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Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University
32
______________________________________________________________________________________
SOUTH CAUCASUS IN THE PHASE OF RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR: NEW
SECURITY CHALLENGES AND POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR DEVELOPMENT
ROMAN KARAPETYAN
Yerevan State University
Abstract
The paper mainly examines the economic, political and military situation in the South Caucasus
after the start of Russian-Ukrainian war. In the paper we are focused on the question of what
kind of consequences does the Russian-Ukrainian war has on the countries of the South
Caucasus. Relying on the analytical-forecasting approach, we also are trying to forecast what
developments can be expected in this region. On this regard we especially look onto the facts
from Armenia’s perspective. Of course, the discussion of the situation in Georgia and
Azerbaijan was also under our great attention, because we also had set a task to compare the
processes that took place in the three countries of the region.
The modernity of the topic can be measured, first of all, by its global political significance:
Russian-Ukrainian conflict continues to be on the top of world political processes. On the other
hand, it is actual when studying political and economic processes in the post-Soviet territory.
By and large, as a result, the South Caucasus is a part of the European and Middle Eastern
security sphere, or at least has an important role in them. Therefore, the ongoing developments
in this region are not local and may also affect the European, Middle Eastern and the processes
also in other regions.
Russian-Ukrainian conflict has affected on foreign policy behavior of the Southern Caucasus
countries. The region is now under the turbulence zone, so we are not aware from being faced
by new challenges and security issues. Since we have highly evaluated the impact of the
conflict on the countries of the region, we have also tried to make certain predictions regarding
possible future development scenarios, which could be as recommendations for foreign policy
decision making structures of Armenia.
Keywords: Russian-Ukrainian conflict, South Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, security
systems, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, energy and diplomacy, European integration, Belt and Road
Initiative.
Roman Karapetyan is a PhD in History, Researcher of the Institute for Armenian Studies, and Associate
Professor of the Chair of International Relations and Diplomacy at Yerevan State University. Email:
roman.karapetyan@ysu.am. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2456-3214.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0
International License.
Received: 10.10.2023
Revised: 30.10.2023
Accepted: 06.12.2023
© The Author(s) 2023
Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University
2023, VOL. 2, NO. 3 (6), December, 32-46
https://doi.org/10.46991/JOPS/2023.2.6.032
Security Policy
33
Introduction
The Russian-Ukrainian war, perhaps, continues to be one of the top problems of world
politics, if not the most urgent. The so-called “special military operation” launched by
Russia in Ukraine in 2022, which immediately turned into a full-scale war, leaved its
political, military and economic mark on all regions of the post-Soviet space, including
the South Caucasus. The Russian-Ukrainian war, with its scale, with the number of
participating and interested actors, could be said to be the largest-scale militarized
process in the Eurasian region after the end of the Cold War. The Russian-Ukrainian
conflict deeply affects political processes in South Caucasus. From the perspective of
the countries of the South Caucasus, the start of this war had a distinctive impact, both
in terms of new challenges and opportunities. However, one factor was common to the
all countries of the region: it is the shocking effect and the need to quickly and correctly
navigate the situation. From the regional perspectives, it is still early to exactly shape the
results of the war and make final consequences, but the past year and half provides an
opportunity to record certain facts and draw conclusions.
The research question of the study is the following: how the Russian-Ukrainian war
affected and continues to affect the South Caucasus, what are the possible scenarios in
the foreign political developments of the regional countries? The main goal of the topic
is to first of all present what consequences the war between Russia and Ukraine has on
geopolitical and economic developments in the South Caucasus, as well as how the
conflict reshapes the relations between the regional countries.
For the implementation of our research, we first of all used the event analysis and
historical argumentation methods. The method of event analysis gives us the opportunity
to observe the existing facts in the chain of events. The next method of our research is
scenario analysis, which will provide an opportunity to understand how the war in
Ukraine can affect the geopolitical and geo-economic environment of the South
Caucasus, what possible scenarios of development can be awaited at the region.
The research is entirely devoted to the developments that have taken place in the last
one and a half years. The research has been done almost parallel to the ongoing events,
striving to first of all give the actual chronology of the events with the means of content
and event analysis, and then also to make predictions about their further developments.
Therefore, official announcements, reports, and speeches were mainly the sources for
the study. Press releases have been used only to record the chronology of events. And
some research-analytical materials helped us to study the position of Russian, Ukrainian
and Western researchers on the issue. We also used the official sources of Georgia and
Azerbaijan, as well as research materials published by Georgian and Azerbaijani experts,
in order to present the current situation in the two countries.
Southern Caucasus during Russian-Ukrainian war: evaluation for the first and half
year
Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University
34
Economic dimensions
In classical theories of geopolitics, when a powerful state goes to war, the effects of the
conflict are usually instantly felt in neighboring regions. This leads to a paradigm shift,
or at the very least, a crisis of the global order (Minassian 2022). So the conflict not only
touched the region with all the sides, but also turned the regional countries as a non-
active players in the conflict.
As for the economic dimensions, the countries of the region found themselves in
mostly advantageous positions as a result of the newly created situation. First, under the
conditions of large-scale economic sanctions against Russia, the countries of South
Caucasus became a more important market for Russia. On the other hand, South
Caucasus countries got an opportunity to fill the demand vacuum created in the Russian
market. In the foreign trade turnover of all countries of the region with the Russian
Federation, a significant increase in export volumes has been recorded. In 2022, Russia’s
trade with the South Caucasus increased nearly 1.5 times, from $7.4 billionto $11.3
billion. Trade with the states of the South Caucasus in 2022 amounted to a mere 1.3
percent of Russia’s foreign-trade turnover, about $850 billion (Souleimanov, Fedorov
2023).
The transit importance of the regional countries was also increased for Russia.
Although some companies have also imposed restrictions on exporting their products to
the countries of the South Caucasus or transiting through them to Russia, international
experts in the economic field state that the countries of the region continue to be the main
source of diversification for the Russian market
1
2
. Of course, similar conversations are
still at the level of suspicion, but it is not excluded that the countries of the South
Caucasus may still come under certain Western, especially US, sanctions.
Georgia has officially banned the entry of sanctioned goods to Russia through its
territory. But if we talk about the facts, Georgia's trade turnover with Russia in 2022
increased by more than 50 percent compared to the previous year. The trade turnover
between Georgia and Russia in 2022 exceeded $2.4 billion, which is 52% more than in
2021, according to the Georgian National Statistics Office
3
. Now Russia is in second
place among Georgia's foreign trade partners, second only to Türkiye in the amount of
about 300 million dollars. Taking into account the growing indicators during the current
year, it is not excluded that in 2023, Russia may overcome Türkiye.
Russia also increased its economic presence in Georgia. In the first six months of
2023, 6,539 Russian companies registered in Georgia, and a total of 21,326 companies
have been registered since the start of the war in Ukraine. From January to June, Georgia
received 2 billion USD in income from Russia through remittances, tourism, and the
export of goods which is 1.6 times more than the income received from Russia in
1
The New York Times. “Russia is importing Western weapons, technology, bypassing sanctions.” June 09,
2023. Accessed June 11, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/18/business/economy/us-russia-chips-
sanctions.html.
2
POLITICO. “‘Ridiculous’ to rope Georgia into Western sanctions against Russia, PM says.” May 24, 2023.
Accessed May 30, 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/economic-sanctions-from-georgia-would-not-affect-
russias-economy-pm-says/.
3
TASS. “Russia becomes Georgia’s main trading partner in 2022 with share of over 16%.” March 24, 2023.
Accessed May 28, 2023. https://tass.com/economy/1592843.
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January-June 2022 from the same sources. In the first half of 2023, income received from
Russia accounted for 14.2% of Georgia's GDP, whereas in the first half of 2022, this
figure was 11.7%
4
. Direct money transfers are also to be raised from Russia. As Asian
development Bank states, money transfer inflows in the first 7 months of 2023 increased
at an annual rate of 27.5% to $2.7 billion, with nearly half of it coming from the Russian
Federation. The ADB also forecasts 5% of economy growth for Georgia in 2024
5
.
In this regard, Azerbaijan recorded more modest results. In 2022, the trade turnover
between Azerbaijan and Russia increased by 23.9% to reach $ 3.71 billion and stood at
7% of the overall trade turnover of Azerbaijan. This means that Russia now ranks third
among top trading partners of Azerbaijan after Italy and Türkiye
6
. However, Azerbaijan
is assigned a different, more important role here. After the termination of the supply of
energy resources from Russia, Azerbaijan got the opportunity to become one of the
largest supplier of gas and oil to the EU. Currently, the issue is in the stage of preliminary
rearrangements, but Azerbaijan has already increased the volumes of energy resources
supplies to Europe. It is also no secret, at least there are reasonable basics to doubt, that
Russian gas is also included in the share of supplied gas
7
(O’Byrne 2022). In fact, it turns
out that Europe is ready to buy Russian gas, but not from Russia. Baku perfectly uses the
situation in Ukraine to solve his political problems, including the conflict with Armenia.
We are sure that the energy factor can have a decisive influence on the formation of the
position of European countries in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.
With a remarkable economy growth of 4.6% in 2023, Azerbaijan was also faced with
high inflation. Average annual inflation doubled from 6.7% in 2021 to 13.9% in 2022 on
stronger domestic demand, rising food prices attributable to disruption caused by the
Russian invasion of Ukraine, and higher prices for other imported goods. Prices rose by
19.5% for food, 8.6% for other goods, and 10.4% for services
8
.
Armenia is the absolute record holder in economic matter. Armenia’s trade turnover
with Russia has doubled, exceeding five billion dollars
9
. Armenia stands out, for the first
time in trade with Russia, the volume of exports exceeded imports. In 2022, Armenia
also recorded its highest economic growth in the last 20 years, bringing it to 12.6
percent
10
. It must be mentioned, that relocations of about 2,600 companies, 6000
4
Transparency International Georgia. Georgia’s Economic Dependence on Russia Continues to Grow:
January-June 2023. September 29, 2023. Accessed October 29, 2023. https://www.transparency.ge/en/-
post/georgias-economic-dependence-russia-continues-grow-january-june-2023.
5
Asian Development Bank. ADB Sees Strong Growth for Georgia in 2023. September 2023.
Accessed November 28, 2023. https://www.adb.org/news/adb-sees-strong-growth-georgia-2023.
6
Russia Briefing. “January 2023 Russia-Azerbaijan Bilateral Trade Up 62.4% YoY.” February 16, 2021.
Accessed May 29, 2023. https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/january-2023-russia-azerbaijan-bilateral-
trade-up-62-4-yoy.html/.
7
European Parliament. “Parliamentary question P-003854/2022. Increased gas exports from Russia to
Azerbaijan.” November 28, 2022. Accessed June 10, 2023. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/-
doceo/document/P-9-2022-003854_EN.html.
8
Asian Development Bank. “Outlook of Azerbaijan.” April 2023. Accessed November 28, 2023.
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/863591/aze-ado-april-2023.pdf.
9
TASS. “Trade between Armenia and Russia for the first time exceeds $5 billion in 2022.” February 8, 2023.
Accessed May 25, 2023. https://tass.com/economy/1573399.
10
International Monetary Fund. “IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on First Review for Armenia’s Stand-
By Arrangement.” April 13, 2023. Accessed May 27, 2023. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/04/-
13/pr23118-armenia-imf-reaches-sla-on-first-review-for-armenia-stand-by-arrangement.
Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University
36
individual entrepreneurs, and 113 thousand non-residents to Armenia since March 2022
have contributed substantially to this remarkable GDP growth. Data provided by the
Armenian Migration Service shows that 372,086 Russian citizens arrived in Armenia
between January and June of 2022. However, it should be noted that most of them later
has left the territory of Armenia
11
.
The trend continues apace. The total trade volume for January-August, 2023
surpassed 4.16 billion USD, a record level since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Exports
from Armenia to Russia in this period totaled 2.3 billion USD and for the first time
exceeded the import figure, which stood at 1.86 billion USD (Mghdesyan 2023).
In fact, if we try to generalize the short-term economic impact of the war on the South
Caucasus, we can evaluate it in positive dynamics. Of course, it is not excluded that in
the long term period it may create new problems for the regional countries as well,
especially for Armenia, since the latter is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union
together with the Russian Federation. Some conversations about including Armenia in
some sanctions from official Washington and Brussels sometimes come. However,
taking into account contemporary development in Armenia-West relationship, we don’t
see big perspectives for this scenario.
Armenia also became a new home for thousands of high-tech workers from Russia.
Dozens of U.S. high-tech companies relocated from Russia to Armenia following the
2022 invasion of Ukraine, increasing Armenia’s high-tech labor force from around
20,000 to more than 30,000. However, US Department of State reports, many businesses
have identified challenges with Armenia’s investment climate in terms of the country’s
small market, limited consumer buying power, relative geographic isolation due to
closed borders with Türkiye and Azerbaijan
12
.
For the states of the Southern Caucasus, the new reality is a double-edged sword.
Increased trade with Russia stimulates economic growth and helps solve socioeconomic
issues. But it makes them more economically and politically dependent on a Russia
whose international standing and internal order are deteriorating (Souleimanov and
Fedorov 2023).
Political dimensions
The Russian-Ukrainian war started new transformations in the geopolitical environment
of the South Caucasus. The created situation is a period of political trials for the countries
of the region. The latter are facing a dilemma, because the collective West demands to
express a specific position regarding the created situation. The either-or policy is more
strongly felt by Georgia. If Armenia and Azerbaijan, as countries with traditionally
closer political and economic ties with Russia, feel relatively little pressure from the
11
EU Reporter. “How Armenia is helping Russia evade Western sanctions?” January 27, 2023. Accessed
May 27, 2023. https://www.eureporter.co/world/armenia/2023/01/27/how-armenia-is-helping-russia-evade-
western-sanctions/.
12
U.S. Department of State. 2023. “Investment Climate Statements: Armenia.” Accessed November 28, 2023.
https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-investment-climate-statements/armenia/.
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West, Georgia, probably, will not be forgiven for not joining the sanctions against Russia
and not providing military support to Ukraine.
Official Tbilisi has adopted a rather interesting political course according the conflict.
The peculiarity of the latter lies in the fact, that two directions with different points of
view has been formed in the country. The day the Russian-Ukrainian war started,
Georgia’s Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili announced that Georgia would remain
neutral to the conflict. So, when the US and European countries announced the launch
of new packages of sanctions against Russia, the Georgian Prime Minister announced
that they would refrain from joining them. On the other hand, President Salome
Zurabishvili demands that the current government fully joins the anti-Russian struggle.
In the first period of the war, even she confidently announced that Georgia would join
all sanctions against Russia
13
. In this matter, she has quite a lot of support in Georgia.
Although the conducted sociological polls show that the majority of the population of
Georgia does not support this approach
14
. Zurabishvili also blames the ruling party for
the failure of Georgia's European integration policy. As is believed, for more than one
year Georgia was not granted EU membership candidate status for its position on the
Ukrainian issue.
Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream, for one and half year tried to seek a neutral
political behavior. Prime Minister Garibashvili has repeatedly stated that Georgia keeps
the sanctions applied by third countries against Russia, it provides humanitarian aid to
Ukraine, but does not join the sanctions against Russia. As Garibashvili noted at the
economic forum in Qatar, joining to the sanctions would destroy Georgia’s economy, it
would damage the interests of the country and it would damage the interests of Georgia’s
people
15
.
Georgia is currently sheltering around 25,000 Ukrainian war refugees. Georgia was
also one of the 38 countries that applied to the International Criminal Court to investigate
Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine, resulting in the issuing of an arrest warrant for President
Vladimir Putin
16
. On February 1, 2023 the Parliament of Georgia adopted a resolution
on possible military escalation in Ukraine. It states that Georgia recognizes the territorial
integrity of Ukraine and condemns any encroachment on it
17
. However, there is no
mention of Russian aggression in the text of the resolution, although the Georgian
opposition demanded to include this position in the document. In fact, the ruling
Georgian Dream party managed to pass a resolution with a rather restrained content and
largely non-committal towards Ukraine. We believe, that Georgia’s balanced policy in
the Ukrainian issue is justified. The challenges that arose in Russian-Georgian relations
after 2008 were instructive for Tbilisi, and now the latter evaluates the situation more
13
Agenda. “President Zourabichvili: Georgia participates in all int’l financial sanctions and resolutions to
support Ukraine.” April 1, 2022. Accessed May 29, 2023. https://agenda.ge/en/news/2022/1036.
14
Civil Georgia. “President Zurabishvili Talks EU, Russian Occupation, Ukraine.” November 21, 2023.
Accessed June 9, 2023. https://civil.ge/archives/515613.
15
Agenda. “Georgian PM: Gov’t imposing sanctions on Russia would “destroy our economy”.” May 24,
2023. Accessed June 5, 2023. https://agenda.ge/en/news/2023/2026.
16
Politico. “Georgia hedges its bets on the EU—and Russia.” June 6, 2023. Accessed June 11, 2023.
https://www.politico.eu/article/georgia-bet-european-union-and-russia-indepedence-day/.
17
Agenda. “Parliament adopts ruling party-initiated resolution in support of Ukraine.” February 1, 2023.
Accessed June 10, 2023. https://agenda.ge/en/news/2022/228.
Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University
38
rationally, putting the strategic approach of not putting its own economic interest at risk
in the foreground.
Some Georgian experts think, that this policy does not have future, Georgia is playing
with fire and it is very dangerous according European integration perspectives
(Avdaliani 2022a, 2022b; Avdaliani 2023a, 2023b). On 8th of November, 2023,
European Commission recommended to grant EU candidate’s status to Georgia
18
. The
European Council will take the decision on granting the status in December 2023. But it
must be mentioned, that Georgia’s future in EU integration processes is not as clear, as
it can be shown. The European Commission recommended the European Council to
grant Georgia the bloc’s candidacy with nine conditions, with new conditions referring
the fight against disinformation and foreign information manipulation about the EU and
its values
19
. EU member states are yet to sign off on the recommendation: that decision
will come in December, but the mood is already celebratory in Georgia.
For all the celebrations, Georgia still remains behind Ukraine and Moldova in the
European waiting room. In its recommendation, the European Commission noted that
Georgia is at odds with the European Union's common policy of economic isolation of
Russia over Ukraine. The European Commission specifically said that Georgia needs to
align itself with the trajectory of the EU’s external relations to make progress toward
membership
20
.
EU ambassador to Georgia, Pawel Herczynski, gave some press remarks about the
Publication of the EU Enlargement Report. Congratulating the Georgian people on this
remarkable event, he also has mentioned - “…the recommendation to grant Georgia the
candidate status is linked to fulfilling important steps. Addressing these steps will be
crucial to move to the next stage. This is the nature of the enlargement process: constant
reform so that the country can be ready to take its place as a full member of the European
Union. While the report acknowledges the progress made by Georgia, it also underlines
that important work remains to be done in essential reform areas such as the rule of law,
the freedom of the media, and holding free and fair elections…”
21
.
To conclude, it must be mentioned, that candidate status is not a guarantee that a
country will become an EU member state. Still, the announcement will likely calm
political tensions in Georgia, which has been arisen after February 2022. Georgian
Dream will, however, benefit from the fact that real progress on Georgia’s path to the
EU was achieved and it will use this argumentation as a tool for propaganda during
2024’s election year.
18
Civil Georgia. “European Commission Recommends EU Candidacy for Georgia.” November 08, 2023.
Accessed November 24, 2023. https://civil.ge/archives/568259.
19
Front News Georgia. “EU Commission recommends Georgia’s candidacy with nine conditions.” November
08, 2023. Accessed November 24, 2023. https://frontnews.ge/en/news/details/49022.
20
European Commission. “Georgia 2023 Report.” November 08, 2023. Accessed November 24, 2023.
https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-
11/SWD_2023_697%20Georgia%20report.pdf.
21
Delegation of the EU to Georgia. “Press Remarks by the EU Ambassador to Georgia, Pawel Herczynski
on the Publication of the EU Enlargement Report.” November 08, 2023. Accessed November 24, 2023.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/press-remarks-eu-ambassador-georgia-pawel-herczynski-
publication-eu-enlargement-report_en?s=221.
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From the political perspectives, official Baku is one of the main beneficiaries from
the results of this war. Russia's temporary withdrawal or weakened positions from the
South Caucasus strengthened Baku’s positions in the region and made him more
unbending in decision making processes. The latter is trying to take advantage of the
created situation and quickly implement its geopolitical plans. In this matter it enjoys the
full support of Türkiye. We are sure, that the re-elected Erdogan will remain faithful to
the policy of support towards Azerbaijan. Although today we see some external political
pressure on Azerbaijan about his aggressive policy towards Armenia, it sometimes
doesn’t work.
On the top of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy agenda we will find so-called “Zangezur
corridor” issue. The corridor is considered to be an international level transportation way
which will connect Azerbaijan and Türkiye by the territory of Armenia at regional level
and China-Central Asia with Europe at a larger level. In general, prom the point of
political perspectives, this is a part of Türkiye-Azerbaijani pan-Turkish ambitious
program, which aims to support land connection between Turkish-speaking countries.
Azerbaijan's advantageous position in this matter is primarily determined by the fact,
that the latter has received a new tool set to influence on European countries policy
making processes: that is, to diversify the energy gaps created in Europe, which arose
after the cessation of energy supplies from Russia.
‘Zangezur corridor’ got new geostrategic meaning for Azerbaijan after Russian-
Ukrainian war. After some difficulties according implementing the northern belt in
China’s Belt and Road Initiative, connected with the war in Ukraine, the central route,
which passes through the Southern Caucasus as well, gets higher importance. Over the
past year, Azerbaijan has not only intensified cooperation with China in this direction,
but also increased his relations with China in other spheres in economy and politics.
Armenia’s interests coincide with Iran’s in the matter. For the latter, the border with
Armenia is of vital importance, so Tehran reacts rather harshly to the plans of Baku and
Ankara to create a sovereign corridor through the territory of Armenia. Of course, the
Republic of Armenia is not against becoming a part of the new international transport
highway, but the peculiarity of the problem here is that Baku offers to take part in the
management of the highway passing through the territory of Armenia. Official Tehran
has repeatedly warned Azerbaijan that it is still unacceptable for him to form the corridor
in this format. One of the direct warning came in October 2022, when Iranian President
Ebrahim Raisi warned against any border changes in the region during his meeting with
President Aliyev (Toroyan 2023). In addition to the verbal warnings, the Islamic
Republic also opened a consulate general in the city of Kapan - the center of the Syunik
region of Armenia. This can be interpreted as a direct indication of Iran's plan to expand
relations with Armenia and warn Azerbaijan once again against border changes.
On the other hand, after the war in Ukraine, Azerbaijan's relations with Russia
intensified. This is primarily due to the fact that both sides have increased their
importance for each other. Azerbaijan can become a lifeline for Russia in its energy
policy, and Azerbaijan needs to relax Moscow’s vigilance as much as possible and
complete its political plans in the region. On February 2022, before the war, Russia
signed an agreement on cooperation in strategic fields with Azerbaijan (Heydar and
Kucera). According to it, Azerbaijan is committed to supply gas to Europe with the
Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University
40
participation of Russia. In fact, with this agreement, Russia has somewhat balanced its
tools of political influence over Azerbaijan. We also do not rule out, that under the
conditions of Russia’s failure in Ukraine, Azerbaijan can quickly get out of Moscow’s
influence.
What about Azerbaijan’s policy towards Russian-Ukrainian war, it continues to play
on two strings. As for official level announcements, Azerbaijan has been among the most
vocal supporters of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Since the start of the
war, Azerbaijan, through the subsidiary of its state energy company, SOCAR Ukraine,
has been providing free gas and petroleum to vehicles in Ukraine used for humanitarian
missions. Azerbaijan has also regularly dispatched humanitarian aid to Kyiv. Over the
course of the ongoing war, Azerbaijan has sent medicines, medical supplies, and food
products to the people of Ukraine, with the total amount of humanitarian aid reaching
approximately 15 million euros (Toghruli 2023). We could also see Moscow’s complaint
about Azerbaijan’s policy on Ukrainian issue.
As for Armenia, it keeps neutrality in the Ukrainian conflict. Official Yerevan tries
to avoid direct announcements about it. The reason is obvious: in the strained military-
political situation created around Armenia by Azerbaijan and Türkiye, Armenia needs
allies the most. Therefore, maintaining and developing relations with Russia and the
West is of strategic importance for Yerevan. However, the dialogue with official
Moscow does not seem to be going very well. We saw difficulties in this regard even
after the 2020 war, but the situation sharply worsened after the new political situation in
Nagorno-Karabakh on September this year. Armenian authorities began to accuse Russia
of not fulfilling its direct responsibilities in this matter, which led to new tension in
relations between Yerevan and Moscow. The two sides are now in a diplomatic exchange
of fire, blaming each other.
If we look at the situation from the security point of view, we can surely state, that
Armenia is on the list of the most affected by the situation. USA and European countries
are trying to fill the political and military vacuum created here as a result of the
weakening of Russia, but this policy works not so effectively as we accepted. There are
several reasons for it. First of all, the South Caucasus has no strategic importance for the
West, so the Western countrie wait too long before showing any activity here. The USA
and European countries are still showing restraint in areas of vital importance for Russia,
and the South Caucasus is one of them. From all this we can conclude that Russia,
although has been retreated from South Caucasus a little, it remains the main political
player in the region. On the other hand, Türkiye has become stronger in the region, and
the latter has its own tools to put pressure on Europe and on the USA. In fact, no matter
how much Armenia tries to conduct a balancing policy, the official Yerevan has to first
sit at the table with the traditional actors of the region.
As for official Yerevan’s policy towards Ukrainian war, Armenia stays neutral. As
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told CNN Prima news during an interview
on June 2023- “Armenia is not Russia’s ally in the war with Ukraine. And our feeling
from that war, from that conflict, is anxiety because it directly affects all our
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41
relationships”
22
. On early September 2023, Armenia sends its first humanitarian aid to
Ukraine since the start of the war. Both official Moscow and Russia’s political and expert
field reacted rather painfully to this. Even Armenia’s ambassador to Russia Vagarshak
Harutyunyan was urgently summoned to the Foreign Ministry of Russia to give some
explanations on this regard
23
.
Leaving aside the fact whether the humanitarian aid sent by Armenia to Ukraine was
justified, especially taking into account the fact that the latter expressed its open political
support to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, two important issues should be
emphasized here. First of all, this was a humanitarian aid that was not directed against
Russia. Of course, since the issue concerns a state at war with your ally country, official
Yerevan should have been much more cautious in the matter of Ukraine and maybe
should not have sent aid with high level escort. On the other hand, official Moscow's
reaction to Armenia can’t be acceptable, if we take into account the fact, that it shows a
much more tolerant behavior towards Azerbaijan, which’s support to Ukraine is much
more.
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict during the Ukrainian war
Russian-Ukrainian war and the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 have a huge
impact on security, connectivity and the conflict zones in the South Caucasus. With the
comprehensive Western sanctions against Russia, Europe’s interest in the Middle
corridor towards Asia through the South Caucasus is growing (Meister 2023a, 2023b).
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict consists of two main components. The first is the status
of Nagorno-Karabakh region. After the second Karabakh war in 2020, Russian
peacekeeping troops has been settled around Karabakh-Azerbaijani border and in
Nagorno-Karabakh region. The period of operation of peacekeeping forces is limited to
5 years, with the possibility of extension in the future. After the start of the Ukrainian
war, Azerbaijan intensified its pressure in this direction, trying to get full guarantees
from the official Yerevan that the latter has no claims according the region. The situation
created in Ukraine has given official Baku hopes that sooner or later Russia will have to
withdraw its troops from Nagorno-Karabakh. This scenario was not from the genre of
fantasy, because Russia could go to concessions in Nagorno-Karabakh issue for the
support of Azerbaijan and Türkiye in Ukraine. However, on the other hand, it should be
remembered that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the only lever with which Moscow
can exert pressure on Baku, so it will do everything to keep this tool under his control.
In general, final solution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will mean the start of Russia’s
ending influence in South Caucasus. On one hand, Russia will weaken its physical
presence in the region, and on the other hand, it will lose its authority in Armenia. With
Russian troops stuck in Ukraine, Moscow’s military and political weaknesses have
22
The Prime Minister of Armenia. “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's interview with CNN Prima News.”
June 1, 2023. Accessed November 25, 2023. https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-
conferences/item/2023/06/01/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-CNN-primanews/.
23
Mediamax. “Russian MFA hands over a note of protest to Armenia’s ambassador.” September 8, 2023.
Accessed November 25, 2023. https://mediamax.am/en/news/foreignpolicy/52427/.
Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University
42
become increasingly obvious. As a result, Azerbaijan has been taking steps toward
resolving the conflict in its favor (Souleimanov and Fedorov 2023; Neset et al. 2023).
From December 2022, Azerbaijan subjected Nagorno Karabakh to a physical
blockade. In September 2023, after a nine-month-long blockade Azerbaijan started
military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh. The military operation was accompanied by a
humanitarian crysis, as a result of which the entire Armenian population of Nagorno
Karabakh, facing the threat of physical annihilation, left the region. At the moment,
Azerbaijan fully controls Nagorno-Karabakh. It is still not clear what awaits the people
who left the region, but one question is clear: at this moment Azerbaijan does not intend
to discuss the issue of the rights of the Armenian people of Nagorno Karabakh with
official Yerevan.
At the end of September, the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh were forced to
negotiate with Azerbaijan in order to save the population of the region from physical
annihilation. As a result of the negotiations, Stepanakert was forced to give in to
Azerbaijan’s pressure, that is, to announce the dissolution of the Nagorno Karabakh
Republic. Nagorno-Karabakh President Samvel Shahramanyan’s decree called for all
institutions and organizations of the Republic of Artsakh to dissolve from January 1,
2024
24
.
The next component in Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is about the normalization of
bilateral relations. This task, besides the humanitarian and civil sides, also has two main
political components: the issue of border demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan
and the opening of the corridor from Azerbaijan to Türkiye through the territory of
Armenia. Azerbaijan seeks to implement the border demarcation process based on data
that is beneficial to him only, without real argumentation. So, using the favorable
situation, Azerbaijan tries to get territorial concessions from Armenia. It also wants to
control the corridor to Türkiye, which is going to pass the territory of Armenia (Galitsky
2022).
We are sure, that official Baku’s hasty policy regarding both the status of Nagorno-
Karabakh and the adjustment of the borders with Armenia and the opening of the corridor
through its territory to Türkiye, is due to the fact that the latter is hurrying to settle them
until the end of the Ukrainian war. Azerbaijan is trying to implement a pressure strategy
against Armenia. Azerbaijan has carried out military operations on the territory of
Armenia or in the border zones several times after the war, trying to extract unilateral
concessions from Armenia. After the end of the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh, the
largest military operation carried out by Azerbaijan against Armenia was in September
2022. As a result of military operations, the Armenian side had more than 200 victims
and almost 300 wounded soldiers. According to Baku, the Azerbaijani side had about 80
victims
25
. It was possible to stop the military operations through the active mediation of
all interested parties, including Russia, European countries, and the United States. Later,
24
CNN. “Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist from next year. How did this happen?” September 28, 2023.
Accessed November 25, 2023. https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/28/europe/nagorno-karabakh-officially-
dissolve-intl/index.html.
25
Reuters. More than 200 killed in Armenia-Azerbaijan border clashes – officials. September 16, 2022.
Accessed May 20, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/armenia-says-135-soldiers-killed-
clashes-with-azerbaijan-this-week-2022-09-16/.
Security Policy
43
the European Union announced its intention to deploy a civilian observation mission on
the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. At the late autumn of 2022 this intention was realized
(Krivosheev 2023). However, it should be noted that this mission does not have any real
leverage in terms of curbing the aggression of the Azerbaijani side. The EU intends to
increase the number of its monitoring mission in the near future. Also, the issue of
expanding the functions of the mission and the tools used is being discussed.
We are sure, that the rhetoric used by official Baku on the issue does not give
optimistic grounds to think that the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict can be settled in a
short term period. Official Yerevan sometimes makes statements containing some
optimism, but they are immediately aborted by impulses coming from Baku. We are also
sure that the settlement of the conflict can become a reality only at the price of
compromises. Unfortunately, Azerbaijan is still guided by a strategy that demands
unilateral concessions from the Armenian side. A lot depends on Türkiye’s position
regarding the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict: Azerbaijan cannot
succeed in its large-scale initiatives without the latter’s support.
Conclusion and discussion
Russian-Ukrainian war is to start new strategic order reschedule in the South Caucasus.
The first steps are done, but it is never clear how Russia will act in a moment. So, the
situation is unclear and full of treats and unstableness.
➢ The continuation of war in Ukraine may bring some global political and economic
changes in the South Caucasus. It can weaken Russia’s influence in the region.
On the other hand, as a result of weakening in Eastern Europe, Russia can seek to
strengthen its presence in this region. Thus, Russia will try to strengthen its
influence in the South Caucasus as compensation for weakening in Eastern
Europe. On the other hand, the West will try to take advantage of the opportunity
and increase the mechanisms of his direct influence in the region.
➢ Western countries, especially the USA, are trying to take advantage of the
favorable geopolitical situation and strengthen their presence in the South
Caucasus. However, it should be remembered, that the region has no strategic
importance for the US, so the latter will show caution here, taking into account
Russia’s traditional influence.
➢ A fairly favorable international economic situation has been created for the
countries of the South Caucasus. All the three countries in the region benefit from
it. Armenia’s and Georgia’s benefits are mainly connected with direct financial
inflows. As we have already stated above, Russian-Ukrainian war has greatly
affected the development of Armenia’s and Georgia’s economy. Azerbaijan can
take advantage in longer term perspectives, taking into account its involvement in
global-shape energetic projects.
➢ As for military-political perspectives, the region will continue to be in turbulence
zone, especially taking into account the new situation in Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Since the start of the 2023 war between Israel and Palestine, the situation
in the South Caucasus has calmed down a bit. However, we believe it could flare
Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University
44
up again at any minute. At this moment, it seems that the West is making great
efforts to prevent the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan from entering a
new phase of escalation.
➢Armenia-Russia relations also faced new challenges during the Ukrainian
conflict. Official Yerevan is moving further and further away from Moscow over
time. Both the policy conducted by Russia regarding the Armenian-Azerbaijani
relations, as well as the continuously developing relations of Armenia with the
West, play a big role in this matter. Although official Moscow shows that it will
not use hard power on Yerevan due to its foreign policy, recently Russia's pressure
on Armenia is increasing. They are still mainly expressed in the form of economic
sanctions and political statements.
Supplementary material
The supplementary material for this article can be found at
https://doi.org/10.46991/JOPS/2023.2.6.032
Conflict of interests
The author declares no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.
Ethical standards
The author affirms this research did not involve human subjects.
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