Available via license: CC BY
Content may be subject to copyright.
Page 1 of 7 Original Research
Read online:
Scan this QR
code with your
smart phone or
mobile device
to read online.
hps://jolgri.org Open Access
Journal of Local Government Research and Innovaon
ISSN: (Online) 2788-919X, (Print) 2709-7412
Author:
Hulisani Takalani1
Phellecy N. Lavhelani1
Aliaon:
1Department of Public and
Development Administraon,
Faculty of Management,
Commerce and Law,
University of Venda,
Thohoyandou, South Africa
Corresponding author:
Hulisani Takalani,
takalanihh@gmail.com
Dates:
Received: 04 Aug. 2023
Accepted: 08 Dec. 2023
Published: 28 Feb. 2024
How to cite this arcle:
Takalani, H. & Lavhelani, P.N,
2024, ‘The administrave
eects of polical killings of
ocials in South African
Municipalies’, Journal of
Local Government Research
and Innovaon 5(0), a161.
hps://doi.org/10.4102/
jolgri.v5i0.161
Copyright:
© 2024. The Authors.
Licensee: AOSIS. This work
is licensed under the
Creave Commons
Aribuon License. Introducon
South Africa has a history of political violence including a culture of violent service delivery
protests and the killings of local government officials. Shaw and Thomas (2017:598) note that
there is a trend of individual assassinations linked to political actors in South Africa and this has
become frequent in local news reporting. In recent times, many local government officials have
lost their lives in various provinces in Kwazulu-Natal, Gauteng, North-West, Limpopo and
Mpumalanga Provinces. Bruce (2009:2014) argues that the key motive behind these killings of
government officials can be linked to the value of public office. The causes of political attacks
are in this view linked to squabbles over the control of municipal financial resources and cadre
deployment positions. Napier (2018) argues that there is a problem with the separation of
political and administrative power in the public sector, especially in the local government.
However, studies ignored this phenomenon. Ward councillors have considerable power to
influence the access to municipal coffers through involvement in tender and contract awarding
processes for houses, the building of roads, water and sanitation and the supply of goods and
service. This paper investigates the administrative effects of the killing of local government
officials in municipalities within South Africa. This paper suggests that the rise in politically
motivated killings is a result of the politicised local government administration characterised
by cadre deployment and continuous political disputes. The study finds that the tensions and
related killings have serious impact on governance by causing instability and compromising
the municipality’s capabilities to deliver services efficiently and effectively to the communities
they serve.
Background: Politically motivated killings have been an increasing concern in South Africa
since the dawn of democracy in 1994. Over the years, various municipalities have seen a rise
in the killing of local government officials. While there are records of the number of incidences
of killings in provinces such as Kwazulu-Natal, Gauteng and Limpopo, it remains unclear how
these occurrences affect local government administration.
Aim: This study seeks to explore the administrative effects of politically motivated killings of
officials in South African municipalities.
Methods: Using the adversarial and politicised bureaucratic models, the study relied on
secondary sources of data from accredited journal articles, books, conference proceedings,
official reports and academic theses. A desktop qualitative review of data was used.
Results: The research found that politically motivated killings of municipal officials have
detrimental effects on good governance and service delivery such as staff rotations,
destabilisation of the councils, skills erosion and continued political tensions.
Conclusion: This study finds that the killings are part of the deeper crisis of politics and
administration dynamics in the public service with detrimental effects on the governance of
municipalities in South Africa. The study recommends that local governments introduce
stringent minimum requirements for appointing officials to minimise the contestation between
politicians and government administrators.
Contribution: This study seeks to stimulate further research interest in the anatomy of political
killings, specifically the diagnosis and specific measures to help curb this phenomenon for
better governance within local government.
Keywords: political killings; local government officials; councillors; municipal councils;
corruption.
The administrave eects of polical killings of
ocials in South African Municipalies
Read online:
Scan this QR
code with your
smart phone or
mobile device
to read online.
Page 2 of 7 Original Research
hps://jolgri.org Open Access
Background
Von Holt (2014) indicates that the political killings of
government officials and intimidation are common in most
developing nations like Mexico because of poor socio-
economic conditions and poverty (Calderón 2018). In Africa,
political tensions are often related to mass government
corruption. While the dynamics, causes, implications and
curtailing measures may be slightly different, political
tensions are no less of a threat to government efficiency in
those countries. In Tanzania for example, Tanzanian
bureaucratic arrangements for licenses and permits were
known to be burdensome because of time spent and
corruption (GAN Integrity 2019). The Anti-Corruption
Unit was established to safeguard against corruption.
Xinhuanet 2017 indicated that President Magufuli established
the anti-corruption court in presidential campaigns for the
October 2015 general election because reducing corruption
was one of his priorities. Later, the court was coded into law
in 2016 under the Economic and Organised Crime Control Act
(Dolve & Mullard, 2019) with the hope of minimising the
killings of government officials and corruption.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996)
encourages respect for human life and democracy. The
present democratic dispensation is built on constitutionalism
that promotes peace and stability. However, it has been
characterised by political killings, particularly in the
Kwazulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and Limpopo Provinces.
According to the Global Initiative on Transnational Organized
Crime (GI-TOC 2022), there has been a marked increase in
targeted killings since 2000 with a recorded 418 political hits
between 2000 and 2021 nationwide. Two hundred and
thirteen of these killings are reported to have taken place in
the last 7 years, with 118 of these murders taking place in the
Kwazulu-Natal (KZN) province. In response, the South
African government established the Moerane Commission to
investigate the motive for the killings since 2011. The
commission found among other things that a weak criminal
justice system and criminal elements by political players for
political and personal gain have escalated the murders
(Nomarwayi et al. 2020:15007). Mongale (2021:159) notes that
areas like KZN have been inundated with political-related
violence since the 1980s. Most notably, the early 1990s was
characterised by inter-party African National Congress
(ANC) versus Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) conflicts for
political dominance. The dominance of the ANC in KZN over
the years has however exacerbated the situation and shifted
the dynamics towards intra-party conflicts where the ANC
members fight each other over government positions such as
mayoral posts and ward counsellor positions.
The political instability that sometimes leads to political
killings stems from a culture of unaccountability that
compromises service delivery at the municipal level.
A Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018) study notes that corruption,
nepotism, theft, embezzlement, negligence and a culture
of impunity undermine the bureaucratic efficiency and
effectiveness of the South African government. Fourie (2018)
indicates that municipalities are required by law to provide
several monopolist services such as water distribution,
refuse removal and sanitation that may not be provided by
other service providers. Municipalities thus have a high
degree of control and discretion regarding the procurement
of services and the appointment of service providers.
Deviations from the prescribed processes because of the
prevalent culture of non-accountability create a conducive
environment for corruption, disruption, political instability
and tensions. Lack of transparency in supply chain processes
(SCM) increases risk factors that are also often attributed to
corruption, skills shortages and knowledge deficits. Masete
and Mafini (2018) posit that ambiguity in the power and
roles of both appointed and elected public officials results in
poor or sub-standard service delivery. Mbandlwa, Dorasamy
and Fagbadebo (2020:1645) also assert that the South African
local government sector is in a mess because of the unethical
conduct of those in leadership positions who focus on intra-
party and inter-party-political battles but fail to instil a
culture of accountability against corrupt individuals.
Consequently, despondent communities resort to service
delivery protests in many parts of the country.
In view of the discussions so far, the problem that underpins
this paper is that although there is sufficient documentation
of politically motivated killings, it is unclear what effects
these incidences have on governance and the delivery of
social services particularly in the local government sphere
where the killings are rife. The aim of this study is therefore
to explore the effects of political killings of local government
officials on the administration and governance in South
African local municipalities.
Theorecal framework
The adversarial model
The adversarial model was adopted as a framework for this
study. The model was first conceptualised by Peters (1987)
as one of the five ideal-typical models of politico-
administrative relations. It posits that there is a permanent
struggle for power between politicians and administrators
where administrators and politicians fight for authority over
public policy processes (Carboni 2010:90). Hults et al. (2015)
concur with Peters’ adversarial model adding that the model
is not characterised by collaboration between politicians and
administrators but instead by a constant battle by both
parties to gain and maintain control. The assumption in this
regard is that both administrators and politicians are driven
by their desire to maximise their goals and interests including
electoral power and personal benefits. Furthermore, there is
an overlapping of roles between politicians and government
administrators. Peters (1987) and Svara (2006) assert that
politicians will end in an administrative state if government
administrators structurally dominate decision-making or
politics driven by a personal and partisan interest in
politically dominant decision-making. This framework is
used to explain the killing of municipal officials which
Page 3 of 7 Original Research
hps://jolgri.org Open Access
mainly reflects a struggle for political control and also for
administrative control of the municipal resources and
processes. In the South African government context, the
politicised model is anchored in the cadre policy and
development strategy of the ruling party, which emphasises
the recruitment from the ruling party and that potential
recruits are made to understand and accept the basic policies
and programmes of the South African governance.
Policised bureaucrac model
In addition to the Adversarial model, the Political Bureaucratic
model was also used. The latter complements the former by
asserting that elected office-bearers or public administrators
are politically mandated to manage and control public service
administration. This includes the appointments of politicians
in senior bureaucratic positions such as senior managers and
general managers (Heywood 1997:335). These appointments
are thus viewed to control bureaucrats and civil service
processes. The model emphasises the inseparable nature of
politics and public administration. In other words, through
this politicised bureaucratic model, politicians lead government
administrative processes. In the case of South Africa, this is
reflected more evidently in the ANC’s cadre deployment
policy and development strategy of 1997, which encourages
the recruitment of party members into administrative
positions (Masuku & Jili 2013:3). This paper relied on the
Politicised Bureaucracy model to argue that the politicisation
of municipal official appointments leads to heightened
contestation for municipal positions and consequent killings of
local government officials.
Methodology
A desktop qualitative approach was adopted, and data were
sourced from available published article journals, books and
statutory reports and documents generated by government
entities. Leavy (2014) asserts that qualitative research employs
inductive approaches to knowledge building aimed at
generating meaning. Researchers use this approach to explore;
robustly investigate and learn about social phenomena; to
unpack the meanings people ascribe to activities, situations
and events. It is for this reason that numerous studies and
records were reviewed and analysed to obtain an overview of
the state of the killings of government officials in various
municipalities across the nine South African provinces.
Scholarships on political conflicts in local government,
political interference and related local government challenges
were reviewed and analysed to understand how all these
factors have considerable consequences for local government
administration.
Best and Kahn (2016) asserted that research credibility is
about adhering to the highest scientific standards, rigour and
transparency towards the public. It is established by how
research findings correspond to real-world situations
under investigation. Creswell (2013) posits that the validation
of research findings increases the trustworthiness and
dependability of study results. To ensure the credibility and
trustworthiness of the findings, the researcher relied on
credible secondary data in the form of published articles
from reputable platforms and journals. The researcher also
used statutory data generated by official state organs. The
researcher was therefore able to verify the authenticity of the
data to ensure that the findings and conclusions presented
paint a realistic picture of the situation under study.
Causes of the killing of municipal
ocials
Cadre deployment
This study submits that cadre deployment contributes to
the killings of local government officials as there are no
minimum requirements for the position and consequent
high contestations for positions. Cadre deployment implies
the administrative practice whereby party loyalists or
representatives are ‘deployed’ to positions in public office
based on their political dependability as opposed to their
suitability for the positions (Siddle & Koelble 2012:118).
Magomane (2012) cited in Mlambo, Zubane and Thusi
(2022:13) argued that the ANC’s failures in the delivery of
basic service delivery are partly attributed to the practice of
cadre deployment in the local government sector. In addition,
municipalities are impacted by related nepotism, cronyism
and political interference around the appointment of officials
in strategic or key positions. The cadre deployment policy is
fit one fit all which in turn attracts competition from various
political players to occupy government as well as municipal
and council positions. This in turn increases political tensions
over municipal positions and power. Reddy (2018) argues
that municipal politicisation and cadre deployment practices
as a substitute for merit-based selection and appointment of
political office bearers result in poor service delivery and loss
of public confidence. These political arrangements are also
applied in the promotion, staff retention, rewarding and
disciplining of municipal officials. The practices ignore
human development capability and deploy cadres based on
political party loyalty rather than competency, knowledge
and skills required for the job. This blind employment of
cadres in local government and other spheres of government
is unethical as it deprives society of capable and competent
office bearers.
Polical interference
Masiya (2020) found that the picture of the internal local
government environment is that of negative political power
struggles between administrators and political players. The
culture of political interference is embedded within the local
government structures and processes as they navigate their
existence through ‘commanding authoritarian language from
politicians’ and nonappreciation for their skills and expertise.
Consequently, these create and cause officials to feel pessimistic
about their ability to undertake their tasks in a professional
manner, and create dissonant workplaces (Masiya et al.
2021:105). The killing of government officials in South African
municipalities is sometimes led by inter-party-political
Page 4 of 7 Original Research
hps://jolgri.org Open Access
dynamics and the contestation over political power and this
hinders the delivery of services. De Haas (2016) indicates that
the manipulation of party lists results in violence among
different political organisations was another contributing
factor in Kwazulu-Natal for killing government officials and
this has led to the assassination of most councillors. Similarly,
Bruce (2013) and De Haas (2016) assert that the lack of
qualifications of politicians coupled with their desire to protect
their positions results in political turfs to the extent of
eliminating their competitors. Duncan (2010) indicates that the
fusion of politics and business through Black Economic
Empowerment (BEE) policies drives politicians to an intimate
relationship between political power and material
accumulation, where they view election to public office as the
best way to quickly accumulate wealth. De Visser (2009) posits
that the problem of division of power and responsibilities
among politicians who are also office bearers in municipalities
has been a persistent cause for tensions and municipalities
have found it difficult to adapt to the new political-
administration dispensation. Research shows that most
municipalities have no job description for speakers and
consequently have no procedure for conflict resolution.
Furthermore, municipal positions have ‘highly charged’
political profiles and this has contributed to shifting the
appointment control to political parties (De Visser 2009:17–18).
Corrupon
The National Planning Commission (2011) identifies
corruption as a leading factor in the killings of government
officials. Moreover, political violence negatively impacts
effective service delivery as some senior officials resigned
because of acts of violence. Raophala (2013) points out that
service delivery is a tormenting issue in South Africa because
of the malpractices of the local government officials. The
provision of quality service delivery to communities is
compromised by corruption rooted in the local government
officials. Soliman and Cable (2011) observe that corruption is
a huge challenge in developmental countries such as South
Africa because resources allocated to address the socio-
economic and developmental objectives are abused by the
local government officials as they benefit themselves, relatives
and friends and neglect the core functions of municipalities.
The lack of capacity of senior administrators results in the
delay of municipal service delivery in South Africa. Hale
(1989) cited in Gaines and Kappeler (2015) asserts that most
people regard crime, misappropriation of funds and cadre
deployment of political office bearers as evidence of
corruption. Gaines and Kappeler (2015) outlined corruption
in the workplace to include sexual harassment of employees,
discrimination or favouritism in staff promotion and
inappropriate work-related activities in which political office
bearers may participate. Wraith and Simpkins (2011) also
note bribery, nepotism and delegation of authority according
to self-interest rather than merit as part of corruption.
Mafunisa (2003) points out that senior managers and other
government administrators are mostly members of the
governing party and are employed because of their political
affiliation. The approach is that senior local government
officials are deployed to run certain government departments
and entities without meeting the job requirements. In this
case, the employee’s ability to carry out the political mandate
is the only criterion used for employment office bearers.
Eects of polical killings on
municipalies
Sta rotaon
Ndevu and Muller (2018) argue that there are many staff
vacancies in various local municipalities across South Africa,
but there is slow progress in filling those positions. This
along with the municipalities’ inherent inability to maintain
and manage public infrastructure, cadre deployment,
corruption and already prevalent skills shortage leads to
mediocre quality of services. The killing of officials therefore
adds to the skills gaps in institutions where there is already
limited training and capacity challenges (Chakunda &
Chakaipa 2015). Office bearers such as municipal managers
are the most targeted because they head municipal
administration as mandated by the Municipal Systems Act
(No. 32 of 2000). In addition, municipal managers provide a
communication link between the council and administration
and therefore are prone to political pressure from conflicting
political interests. Similarly, other senior officials such as
Chief Financial Officers are at considerable risk as custodians
of public funds of the municipality as proclaimed in section
81(1) (a) of the Municipal Finance Management Act 2003. The
South African Local Government Association (SALGA)
suggested that the reasons for killing and threatening
municipal managers and other senior municipal officials
relate to employment, tenders and salaries (SALGA, 2016).
Von Holt (2014) also argues that competition for socio-
economic opportunities and resources that are managed by
local authorities and senior municipal officials causes
political killings. Consequently, there is no stable, structured
and strategic leadership required for good governance
because of the killing of officials in strategic positions.
Municipal councils
In his classic, Poejie (1917) identifies directly elected
municipal councils as a core institution of democratic local
government. He argues that it is important to have effective
and efficient governance as well as professionals in the local
government who would marshal services to the communities.
He adds that this would increase levels of formal awareness
and assertiveness and increase capabilities. More than 40
years later however, far from professionalism in local
government, Mamokhere (2022:16) argues that political
instability is a major problem for municipal councils. The
author posits that political rifts within the ruling party are a
concern for service delivery where many municipal councils
have in some instances failed to convene meetings because of
rampant political infighting. This in turn undermines the
delivery of basic services and corrodes public trust in local
government’s ability to meet the needs of communities.
Political violence negatively impacts decision-making and
Page 5 of 7 Original Research
hps://jolgri.org Open Access
the adoption of resolutions in municipal councils. At the
heart of the constant, conflict at the local government level is
the inability to separate administrative responsibilities from
political dynamics by office bearers who are also political
players of represented political formations. To support this,
Mhelembe and Mafini (2019) argue that although councillors
are prohibited from political interference in administrative
issues by the Code of Conduct affairs and from partaking in
tender decision processes, by Section 118 of the Municipal
Finance Management Act (MFMA), political interference in
these activities remain a key challenge. Sibanda, Zindi and
Maramura (2020) argue that this blurred distinction
between administrative and political functions results
in increased political interference and tensions, which
consequently affects governance and service delivery.
Service delivery
Government politicisation has compromised local
municipalities’ capabilities to provide services. The increasing
killing of municipal officials is partly a result of the politicised
local government administration characterised by cadre
deployment and continuous political disputes. Thornhill and
Cloete (eds. 2014) suggest that the appointment of senior
municipal officials such as municipal managers and Chief
Financial Officers has also been made based on political
affiliation rather than expertise and ability to manage fiscal
challenges. In support of this view, Pieterse (2021) argues that
political killings in South Africa have coincided with appalling
financial mismanagement and skill capacity challenges.
Furthermore, the politicisation of the executive and
administrative positions and political interference are major
causes of ongoing skills depletion in various municipal
departments. Thus, there is little strategic leadership in most
municipalities because of skills shortages coupled with a high
turnover of political leadership Corruption in procurement is
often a result of these political contestations between local
government administrators and politicians. Sibanda et al.
(2020:9–10) posit that political interference is to corruptly have
an influence on tenders and contracts at the Municipal level.
As a result, municipalities provide sub-standard service and
award tenders to those linked to councillors and officials. This
is even though the municipal councillors’ Code and Conduct
and Section 118 of the MFMA forbid undue political
interference and bar municipal councillors from partaking in
tendering and other administrative issues.
Good governance
Political instability influences governance continuity in local
municipalities. Onwuegbuchulam (2021) posits that while
patronage and political party power struggles are at the
centre of killings of officials and other political violence in
KZN, there is a growing culture of violence especially in
intra-party politics, which has detrimental effects on the
work of government. For example, the ANC’s political
infighting, wholesome corruption and related service
delivery failure led to the change of governments in many
metros including Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson
Mandela through coalitions with the minority parties
(Bradshaw & Breakfast 2019:115). Part of good governance in
local government is the requirement to hold free and fair
democratic elections. Midlarsky (1998) suggests that
democracies are more stable than autocratic governments
and characterised by minimal domestic political violence.
However, political violence and murders as seen in the build-
up and during the 2016 and 2021 local government elections
are a direct threat to this crucial democratic exercise. SALGA
(2017:1) observes that the act of ‘violence or even to the extent
of killing municipal councillors and/or senior managers
should be viewed within the contestation of power, therefore
undermining democracy’. The heightened killing of local
government officials and political violence during the time of
local government elections affects democratic consolidation
at the municipal level. Electoral regimes where democracy is
fully entrenched should be capable of conducting free and
fair elections where political formations or parties that win
the contestations replace those who previously occupied
power in a peaceful and democratic process (Huntington
1991:267 cited in Nomarwayi et al. 2020:6).
Discussion
This study explored the administrative effects of the killings of
local government officials within municipalities in South
Africa. Despite quick progress made in the governance of local
government since 1994, South African local government’s
sphere is still faced with a myriad of inherent systematic,
institutional and administrative challenges. The political
tensions that sometimes result in the killing of officials in local
municipalities fall within this political-admirative crisis. The
study found that the killing of local government officials is a
major concern in Kwazulu-Natal, Limpopo and North-West
Provinces. Cadre deployment policies, corruption and conflicts
over the control of municipal resources are among the major
causes of political tensions and the killing of officials. Cadre
deployment is a consequence of no-requirement policies for
municipal councils, which makes all those with party affiliation
potential contenders for council. The appointment of
unqualified and unskilled party officials to strategic positions
for personal or political gain is also a major contributor to the
political tensions.
The killings of local government officials continue to pose
detrimental threats on the sustainability of these institutions.
Removal of officials because of death results in unoccupied
positions and high staff rotation, which compromise the
municipalities’ capacity to provide basic services. The delayed
provision of service delivery affects poor communities and
has often caused violent protests. Furthermore, the killing
and political squabbles result in leadership instability, which
in turn exacerbates governance challenges at municipalities.
According to Ndaba (2007), the African National Congress
itself admits that the infighting within the organisation has
contributed to instability and consequent service delivery
protests in various municipalities across South Africa. The
Department of Cooperative Governance, Human Settlement
and Traditional Affairs (2017:8) cited in Mamokhere (2020)
Page 6 of 7 Original Research
hps://jolgri.org Open Access
states that political tensions and infighting have a negative
impact on the provision of services and development in many
municipalities. The inter-party conflicts affect the democratic
processes of free and fair elections and by-elections used to
constitute local government councils.
To help curb the political tensions that lead to the killing of
municipal officials, this study makes the following
recommendations:
• In dealing with contestation over the occupancy of
municipal positions, the South African government should
develop the minimum qualifications and competency
requirements of government positions. This is likely to
limit the number of targeted killings of municipal positions.
• Municipal structures should investigate ways of
professionalising the role of ward councillors and impose
qualification requirements where possible. This will not
only address the skills and capacity challenges but enable
councillors to move beyond serving their political principals
and representing communities and their municipalities.
• The tender and procurement policies should be reviewed
with the intention to limit corruption, which has in the past
ensured that municipal officials award municipal contracts
to family members, friends and political affiliates.
• There should be a clear distinction between political and
administrative roles at the municipal level particularly
for municipal officials who are also political players.
• The study recommends that effective cadre deployment
policy goes with the minimum qualifications of the senior
positions in the municipalities.
• Municipal structure should be strengthened through the
effective implementation of relevant public administrative
policies like the Municipal Finance Management Act
(MFMA) to guard against unfair and corrupt practices in
procurement and other local government functions.
• Municipalities should impose effective accountability
mechanisms for municipal office bearers who are found
guilty of malpractices linked to political interference. This
should include harsh legal action against individuals and
political parties engaging in political violence and
targeted killings.
• Furthermore, municipalities should invest more in the
training of officials. Some high-ranking municipal
officials including Municipal Managers do not have the
necessary administrative and modern technological skills
to deliver proper services to the communities. Training
will assist managers in solving institutional problems
such as political and personal disputes, absenteeism,
ineffective and inefficient performance, low productivity,
disputes and overall poor service delivery.
Conclusion
This study sought to explore the administrative effects of the
killing of municipal officials in municipalities within South
Africa. The article adopted a qualitative desktop approach to
gather data. The study relied on the Adversarial and Political
Bureaucratic theoretical models to explore how the politico-
administrative relations at local government lead to political
killings and the consequence they impose on the continuity
of governance. The study found that these targeted killings
signify much deeper issues within the municipal structures
including contestations over resources, political interference
and easily accessible municipal positions linked to cadre
deployment practices. The paper submits that the killings
have detrimental impacts on municipal functions and
government continuity. The killings also have various
financial implications and affect the overall provision of good
quality services by municipalities. The study found that
government officials such as municipal managers, senior
municipal officials and ward councillors are at risk of political
violence. The study concludes by recommending that the
South African government must develop measures and
strengthen appointment policies focusing on competencies
and skills requirements to minimise contestations for
positions and improve service delivery. Furthermore, the
paper submits that there should be a clear distinction between
administrative and political roles within municipalities and
other government structures supported by the effective
implementation of current policies and regulations against
malpractices. The paper adds that the government should
take serious action against perpetrators of political
interference, corruption, killings and other related offenses.
Lastly, the paper seeks to stimulate further interest in research
on specific measures to help curb political instability within
local government and other government structures.
Acknowledgements
Compeng interests
The authors declare that they have no financial or personal
relationships that may have inappropriately influenced
them in writing this article.
Authors’ contribuons
H.T. and P.N.L. meet the criteria for authorship as outlined in
the authorship policy and author contribution statements.
H.T. and P.N.L. equally contributed to the research,
development, editing and reviewing of the manuscript.
Ethical consideraons
This article followed all ethical standards for research
without direct contact with human or animal subjects.
Funding informaon
This research received no specific grant from any funding
agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Data availability
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data
were created or analysed in this study.
Page 7 of 7 Original Research
hps://jolgri.org Open Access
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of
the authors and are the product of professional research. It
does not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of
any affiliated institution, funder, agency, or that of the
publisher. The authors are responsible for this article’s results,
findings, and content.
References
Bertelsmann Sung, 2018, Tranformaon Index BTI 2018: Vietnam country report,
Verlag Bertelsmann Sung, viewed n.d., from hps://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/imported/leseprobe/LP_978-3-
86793-797-9_1.pdf.
Best, J.W. & Kahn, J.V., 2016, Research in educaon, Pearson Educaon, India.
Bradshaw, G. & Breakfast, N., 2019, ‘Mediang coalion polics at the local
government level in South Africa, 2016–2019’, Journal of Gender, Informaon and
Development in Africa 8(2), 113–129.
Bruce, P., 2009, ‘Dictang the Local balance of Power: Elecon Violence in South
Africa’, SA Crime Quarterly (28), 3–9.
Bruce, P., 2013, ‘A Provincial Concern? Polical Killings in South Africa’, SA Crime
Quarterly (45), 13–24.
Bruce, P., 2014, Polical killings in South Africa: The ulmate inmidaon, Instute for
Security Studies, Policy Brief 64.
Calderón, L.Y., 2018, An analysis of Mayoral Assassinaons in Mexico, 2000–17,
Jusce in Mexico, Working Paper Series, vol. 15, University of San Diego,
San Diego, CA.
Carboni, N., 2010, ‘Changing relaonships between policians and bureaucrats in
contemporary democracies: An empirical analysis of the Italian experience’,
Internaonal Public Management Review 11(1), 90–109.
Chakunda, V. & Chakaipa S., 2015, ‘Local Government Capacity Building and
Development: Lessons, Challenges and Opportunies’, Journal of Polical Science
and Public Aairs 3(1), 1–5.
Creswell, J.W., 2013, Qualitave inquiry and research design: Choosing among ve
approaches, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
De Haas, M., 2016, ‘The killing elds of KwaZulu-Natal: Local government elecons,
Violence and democracy in 2016’, South African Crime Quarterly 57, 43–53.
hps://doi.org/10.17159/2413-3108/2016/v0n57a456
Department of Cooperave Governance, Human Selements and Tradional
Aairs, 2017, Municipal Service Delivery Protests within the Context of
Developmental Local Governance in Limpopo Province, Government Printers,
Polokwane.
De Visser, J., 2009, ‘Developmental local government in South Africa: Instuonal
fault lines’, Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance (2), 7–25. hps://doi.
org/10.5130/cjlg.v0i2.1005
Dolve, M. & Mullard, S., 2019, Addressing illicit nancial ows for an-corrupon at
country level: A Primer for Development Praconers, U4 An-Corrupon
Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Instute.
Duncan, J., 2010, A culture of polical assassinaon, viewed 03 September 2018, from
hp://sacsis.org.za/site/arcle/575.1.
Fourie, D., 2018, ‘Ethics in municipal supply chain management in South Africa’, Local
Economy 33(7), 726–739. hps://doi.org/10.1177/0269094218809598
GAN Integrity, 2019, Tanzania corrupon report, viewed September 2018, from
hps://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/countryproles/tanzania/.
Global Iniave Against Transnaonal Organized Crime (GI-TOC), 2022, Strategic
organized crime risk assessment – South Africa, viewed September 2023, from
hps://globaliniave.net/.
Heywood, P., 1997, ‘Polical corrupon: Problems and perspecves’, Polical Studies
45(3), 417–435.
Hulst, R., Mafuru, W. & Mpenzi, D., 2015, ‘Fieen years aer decentralizaon by
devoluon: Polical-administrave relaons in Tanzanian local government’,
Public Administaron and Development 35(5), 360–371. hps://doi.org/10.1002/
pad.1743
Leavy, P., (Ed.), 2014, The Oxford handbook of qualitave research, Oxford University
Press.
Mafunisa, M. J., 2003, ‘Separaon of polics from the South African public service:
Rhetoric or reality’, Journal of Public Administraon 38(2), 85–101.
Mamokhere, J., 2020, ‘An assessment of reasons behind service delivery protests: A
case of greater Tzaneen Municipality’, Journal of Public Aairs 20(2), e2049.
hps://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2049
Mamokhere, J., 2022, ‘Understanding the complex interplay of governance,
systemac, and structural factors aecng service delivery in South African
Municipalies’, Commonwealth Youth & Development 20(2), e12230. hps://doi.
org/10.25159/2663-6549/12230
Masete, M.Z. & Mani, C., 2018, ‘Internal barriers to supply chain management
implementaon in a South African tradional university’, Journal of Transport and
Supply Chain Management 12(10), 389–402. hps://doi.org/10.4102/jtscm.
v12i0.389
Masiya, T., Davids, Y.D. & Mangai, M.S., 2021, ‘Factors aecng the performance of South
African municipal ocials: stakeholders’ perspecves’, Commonwealth Journal of
Local Governance (25), 97–115.
Masuku, M.M. & Jili, N.N., 2019, ‘Public service delivery in South Africa: The polical
inuence at local government level’, Journal of Public Aairs 19(4), e1935. hps://
doi.org/10.1002/pa.1935
Mbandlwa, Z., Dorasamy, N. & Fagbadebo, O., 2020, ‘Leadership challenges in the South
African local government system’, Journal of Crical review 7(13), 1642–1653.
Mlambo, V., Zubane, S. & Thusi, X., 2022, ‘Interrogating governance challenges
and Cadre deployment in South Africa’, Cihan University-Erbil Journal of
Humanities and Social Sciences 6(1), 11–18. https://doi.org/10.24086/
cuejhss.v6n1y2022
Mhelembe, K. & Mani, C., 2019, ‘Modelling the link between supply chain risk,
exibility and performance in the public sector’, South African Journal of Economic
and Management Sciences 22(1), 12.
Midlarsky, M.I., 1988, ‘Rulers and the ruled: Paerned inequality and the onset of mass
polical violence’, American polical science Review 82(2), 491–509.
Mongale, C.O., 2021, War party: How the ANC’s polical killings are breaking South
Africa, New Contree, No. 87, Book Reviews, pp. 154–163, Cape Town.
Napier, C.J., 2018, ‘Polical oversight commiees and the separaon of powers in the
local sphere of government: The case of the City of Tshwane’, Journal of Public
Administraon 53(2), 169–185.
Naonal Planning Commission, 2011, Naonal Development Plan, Government
Printers, Pretoria.
Ndaba, B., 2007, ANC Admits to Inghng Role in Service Delivery Rows, Star,
Johannesburg.
Ndevu, Z.J. & Muller, K., 2018, ‘Operaonalising performance management in local
government: The use of the balanced scorecard’, SA Journal of Human Resource
Management 16(0), 977. hps://doi.org/10.4102/sajhrm.v16i0.977
Nomarwayi, T., Breakfast, N.B., Bradshaw, G. & Dlamini, S, 2020, ‘Polical killings in
the post-apartheid South Africa: A polical and criminological perspecve
in Kwazulu-Natal Province, 1994–2019’, Gender and Behaviour 18(1),
15006–15016.
Onwuegbuchulam, S.P.C., 2021, ‘Anatomy of polical violence in South Africa:
Historical and pedagogical presupposions of the KZN polical killings’,
Intervenons, 24(6), 879–896.
Peters, G., 1987, ‘Policians and bureaucrats in the polics of policymaking’, in
J-E. Lane (ed.), Bureaucracy and public choice, pp. 256–282, Sage, Bristol.
Pieterse, M., 2021, ‘Anatomy of a crisis: Structural factors contribung to the collapse
of Urban Municipal Governance in Emfuleni, South Africa’, Urban Forum 32, 1–15.
hps://doi.org/10.1007/s12132-020-09406-4
Poelje, G.A.V., 1917, Hedendaagsch gemeenterecht, Nijho.
Raophala, M.N., 2013, ‘Municipal service delivery in Greater Tzaneen local
municipality in Limpopo Province, A case of Lenyenye Township’, Master of Public
Administraon, mini dissertaon, University of Limpopo.
Reddy, P.S., 2018, ‘Evolving local government in post-conict South Africa: Where to?’,
Local Economy 33(7), 710–725. hps://doi.org/10.1177/0269094218809079
Republic of South Africa, 1996, Constuon of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of
1996, Government Printers, Pretoria.
Republic of South Africa, 2000, Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act
32 of 2000, Government Printer, Pretoria.
Republic of South Africa, 2003, Local Government: Municipal Finance Management
Act, 2003 (Act 56 of 2003), Government Printer, Pretoria, South Africa.
Shaw, M. & Thomas, K., 2017, ‘The commercializaon of assassinaon: “Hits” and
contract killing in South Africa, 2000–2015’, African Aairs 116(465), 597–620.
hps://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adw050
Sibanda, M.M., Zindi, B. & Maramura, T.C., 2020, ‘Control and accountability in supply
chain management: Evidence from a South African metropolitan municipality ’,
Cogent Business & Management 7(1), 1785105. hps://doi.org/10.1080/233119
75.2020.1785105
Siddle, A. & Koelble, T.A., 2012, The failure of decentralisaon in South African local
government, UCT Press, Cape Town.
Soliman, H. & Cable, S., 2011, ‘Sinking under the weight of corrupon: Neoliberal
reform, polical accountability and jusce’, Current Sociology 59(6), 735–753.
hps://doi.org/10.1177/0011392111419748
South African Local Government Associaon (SALGA), 2016, Violence in Democracy:
The Polical Killing and Inmidaon of Local Representaves and Administrators,
SALGA, Pretoria.
Svara, J.H., 2006, ‘Introduction: Politicians and administrators in the political
process – A review of themes and issues in the literature’, International
Journal of Public Administration 29(12), 953–976. https://doi.
org/10.1080/01900690600854555
Thornhill, C. & Cloete, J.J.N. (eds.), 2014, South African Municipal Government and
administraon, JL Van Schaik Publishers, Pretoria.
Thornhill, C., 2013, ‘Sustainable service delivery in democrac local government:
Crical African challenges and prospects’, in SPMA sixth internaonal conference,
December 5, 2013, University of Pretoria, Pretoria.
Von Holt, K., 2014, ‘On violent democracy’, Sociological Review 6(2), 129–151. hps://
doi.org/10.1111/1467-954X.12196
Wraith, R. & Simpkins, E., 2011, Corrupon in developing countries, Routledge Library
edn., Routledge, London.
Xinhuanet, 2017, Tanzania’s progress in ghng corrupon key to poverty eradicaon,
WB, viewed September 2023, from hp://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-
06/22/c_136386988.htm.
