communicative mode revolves around
this
circumstance,
and it is no coincidence
that insinuation
is overwhelmingly found with propositional
content having
the value
of doubt,
suspicion, or accusiltion.
against
which
the interlocutor endeavours to
shape a defense with
retorts of the
type
"What
are you trying to insinuate?"
Parret seems
to reject this analvsis when
he savs that it is
wrong
to assume
that the
content of an insinuaticln is always reprehensible and that it is precisely
the
reprehensible
nature of the insinuated
proposition
that causes the impossibility
of
a
performative preflr.
A doctor, Parret claims, can try to insinuate into a patient's
mind that it would be advisable for him,her
to
go
on a diet without this
necessarily
being construable as a reprehensible event.
Personally, I believe that
this
objection
can be
overcome
once it is realized
that in this case.
what
is being insinuated is
not
the
advice
itself,
but on the
contrary
the indirect
charge
of being
too fat. which
is
generally accompanied
by a negative ATT.
Moreover. the success of insinuation is
linked
to the recovery of knorvledge
which,
taken in conjunction
with the speaker's literal proposition,
enables the
listener to deduce the proposition
that the speaker intended to communicate
indirectly.
It is this
knowledge
that leads to p being
identified as a negative ATT,
but it also stands in opposition to a complementary set
which
does
not necessarily
lead to a p with
negative ATT. Thus the
insinuation tails if the
interlocutor activates
the
complementary
set within his own cognitive
environment.
For instance
an

(4)
198 Marcella Banuccelli Papi
utterance such as:
Your wite has been out with Bob quite
often recentlv
functions as an insinuation that the wife in question has betrayed the
husband-listene
r with a certain Bob only
if the husband activates knowledge
of a
certain type
within
his mind. But if, instead, the husband actives
knowledge
relating
to the fact that this Bob is a friend
who
frequently
suffers from crises
of depression,
then
the contextual eff-ect of the utterance will be different.
In this case, the
listener
is
likely
to
interpret
the utterance as a simple allusion (see Bertuccelli Papi
in
print),
for instance
with the meaning that "Therefore
Bob is going
through a bad patch
again".
This will act
retroactively
on the speaker
who
intended to insinuate
adultery,
obliging him/her to introduce
additional material
that points
more compellingly
in
that direction.
An even
finer analysis of insinuation
will also have to keep in mind that 1)
the listener's
ATT towards
the speaker is an important factor in detection
of
insinuation. As Austin conjectured
in lecture VI of How to Do Things
with Words,
there are some
things
that can
act
as insinuations
if said
by some particular person
but
not if said by another person; 2) the
speaker's attitude towards the attitude held
by the listener towards
p is also
a parameter that can help to distinguish
between
dittbrent types
of insinuation.
In this
connection,
it is
well to note that there
are
varying
degrees of nastiness embodied in insinuations. Unpleasant insinuations
are
those
which
involve the speaker's
malicious
pleasure
over
the negative eff'ect
p will
have on the interlocutor,
whereas
insinuations
aiming simply to relieve the
speaker
of the responsibility for this
negative effect are less nasty.
An example of this
second kind can
be found in the first act of.
Waiting
for
Godot.
The insinuation by
Estragon,
which extends
over
several repartees,
aims
to
cast
doubt on
Vladimir's
certainty that
the
place
where
they are
waiting
is the right
place
(face threatening insinuation):
E. Let's
go
V. We cant
E. Why not?
V. We are waiting
for Godot
E. Ah... You're
sure
it was
here'J
V. What'l
E,.
That we
were
to wait
V. He said
by the tree...
Do you
see
any othrs?
E. What is it?
V. I don't knorv
- a willow
E. Where
are the leaves'/
V. It must be dead
E.
No more
wceping
V. Or perhaps
it's not the
season
E,. Looks to me more
like a bush
V. A shrub
E. A bush
V. A - What are you insinuating?
That
we've
come to the wrong
place?

Insinuatinc I99
4.
Jago's
insinuation
An example
of a rather
nastier
type of insinuation is to be found in the great
dialogue between Iago
and Othello, in Act III of Shakespeare's
tragedy.
Iago
has
just
caught sight of Cassius
talking
to
Desdemona, and he
seizes
the
opportunity
to set in motion his grandiose plzin.
"...
while this honest
tool / plies
Desdemona
to repair his tortunes,
/ And she
for him
pleads
strongly
to the Moor",
Iago tells
the
public,
"l'll pour this pestilence
into his
earl
That she repeals hirn for
her body's lust;
/ ...So
rvill I turn her virtuc into pitch.
/ And out of her own
goodness
make
the
net
/ That shall
enmesh
them all.
Iago's rhetoric
and his discourse
tactics
have been analyzed in depth with
great
sensitivity
and keen literarv
awareness by esteemed literary scholars and
linguists
(among the latter, see CoultharrJ
7971;
Widdowson
1982). My analysis
of
the
above cited dialogue will not endeavour to offer aesthetic
judgments
but will
focus
instead on obtaining
information concerning possible modes of introducticln
and accomplishment
of insinuation
within the theclreticzrl perspective sketched
above.
This does not. however, mezrn that the Shakespearian
text can
be treated as
if it were
simply
a frasment
of real conversation.
Even if one admits
that drama
cannot
truly be considered literature. there can be no clispute concerning the
semiotic
conditions imposed by the setting
up and treatment of an expressive
category within the terms of dramatic fiction. Nor can one ignore the
ideological-cultural presuppositions
that fclrm the background and framework of the
use
of rhetoric in
the
Elizabethan drama. and in Shakespearian drama in particular.
For if it is brlrne in mind that fr<lm
the point of view of rhetorical
analysis,
insinuation
makes
use
of
the metalogistic instruments
of suppression,
such as
litotes,
suspension. reticence
to the point of silence, then it cannot be ignored that the
rhetoric
of silence and of the firrms of indirect modes of speech
played a highly
significant
role in the 16th.
and 17th. century. Between 1500
and 1600 the
imperatives
of silence
assumed the value of signs denoting the quality of a
gentleman.
and were the response to a model of social and political behzrviour
governed
by prudence.
In the 17th.
century
this model was embodied by the
Courtesan,
in whose
hands
it became a tactical instrument
for astute calculations
designed to take possession
of others,
dominate
them and exert domination
over
them.
The silence of dissimulation, the smug
silence
of adulation. scornful silence,
and
the many other tbrms
of deceitful
behaviour later
theorized
by Abb6 Dinouart
were
already present ers
essential mechanisms of the Art of the C<lurtesan, an art
founded
on discretion,
circumspection, medietas. Truth was never completely
revealed, but neither
wils
it ever completely concealed.
Within this framework,
Iago's
verbal
technique and ability are a perfect
mirror
of his
era: Iago is tully in control of himself-,
unlike
Othello.
who
more than
once admits
his naivet6
where
rhetorical conduct is
concerned: "Rude am I in my
speech,
/ And little hless'd
with the sotl
phrase
of peace";
"Haply,
for I am black,
/ And
have
not those soft parts of conversation
/ that chamberers
have.....". Iago
thus pursues
his own
ends
in a methodical and
pre-ordained
manner, systematically
isolating all the attitudes characterizing Othello's initial condition and destroying
them
one by clne.

200 Marcella Bemtccelli Papi
This initial condition is
rcpresented by the following coordinates.
Three
textual
themes
are evoked:
l. Othello's
relationship
with
Desdemona
2. Othello's relationship with Cassius
3. Othello's relationship with Iago
Each of these
is
associated with
a complex
of epistemic
attitudes
which themselves
call
forth positive
emotional
values:
1. Othello
believes,
indeed is ferventlv
convinced that 1)
Desdemona loves him and
is faithful to him; 2) Cassius is
honest; 3) Iago is
sincere
and
disinterested.
These relations
are
in turn
the object of epistemic
and evaluative
attitudes on the
part of Iago himself. Iago knows that 1) Desdemona
loves
the Moor; 2) Cassius
loves Desdemona;
3) Othello
has a high regard for Cassius and
trusts Desdemona.
In addition, the audience
knows
- either because they
have
seen it with their own
eyes
or else because Iago has stated as much - that what Othello knows is only
partly true.
In particular,
the
audience
knows that
Iago
is
far
from being sincere and
disinterested.
Now,
presumably
to avenge the wrong
inflicted on him by Othello, who had
rejected him as his lieutenant
in favour of Cassius,
or perhaps
because
Othello
had
slipped into his conjugal
bed - but Bradley rightly
has doubts
about the real
motivation
tor Iago's wickedness
- Iago wants to transform
Othello's initial condition
into its opposite
as
far as relations with Cassius and Desdemona are concerned.
Otherwise
stated, Othello must be
made
to believe that Desdemona does
not love
him and
is
betraying him with
Cassius. But to achieve this
result, it is
necessary that
he should
continue
to believe
that Iago
is
sincere and disinterested.
Iago
pursues
this latter
aim by activating
a "ritual
of honour",
as Emmanuele Tesauro was
to
describe it a few vears
later
in his
Carmocchiale Aistotelico, a ritual bearing all the
external hallmarks of high
regard and
encompassing a wide
range of constitutive
acts, whose
semiotic fezrtures
make up the pattern of "the etiquette
of situation
control".
The primary
objective, on the other hand, is
pursued
through the medium
of insinuation, which procedes
to dismantle Othello's attitudes of certainty by
operating on two main semantic oppositions: Seeming/being
and true/false,
Iago
must make what is true seem to be mere appearance,
and appearances must be
madc to look
as
if they were the truth.
To this
end, Iago
subtly plays on the relation
between
explicit
and
implicit:
He explicitly
casts
doubt on the truth, reducing it to
mere
appearance,
and implicitly asserts a falsehood, clothing it in substance.
The insinuation
proceeds from
what
Othello
knows about Cassius,
and
sets
itself the goal
of underminrng
the logical ecluation
between
what
is known (Kp) and
what is true (p), replacing it - as
the first step
in a semantic weakening
- by the
relativizing
equation between what
is known
and
what
seems to be true. But lago's
cunningness,
and indeed the characteristic propcrty
of insinuation,
consists, as
we
have seen,
in inducing Othello
himself to perform the
operation. This is achieved,
in the
tirst part of the dialogue,
through two
main instruments:
A fictitious question
and
several echo
statements.
Thus the question
trom
which
the operation
starts out, "My
nclble lord....Did
MichaelCassio, when
you woo'd
my
lady,
/ Know of your love?",
is
a
false question,

Insinuating 201
very close to a rhetorical question, and has the function of introducing the first
textual theme, namely the relation between Othello and Cassius
and the set of
attitudes associated
with them. If the intuition is correct,
then this means
that one
of the conditions for a successful question
is not satisfied. In this particular case,
it
is the sincerity condition, which assumes that the answer is not yet known to the
speaker.
Notice that in the lin_euistic
theory of speech acts, the sincerity condition
is the locus
of speaker attitudes.
and Othellcl
perceives that something is about to
happen on this plane. It is for this
reason
that he replies
by enquiring about the real
motivation for the question. Intentionally, Iago responds
to Othello's query with
reticent
behaviour: Thc transformation
has now been set in motion and Othello will
no longer be able to elude the seduction
of the unsaid.
The echo answers
("Honest, my lord? Think, my lord!) can but reinforce
Othello's creeping suspicion that what he knows is threatened by something else
Iago is givin_q
him to understand that he, Iago.is aware of. For the echo utterance
indicates that the speaker is focusing attention not sc'l
much on the content of the
(interlocutor's)
utterance as cln its representation in the interlocutr)r's mind, i.e.
on
p and its categorial complex of associated attitudes. It thus acts as a signal
suggesting
that one of the reasons
whv the speaker is focusing on that utterance is
the
verv fact that it has been produced and expressed
by the interlocutor, and this
in its turn suggests
an att towards the representation itself. The quantity and types
of attitudes that a speaker can evoke through an echo utterance is potentially
limitless
- from approval to reverence,
from surprise to incredulity to irony, and
reveals an equally vast range of discordant evaluations of the content clf the
representation itself - inappropriacy, falseness, absurdity (Sperher
and Wilson 1993)
...
All these
are inevitably projected onto the interlocutor, shattering his/her value
svstem. Iago's echoic cluips
sting
C)thello to the heart because they put their finger
right
on his convictions, i.e. they strikc directly zrt the fact that he, the great general,
believes in what he believes. and at the presuppositions on which these belief.s rest.
This first step is fundamental for the subsequent
unfolding of the dialogue.
fu-ter evoking Othello's att towards Cassius, Iago pro_{ressively
broadens the
semantic
scope of the insinuation. bnnging into sharp focus the entire existential
world of Othello. his credibility, his claim to authority, his intelligence.
Othelkr is
now
left alone to face himself, or rather his own attitudes
(what he thinks, believes,
knows). but with the awareness that there exists anothcr possible world. the
complementary set clf attitr.rdes of opposite polarity which Iago is skrwly instilling
into
his
mind (note the assertion
"l did not think he had
been ucquainted
with her"
and
the restriction "tbr aught I knclw").
As a detensive
move, Othello then appeals
to the second thernatic
relation:
The relationship with lago. "lf thou dost love ffie,
I Show me thy thought", and
indeed
Iago
proclaims his affection
for Othello, but as the object of a super-ordered
epistemic attitude which has
the effect of maintaining
the empathetic orientation of
the
discourse
that is prospectively
directed towards
Othello: "My lord, you KNOW
I love
you". Othello must also shoulder the responsibility
for his own judgement of
Iago - which is exactlv
what Iaqo wanted in order to be able to continue in the
course
of action he has set himself. The equation between knowing and being is
presented
to Othello arraved in all its enigmatic
dimension. The next step is fully
in line with this progression:
A semantic shitl from being to seeming takes place.
whereby
Iago
vigonrusly
asserts
that Cassius is honest
"For Michael Cassio,
/ I dare

202 Marcella Bartuccelti Papi
be
sworn
I think
that
he
is
honest." But this is
a courtesan's tribute which contlrms
to Othello that knowing and
being coincide
as
regards Iago. The road is
now open
for the latter to launch a new and
definitive attack on Othello's atts towards
Cassius:
"Men should
be what they seem:
I Or those that be not,
would they
might seem
none!".
"Certain,
men should
be what they
seem." replies Othello,
expressing an
agreement
that
reverently mirrors Iago's thought. From the latter
there
now
comes
a reiterated declaration
of confidence in Cassius' honesty,
though
fractionally
weakened semantiutlly as a result of the
predicate
clf propositional attitude: Thus
where
one might expect an oath to swear his belief, one merely finds
"Why
then,
I
think
Cassio's an honest man".
Othello,
now
engulfed
in the coils
of the
poisonous
insinuation, cannot tail
to perceive the treacherous thrust of lago's allusive
jibe. Faced with a renewed
demand for explanation,
Iago resorts to a crafty strategy of exploiting the
presupposition to make an implicit admission that he does have secret thoughts. By
dint of
this ruse,
he shrinks
even
further away trom his communicative responsibility.
He
then takes shelter
behind a
parenthetical
litosis
which
aims
to
reintbrce Othello's
att
towards
himself, by stating
that
he,
Iago,
does not
wish
to confess these thoughts
because
they
could
be the fruit of deceit.
With two rhetorical questions, he then
outlines to Othello
what the
negative effects deriving from the revelation might be.
The culminating point
of this sequence
has now been reached, and
we are now at
the climax: Significantly,
we
are at the heart
of
the dialogue, and, iconically, we
feel
that
we are in Othello's heart. Slowly, cautiously, through gnomic sentences
and
generic comments, the third
theme is
brought
in , the most delicate and
dangerous
one for Iago: The theme of the relation between Othello and Desdemona. Iago
lays
siege to this last
stronghold of Othello's heart
with an admclnishment
"O! beware,
my lord,
of
jealousy;
I It is the
green-ey'd
monster
which
doth mock
/ The meat it
feeds on;", and brings up such subjects as
doubts, suspicions...Defeated, Othello
bursts out into a howl of anxiety,
but then
he
immediately
takes control
of himself
again and,
with a burst of pride,
sets about defending himself with all the
force
of
his rationality:
"Why,
why
is this'/
/ Think'st thou
I'd make
a life
of jealousy,
/ To
tollow
still the changes
of the
moon
/ With
fresh suspicions? ........ No, Iago;
/ I'll see
befclre I doubt: when
I doubt, prove;
/ And, on
the proot,
there is no more but this,
I Away at once with love or jeakrusy!"."
But lagcl seizes
hold of tune other
than lis OTHELLO'S ratiotnlily to bring
his plan to completion and destroy that certainty
as
well.
He launches forth again
with
a negation that
is
paraleipsis.
"l speak
not
yet of proof',
only to contradict this
statement
by proceeding to give a demonstration that
piles up its evidence in the
wake
of an ominous
warning:
"Look to your wife;
observe her well with Cassio".
This artitlce explicitly focuses
on the underlying
theme
of insinuation, and implicitly
introduces the actual proposition
that lago intends to insinuate. And indeed it is
none
other than
Desdemona
who
becomes the central
point
concerning
and against
whom
lago
sharpens
his
weapons,
until he shapes
for
Othello's
mind the loathsome
syllogism:
"She
that .... ccluld give
out such a seeming
/ To seel
her father's
eyes
up
close as
oak..."
Suspension.
Othello is distraught,
yet he will not give up, and he
verbally
repeats
his own conviction that
Desdemona is honest. Iago's exclamation
has a sardonic
ring to it: "Long
live
she so! and long
live you to think so!"
But
Othello unforgivably
falters at one crucial point,
"And,
yet,
how nature erring
from
itself - "and Iagcl cannot foreso the final stab:
"Much will be seen in that"...."

Insinuating 203
Through the very tbrce of the logical argument itself, the possible becomes
necessary!
and appearance bcomes realitv.
5. Conclusion
Insinuation plays havoc with Othello's values, destroying,
one after another, the
alethic,
epistemic, deontic and emotive values of the operator which, in my
hypothesis, initially characterizes
Othello's thought.
However, since
the propositional
contents
thus laid bare cannot remain shorn of values,
the latter will be substituted
by different
ones - those
intended by Iago, who has seduced
Othello's intellect and
drawn him ontcl his side . Othello thus now stands before him as a desubjectivized
subject,for
whom nothing is left but to acknclwledge
his bewilderment: "l think my
wife be honest and think she is not; / I think that thou art just and think thou art
not.
/ I'll have some proof..."
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