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Citation: Thomsen, A.M.; Borrie,
W.T.; Miller, K.K.; Cardilini, A.P.A.
Listen to Us: Perceptions of Animal
Voice and Agency. Animals 2023,13,
3271. https://doi.org/10.3390/
ani13203271
Academic Editor: Clive J. C. Phillips
Received: 11 August 2023
Revised: 12 September 2023
Accepted: 17 October 2023
Published: 19 October 2023
Copyright: © 2023 by the authors.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
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Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
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4.0/).
animals
Article
Listen to Us: Perceptions of Animal Voice and Agency
Anja M. Thomsen 1, *, William T. Borrie 1,2 , Kelly K. Miller 1and Adam P. A. Cardilini 1,2
1School of Life and Environmental Sciences, Deakin University, Melbourne, VIC 3125, Australia;
b.borrie@deakin.edu.au (W.T.B.); kelly.miller@deakin.edu.au (K.K.M.);
adam.cardilini@deakin.edu.au (A.P.A.C.)
2PAN Works, Marlborough, MA 01752, USA
*Correspondence: fanjathomsen@gmail.com
Simple Summary:
In this study, we used open-ended interviews to explore how animal moral claims
and interests may be best represented in the human world. The findings suggest that the key to
animal representation lies in human perceptions of animal voice and that these perceptions are shaped
by cultural, social, economic, legal, and political language constructs and paradigms. Our findings
illustrate how the human contextual definition of animals as voiceless or as having a voice has serious
implications for animals, society, and the environment. This study highlights the importance of
recognising animal voice as crucial for animal representation and draws parallels with similar calls
in the literature. We recommend future research to focus on developing ethical, compassionate,
and respectful approaches to understanding animal subjective experiences to empower and amplify
animal voices.
Abstract:
In many contexts, the interests of nonhuman animals (hereafter “animals”) are often
overlooked or considered to be a lower priority than those of humans. While strong arguments exist
for taking animal moral claims seriously, these largely go unheard due to dominant anthropocentric
attitudes and beliefs. This study aimed to explore how animal interests might be best represented in
the human world. We conducted interviews to investigate people’s perceptions of what it means to
speak for other animals and who can reliably represent animal interests. Using Grounded Theory
analytical methods, we identified one major theme: “Animal voice”, and its subthemes: “Animals
do/do not have a voice”, “Human language constructs realities and paradigms”, and “Let animals
speak”. Our findings illustrate how human language constructs contribute to shaping the realities
of animals by contextually defining them as voiceless. This has serious implications for animals,
society, and the environment. Drawing parallels with the relevant literature, our results reflect
calls for the social and political recognition of animal voice as fundamental to animal representation.
We recommend future research to focus on developing ethical and compassionate approaches to
understanding animal subjective experiences to empower and amplify animal voices.
Keywords:
animal representation; animal communication; human perceptions; human language
constructs and paradigms; human–animal relationships; animal voice amplification
1. Introduction
In many contexts, the needs and wishes of nonhuman animals (hereafter animals) are
often overlooked or considered to be a lower priority than those of humans. This has sig-
nificant ethical, social, cultural, environmental, economic, and political implications, with
growing public and academic concerns over how animals are considered in
society [1–8]
.
Historical and predominantly Western philosophical ideas and constructs have contributed
to a general acceptance of human animal superiority over other animals [
9
]. Perhaps the
most extreme expression of these ideas, animals as “automata” (machines), was conceptu-
alised by influential French philosopher Renee Descartes 1637, arguably absolving humans
of moral responsibility towards other animals [
9
,
10
]. Both Descartes and the Enlightenment
Animals 2023,13, 3271. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani13203271 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/animals
Animals 2023,13, 3271 2 of 26
philosopher Immanuel Kant defended the human/animal distinction based on the assump-
tion that non-human animals do not possess a mind and, therefore, lack self-awareness and
the ability to make themselves understood through language. However, prominent thinkers
have also criticised the human/animal distinction and that this distinction was enough to
exclude animals from moral consideration. Jeremy Bentham famously summarised their
critical stance: “The question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they
suffer?” [
11
]. In a similar critique, Henry S. Salt (1894) was one of the first to challenge
the human/animal dichotomy with an explicit focus on connecting animal rights to social
progress [12].
The idea that animals lack rationality and mind, and that this distinction justifies
the depersonalisation and commodification of animals as resources for humans, prevails
in certain scientific, economic, social, and political systems today [
13
]. Conditions for
most animals, both wild and domestic, have worsened in the last two centuries due to
the intensification of both terrestrial and marine factory farming [
14
–
20
], the increasing
destruction and disturbance of wild animal habitats for urban and agricultural land devel-
opment [
21
–
25
], and the impacts of climate change such as wildfires, desertification, ocean
acidification, rising nutrient loads in water bodies, and more frequent extreme weather
events [26–30].
Developing scientific research of animal cognitive, emotional, social, and cultural
ability and complexity is increasingly challenging how we think about animal minds and
lives [
13
,
31
]. For example, Broom (2003) described the widespread biased assumption that
the only significant evolutionary path was that which leads to man, particularly as concerns
brain function, as biologically naïve [
32
] (p. 85). Larger brains may store more memory, but
this does not necessarily imply more cognitive ability [33].
Research has documented that, like us, animals seek comfort, playtime, compan-
ionship, freedom of expression, and display a variety of emotions and differences in
personality [
34
–
47
]. Questioning the notion that culture is unique to humans, research also
shows that animals have their own unique cultures and social structures where knowledge
and language are passed on via generational learning [
48
–
54
]. Furthermore, an increas-
ing body of studies have showed that emotional states, as observed in vertebrates, some
cephalopods [
55
,
56
], and invertebrates [
57
], affect judgement and determine decision-
making processes, as with humans [
58
–
61
]. Researchers have also called for the recognition
of sentience in many animal groups we have not previously considered, most notably
invertebrates [
62
]. For example, new research demonstrates that wasps can recognise
species-specific individual faces, demonstrating evolutionary convergence between mam-
mals and wasps, despite their differing sensory and neural structures [
63
], while other
evidence has suggested hedonistic behaviour in bees [
64
]. Additionally, there are calls
to improve our understanding of animal communication, cognition, subjective experi-
ence, agency, interests, and their place in society [
65
–
69
]. This research challenges old
assumptions about animals and makes us question the human/animal dichotomy.
We must rethink our relations and entangled existences with animals if animals are to
have dignified and flourishing lives. While animal advocacy has contributed to increasing
public awareness about the issues confronting animals, its influence and impact has been
limited [
70
]. While strong arguments exist for taking animal moral claims seriously, these
largely go unheard because of inequalities in representation, similar to marginalised groups
of humans in society [
71
]. Some authors therefore now argue for expanding the discussion
of animal consideration beyond the typical discourses regarding animal legal rights or duties
towards animals, to include the political representation of animals’ interests [
72
]. In the
political and philosophical disciplines, this has been identified as part of the Political Turn
in Animal Ethics [72,73].
Scholars have increasingly called for considering animal representation in social and
political discourse [
71
,
73
–
86
], but many challenges remain in terms of how this could be
realised. Magaña (2022) summarised these challenges by what they describe as individual
factors—the aspects of human psychological mechanisms that predispose our thinking and
Animals 2023,13, 3271 3 of 26
behaviour in favour of the human perspective and interests. And institutional factors which
relate to animals’ inability to vote, human political and economic interests to favour animal
exploitation, and electoral barriers whereby, for example, minor pro-animal parties have
limited political presence and influence [
72
]. However, animal representation currently
faces the significant barrier of requiring humans to act as representatives on their behalf,
which begs the question: How can we reliably represent the interests of animals, and who
can do it? As such, one critical step for animal representation is to identify the characteristics
of someone who can reliably speak for animal interests. This furthermore requires that we
investigate what it means to reliably represent animals. The following question broadly
addresses the issue: What does it mean to speak for animals?
To speak for anyone else, even other humans, is a difficult task. For example, certain
groups in society may not be well represented in the political process including, but not lim-
ited to, people with disabilities, prisoners, the elderly, social housing clients, asylum seekers,
the homeless, the unemployed, and other similarly vulnerable members of
society [87].
Similar issues exist for animals, who may be considered particularly vulnerable in the sense
that they are subject to laws imposed on them by humans, often reflecting the interests
of the humans rather than those of the animals themselves [
88
]. In the human world, we
have attempted to protect vulnerable members of society via various legal means. For
example, like animals, human children are considered vulnerable in the sense that they
may not be able to speak for themselves or protect themselves in specific contexts. In
International Law, specific notions have therefore been developed to include particularly
vulnerable individuals who may be considered unable to speak for themselves. The 1989
International Convention on the Rights of the Child therefore incorporated the dimension
of vulnerability as a more precise criterion for inclusion because it extended to also include
children with disabilities [
89
]. It may be productive to think about treating the issue of
animal representation similarly.
Additionally, speaking for animals is already a challenge because animals communi-
cate differently to humans. As such, because our systems are built on human language,
communication, and interests, animals who communicate differently and have different
interests fall outside this system [
90
,
91
]. And, while science can give us some of the prac-
tical tools to better understand how animals communicate their interests, there are still
significant issues of interpretation.
One major challenge has been the historical focus on verbal language as the only mean-
ingful form of communication. The logic of typical language models is flawed because it
has been using human signalling behaviour as the benchmark for understanding all other
forms of communication [
92
]. Expanding our understanding of what counts as language
challenges the anthropocentric notion that difference is equal to deficiency and that we
ought to consider differences as a matter of degree, not of kind [
91
]. However, it also chal-
lenges us to carefully consider differences to avoid anthropocentric misappropriations and
misrepresentations in our attempts to understand and engage with animals [
93
]. For the
sake of clarity, we emphasise that our use of the terms “animal communication”, “animal
voice”, and “interspecies communication” implicitly acknowledge these challenges. We
have therefore structured our discussion and the concept of animal voice from the viewpoint
of Donna Haraway’s (2003) ethical approach, captured as humans and nonhumans “bonded
in significant otherness” [
94
] (p. 16). The benefit of the ethical approach is that it can be
extended to include cognitive, psychological, ethological, interactional (concerning “the
nature of communication and the structure of interaction” [
93
] (p. 359)), and ontological
approaches to understanding animal communication. As Kulick (2017) summarises, the eth-
ical approach implies respectful and compassionate engagement with animals that avoids
reducing their communication to anthropocentric projections or perpetuating cartesian
notions of animals as exploitable “automata”. It furthermore acknowledges that recognis-
ing and understanding animal communication (for example, “through acts of protest and
dissent” [
90
] (p. 31)) may as much be a matter of respectful non-engagement (e.g., [
90
,
95
]).
Animals 2023,13, 3271 4 of 26
The aim of this study was to explore the issue of how animal interests might be
best represented in the human world. Our approach was to capture thoughts from both
experts in relevant academic fields, but also people with expertise and experience working
with (e.g., farmers) and for (e.g., politicians, animal advocates) animals outside academia
who can describe animal representation across multiple dimensions and identify gaps
and challenges to better representing animals in the social–political arena. We conducted
qualitative interviews with people who had significant experience with animals and/or
issues relating to animals. This included people from a wide range of animal-related
work and activities with various relationships to animals. We documented participants
perceptions of animal representation by broadly asking: “Who can speak for animals?”
Using a data-driven approach, we conducted thematic analysis to help identify and expand
theoretical concepts related to animal representation. We compared and contrasted our
results with the discussion being had in the literature to identify convergence, gaps, and
future opportunities.
2. Materials and Methods
For this study, we conducted interviews to gather information related to people’s per-
ceptions of what it means to speak for other animals and who can reliably represent animal
interests. The semi-structured interviews were guided via methodologies in Grounded
Theory and Thematic Analysis [
96
–
98
]. This qualitative approach is suited to poorly un-
derstood, complex, and/or emerging issues, or issues that require an in-depth scrutiny of
untested assumptions [
99
,
100
]. We used the open-ended approach to encourage partici-
pants to explore emerging themes of interest more freely, thereby opening the potential
for previously unexplored ideas to be investigated [
101
]. Common themes may typically
derive from richer, more in-depth data sets and leads to the development of theories and/or
detailed conceptualisations of categories of interest. We used the inductive approach of
moving from specific interviews to common insights and patterns of meaning, allowing the
data to drive the research [
96
,
100
]. We checked for researcher bias using techniques such as
personal reflexivity and conversations among the research team [102,103].
2.1. Interview Participants
We approached prospective participants via their publicly available email addresses.
Participants were selected for their varied expertise and/or experience concerning human–
animal relationships from a wide range of relevant contexts. Participants needed to have
close experience with animals or proficiency with animal topics via their work and/or other
experience with animals. Closeness here is defined as a relationship with other animals that
at least requires significant animal/species knowledge, expertise, and experience, as well
as an understanding of human–animal relationships, including but not exclusive to people
who feel personal closeness, respect, and/or empathy for other animals as demonstrated
via their advocacy work, academic publication, or authorship. The selection criteria that
participants were required to have are as follows:
•worked or are working with living animals in a range of contexts, and/or
•
contributed to critical or deep thinking concerning human–animal relationships,
and/or
•represented animals in public discourse.
Most of our participants were selected for their academic/research expertise or other
relevant skills in various types of animal work. These fields included animals in political
science (n= 1), psychology and philosophy (n= 2); biomedical and toxicology research
(n= 2); animal welfare science, policy, and law (n= 3); wild animal conservation, ecology,
and management (n= 3); sociology, media, and literature (n= 2); political representation
(n= 1); and animal farming (n= 1). Some of these participants had additional significant
advocacy expertise or experience related to improving or reporting on the lives of animals in
industrialised animal agriculture. The participants came from different countries, including
Australia, Canada, USA, Portugal, Germany, Finland, and the UK.
Animals 2023,13, 3271 5 of 26
2.2. Interview Procedure
We received human ethics research approval (ID SEBE-2021-MOD02) for this study.
The question guide was developed by the researchers based on initial readings and dis-
cussions surrounding voice and speaking for animals (see Supplementary File S1 for the
question guide). Author AT conducted the interviews between February and May 2022
online via Zoom video and/or phone calls (per participant preference). Each interview
lasted 30–60 min and, with written consent, was recorded.
The interview included questions concerning how people speak for animals, the
participant’s thoughts about what it means to reliably represent animals’ interests, how
animal representation could/should manifest, and what relationship with animals and
personal characteristics someone would need to be able to reliably speak for them. We
added a personal dimension by asking participants if they had individual experiences with
speaking for, or interactions with, animals and, if so, what their thoughts were related
to these experiences. The interview schedule was loosely adhered to [
97
] (pp. 62–82) as
the participants often initiated their own elaborations, and as such, needed no additional
prompts from the interviewer in terms of keeping the responses related to the questions. At
the end of each interview, demographic data were collected related to age, gender identity,
and rural/urban location for aggregative reporting. The participants were given the choice
of creating their own pseudonym or having us create one for them. The interviews were
transcribed intelligent verbatim (omitting unnecessary or filler words) as the key focus was
to extract meaning. The participants were not offered incentives or other rewards for their
contributions. Themes and concepts related to speaking for animals were explored until it
appeared that no new relevant substantive insights and themes were being introduced by
participants, which resulted in a total of 15 interviews.
2.3. Data Analysis
Author AT analysed the content of each interview inductively, guided via the method-
ologies of reflexive Thematic Analysis (Big Q Qualitative Analysis) [
98
,
104
]. In qualitative
analysis, data collection, memoing (descriptive/interpretive notes), data analysis, and
coding and theory development often occurs simultaneously, guided via a “constant com-
parison analysis” which refers to the method of comparing emerging findings and meanings
with existing findings [
105
–
107
]. The preparation included reading each of the transcripts
a minimum of three times to become familiar with the content of the individual interviews.
Author AT used a methodological journal and conceptual mind mapping software to
reflexively record memos, patterns, themes, and sub-themes, as well as their potential rela-
tionships and/or dissimilarities. The data from the initial interviews were used to identify
major themes to be used as a guide for subsequent theoretical sampling (i.e., selecting future
interview participants based on their ability to elucidate and expand their understandings
and insights of emerging theoretical domains). Themes were compared with the literature
from a combination of critical animal studies and other related humanities disciplines. At
the coding level, the interpretation was partially driven via semantic (participant-driven,
explicit meaning) and latent (researcher-driven, conceptual, implicit meaning) levels [
98
].
We used selected quotes to illustrate aspects of the subthemes.
3. Results
Participants provided varied and rich perspectives based on a wide range of experi-
ences and relationships with animals, including wild animals, so-called “pest” animals,
domestic animals including animals in biomedical research, companion animals, and ani-
mals in the entertainment/racing industry. However, despite the various background of
the participants, farm animals were commonly referred to as examples of the concepts they
were describing.
The reason why animals in production tend to be a common discussion point is:
(1) the sheer number of animals affected, and (2) the profound social and environmen-
tal/ecological/climate impacts of factory farming [
26
,
108
]. They are furthermore a common
Animals 2023,13, 3271 6 of 26
and obvious example of human overreach. A significant portion (62 per cent) of the Earth’s
total biomass of mammals are trapped within human industrial systems [
109
], and as
outlined in the introduction, industrial practices significantly impact ecological systems
and the animals that are part of those. The situation for domestic animals and wild animals
may therefore be considered aspects of the same issue [31].
Participants provided varied and rich perspectives based on a wide range of expe-
riences and relationships with animals, both wild and domestic. The major theme was
“Animal voice”, which represents the participants’ perceptions of what animal voice is,
and how human language constructs and paradigms shape the realities of other animals
(Table 1). Participants identified several important properties that constitute this theme.
Below, we explore the theme of “Animal Voice”, its subthemes, and its properties within
the context of ongoing discussions in the literature.
Table 1. Thematic analysis, including subthemes and summary of subthemes.
Themes Subthemes Summary
Animal Voice
Animals do/do not have a voice Animals already speak/communicate
Artificial voicelessness
Sometimes animals need us to speak for them:
contextual voicelessness
Knowledge deficiency of animal
language and communication
We are only just beginning to understand
Human language constructs
realities and paradigms
Misguided conceptions and messages; inconsistency,
speciesism, anthropocentrism, othering.
Scientific reductionism, ontological, and epistemological
approaches to understanding animal voice
Let animals speak
Listening
Communication is more than spoken language: embodied
and visual. Knowledge, intimacy,
compassion, respect, reciprocity
Amplify animal voices
3.1. The Animal Voice and the Role of Human Language in Shaping Perceptions
The theme describes participants’ experiences and reflections on common perceptions
related to the concept of animal voice and how the human language can be used to construct
stories and paradigms which may prevent us from thinking about animals as being able
to communicate. The theme describes how current anthropocentric paradigms influence
how we approach scientific research on animal communication and how conceptions and
messages about animals as voiceless may perpetuate anthropocentrism, even in animal
advocacy. While participants emphasised that scientific theory and research, as well as
experience with animals are crucial aspects of understanding, a complete understanding
of animals requires that we challenge and attempt to move beyond current scientific
definitions and paradigms by working for and with animals.
Most participants explicitly or implicitly stated that animals have a voice and that they
are communicating; that animals will speak for themselves if we dedicate attention and time
to listening, observing, and understanding. They highlighted the importance of experience
with animals through intimacy (active listening, patient observation, and interaction),
reciprocity, respect, and compassion. This includes acknowledging animals as individuals
and agents of their own lives and experiences, as well as recognising their individual wants
and wills. This implies that we must begin to seriously consider and include novel and
alternative methods to understand animals beyond the limits of biological/physiological
needs and behaviour.
Animals 2023,13, 3271 7 of 26
Participants furthermore touched on complementary ways of understanding nonhu-
man animals, drawing analogies with certain groups of similarly vulnerable humans. The
subthemes will be discussed in more detail in the sections below.
3.1.1. Animals Do/Do Not Have a Voice
Animals already speak/communicate. Some participants highlighted that speaking for an-
imals is a modern and predominantly Western problematic concept because it perpetuates
misguided and/or inaccurate human constructs about animal voice and communication,
effectively disabling the agency and voices of animals:
“I think within this term, speaking for animals, that’s the danger and tendency, that
what you’re doing is actually replicating the idea that animals cannot communicate
and aren’t able to partake in co-creation of space or ideas or community. For me, the
concept of speaking for animals is within this Western, White, European enlighten-
ment, colonial mindset. You don’t get it in Indigenous mindsets. Animals speak for
themselves there. They absolutely speak for themselves through spirit, through mystery,
through myth. . .” (Mischa)
Other participants explained that we perceive animals as voiceless because our current
understanding of voice and communication tends to be limited. Our perceptions and
depictions of animals as voiceless are artificial constructs, but have become normalised
because we are conditioned to limit listening and understanding to verbal communication:
“
. . .
There’s a fantastic organisation in Australia called Voiceless but I continue to disagree
with the name of their organisation because they (animals) do have a voice and they do
communicate—we just don’t share a common language
. . .
.and so it is common to say
they’re voiceless because they don’t speak our tongue. . .” (Snowy Owl)
Several participants expressed their reluctance to speak for animals. Years of observa-
tion and experience had left them with a great sense of awe, admiration, and respect for
the animals, and as such, did not feel it was their place to speak for them:
“I think it’s highly arrogant of me to think I can speak for a snake. I’m just not comfortable
with that
. . .
I just feel that it would be limiting of me to try and do that because the snake
is so much richer and more sophisticated than I will ever be.” (Snake Advocate)
One participant framed animal voice in terms of consent and new approaches to listen-
ing. To determine whether our actions for animals are foregrounding their interests and
needs, we must begin by paying attention to their various means of communication. Since
we are interacting with or observing individuals who communicate differently, the first
step is to approach listening differently:
“I think the issue of consent brings an important issue to the fore of, is this a self-
proclaimed right to decide what is best for animals from a human point of view? The
first step there to minimise that would be to listen to animals, and listening would be
more than theoretical, through for example science and seeing how they behave, what
their ethology is. Listening is a physical act as well, and it involves proximity, it involves
sharing the landscape.” (Cat Man)
The issue of animal consent and agency was also discussed in terms of personal and
organisational approaches to speaking for animals, and how these approaches are shaped
by cultural norms about the subordination of animals—that we may assume a right to act
on behalf of, or speak for, animals:
“
. . .
and I get that some animal advocates say that’s at the heart of the subordination of
animals that we just feel that we can, with very limited authority or knowledge interfere
in the lives of animals who don’t understand as well. And talking to someone who’s
working with an animal psychologist recently it actually came home to me how I don’t
know anything about how dogs socialise—and still unreflexibly willing to intervene in
an animal’s activities on that basis. And then we have people who work for advocacy
Animals 2023,13, 3271 8 of 26
organisations. And some of those people seem extremely knowledgeable about animals,
and some of those people seem extremely unknowledgeable about animals—but by and
large, many of them are to some degree self-appointed individuals.” (White Ibis)
Sometimes animals need us to speak for them: contextual voicelessness. Some participants
emphasised that sometimes humans need to speak for animals because there are contexts
where animal voices are not being heard or ignored. For example, increasing urbanisation
and the covert practices of factory farm animal industries have disabled animal voices
through their enforced separation from humans. Many people have lost the opportunities
to meet, become familiar with, and become acquainted with animals intimately, thereby
also removing farm animals’ opportunity to be seen and heard by people:
“They desperately need us to speak for them
. . .
I mean animals on the one hand, have no
option. They have no voice as it were. They can’t speak for themselves as it were
. . .
I have
sheep here, rescue sheep. They do speak for themselves. But the way they speak takes a
lot of experience to hear anything that they are trying to say
. . .
. So I would say, ideally,
people speaking for animals have experience of animals. But 95 per cent of Australians
live in cities. They don’t have that kind of opportunity.” (Daniel)
One participant evoked the experiences of animals in a human-dominant world by
drawing the analogy with vulnerable human children who may be unable to speak for
themselves, defend themselves, or represent their own case in a world made for adults:
“So, I think what we need is to change the paradigm. We have to think about animals as
we think about our children, vulnerable creatures that we need to protect, look after and
you only stress or harm them when it is very important for their own good. I only subject
my dog to a vaccine if it’s for their own good” (Maria)
Similarly, another participant described contextual voicelessness as the silencing of
animal voices through the structural processes of stigmatisation in policy and legislation,
drawing parallels to stigmatised groups of humans:
“Animals to me are the most stigmatised and silenced social group, like to me, they are a
social population in the same way that we have different human social groups that are
stigmatised and silenced—animals don’t get to have a voice at all and that’s existed for
other human groups over time and the way those groups are silenced is through structural
stigmatisation through language, in particular policy and legislation. So, the language
that we use to talk about those issues and those beings is designed to silence them or make
them invisible or undermine their right to have a voice—or the meaningfulness of their
voice.” (Gunter Goose)
Participants discussed aspects of animals’ contextual voicelessness that is perpetuated
through our food choices. As long as we let our perceptions and attitudes regarding animals
as food continue to dominate our actions and thoughts, we are also willingly closing our
ears to animal voices. Some suggested that our obsession with meat means most of us will
not be open to considering animals as having voices because hearing their voices may be
too confronting.
“So listening to animals is [
. . .
] less than a priority, it’s like negative priority [
. . .
] we
want the opposite of listening to animals—we don’t want to hear them at all. I mean,
we’re breeding meat so that we can still eat meat and [
. . .
] we’re doing cell-ag, which I
think is a good thing and hopefully that will help change the world but, we want meat
so badly that we’re investing billions every year so we can grow it in a lab so that it
doesn’t have a brain it just has flesh so that we can continue on eating this thing that
we really want—without having to deal with the individual—and any of the (laughs)
communications that would arise. . .” (Snowy Owl)
We may be happy to listen to people who speak for the animals we are close to as
companions but feel uncomfortable when being confronted with the prospect of similarly
considering the more distant animals we want to eat or those we consider inconvenient.
Animals 2023,13, 3271 9 of 26
“
. . .
the general public as animal using community does express a concern for the wellbeing
of all animals—but we know that companion animals are treated different to production
animals and animals that are kind of classified as pest animals—and there were some
interesting studies that were done around cognitive dissonance that shows that people do
not really want to talk about animals that they consume
. . .
particularly the closer they
get to a consumption [
. . .
] so, I guess in that kind of ‘who gets to speak for animals’ [
. . .
]
is also who is listening.” (White Ibis)
Knowledge deficiency of animal language and communication. Participants emphasised the
importance of recognising the growing science on animal communication, language, and
behaviour, especially those that document the emotional/subjective experiences of animals
that we do not necessarily (want to) see or hear:
“
. . .
he tells me stuff that he has seen and learned in labs, like for example—the vocalisa-
tions of rats—this is about their communication and our listening and discerning and
interpreting—and I didn’t know until he told me about rats’ laugh [
. . .
] they have high
pitched sounds of joy when they’re with their loved ones—and if they’re having a good
laugh, like if you’re tickling them—they’ll have a really good laugh [
. . .
] and the study
has shown that this is happening, which makes it all the sadder that we can’t hear that
. . .
”
(Snowy Owl)
From the perspective of someone with many years of experience with animal be-
haviour and wildlife management, one participant heralded significant future changes by
pointing to emerging scientific trends. We are only just beginning to scratch the surface in
terms of understanding the many different ways that animals communicate:
“Nature does not usually allow for frivolity, birds sing and communicate information for
purposes that we think simplistically advances their reproductive success or their dominance
over other birds—but there’s a lot more going on than that, and I think we are just beginning
this current phase of understanding animal behaviour. . .”(Old Man Winter)
3.1.2. Human Language Creates Realities and Paradigms
Misguided conceptions and messages; inconsistency, speciesism, anthropocentrism, and oth-
ering. Participants described our historical use of language to describe animals and the
socio-psychological factors, including human superiority and dominance narratives that
have become so ingrained in our culture, language, behaviour, and actions that we no
longer question them. Via these narratives, we have become conditioned to minimise
animal experiences and maintain their separation from us by ignoring their voices:
“
. . .
I think because we don’t have a history of paying close attention, it’s a history of
othering—of diminishing their value and their worth in the hierarchy we’ve created about
humanity, all of these reasons for us to not listen to animals, not to pay attention
. . .
”
(Snowy Owl)
Some described the theme in terms of anthropocentrism and the social exclusion of
certain animals (speciesism):
“In fact, I consider this all the same fight pretty much and the same challenge, the
challenge being anthropocentrism as a paradigm, as a worldview. If you look at it that
way, then we’re talking about folks who I think can speak for animals are folks who treat
this not as an environmental issue, not as an ecological issue but as a social justice issue,
in the same way that you would treat any environmental justice issue to more vulnerable
marginalised human communities.” (Cat Man)
One participant described how we can change paradigms with relative ease to either
benefit or exclude animals. Institutional re-structuring of relationships via the arbitrary
categorisation of certain animals may dictate how we speak for them or how we choose to
frame debates related to them. While these changing relationships may not affect us, they
may have profound effects on animals and how we view or treat them.
Animals 2023,13, 3271 10 of 26
“
. . .
so thinking about the Royal Society for the Protection of Animals in Queensland it
was originally the Royal Society for the Protection of Animals and Children
. . .
.and so,
we see these things as separate today but once upon a time they were actually much more
conjoined—I think it points to that we have become calcified into a particular form of
structural relationship around the debates about animals—and that’s not necessarily a
natural or necessary thing—it could be subject to contestation.” (White Ibis)
They also provided an example of how institutional categorisations may shape human
compassion and moral concern for certain animals, and therefore, how we choose to speak
for them, depending on the geographical context. In landscapes where ecological commu-
nities are largely changed by humans, certain animals have become particularly vulnerable
as they are judged according to what we currently value as aesthetically important to that
particular landscape:
“
. . .
every country has its own taxonomy of animals and what animals are—in Australia
the possum is a wonderfully cute animal that you would create an effigy of to give to a
child whereas in New Zealand, the possum is an invasive species, and you might recruit
children to systematically cull them at the schools
. . .
and [
. . .
] particularly in regards to
animals, there’s no rhyme nor reason to the inclusion or exclusion of different animals
from the circle of compassion and that’s the way in which people will speak for them.”
(White Ibis)
One participant described how inconsistent attitudes to different animals means certain
animals are rejected as worthy. We stigmatise some animals as undesirable or unwanted
according to inconsistent rules. As such, some animals may be perceived as undeserving of
representation while other animals are represented because they fit in with the preferences
of certain groups of humans.
“I don’t think that you can tailor your speech for animals by saying these are the animals
we can speak for and these animals we can’t. I don’t think you can pick and choose because
then you’re imposing an aesthetic on the world. You know, it’s an aesthetic. It’s not
consistent.” (Daniel)
Institutional inconsistency in attitudes to animals is similarly reflected in the way
humans design animal law, which may arbitrarily protect or not protect animals depending
on the context in which animals are placed by humans. Animals are often not given a
choice in where they are placed, with whom, or how they will be perceived according to
the context. When we perceive animals as having no agency or voice, we assume a right
to change their legal status according to which anthropocentric values are relative to the
context: economy, hedonism, aesthetics, convenience, or similar utilitarian justification to
favour human interests:
“In Victoria, we have codes of practice for different species of animals. Only the ones
that relate to cats and dogs are mandatory to follow and illegal to break, the ones for
agricultural animals and racing animals, they are all just voluntary, so it really doesn’t
give them any sort of protection
. . .
a greyhound will be in the racing industry and basically
have no protection and then as soon as they finish racing and get adopted as a pet, they
suddenly have some sort of legal protection when they’re the same animal—their situation
has just changed so, it’s a very clear issue in terms of how we view them” (Gigi)
Similarly, while constitutional changes or changes in animal law are important steps
forward, these may be more symbolic than reflective of immediate or authentic intention to
implement meaningful change for animals.
“Legally, it doesn’t have a strong direct impact on actual substantive duties towards
animals under the law. It depends on how sentience is recognised and whether it is
attached to actual operative provisions within the act. But at the moment, it’s just more
symbolic.” (Shy Albatross)
Animals 2023,13, 3271 11 of 26
While several countries now legally recognise animals as sentient, limitations render
the recognition with limited operational power as long as the more powerful voices of the
animal industries are prioritised at governmental decision levels:
“
. . .
I think that is subject to contestation, but I think that’s really interesting how
theoretically that is supposed to be a game-changer [
. . .
]—but yet there is massive
continuity, and it just shows how power is really written into the fundamental systems of
production that are resistant to change—” (White Ibis)
While the official recognition of sentience may be perceived as important at higher
levels, members of the public react with puzzlement to the idea that sentience in animals
needs to be recognised by the law:
“So yeah, I think it’s positive. It’s funny because we campaigned to have sentience
recognised in law. Then when people ask you like, well what does that mean, and you say
well, it’s just about recognising the fact that animals can feel fundamentally. People sort
of look at you like you know, who denies that?” (Shy Albatross)
Scientific reductionism, ontological, and epistemological approaches to understanding animal
voice. Participants explained that we have made assumptions about animal communica-
tion through an over-emphasis on scientific reductionism. As such, participants explained
that human willingness to consider ontological and epistemological alternatives is the key to
understanding animal voice. Animal language and communication exist regardless of how
humans define them or choose to interpret them—we have, until recently, not focussed on
different approaches to understand animals beyond biology, physiology, and behaviour.
Our claim to speak for animals is limited if we do not understand animals as individuals
with their own unique wants and interests.
“
. . .
We’re conditioned to listen for a language whereas animals are often quite embodied.
You don’t just listen with your ears, or you can’t say you’re listening to animals because
you read twenty papers on the ethology of these animals and suddenly, you’re an expert on
them—your credentials speak for them almost—when you don’t know them
. . .
” (Cat Man)
Participants also highlighted how scientific reductionism manifests as a tendency to
present one-dimensional images of animal lives and experiences. Rarely do we consider
speaking for or representing animals in terms of personality and subjective experiences:
“We’re judging on something which, you know, the focus is very narrow. It’s all about
harm, it’s suffering, it’s pain and it’s that what we are talking about when talking for the
animal. Mostly what we are not doing is about the daily life of an animal. It’s not the
feelings of the animal. It’s just does it like to talk to you, does it want to look at television,
does it tell you to put on the radio or whatever? So, there is more than this actually, but
we are very narrow in the discussion. It’s not the whole total behaviour and living of the
animal we are talking about when we talk about speaking for an animal.” (Junior)
Using scientific reductionism, we have created a mechanistic framework from within
which exploitative industries can more easily justify their instrumentalisation of ani-
mals, rendering animals vulnerable to harm, misrepresentation, and the suppression of
their voices.
“I think it leads on from what we were just talking about in terms of the physical scientists
and the reductive nature of positivist scientific discourses. So that the fundamental
underpinnings of that kind of science can lead you down very blinkered paths that don’t
take into consideration the feelings or thoughts of animals in a meaningful way. It’s only
about observable traits and responses. That’s a dangerous thing when you see agriculture
industrialising more and more. Animals being put in sheds and vets being tasked with
keeping them alive” (Busy Bee)
Participants also described the issue in terms of limited ethical, legal, and welfare
science knowledge within the agricultural animal industry:
Animals 2023,13, 3271 12 of 26
“
. . .
there are a lot of vets who don’t have that [legitimacy to talk about animal welfare
science, ethics, and law] and are still considered and taken by government and industry
to be experts on animal welfare which I think is really interesting because in reality the
animal welfare that’s taught in vet schools is tiny
. . .
we know more about wildlife than
animal welfare in terms of what we’re taught, and we don’t know much about wildlife
. . .
”
(Blue Angel)
Participants explained that understanding animals may also include coming to terms
with our own limitations of understanding—a different and perhaps more profound
sense of appreciation of animals that is not defined by or limited to scientific knowledge.
One participant
illustrated this concept as contemplating the prospect of other animals’
existence throughout deep time and comparing with the relatively limited time that hu-
mans have existed. This idea challenges us to situate humans into a different temporal
perspective in which we are no more than animals to have perhaps relatively briefly existed
among a long line of other animals. From the perspective of deep time, mystery, and a
sense of humility, we may come to appreciate that animal lives are and have always been
as rich and eventful as ours—regardless of our existence and our understanding of them.
“There are guestimates, there’s great science on evolutionary biology, but they’ve [snakes]
been here a long time and I just think there’s so much that we don’t understand about
these animals, and I love that. I love the fact that we’ll never fully understand how they
navigate, how they feel, how they communicate with each other. That’s why I feel like I’m
maybe not your orthodox scientist who wants to know everything.” (Snake Advocate)
3.1.3. Let Animals Speak
Communication is more than spoken language. Some participants explored the concept
of animal voice in the context of companion animal relationships and the importance of
listening to animals. Key words included openness, observation, reciprocity, closeness,
respect, and intimacy. While many of these relationships may typically be characterised
by human dominance, some also provide powerful examples of respectful and reciprocal
communication and intimacy between species. We need to recognise these relationships
culturally due to their profound nature:
“Listening to the movement, sounds, demands and needs of the domestic companion in
the domestic space is really important. The more you do that, the more you deepen your
relationship. I think it’s much more profound. I think a lot more people know it and it
would be great if we had more cultural recognition of how profound that is.” (Mischa)
Similarly, another participant described how their first experience of living with
companion/domestic animals (a cat, two dogs, and several chickens) profoundly changed
their perspective in terms of understanding animals. Coming from a scientific background,
the experience made them see animals from a different perspective; as individuals who each
required very specific approaches depending on their personal needs, wants, and moods:
“They [animals] have been the primary teachers of—are we actually listening to what
these individuals have to say? The only way I would have ever been able to figure
him [cat companion] out is just spending time next to him, not only observing him
and complying with his cues but—just observe what this individual wants, what he
finds pleasurable when I am not engaging with him as well
. . .
It speaks so much to the
physical aspect of listening
. . .
that the individuals need to get physically comfortable with
you before they start showing you who they are
. . .
I thought that a cat is a cat, and a dog
is a dog” (Cat Man)
Amplify animal voices. One participant described representation in terms of ambassador-
ship and familiarity with wild animals via education and exposure. Via their work as a
highly skilled, knowledgeable, and passionate educator, their role expanded to become one
of both advocate and diplomat. By allowing people to experience a different perspective of
snakes through the compassionate lens of the educator, the animals commonly perceived
Animals 2023,13, 3271 13 of 26
as hostile or repulsive are presented in a light to reveal other dimensions of who they are.
Animals are thus transformed from being perceived as repulsive and/or a potential threat
to humans, to becoming individual beings with their own important lives, wills, wants,
and sense of place in the world.
“I can take all my insights and experiences and try and bundle them up into something
that people think, oh, next time I see a snake, I’m not going to freak out. I’m not going to
use that shovel. I might just leave it alone.” (Snake Advocate)
Rather than speaking for animals, advocates should strive to act as amplifiers for their
voices and interests:
“It’s the paradigmatic structures of anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism that
need to be dismantled, and we can’t dismantle them by doing piecemeal changes through
anthropocentric practices. That is not going dismantle the overall structure. I think this
whole idea of speaking for the animals because they can’t speak for themselves is that
anthropocentric reinforcement, whereas speaking for the animals to amplify their voice
and advocate for them in ways that they don’t have access to, is at least attempting and
non-anthropocentric practice.” (Mischa)
Participants furthermore discussed alternative ways that humans give animal voices a
platform, such as via various art media or cultural community:
“I think it’s absolutely fine to experiment and explore representing animal language in
human language, with understanding the caveat that we can’t ever do that properly
. . .
I
think that is actually a really interesting area for exploration. I think all of those [creative
writers], or certainly Gene Stone, certainly Laura Jean McKay, they would consider
themselves advocates for animals. They are performing it outside of standard advocacy
space, but they are advocating for animal representation. I don’t have an answer or theory
about it, but I think it’s a really valuable space for exploring this question. . .” (Mischa)
Others described the potential for tapping into a public thirst for learning about
animals and emphasised the significant influence through which various forms of cultural
expressions, such as games, can bring animals to our attention:
“
. . .
and this game, Wingspan, which is produced by female game designers, was hugely
successful and sort of talks about this great cultural thirst for animal related stuff in
every kind of area, and in the sense the game itself is about animals and laying eggs
and their lifecycle [
. . .
] that represent talking about animals and learning about animals
in different ways
. . .
I just think on a kind of practical everyday basis it really is people
within the cultural industry who predominantly dominate the talking for or representing
animals—not really advocates and activists” (White Ibis)
4. Discussion
We interviewed 15 people with deep, sustained, and diverse experience and knowl-
edge of animals to gather insights about current thoughts and perceptions related to animal
representation. We used an inductive, qualitative approach to develop new ideas and to
deepen the understanding of current and emerging concepts. The major theme, animal
voice, represented common topics in the interviews and the participants elucidated several
subthemes and their properties. Participants described animal voice in the sense that animal
voice is currently contextually defined and/or limited by humans. This renders animals
artificially voiceless and thus vulnerable to misrepresentation and harm. The subthemes
of animal voice represent different aspects of how we may assume to speak for animals or
seek to empower animal voices based on different conceptions and constructs related to
animal voice.
Animals do/do not have a voice.
The issue of misrepresentation of animal voice was
evident in the participants’ reaction to the implicit suggestion that speaking for animals
is necessary because animals cannot speak. As one participant summarised, animals will
speak if we are willing to listen and observe. Some explained that the term “voiceless”
Animals 2023,13, 3271 14 of 26
risks perpetuating the anthropocentric idea that animals cannot speak or communicate. It
may additionally perpetuate the idea that animals have no agency, suggesting that humans
therefore need to interfere and take charge of their lives.
Other participants expressed a reluctance to speak for animals because of their pro-
found sense of humility and respect for them. They described their own as well as other
alternative methods to convey the plight of animals. This included providing animals
with a communication platform via various media and the arts or via education. For
example, they described how sharing discovery and exploration through the lens of some-
one who profoundly respects and cares for animals presents people with the option of
learning through compassion. At the same time participants were clear that compassionate
approaches need not exclude traditional scientific knowledge, but rather that the added
dimension of compassion allows us to discover animal voices in ways that have been un-
derstood mostly through intimate human/animal relationships. Learning can thus expand
beyond the limited scope of just satisfying our own curiosity or as a means of fulfilling the
criteria for certain institutional learning processes. It may elevate learning to recognise and
nurture our own potential compassion for animals, which can be a profoundly rewarding,
insightful, and healing personal journey [
110
], both for ourselves and the animals we
extend our compassion towards.
Some participants provided a different perspective on animal voice and discussed
how voicelessness is imposed on animals by various oppressive institutionalised systems.
There were parallels drawn with vulnerable humans such as children, who may be con-
sidered voiceless because they depend on trusted others to speak for them in a world
of social, political, educational, and economic systems designed by and for adults. In
the industrial/institutional context, animal voices are relevant only (if at all) in terms of
being instrumental to aspects of the scientific and operational processes for optimising
production [111].
Acknowledging agricultural animal voices thus begins with acknowledg-
ing the reality which has rendered them contextually voiceless—the commodification of
them as “meat” (discussed in more detail below).
Knowledge deficiency of animal language and communication. Some participants explained
that our concept of animal voice and communication may be limited because human con-
structs of language are narrow. Participants described how we are only just beginning to
take an interest in this aspect of animal lives. As an example, they discussed the importance
of recognising the unique and varied approaches for the shared understanding between
humans and animals in intimate relationships. As noted in the introduction, similar ideas
have long been discussed in the literature. In 1982, Levinson called for the developing field
of human–animal relationships to become a discipline in its own right, emphasising the im-
portance of recognising both intuitive and scientific methods as equally important aspects
of understanding animals and their communication [
112
]. Until recently, this literature has
largely focussed on companion animal relationships from the perspective of human benefit.
This instrumentalisation of companion animals has ignored the animal perspective and
the possibility that these relationships may be more dynamic, reciprocal, and profound
than previously assumed. Over the last decade, this recognition has prompted an increase
in studies that have explored companion animals’ perceptions and reactions in human
environments [113].
As participants noted, communication in other animals is often nonverbal. It can be
embodied, chemical, and/or visual, and also manifests in various patterns such as in the
song of birds and whales [
114
–
116
]. Recently, machine learning to decode animal commu-
nication has become more widespread [
117
], as demonstrated in attempts to find ways to
decode the languages of sperm whales [
118
] and song birds [
119
], rather than just recording
and describing their various species manifestations and patterns. The Earth Species Project
is in the process of applying machine learning to understand communication in primates
and some species of birds. Fitch (2019) has furthermore argued that human conceptions of
language need to expand beyond communication because we are missing an important
aspect of understanding in animals. Fitch (2019) stated that the fact that some animals do
Animals 2023,13, 3271 15 of 26
not express understanding does not mean they do not possess understanding [
120
], as doc-
umented by a large body of the literature on animal cognition [
121
]. The concept of animal
understanding is being similarly explored by artists and researchers at the Interspecies
Communication Research Initiative (ISCRI). This research aims to address questions of
what nonhuman intelligence is and where in the body it is located, involving developing
novel approaches to gain insights about the internal lives of octopuses via the close study
of AI/octopus interaction.
As reflected by our data, scientific research and general attitudes are as such gradually
changing how we approach the understanding of animals, and importantly, shifting the
focus towards capturing animal understanding and perspectives. However, some partici-
pants reflected on the extent to which we can assume a right to understand animal voices
and, if so, how do we determine the best ethical approaches to advance this understanding?
These issues have been discussed in depth by Eva Meijer in their groundbreaking book
When Animals Speak [
122
] and with Bovenkerk (2021) in “Taking animal perspectives into
account in animal ethics” [
67
]. While critical to anthropocentric approaches, Meijer and
Bovenkerk argue that to be able to make democratic decisions with animals, we need to
recognise animal agency as an essential first step. Meijer and Bovenkerk furthermore argue
that we need to develop better relationships with animals by improving our understanding
of their differences in expression, wants, and wills [
67
] (p. 50). This can be achieved using
alternative methods that do not reinforce the anthropocentric oppression of animal agency.
Meijer (2019) suggested one approach is through experimental settings in sanctuaries or
multispecies households where the animals themselves can determine the grounds for
interaction [122] (p. 239).
In terms of institutional perceptions of animal voice and agency, the constitutional
recognition of animals as sentient beings and existing laws to protect animals in some
countries [123–125]
may reflect a positive institutional paradigm change in human attitudes to
animals. However, as some participants emphasised, even constitutional sentience recognition
continues to have little meaningful effect as long as there are legal inconsistencies, codes of
practice, and provisions that enable economic/legal [
88
,
108
,
126
],
aesthetic [127]
, nationalis-
tic/cultural [
128
], ideological/supremacist [
129
–
131
], speciesist [
132
], and
hedonistic [133,134]
justifications to suppress animal voices. Even if animals are to be constitutionally included
similarly to humans, the challenge remains that our current democratic and judicial pro-
cesses rest on the assumption that constitutional actors have the ability to assert their own
interests [123].
Eisen (2018) has argued that for this reason, we need to consider expanding
the discourse on constitutional animal protection to include the consideration and protection
of subjects that are unable to or unwilling to “speak in the language of the law with their own
voices.” (p. 909).
Human language constructs realities and paradigms.
The issue was discussed in
terms of how the old paradigms of human superiority and dominance perpetuate anthro-
pocentric thinking in many human systems, but that these attitudes are gradually changing.
Humans are increasingly questioning past assumptions of sharp divides between humans
and nonhumans, and with this acknowledgement, some biologists are even beginning to
challenge the concept of sharply divided species boundaries (see [
135
,
136
]). The scientific
and philosophical discourse has thus increasingly focussed on arguments that basic emo-
tion and social intelligence are not just fundamental in human animals, but also in other
vertebrate and many invertebrate nonhuman species [31,43,125,137–145].
Participants drew parallels between the traditional ways in which we have perceived
groups of marginalised humans and how we similarly view animals. Rather than viewing
certain traits and abilities as exceptional to humans, we are beginning to recognise that
these and other abilities are present in most sentient, if not all animals, and that species
differences perhaps ought to be viewed on a spectrum rather than by rank [135].
Issues regarding mental and physical ability have been similarly discussed in terms
of how human language shapes how we think about and treat people who fall outside
able-bodied norms [
146
]. For example, the UK-based Union of Physically Impaired Against
Animals 2023,13, 3271 16 of 26
Segregation described the word “disability” (a negating term) as a form of oppression that
only adds further to the burden of their already existing challenges [
147
]. Similarly, the
words “voiceless” and “animal” may contribute to perpetuating biased negative percep-
tions of animals as they conceptually separate and categorise animals negatively against
humans. Sunaura Taylor (2017) drew this parallel explicitly in their book Beasts of Burden,
positing that mental and physical ability is not what gives living beings dignity and value.
As with humans with different abilities, we have constructed a story of human dominance
over animals by comparing their abilities and traits to our own [146].
Meijer (2013) has similarly argued that the hyperfocus on discourses regarding animal
emotionality, consciousness, and cognitive and physical ability has distracted from a
fundamental ethical argument that the social and political inclusion of nonhuman animals
need not be contingent on their intrinsic capacities and/or human perceptions of moral
agency. Abbate (2020) furthermore suggested an important first step would be to consider
that animals, like humans, have intrinsic worth, independent of their value to humans.
This means we need to respect animals in terms of how we treat them, but also how we
talk about them [148].
Scientific reductionism, ontological, and epistemological approaches. Moreover, participants
discussed how animals are deprived of their voices via an over-emphasis on institution-
alised objective, positivist, and deceptive language in animal science and welfare policy and
the linguistic mechanisms to discourage the humanising of animals in industry/educational
institutions. These institutionalised mechanisms have also been brought to attention by
authors who describe how non-emotive terms may be deliberately or unconsciously used to
desensitise us to the reality of animals [
149
,
150
] or to facilitate dissociation by discouraging
the use of humanising terms to describe animals [151–153].
Other authors have discussed how these mechanisms are also prevalent in our daily
language. For example, Adams (2016) explained how we create “false mass terms” by
wrongly lumping individuals under certain umbrella terms. The mass term “meat” is used
to define entire species, transforming animals from sentient individuals to “food” (another
mass term), protecting us from the discomfort of contemplating the remnants on our plate
as those belonging to a destroyed individual [
152
]. Adams (2016) explained that via the
use of dissociating terms, we grant ourselves perceived license to eat animals as it is no
longer considered contact with the animal, but contact with “food” [152] (p. 6).
Some participants similarly reflected on the many ways in which humans deal with
the personal discomfort (“cognitive dissonance”) that arises as the result of wanting to
eat meat, while at the same time having awareness of the confronting realities of factory
farm animals. In the literature, this has been coined as the “meat paradox”: while we
are concerned for farm animals, we simultaneously continue to find ways to suppress the
underlying discomfort in contemplating the lives and deaths of the animals we wish to
keep consuming [154,155].
Participants discussed other issues with the over-emphasis on reductionistic think-
ing and how this paradigm is being increasingly challenged by the billions of humans
globally who regard their companion animals as full-blown family members with their
own meaningful and rich experiences of the world [
156
–
158
]. While the power structures
in these human–companion animal relationships still require closer examination [
159
],
many transcend species barriers as evident not just by the strong emotional bonds that are
developed between humans and nonhumans, but also the reciprocal nature of interaction
and the development of common understanding [
112
,
160
]. By including animals into our
moral circle, we are also more likely to extend prosocial behaviours toward them [
158
],
giving their voice validation.
This concept was vividly illustrated by participants who described their own eye-
opening experiences of sharing a home with companion animals. It was also described by
those who had devoted their lives to the close scientific study and/or advocacy of wild
animal species, those who had tirelessly devoted their lives to advocacy work for farm ani-
mals, or those who had spent a significant part of their lives volunteering in rescue animal
Animals 2023,13, 3271 17 of 26
shelters. Their accounts documented that intimacy with animals is a crucial aspect of listen-
ing to their voices and thus requires an open mind as well as a respectful, compassionate,
and patient approach, similarly to how we would interact with other humans.
Some participants noted that it may be argued by some who are closely involved with
animals that their close proximity to and experience with animals implies they are their
best care providers. However, physical proximity does not guarantee or promote best care
practices [
161
] and may indeed tell us very little about the true nature of the human/animal
relationship/connection.
This concept was illustrated by Gruen and Jones (2015), who drew critical attention to
the “romanticisation” of the “connection” that people who are uncomfortable with factory
farming (“compassionate carnivores”) imagine with the animals they kill and consume.
Somehow, being involved in every step of the process of slaughter is viewed as a more
ethical form of consuming animals, as killing the animal one has raised is thought to increase
a sense of humility and respect for the animal. And, while this may be true to some extent,
the authors argue this connection may not be as genuine as much as a false connection [
162
].
The authors refer to Katie Gillespie’s (2011) concept of “connected disconnection” in which
the process of killing necessitates emotional distance from the animal, which is made
possible by connecting to the violence against the animal [163] (p. 120).
Whether we are involved directly in the killing or paying someone else to kill, Griffin
and Griffin (2021) argued that because animals are social beings and part of our social
world, our violence towards animals is a social harm affecting not only animals, but also
humans and the environment [
108
]. These harms include but are not limited to the docu-
mented harms associated with slaughterhouse work and meat consumption, but also harms
that correspond closely with what Adams (1990) identified as the underlying sexist and
patriarchal devaluation and feminisation of compassion for animals and
nature [164,165]
.
Brooks Pribac (2016) furthermore noted how caring for animals is invalidated as a form
of weakness or even seen as pathological—and how the associated systemic processes of
dissociation not only contribute to obscuring animal suffering but may also lead to the
dismissal of those who advocate for them as over-emotional, or it may even lead to the
victimisation of the “perpetrators” (farmers and consumers) (p. 56). The author describes
these processes as a betrayal not just of the animals, but also those who are unwittingly
part of the supporting mechanisms of their exploitation [166].
Abbate (2020) has described the social pressures that contribute to drive meat con-
sumption despite people’s awareness of factory farm animal suffering. Aspects of “social
duress” may include various socio-cultural environmental factors that pressure individuals
to comply with contextual meat-eating norms and traditions for social acceptance. Abbate
(2020) thus noted that while consumers of factory-farmed meat can be argued to be partially
morally responsible for the violence towards animals, it is important to consider that they
may be acting under social duress which causes volitional impairment: “One need not have
a gun pointed towards one’s head to act under duress” [
167
] (p. 11). Abbate’s concept of
social duress and volitional impairment could be expanded to include ideological, political,
and academic domains where moral and ethical discourses on animals may affect indi-
viduals who try to speak for animals, and therefore, also influences where the discourse
is headed.
The connection and closeness with animals identified by participants was described as
profound, reciprocal, respectful, compassionate, and personal, such as those that may typi-
cally be found in companion animal relationships [
157
,
168
,
169
]. While many participants
used companion animals as a common example, participants described a close affinity or
shared experiences with animals in other categories, such as wild snakes, pigs, chickens,
geese, sheep, wild birds, animals in biomedical research, and so on. This type of close-
ness is not necessarily limited to physical closeness but is characterised by an authentic
sense of moral concern and compassion which recognises the animal as an individual
with their own agency and interests. In intimate relationships, humans and animals, via a
Animals 2023,13, 3271 18 of 26
process of mutual interactions and intuitive approaches, develop a common language of
understanding that may be embodied as well as vocal.
Importantly, our moral concern may extend beyond the individual to include other
individuals, realising the potential of companion animals as ambassadors for other animals.
Participants noted that these relationships therefore deserve wider cultural and academic
recognition. Amiot, Bastian, and Martin (2016) have similarly stated that human/animal
relationships have always been central to human existence [
170
]. These relationships
have existed for a very long time; however, their importance and prominence have been
underestimated and hidden as a result of the so-called “species-barrier” [
168
,
171
]. Levinson
(1982) suggested that the potential for living at peace with animals lies in the investigation
of these human–animal relationships, emphasising the importance of incorporating both
intuitive and scientific methods: “The intuitive method looks at an animal as a teacher and
friend, while the scientific method looks at an animal as an object of curiosity.” (p. 284).
This influence of closeness with companion animals as well as the positive relation-
ship between increasing wealth, urbanisation, and concern for wild animals (feelings of
mutualism) has been explored by several authors. Manfredo et al. (2020:1) questioned
the suggestion that modernisation is the most prominent factor in favouring mutualist
values (values that regard wild animals as individual fellow beings in a common social
community) over dominance values (values that emphasise domination over wild animals).
The authors argue that because modernisation has generally contributed to furthering
the physical distance between humans and wild animals, there must be other moderating
factors contributing to increased feelings of mutualism. Their results demonstrated that
rising anthropomorphism is strongly associated with increasing mutualist values and could
therefore partially explain why people in urbanised areas are increasingly regarding wild
animals as deserving of rights similar to humans [
172
]. The authors discussed their results
in the context of the Australian study results of Franklin (1999, 2007), who reported a
significant positive and inclusive shift in human attitudes to animals as a function of the
rising numbers of human relationships with companion animals [156,157].
In terms of concerns for the plight of farm animals, the potentially powerful influence
of farm animal ambassadors has therefore become a topic of increased focus. This work has
been conducted in sanctuaries that specifically aim to actively foster human connections
with rescued farm animals, rather than passively displaying them as objects of human
entertainment. A Faunalytics (2020) study reported the significant positive impact that
physical/emotional contact and closeness with rescued farm animals had on visitors [
173
].
At these sanctuaries, visitors are given the unique opportunity to experience rescued farm
animals as living, feeling individuals, each with their own story to tell. The stories combined
with the closeness with individual rescued farm animals elicited feelings of heightened
empathy and compassion for farm animals generally [
174
]. As a consequence, visitors felt
compelled to make significant life changes as a gesture of solidarity or sympathy with farm
animals. These findings are consistent with research that shows that people who include
animals in their moral sphere are also more likely to extend prosocial behaviours towards
them [158].
Let animals speak.
Participants discussed the need to incorporate the subjective ex-
periences of animals as individuals and persons for a more complete understanding of
animals by amplifying animal voices. Amplification as much as possible attempts to avoid
speaking for animals, focusing instead on enhancing animal voices or giving their voice a
platform. They described this concept as advocacy and scientific approaches that recognise
and promote the powerful agency of animals, giving animals a voice and a central place.
Participants discussed alternative approaches to accessing and exploring animal voice and
language, as demonstrated in other academic disciplines as well as various cultural and
visual media. In Slithering Stories we Live by: Animal Educators’ Construction and Enactment
of Positive Snake Narratives, Rosenfeld (2021) incorporated the concept of critical anthropo-
morphism to consider snake voices, demonstrating how animal voices can be empowered
without their direct involvement. Via ethnographic methods, they explored how social
Animals 2023,13, 3271 19 of 26
setting, location, personal factors, and the stories told combine to shape conceptualisations
of “snake” [
175
]. Rosenfeld (2021) demonstrated that negative perceptions of “snake” can
be reshaped using these same mechanisms to improve human attitudes and reduce the
influence of myths that increase our aversion towards and stigmatisation of certain animals.
This potential for empowering animal voices via public education and storytelling
was illustrated by the participants who were involved in advocacy for typically stigmatised
and contextually voiceless animals, such as snakes or animals categorised as “pests”. Via
these alternative approaches, the animals themselves become the subjects with space to
unfold their personalities, creating their own realities and allowing their voice a central
place in our narratives. The unexpected and novel framing present a different perspective
of animals, prompting us to consider the animal perspective.
Other studies have similarly attempted to address human–animal relationships with animals
as the subjects, either in terms of species-specific or inter-species
communication [65,176–183]
or by presenting issues from the nonhuman point of view [
184
–
187
]. While participants noted
that novel approaches should not exclude the attention to species-specific biology, life histories,
behaviours, abilities, and communication, their insights suggested that it is via the additional
incorporation of the subjective dimensions of animal wants and wills that animals can transcend
from inanimate background props to become central, living individuals free to assert their voice
and agency in a world shared with humans.
Importantly, participants remarked that we also need to consider to what extent we
can assume a right to involve ourselves in animal lives, including issues related to animal
consent. We need to carefully evaluate the ethical implications of involving animals, and if
we do involve them, we must practice “epistemic humility” (acknowledging what we do
not know about animals), echoing the concerns of Meijer and Bovenkerk (2021) (p. 50). At
the same time, if we have a limited understanding of animal communication, it may limit
our understanding of animal wants and interests. We have, for example, not been asking
the right questions, as in cases where we ask questions about animal choices in settings
where their choices are significantly limited [
67
]. Similar ideas for ethical approaches are
suggested in studies that emphasise researching with animals as subjects as an attempt
to disrupt the human tendency to speak for animals. For example, Barrett et al. (2021)
suggested exploring intuitive interspecies communication (IIC) by using specialised animal
communicators: people who have developed specialised skills through direct experiences
with animals and as such, learnt to understand and interpret animal communication.
Our participants described similar respectful and compassionate approaches that they
had used in their own work as well as future potentials for including these approaches in
science, advocacy, and the political representation of animals. They also listed common
themes related to reciprocal interactions and intimacy with animals, as well as respectful
recognition of animal agency and personhood. Meijer (2021) discussed the potential for
such ethical exploration of animal political agency and voice in sanctuaries like VINE,
which offers refuge to escaped or rescued animals [
188
]. VINE challenges perceptions of
animals as helpless and voiceless victims by encouraging and actively involving animal
residents in community decisions. This requires that human staff put aside notions of
themselves as hosts, rulers, and rescuers to engage in processes of interaction with the
animal residents on their own terms. As a contrast to sanctuaries that advocate to encourage
veganism, VINE acts as a model for improved interspecies relations, fostering connections
with larger social justice movements and working towards systemic changes in our political
and economic structures [188].
5. Conclusions
This study is the first to have explored themes related to animal representation in
a cohort of participants from a variety of relevant expert and otherwise skilled back-
grounds. The resulting theme, animal voice, and its subthemes indicated that animals and
their interests are currently challenged by the entanglement with human interests and
Animals 2023,13, 3271 20 of 26
anthropocentric power structures. This has rendered countless animals artificially and
contextually voiceless and thus vulnerable to harm, exploitation, and misrepresentation.
The themes from this study have identified barriers to empowering animal voices
and authentically representing their interests. Our interview data reflects scholarly calls
to reframe the plight of animals as a social issue as well as reconsidering institutional and
individual perceptions of animal voice. Our results reflect the growing consensus in the
literature that animals have intrinsic worth, independent of how humans value them.
This implies we need to seriously consider and recognise animals as individuals with
their own intrinsic worth, voice, and agency in both public and professional discourses
related to animals. It furthermore requires that we consider animals with respect and
compassion at both individual and species levels, recognising animals as individuals with
their own agency, personalities, interests, wants, and wills.
Echoing the recommendations of Meijer (2019), the themes developed from our in-
terviews point to the need to develop ethical working relationships with animals, which
requires that we move away from anthropocentric notions of animals as objects and in-
struments to consider animals as subjects and agents of their own lives. This by no means
implies we ignore scientific developments related to the physical, cognitive, and emotional
abilities of animals, but rather that we seriously consider the growing calls to develop and
incorporate novel methods that focus on moving away from old anthropocentric concep-
tions and conjectures of animals as voiceless. However, how these approaches should be
conducted and if/when we can assume to interfere in animal lives need to be considered
within moral, ethical, and philosophical frameworks to foreground the animal perspective.
Recognising animal voice is an important step if we are to improve our understanding of
animal interests at both individual and species levels, enabling us to devise and implement
better animal-informed decisions to empower and amplify animal voices.
Notes on Methodology and Author Personal Perspective and Potential Influence
The authors’ values are an important driver of this research. While the lead author
acknowledges that personal views to some degree may be reflected in conversations with
interviewees and the resulting data analysis, the Grounded Theory methodology incorpo-
rates steps to reflexively consider researcher views. The interview process is a dynamic
interviewer–interviewee interaction to encourage free and open dialogue, allowing for
richer data sets. It is not the role of the interviewer to control the responses on the sole
basis of extracting untainted data, as this could equally taint the data and/or become a
hindrance to the natural conversational flow. As much as possible, we have attempted to
avoid imposing our own views during interviews and during data analysis.
Supplementary Materials:
The following supporting information can be downloaded at: https://
www.mdpi.com/article/10.3390/ani13203271/s1, File S1: Semi-structured interview schedule.
Author Contributions:
Conceptualisation, A.M.T., A.P.A.C., W.T.B. and K.K.M.; methodology, A.M.T.,
A.P.A.C., W.T.B. and K.K.M.; software, A.M.T.; validation, A.M.T., A.P.A.C., W.T.B. and K.K.M.; formal
analysis, A.M.T.; investigation, A.M.T.; resources, A.M.T., A.P.A.C., W.T.B. and K.K.M.; data curation,
A.M.T.; writing—original draft preparation, A.M.T.; writing—review and editing, A.M.T., A.P.A.C.,
W.T.B. and K.K.M.; supervision, A.P.A.C., W.T.B. and K.K.M.; project administration, A.M.T. and
A.P.A.C. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding:
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public,
commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Institutional Review Board Statement:
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declara-
tion of Helsinki and approved by the Institutional Review Board (or Ethics Committee) of Deakin
University (protocol code ID SEBE-2021-MOD02, date of approval 18 October 2021).
Informed Consent Statement:
Informed consent was obtained from all subjects involved in
the study.
Data Availability Statement:
The data are unavailable due to privacy and ethical approval restric-
tions and conditions.
Animals 2023,13, 3271 21 of 26
Acknowledgments:
We thank the School of Life and Environmental Sciences at Deakin University
for supporting this study and our interview participants for their time and insights. The lead
author wishes to thank all their co-authors for their unwavering support and inspiration, and their
companion cat Shadow for their affectionate inspiration and animal wisdom.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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