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All hands on deck : An interactive perspective on complex common-pool resource management based on case studies in the coastal waters of the Isle of Wight (UK), Connemara (Ireland) and the Dutch Wadden Sea
Abstract
In 1996, the new fish cages of an Irish salmon farm were sabotaged and juvenile salmon with a value of IR£ 250,000 were released, nearly putting the farm out of business. This deed was an act of protest against the growth of the salmon farming industry. The loss of fishing grounds, ecological and environmental concerns, and the perceived impact on the unspoilt scenery of the area are amongst the factors that explain local opposition against salmon farming.In 1991, Dutch mussel cultivators in the Wadden Sea and the government agreed on a division of available mussel seed between fishermen and birds. A year later, the mussel cultivators voluntarily closed part of the tidal mudflats for the seed fishery. These actions were a response to the heavy criticisms by environmental groups, who blamed the shellfish fishermen for causing the death of thousands of birds by 'robbing' them of their main diet.The above examples are illustrative of the problems associated with the management of complex, multiple-use common-pool resources. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are resources for which: (i) joint use involves subtractability (use by one user will subtract benefits from another user's enjoyment of the resource system), and (ii) exclusion of users involves high transaction costs. For a long time, policies aimed at sustainable CPR management were fuelled by the belief that rational individuals, who are driven by utility maximisation, cannot maintain a common resource (the Tragedy of the Commons). The implementation of a multitude of management regimes to regulate CPR use has, however, not prevented externalities, such as resource degradation and conflicts, from occurring. This is particularly the case in complex, multiple-use CPRs, where different activities take place in the same resource system and where uses may be competing or incompatible (Chapter One). The coastal waters, which are the setting of this study, are an example of a complex CPR.The complexity and interconnectedness of coastal management problems, combined with the incapacity of existing institutions for monitoring and protection to deal with the continuous decline of the coastal zone, has resulted in local, national and global collective action initiatives, which consider management issues from a broader perspective and where stakeholders work collectively towards problem solution. Increasingly, a collective action approach is seen as an alternative in dealing with complex problems (Chapter One). This book aims to contribute towards an understanding of the processes that shape collective actions amongst multiple stakeholders in complex CPRs.The theoretical argument of this study is that CPR theory - a body of knowledge that deals with the analysis of collective action and the associated social dilemmas, in 'real life' scenarios - is not sufficiently developed for the study and facilitation of collective action in complex CPR management. This argument is elaborated in Chapter One. On the basis of an examination of CPR theory and its roots, rational choice theory and the new institutionalism, it is argued that the application of the conceptual frameworks of CPR theory to the study of complex resources is problematic, since they are based on: (i) the simplistic assumption that CPRs are used for one single type of use, (ii) the exclusive analysis of the internal dynamics of the collective management system, thereby 'black boxing' the influence of external factors, (iii) a static model of strategic rationality, and (iv) the assumption that the outcomes of collective resource management are determined by a number of pre-defined design principles. Building on a grounded theory approach, this book proposes a new perspective for the study and facilitation of collective action processes in complex CPR management scenarios.The empirical basis is laid by three case studies in the English, Irish and Dutch coastal waters. In each study area, fishermen were confronted with the arrival of new activities and/or the articulation of other interests in or near their fishing grounds. The cases focus on the interactions amongst fishermen (or their representatives), other marine users and non-governmental and state agencies, and the way (collective) management of resources, spaces and people take shape.Chapter Three develops a conceptual framework that assists the analysis of the collective action processes in the empirical studies. This conceptual framework is based on a critical examination of CPR theory and its problems in Chapter One, and supported by a case study of complex CPR management in Cowes Harbour (UK) in Chapter Two. It builds on theoretical notions from Habermas' theory of communicative action, actor-network theory (ANT) and the knowledge systems perspective. It has several methodological consequences for this study. First, the notion of the rational actor is replaced by that of the collectif (Callon & Law, 1995): an actor is considered to be the effect of interactions of human and material resources. The objectives, strategies and rationalities of collectifs are continuously reshaped as new collectifs enter the arena and new relationships are brought into being. Second, following ANT, any pre-defined models and conditions for collective action are left out, and co-operation in a collective action situation is explained in the same way as free-riding. Finally, an action -oriented perspective, aimed at the facilitation of collective action, is adopted. For the organisation of this book, the grounded theory approach to data analysis (Chapter Four) means that the conclusions of each chapter feed into the next one, with the exception of Chapter Four, which describes the research methodology.The case study of Cowes Harbour (UK) in Chapter Two follows the oyster fishermen in their collective action aimed at securing access to the fishery, which was threatened by a closure in the interest of navigation and nature conservation considerations. It illustrates the complexities associated with the management of multiple-use CPRs, by showing how the different activities and interests in the harbour are interdependent and why, in a complex scenario, the presence of individual management regimes for the different uses is not a sufficient strategy. The preliminary conclusions support the development of the conceptual framework in Chapter Three.Chapter Five presents a comparative case study of two bays in NW Connemara (Ireland). In this area, local marine resource use has become increasingly become contested, particularly because of the development of salmon farming. The case follows fishermen and freshwater fisheries in the two bays in their interactions with the new user groups. While in one bay, collective action by the fishermen is exclusively aimed at preventing the local salmon farm from expanding, in the other bay, 15km to the north, collective actions amongst the same fishermen, the salmon farm and shellfish producers are aimed at balancing resource use. In this later bay, however, the local freshwater fishery is involved in a heavy dispute with the salmon farm over the collapse of its sea trout stocks, while in the former bay, this dispute is not articulated, despite a similar stock collapse. The case study illustrates how different social, historical, institutional and physical contexts, are important in shaping the interaction processes amongst multiple stakeholders. The case study in Chapter Seven is set in the Dutch Wadden Sea, where the shellfish fisheries are contested by nature conservation groups. It follows the shellfish fishermen in their efforts to achieve a balance between their fishing activities and nature conservation. The implementation of voluntary nature conservation measures by the shellfish sector formed the basis for the implementation of a statutory co-management strategy, involving the shellfish industry, the government, nature conservation groups and scientists. The case illustrates how the images that stakeholders have of each other's activities and interests, and the role they adopt towards resource management, influence the decision-making process in the co-management platform.In the theoretical intermezzos in Chapters Six and Eight, the cases of NW Connemara and the Wadden Sea are analysed. The conclusions resulting from the analyses are merged and developed further in Chapter Nine. The general conclusion is that, in its present form, CPR theory hampers the analysis of the complex processes through which collective action is achieved (or frustrated), and needs to be redeveloped. First, the definition of the rational, atomised actor is too limited to explain collective action processes. Instead, actors should be regarded as nested collectifs , whose strategies in the collective action arena are constantly reshaped. Second, the use of a static strategic model of rationality is insufficient to appreciate the shaping of collective action (or free-riding). The case studies show how collectifs use different social and material means to achieve their objectives. In trying to enrol other collectifs in collective actions aimed at realising their projects, different forms of strategic and communicative rationality emerge. Third, the use of pre-defined categories and design principles diverts attention from (i) the stakeholders' constructions of collective resource management, and (ii) the influence of contextual factors, and therefore limits the explanatory power of CPR theory. Furthermore, a danger inherent in the design principles is that they are picked up as blueprints for the development of policies and intervention programmes for 'successful' CPR management. For these reasons, CPR theory should become explicitly concerned with contextual analysis, rather than merely describing 'successes on the commons' and developing prescriptive principles. In this context, a number of methodologies for contextual analysis are introduced.The second general conclusion concerns the facilitation of collective action, which has only recently emerged on the agenda of CPR scholars. This book demonstrates that balancing a mix of uses is crucial for the management of complex CPRs, since the interdependency of multiple uses is likely to result in externalities. Experiences from the case studies show that nested platforms for CPR use negotiation are a promising heuristic tool for the facilitation of collective problem appreciation and solution. The performance of platforms is, however, associated with, a large number of critical factors, including, amongst others: (i) the influence of different perceptions and 'stereotyping' of participants on collective decision-making, and (ii) the position of third parties, who may act as a facilitator or gatekeeper, but may also frustrate collective action by imposing their own agenda.Based on an extensive discussion of the above issues, the book concludes that radical reconstruction of the ontological foundation of CPR theory is needed if it is to be used as (i) a foundation for the analysis of complex CPRs, or as (ii) a conceptual framework in pursuing the idea that collective action is a powerful alternative to deal with complex resource management problems. A social constructivist approach to the study and facilitation of complex CPR management is proposed. Two principles, derived from actor-network theory, form the foundation for this new perspective. The first principle is generalised agnosticism , which means that pre-defined categories (e.g., success, rational behaviour) and design principles have to be abandoned; instead, the focus of analysis should be on the tactics that the nested collectifs employ in mobilising social and material means to enrol others in their projects. The second principle is symmetry , which means that everything in a CPR management scenario needs explaining in the same way; in other words, co-operation in a collective action situation should be explained in the same way as defective behaviour.The adoption of these principles will facilitate the understanding of the contingencies involved in the evolution of collective action, by focussing on the sociotechnical construction of CPR management and the internal and contextual factors that influence the action strategies adopted by nested collectifs . In this analytical process, co-operation, free-riding and rationality are outcomes of the interplay and trials of strength amongst the different collectifs with a stake in the CPR, and their mobilisation of social and material resources.The book concludes with two main recommendations for future research and policy into complex CPR management. First, the potential of a social constructivist perspective needs further exploration. In particular, the development of new methodologies that make the contingencies involved in collective action processes visible, is required. Second, in view of the increasing reliance on collective action to solve complex resource management problems, the development of a praxeology (a theory that informs practice) for CPR theory needs urgent attention.
... Voorgaand onderzoek wees al uit dat de verschillende partijen in de Waddenzee fundamenteel andere ideeën hebben over wat natuur is en wat de relatie tussen de mens en natuur is (Steins, 1999;Swart & van der Windt, 2005), wat de perceptie van de huidige staat van de Waddenzee en een Rijke Waddenzee kan beïnvloeden. Volgens dit onderzoek beschouwen mosselkwekers kweekpercelen bijvoorbeeld als een onderdeel van een goedgeorganiseerde natuurrijke Waddenzee, terwijl natuurbeschermers een chaotische en onvoorspelbare Waddenzee als natuurlijk en wenselijk beschouwen (Steins, 1999 (Van Ginkel, 1990). ...
... Voorgaand onderzoek wees al uit dat de verschillende partijen in de Waddenzee fundamenteel andere ideeën hebben over wat natuur is en wat de relatie tussen de mens en natuur is (Steins, 1999;Swart & van der Windt, 2005), wat de perceptie van de huidige staat van de Waddenzee en een Rijke Waddenzee kan beïnvloeden. Volgens dit onderzoek beschouwen mosselkwekers kweekpercelen bijvoorbeeld als een onderdeel van een goedgeorganiseerde natuurrijke Waddenzee, terwijl natuurbeschermers een chaotische en onvoorspelbare Waddenzee als natuurlijk en wenselijk beschouwen (Steins, 1999 (Van Ginkel, 1990). In de jaren negentig ging het echter slechter met de natuurlijke mosselbanken in de Waddenzee; zowel mosselen als kokkels zetten in deze periode weinig zaad af, wat het voortbestaan van de litorale mosselbanken ernstig bedreigde (Smit, 1995). ...
... Ondanks dat de kokkelvisserij in 1991 voor 50% werd gesloten, bleef het voedselaanbod te laag voor deze vogelsoorten. De hoge sterfte onder de vogels kwam groot in het nieuws, waarbij overbevissing van de schelpdierbestanden als belangrijkste oorzaak werd genoemd, terwijl natuurlijke fluctuaties hierbij waarschijnlijk ook een rol speelden (Steins, 1999). In 1992 werden er afspraken gemaakt tussen de Nederlandse overheid en de mosselsector, waarbij er een jaarlijkse Total Allowable Catch (TAC) 1 van mosselzaad werd ingesteld en de Oostelijke Waddenzee werd vrijgesteld van mosselzaadvisserij (Keus, 1994 (Steins, 1999 (Ens, Smaal, en De Vlas, 2004;Floor et al., 2016). ...
This report describes the different perceptions of mussel farmers, NGOs, scientists and policy makers of a Rich Waddden Sea. The mussel covenant was a solution for a conflict between the mussel sector and nature organisations around the effects of spat fishing on natural mussel banks but seems to have returned to a deadlock position. In the covenant there is a focus on divergent scientific opinions, although the core of the conflict consists different values, norms and experiences. With regard to these different values, norms and experiences, the participants of the covenant can be split into two groups. For the first group the Wadden Sea is dynamic and productive and is not per definition harmed by co-use like mussel spat fisheries. For the second group the Wadden Sea is biodiverse and pristine, every form of yield is therefore unwanted. To continue with the covenant, more attention has to be paid to the divergent values, norms and experience. This can be facilitated by policy officers from the ministry and scientists, as these have representatives in both groups
... The research and an advisory role was taken up by research institutes and universities in the 1980s (Wolff 2013). The knowledge of these science-based experts has been used by actors at opposing ends of the conflict; furthermore, some scientists themselves have played crucial roles in conflicts over human activities (Steins 1999;Turnhout et al. 2008). ...
... In reaction to this conflict, the ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality came in 1993 with new regulations in the form of the Sea and Coastal Fisheries Policy: 26% of the Dutch Wadden Sea area became closed for mussel seed and cockle fishing and enough cockles and mussels should be left to satisfy 60% of the food requirement of the bird populations (LNV 1993). Also the fishermen came up with new initiatives, such as fishing plans, logging their activities through black boxes, and organising themselves in a Producers Organisation (Steins 1999). ...
... In contrast to the research of Swart & Van der Windt the analysis of Steins (1999) does not start with the conflict, but with the co-operation between fishery organisations and the Wadden Society in the co-management of the shellfish fisheries in the period 1993-1999. Although Steins also concludes: "of crucial importance for the relationship between nature conservation groups and the shellfish industry, and therefore for resource use negotiation, are the images both groups have of nature and each other" (Steins 1999, p.139). ...
... A further group of studies of collective action, involving actors in rural areas, has been conducted from a sociological or anthropological perspective. These studies use very diverse theoretical bases, for example, political ecology (Campbell 2007;Dahal et al. 2014) or actor-network theory (Steins 1999;Van Der Kooij et al. 2015). Studies in sociology and anthropology do not generally propose standard methods to analyze cases of collective action because they consider that methods should be specifically adapted to each case. ...
... According to Mosse (1997) and Johnson (2004), the IESD theoretical bases give limited importance to the dynamics of socio-ecological systems. Studies using these theoretical bases have been accused of providing "snapshots" of management regimes (Steins 1999). However, Ostrom has attributed greater importance to the evolution of institutions in her last works (e.g. ...
The theories of collective action relating to natural resource management and agricultural development are often considered to be polarized. The theories are divided into institutional economics with a focus on social dilemmas and sociology/anthropology. This article reviews the attempts to find common ground between the two groups. Several studies in sociology and anthropology have pointed out weaknesses in the approaches based on institutional economics. However, the criticisms have failed to trigger serious debate. Studies in each group have taken the initiative to "reach out" to the other, but so far the results have been limited. This article proposes an alternative approach to finding common ground between both groups. This involves focusing on the scales of validity of the research, i.e. the scale at which research results are considered valid. Many studies use or develop theoretical bases and build methodologies in order to obtain results that are deemed to be valid at a local or global scale. Other approaches use a meso-validity scale, e.g. one economic sector or one type of natural resource in a specific region. Some of these approaches organize a struc-tured comparison between different cases of collective action and, at the same time, address the criticisms made by sociologists and anthropologists with regard to the approaches used in institutional economics. Research at a meso-validity scale can help establish common ground between the two main groups of theories concerned by collective action.
... This led to the first policies, initially through voluntary measures by the industry aimed at preventing overharvesting and recovery of littoral beds. Policy measures included closing areas for fisheries and setting annual quota for the mussel spat (Steins, 1999). ...
Deliberative governance is gaining increasing attention in the management of natural resources with conflicting stakes. Although disputed knowledge is known to affect deliberation, the role of perceptions is understudied. Based on a case study in the Dutch Wadden Sea, a marine protected area, we examine the social representations of shellfish fisheries and marine nature of stakeholders within one deliberative governance arrangement, the Mussel Covenant. Our results show that within this covenant there are two opposing social representations of marine nature which both are not in line with the agreed objectives. Instead, governmental policies still form the guidelines to covenant decisions. We conclude that diverging representations and state-influence decrease deliberation. Therefore, we argue that deliberative governance is not possible without explicitly considering the different cognitive, normative and expressive meanings attached to the marine area or issue at stake. To achieve deliberation, values of stakeholders should explicitly be acknowledged and discussed, and state-influence should be kept to a minimum.
... Resource users are capable of learning about (the consequences of) their own actions and those of others and through strategic interactions in social networks (Giddens, 1986;Shepsle, 1989;Ostrom, 1990;Long, 1992;Acheson, 1994;Jentoft et al., 1998). In addition, resource users can work together based on common understanding of a problem (Callon and Law, 1989;Habermas, 1984;Steins, 1999;Röling and Maarleveld, 1999). This learning and collaboration allows self-regulation and potentially makes resource users overcome the tragedy of the commons. ...
Self-regulation is now widely regarded as an effective mechanism for collective action aimed at sustainable management of common pool re-sources. The brown shrimp (Crangon crangon) fishing industry in the Netherlands has been working on the implementation of a self-management strategy since 2007, as part of its ambition to get certified to the Marine Stewardship Council standard. Part of the self-management strategy is the development of a harvest control rule for reducing fishing effort when catches are low. Until recently, these
attempts failed. The failure of the initiatives for self-management is examined within Ostrom’s nested framework for understanding institutions for managing resource use. This framework emphasises the importance of strong vertical embeddedness of institutional arrangements for resource (co)management. Our analysis shows that, despite a strong vertical embeddedness, mismatches between different institutional
frameworks at the same level (horizontal interaction) affect the performance of self-management at the organizational level. This inhibits the resource users’ collective actions to self-manage their brown shrimp fishery, leading to a potential commons tragedy.
... 8 The Dutch government never expressed the intention to safeguard local fishing economies or culture. 9 Approximately at the same time a co-management system in the Wadden Sea for fisheries and shell fish fisheries was implemented [23]. 10 The rapidly increasing level of state and EU intervention in Dutch fisheries also after 1993, has regularly provoked obstruction and protest, though [25]. ...
The Netherlands was one of the first nations to introduce ITQs in their fisheries to manage national yearly Total Allowable Catches (TACs). These ITQs have gradually developed from an individual quota system in 1976 to an ITQ system in the 1980s. In 1993 the system was reformed into a co-management system. In this paper it is argued that many of the usual negative socio-economic consequences of ITQs mentioned in the literature have been largely absent, due to the embeddedness of ITQs in co-management arrangements. However, cracks have appeared lately in this combined management system, allowing an identification of its vulnerabilities. These findings show that the social and economic structure of Dutch fisheries is changing from a rather cooperative to a more competitive and exclusive system, more like conventional ITQs.
... Similarly, Natalia Steins ( 1999 ) combined the study of commons and community in three case studies of the Isle of Wight (UK), Connemara (Ireland) and the Dutch Wadden Sea. Her study stressed the importance of actor-networks in processes involving multiple stakeholders pursuing rational but confl icting choices. ...
Marine environmental history analyses the changing relationships between human societies and marine natural resources over time. This is the first book which deals in a systematic way with the theoretical backgrounds of this discipline. Major theories and methods are introduced by leading scholars of the field. The book seeks to encapsulate some of the major novelties of this fascinating new discipline and its contribution to the management, conservation and restoration of marine and coastal ecosystems as well as the cultural heritages of coastal communities in different parts of the world.
Co-management of forest resources has gained acceptance among governments, development agencies and development practitioners as an alternative natural resources management strategy to the top-down or centralized government management approach. However, a significant methodological issue in the current literature on evaluation of co-management institutional arrangement is how to link these institutions with sustainable livelihood outcomes of the poor forest dependent communities. To address this limitation, there is need for linking co-management with the sustainability of the community, effectively for the sustainability of its livelihood. This article links two theoretical concepts—co-management and sustainable livelihood approach (SLA)—to formulate an evaluative framework for co-management of forest institutions and their associated livelihood outcomes.
Community-building is one tool of human resilience to overcome the challenges of a hostile environment such as the marine. The chapter provides an overview of how the concept of community has been deployed in historical and social anthropology studies of maritime communities since the 1920s. Two main insights come out of this study, Firstly, the theoretical consciousness borne out of disciplines such as sociology, social anthropology and ethnography are valuable assets in the context of marine environmental history, and deserves to be considered in more historical studies than what has been the case so far.
Secondly, while many community studies have been occupied with fishing communities in the nineteenth and twentieth century there is much to be gained from following a community based approach in contemporary marine environmental history studies. Yet, the very fact that in the twenty-first century the fishing effort of the industrialized world is concentrated on ever fewer vessels operated by ever fewer people provides a discussion point in relation to whether or not the community concept will continue to be a fruitful analytical category.
In collective action research there is a tendency to formulate 'conditions for successful co-operation'. Unfortunately, little or no attention is paid to the impact of the social, cultural, economic, historical, political and institutional environment on a collective management system. Collective action is, however, a social process; it is the outcome of interactions between individual resource managers and non-human entities, as well as between stakeholders and other people in their everyday environment. It would be a serious mistake if researchers and policy-makers tacitly accept a number of factors that - in a specific collective action situation - contribute to fruitful co-operation, as the conditions for success; a priori distinctions between factors leading either to successes or failures may hinder, rather than facilitate, collective action research or policy-making.
This statement is illustrated by a case study of a group of Irish fishermen, who felt alienated from their fishery as a result of the expansion of commercial finfish farms in the local bay. The fishermen established a shellfish co-operative to obtain licenses for parts of the bay, and, in this way, secured access to their fishing grounds. Notwithstanding the presence of rather favourable management conditions, context-specific factors thwart successful collective action at the co-operative.
Under the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), autonomous state control of territorial waters exists effectively only in the 12 mile limit. The future status of these waters is at risk from the potential non-renewal of a derogation, which places jurisdiction for the 12 mile zone with the Member States, after the CFP review in 2002. In this context, the European Social Science Network has initiated a Task Group to undertake a comparative study of fisheries management systems in the Member States’ 12 mile waters and to assess their socio-economic importance. This Working Paper presents an overview of inshore fisheries management in Ireland.
The Working Paper is based on an analysis of (i) 28 face-to-face, open-ended interviews with the main stakeholders involved in the 12 mile fisheries at the operational, organisational and legislative levels; (ii) telephone and email conversations; (iii) questionnaires; and (iv) reports and publications.
The Working Paper is divided into four sections. It begins by examining what ‘inshore fisheries’ mean in the Irish context. Inshore fisheries are defined as: all fisheries that take place within the 12 mile zone (demersal, pelagic, shellfish, salmon and aquaculture. Inshore fishermen are defined as ‘part-time and full-time fishermen fishing for quota and non-quota species in the 12 mile zone in vessels under 17m’. Coastal fishermen are defined as ‘seasonal, part-time and full-time fishermen fishing exclusively for non-quota species in the 0-6 mile zone in vessels under 12m’.
Section 2 gives a descriptive account of the inshore fisheries sector. The Irish inshore waters are an important resource for wild fisheries and for aquaculture. Although fisheries only account for 1% of he Gross Domestic Product and the industry as a whole provides employment for only 1.4% of the workforce, the inshore industry is locally important in that it creates direct and indirect employment opportunities in peripheral areas, where alternative employment is not available. In recent years, aquaculture has become more important, with shellfish production being the main growth sector. Many shellfish producers are part-time and coastal fishermen, seeking alternative employment to support their income from fishing. Approximately 70% of the Irish fleet is dependent on the inshore waters for a number of reasons, the most important being: (i) the average old age of fishing vessels, and (ii) the types of fishery in which the fleet is involved.
Fisheries are managed through a centralised system with the Department of the Marine and Natural Resources as the responsible authority. Salmon fisheries management takes place though a more devolved system of Fisheries Boards. Inshore fisheries management involves a complex set of regulatory mechanisms stipulated in Government Acts and European legislation. Management regimes for inshore waters differ between species and primarily focus on stock conservation through quota allocation (for quota species), closure of fisheries and restrictions on gear. Herring and salmon are the two main species in the inshore waters for which a management regime is in effect, reflecting the national importance attributed to these stocks for the (pelagic) fishing industry and the tourism sector respectively.
The third section examines the stakeholders’ views on inshore fisheries management. A large number of issues emerged from the analysis of the interviews and questionnaires. A first issue is the structure of the fleet. Four main concerns were identified: (i) the centralisation of fishing capacity; (ii) the average old age of the fleet; (iii) the large number of unregistered vessels under 12m; and (iv) the socio-economic consequences of prohibiting dual purpose vessels. Marketing problems at national and international levels were identified as a second issue of concern. The third issue is related to the conservation of stocks. Overfishing, the effect of other marine activities and the absence of management regulations for non-quota species were the main concerns relating to stock conservation. Constraints to aquaculture development are a fourth area of concern. Constraints are related to: (i) scarcity of suitable production sites; (ii) lack of investment opportunities; (iii) disease problems; (iv) strong research focus on finfish aquaculture; (v) end of the EU’s PESCA programme; and (vi) competition over space. A fifth emerging issue is related to the management of salmon fisheries and the debate on whether or not commercial fisheries should be phased out to protect the salmon stocks and enhance the recreational value of the resource. Finally, the national, centralised approach to fisheries management is considered to pose three problems: (i) lack of consultation of fishing industry; (ii) lack of proactive management for non-quota species; and (iii) lack of locally-specific management regulations. Stakeholders called for a more devolved approach to inshore fisheries management.
Based on the descriptive account and the stakeholders’ views, the final section of this Working Paper concludes that, although centralised management in the Irish context may work for quota species, such as herring, this approach has a number of shortcomings for the management of non-quota species. These include: (i) the absence of locally-specific management regulations for such fisheries; (ii) the emergence of conflicts between different marine users; (iii) difficulties in monitoring fishing activities; (iv) the lack of opportunities for proactive management at local level; (v) lack of empowerment of local fishermen and shellfish cultivators; and (vi) a general feeling that the central Government does not appreciate the difficulties coastal communities and fishing ports are facing. The Paper also concludes that there has been a shift towards ‘conservation-mindedness’ amongst fishermen fishing for non-quota species, triggered by the lobster v-notching programme. However, to remain successful in future and to protect the efforts of those who have invested in the lobster fishery, it is necessary that further national regulations are implemented. The lobster management programme may be used as an example for the development of other community-based initiatives for non-quota species.
It is recommended that the development of a decentralised approach is done through a participatory process. Representation of the industry’s interests in the design and evaluation of devolved management regulations affecting their livelihoods, is a necessary measure to protect inshore fisheries. This of particular importance in the context of the continuing development of the coastal waters for new marine activities and the ongoing debate on salmon fisheries management. In this light, fisheries management should go beyond the biological objective of stock conservation to include economic, social and environmental considerations.
Finally, it is recommended that further research should be undertaken into the socio-economic, biological and environmental consequences into the potential ending of the 12 mile derogation after 2002 and that a strategy for future management of the 12 mile zone in such a scenario should be developed.
This Working Paper in Coastal Zone Management presents three case studies of fisheries co-management in the Dutch Wadden Sea: (i) the mechanical and non-mechanical cockle fishery; (ii) the mussel fishery; and (iii) the shrimp fishery. Its main objective is to describe how the Sea and Coastal Fisheries Policy (SCFP), which came into force in 1993 and aims at the integration of fisheries and nature and the division of management responsibilities between the Government and the fishing industry, has influenced fisheries management at the operational level. The research is based on 37 interviews with fishermen, their representatives, nature conservation organisations, researchers, and provincial and state authorities.
The ecological importance of the Wadden Sea was first acknowledged in the 1970s, and has resulted in a complex institutional framework for nature conservation at the national and international level. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the institutional framework for nature conservation. It also describes how the co-management strategy for fisheries management evolved.
The increasing public and political awareness of the ecological importance of the Wadden Sea has had a significant impact on the economic uses that take place in the Wadden Sea, such as fisheries. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, high mortality rates of oyster catchers and eiders due to a combination of natural and human factors, caused much unrest among nature conservation organisations, the research community and the public. In the national newspapers, the cockle and mussel sectors were blamed for robbing the birds’ food sources. The mussel and cockle sector voluntarily decided to impose a number of restrictions, thereby turning an open access resource for licence holders into a common property resource. In 1993, the Sea and Coastal Fisheries Policy (SCFP) came into being. The SCFP provides a framework within which the fishing industry, in collaboration with nature conservation interest, is responsible for sound management through the design and implementation of yearly fishing plans.
Chapter 3 describes the cockle fishery in the Wadden Sea, which can be divided into the traditional, non-mechanical sector and the mechanical sector. It discusses the effects of the SCFP on fisheries management. The non-mechanical fishermen identified three effects: (i) the allocation of the quota in years with a food shortage; (ii) practical problems related to the system of fishing on squares; and (iii) impacts on output. The mechanical sector identified both advantages and disadvantages. The benefits of the co-management regime include: (a) the shift from a wild west fishery to a regulated fishery; (b) the effects of the black box; (c) quality improvements; and (d) economic advantages due to the concentration of licences on vessels. Disadvantages are: (i) financial setbacks due to decreasing output; and (ii) exercising the profession of fishermen (e.g. using professional skills and judgement). The chapter also discusses the relationship between the fishermen on the one hand and the environmental groups, the research community and the Government on the other hand. These relationships are to a large extent determined by the actors’ different images of fishing and nature. In particular, the common interest of the cockle sector and the nature conservationists is overshadowed by the different language the groups use when discussing the integration of fisheries and nature. The fragile relation between these groups has received a number of blows through the subjective use of language and creation of a negative image by nature conservation groups in the media.
Chapter 4 describes the mussel seed fishery and mussel cultivation and the effects of the co-management framework on the fishery. Mussel cultivators identified the following benefits: (i) the shift from ‘tramp fishing’ to a regulated fishery; (ii) more efficient use of mussel seed; (iii) the effects of the black box; (iv) the optimisation of parcels; and (v) research into new fishing gear. The disadvantage of the present policy is the absence of a so-called extension de régime. At present the co-management measures in the sector’s fishing plans are not binding to non-members; this undermines the co-management system since non-members can rely on ‘alternative’ management regulations offered by the Government. The chapter also discusses the relationship between the mussel sector and the nature conservation groups, research community and the Government. As is the case with the cockle fishery, the different images of fishing and nature are important in determining the relationships between the mussel sector and nature conservation interests. However, in contrast to the cockle sector, the mussel fishery has been under far less criticism by environmental groups, and the two parties are engaged in an ongoing discussion.
The fifth chapter presents a case study of the shrimp fishery. Although the SCFP does not include any direct measures for the shrimp fishery, the shrimp fishermen perceive a number of indirect effects of the policy: (i) greater flexibility for shrimpers with a finfish quota through the Biesheuvel quota management groups; (ii) the optimisation of the mussel parcels which resulted in a number of fishermen being bought out; and (iii) increased competition with the Eurocutter fleet. Like the mussel cultivators, the shrimp sector feels that long term successful fisheries management is only possible though an extension de régime, which is not provided for in the SCFP. The relationship between the shrimp fishermen and other stakeholders is also discussed. This analysis indicates that the relationship between the different actors and the discussion about shrimp fishing, is largely determined by a traditional or romantic image of this type of fishery. Conflicting interests between the mussel cultivators and the shrimp fishermen have in some cases related to strained relationships and are largely determined by socio-historical factors.
The integration of fisheries and nature through co-management is discussed in chapter 6 and builds heavily on the three case studies. The first phase of the SCFP (1994-1997) has resulted in a number of dramatic changes. First, the cockle and mussel fisheries have been converted from an open access fishery for licence holders to a true common property fishery. Second, the cockle and mussel sector are now responsible for the design and implementation of resource management rules within a framework set by the Government. Third, nature values are explicitly recognised in the SCFP. Fourth, the management framework provided by the SCFP has forced the environmental groups and the cockle and mussel sector into a partnership. The question is if the first phase of the SCFP has resulted in the integration of the shellfish fisheries and nature?
The first dimension of the above question - the effect of the co-management measures on nature values - is difficult to answer. The short period during which the SCFP has been in place, hinders the pronouncement of any well-founded scientific statements. However, the SCFP has certainly resulted in decreased competition between fishermen and birds over shellfish stocks due to the closure of 26% of the Wadden Sea.
The second dimension of the question - the extent to which the industry had succeeded in implementing their management plans - can be answered on the basis of this study. It can be concluded that the fishing industry has successfully implemented and enforced the co-management measures. However, two critical issues emerge from this conclusion. First, it can be questioned whether or not the measures taken by the cockle and mussel sectors were sufficiently aimed at the integration of fisheries and nature values. Second, the question can be raised if the way in which the co-management regime has been shaped is sufficient to guarantee compliance with fisheries regulations on the long term.
Since in the first phase of the SCFP, no restrictive measures were taken for the shrimp fishery, the question whether or not the policy has resulted in the integration of fisheries and nature values, is not an issue. However, in relation to the general objective of integrating fisheries and nature two critical issues emerge. First, it can be questioned whether or not the decision not to take any measure to restrict this type of fishery should be based on assumptions with respect to its non-damaging effects. Second, the question can be raised if the way in which the co-management regime has been shaped is sufficient to guarantee compliance with fisheries regulations on the long term.
Based on this study it can be concluded that co-management is the way forward for fisheries management in the Wadden Sea. However, the discussion on the ‘effectiveness’ of the co-management measures with respect to nature conservation can only lead to tangible results if:
1. a political decision is made on quantifiable objectives with respect to the long term carrying capacity of the Wadden Sea; and
2. the discussion on cockle, mussel and shrimp fisheries is led by scientific and rational arguments, which also take into account the socio-economic importance of these fisheries, rather than on the basis of prevailing images of different types of fisheries.
To guarantee the long term success of the co-management strategy, two further conditions are necessary:
3. an extension de régime which extends the enforcement powers of the producers’ organisations to non-members; and
4. further strengthening of the feeling of trust and partnership between nature conservation organisations and the fishing industry.
The aquaculture industry and production has witnessed a dramatic growth during the past decade. Aquaculture development has number of advantages: (i) it generates employment in coastal communities, where employment opportunities are often scarce; (ii) it uses existing marine resources; (iii) it takes place in licensed areas with well-defined property rights; (iv) it contributes to meeting the growing need and demand for food; (v) it reduces pressures on wild stocks, and (iv) it generates a substantial export income. In the context of the European Union, its advantages must also be considered in relation to the Common Fisheries Policy: (a) aquaculture supplements depleting wild fish stocks free from quota restrictions, and (b) helps fishermen facing the challenges associated with depleting stocks, decommissioning and marketing problems. Its development has, however, also resulted in conflicts between aquaculturalists and other marine users. Such multi-use conflicts tend to focus on competition over fishing grounds, the alleged environmental and ecological effects of aquaculture and aesthetic issues. This paper has two objectives. First, it gives a brief overview of the nature and origin of multi-use conflicts related to finfish and shellfish aquaculture in Ireland and The Netherlands. Second, based on experiences in the aforementioned countries, it discusses and evaluates a number of approaches for conflict resolution and consensus building for responsible practice.
Regulations for the UK’s inshore fisheries have become more and more complex in the past few decades. One factor that contributes to this complexity is the presence of multiple management authorities. Although the management of inshore fisheries within 6 nautical miles from the shore is the responsibility of Sea Fisheries Committees, legislation by the European Union and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food also affects fishing activities in the areas under jurisdiction of the Sea Fisheries Committees.
Some inshore fisheries are located in estuaries, where, under the Sea Fisheries (Regulation) Act 1966, the jurisdiction of the Sea Fisheries Committees is transferred to the Environment Agency. Since the latter does not necessarily have the same management regulations as the Sea Fisheries Committees, resource management in these areas is even more complex. The niche that is created as a result of different regulations makes it hard for the authorities to control regulations.
This paper presents an extensive case study of the oyster fishery in the Medina Estuary, Isle of Wight. The fishery is located in Cowes Harbour. The jurisdiction of the Southern Sea Fisheries Committee (SSFC) ends at the Harbour entrance and, as a result, the Environment Agency is responsible for controlling the fishery. The latter, however, does not want to act as the local fisheries authority for the oyster beds. As a consequence, the only rules fishermen have to follow are the national regulations under the 1967 Sea Fisheries (Shellfish) Act. Since the oyster beds are located within Cowes Harbour, the fishery's management is also subject to navigational regulations imposed by the Harbour Commissioners, a navigational authority. The 'grey area' of regulations that has evolved as a result of the presence of different authorities, which each have different rules, has an important impact on the management of the Medina oyster fishery.
At present, oystering in the Medina takes place on the basis of an ‘unspoken agreement’ and navigational Cowes Harbour rules. Fishermen are concerned that the port authorities will close the fishery, because of a small minority of fishermen who do not comply with the rules. In terms of its social, economic and ecological value, closure of the oyster fishery would be unfavourable. However, protection and control of the fishery cannot be accomplished under the present framework of fisheries legislation: the Environment Agency refuses to act as the responsible fisheries authority, and SSFC, the authority which the fishermen perceive to be the fisheries authority, does not have any statutory control.
The ‘grey area’ of regulations in which the fishery is located, also creates a niche within which Medina oystermen can free-ride in the Solent oyster fishery, controlled by SSFC.
In order to solve resource management problems that are generated by ambiguous legislation due to the presence of multiple authorities, the Medina oystermen have started negotiations with the Cowes Harbour Commissioners about the possibility of creating property rights to the fishery.
The case study demonstrates that effective coastal fisheries management can only be achieved if the rules set by the local fisheries authorities are unambiguous, if the responsible authority takes the responsibility to manage and control the fishery, and if management rules make ‘common sense’ at the operational level. The latter can only be achieved if the responsible authorities welcome the user group’s voice in the operational rules affecting their resource.
In this Working Paper, the Oakerson framework, which is an heuristic tool to analyse the management of resources that are held in common, is made applicable to multiple-use commons.
The original Oakerson framework focused on the analysis of resources that are characterised by one single, extractive use. However, this assumption is unrealistic for two reasons. In the first place, natural resources produce a multitude of ‘resource units’. It is not realistic to assume that people will use a resource for one use (e.g. cutting timber), if the same resource also yields other resource units (e.g. the same forest can be used for grazing cattle). In the second place, commons evolve due to demographic changes, technological developments and the integration of the resource in the market. In this context, the resource system will become increasingly subject to multiple uses (Edwards, 1996; Edwards & Steins, 1996; Selsky & Creahan, 1996).
In order to make the Oakerson framework applicable to multiple-use commons, several change have to be made (see Edwards & Steins, 1996; Steins, 1996a). This paper focuses on the multiple level analysis of institutional arrangements. Institutional arrangements regulate access, resource allocation and provide for sanctions if people do not abide with access and allocation rules. These arrangements can be found at three levels: the constitutional, collective-choice and operational level (Chapter 1).
The empirical basis for the adaptation of the framework is a case study of three user groups in Cowes Harbour, Isle of Wight, namely: (1) the oyster fishermen; (2) the yachting industry; and (3) the commercial shipping industry. The study briefly describes resource management by the three user groups, and focuses on how the different groups are affected by resource management processes in the Harbour (Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5).
It was found that there is an interdependent relationship between different harbour uses: changes in one system will influence resource management of other systems and the resource as a whole. The decision-making arrangements that govern resource management at the operational level can be divided into rights, rules, conventions and contracts (Swallow & Bromley, 1995). It was found that resource systems that are characterised by less formalised institutions such as conventions, have a vulnerable position within the governance of the multiple-use resource. The ability of individual user groups to influence overall resource management depends on a number of factors, such as: (a) the historical background of the specific use within the overall management system; (b) the socio-economic value of the user group’s activity within the multiple-use resource and the wider environment in which it is embedded; (c) the level of organisation between the individual users that are engaged in a certain activity; (d) the level of organisation between users and representative bodies; (e) the extent to which relationships between user groups and the ‘umbrella authority’ are formalised through participation in the latter’s authority structure; (f) the strength and skills of associations and federations representing the interests of the user group in policy-making; and (g) the extent to which informal relationships between the user group and the umbrella authority are established.
It was also found that in situations where a multitude of uses takes place under the governance of one ‘umbrella authority’, operational resource management by the different users is complicated, since they have to use operational rules that comply with both the constitutional and collective-choice rules of their own sector and with the resource management rules by the umbrella authority. However, the presence of an umbrella authority helps to reduce user conflicts, especially in a situations where competition for resource units and, in this space, is a key issue.
The above findings were integrated in a framework for the analysis of multiple-use resource governance. The framework must be seen as a heuristic tool that helps researchers and practitioners to organise information about the governance of a multiple-use resource, interactions between the different resource systems that are embedded in the larger resource, and the changes in institutional arrangements that take place at different levels. Another advantage of the framework is that it provides researchers and practitioners with a tool to compare different multiple-use case studies.