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Why do warring parties enter negotiations during an ongoing war? Insights from the 2022 Ukraine–Russia talksWarum nehmen Kriegsparteien Verhandlungen auf? Erkenntnisse aus den Gesprächen zwischen der Ukraine und Russland 2022
Abstract
Why do warring parties enter negotiations during an ongoing war? This article builds on previous scholarship that has argued that the onset of wartime negotiations does not always exclusively represent a genuine will by belligerents to arrive at a settlement, but that alternative motives may also drive their decision to negotiate. The article identifies and distinguishes four alternative political and military motives and argues that belligerents may come to the table at times when they need to establish their status vis-à-vis an opponent, establish or safeguard domestic as well as external support, or when they need to buy time if they can no longer uphold levels of violence on the battlefield. This article examines the utility of this argument for the early round of talks between Russian and Ukrainian delegations, which took place during Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine in February and March 2022. Triangulating information from semi-structured interviews with country experts, case studies, news sources, and statements by the warring parties, the analysis particularly underlines findings put forward by past research on the costs of war as a determinant for entering talks and shows that entering talks helped Ukraine’s government establish agency and status as a bargaining partner while also serving its broader strategic communication with external actors. There is no evidence, however, supporting proposed mechanisms on belligerents coming to the table in order to establish domestic political support or buy time on the battlefield for the case under analysis.
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Gender mainstreaming and peacemaking are fundamentally about spurring institutional change. Much of the literature on gendering peace negotiations does not explicitly address the institutional nature of these spheres. Using a feminist institutionalist framework, I analyze the 2010–2016 Colombian peace talks to uncover the endogenic formal and informal ‘rules of the game’ that both enabled and constrained feminist work and the eventual incorporation of a gender perspective within the final agreement. I show that Colombia’s exceptional gender perspective in its 2016 peace agreement was due not just to the inclusion of women at the negotiation table but also paradoxically because of and despite continued gendered logics that prioritized the masculine over the feminine. These findings demonstrate that to understand gender mainstreaming outcomes in peace processes we must not simply account for how many women and which women are at the table, but also for the gendered logics of the negotiation space.
This article reports on trends in organized violence, building on new data by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The falling trend in fatalities stemming from organized violence in the world, observed between 2014 and 2019, was decisively reversed in 2021 as fatalities increased significantly. UCDP registered more than 119,100 deaths in organized violence in 2021, a 46% increase from the previous year. The increase was largely driven by escalating conflicts in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Yemen. Fatalities increased in all three categories of organized violence, despite a decrease in the number of active state-based conflicts, as well as the number of actors carrying out one-sided violence against civilians. UCDP recorded 54 state-based conflicts in 2021, a decrease by two compared to the previous year. Five of the conflicts were active at the intensity of war, the lowest number of wars since 2010. Violence in 2021 was thus concentrated to fewer but bloodier conflicts. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, have become increasingly important features of modern conflicts, and the trend in their usage is discussed in the special feature section. UAV usage has since 2019 dispersed among a significant larger number of actors, even as the downscaling in the involvement of the United States in the war on terror has led to a decrease in drone-related fatalities.
Citizen engagement in and support for peace processes have been deemed important for sustainable peace after civil wars. Yet much of what we know about peace processes in civil wars centers on the interests of elite actors. This special feature aims to advance a research agenda focusing on citizens in peace processes to address this mismatch. In the introduction to the special feature, we first present empirical evidence situating citizens in relation to civil war peace processes. We then trace the current state of the literature on the roles of citizens in peace processes. Following that, we introduce a conceptual framework designed to improve scholarly analysis of the political behavior of citizens in peace processes. We also locate the individual contributions to the special feature within the framework in order to demonstrate its utility and as a means of helping to identify directions for future research.
Ceasefires are often associated with inhibiting conflict ripeness because they remove the immediate costs of conflict and the pressure on conflicting parties to negotiate. Yet, in many intrastate conflicts, ceasefires have proven instrumental in reviving or enabling peace talks. This article provides an analytical framework to systematically assess the impact of ceasefires on conflict ripeness and identify key factors that condition their effects. Enriching ripeness theory with insights from the related bargaining theory of war and ceasefire research, this article identifies three key milestones in the transition from war to negotiated settlement—ripeness for negotiations, for concessions and for settlement—and the conditions that help conflicting parties reach these milestones. It demonstrates how and why ceasefires have the potential to foster ripeness at all three stages, whereas ceasefire violations threaten to undermine the ripening process, particularly after the onset of negotiations. The analysis suggests that temporal limits to ceasefires in the first two ripeness stages increase the probability that ceasefires contribute to ripening, while in the third stage, it is better that parties agree on an indefinite ceasefire or link it to the progress of negotiations in order to enable movement towards settlement. External enforcement of a ceasefire can pose a significant impediment to conflict ripeness.
Ceasefires play a role in almost all civil war peace processes. Yet existing studies undertheorize the ways in which different logics drive the design of ceasefire agreements, and the effect this has on violence suspension. Building on bargaining theory and existing ceasefire literature, we identify different bargaining problems conflict parties face over the course of a conflict, and three classes of ceasefire design they use to address these problems. We argue that the effect of ceasefires is driven both by these underlying logics and by the provisions they contain. Building on the PA-X data to capture the provisions included within all written civil war ceasefires between 1990 and 2019, and using Uppsala Conflict Data Program georeferenced event data, we estimate models of ceasefire survival, with conflict deaths as the main measure of whether a ceasefire remains in place. We find that definitive ceasefires (i.e., agreements with demobilization and incompatibility provisions), followed by preliminary ceasefires (i.e., agreements with compliance mechanisms), are associated with longer periods of violence suspension than cessation of hostilities agreements that lack such provisions. We discuss the implications of our results for conflict parties and third parties seeking to facilitate the transition from war to peace.
Research shows that conflict parties engage in ceasefires in pursuit of a variety of objectives, some of which reduce while others fuel violent conflict. This article provides a framework that links these objectives to a larger process. Building on bargaining theory, three distinct bargaining contexts are specified for intrastate conflicts. In the Diminishing Opponent context, leaders believe that a military solution yields a better outcome than a political settlement. In the Forcing Concessions context, they recognize the benefit of conflict settlement, but expectations about a mutually acceptable agreement still widely diverge. In the Enabling Agreement context, expectations converge, and leaders seek to pursue settlement without incurring further costs. In line with these readings, conflict party leaders adapt their strategic goal, from seeking to set up a military advantage, to boosting their bargaining power, to increasing the chances of a negotiated settlement. They may use ceasefires in the pursuit of any of these three goals, shifting the function of a ceasefire as they gain a better understanding of bargaining dynamics. A comparison of violence and ceasefire patterns in six contemporary peace processes and a congruence test conducted on the 2012–16 peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the guerilla organization FARC offer support for the theoretical framework. The findings highlight the important, and shifting, role ceasefires play in the transition from war to negotiated peace.
Data from two UMD Critical Issues Polls conducted in September and October 2019 (Questionnaire: https://criticalissues.umd.edu/sites/criticalissues.umd.edu/files/UMCIP%20Middle%20East%20Questionnaire.pdf) (Full PowerPoint: https://criticalissues.umd.edu/sites/criticalissues.umd.edu/files/UMCIP%20Middle%20East%20PowerPoint.pdf)
Most research on social media as a tool for public diplomacy focuses on its use by recognized international actors to advance their national interest and reputation, deliver foreign policy objectives or promote their global interests. This article highlights the need for paying more attention to non-state diplomacy in conflict situations outside the western world. We examine how rebel groups use new media to enhance their communications, and what the motivations behind this are. Our public diplomacy perspective helps convey the scope of rebel communications with external actors and provides insights for policy-makers seeking to ascertain the nature, intentions and capacities of myriad rebel groups. Our focus is on the Sahel region, where numerous such groups vying for international attention and support make use of multiple social media channels. We analyse two groups in Mali: the MNLA, a Tuareg secessionist group; and Ansar Dine, a Salafist insurgency with ties to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Our qualitative analysis of Ansar Dine and MNLA communications on several digital platforms helps identify these African rebel groups' international and local framing activities. Rebel groups use public diplomacy nimbly and pragmatically. The digital age has fundamentally changed which stakeholders such groups can reach, and we suggest that social media increase the power they are able to carve out for themselves on the international stage.
Given that minority ethno-political organizations are generally weaker than states yet seek to change their policies or remove the ruling regime from power, why would negotiation occur? States prefer to ignore or repress such organizations, which generally have little to offer in return amidst negotiations that can legitimize them while delegitimizing the state. When a challenging organization establishes governing structures and controls movement in part of a state's territory, however, it can easily inflict significant economic and political costs on the state while also possessing a valuable asset to exchange for concessions. An organization with territorial control cannot be ignored, while the state will have a strong incentive to negotiate before the state loses more face, the group gains more legitimacy, neighboring states are more likely to invade, and the international community is more likely to formally recognize any facts on the ground as a new status quo. Our analysis of 118 organizations in the Middle East and North Africa from 1980–2004 reveals that territorial control is the most important determinant of intrastate negotiation. In regards to existing scholarship, this suggests that a certain type of successful violence works—not all violence and not only nonviolence—while certain types of strong organizations—those that control territory—are more likely to reach negotiations with the state than weak ones.
Researchers employ triangulation to increase the validity of inference in qualitative and quantitative research. Leuffen, Shikano, and Walter have presented guidance as to which strategies to use when triangulating data sources. In this paper, I ask: how can their findings be translated for practical research purposes? I offer an illustrative application concentrating on the political power of traditional political authorities in Uganda and Tanzania. I analyze the status quo of political pow-er and the preferred political power of traditional leaders. To triangulate, I use three sources: (1) constitutional-legal texts; (2) the Afrobarometer survey; and (3) in-depth interviews. I shed light on possible problems and analytical strategies for triangulation in practice, with a specific focus on convergence and divergence of sources.
The European Union has expanded its role in preventing conflicts and building peace, but its institutional practices remain insufficiently conceptualized. This article argues that, drawing from a strong self-perception toward a neo-functionalist interpretation of its own history, the EU uses 'neo-functional peace' as an approach for resolving protracted disputes, through deconstructing highly political issues into technical meanings in order to achieve mutually acceptable agreements. This article explores the EU's efforts to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and examines the reliance on aspects of neo-functionalism for building peace after protracted disputes. We argue that neo-functional peace has played a crucial role in normalizing political relations and reconciling some of the outstanding disputes between Kosovo and Serbia. Building on this case study, we suggest a theoretical concept of neo-functional peace as a useful means to conceptualize the EU's peace support practices.
Since 1990, negotiated settlements have become the preferred means for settling civil wars. Historically, however, these types of settlements have proven largely ineffective: civil wars ended by negotiated settlement are more likely to recur than those ending in victory by one side or the other. A theoretical and statistical analysis of how civil wars end reveals that the type of ending influences the prospects for longer-term outcomes. An examination of all civil war endings since 1940 finds that rebel victories are more likely to secure the peace than are negotiated settlements. A statistical analysis of civil wars from 1940 to 2002 and the case of Uganda illustrate why rebel victories result in more stable outcomes. Expanding scholarly and policy analysis of civil war termination types beyond the current default of negotiated settlement to include victories provides a much larger set of cases and variables to draw upon to enhance understanding of the conditions most likely to support long-term stability, democracy, and prosperity.
This article explores the effect of political and institutional constraints on negotiations that seek to end civil wars. Two aspects of negotiations are statistically examined. Greater political constraints on the leaders of states appear to have no effect on the likelihood of negotiations taking place, but greater political constraints do reduce the likelihood of negotiations succeeding. The results of this analysis demonstrate that political constraints are a powerful factor driving the likelihood of negotiation success. The article concludes with a discussion of why political constraints do not produce a similar reduction in the likelihood of negotiations.
This article examines the process of international mediation from the perspective of the disputants. It posits that contrary to standard analyses, which tend to examine mediation from the perspective of the conflict or the third party, an examination from the point of view of the disputants provides significant insights into mediation as a form of conflict management. From an inside-out perspective, it becomes apparent that the underlying assumption that a compromise solution is the objective of the disputants involved in the mediation process is suspect. Thus, disputants may become involved in a mediation process in order to improve upon their prospects, but not necessarily in terms of a compromise with their adversary. This article argues that a mediation process carries with it a series of assets that the disputants may value in terms of their pre-negotiation objectives, rather than in terms of the compromise that the previous debates about international mediation have indicated. The disputants may therefore harbour `devious objectives', unrelated to the attainment of a compromise solution, which might include time to regroup and reorganize; internationalization; the search for an ally; empowerment; legitimization of their negotiation positions and current status; face saving; and avoiding costly concessions by prolonging the process itself.
This article presents new data on the start and end dates and the means of termination for armed conflicts, 1946-2005. These data contribute to quantitative research on conflict resolution and recurrence in three important respects: the data cover both interstate and intrastate armed conflicts, the data cover low-intensity conflicts, and the data provide information on a broad range of termination outcomes. In order to disaggregate the UCDP-PRIO Armed Conflict dataset into multiple analytical units, this dataset introduces the concept of conflict episodes, defined as years of continuous use of armed force in a conflict. Using these data, general trends and patterns are presented, showing that conflicts do not exclusively end with decisive outcomes such as victory or peace agreement but more often under unclear circumstances where fighting simply ceases. This pattern is consistent across different types of conflict, as is the finding that victories are more common in conflicts with short duration. The article then examines some factors that have been found to predict civil war recurrence and explores whether using the new dataset produces similar results. This exercise offers a number of interesting new insights and finds that the determinants for civil war recurrence identified in previous research are sensitive to alternate formulations of conflict termination data. The findings suggest that intrastate conflicts are less likely to recur after government victories or after the deployment of peacekeepers. If the previous conflict is fought with rebels aiming for total control over government or if the belligerents mobilized along ethnic lines, the risk of recurrence increases. The discrepancy in findings with previous research indicates the need for further study of conflict resolution and recurrence, for which this dataset will be useful.
This article introduces the Peace Negotiations in Civil Conflicts (PNCC) dataset, which identifies whether a state-party and rival non-state armed group is in the formal negotiation phase of a peace process. The PNCC goes beyond recording instances of peace talks by offering a conceptual framework to identify when a government-rebel group dyad is at risk of formal negotiations. It explicitly considers issues central in event-history modelling, including censoring and the observation period. The PNCC also provides detailed information on negotiations, including the date and location of peace talks, and whether negotiations were bilateral or through mediation. The PNCC is the first source to distinguish mediated and non-mediated civil conflict negotiations under a single framework. Structured over the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset with global coverage for 1975-2013, the PNCC is integrable to commonly used civil war datasets.
The United States government’s inability to view the conflict with the Taliban through the lens of the bargaining model of war was a fundamental element of its failure in Afghanistan. This problem was reinforced by a dysfunctional civil–military relations shaped by Samuel Huntington’s theory of objective control, resulting in the military pursuing campaigns of attrition that fit its organizational preferences but did not advance civilian political goals. These issues are evident in three different moments during the War in Afghanistan where the U.S. failed to seize an opportunity that could have changed the result of the conflict.
Why do some civil war peace processes stall, while others build momentum? This paper examines how combatant behavior surrounding previous negotiations influences future talks during civil war. We argue disputants learn about the severity of the commitment problem based on whether their opponent escalates or de-escalates violence immediately after negotiations. While de-escalation reveals the opponent is willing and able to negotiate in good faith, escalation reveals the commitment problem to be severe. Post-negotiation escalation is perceived as a sign of bad faith or dissent within the opponent's ranks over the decision to negotiate. We hypothesize, therefore, that escalation after prior negotiations reduces the likelihood of subsequent talks relative to de-escalation. As a consequence, reviving a peace process after post-negotiation escalation may require external pressure to bring the disputants back to the table. We expect third-party involvement to mitigate the negative effect of prior escalation by providing incentives to revive talks or alleviating fears of defection. We test our expectations on monthly data on civil conflicts in Africa, finding post-negotiation escalation decreases the probability of subsequent negotiations, conditioned by third-party involvement. These findings are robust to a variety of operationalization and model specification choices.
¿Por qué algunos procesos de paz de las guerras civiles se detienen, mientras que otros generan impulso? Este ensayo analiza cómo la conducta combatiente que rodea las negociaciones previas influye en las conversaciones futuras durante la guerra civil. Sostenemos que los contendientes aprenden sobre la gravedad del problema de compromiso en función de si su oponente intensifica la violencia o frena su escalada inmediatamente después de las negociaciones. Mientras que frenar la escalada de violencia revela que el oponente está dispuesto a negociar de buena fe, intensificar la violencia pone de manifiesto que el problema de compromiso es grave. La intensificación de la violencia posnegociaciones se percibe como una señal de mala fe o disidencia en los rangos del oponente respecto de la decisión de negociar. Por consiguiente, hipotetizamos que la intensificación de la violencia después de las negociaciones previas reduce la probabilidad de que haya conversaciones posteriores, comparada con la desintensificación. En consecuencia, reactivar un proceso de paz tras la intensificación de la violencia posnegociaciones puede requerir una presión externa de lograr que los contendientes vuelvan a la mesa de negociaciones. Esperamos la participación de terceros para mitigar el efecto negativo de la intensificación previa proporcionando incentivos para retomar las conversaciones o aliviar los temores de defección. Analizamos nuestras expectativas con los datos mensuales sobre conflictos civiles en África y descubrimos que la intensificación de la violencia posnegociaciones disminuye la probabilidad de que haya negociaciones posteriores, condicionadas a la participación de terceros. Estas conclusiones son valederas independientemente de diversas elecciones de puesta en práctica y especificación de modelo.
Pourquoi certains processus de pacification de guerres civiles s'immobilisent alors que d'autres s'accélèrent ? Cet article examine la façon dont le comportement des combattants dans les négociations précédentes influence les pourparlers futurs lors d'une guerre civile. Nous soutenons que les participants à la négociation prennent conscience de la gravité du problème d'engagement en se basant sur l'escalade ou la désescalade de la violence de leur adversaire immédiatement après les négociations. Bien que la désescalade de la violence révèle que l'adversaire est désireux et capable de négocier de bonne foi, son escalade révèle que le problème d'engagement est grave. L'escalade post-négociation de la violence est perçue comme un signe de mauvaise foi ou de désaccord par rapport à la décision de négocier dans les rangs de l'adversaire. Nous émettons donc l'hypothèse que contrairement à la désescalade de la violence, son escalade après des négociations réduit la probabilité de pourparlers ultérieurs. Par conséquent, la relance d'un processus de paix après une escalade post-négociation de la violence peut exiger une pression extérieure pour ramener les parties prenantes à la table des négociations. Nous pensons que l'implication d'un tiers atténue l'effet négatif d'une précédente escalade de la violence en fournissant des incitations à relancer les pourparlers ou en réduisant les craintes de défection. Nous avons mis nos points de vue à l’épreuve en nous basant sur des données mensuelles sur les conflits civils en Afrique, et nous avons constaté que l'escalade post-négociation de la violence réduisait la probabilité de négociations ultérieures, qui était alors conditionnée par l'implication d'un tiers. Ces résultats sont robustes face à divers choix d'opérationnalisation et de spécification de modèles.
Contemporary studies of conflict have adopted approaches that minimize the importance of negotiation during war or treat it as a constant and mechanical activity. This is strongly related to the lack of systematic data that track and illustrate the complex nature of wartime diplomacy. I address these issues by creating and exploring a new daily-level data set of negotiations in all interstate wars from 1816 to the present. I find strong indications that post-1945 wars feature more frequent negotiations and that these negotiations are far less predictive of war termination. Evidence suggests that increased international pressures for peace and stability after World War II, especially emanating from nuclear weapons and international alliances, account for this trend. These original data and insights establish a dynamic research agenda that enables a more policy-relevant study of conflict management, highlights a historical angle to conflict resolution, and speaks to the utility of viewing diplomacy as an essential dimension to understanding war.
This article examines the ways in which the negotiation framework—i.e., the legal guarantees, information management mechanism, and degree of inclusivity in peace negotiations—shapes the likelihood of concluding a peace agreement. Codifying the peace negotiations in law, publicizing information about the content of negotiations, and including mediators and civil society actors in peace talks is likely to increase a government's short‐term costs. However, doing so alleviates the adversaries' information asymmetry and commitment problems, sets guidelines to insure the process against exogenous shocks, and increases the number of actors taking part in conflict management. Comparing the recent peace negotiations to end intrastate wars in Colombia and Turkey, this article argues that a legalized, public, and inclusive framework made a peace agreement possible in Colombia, while the lack of such a framework caused Turkey's peace talks to fail.
This paper examines the pursuit of legitimacy by the self-proclaimed “republics” in Ukraine. While these “republics” are illegal, questions of their legitimacy are commonly discussed almost entirely through Weberian rule-conformity. We argue that this one-dimensional view of legitimacy overlooks the rich context of normative aspects of power relationships. If the occupied Donbas is to be reintegrated into Ukraine, it is essential to understand the perceived legitimation of the political institutions in this region. We use David Beetham’s framework of legitimacy—consisting of legality, morality, and consent—to analyze the “republics’” pursuit of legitimacy. Our analysis leads to the proposition that while the “republics” are illegal, their supporters’ normative perceptions of the right to govern have ascribed more validity to the fake “governments” than what would have been expected from a legal point of view. Additionally, while a ceasefire between the Russian proxies and Ukraine’s forces has reduced violence, it has also levied temporal effect on the legitimation of illegitimate institutions. Our treatment of the process of legitimation over time helps us identify potential strategies of delegitimization should DPR and LPR reincorporate with Ukraine-controlled territory. Without dismantling internal perceptions of institutional legitimacy among inhabitants of nongovernment-controlled areas, a re-integration could not be accomplished.
Ceasefires are a difficult thing to achieve. No more so than in the conflicts of the Middle East. Without ceasefires civilians caught in wars remain vulnerable. As recent events in the Middle East have demonstrated though ceasefires are difficult to negotiate and are far more likely to breakdown than succeed. When it comes to the notion of negotiating ceasefires with Islamist groups, in particular, there is a widely held belief in Western policy-making circles that the task is even harder if not impossible. This is because such counterparts are frequently viewed as holding absolutist goals and positions which are entirely incompatible with peace-making. In this article we present analysis of one such group the Palestinian Hamas movement. we find evidence that far from seeking to prolong conflict Hamas has offered ceasefires and calms on repeated occasions to Israel. This article contends that the willingness of Hamas, however, is circumscribed by the context of conflict and its other actors, as well as the unwillingness of mediators and negotiations to explore inclusion of such groups into the political process.
Why do some parties to intrastate conflict refuse to negotiate? I propose a simple theory of civil conflict in which the act
of negotiation itself carries costs and benefits. Several hypotheses follow: parties to civil conflict will avoid negotiation
when they (1) fear alienating external supporters or internal constituencies, (2) risk granting legitimacy to their opponents
or signaling weakness to other potential claimants, or (3) find it difficult to identify reliable negotiating partners. Empirical
tests find support for my argument. My findings suggest that cases exist in which the parties would reach an agreement if
only they could overcome the costs of negotiation and engage in talks. Diplomats and mediators should consider the costs and
benefits of talks when planning the timing and form of interventions designed to bring parties to the table.
This book evaluates the role of international mediators in bringing civil wars to an end and makes the case for 'powerful peacemaking' - using incentives and sanctions - to leverage parties into peace. As internal violence within countries is a hugely significant threat to international peace in the post-Cold War era, the question of how these wars end has become an urgent research and policy question. This volume explores a critical aspect of peacemaking that has yet to be sufficiently evaluated: the turbulent period beyond the onset of formal or open negotiations to end civil wars and the clinching of an initially sustainable negotiated settlement. The book argues that the transnational flow of weapons, resources, and ideas means that when civil wars today end, they are more likely to do so at the negotiating table than on the battlefield. It uses bargaining theory to develop an analytical framework to evaluate peace processes - moving from stalemate in wars to negotiated settlement - and it rigorously analyses the experiences of five cases of negotiated transitions from war and the role of international mediators: South Africa, Liberia, Burundi, Kashmir, and Sri Lanka.
Expert interviews are a good example of the way in which the everyday practice of social research and theoretical consideration of this practice do not always run parallel to one another. The use of particular methods sometimes precedes their general theoretical reflection. For many years, the widely held view was that expert interviews were conducted frequently but only rarely thought through (Meuser and Nagel, 1991). Only in recent years has the debate about expert interviews gradually become more concrete (see Bogner and Menz, 2008). However, this has certainly not led to a situation in which the different definitions and methodological conceptions of expert interviews have moved closer together. Even today there are disputes not only about how expert interviews can be placed on a secure methodological footing, but also about whether this is even possible in principle.
This study presents a comparative analysis of two case studies in which attempts were made to resolve intractable ethno-national conflicts: the peace process undertaken in Aceh between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, which led to the signing of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (mou) ending the conflict in Aceh; and the process conducted in the Sri Lanka conflict from 2001 through 2004 between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers, which failed to yield an agreement. The two peace processes will be examined using readiness theory, which focuses on the factors influencing the decision to enter into negotiations. This article also attempts to extend the hypotheses of readiness theory to explore the process of concession-making during the negotiations that took place in the two case studies. The findings indicate that the theory does contribute to understanding the dynamics of the pre-negotiation in both case studies and that applying its hypotheses may contribute to the understanding of the dynamics of the process of reaching an agreement in the Aceh process and of the factors leading to the failure of the negotiations in the Sri Lanka conflict. The analysis also gives rise to some questions that challenge readiness theory and its hypotheses – empirically and methodologically.
America's experience of fighting while negotiating in the Korean War and the Vietnam War offers valuable lessons for understanding the current peace talks in Afghanistan: the adversaries are averse to making concessions; violence is a bargaining tool; the fate of captives can derail negotiations; alliances may be strained; broader regional dynamics are critical, and the peace process is imbued with symbolism.
Is peace more likely to prevail when the peace accord includes civil society actors such as religious groups, women's organizations and human rights groups? This is the first statistical study that explores this issue. The article develops key claims in previous research regarding the role of civil society actors and durable peace, and proposes a set of hypotheses that focus on legitimacy in this process. The hypotheses are examined by employing unique data on the inclusion of civil society actors in all peace agreements in the post-Cold War period. The statistical analysis shows that inclusion of civil society actors in the peace settlement increases the durability of peace. The results further demonstrate that peace accords with involvement from civil society actors and political parties in combination are more likely to see peace prevail. The findings also suggest that inclusion of civil society has a particularly profound effect on the prospects for overall peace in non-democratic societies.
The impacts of six attempts to mediate the conflict over the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh in the Caucasus region of the former Soviet Union were compared. Each mediation was intended to get the direct parties - Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh - to the negotiating table. Nearly 4,000 events were recorded for a six-year period from 1990 through 1995. Each event was coded in terms of a six-step scale ranging from a significant action toward peace (+3) to substantial violence directed at an adversary (-3). Time-series analyses of changes in the extent of violence showed no change from before to after any of the mediations. A significant change did occur, however, between the months preceding and following the period of intensive combat between April 1993 and February 1994. These results support the hypothesis that a mutually hurting stalemate is a condition for negotiating a ceasefire and reduced violence between warring parties. A number of theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.
Barbara F. Walter is Assistant Professor, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, and Research Director for International Security at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California. The Ford Foundation supported this work through a grant to the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. A version of this article will appear in Barbara F. Walter and Jack L. Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity, and International Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming).
The author wishes to thank James Fearon, Henk Goemans, Peter Gourevitch, Robert Jervis, David Laitin, David Lake, John McMillan, Jack Snyder, Richard Tucker, Barry Weingast, Christopher Woodruff, the participants of the 1998 John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies' seminar series, and especially Zoltan Hajnal for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. I coded civil wars as having had "negotiations" if factions held face-to-face talks and issues relevant to resolving the war were discussed. These qualifications eliminated scheduled talks that never took place, meetings where no substantive issues were deliberated, and talks that excluded key participants. I also attempted to apply a "good faith" proviso and exclude those meetings where one or both participants were obviously unwilling to yield on important issues. Although sometimes difficult to determine, certain actions did signal whether or not faction leaders honestly wished to cooperate. Their readiness to accept supervision, make public announcements of important concessions, discuss the details of a transfer of power, and participate in lengthy negotiations all generated costs to the groups involved and indicated more than a tactical interest in appearing to be cooperative. To say that a civil war experienced "negotiations," however, does not imply that groups would not willingly defect if they could benefit from cheating. "Negotiations" simply indicate that they were willing to consider an alternative to war.
2. Throughout this article, I treat both the government and the rebels as if leaders on each side represent a homogeneous group with unitary interests. In reality, the interests of a group are often diverse and transitory, and leaders frequently preside over fragile coalitions whose internal politics dictate behavior. Nonetheless, this assumption is justified because I argue that even if leaders are fortunate enough to preside over a group in complete agreement on behavior, they will still encounter difficult commitment problems. For an article that specifically addresses how the internal politics of a group can affect decisions to negotiate or fight, see Barbara F. Walter and Andrew Kydd, "Extremists, Uncertainty, and Commitments to Peace," unpublished paper, University of California, San Diego, or University of California, Riverside, September 1998.
3. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 564. See also Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 5-53.
4. Quoted in Goswin Baumhoegger, The Struggle for Independence: Documents on the Recent Development of Zimbabwe (1975-1980) (Hamburg: Institute of African Studies, Africa Documentation Center, 1984), vol. 2, p. 7.
5. Much exciting research is being done in the area of strategic barriers to successful negotiation in international relations. See especially James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414; and David A. Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).
6. Paul Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 24. For similar arguments, see Fred Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 95; George Modelski, "International Settlement of Internal War," in James Rosenau, ed., International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964); and R. Harrison Wagner, "The Causes of Peace," in Roy Licklider, ed., Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End (New York: New York University Press, 1993).
7. See James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 269-305.
8. See Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite, "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 29, No. 2 (April 1983), pp. 265-281; James D...
International crises are modeled as a political “war of attrition” in which state leaders choose at each moment whether to attack, back down, or escalate. A leader who backs down suffers audience costs that increase as the public confrontation proceeds. Equilibrium analysis shows how audience costs enable leaders to learn an adversary's true preferences concerning settlement versus war and thus whether and when attack is rational. The model also generates strong comparative statics results, mainly on the question of which side is most likely to back down. Publicly observable measures of relative military capabilities and relative interests prove to have no direct effect once a crisis begins. Instead, relative audience costs matter: the side with a stronger domestic audience (e.g., a democracy) is always less likely to back down than the side less able to generate audience costs (a nondemocracy). More broadly, the analysis suggests that democracies should be able to signal their intentions to other states more credibly and clearly than authoritarian states can, perhaps ameliorating the security dilemma between democratic states.
What accounts for the absence of extremism surrounding the current peace talks between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan state? In similar cases of ethnic conflict, the strategies employed by the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have exacerbated extremism on both sides and led to ever increasing degrees of violence. In the Palestinian case, for example, suicide bombings mobilized and radicalized the Palestinian community, decimated the Israeli Left and hardened Israeli right‐wing attitudes regarding prospects for peace. This research seeks to examine the Sri Lankan case, provide a detailed background to the Tamil‐Sinhalese conflict that is relatively unfamiliar to some Western audiences and draw comparisons between the Sri Lanka and Palestinian cases.
This paper analyzes the conditions that encourage (or hinder) conflicting states in coming to the negotiating table. It also explores the factors that influence the successfulness of such negotiation attempts. A main argument of the paper is that it is important to look at what brings states to the table, because this may have a direct or indirect impact on the outcome of such negotiations. While confirming some of the findings within the conflict management literature, this paper demonstrates that contextual factors seem to have different effects or a different impact on each stage, implying that while certain factors may bring states to the table, they may not be the same factors that make agreements possible.
In this article, I analyze the conditions that promote the request, offer, and occurrence of mediation between enduring rivals. Although the mediation literature has devoted considerable attention to the form that mediation takes, the approaches that mediators use, and the conditions under which it is successful, little attention has been given to the conditions under which mediation is most likely to occur. The results of the analysis point to a disconnect among enduring rivalries between the factors that the literature highlights as promoting mediation success and those that promote the onset of mediation. This disconnect is particularly apparent in the conditions that prompt third-parties to offer mediation.
In the aftermath of war, what determines whether peace lasts or fighting resumes, and what can be done to foster durable peace? Drawing on theories of cooperation, I argue that belligerents can overcome the obstacles to peace by implementing measures that alter incentives, reduce uncertainty about intentions, and manage accidents. A counterargument suggests that agreements are epiphenomenal, merely reflecting the underlying probability of war resumption. I test hypotheses about the durability of peace using hazard analysis. Controlling for factors (including the decisiveness of victory, the cost of war, relative capabilities, and others) that affect the baseline prospects for peace, I find that stronger agreements enhance the durability of peace. In particular, measures such as the creation of demilitarized zones, explicit third-party guarantees, peacekeeping, and joint commissions for dispute resolution affect the duration of peace. Agreements are not merely scraps of paper; rather, their content matters in the construction of peace that lasts.Many friends and colleagues have given advice and comments on the larger project of which this paper is a part. In particular I would like to thank Scott Bennett, Nora Bensahel, Erik Bleich, Dan Drezner, Lynn Eden, Nisha Fazal, Jim Fearon, Wendy Franz, Erik Gartzke, Chris Gelpi, Doug Gibler, Hein Goemans, Amy Gurowitz, Lise Howard, Bob Jervis, Bob Keohane, Zeev Maoz, Lisa Martin, Dani Reiter, Don Rothchild, Evan Schofer, Curt Signorino, Jack Snyder, Al Stam, Celeste Wallander, Barb Walter, Suzanne Werner, and four anonymous reviewers. I am grateful also for research assistance from Carol St. Louis. This project would not have been possible without financial and intellectual support from the Olin Institute at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.
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