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140
ELECTION OF REGIONAL HEAD BASED ON HIERARCHY:
STRENGTHENING ARGUMENTATION OF THE DISCUSSION
OF ABOLISHING DIRECT ELECTIONS IN INDONESIA AND
PROPOSED MODELS
PEMILIHAN KEPALA DAERAH BERBASIS HIRARKI:
PENGUATAN ARGUMENTASI WACANA PENGHAPUSAN
PILKADA LANGSUNG DI INDONESIA DAN USULAN MODEL
Taufik Hidayat1*, Lia Fitrinigrum2
1,2 Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional
*Pemerintah Provinsi Jawa Barat, Indonesia
*Email: taufik151076@gmail.com
Volume 1, Number 2, September 2022
Received: July 20, 2022 Accepted: August 30, 2022 Online Published: September 30, 2022.
ABSTRACT
Since the direct election of regional heads (Pilkadasung) has resulted in six
major problems. These six big problems gave birth to the discourse of
eliminating the Pilkadasung in Indonesia, and replacing it with a new system
that is still within the corridors of democracy. The formulation of the problem
in this paper are: (1) what arguments can be given in order to strengthen the
discourse on the abolition of the Pilkadasung?, and (2) the proposed model
that can be given as a substitute for the abolition of the Pilkadasung?. This
paper is a conceptual study. Based on state administration practices that
occur in the Special Region of Yogyakarta, where the election of regional heads
uses the determination method, where Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono and Sri
Paku Alam are appointed by the President as Governor and Deputy Governor
(DIY). As well as. practice of state administration in the Special Capital Region
of Jakarta, where the Mayor is appointed by the Governor. Then, based on
the theory from Manor and Crook. Strengthening the argument that the
Pilkadasung is not the only way that is the most democratic, so alternative
models can be used with other systems. In an effort to eliminate the six major
problems of the Pilkadasung, the proposed model proposed in this paper is a
hierarchy-based regional head election. The Governor is appointed by the
President, and the Mayor/Regent is appointed by the Governor. The
appointment process uses the following mechanisms: (1) an open position
auction, (2) a public hearing, and (3) a fit and proper test at the Provincial
141
DPRD for the Governor and at the City/Regency DPRD for the Mayor
and/Regent. This mechanism is implemented gradually and transparently.
Keywords
:
Hierarchy; Direct Pilkada; Democracy; Model
ABSTRAK
Sejak bergulirnya pemilihan kepala daerah langsung (Pilkadasung) telah
membuahkan enam masalah besar. Keenam masalah besar ini melahirkan
wacana penghapusan Pilkadasung di Indonesia, serta menggantinya dengan
sistem baru yang masih dalam koridor demokrasi. Perumusan masalah dalam
tulisan ini adalah : (1) argumentasi apa yang dapat diberikan dalam rangka
penguatan wacana penghapusan Pilkadasung?, dan (2) usulan model yang
dapat diberikan sebagai pengganti penghapusan Pilkadasung?. Tulisan ini
adalah sebuah kajian konseptual. Berdasarkan pada praktek tata negara
yang terjadi di Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, dimana pemilihan kepala daerah
menggunakan metode penetapan, dimana Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono dan
Sri Paku Alam ditetapkan oleh Presiden sebagai Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur
(DIY). Serta. praktek tata negara di Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta, dimana
Walikota ditunjuk oleh Gubernur. Kemudian, berdasarkan teori dari Manor
dan Crook. Menguatkan argumentasi bahwa Pilkadasung bukan satu-satunya
cara yang paling demokratis, sehingga dapat digunakan alternatif model
dengan sistem yang lain. Dalam rangka upaya menghilangkan enam masalah
besar Pilkadasung, usulan model yang diajukan dalam tulisan ini adalah
pemilihan kepala daerah berbasis hirarki. Gubernur ditunjuk oleh Presiden,
dan Walikota/Bupati di tunjuk oleh Gubernur. Proses penunjukan ini
menggunakan mekanisme : (1) lelang jabatan terbuka, (2) public hearing, dan
(3) fit and proper tes di DPRD Provinsi untuk Gubernur dan di DPRD
Kota/Kabupaten untuk Walikota dan/Bupati. Mekanisme ini dilaksanakan
secara bertahap dan transparan.
Kata Kunci
:
Hirarki; Pilkada Langsung; Demokrasi; Model
I. INTRODUCTION
Like a big tree, direct regional head elections (Pilkadasung), produce at
least six big problems. The six big problems are: First, until March 2021, as
many as 429 regional heads were arrested for corruption cases
1
. Every year
this figure has continued to exist, since the Pilkadasung was launched in
2005.
Second, a number of central and local government programs are often
out of sync. As a result, the budget allocation is not optimal in moving the
people's economy
2
. Third, the occurrence of community polarization and it
does not only occur in DKI Jakarta but all corners of the country. In DKI
1
Nurul Ghufron, Rapat Koordinasi Pencegahan Korupsi Kepala Daerah Se-Sumatera
Barat, Padang, 2021.
2
Robert Endi Jaweng, Seminar Memperkuat Perekonomian Domestik Melalui
Sinkronisasi Perencanaan Pembangunan Pusat dan Daerah, 2012, Bappenas
142
Jakarta, people who are not politically related to DKI Jakarta also take part
in heating up the political situation
3
.
Fourth, the high cost of campaigning in the Pilkadasung raises the
possibility of an impact on the election results which are difficult to separate
from the corrupt behavior of the elected regional head. Hopes for accelerating
people's welfare have been distorted by the Pilkadasung system
4
. Fifth, the
high cost of the Pilkadasung caused more losses than profits
5
.
Sixth, the conflict that occurred as a result of the Pilkadasung. As
happened in the Pilkadasung, South Buru Regency-Maluku Province, there
has been destruction and burning of houses against supporters of one
partner. This conflict is based on a sense of dissatisfaction with the election
results won by other couples. The conflict that resulted in 97 Heads of
Families having to be evacuated
6
. Based on these six problems, a discourse
was born to abolish the Pilkadasung system by looking for new mechanisms
that are still in the corridors of the democratic system. Starting in 2014, this
discourse began shortly after the general election took place. Despite getting
a lot of opposition, it seems that this discourse did not dampen some members
of the House of Representatives (DPR). During the 2017 Annual Report of the
Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) on March 12 2018, the Chairman
of the DPR, Dr. Bambang Soesatyo, who was the speaker, stated this and even
asked the KPK to support this discourse as a form of prevention against the
rampant corruption in Indonesia.
These six problems are also the reasons so that it is considered important
to do writing in the form of this conceptual study. This paper seeks to
strengthen the discourse on the abolition of the Pilkadasung by providing a
proposed model as a substitute for the Pilkadasung by taking into account
the concepts of democracy. It is hoped that this paper can provide new ideas
and alternatives in the knowledge of constitutional law, especially in the study
of regional head elections.
In strengthening the argument for the abolition of the Pilkadasung by
using a hierarchy-based regional head election, an analysis is presented in
the form of state administration practices, as well as theory. The practice of
state administration in Indonesia recognizes the mechanism for filling the
positions of regional heads through a determination system, as happened in
the election model for the positions of Governor and Deputy Governor of the
Special Region of Yogyakarta. Sri Sultan Hamengkubowono and Sri Paku
Alam as Governor and Deputy Governor of the Special Region of Yogyakarta
3
Wicaksono, A. (2019). Gubernur DKI Jakarta Dipilih Presiden: Sebuah Wacana yang
Patut Dipertimbangkan. Jurnal PolGov, 1(1), 35.
https://doi.org/10.22146/polgov.v1i1.48286
4
Ryaas Rasyid, 2011, dalam
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/08/24/14261156/Tiga.Dampak.Negatif.Pilkada.
Langsung
5
Tito Karnavia, 2019, dalam
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/11/13/10205041/usul-tito-soal-evaluasi-
pilkada-langsung-dan-jawaban-jokowi?page=all
6
Loilatu, M. J. (2011). RESOLUSI KONFLIK PEMILIHAN KEPALA DAERAH (PILKADA)
KABUPATEN BURU SELATAN TAHUN 2015. Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and
Theoretical, 44(8), 1689–1699.
143
were selected through a determination mechanism
7
. Also, the appointment of
mayors in the Special Capital Region of Jakarta by the Governor.
The theory presented in this paper is the Manor and Crook Theory which
states, in many cases the direct election of regional heads and the separation
between majors (regional heads) and councilors (members of the DPRD) in
developing countries have led to worse governance practices. The main factors
are the co-optative character of the local elite and always close the opportunity
for other parties to compete in politics, the low level of knowledge and political
awareness of the community, and the absence of DPRD oversight of regional
heads. These factors are reflected in Indonesia. Co-optation of power is carried
out by the incumbent by utilizing bureaucratic access. As a result, it is not
uncommon for population data to be manipulated, the process of
administering regional elections is not objective and not independent.
II. METHOD
This paper is a conceptual study. In a conceptual study, a framework of
thought is needed that is used as a rationale that contains a combination of
theory with facts, observations, and literature studies, which will be used as
the basis for
8
. The framework of thinking has the benefit of helping writers to
place their writing in a wider context. In addition, it also helps the author in
testing the formulation of the problem. The last benefit is that it makes it
easier for writers to find theories or concepts. Of course the theory or concept
in question is a theory or concept that is used as a tool to answer the problem.
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
a. Strengthening Discourse Arguments for Abolishing Direct Pilkada
The six major problems that resulted from the direct Pilkada are
fundamental, thus giving rise to the discourse of abolishing the Direct Pilkada
and trying to find a new mechanism for the election of regional heads which
is still within the corridors of democracy.
The six problems have been briefly described in the background section.
In this section, these six big problems will be further elaborated. First, until
March 2021 as many as 429 Regional Heads as a result of the Direct Election
were caught Corruption, this figure seems to have no end. The data for the
last five years shows the number of regional heads arrested for corruption by
the Corruption Eradication Commission:
9
Table 1. Regional head arrested by the Corruption Eradication Commission
No.
Position
2021
2020
2019
2018
2017
1
Governor
1
-
1
2
1
2
Mayor/Regent and Deputy
19
10
18
30
13
7
Engkus Kuswara, Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Dalam Perspektif Hukum Tata Negara-
Tinjauan Atas Pengisian Jabatan Gubernur Provinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, Skripsi,
Universitas Indonesia, 2012, p.10.
8
Unaradjan, D. D. (2019). Metode Penelitian Kuantitatif. Universitas Atma Jaya (p.
302).
9
https://www.kpk.go.id/id/statistik/penindakan/tpk-berdasarkan-profesi-jabatan
144
Not even a month in 2022, corruption cases have re-emerged. In
January, for three weeks in a row, the public had been treated to news of the
arrest of a regional head who was entangled in corruption. No less than three
regional heads have been named as rasuah suspects. The arrest of the three
opened a black sheet at the beginning of the year and added to the long list
of corruption cases of regional heads
10
.
Three main factors causing regional head corruption
11
, namely:
monopoly of power, policy discretion, weak accountability. Regional heads
have enormous power in managing the APBD budget, recruiting regional
officials, granting natural resource permits, procurement of goods and
services and making regional head regulations, and the existence of a dynasty
of power, this causes regional heads to commit criminal acts of corruption
through bribery and gratuities. . The right of discretion is attached to public
officials, especially regional heads, meaning that discretion is exercised
because not everything is covered by regulations so that policies are needed
to decide something, so that what is targeted can be fulfilled without having
to wait for available rules, the problem is then this discretion is understood
very well. wide, even though the discretion is very limited, he can only be given
his space when there are no rules and that is in a very urgent situation. There
is a situation where a regional head incurs costs that are not in the APBD,
therefore the regional head looks for loopholes to create fictitious expenditures
to cover these costs so that regional heads tend to commit corruption for the
benefit of the service as well as for personal interests. There is collusion
between regional heads and DPRD related to policies made by regional heads,
for example problems in making regional regulations and licensing. Included
in the weakness of accountability is the lack of transparency in budget
management, asset management and in the procurement of goods and
services, causing regional heads to take action. corruption crime.
There are also several other factors that cause regional heads to commit
corruption, among others due to the high cost of direct regional elections, lack
of competence in regional financial management, lack of understanding of
regulations, and understanding of the wrong cultural concept
12
.
Second, central and local government programs are often out of sync.
Synchronization of planning through deliberation on development plans
(musrenbang) from the village or sub-district to the center, is often dominated
by political processes and is technocratic
13
.
One of the consequences of this non-synchronization is that there are
many errors in the use of inappropriate budgets between ministries/agencies
(K/L) and local governments, resulting in non-optimal performance
achievements. This discrepancy also appears in the findings of the Supreme
Audit Agency (BPK), where many K/Ls ask for a budget to produce goods
which will be handed over to the community or local government (Pemda). On
the other hand, when a request has been approved and granted and then
realized to produce goods or infrastructure in an area, many local
10
https://antikorupsi.org/id/article/korupsi-kepala-daerah-0
11
Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Pengawasan, Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan
Pembangunan, Laporan penelitian , 2016, p.15.
12
Ibid.
13
Robert Andi Jaweng, Loc.cit.
145
governments refuse. The local government does not necessarily want to accept
it because the goods or infrastructure are central government programs.
Therefore, they assume they have no obligation to maintain. The local
government also did not accept it because the goods or infrastructure were
not what they had requested from the start. Not only that, BPK also found
other problems related to inappropriate spending to the community and local
governments due to the lack of synchronization between the center and the
regions
14
.
One of the causes of this discrepancy is that in the regional sphere, the
Governors, Regents, and Mayors often have regional development plans that
differ from national development. This is because of the tug-of-war of interests
such as different visions and missions, campaign promises and so on
15
. There
needs to be a locking formulation that can equate development plans between
the center and the regions
16
. Then, in the preparation of the RPJMD/RPJMN
there are two documents that are actually running, namely the political and
the technocratic. This is what makes sometimes between the regions and the
center out of sync. Sometimes the central plan is not implemented because it
is unpopular
17
.
Third, the occurrence of community polarization. The potential for
division of society in the implementation of direct elections is still a threat.
The results of a study by the Ministry of Home Affairs show that polarization
has the potential to occur when regional democratic parties take place,
including touching on ethnic, religious, racial and intergroup (SARA) issues
18
.
Chairman of the National Mandate Party (PAN) Zulkifli Hasan highlighted
the increasingly polarized political conditions in Indonesia. According to him,
this happened as a result of the 2017 and 2018 regional elections, the 2019
presidential elections, and the 2020 regional elections which contain a
deceitful character of democracy. The polarization that occurs in society is
intense, even giving rise to the seeds of hostility and hatred which have very
high social and cultural costs.
19
The 6th President of the Republic of Indonesia Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono (SBY) also highlighted social and political life which according to
him has become increasingly polarized since the 2017 DKI Jakarta Pilkada
contestation. Starting from the political dynamics in the 2017 Jakarta
Pilkada, it seems that in people's lives, distance and separation are built that
14
Sri Mulyani, Rapat Kerja Bersama Komsi XI, 2020, dalam
https://m.lampost.co/berita-belanja-pusat-dan-pemerintah-daerah-tidak-sinkron.html
15
Cholid Mahmud, Diskusi Terbatas Sinkronisasi dan konsistensi Pelaksanaan RPJMN
dan RPJPN 2005-2025, DPD Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, 2018.
16
Purwo Susanto, 2018, Diskusi Terbatas Sinkronisasi dan konsistensi Pelaksanaan
RPJMN dan RPJPN 2005-2025, DPD Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta.
17
Tavip Agus Rayanto, Diskusi Terbatas Sinkronisasi dan konsistensi Pelaksanaan
RPJMN dan RPJPN 2005-2025, DPD Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, 2018.
18
http://harnas.co/2019/12/16/waspadai-polarisasi-pilkada
19
https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20210324200722-32-621728/soroti-
polarisasi-zulhas-sindir-demokrasi-culas-pilkada-2017
146
should not happen. A sharp polarization is built among the people, both
because of identity, politics and ideology factors.
20
Fourth, the corrupt behavior of the elected regional heads due to the very
large costs of participating in the direct elections. There is a correlation
between direct post-conflict local election and corrupt behavior. The
entanglement of hundreds of regional heads in corruption cases is suspected
of high political costs, both for nominations through political parties,
campaign costs that are not properly monitored so that there are no limits,
and the existence of money politics directly to voters, triggering regional heads
to try to return capital, giving rise to the term political industry.
21
Furthermore, research from Iza Rumestan concludes that there is a
correlation between the corrupt behavior of regional heads and the Pilkasung.
This correlation occurs because the direct Pilkada requires large political
costs so that after being elected the official concerned tries to recover the
political costs that have been incurred during the election process plus
additional capital to re-nominate.
22
The high number of corruption in the regions, apart from lust for power,
is also caused by other problems such as high political costs. Swelling political
costs then encourage candidates to seek other sources of funding. This
phenomenon is coupled with the professionalization of political activities such
as campaign costs, polls, advertisements in the mass media, to political
consultants, all of which need financing. On the other hand, candidates also
do not have roots in the community, like political parties that do not have
ideological closeness to the community and tend to only become boats for a
few individuals. This causes the campaign to be intensified and expensive.
The amount of money spent, ultimately encourages candidates to 'return their
capital', thus seeking many sources of funding, including corruption.
23
Kelima, besarnya biaya pelaksanaan Pilkada Langsung. Pelaksanaan
Pilkada Langsung ternyata membebani Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Darah.
Biaya pelaksanaan pilkada tiap tingkatan menghabiskan anggaran berbeda.
Besarannya antara tiga puluh miliar rupiah sampai 40 miliar rupiah. Jumlah
tersebut belum termasuk yang dikeluarkan para kandidat calon kepala
daerah. Untuk tingkat Bupati setidaknya perlu mengeluarkan RP 30 miliar.
Sementara untuk tingkat provinsi mencapai Rp 100 miliar.
24
The
implementation of direct elections is ineffective in terms of time and inefficient
in terms of cost because it wastes a lot of regional budgets, while the fiscal
20
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia Tahun 2021, Peluang Untuk Suskses Ada,
Jangan Kita Sia-Siakan, 2021, dalam https://www.demokrat.or.id/indonesia-tahun-2021-
peluang-untuk-sukses-ada-jangan-kita-sia-siakan/
21
Hayati, M., & Noor, R. S. (2020). Korelasi PILKADA Langsung dan Korupsi di
Indonesia. MORALITY : Jurnal Ilmu Hukum, 6(2), 102.
https://doi.org/10.52947/morality.v6i2.174
22
Karyono. (2016). Korelasi Sistem Pilkada Langsung Dengan Perilaku Korupsi Kepala
Daerah. Harmony, 1(1), 30–44.
23
Kahfi Adlan Azis, 2021, dalam https://rumahpemilu.org/korupsi-kepala-daerah-
dan-tingginya-biaya-politik/
24
Glidheo Algifaryano, dalam
https://www.liputan6.com/bisnis/read/4134744/mahalnya-pilkada-langsung-hingga-
habiskan-uang-rp-100-miliar
147
capacity of the regions is low so that the election financing is taken by
reducing public service spending (education and health).
25
Sixth, conflicts due to the implementation of direct elections. The
contestation in the struggle for power at the local level which is dominated by
cases of conflict during the implementation of direct local elections is a
phenomenon that is the antithesis of democratic ways of choosing a leader.
Democracy actually requires non-violent ways in determining a leader
because of the principles of democracy in an election. In addition, elections
and local elections are the extent to which everyone has the same opportunity,
the process uses democratic methods. There have been several conflicts in
direct local elections, including in Tuban Regency, North Maluku Province
and South Sulawesi Province, it seems that they are relatively similar to each
other in triggering the conflict, namely the dispute over the election results.
direct pilkada Referred to as embryo because the slight difference causes
dissatisfaction of the losing candidate pair.
26
The conflict due to the direct elections took many victims, as happened
in the direct elections of South Buru Regency-Maluku Province in 2015, there
were destruction and burning of houses against supporters of one partner.
This conflict is based on a sense of dissatisfaction with the election results
won by other couples. The conflict that resulted in 97 Heads of Families
having to be evacuated. The six major problems of the direct elections, in other
terms the negative impact of direct elections, gave birth to the discourse of
abolishing the direct elections and seeking a new system of regional head
elections that were still within the corridors of democracy. The argument for
strengthening the discourse can be postulated on the practice of state
administration, and theory.
First, the practice of state administration in Indonesia recognizes the
mechanism for filling regional head positions through a determination
system, as happened in the model for the election of the Governor and Deputy
Governor of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY). Sri Sultan
Hamengkubowono and Sri Paku Alam as Governor and Deputy Governor of
the Special Region of Yogyakarta were selected through a determination
mechanism.
The Special Region of Yogyakarta, both historically and juridically, has
strong legitimacy as a special blood. The privilege of DIY is also reflected in
the mechanism for filling the positions of Governor and Deputy Governor with
a determination system, in which Sri Sultan Hamengkubowono and Sri Paku
Alam are appointed directly by the President. Constitutionally, the stipulation
system as Governor and Deputy Governor of DIY is not contrary to the
constitution, as long as the stipulation has legitimacy from the community
25
Aziz, N. L. L. (2016). Politik Anggaran Dalam Pelaksanaan Pilkada Serentak Di
Indonesia. Jurnal Masyarakat Indonesia, 42(1), 51–64. Retrieved from
http://jmi.ipsk.lipi.go.id/index.php/jmiipsk/article/view/359
26
Nurhasim, Moch. (2010). Konflik dalam Pilkada Langsung: Studi tentang Penyebab
dan Dampak Konflik. Jurnal Penelitian Politik LIPI: Peluang Indonesia Dalam Perdagangan
Bebas, 7(2), 105–117.
148
(the people want it).
27
This has also been regulated in Law Number 13 of 2012
concerning the Privileges of the Special Region of Yogyakarta.
Furthermore, in DKI Jakarta the mayor is appointed by the Governor on
the consideration of the Jakarta Provincial DPRD taken from elements of civil
servants who meet the requirements.
28
This is based on Law Number 29 of
2007 concerning the Provincial Government of the Special Capital Region of
Jakarta as the Capital of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.
Second, the theory used as an argument is Manor and Crook. According
to Manor and Crook, in many cases the direct election of regional heads and
the separation between majors (regional heads) and counceilors (members of
the DPRD) in developing countries have led to worse governance practices.
The main factors are the co-optative character of the local elite and always
close the opportunity for other parties to compete in politics, the low level of
knowledge and political awareness of the community, and the absence of
DPRD oversight of regional heads. These factors are reflected in Indonesia.
Co-optation of power is carried out by the incumbent by utilizing bureaucratic
access. As a result, it is not uncommon for population data to be manipulated,
the election process is not objective and not independent.
29
The basic
principles of decentralization, namely the existence of political equality and
political accountability at the local level do not have a positive correlation with
strengthening democracy at the local level.
30
More, Wawan and friends
31
in the study concluded that the post-conflict
local election mechanism using a direct and indirect system, when compared,
tends to be more profitable by using an indirect election system.
Third, that in Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution, it is stated that
Governors-Deputy Governors, Regents-Deputy Regents, Mayors-Deputy
Mayors can be elected in a democratic way. Democracy can be direct and
indirect. Regarding regional head elections, this regional head election is
contained in Article 18 of the 1945 amendment to the 1945 Constitution of
the Republic of Indonesia. Article 18 only states that Governors, Regents and
Mayors are elected through democratic means. Democratic methods have
multiple interpretations, depending on how the law translates them. Initially,
the election was conducted by means of a representative mechanism by the
DPRD and now the election system has been replaced directly by the people.
Basically, the two post-conflict local election systems, directly or indirectly,
do not conflict with the Basic State and the Constitution. If the elections are
conducted directly, then the democracy used is pure democracy, in which the
implementation of the elections is carried out by the people, of the people and
27
Widodo, I. G. (2011). SISTEM PENETAPAN GUBERNUR KEPALA DAERAH ISTIMEWA
YOGYAKARTA DALAM SISTEM PEMILIHAN KEPALA DAERAH BERDASARKAN PASAL 18
AYAT (4) UUD 1945. Jurnal Dinamika Hukum, 11(2).
https://doi.org/10.20884/1.jdh.2011.11.2.190
28
Charles Simabura, 2019, dalam https://www.hukumonline.com/klinik/a/alasan-
walikota-dki-jakarta-tidak-dipilih-secara-langsung-lt5cd5441ad8b65
29
Eko Prasojo, Loc.cit.
30
Romli, L. (2018). Pilkada Langsung, Calon Tunggal, dan Masa Depan Demokrasi
Lokal. Jurnal Penelitian Politik, 15(2), 143. https://doi.org/10.14203/jpp.v15i2.757
31
Wawan, S., Yudhitiya, D. S., & Caecia, G. (2015). Tinjauan Yuridis Perbandingan
Sistem Pilkada Langsung dan Tidak Langsung Berdasarkan Demokrasi Pancasila. Jurnal
Dinamika Sosial Budaya, 17(2), 300–310.
149
for the people based on the values of Pancasila. On the other hand, the
indirect election system is also a manifestation of the implementation of
Pancasila democracy. The difference is that the democracy applied is
representative democracy, where the election of regional heads can be carried
out by members of the local DPRD who are the embodiment of the Indonesian
people or through an open auction with a transparent and accountable public
hearing. Thus, indirect elections do not conflict with Pancasila democracy.
Thus, arguing on the practice of state administration, and the theory, it
can be said that direct Pilkada is not the only democratic way of electing
regional heads, it is very open to opportunities for other systems to be applied
in the context of regional head elections which are still within the corridor of
democracy.
b. Proposed Hierarchy-Based Regional Head Election Model
Until now, many formulas have been offered as a substitute for direct
regional elections, one of which is the discourse of returning to the system of
regional heads elected by the Regional People's Representative Council. It is
based on the cause of the emergence of the discourse on the abolition of Direct
Pilkada as well as its supporting arguments in the practice of state
administration and theories. In this study, a hierarchical-based regional head
election model is proposed.
In this hierarchy-based regional head election model, the Governor is
appointed by the President. Furthermore, the Mayor and Regent are
appointed by the Governor. The appointment must first go through the
following mechanisms: (1) Open Position Auction; (2) Public Hearings; and (3)
Fit and Proper Test.
The first is the open position auction or also known as the open selection
process, Eko Prasojo
32
stated that the job auction scheme will create fair and
objective competition, so that the best candidate for leadership can be
obtained.
This position auction is an adaptation of an open and competitive
promotion among civil servants (PNS). The position auction is a mechanism
system carried out in implementing the appointment of civil servants (PNS) in
a structural position which is carried out based on the principle of
professionalism. The auction of office itself has been introduced and practiced
in Western countries, with different terms. The aim is to select personnel who
have adequate capacity, competence and integrity to fill certain positions.
With the auction of positions, it is able to reduce the occurrence of corruption,
collusion and nepotism (KKN). This is because the auction of positions is
carried out in a transparent manner. The job auction mechanism is able to
prevent the politicization of the bureaucracy, or the attitude of leaders who
choose officials based on subjectivity in voting.
33
In the bidding process for this position, the President prior to appointing
the Governor, conducts an open bidding (open bidding) to the entire
community by providing certain qualifications and requirements in a
32
Dalam Anugerah E Yugiantoro, Lelang Jabatan: Penerapan Good Governance dalam
Birokrasi, Makalah Tidak Diterbitkan, tanpa tahun, p.1.
33
Fajria Anindya Utami, https://wartaekonomi.co.id/read340595/apa-itu-lelang-
jabatan, 2021.
150
transparent process. This open bidding resulted in a number of (could be 7,
9, or 11) top ranking people to participate in the public hearing process.
Second, the number of people (can be 7, 9 or 11) at the top of the open
bidding results, then called candidates, must follow the next process, namely
public hearings. This public hearing concerns the profile and track record of
the candidate. Hearings from the community can be done offline or online.
Public hearings are scored using a certain method, based on the scores from
these public hearings, the President picks 5 candidates with the best scores
to then take the fit and proper test at the Level I Regional House of
Representatives (DPRD Province).
Third, the 5 candidates with the best scores took the fit and proper test
at the Level I Regional House of Representatives (DPRD Province). As a result
of the fit and proper test, the Provincial DPRD determines the 3 best
candidates, which will then be submitted to the President. Then as the end of
the process, the President selects and appoints one of the 3 candidates as
Governor. The same process also applies to the appointment of the
Mayor/Regent by the Governor, the difference is that the fit and proper test
process is carried out at the City/Regency DPRD.
This model can eliminate the six big problems of Piladasung, because:
1) The whole process of this model is low-cost, and does not require
campaigning, does not require political dowries, politics of money-
sharing, and so on, which can suppress the corrupt behavior of the
appointed regional head;
2) Ensure that there will be synchronization and continuity of
programs between the central and regional governments, as well as
in the regions themselves; as well as
3) Conflict and community polarization can be avoided.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since the direct elections in Indonesia have given birth to six major
problems, namely: (1). Many regional heads resulting from the direct elections
have been caught in corruption, (2). Central and local government programs
are often out of sync,(3). The occurrence of community polarization, (4). The
corrupt behavior of the elected regional heads due to the very large costs of
participating in the direct elections, (5). The amount of the direct election
implementation costs, (6). Conflicts due to the implementation of direct
elections.The existence of these six major problems gave rise to the discourse
of abolishing direct elections and looking for a new system in regional head
elections that are still within the corridors of democracy. The arguments for
the practice of state administration and theory confirm that direct Pilkada is
not the only democratic way of electing regional heads. For this reason, as an
alternative to the election of regional heads, this study proposes a
hierarchical-based model of regional head elections. The President appoints
the Governor, and the Governor appoints the Mayor/Regent. The appointment
process follows a mechanism with several stages, namely: (1) an open position
auction, (2) a public hearing, and (3) a fit and proper test at the Provincial
DPRD for the Governor, for the Mayor/Regent at the Regency DPRD.
151
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