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Defining of Goals in the Development of Cyber Resilient Systems According to NIST

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  • SSSCIP of Ukraine
  • Institute for Modelling in Energy Engineering, Ukraine

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This paper introduces an approach to defining goals in the development of cyber-resilient systems, following the guidelines established in the standards of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the United States. This work aims to provide a roadmap for researchers and practitioners of cyber resilience in creating information systems capable of withstanding and adapting to adverse conditions, malfunctions, and attacks while ensuring the guaranteed execution of all primary cyber-system functions.
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UDC 004.056.5
Defining of Goals in the Development
of Cyber Resilient Systems According to NIST
Oleksandr Bakalynskyi1, Fedir Korobeynikov1
1 Pukhov Institute for Modelling in Energy Engineering, Kyiv, 02000, Ukraine
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Abstract
This paper introduces an approach to defining goals in the development of cyber-resilient systems,
following the guidelines established in the standards of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) in the United States. This work aims to provide a roadmap for researchers and
practitioners of cyber resilience in creating information systems capable of withstanding and adapting
to adverse conditions, malfunctions, and attacks while ensuring the guaranteed execution of all
primary cyber-system functions.
Keywords: cyber resilience, NIST, framework, goals, anticipation, resistance, recovery, adaptation
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Introduction
The need for resilient systems in our era
becomes increasingly relevant. With a constantly
changing threat landscape, intensifying political,
social, and climatic instability, total digital
network globalization, and growing reliance of
most of the planet's inhabitants on technologies
to access basic services, standard cybersecurity
strategies can no longer ensure system resilience.
Acknowledging the fact that the current level
of technology essentially precludes guaranteeing
full security of information assets, NIST
developed standard SP 800-160, Volume 2
Developing Cyber-Resilient Systems: A Systems
Security Engineering Approach, which
prescribes a new approach to system
trustworthiness by creating adaptive
mechanisms. These absorb the impacts of
destructive incidents, attacks, or internal failures
and maintain the functionality of critical
processes of missions or organizations.
This research focuses on the process of
defining, aligning, and developing proposals for
the implementation of goals in building resilient
systems according to NIST.
The aim of the study is to identify the
practical aspects of the high-level construct
"GOALS" of the cyber-resilience building
framework developed by NIST, which
encompasses: justification for implementing
resilience in an organization; highlighting its key
differences from cybersecurity; aligning
resilience goals at all organizational levels;
determining those responsible for
implementation; and creating high-level
mechanisms for monitoring the effectiveness of
achieving these goals.
1. Concept of Cyber-resilience
The second volume of the standard 800-160 is
focused around the concept of cyber-resilience.
Its definition is provided as follows: «Cyber-
resilience is the ability to anticipate, withstand,
recover from, and adapt to adverse conditions,
stresses, attacks, or compromises on systems that
use or are enabled by cyber resources» [1].
It's also noted that «all discussions of cyber
resiliency focus on assuring mission or business
functions and are predicated on the assumption
that the adversary will breach defenses and
establish a long-term presence in organizational
systems» [1]. Thus, it immediately underscores
the difference from standard cybersecurity
strategies that include instructions for systems
designed with a focus on ensuring the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
information assets (cybersecurity goals). In the
second volume of the standard, the primary focus
is on guaranteeing the viability of critical
systems that include cyber resources - by
integrating resilience elements, it is proposed to
provide the ability to anticipate attacks,
withstand them, recover, and adapt to threats
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Defining of Goals in the Development of Cyber Resilient Systems According to NIST
56
(cyber resilience goals), ensuring the execution
of their assigned missions, regardless of
malfunctions, adverse conditions, stresses,
attacks, compromises, etc.
2. Cyber Resilience Engineering
Framework
NIST Special Publication 800-160, Volume 2,
considers: the framework for building cyber
resilience; cyber resilience constructions that are
part of this framework; the concept of using the
framework; as well as considerations for
implementing cyber resilience into the life cycle
of systems, companies or organizations.
Constructions are the basic elements (i.e.,
building blocks) of the framework and include
goals, objectives, methods, approaches to
implementation, measures to mitigate risks and
consequences, and design principles.
The framework focuses on cyber resilience,
which, although related to cyber security and
fault tolerance, has a distinctive structure for
identifying its problem field and solution field.
While SP 800-160, v.2 is focused on cyber
resilience engineering, the high-level concepts
(i.e., goals, objectives, and methods of ensuring
cyber resilience) are defined in such a way that
they can be applied in a broad context. Their
definitions are written in a technology-neutral
manner and do not mention cyber resources.
The goals and objectives of cyber resilience
define "what" cyber resilience is - that is, what
properties and behaviour are inherent to cyber-
resilient systems (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Relationships among cyber resiliency
constructs (NIST SP 800-160, 2.1.5)
3. Goals of Cyber Resilience
Goals are high-level articulations of desired
outcomes that are common to many definitions
of resilience. They are included in the cyber
resilience building framework to provide a link
between risk management decisions at the
system level, mission level, and business process
level, as well as at the organizational level [1].
Organizational risk management strategies can
use cyber resilience goals and associated
strategies for cyber resilience integration.
Cyber resilience goals are not so much
ultimate goals as they are current strategic tasks
that shape the operational landscape of an
organization. They are the cornerstone of the
NIST cyber resilience building system and are
vital for developing a comprehensive cyber
resilience strategy. These goals guide risk
management decisions at various levels -
systems, missions, business processes, and the
organization. They provide a more unified
approach to risk management, bridging gaps
between different organizational levels and
promoting a culture of proactive cyber resilience.
In line with the definition of cyber resilience,
it is important to understand that desired
outcomes go beyond simply preparing for and
responding to cyber threats. They also include
the ability to evolve and adapt under the
influence of these threats, thereby improving the
overall cyber capabilities of the relevant
organization. Cyber resilience is not a static
quality but a dynamic one that requires
continuous development and improvement.
To understand the essence of cyber resilience
and how it differs from cybersecurity, it is
necessary to consider each of the goals described
in the framework:
ANTICIPATE: This goal focuses on
proactive measures to predict and identify which
system elements are most important for the
organization's operations and are vulnerable to
sophisticated professional attacks, unpredictable
failures, or incidents. All risks with a critical
level of harm, regardless of the likelihood of
their realization, must be considered and
processed by applying resilience solutions to
them, assuming that the threat, however unlikely
and complex in realization it may be, will still be
realized.
Threat intelligence, risk assessment, and
predictive analytics play a key role in achieving
this goal. It is not enough to simply respond to
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Industrial systems and critical infrastructure security
57
threats; organizations must anticipate them,
implementing resilience elements in the most
critical and weak elements of the organization's
operational system.
NIST advocates a proactive, anticipatory
stance on threats. This involves conducting
comprehensive operations to scout for new types
of threats to identify potential attack vectors and
predict new threats. It also includes regular
audits and stress testing of systems to detect
vulnerabilities before they can be exploited. Such
forward-thinking should permeate all levels of
the organization, encouraging vigilance and
continuous learning.
This goal also involves developing a culture
of awareness, education, and constant vigilance.
WITHSTAND: The cyber resilience
framework helps to create an additional
protective contour for the organization that is
activated when cybersecurity elements cannot
cope with an attack, failure, or adverse event.
The practical realization of this goal means that
resilient systems should be capable of
withstanding adversity, guaranteeing minimal
necessary functionality (for example, satisfying
critical mission needs). New cyber threats can be
tested on a range or in an isolated environment
with the aim of determining the system's ability
to withstand them. Understanding the limitations
of individual entities, organizations, and systems
is crucial.
Resilience should also be achieved through
protective measures to prevent cyber threats from
becoming real attacks. These measures could
include implementing multi-tiered defense
strategies, developing secure software and
systems, using reliable encryption, and
maintaining proper cyber hygiene. However, this
also extends to the human elements of cyber
resilience: employees must be trained to
recognize and resist social engineering attacks,
for example. The aim here is to strengthen the
organization's defense using methods that do not
fall within the information security framework.
RECOVER: The ability to quickly restore
normal operation after a cyber incident is crucial
for cyber resilience. Swift and effective recovery
can significantly mitigate the impact of the
incident on the organization's operations,
performance, and reputation.
Recovery is a multifaceted process. It
involves not only the technical aspects of
restoring systems and data after an incident, but
also managing the broader consequences of a
cyberattack. This could include communication
strategies for managing reputational damage or
legal considerations in the event of a data breach.
The NIST cybersecurity framework [2] includes
a "Recovery" function, which provides guidance
on the development and implementation of
robust recovery plans.
In line with the goals set out by SP 800-160
vol.2, systems should not only withstand and
recover from blows, but also undergo iterations,
as a result of which they will become even more
reliable.
ADAPT: Perhaps the most important aspect
of cyber resilience is the ability to continuously
accumulate information about incidents,
vulnerabilities, new technologies, and
adversaries and accordingly adapt strategies.
This can include reviewing security policies,
enhancing threat intelligence, and reassessing
risk management strategies, which should occur
with a certain regularity.
During an attack, a resilient system must be
able to quickly adapt, find new resources, and
adjust (even with reduced functionality) to
perform its primary tasks and minimize damage
from potential threats and attacks.
Continuous learning and system evolution are
keys to maintaining resilience in a constantly
changing cyber threat landscape. It is precisely
this adaptability, combined with a reliable
approach to anticipating, withstanding, and
recovering from cyber threats, that defines a truly
resilient organization.
The goals are not linear stages that need to be
executed one after another, but rather intersect
and are interdependent aspects of cyber
resilience.
A key feature of this part of the framework
concept is the assumption that all four goals must
be addressed simultaneously. For example, even
while withstanding a cyberattack or recovering
from it, mission or organization management
structures should anticipate other attacks. Even
when predicting, withstanding attacks, or
recovering from them, mission/business
segments, as well as mission or business
processes that rely on them, continuously evolve
to meet the changing operational and technical
environment.
At all levels of the framework, the approach
to cyber resilience has a cyclical and continuous
nature. Regardless of the stage the organization
is at - predicting future threats, resisting attacks,
recovering from incidents, and adapting
strategies must be constant processes.
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Defining of Goals in the Development of Cyber Resilient Systems According to NIST
58
According to NIST SP 800-160, v 2, defining
and agreeing on cyber resilience goals is a
collaborative work involving various
stakeholders in the organization. This process
should be guided by the organization's Risk
Management Strategy (RMS) and be integrated
into the Risk Management Framework (RMF).
NIST states that the Risk Management
Executive (function) is responsible for this
process, ensuring that issues related to security
risks for individual information systems are
considered from an organization-wide
perspective in relation to the overall strategic
goals and objectives of the organization in
carrying out its mission and business functions.
They also ensure that risk management related to
individual information systems is coordinated
across the organization, reflects organizational
risk tolerance, and is considered along with other
organizational risks affecting mission/business
success.
The risk management function can be
assigned to a group, which typically includes
senior-level managers. They must first have full
information about the organization's priority
goals and the critical processes without which
the organization cannot operate at a level
sufficient to achieve these goals. Secondly, they
must have the authority to make decisions based
on risk assessments that affect the organization
as a whole. All managerial roles in the
organization should cooperate to perform tasks
related to risk management. This includes setting
and agreeing on cyber resilience goals. These
goals should reflect the results of risk assessment
and should be supplemented with tasks in such a
way as to ensure resilience, primarily, of the
most critical systems, operations, and data of the
organization.
In light of the fact that objectives constitute
high-level constructs of the cyber resilience
framework, the metrics that evaluate the level of
their achievement must hold constructively
significant value for making strategic decisions
at the higher echelons of organizational
hierarchy. Concurrently, to ensure
comprehensive understanding and acceptance of
these metrics, the results must be presented in a
manner that makes them accessible and
comprehensible to individuals lacking
specialized knowledge at all levels of the
organization.
Taking these factors into account and given
the lack of clearly defined metrics in NIST
standards to assess high-level resilience goals, it
is suggested that the metrics below be used
regularly and that a longitudinal method be
applied to track the dynamics of change.
For the goal of ANTICIPATE, an apt metric
would be the uptime metric, which measures the
duration of uninterrupted operation of critical
systems.
Uptime represents the percentage of time
during which the organization's or mission's
critical systems are operational and available for
use. It is calculated as: (((Total time - Downtime)
/ Total time) ×100%).
This is an indicator of effective resilience,
and the better the conscious preparedness, the
better the planning for unforeseen situations, the
higher the value will be when calculating this
metric.
To understand the success of achieving the
WITHSTAND goal, organization's management
needs to know what percentage of all incidents
related to critical processes and systems did not
cause downtime in the organization's work. For
this, from the total number of incidents aimed at
critical systems, subtract the number of incidents
that led to downtime (critical incidents), divide
the obtained value by the total number of
incidents aimed at critical systems, and multiply
by one hundred percent. A higher percentage will
mean a higher level of the organization's
resilience, and express its ability to resist attacks
and adverse conditions.
The widely-used metric Mean Time To
Repair (MTTR) is a vivid indicator of the
RECOVER goal. Incidents are inevitable, but
resilient systems must recover quickly.
The mean time to resolve an issue is the
average time needed to fix a failure or the effects
of an attack, and restore the operation of critical
systems.
It is calculated as: Total downtime of critical
systems / Number of critical incidents that led to
these downtimes.
The effectiveness of high-level adaptation of
an organization's or mission's systems (ADAPT)
can be measured using the Mean Time Between
Failures (MTBF) metric, which calculates the
average time from one critical incident to the
next (assuming adaptive changes are made to the
systems after incidents).
MTBF is calculated as: (Total time -
Downtime) / Number of critical incidents. An
increase in the MTBF value indicates a higher
resilience of the organization.
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Industrial systems and critical infrastructure security
59
Conclusions
In the study, high-level resilience objectives
were defined and analyzed according to the
NIST framework. Definitions and purposes of
each of the cyber resilience goals from the
perspective of the organization as a whole were
presented, as well as the key elements of
interaction at all organizational levels when
implementing resilience.
Metrics and a method were proposed for
high-level evaluation and control of achieving
resilience goals.
Key differences between cyber resilience and
cybersecurity goals were explained.
References
[1] NIST Special Publication 800-160, Volume
2. Developing Cyber-Resilient Systems: A
Systems Security Engineering Approach,
NIST, 2021. URL:
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Special
Publications/NIST.SP.800-160v2r1.pdf.
[2] NIST Cybersecurity Framework, NIST.
2018. URL:
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIS
T.CSWP.04162018.pdf .
[3] D.Bodeau, R. Graubart, J. Picciotto, R.
Mcquaid, Cyber Resiliency Engineering
Framework, MITRE, 2011.URL:
https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/me
dia/publication/11_4436_2.pdf .
[4] Definition of term “risk executive
(function)”. Glossary of Computer Security
Resource Center (CSRC), NIST. URL:
https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/risk_exec
utive.
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Defining of Goals in the Development of Cyber Resilient Systems According to NIST
60
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Developing Cyber-Resilient Systems: A Systems Security Engineering Approach, NIST
NIST Special Publication 800-160, Volume 2. Developing Cyber-Resilient Systems: A Systems Security Engineering Approach, NIST, 2021. URL: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Special Publications/NIST.SP.800-160v2r1.pdf.
Cyber Resiliency Engineering Framework, MITRE
  • D Bodeau
  • R Graubart
  • J Picciotto
  • R Mcquaid
D.Bodeau, R. Graubart, J. Picciotto, R. Mcquaid, Cyber Resiliency Engineering Framework, MITRE, 2011.URL: https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/me dia/publication/11_4436_2.pdf.