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Central Bank Digital Currency and Monetary Policy
Keynote Speech by
Dong He
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Deputy Director, Monetary and Capital Markets Department
International Monetary Fund
International Conference on Central Bank Digital Currencies and Payment Systems
Hong Kong Monetary Authority
April 11, 2024
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The views expressed in this speech are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of the IMF, its Executive
Board, or IMF management. I thank Chris Erceg, Darryl King, Tansaya Kunaratskul, Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli,
Marcello Miccoli, Andre Reslow, Gabriel Soderberg, and Brandon Tan for discussion and assistance preparing
this speech.
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Introduction
Good morning. I'm honored to have been invited to speak at this important conference.
Today, I’d like to share with you the ongoing and preliminary work being conducted by the IMF's Monetary and
Capital Markets Department on Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) and its implications for monetary policy.
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This topic, in my opinion, warrants further exploration, and I am hopeful that our findings will inspire continued
research by both academics and central bank researchers.
In my presentation, I will explore three critical questions: 1) Why is CBDC potentially significant for monetary
policy? 2) How might CBDC influence the implementation of monetary policy? 3) In what ways could CBDC alter
the transmission of monetary policy?
Why CBDC Might Be Important for Monetary Policy
Central banks may pursue various policy objectives when considering the introduction of CBDC (e.g., Soderberg
et al., 2023). From a monetary policy standpoint, CBDC holds importance for several reasons: firstly, it could
ensure the continued demand for central bank money as the ultimate settlement asset in the digital age.
Secondly, it might uphold the role of central bank money in defining the economy's unit of account. Lastly, by
potentially bearing interest, CBDC could serve as an additional instrument in the central bank's monetary policy
toolkit, thus enhancing its capability.
To grasp these points, we must revisit the question “What’s special about the central bank?” As Bruce White
(2001) eloquently asked: “What is at the heart of a central bank’s ability to dictate monetary policy? Why is it that
if the central bank says the cash interest rate will be “x”, it is “x”, while if a commercial bank were to say it will be
“y’, it would remain “x”? What is it about a central bank, at a fundamental level, that gives it an ability to drive the
whole financial market, and ultimately to determine the price level?”
Indeed, exploring CBDC inherently steers us towards revisiting the fundamental principles of central banking.
How, exactly, does the central bank affect interest rates? Central banks can and do dictate monetary policy
because it has two unique capabilities.
Firstly, the central bank is a monopolist: it is the one and only supplier of the ultimate settlement asset (cash and
reserves). Commercial banks and other financial institutions rely on central bank reserves for settling
transactions because these reserves represent the safest and most liquid asset in the whole economy.
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See Das et al (2023) and Kunaratskul et al (2024).
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Secondly, the central bank sets the standard for the pricing system: its liabilities determine the economy's "unit
of account." Prices for goods, services, and financial assets within a given economy are denominated in this unit
of account, established by central bank money.
Monetary policy is executed through these two capabilities. Central banks typically control short-term interest
rates by conducting monetary operations using either the corridor system or the floor system (as depicted in
Figure 1).
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In the corridor system, the central bank either adjusts its reserve supply to meet forecasted demand
so that the market rates stay close to the target rate; or provides unlimited reserves at the fixed (policy) rate to
meet demand for reserves (full allotment). In the floor system, the central bank sets the policy rate at the floor of
the corridor and supply sufficient reserves to keep market rates at or close to that floor. In such a system, the
central bank controls both the price and quantity of reserves.
The policy interest rate is subsequently transmitted to the broader banking system and financial markets through
arbitrage, with commercial banks committing to maintain a one-to-one nominal parity with central bank money
(as illustrated in Figure 2).
Figure 1: Monetary operations: the determination of short-term interest rates
Source: IMF staff.
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King and Mancini-Griffoli (2018) compares the strengths and weaknesses of various frameworks of monetary
operations.
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Figure 2: The transmission of interest rates
Source: IMF staff.
However, such unique capabilities of central banks may be challenged by digitalization of the economy and the
financial system. For example, the proliferation of crypto assets could reduce the effectiveness of monetary
policy (He, 2018). More broadly, the digitalization of money and payments could reduce the relevance of central
bank money either as the ultimate settlement asset or its role in defining the unit of account of the economy.
The advent of the internet over two decades ago sparked debate among leading economists and central
bankers about the potential obsolescence of central bank money due to technological advancements. While
concerns were raised about the sustainability of demand for central bank money as the ultimate settlement
asset (Friedman, 1999), others argued that its critical role in defining the unit of account is what truly matters for
monetary policy (Woodford, 2000).
Rapid progress of information technology and computing power could make it possible to have a pure exchange
economy with little need for central bank money to be used as a universal medium of exchange (King,1999).
Money is used as the settlement asset in a world with limited information because it is the least information-
sensitive asset, with “no question asked”. However, if market prices of securities can be ascertained in real time,
swaps of such securities would enable financial transactions to settle without the need for central bank money.
More recently, Brunnermeier et al (2019) introduced the concept of a “digital currency area”, which is defined as
a network where payments and transactions are made digitally by using a currency that is specific to that
network. The network uses its own unit of account, distinct from existing official currencies, and it operates a
payment instrument, a medium of exchange, that can only be used inside, between its participants. The
proliferation of such digital currency areas would also reduce the demand for central bank money as the
settlement asset and render its unit-of-account function less relevant for economic activities.
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The proliferation of private tokenized monies that circulate as bearer instruments, like stablecoins, may entail
violation of the “singleness of money”, which in turn undermines the unit of account (Garratt and Shin, 2023).
Singleness of money ensures that monetary exchange is not subject to fluctuating exchange rates between
different forms of money, whether they be privately issued money (e.g., deposits) or publicly issued money (e.g.,
cash). With singleness of money, there is an unambiguous unit of account that underpins all economic
transactions in society.
In response to these challenges, central banks must adapt to maintain the functions of central bank money as
the ultimate settlement asset and as the unit of account within a digital, shared, and decentralized economy.
Defensively, CBDC represents an opportunity to upgrade central bank money to be fit-for-purpose. CBDC could
be designed to facilitate the convertibility of privately issued monies into central bank money and ensure
interoperability between privately managed and central bank-managed payment systems. Establishing a
framework for convertibility and interoperability with CBDC could address inefficiencies caused by information
asymmetries in an economy with imperfectly substitutable currencies. Crucially, this could result in a unified unit
of account, essential for preserving the central bank's influence over monetary policy.
Offensively, CBDC offers the potential to directly transmit monetary policy to the public. A universally accessible,
interest-bearing CBDC could enhance the existing monetary policy toolkit and strengthen the transmission
mechanism (Meaning et al., 2021), though this design is not currently pursued by most central banks. The
interest rate on reserves and the interest rate on CBDC can be two separate policy instruments, and the two
policy instruments can be combined or coordinated to achieve certain policy objectives (Jiang and Zhu, 2021).
Moreover, CBDC could enable the execution of unconventional monetary policies, such as negative interest
rates (Bordo and Levin, 2017) or helicopter money, should economic conditions necessitate such measures.
Impact of CBDC on Monetary Policy Implementation
A useful conceptual framework for assessing the potential effects of CBDC on the implementation of monetary
policy distinguishes between "autonomous factors" and "policy instruments" within the central bank's balance
sheet. Autonomous factors lie beyond the central bank's direct control, while policy instruments are actively
managed by it.
The impact of CBDC on monetary operations largely hinges on its design features, which dictate its
substitutability with existing forms of base money (cash and reserves). Key design considerations include
access (whether it's restricted to banks or also available to NBFIs, firms, and households), limits (whether its
holdings or transactions are subject to quantitative restrictions), whether it bears interest, its availability (24/7 or
during specific hours), and its regulatory treatment (e.g., eligibility for satisfying reserve requirements or
classification as high-quality liquid assets).
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Should the CBDC be designed with retail purposes in mind and be interchangeable with cash, it would represent
another autonomous factor on the central bank’s balance sheet, not necessitating a central bank response in
terms of reserve supply adjustments (as illustrated in Figure 3). However, the inherent digital nature of such a
retail CBDC could lead to different volatility patterns compared to cash. The unpredictability and novelty of
demand for this new payment method could pose challenges for liquidity forecasting crucial to optimizing open
market operations. Nevertheless, with time, central banks are likely to enhance their forecasting accuracy and
develop mechanisms to counteract forecasting discrepancies. Additionally, adopting a full-allotment regime
temporarily might be a viable strategy if necessary (Das et al., 2023).
Figure 3: Central Bank Balance Sheets and CBDC
Source: IMF staff.
When a retail CBDC is designed to function as a direct substitute for bank deposits, the implications on
monetary operations could be more significant. When the CBDC replaces bank deposits, the reduction in the
deposits is mapped by the fall in reserves (Figure 3), causing commercial banks’ balance sheets to shrink. This
contraction might compel banks to seek replenishment of their deposits, potentially facing a scenario where
available reserves are insufficient, thereby exerting upward pressure on short-term market interest rates.
Concurrently, the demand for reserves may undergo adjustments, although predicting the extent or the direction
of this change is challenging due to the myriad of factors influencing reserve demand. Additionally, this demand
could experience heightened volatility.
Under these circumstances, it becomes imperative for the central bank to engage in monetary operations aimed
at increasing the supply of reserves and refining its liquidity forecasting techniques (Figure 4). Adopting
strategies such as transitioning to a fixed-rate/full-allotment regime or employing a floor system could prove
beneficial, though they could have the side effect of discouraging interbank activities in certain circumstances.
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Figure 4: Dealing with liquidity shocks induced by retail CBDC adoption
Note: Shifts in the supply of and demand for reserves from CBDC adoption could result in changes in the short-
term market rates and require the central bank to adjust the supply of reserves and shift the supply curve back
to where the market clears at the policy rate.
Source: IMF staff.
CBDC's influence on the implementation of monetary policy extends to its impact on the size of the central
bank's balance sheet. CBDC extends the central bank’s counterparts beyond domestic banks, potentially to
non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), firms, and households. Size of the central bank balance sheet could
grow considerably if CBDC adoption is high. Seigniorage revenue may increase, but a larger balance sheet
could lead to higher interest rate, FX, and credit risks. Losses arising from such financial risks could undermine
the central bank’s credibility and independence.
The extent to which a wholesale CBDC will be a close substitute for reserves hinges on several key design
elements, including access, availability, intended use cases, and notably, remuneration. A wholesale CBDC
might extend access beyond current RTGS participants, potentially to NBFIs. Consequently, the central bank
could use CBDC to directly acquire assets from nonbanks, bypassing the traditional banking system, possibly to
implement quantitative easing measures.
Should the central bank's counterparts encompass entities not under its supervision, several pertinent questions
emerge: Would these institutions bear the same responsibilities as primary dealers in open market operations?
Regarding availability, is the CBDC confined to intra-day transactions, or is it accessible round-the-clock? If
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CBDC is available 24x7 and closely substitutable with reserves, the "overnight interest rate" concept might
become obsolete, prompting a shift towards 24x7 monetary operations.
Moreover, the introduction of a wholesale CBDC tailored for specific use cases, distinct from reserves (as
depicted in Figure 5), could lead to potential liquidity segmentation across systems. It's crucial for the central
bank to deliberate on the ramifications of liquidity fragmentation between these systems.
Figure 5: Wholesale CBDC and Use Cases
Source: IMF staff.
The remuneration of wholesale CBDC introduces the possibility of leveraging it as a distinct and supplementary
interest rate tool. The design of CBDC could align its interest rate with that of reserves, or it could feature a
different interest rate, with either a fixed or variable spread in relation to the interest rate on reserves. This
necessitates central banks to delineate the specific roles each interest rate will fulfill—a complex endeavor
warranting extensive research. One potential approach is to maintain the interest rate on reserves as the
primary rate of monetary policy, while utilizing the CBDC rate to modulate its demand in comparison to bank
deposits, a strategy discussed by Meaning et al. (2021) and Jiang and Zhu (2021).
Before I conclude the discussion on the implications for monetary operations, it is pertinent to consider whether
the discussions above, primarily based on the mechanics observed in an inflation targeting regime, are equally
applicable to alternative monetary policy regimes, such as exchange rate targeting or monetary targeting.
Indeed, as Disyatat (2008) noted, the underlying mechanics of monetary operations tend to be remarkably
consistent across central banks, irrespective of the specific monetary policy regime in place. Whether the
operational target is on managing the exchange rate, the base money aggregate, or a short-term interest rate, a
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proper understanding of the implications of CBDC for monetary operations requires a full appreciation of how
the design features of CBDC would affect the demand for and supply of reserves.
However, in the context of exchange rate targeting regimes, the facilitation of domestic asset access for
nonresidents through CBDC could introduce complexities in liquidity forecasting. This is particularly relevant if
net foreign assets (NFAs) on the central bank's balance sheet become significantly large and volatile, as
highlighted by the IMF (2020). Indeed, NFAs are another autonomous factor necessitating consideration in
liquidity projections. For regimes targeting monetary aggregates, the introduction of CBDC could instigate
changes in money velocity, potentially altering the relationship between monetary aggregates and economic
activity (Lukonga, 2023). These shifts must also be integrated into reserve management strategies.
How CBDC Might Transform Monetary Policy Transmission
Monetary policy is transmitted from the central bank’s monetary operations to the broader economy through
several key channels, including the interest rate, bank lending, asset price, and exchange rate channels.
Transmission is said to be stronger if a given change in the tightness of financial conditions has larger effects on
macroeconomic variables in an economy with a CBDC than in one without CBDCs, all else equal (Das et al,
2023).
Conceptually speaking, the effects on monetary policy transmission of a universally accessible, interest bearing
CBDC would give us a sense of an upper bound on how much the interest rate transmission channel would be
affected. Interest rate on a universally accessible CBDC would be a very effective floor for the whole financial
system, enhancing the pass-through from policy rates to other interest rates within the economy (Meaning et al,
2021).
However, there's a critical trade-off to consider: while making CBDC attractive relative to bank deposits could
amplify the efficacy of the interest rate channel, it might simultaneously weaken the bank lending channel by
disintermediating banks. But introducing a CBDC does not necessarily lead to disintermediation if banks have
market power in the deposit market. Interestingly, CBDC could potentially facilitate greater bank intermediation if
its interest rate is set within a moderate range, avoiding disintermediation that could otherwise occur if the rate is
set too high (Chiu et al., 2023).
Das et al (2023) adopts a broader conceptual framework, in which the implications of CBDC issuance on
monetary policy are intermediated by its impact on key parts of the macroeconomic environment. The
framework also makes a distinction between “level effects”—whereby the introduction of CBDCs could tighten or
loosen financial conditions as a shock—and “transmission effects,” whereby CBDCs change the impact of a
given monetary policy shock on output, employment, and inflation.
Focusing on a domestically accessible, non-remunerated retail CBDC, its introduction could reshape the
economic environment in several ways.
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Firstly, it might intensify competition for bank deposit funding, as the CBDC offers a secure store of value and an
efficient payment method, potentially diverting deposits away from banks. Consequently, banks may seek to
compensate for deposit outflows by increasing their reliance on wholesale funding.
Moreover, the competitive pressure from CBDC could erode bank profitability. Banks may be compelled to
increase deposit interest rates to remain competitive with CBDC or face higher funding costs due to a greater
dependence on wholesale funding, ultimately reducing profit margins if these higher costs cannot be fully offset
by increasing lending rates.
CBDC also holds promise for enhancing financial inclusion, offering a gateway to financial services for the
unbanked and serving as an entry point to digital financial accounts (Lannquist and Tan, 2023).
Furthermore, CBDC could support efforts of de-dollarization or counteract the rise of crypto assets
(“cryptoization”) by reducing the attractiveness of digital means of payments denominated in foreign currencies
or crypto assets. However, it's important to recognize that CBDC alone cannot resolve underlying issues related
to the country's monetary policy framework and the credibility of its central bank.
The issuance of CBDC may initially either tighten or loosen financial conditions due to the aforementioned "level
effects." (Figure 6) Increased competition for bank deposits, higher wholesale funding, and reduced bank profits
could tighten financial conditions, whereas enhanced financial inclusion might have a loosening effect. The
effects of decreased dollarization or "cryptoization" on financial conditions remain ambiguous, as they hinge on
the disparity in interest rates between domestic and foreign currencies. For example, if the domestic interest
rate exceeds the foreign one, a reduction in dollarization can result in a tightening in financial conditions.
The overall impact is ambiguous, and the central bank must diligently monitor the evolving macroeconomic
environment to avert unintended shifts in financial conditions and adjust its policy instruments when appropriate.
Figure 6: Impact of CBDC Issuance on Financial Conditions
Source: Das et al (2023).
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Shifts in economic conditions have the potential to enhance the efficacy of monetary policy's transmission
mechanisms, as illustrated in Figure 7.
Heightened competition for bank deposit funding can bolster both the interest rate and bank lending channels.
The pass-through from policy rates to deposit rates is stronger when banks have less market power, and bank
lending rates would also become more sensitive to the policy rate.
Furthermore, an increase in wholesale funding is likely to fortify the bank lending channel. This is because the
costs associated with wholesale funding are generally more responsive to changes in the central bank's policy
rate compared to those associated with retail deposits.
Banks may be more motivated to adjust interest rates in response to changes in the policy rate to preserve their
narrow profit margins, thereby reinforcing the efficiency of policy transmission. An increase in the policy rate
prompts banks to raise interest rates, while a decrease in the policy rate would likely lead to the opposite effect.
Nonetheless, the magnitude of this impact is expected to be modest.
Enhanced financial inclusion means a larger portion of the population becomes more responsive to monetary
policy changes, especially if CBDC improves access to borrowing and saving options that are sensitive to
interest rates. This scenario results in a broader segment of the economy engaging in consumption and saving
decisions based on interest rate movements, thereby strengthening the transmission of monetary policy via both
the interest rate and asset price channels.
Lastly, achieving greater monetary autonomy through reduced dollarization or cryptoization can intensify the
effectiveness of all monetary policy transmission channels.
Figure 7: Impact on the Transmission of Monetary Policy
Source: Das et al (2023).
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Under typical conditions, the quantitative importance of these phenomena might be modest. In other words, the
presence of a retail and non-interest-bearing CBDC is anticipated to exert a positive, yet relatively small
influence on the transmission of monetary policy during normal periods.
The likelihood of bank deposits being significantly replaced by CBDC is perhaps limited, particularly as central
banks have the option to implement precautionary design measures. These could include restrictions on
transaction volumes and account balances, as well as a tiered approach to interest rates, to mitigate the risk of
substantial substitution.
Moreover, the contribution of financial inclusion to enhancing monetary policy transmission could be tempered
by the relatively small proportion of overall savings and lending that the financially excluded population
represents.
Similarly, the potential for de-dollarization or de-cryptoization to significantly impact monetary policy
transmission could be limited if the CBDC does not substantially bolster the appeal of the local currency over
foreign currencies or crypto assets.
Nonetheless, these effects could become markedly more pronounced in scenarios characterized by low interest
rates or periods of financial market turbulence. A non-remunerated CBDC could entrench the zero lower bound
for interest rates. Furthermore, in times of financial market distress, there may be an amplified risk of a flight to
safety from retail bank deposits to CBDC, as individuals and businesses seek safer havens for their assets. But
such risks can be mitigated by appropriate design of the CBDC, including the use of quantitative limits and
interest rate tiering.
Conclusions
To conclude, today I have had the privilege of sharing with you the ongoing work being undertaken by the
Monetary and Capital Markets Department of the IMF on CBDC and their implications for monetary policy. While
these insights are based on preliminary findings, I trust they have sparked interest and underscored the
necessity for further research in this evolving field.
I have presented the argument that a universally convertible and interoperable CBDC could bolster the role of
central bank money as both the ultimate settlement asset and the unit of account. This enhancement could help
preserve the central bank's capacity to implement monetary policy effectively in the digital age. It's important to
clarify that the intention here is not to advocate for the issuance of CBDC per se, but to illuminate their potential
implications for monetary policy.
CBDC can be designed with a variety of features which dictate its substitutability with existing forms of base
money, either as "autonomous factors" or "policy instruments" within the central bank's balance sheet.
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Forecasting the demand for bank reserves will remain the key to effective monetary policy implementation, so
an important challenge is to figure out how the demand for reserves would be affected by the introduction of
CBDC.
The operational framework may need to be reconfigured to deal with increased volatility in the demand for
reserves. Implementing strategies like shifting to a fixed-rate/full-allotment regime or adopting a floor system
may be advantageous. Central bank capital buffers may also need to be revisited if balance sheet materially
increases in size and in financial risks because of CBDC adoption.
Regarding monetary policy transmission, an interest-bearing CBDC, which is currently not being considered by
most central banks, could amplify the passthrough from policy interest rates to broader monetary conditions.
However, this could potentially lead to the disintermediation of traditional banks, especially if the CBDC's
interest rate is set too high. Navigating this trade-off will be contingent upon the specific economic context of
each country, including the comparative market power of banks and their role relative to non-bank financial
institutions.
Furthermore, even a non-interest-bearing CBDC could enhance the channels of monetary policy transmission,
albeit the magnitude of this effect is anticipated to be modest and heavily reliant on country characteristics, such
as the capacity of CBDC to advance financial inclusion or diminish the appeal of currency substitution.
In closing, I invite you to ponder the boundless potential that lies ahead. The journey of CBDC, coupled with
ongoing technological advancements, may unveil novel instruments for monetary policy that are yet to be
envisioned.
Thank you for your attention.
References
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