Hybrid warfare and the challenge to international law

Abstract

This article explores the complex landscape of hybrid warfare, a multifaceted conflict strategy blending conventional military tactics with cyberattacks, information warfare, and economic coercion. It examines the challenges hybrid warfare poses to international law, the difficulties in establishing legal definitions, and the strategic responses by major powers including Russia, the United States, and China. The discussion extends to the adaptation of national and international strategies to address the gray zones of conflict that hybrid warfare exploits. Emphasizing the need for innovative legal frameworks and international cooperation, the article highlights hybrid warfare’s impact on global security dynamics and the evolving nature of warfare in the digital age.

Full text

Eurasian Science Review ISSN 3006-1164
Volume 2, No 4
HYBRID WARFARE AND THE CHALLENGE TO IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW
Tursyn Alisher1, Turuntayeva Aigerim2
1 Master student of the Faculty of International Relations, L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National
University, Kazakhstan.
E-mail: alisher.tursyn@gmail.com
2Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor, Faculty of International Relations,
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Kazakhstan
E-mail: a.turuntaeva@mail.ru
Keywords
Hybrid Warfare
International Law
Cybersecurity
Information Warfare
Strategic Deterrence
Legal Frameworks
Abstract
This article explores the complex landscape of hybrid warfare, a
multifaceted conflict strategy blending conventional military
tactics with cyberattacks, information warfare, and economic
coercion. It examines the challenges hybrid warfare poses to
international law, the difficulties in establishing legal definitions,
and the strategic responses by major powers including Russia, the
United States, and China. The discussion extends to the adaptation
of national and international strategies to address the gray zones
of conflict that hybrid warfare exploits. Emphasizing the need for
innovative legal frameworks and international cooperation, the
article highlights hybrid warfare’s impact on global security
dynamics and the evolving nature of warfare in the digital age.

Eurasian Science Review ISSN 3006-1164
Volume 2, No 4
Introduction.
In a globalized world, where traditional
forms of military confrontation give way to new
conflict methods, the phenomenon of hybrid war-
fare takes center stage in discussions on interna-
tional security and legal order. Hybrid warfare, a
complex blend of military and non-military
means and actions, openly challenges existing in-
ternational legal norms and regulatory mecha-
nisms. The difficulty in classifying and regulating
hybrid wars stems from their multidimensional
nature, which includes not only military opera-
tions but also information warfare, cyberattacks,
economic pressure, psychological impact, and
even cultural influence. This multifaceted ap-
proach poses serious challenges to international
law, necessitating innovative approaches and a
deep understanding of interstate relations dy-
namics.
Despite the widespread use of the term "hy-
brid war" in political and academic discourses, its
legal definition remains a subject of lively debates
and scholarly research. This particularly concerns
the legitimacy of using certain methods and
means within such conflicts, as well as the possi-
bility of regulating them through existing interna-
tional agreements and conventions.
It is crucial to emphasize that the interna-
tional legal regulation of hybrid wars encounters
obstacles not only due to their complexity and
multifaceted nature but also because of the rap-
idly changing nature of international relations in
the digital and globalization era. Modern hybrid
conflicts often include elements beyond the tradi-
tional understanding of military actions, such as
cyber wars and informational confrontations,
complicating the application of existing interna-
tional treaties and conventions.
Moreover, hybrid wars are often character-
ized by asymmetry, where one side may use un-
conventional and non-obvious methods to
achieve its goals, while the other side may adhere
to more traditional and rule-bound warfare. This
asymmetry creates additional difficulties for legal
regulation and requires a reassessment of tradi-
tional approaches to international law.
2. Russian perspectives on hybrid war-
fare: multifaceted conflicts and the quest
for legal and educational adaptation
In Russia, hybrid wars are considered not
only as military conflicts but also as operations
that involve a wide range of actions, such as infor-
mation wars, cyberattacks, economic pressure,
and propaganda campaigns. This means that such
wars include both forceful and non-forceful ele-
ments, making them particularly difficult to an-
alyze and control.
The complexity of hybrid wars in the Rus-
sian context also lies in their decentralized na-
ture. This means that actions can be taken by
various actors, not necessarily directly linked to
state structures, which complicates the identifi-
cation of threat sources and responsive
measures. Moreover, this aspect makes tradi-
tional diplomatic and international legal control
mechanisms less effective, as they are often ori-
ented towards state structures and traditional
forms of conflict.
One of the key characteristics of hybrid
wars, according to Russian experts, is their abil-
ity to escalate quickly and the difficulty in ceas-
ing them. This is because such wars often in-
clude diverse, often unrelated elements, making
it difficult to identify them and develop effective
control mechanisms and cessation. The issue of
hybrid wars in the Russian context is also exac-
erbated by the lack of clear international legal
mechanisms for regulating such conflicts, espe-
cially in situations where many actions occur in
the "gray zones" of international law.
An additional complexity involves the con-
trol and influence over informal groups and net-
works, which often play a key role in hybrid
wars. This goes beyond the traditional under-
standing of diplomacy and international rela-
tions, where states are the main actors. Thus,
the Russian approach to hybrid wars empha-
sizes the need to develop new, more flexible and
adaptive political and legal regulatory tools to
effectively respond to such complex and dy-
namic threats.
In Russian higher education institutions,
there is a trend towards increasing and system-
atizing educational programs dedicated to hy-
brid wars and information conflicts. In 2022,
the Russian Ministry of Education approved the
introduction of a course on hybrid wars, devel-
oped by the Russian Social State University, and
its integration into the educational programs of
most universities. This course covers "elements
of theory and practice" of hybrid wars, empha-
sizing their reality in the 21st century as con-
flicts that occur not only on the battlefield but
also in the economy, media, and people's con-
sciousness.
Additionally, proposals for increasing the
training of specialists in hybrid wars are being
discussed in Russia, supported by high-ranking
officials and presented as a response to infor-
mation wars waged against the Russian Federa-
tion. This includes the creation of specialized
faculties in military universities and educational

Eurasian Science Review ISSN 3006-1164
Volume 2, No 4
programs in civilian educational institutions. Lo-
monosov Moscow State University stands out as a
venue for developing and implementing the pro-
gram "Information and Hybrid Wars," becoming
the first university in Russia where training of
specialists to counteract information and hybrid
warfare operations at a high level began.
3. US perspectives on hybrid warfare:
strategic deterrence and national defense
in the gray zone
In the United States, the concept of hybrid
warfare is considered a reality requiring the read-
iness of military forces to counter and deter. Hy-
brid warfare, also known as "gray zone" conflict or
low-intensity conflict, encompasses diverse activ-
ities such as information operations, troop move-
ments, disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks,
and the actual use of force. Examples of hybrid
warfare include China's actions in the South
China Sea and Russia's operations in Georgia and
Ukraine. A key feature of hybrid warfare is its abil-
ity to achieve strategic goals without the use of sig-
nificant force.
In 2022, the National Defense Strategy of the
USA highlights integrated deterrence as a key
component aimed at countering hybrid and "gray
zone" military strategies. The definition of gray
zone methods includes "coercive approaches that
may not reach perceived thresholds of USmilitary
actions and cover areas of responsibility across
various parts of the US government." This strat-
egy recognizes that strategic competitors are in-
creasingly engaging in battles outside the physical
battlefield, using unconventional and non-mili-
tary means to undermine US security and that of
their allies. A vital element of integrated deter-
rence is the US's ability to articulate its "red
lines"—actions by adversaries that would trigger a
US military response—in order to effectively
shape behavior that supports US interests and
those of its allies.
Lieutenant General Karen H. Gibson, the
Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Na-
tional Security Partnerships, provided profound
insights on the concept and challenges of hybrid
warfare at a Defense News conference in Arling-
ton, Virginia. Her remarks highlighted the evolv-
ing nature of conflicts in the modern world and
the necessity for US military readiness to counter
and deter these threats. She defined hybrid war-
fare as an attempt to achieve strategic objectives
without the use of significant force, including tac-
tics such as information operations, troop move-
ments, disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks,
and sometimes the actual use of force, exemplified
by Russia's actions in Ukraine. Lieutenant
General Gibson cited China's actions in the
South China Sea and Russian operations in
Georgia and Ukraine as examples of hybrid war-
fare. She also noted the ongoing efforts of Rus-
sia and China to influence and undermine alli-
ances in Europe and the Pacific region, respec-
tively.
A significant change in modern warfare is
the expanded capability to use information as a
tool of war, facilitated by global IT systems. This
includes disseminating information and target-
ing specific audiences with greater precision
than ever before. Identifying and publicly ex-
plaining the actions of adversaries in the realm
of hybrid warfare presents a complex challenge.
It involves balancing the need to protect intelli-
gence sources and methods with the need to en-
sure accuracy and timeliness. Hybrid warfare is
attractive to adversaries because it carries a low
level of risk, is low-cost, and allows for obfus-
cated accountability.
In a new preface to his work, Ofer Fridman
emphasizes that in the context of often exagger-
ated claims by both Russia and the West about
hybrid warfare, which began with Russia's an-
nexation of Crimea in 2014, the events of 2022
led to a real military conflict. He points out the
importance of words and their impact on reality.
Fridman discusses the politicization of the con-
cept of hybrid warfare, particularly in the con-
text of attempts by Russia and the West, includ-
ing NATO and the US, to understand each oth-
er's motives. Both sides accuse each other of em-
ploying hybrid warfare methods, including ac-
tions in the "gray zone." Interestingly, the con-
cept of hybrid warfare did not originate in Rus-
sia but in the US, thanks to the work of military
theorist Frank Hoffman, who in the 2000s de-
scribed a "new tactical-operational environ-
ment" that included a combination of regular
and irregular forces and methods.
Hoffman emphasized that hybrid warfare
involves actual military actions, which Fridman
also points out. However, when Russia adapted
the concept of hybrid warfare, it took on a dif-
ferent meaning, describing primarily an infor-
mation war aimed at intensifying internal disa-
greements within the opponent's society. These
methods, as perceived in the West, are actively
used by Russia to spread disinformation
through social networks, influence elections,
and support Russian narratives in the West.
Meanwhile, in Russia, hybrid warfare is under-
stood to mean actions by the US, primarily
against Russia, more closely describing Hoff-
man's definition of hybrid warfare.
In developing the concept of hybrid war-
fare, several thinkers and theorists have

Eurasian Science Review ISSN 3006-1164
Volume 2, No 4
developed variations on ideas about how states
undermine their enemies from within and under-
mine their will to fight. Some of these, such as
post-war theorist Yevgeny Messner with his con-
cept of "subversive war" and contemporary "Eur-
asian" ideologist Alexander Dugin with "net-cen-
tric warfare," have influenced how Russians think
about information warfare. For many Russians,
the dissolution of the Soviet Union without a sin-
gle shot being fired was the direct result of an in-
formation war led by the US. Supposedly a com-
plex, well-planned, and flawlessly implemented
recipe for defeating the USSR, proposed by the
Western world, is something that contemporary
Russians are very eager to master and use against
their adversaries. Fridman says that the West
should strive to understand Russia better and not
succumb to fear of Russian hybrid warfare, as the
previous generation of the Cold War feared "reds
under every bed.
4. China's hybrid warfare: strategic in-
tegration of tradition and technology
The Chinese understanding and implemen-
tation of hybrid warfare is a unique blend of tra-
ditional military strategies and modern technolo-
gies aimed at achieving strategic goals without the
direct use of significant force. This approach is
grounded in ancient military thinking, tailored to
modern conditions where digital technologies and
information space play a crucial role.
At the core of modern Chinese hybrid warfare
strategy is the work of Chinese military theorists
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. In their 1999 pub-
lication "Unrestricted Warfare," they explored the
nature of contemporary warfare and defined the
future battlefield as an "expanded domain." In
this domain, the focus is not on lethal actions but
on the ability to "paralyze and undermine the en-
emy" using tools such as cyber attacks, financial
operations, and media as instruments of warfare.
Over time, China's strategy has evolved,
adapting to new technological realities and the
global political climate. Throughout the tenures of
Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, China has actively de-
veloped its military, cybernetic, and informational
capabilities, aiming for the "intellectualization" of
military actions and strengthening its position as
a global superpower capable of competing with
the USA for spheres of influence.
In the context of global hybrid warfare, China
employs tools such as psychological warfare,
propaganda, and legal manipulation to advance
its territorial claims without needing to resort to
open conflict. This demonstrates the deep inte-
gration of military strategy, information opera-
tions, and legal maneuvering, aimed at
strengthening China's positions both regionally
and globally.
The United Kingdom acknowledges the se-
verity of hybrid threats and is actively develop-
ing strategies to counter them. The "Countering
Hybrid Warfare" (CHW) initiative, spearheaded
by the UK Ministry of Defence, aims to under-
stand the nature and characteristics of modern
hybrid threats. This multinational project em-
phasizes the need for collaboration and the de-
velopment of conceptual guidelines for counter-
ing hybrid warfare, based on a series of informa-
tional notes covering key ideas and concepts re-
lated to hybrid warfare.
An important aspect of the UK's efforts in
this area is the development and updating of
policies to counter hybrid threats, as reflected in
publications on the official government website.
These documents provide a fundamental as-
sessment and understanding of hybrid warfare,
including containment strategies, methods to
counter hybrid attacks, and the role of corrup-
tion as an element of hybrid warfare.
In the context of broader analysis on hybrid
wars, the UK's approach demonstrates a com-
prehensive view of the issue, including under-
standing how hybrid threats can be countered
and what political and military strategies can be
effective in combating these threats. The UK is
committed to international cooperation and
knowledge exchange as part of its efforts to
counter hybrid threats, emphasizing the im-
portance of collective actions and joint strategy
development.The approaches to hybrid warfare
differ significantly between Russia, China, and
the Western countries. Russia utilizes hybrid
strategies, including informational wars, cyber-
attacks, and economic pressure, exemplified by
the 2014 annexation of Crimea which combined
military and non-military tactics to achieve po-
litical goals without large-scale armed conflict.
China focuses on leveraging cyberspace and
technological innovations for hybrid warfare,
utilizing strategies like the "Three Warfares" —
psychological, media, and legal warfare — to
shape public opinion and justify actions strate-
gically.
Western nations, including the USA and
EU countries, adopt a comprehensive approach
to hybrid threats, emphasizing cyber security,
countering misinformation, and strengthening
international legal order. The USA's National
Security Strategy underscores the importance of
fortifying cyberspace and information environ-
ments to guard against hybrid threats. The EU
is actively developing initiatives to combat mis-
information and promote media literacy.
The principal differences in these

Eurasian Science Review ISSN 3006-1164
Volume 2, No 4
approaches lie in the objectives, preferred tools,
and methods of conflict. Russia and China use hy-
brid strategies to extend their influence and
achieve national interests through a mix of mili-
tary force and non-military means. In contrast,
Western countries focus on protecting their soci-
eties and infrastructures from such threats, prior-
itizing international cooperation and legal frame-
work strengthening.
Hybrid wars serve as a multifunctional tool
for states aiming to advance their interests on the
international stage, necessitating the develop-
ment of coordinated strategies and mechanisms
by the global community to effectively counter hy-
brid threats and maintain international peace and
stability.
Conclusion
There is no unified definition of hybrid war-
fare within the United Nations due to the ambigu-
ity and multifaceted nature of the phenomenon.
Hybrid warfare combines traditional military ac-
tions and non-military methods such as cyberat-
tacks, economic pressure, information cam-
paigns, and psychological effects. This complexity
makes it difficult to develop a universally accepta-
ble definition that accommodates the diverse legal
traditions and security interests of UN member
states. Furthermore, the international community
faces challenges in adapting existing international
norms and agreements to new forms of conflict.
The absence of a clear definition complicates the
identification and attribution of responsibility for
hybrid attacks, thereby hindering the implemen-
tation of targeted countermeasures at the interna-
tional level. This creates gaps in the legal frame-
work that can be exploited by states and non-state
actors to carry out destabilizing actions under a
veil of uncertainty. For example, the International
Committee of the Red Cross has highlighted the
need to adapt international humanitarian law to
new challenges posed by the blurred lines be-
tween military and civilian spheres in hybrid con-
flicts.One of the key documents in this context is
NATO's "Strategy on Hybrid Threats," developed
in response to the increasing complexity and di-
versity of security challenges faced by member
states. The strategy outlines that hybrid threats
can encompass a wide range of military and non-
military measures, including cyberattacks, propa-
ganda, political pressure, and economic impact.
These actions are often conducted in a manner
that makes identifying and attributing the aggres-
sor difficult, complicating decision-making pro-
cesses within NATO and national governments. In
response, NATO has devised a comprehensive ap-
proach that includes enhancing the alliance's
intelligence capabilities to better identify hybrid
threats, developing cyber defense measures,
and strategies for information security. Addi-
tionally, NATO actively works on strengthening
the resilience and defense capabilities of its
members through intelligence sharing, joint ex-
ercises, and the development of recommenda-
tions for improving national security systems.
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