Content uploaded by Elizabeth Cashdan
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Elizabeth Cashdan on Oct 15, 2014
Content may be subject to copyright.
760 Fcurrent anthropology
tation: An anthropology perspective. Edited by L. Cronk, N.
Chagnon, and W. Irons, pp. 65–86. New York: Elsevier.
eder, j. f. 1987.On the road to tribal extinction. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
ember, c. 1978. Myths about hunter-gatherers. Ethnology 17:
439–48.
hawkes, k., j. f. o’connell, and n. g. blurton
jones. 1991. Hunting income patterns among the Hadza: Big
game, common goods, foraging goals, and the evolution of the
human diet. Philosophical Transcripts of the Royal Society of
London 334:243–51.
———. 2001. Hadza meat sharing. Evolution and Human Behav-
ior 22:113–42.
hawkes, k., n. g. blurton jones, h. alvarez,
and e. l. charnov. 1998. Grandmothering, menopause,
and the evolution of human life histories. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A. 95:1336–39.
hewlett, b. s. 1991. Demography and childcare in preindus-
trial societies. Journal of Anthropological Research 47:1–37.
hiatt, b. 1974. “Woman the gatherer,” in Woman’s role in
aboriginal society. Edited by F. Gale, pp. 4–15. Canberra: Aus-
tralian Institute of Aboriginal Studies.
hill, k., c. boesch, j. goodall, a. pusey, j. wil-
liams, and r. wrangham. 2001. Mortality rates among
wild chimpanzees. Journal of Human Evolution 40:437–50.
hill, k., and a. m. hurtado. 1996.Ache life history:
The ecology and demography of a foraging people. New York:
Aldine.
hurtado, a. m., k. hill, h. kaplan, and i. hur-
tado. 1992. Trade-offs between female food acquisition and
child care among Hiwi and Ache foragers. Human Nature 3:
185–216.
kaplan, h., and k. hill. 1985. Food sharing among Ache
foragers: Tests of explanatory hypotheses. current anthro-
pology 26:223–46.
kaplan, h., k. hill, j. lancaster, and a. m. hur-
tado. 2000. A theory of human life history evolution: Diet,
intelligence, and longevity. Evolutionary Anthropology 9:
156–85.
kelly, r. l. 1995.The foraging spectrum: Diversity in hunter-
gatherer lifeways. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution
Press.
lack, d. 1968.Ecological adaptations for breeding birds. Lon-
don: Methuen.
lancaster, j. b., and c. s. lancaster. 1983. “Paren-
tal investment: The hominid adaptation,” in How humans
adapt. Edited by D. Ortner, pp. 33–58. Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution Press.
lee, r. b. 1968. “What hunters do for a living, or How to
make out on scarce resources,” in Man the hunter. Edited by
R. B. Lee and I. DeVore, pp. 30–48. Chicago: Aldine.
lovejoy, o. 1981. The origin of man. Science 211:341–50.
marlowe, f. 2000a. Paternal investment and the human mat-
ing system. Behavioural Processes51:45–61.
———. 2000b. The patriarch hypothesis: An alternative explana-
tion of menopause. Human Nature 11:27–42.
———. n.d. Why get married? Foraging, mating, and parenting
among Hadza hunter-gatherers. MS.
pennington, r. 1996. Causes of early human population
growth. American Journal of Physical Anthropology 99:259–74.
sellen, d. and r. mace. 1997. Fertility and mode of sub-
sistence: A phylogenetic analysis. current anthropology 38:
878–89.
———. 1999. A phylogenetic analysis of the relationship between
sub-adult mortality and mode of subsistence. Journal of Bioso-
cial Science 31:1–16.
smith, c. s., and s. d. fretwell. 1974. The optimal
balance between size and number of offspring. American Natu-
ralist 108:499–506.
van den berghe, p. 1979.Human family systems. Prospect
Heights: Waveland.
westermarck, e. 1929.Marriage. New York: Jonathan Cape
and Harrison Smith.
Ethnocentrism and Xenophobia:
A Cross-Cultural Study
1
elizabeth cashdan
King’s College Research Centre Human Diversity
Project, King’s College, Cambridge CB
21
ST, U.K. and
Department of Anthropology, University of Utah,
270
S
1400
ERm
102
, Salt Lake City, Utah
84112-0060
,
U.S.A. (elizabeth.cashdan@anthro.utah.edu).25 iv 01
People readily though not inevitably develop strong loy-
alties to their own ethnic group and discriminate against
outsiders. In this report I use cross-cultural data to (1)
determine the factors that strengthen and weaken these
tendencies and (1) ascertain whether they have the same
determinants. It is often supposed that ethnocentrism
and xenophobia are opposite sides of the same coin, but
a few voices have cautioned that this need not be the
case.
Van den Berghe (1999) points out that it would be mal-
adaptive for xenophobia to be an inevitable result of eth-
nocentrism. Ethnic affiliation, he reminds us, usually
involves some claim of common ancestry (real or fictive),
and a propensity to favor fellow ethnics is no doubt en-
hanced by this feeling of kinship. But reciprocal rela-
tionships with members of other groups can frequently
be adaptive also, and it would be foolish to assume an
attitude of hostility. The threshold for cooperation may
be higher and the insistence on reciprocity may be
greater, but a smart opportunist keeps his options open.
Recent experimental work in psychology also suggests
that in-group favoritism is not a necessary concomitant
of out-group hostility (Rabbie 1982,1992; Ray and Love-
joy 1986; Struch and Schwartz 1989). While both can be
enhanced by competition and external threats (see Sherif
1961 for the classic field experiment), in-group favorit-
ism should be expected only if affiliation with the in-
group can successfully counter the competitive threat
(Rabbie et al 1974). If a group is unable to be successful,
hostility to outsiders may be mirrored by ethnic break-
down and further hostility and competition within the
group. Finally, threats can arise from environmental ca-
tastrophes as well as from outsiders, and we might expect
that such disasters would foster enhanced group loyalty
without any concomitant hostility to outsiders.
The cross-cultural data analyzed here provide no sup-
port for the proposition that out-group hostility is a nec-
䉷2001 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Re-
search. All rights reserved 0011-3204/2001/4205-0005 $1.00
1. This research was undertaken as part of the King’s College Hu-
man Diversity Project. I am particularly indebted to Robert Foley
and the King’s College Research Centre of Cambridge University
for financial support and a stimulating intellectual environment. I
also thank Napoleon Chagnon, Carol Ember, Patrick Gray, Hartmut
Lang, Alan Rogers, Pierre van den Berghe, and Polly Wiessner for
helpful advice.
Volume
42
, Number
5
, December
2001
F761
table 1
Intraethnic Loyalty and Interethnic Warfare
Loyalty (Ross) Loyalty (Lang)
Measure r
s
pnr
s
pn
All societies
External warfare (R) .21 .07 74 .30 .04 45
External warfare (E) .44 .0006 59 .28 .02 63
External warfare (L) .13 n.s. 35 .11 n.s. 61
Interethnic violence
(L)
.44 .003 43 .24 .05 72
Unpacified societies
only
External warfare (R) .45 .001 47 .45 .01 30
External warfare (E) .60 !.0001 37 .32 .04 42
External warfare (L) .33 n.s. 21 .35 .02 41
Interethnic violence
(L)
.63 .0002 30 .37 .008 50
note: See text and appendix for variable definitions.
sources: R, Ross (1983); E, Ember and Ember (1992b); L, Lang
(1995).
essary concomitant of in-group loyalty. The threat to the
group that arises from catastrophic food shortage en-
hances ethnic loyalty without increasing hostility to out-
side groups, and even when the threat arises from other
groups (external warfare), the associated ethnocentrism
and xenophobia seem to have different causes. Overall,
ethnocentrism and xenophobia were uncorrelated in this
dataset, with the latter being most strongly associated
with the overall level of violence within as well as be-
tween ethnic groups.
methods
The study uses published codes and data collected for
the standard cross-cultural sample of 186 societies (Mur-
dock and White 1969). The sample was selected to max-
imize geographic and linguistic independence. The phy-
logenetic methods advocated by Mace and Pagel (1994)
to ensure independence were not used here both for the-
oretical reasons suggested elsewhere (Rogers and Cash-
dan 1997) and because the intensity of intraethnic loyalty
and the intensity of interethnic hostility are highly labile
traits and therefore unlikely to be affected by distant
historical connections between societies. Each society
in the sample is pinpointed to a specific place and time;
for most societies, that time is the early to middle 20th
century.
Ross (1983) and Lang (1995) have independently used
somewhat different subsets of the standard sample to
code both ethnic loyalty and out-group hostility. Ross
defines the former as “in-group loyalty, or we feeling,
directed towards the wide society” (i.e., in contrast to
the local community, which he coded separately). Lang’s
definition refers specifically to “loyalty within the eth-
nic group,” loyalty being defined as “consciousness of
belonging together.” Both measures of out-group hostil-
ity refer to attitudes rather than behaviors: Ross’s mea-
sure “seeks to evaluate the feelings towards other soci-
eties” and Lang’s definition specifies “negative attitudes
and emotions, contempt, mistrust.” As with the loyalty
measures, Ross specifies hostility to “other societies”
while Lang specifies hostility to “other ethnic groups.”
I have sometimes reversed the order of Ross’s ratings in
order to make them consistent with those of Lang and
the other researchers cited. In all cases reported here,
larger numbers indicate more of a variable (greater loy-
alty, more frequent warfare, more severe famine, etc.).
The measures of Ross and Lang are significantly, al-
though not strongly, correlated with each other.
Two types of threat are considered here: famine, coded
independently by Ember and Ember (1992b) and Dirks
(1993), and external warfare, coded independently by Em-
ber and Ember (1992b), Ross (1983), and Lang (1995). As
with the loyalty and hostility variables, consistent re-
sults from independently derived data allow greater con-
fidence in the conclusions. These and other variables
used in the analysis are fully defined in the appendix.
All data are available not only in the cited sources but
in the electronic journal World Cultures.
Nonparametric statistics (Spearman’s correlation co-
efficients) are used throughout because the data are or-
dinal, with most variables taking only four values. Al-
though I have predicted the direction of effects, all
significance tests reported below are two-tailed.
intraethnic loyalty
Threats and competition from outside groups are often
cited as an important force in fostering ethnic loyalty
(Levine and Campbell 1972, Roosens 1989, van der Den-
nen 1987, Durham 1994). In order to explore this prop-
osition cross-culturally, I correlated frequency of exter-
nal warfare, as measured by Ross (1983), Lang (1995), and
Ember and Ember (1992b), with ethnic loyalty as mea-
sured by Ross (1983) and Lang (1995). As table 1shows,
this proposition receives support from the codings of
Ross and Ember and Ember. The absence of patterning
with Lang’s external-warfare variable probably derives
from differences in the way this variable was coded.
Lang’s definition of external warfare differs in applying
only to societies in which formal political offices are
present. His measure of interethnic violence (“frequency
of interethnic violence/attacking”) is applicable to all
societies and shows patterning similar in strength and
direction to the external-warfare variables of Ross and
Ember and Ember. The absence of association with
Lang’s measure of warfare suggests that external warfare
promotes ethnic loyalty more strongly in egalitarian
societies.
Ember and Ember, noting that some societies lack war-
fare only because they have been pacified, omitted such
societies from their sample when they analyzed the de-
terminants of warfare, since pacified societies might still
have conditions that predisposed to it (1992a,b). I used
their measure of pacification for an analogous reason and
found that the relationship between external warfare and
ethnic loyalty was much stronger when only unpacified
762 Fcurrent anthropology
table 2
Intraethnic Loyalty and Risk of Famine
Loyalty (Ross) Loyalty (Lang)
Measure r
s
pnr
s
pn
Routine food shortage
Chronic resource problems (E) .07 n.s. 54 .05 n.s. 55
Ordinary nutrition (D) ⫺.13 n.s. 52 .11 n.s. 53
Short-term starvation (D) .07 n.s. 74 .08 n.s. 80
Seasonal starvation (D) ⫺.02 n.s. 73 .03 n.s. 80
Catastrophic food shortage
Threat of famine (E) .39 .008 44 .23 .11 48
Severity of famine (D) .19 n.s. 51 .17 n.s. 54
Persistence of famine (D) .37 .009 49 .28 .04 56
Recurrence of famine (D) .30 .02 59 .17 n.s. 67
Catastrophic food shortage, unpacified
societies only
Threat of famine (E) .58 .0009 29 .42 .02 32
Severity of famine (D) .41 .02 33 .24 n.s. 36
Persistence of famine (D) .63 .0002 30 .39 .02 38
Recurrence of famine (D) .42 .007 39 .19 n.s. 46
note: See appendix for variable definitions.
sources: E, Ember and Ember (1992b); D, Dirks (1993).
societies were considered. Pacification need not mean
the end of interethnic competition—indeed, colonialism
has often exacerbated it (Gulliver 1969, Arens 1978,
Roosens 1989)—hence we might expect that absence of
warfare due to pacification would typically not remove
the competitive pressures that lead to strengthened eth-
nic loyalty. In order words, warfare in pacified societies
was suppressed but the competition that fostered ethnic
loyalty typically was not. If this argument is correct,
including pacified societies would weaken the correla-
tion between frequency of warfare and ethnic loyalty, as
it does here (see table 1).
Threats to the group need not come from outsiders. In
order to see whether environmentally induced hardships
also promote group loyalty, I correlated loyalty with var-
ious measures of food stress and famine. As table 2
shows, routine food shortage (mild, chronic, or seasonal)
has no effect on ethnic loyalty whereas real famine (se-
vere and socially disruptive food shortage) has a mod-
erate but statically significant positive effect. The strong-
est correlations are with threat of famine as measured
by Ember and Ember and persistence of famine as mea-
sured by Dirks. Threat of famine measures the likelihood
of its occurrence and is chiefly a measure of frequency.
Persistence of famine assesses specifically how often liv-
ing members of the society have experienced famine (see
appendix for complete definitions). Famine, by Dirks’s
definition, is never routine, but a society that has some
experience of it in its cultural memory might be more
likely to respond in productive, culturally mediated
ways. A society facing famine with no history to guide
it might be more susceptible to societal chaos and the
breakdown of mutual support.
Table 2also shows that the correlation between fam-
ine and ethnic loyalty is stronger when the sample is
limited to unpacified societies. This result was unantic-
ipated, but the explanation may lie in the greater infra-
structure and organizational complexity of the “pacify-
ing” society, together with the economic dependency
such a situation often imposes. Any society able to pacify
another is likely to be better able to buffer food shortages
through storage and trade, so perhaps people in pacified
societies respond to famine by relying on the dominant
society rather than by bonding together to help
themselves.
I explored some likely antecedents of warfare and fam-
ine to see whether these variables were also correlated
with ethnic loyalty but found no relationships. Variables
I considered included measures of density pressure (pop-
ulation density, land availability, agricultural intensifi-
cation), Ember’s measure of natural disasters (a correlate
of warfare), and various climatological measures of
harshness and unpredictability (a possible cause of fam-
ine). Variable and unpredictable climates have a strong
effect on the spatial extent of ethnic groups (Cashdan
1991), but I found no consistent climatic associations
with ethnic loyalty or interethnic hostility.
interethnic hostility
If interethnic hostility is the flip side of intraethnic loy-
alty, the two should be strongly correlated and have the
same determinants. Neither is the case.
Both external warfare and famine are associated with
ethnic loyalty. It is reasonable to expect external warfare
to be associated with interethnic hostility, and table 3
shows that this is indeed the case. But interethnic hos-
tility is also associated with internal warfare (warfare
between communities of the same society or ethnic
group); the associations are in the same positive direction
Volume
42
, Number
5
, December
2001
F763
table 4
Intraethnic Loyalty and Interethnic Hostility
Correlates r
s
pn
Loyalty (Lang) #loy-
alty (Ross)
.54 .0001 44
Hostility (Lang) #
hostility (Ross)
.37 .03 36
Loyalty #hostility
(Lang)
⫺.06 n.s. 64
Loyalty #hostility
(Ross)
⫺.01 n.s. 69
Loyalty (Lang) #hos-
tility (Ross)
.08 n.s. 41
Loyalty (Ross) #hos-
tility (Lang)
⫺.25 n.s. 39
table 3
Hostility to Other Societies, Violence, and Warfare
Hostility (Ross) Hostility (Lang)
Measure r
s
pnr
s
pn
Interethnic fighting
External warfare (R) .72 !.0001 68 .34 .03 42
External warfare (E) .32 .02 53 .17 n.s. 56
External warfare (L) .34 .07 30 .37 .008 52
Interethnic violence (L) .34 .03 39 .19 n.s. 64
Intraethnic fighting
Internal warfare (R) .47 !.0001 69 .12 n.s. 43
Internal warfare (E) .48 .0005 49 .29 .04 50
Intraethnic violence (L) .40 .007 45 .21 .09 68
Intercommunity con-
flict (R)
.37 .002 69 .07 n.s. 40
Local conflict (R) .22 .06 69 .24 n.s. 40
note: See appendix for variable definitions.
source: R, Ross (1983); L, Lang ( 1995); E, Ember and Ember
(1992b).
and of similar magnitude. The same is true of Lang’s
measures of intra- and interethnic violence (see table 3),
and Ross’s measures of local and intercommunity con-
flict show trends in the same direction. Taken together,
these data suggest that hostility to outsiders is not sim-
ply a direct response to external threat but is likely to
reflect the prevailing level of violence in the region.
Levine and Campbell (1972:213–14) note that while
most theories of ethnicity predict an inverse relationship
between in-group loyalty and out-group hostility (albeit
for different reasons), other theories predict a continuity
in the violence experienced at different levels of group-
ing. These data suggest there is a continuity of violence
at local (intraethnic) and regional (interethnic) levels
rather than the discontinuity that would result if in-
group loyalty were reflected in out-group hostility.
Famine, the other threat considered here, is correlated
with ethnic loyalty but not with interethnic hostility.
The lack of correlation may reflect the complexity of
these relationships, as illustrated by Levine and Camp-
bell’s account of catastrophic food shortages in Kenya.
They argue that while destruction of cattle by rinderpest
exacerbated out-group hostility, famines due to grain
crop failures in the same area “were traditionally times
of formal peacemaking, increased trade, sharing across
ethnic group lines, and the peaceable transfer of children
and women from the group with most famine to others
more fortunate, in exchange for grain” (Levine and
Campbell 1972:36).
Rabbie (1982,1992) has shown experimentally that in-
tragroup cooperation can foster an in-group bias without
necessarily increasing the level of hostility between
groups. This finding is supported in this dataset by the
relationship between crosscutting ties within a society
(data from Ross) and ethnic loyalty as measured by Ross
(r
s
p.62,p!.0001,np77) and Lang (r
s
p.40,pp.005,
np47) and the absence of any such correlation with
hostility. Extensive crosscutting ties (presumably related
to the level of intragroup cooperation) foster ethnic loy-
alty but are unrelated to interethnic hostility.
Since ethnic loyalty and interethnic hostility appear
to have different determinants, we might expect them
not to be strongly correlated. This is indeed the case. We
see in table 4both the correlation between Ross’s and
Lang’s measures of the same variables and the absence
of any relationships between ethnic loyalty and hostility
to outsiders in either dataset.
The absence of correlation between ethnic loyalty and
hostility to outsiders is encouraging for the prospects of
a peaceful multiethnic state and suggests that the flow-
ering of ethnicity is not necessarily something to fear.
Most of the societies in this sample, however, were de-
scribed in the early to middle 20th century. As ethnic
groups become increasingly class-based elements in
complex societies, the frustration of being have-nots in
a wealthy society is always a potential source of violence
and hostility. What this study shows is that interethnic
hostility is not an integral part of strong ethnic identity
and that its source must be sought elsewhere.
appendix: variable definitions and notes
From Dirks (1993):
Famine: “an episode of starvation that is attended by
sharply increased mortality rates and marked disruptions
in community life. Its duration exceeds short-term star-
vation. Unlike seasonal starvation it does not occur an-
nually. Unlike short-term and seasonal starvation, fam-
ine lacks a routine character. It disrupts society from the
start and it can progress to the point of massive insti-
tutional collapses” (p. 30). (This distinction parallels the
distinction in table 1between “routine food shortage”
and “catastrophic food shortage.”)
Endemic starvation: “a condition of chronic under-
nutrition, unrelated to daily contingencies, season, or the
fortunes that affect food availability in any particular
year” (p. 30). “Endemic starvation exists when there is
evidence that some members of society suffer caloric
insufficiency under normal conditions.”
Short-term starvation: “an episode of starvation that
has a duration of a few days or weeks....[These episodes
764 Fcurrent anthropology
are] typically recurrent and familiar. As a result, out-
breaks do not excite alarm [and one] usually does not
result in death” (p. 30).
Seasonal starvation: “occurs at regular times every
year. It may last from several weeks to as long as three
or four months. [Increased morbidity and mortality] are
not detected readily, and, until recently, not often re-
ported. Like short-term starvation, seasonal starvation
is a familiar event. Consequently communities that ex-
perience it have a repertoire of customary adjustments
by means of which they avoid social disruption” (p. 30).
Severity of famine: “the extent to which a community
or some segment of it progresses toward complete in-
stitutional breakdown” (p. 31).
Persistence of famine: “the frequency of its occurrence
over a relatively short period of time [50 years]—how
often a living set of generations has had direct experience
with famine” (p. 31).
Recurrence of famine: “its repetition over long periods
of time. . . . at least one famine in each of the two im-
mediately preceding centuries” (p. 31).
From Ember and Ember (1992b):
Famine: “a time of starvation when either many hu-
man deaths occur or it is reported that a substantial seg-
ment of the society has to move because of a lack of food
. . . [or] the ethnographer uses the word famine” (p. 180).
The measure “picks up only extremely serious resource
problems” (p. 180) and does not include chronic hunger.
It is chiefly a measure of famine frequency.
Chronic resource problems: distinguished from “un-
predictable resource problems” (p. 181).
Warfare: “socially organized armed combat between
members of different territorial units (communities or
aggregates of communities)” (p. 172).
Internal warfare: “socially organized armed combat be-
tween territorial units (communities or larger aggregates)
within the same society. By ‘society’ we mean a more
or less continuously distributed population that speaks
a common language” (p. 173).
External warfare: “war between the focal society and
other societies” (p. 173).
Pacification: “the elimination of war by an external
power before the twenty-five-year time period” (p. 175).
(I considered societies coded 1or 2“unpacified.”)
From Lang (1995):
Ethnic group: “group of persons perceiving themselves
as unit and set themselves apart from other such units.
The unity is based on real or supposed common origin,
common fate, common language or relation, adherence
to common norms and values” (p. 50).
Loyalty: “consciousness of belonging together . . . the
variable measures the degree of loyalty within the ethnic
group as a whole. If for instance there are strong feelings
of loyalty among a small part of the ethnic group and no
loyalty within the group as a whole the code 1[plow]
applies” (p. 50).
Hostility: “negative attitudes and emotions, contempt,
mistrust” (p. 51). (Code incorporates both degree of hos-
tility and its targets; I lumped values for the different
types of targets so that the scale measured only degree
of hostility.)
External warfare: “warfare where at least one party
involved is a maximal unit of political authority” (p. 36).
(I deleted cases coded 0, “no formal political office pre-
sent,” since this does not discriminate the amount of
fighting in such societies.)
Interethnic violence: “frequency of interethnic vio-
lence/attacking” (p. 54). (I deleted the few societies with
no interethnic contact.)
Intraethnic violence: “intensity of intraethnic vio-
lence” (p. 54).
(Internal warfare was not rated for societies with “no
political office above the level of the local community,”
more than half of the codable societies. I did not use
these variables for this reason and because of their lack
of comparability with the internal-warfare measures of
Ross and Ember.)
From Ross (1983):
Loyalty to the wider society: “in-group loyalty, or we
feeling, directed towards the wider society” (distin-
guished from loyalty to the local community, which
Ross coded separately) (p. 180).
Hostility toward other societies: “bitter feelings” to-
ward “outsiders” (p. 180).
Internal warfare: warfare “between communities of
same society” (p. 179).
External warfare: “with other societies” (p. 179).
Local conflict: political conflict and social conflict
more generally at the local community level (p. 177).
Intercommunity conflict: conflict between commu-
nities of the same society (p. 178).
Crosscutting ties: “politically relevant” links between
individuals living in different communities of the same
society (p. 181).
References Cited
arens, w. 1978. “Changing patterns of ethnic identity and
prestige in East Africa,” Perspectives on ethnicity. Edited by R.
E. Holloman and S. A. Arutiunov, pp. 211–20. The Hague:
Mouton.
cashdan, e. 1991. Ethnic diversity and its environmental de-
terminants: Effects of climate, pathogens, and habitat diversity.
American Anthropologist 103(4).
dirks, r. 1993. Starvation and famine: Cross-cultural codes
and some hypothesis tests. Cross-Cultural Research 27:28–69.
durham, w. 1994. “Conflict, migration, and ethnicity: A
summary,” in The anthropology of ethnicity: Beyond “Ethnic
Groups and Boundaries”. Edited by H. Vermeulen and C. Gov-
ers, pp. 138–45. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
ember, c. r., and m. ember. 1992a. Resource unpredict-
ability, mistrust, and war: A cross-cultural study. Journal of
Conflict Resolution 36:242–62.
———. 1992b. Warfare, aggression, and resource problems: Cross-
cultural codes. Behavior Science Research 26:169–86.
gulliver, p. h. 1969. “Introduction,” in Tradition and tran-
sition in East Africa: Studies of the tribal element in the mod-
ern era. Edited by P. H. Gulliver, pp. 5–38. Berkeley: University
of California Press.
lang, h. 1995. Conan: An electronic code-text data-base for
cross-cultural studies. World Cultures 9(2):13–56.
levine, r. a., and d. t. campbell. 1972.Ethnocen-
Volume
42
, Number
5
, December
2001
F765
trism: Theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes, and group behav-
ior. New York: John Wiley.
mace, r., and m. pagel. 1994. The comparative method
in anthropology. current anthropology 35:549–57.
murdock, g. p., and d. r. white. 1969. Standard cross-
cultural sample. Ethnology 8:329–60.
rabbie, j. m. 1982. “The effects of intergroup competition on
intragroup and intergroup relationships,” in Cooperation and
helping behavior: Theories and research. Edited by V. J. Der-
lega and J. Grzelak, pp. 123–49. New York: Academic Press.
———. 1992. “The effects of intragroup cooperation and inter-
group competition on in-group cohesion and out-group hostil-
ity,” in Coalitions and alliances in humans and other ani-
mals. Edited by A. H. Harcourt and F. B. M. de Waal, pp.
175–205. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
rabbie, j. m., f. benoist, h. oosterbaan, and l.
visser. 1974. Differential power and effects of expected com-
petitive and cooperative intergroup interaction on intragroup
and outgroup attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology 30:46–56.
ray, j. j., and f. h. lovejoy. 1986. The generality of ra-
cial prejudice. Journal of Social Psychology 126:563–64.
rogers, a. r., and e. cashdan. 1997. The phylogenetic
approach to comparing human populations. Evolution and Hu-
man Behavior 18:353–58.
roosens, e. e. 1989.Creating ethnicity: The process of eth-
nogenesis. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage.
ross, m. 1983. Political decision making and conflict: Addi-
tional cross-cultural codes and scales. Ethnology 22:169–92.
sherif, m. 1961.Intergroup conflict and cooperation: The
Robbers Cave experiment. Norman: University Book
Exchange.
struch, n., and s. h. schwartz. 1989. Intergroup ag-
gression: Its predictors and distinctness from in-group bias.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 56:364–73.
van den berghe, p. l. 1999. “Racism, ethnocentrism, and
xenophobia: In our genes or in our memes?” in In-group/out-
group behaviour in modern societies: An evolutionary perspec-
tive. Edited by K. Thienpont and R. Cliquet. Brussels: NIDI
CBGS Publications.
van der dennen, j. m. g. 1987. “Ethnocentrism and in-
group/out-group differentiation: A review of the literature,” in
The sociobiology of ethnocentrism: Evolutionary dimensions
of xenophobia, discrimination, racism, and nationalism. Ed-
ited by V. Reynolds, V. Falger, and I. Vine, pp. 1–47. Athens:
University of Georgia Press.
