US-Iran Relations and its Implications on International Peace and Security

Abstract

This piece analyses stages of friendly as well as ferocious relationships between United States of America (US) and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The paper identified unhealthy struggle for dominance and the attendant use of surrogates by the countries to achieve their aims. The paper objective centres on ascertaining the causes of the multi-decade sour relations between the states. With the aid of descriptive approach, data obtained from text books, journals, mass media (of international repute), and internet resources were sourced and analysed. Theoretically, Morgenthau’s political realism, with emphasis on interest defined in terms of (political, economic, military and other corollaries) of power was adopted to unravel the relation between the variables. Findings show that US and Iran were allies before a military coup that unseat the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq and restored full political powers to the Shah in 1953. There was a trilateral relation amongst Iran, US and Israel; the relationship, necessitated by the fear of Soviet expansion into Middle East by all parties and amplified by Iran’s strategic position between Far-East and Indian Ocean and the need to protect multiple US economic interests in Iran, instilled fears and suspicion among Sunni majority of the region. The paper, also, traces the non-Arab cultural, linguistic, and historic Judeo and Persian national identities distinct in an otherwise predominantly Sunni-Arab region. Also that a US-Iran war portent the ability to suspend the fragile peace in the Middle East and further wreck the relations between US and host of Iranian super allies. Thus, the paper recommends among others that, there is need for the two sides to maintain their border of influence to allow peace and stability of the international political system though anarchically laden.

Full text

African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)
16(1) (June, 2023):509-530 p-
ISSN: 2787
Available online at
https://www.ajpasebsu.org.ng/
https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajpas.v16i1.29
US-
Iran Relations and its Implications
1Fidelis I
kaade
1&2
Department of Political S
Corresponding author’s e-mail
:
Abstract
This piece analyses stages of friendly as well as ferocious relationships between United State
America (US) and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The paper identified unhealthy struggle for
dominance and the attendant use of surrogates by the countries to achieve their aims. The paper
objective centres on
ascertaining the causes of the multi
With the aid of descriptive approach, data obtained from text books, journals
international repute), and internet resources were sourced and analysed. Theoretically,
Morgenthau’s political realism, with em
economic, military and other corollaries) of power was adopted to unravel the relation between
the variables. Findings show
that US and Iran were allies before
democratically
elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq and restored full political powers
to the Shah in 1953. There was a trilateral relation amongst Iran, US and Israel; the relationship,
necessitated by the fear of Soviet expansion into Middle East by all parties an
Iran’s strategic position between Far
economic interests in Iran, instilled fears and suspicion among Sunni majority of the region. The
paper, also, traces the non-
Arab cultural, ling
identities distinct in an otherwise predomi
portent the ability to suspend the fragile peace in the Middle East and further wreck the relations
between US and
host of Iranian super allies. Thus, the paper recommends among others that,
there is need for the two sides to maintain their border of influence to allow peace and stability of
the international political system though anarchically laden.
Key Words: Military
Capability
Citation of article:
Ochim, F.I. &Haruna, H. H
on International Peace and Security.
Studies(AJPAS), 16(1):
Date Submitted: 12/02/2023
Date Accepted
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P a g e
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Iran Relations and its Implications
on
International Peace and
Security
kaade
Ochim & 2Haruna Hassan-Haruna
Department of Political S
cience, Federal university of Lafia,
Nasarawa State
Nigeria
:
ochimfidelis@yahoo.com
This piece analyses stages of friendly as well as ferocious relationships between United State
America (US) and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The paper identified unhealthy struggle for
dominance and the attendant use of surrogates by the countries to achieve their aims. The paper
ascertaining the causes of the multi
-decade
sour relations between the states.
With the aid of descriptive approach, data obtained from text books, journals
, mass
international repute), and internet resources were sourced and analysed. Theoretically,
Morgenthau’s political realism, with em
phasis on interest defined in terms of (political,
economic, military and other corollaries) of power was adopted to unravel the relation between
that US and Iran were allies before
a military coup that unseat the
elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq and restored full political powers
to the Shah in 1953. There was a trilateral relation amongst Iran, US and Israel; the relationship,
necessitated by the fear of Soviet expansion into Middle East by all parties an
Iran’s strategic position between Far
-
East and Indian Ocean and the need to protect multiple US
economic interests in Iran, instilled fears and suspicion among Sunni majority of the region. The
Arab cultural, ling
uistic, and historic Judeo and Persian national
identities distinct in an otherwise predomi
nantly Sunni-Arab region. Also
that a US
portent the ability to suspend the fragile peace in the Middle East and further wreck the relations
host of Iranian super allies. Thus, the paper recommends among others that,
there is need for the two sides to maintain their border of influence to allow peace and stability of
the international political system though anarchically laden.
Capability
, Middle- East, Saudi- Arabia, US- Iran,
Relations, War
Ochim, F.I. &Haruna, H. H
(2023).US-
Iran Relations and its Implications
on International Peace and Security.
African Journal of Politics and
Administrative
Date Accepted
: 14/03/2023 Date Published
: June, 2023.
P a g e
| 509
Copy Right: © Author (s)
International Peace and
Nasarawa State
,
This piece analyses stages of friendly as well as ferocious relationships between United State
s of
America (US) and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The paper identified unhealthy struggle for
dominance and the attendant use of surrogates by the countries to achieve their aims. The paper
sour relations between the states.
, mass
media (of
international repute), and internet resources were sourced and analysed. Theoretically,
phasis on interest defined in terms of (political,
economic, military and other corollaries) of power was adopted to unravel the relation between
a military coup that unseat the
elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq and restored full political powers
to the Shah in 1953. There was a trilateral relation amongst Iran, US and Israel; the relationship,
necessitated by the fear of Soviet expansion into Middle East by all parties an
d amplified by
East and Indian Ocean and the need to protect multiple US
economic interests in Iran, instilled fears and suspicion among Sunni majority of the region. The
uistic, and historic Judeo and Persian national
that a US
-Iran war
portent the ability to suspend the fragile peace in the Middle East and further wreck the relations
host of Iranian super allies. Thus, the paper recommends among others that,
there is need for the two sides to maintain their border of influence to allow peace and stability of
Relations, War
.
Iran Relations and its Implications
Administrative
: June, 2023.

African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)
16(1) (June, 2023):509-530 p-
ISSN: 2787
Available online at
https://www.ajpasebsu.org.ng/
https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajpas.v16i1.29
Introduction
Palme
r and Perkins (2010, p.640)
in international politics. “By history, and by experience”, “by temperament and by inclination,
Americans are prepared
to accept the heavy responsibility and commitment in international
affairs which their
country assume
of this paper, if this liberal-
public good assumption applies in terms of US
makes or mar international peace.US active participation in world politics assu
dimension after the first World War between 1914
1945 2nd World War(LOC, nd).
The sudden paradigm shift from keeping a safe distance from the pre
transnational relations, a
nd the speed with which episodes “accelerated too rapidly, for” the
institutionalisation of an ideal long term foreign policy that led US officials to assume a
“goddess of li
berty” status for their country o
acc
laimed international police (Cartey, 1997) as heavy
by the communists world.Also,
t
became a centre of attraction in the world politics. The duo,
concluded that the above expressions about US “are stereotypes”. It is significant not to
understand these characterisations in terms of misrepresenting or obscuring the materiality
(reality) about the US; rather, the characteri
of testimonies to the unique nature of the foreign policy.
The following dynamics, in the other divide, are essential to understanding Iran’s centrality in
US foreign relations: Iran largely represents
region and in the Middle-
East. The Shiite state is the vigorous, if not the only threat to US best
ally of necessity - Sunni-
ruled Saudi Arabia
Hensell and Guffey, 2009
and Henderson, 2016). Albeit, the
2019) states of the region are not in friendly terms with their Israelites neighbours, Iran
represents the worst of the threats to the former which enjoys US protection and su
ramifications
of State’s endeavours. The conspicuous romance between Iran and US’s major and,
African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)
P a g e
ISSN: 2787
-0367;e-ISSN: 2787-0359
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https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajpas.v16i1.29
r and Perkins (2010, p.640)
opined that
the United States (US) has been a very busy actor
in international politics. “By history, and by experience”, “by temperament and by inclination,
to accept the heavy responsibility and commitment in international
country assume
d in recent years”.However it remains to be seen,
public good assumption applies in terms of US
-
Iran relations as it
makes or mar international peace.US active participation in world politics assu
dimension after the first World War between 1914
–
1918 and before, during and after 1939
The sudden paradigm shift from keeping a safe distance from the pre
-
world wars Euro
nd the speed with which episodes “accelerated too rapidly, for” the
institutionalisation of an ideal long term foreign policy that led US officials to assume a
berty” status for their country o
n one hand, and the painting of the same self
laimed international police (Cartey, 1997) as heavy
-
handed statist or ego centrist impe
the profiling and counter-
profiling indicate that US has, indeed,
became a centre of attraction in the world politics. The duo,
Palmer and Perkins, rightly
concluded that the above expressions about US “are stereotypes”. It is significant not to
understand these characterisations in terms of misrepresenting or obscuring the materiality
(reality) about the US; rather, the characteri
sations should be understood or appreciated in terms
of testimonies to the unique nature of the foreign policy.
The following dynamics, in the other divide, are essential to understanding Iran’s centrality in
US foreign relations: Iran largely represents
nothing but a real threat to US interests in the Gulf
East. The Shiite state is the vigorous, if not the only threat to US best
ruled Saudi Arabia
-
in the region (Wehrey, Karasik, Alireza, Ghez,
and Henderson, 2016). Albeit, the
Ishmaelites (Merriam
2019) states of the region are not in friendly terms with their Israelites neighbours, Iran
represents the worst of the threats to the former which enjoys US protection and su
of State’s endeavours. The conspicuous romance between Iran and US’s major and,
P a g e
| 510
Copy Right: © Author (s)
the United States (US) has been a very busy actor
in international politics. “By history, and by experience”, “by temperament and by inclination,
to accept the heavy responsibility and commitment in international
d in recent years”.However it remains to be seen,
in the course
Iran relations as it
makes or mar international peace.US active participation in world politics assu
mes a spacious
1918 and before, during and after 1939
-
world wars Euro
-centric
nd the speed with which episodes “accelerated too rapidly, for” the
institutionalisation of an ideal long term foreign policy that led US officials to assume a
n one hand, and the painting of the same self
-
handed statist or ego centrist impe
rialist
profiling indicate that US has, indeed,
Palmer and Perkins, rightly
concluded that the above expressions about US “are stereotypes”. It is significant not to
understand these characterisations in terms of misrepresenting or obscuring the materiality
sations should be understood or appreciated in terms
The following dynamics, in the other divide, are essential to understanding Iran’s centrality in
nothing but a real threat to US interests in the Gulf
East. The Shiite state is the vigorous, if not the only threat to US best
in the region (Wehrey, Karasik, Alireza, Ghez,
Ishmaelites (Merriam
-Webster,
2019) states of the region are not in friendly terms with their Israelites neighbours, Iran
represents the worst of the threats to the former which enjoys US protection and su
pport in all
of State’s endeavours. The conspicuous romance between Iran and US’s major and,

African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)
16(1) (June, 2023):509-530 p-
ISSN: 2787
Available online at
https://www.ajpasebsu.org.ng/
https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajpas.v16i1.29
perhaps, the only contemporary economic threat: China, in a sense, and the explicit defence
alliance that exists between the theocratic guardianship
leading military rival -
the Russian Federation
relations between US and Iran (Ochmanek, Wilson, Allen, Meyers & Price, 2017).
The aforementioned dynamics could be deduce
relations; Iran-
Israeli relations; and Iran and the super five (5); and finally, though not discussed
above, what Ochmanek, Wilson, Allen, Meyers and Price (2017 p
the strait of Ho
rmuz” to global energy industry/sector. Hormuz is a narrow waterway through
which a minimum of sixteen (16) million barrels of Brent Crude pass on daily basis. Iran,
possibly, enjoys 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) status over the waterway
passage forms part of its territorial waters. Should this
crude oil consumers, stands to pay a very serious price. This also explains, asserts Ochmanek
(2017), the continuous presence of US military in the region.
Literature Review
Thematic attempt shall be made in navigating the extent of
understanding US –
Iran relation
security. As such, the paper attempts review of US Foreign
US and Arab World.
(i) US
Foreign Policy
While the question of what foreign policy should US adopt after: September 11
incidents in Manhattan, New York and Pentagon, Washington DC; the withering away of
balance of power arrangement, the rise of new actors in international politics (terrorists); the
proliferation of Weapon of Mass destruction (WMD); and availability o
technology for development of WMDs agitates Evera (2006). Halidu and Silas (2022) attempted
a brief historical overview of the North American giant’s foreign policy. They rightly submitted
that after the WW II, US shifted from politi
affairs of other states. Prevention, deterrence and reduction of the threat of W
African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)
P a g e
ISSN: 2787
-0367;e-ISSN: 2787-0359
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https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajpas.v16i1.29
perhaps, the only contemporary economic threat: China, in a sense, and the explicit defence
alliance that exists between the theocratic guardianship
democracy (Moodles, 2006) and the US
the Russian Federation
–
in another sense, adds impetus to the soured
relations between US and Iran (Ochmanek, Wilson, Allen, Meyers & Price, 2017).
The aforementioned dynamics could be deduce
d to: Iran-
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)
Israeli relations; and Iran and the super five (5); and finally, though not discussed
above, what Ochmanek, Wilson, Allen, Meyers and Price (2017 p
.62) termed
the “criticality of
rmuz” to global energy industry/sector. Hormuz is a narrow waterway through
which a minimum of sixteen (16) million barrels of Brent Crude pass on daily basis. Iran,
possibly, enjoys 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) status over the waterway
passage forms part of its territorial waters. Should this
happen
, US, being one of world leading
crude oil consumers, stands to pay a very serious price. This also explains, asserts Ochmanek
(2017), the continuous presence of US military in the region.
Thematic attempt shall be made in navigating the extent of
scholarly
Iran relation
s
and its attendant implications on international peace and
security. As such, the paper attempts review of US Foreign
Policy, Iranian Foreign Policy, and
Foreign Policy
While the question of what foreign policy should US adopt after: September 11
incidents in Manhattan, New York and Pentagon, Washington DC; the withering away of
balance of power arrangement, the rise of new actors in international politics (terrorists); the
proliferation of Weapon of Mass destruction (WMD); and availability o
f materials as well as
technology for development of WMDs agitates Evera (2006). Halidu and Silas (2022) attempted
a brief historical overview of the North American giant’s foreign policy. They rightly submitted
that after the WW II, US shifted from politi
cs of “Non-
interventionism to interventionism” in the
affairs of other states. Prevention, deterrence and reduction of the threat of W
P a g e
| 511
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perhaps, the only contemporary economic threat: China, in a sense, and the explicit defence
democracy (Moodles, 2006) and the US
in another sense, adds impetus to the soured
relations between US and Iran (Ochmanek, Wilson, Allen, Meyers & Price, 2017).
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)
Israeli relations; and Iran and the super five (5); and finally, though not discussed
the “criticality of
rmuz” to global energy industry/sector. Hormuz is a narrow waterway through
which a minimum of sixteen (16) million barrels of Brent Crude pass on daily basis. Iran,
possibly, enjoys 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) status over the waterway
or
, US, being one of world leading
crude oil consumers, stands to pay a very serious price. This also explains, asserts Ochmanek
scholarly
contributions at
and its attendant implications on international peace and
Policy, Iranian Foreign Policy, and
While the question of what foreign policy should US adopt after: September 11
, 2001, ugly
incidents in Manhattan, New York and Pentagon, Washington DC; the withering away of
balance of power arrangement, the rise of new actors in international politics (terrorists); the
f materials as well as
technology for development of WMDs agitates Evera (2006). Halidu and Silas (2022) attempted
a brief historical overview of the North American giant’s foreign policy. They rightly submitted
interventionism to interventionism” in the
affairs of other states. Prevention, deterrence and reduction of the threat of W
MDs on the

African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)
16(1) (June, 2023):509-530 p-
ISSN: 2787
Available online at
https://www.ajpasebsu.org.ng/
https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajpas.v16i1.29
American citizens
and military personnel; survival of US allies and an enabling conditions for
the allies’ cont
ribution in shaping the international system that suits US culture; prevention of
emergence of substantive hostile powers that could disrupt US
establishment of “product relations” were identified as “shapers” of US foreig
Evera, Halidu and Silas were conspicuously short of
implement the foreign policies without violating the concept of sovereignty.
A rather critique of US foreign policy, Carnegie Endowment for Internation
(2020) decried the former benign hegemony’s foreign politics for gaining more than
necessaryattention to “primacy” on international stage while
rather precarious state. The project rightly submitted advocate
class anxieties and foreign policy; a foreign policy that advances the interests of the middle class;
and rebuilding the trust between policy makers and the middle
Ates (2022) establishes a nex
us between US foreign policy on one hand and international trends
and domestic political institutions and processes on the other. Yes
are, partly, response to systemic (international system) trends;
underemphasise the same in
favour of internal factors. It is s
the differences in submissions of CEIP (2020) and Ates (2020): while CEIP accuses the makers
of US foreign policy of gross insensitivity to the midd
on such internal factors as state institutions.
(ii)
Iranian Foreign Policy In Perspectives
Institutions and personalities (idiosyncrasy) play great roles in formula
states. In the case of Iran
Wastnidge (2020),
formulating Iranian foreign policies are largely religious and cultural institutions. The religious
institutions, as rightly observed, are responsible
link between Shiites worldwide and the Iranian authorities.Golmohammadi (2018) identifies “a
variety of trends and developments” “within a framework of basic principles” and fundamental
institutions in Iranian f
oreign policy development and application. This assertion strengthens and
supports Wastnidge’s submissions as regard roles of institutions in formulating the Islamic
African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)
P a g e
ISSN: 2787
-0367;e-ISSN: 2787-0359
Copy Right: © Author (s)
https://www.ajpasebsu.org.ng/
https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajpas.v16i1.29
and military personnel; survival of US allies and an enabling conditions for
ribution in shaping the international system that suits US culture; prevention of
emergence of substantive hostile powers that could disrupt US
–
styled international trade; and
establishment of “product relations” were identified as “shapers” of US foreig
Evera, Halidu and Silas were conspicuously short of
wordsin
explaining how
implement the foreign policies without violating the concept of sovereignty.
A rather critique of US foreign policy, Carnegie Endowment for Internation
(2020) decried the former benign hegemony’s foreign politics for gaining more than
necessaryattention to “primacy” on international stage while
abandoning its
middle class in a
rather precarious state. The project rightly submitted advocate
d for: a link between middle
class anxieties and foreign policy; a foreign policy that advances the interests of the middle class;
and rebuilding the trust between policy makers and the middle
–
class among other agitations.
us between US foreign policy on one hand and international trends
and domestic political institutions and processes on the other. Yes
,
most states’ foreign policies
are, partly, response to systemic (international system) trends;
however, it is
quite erron
favour of internal factors. It is s
instructive, however to take not
the differences in submissions of CEIP (2020) and Ates (2020): while CEIP accuses the makers
of US foreign policy of gross insensitivity to the midd
le –
class (an internal factor), Ates dwells
on such internal factors as state institutions.
Iranian Foreign Policy In Perspectives
Institutions and personalities (idiosyncrasy) play great roles in formula
ting foreign policies of
Wastnidge (2020),
opines that,
the institutions responsible for
formulating Iranian foreign policies are largely religious and cultural institutions. The religious
institutions, as rightly observed, are responsible
for
establishing the link between transnational
link between Shiites worldwide and the Iranian authorities.Golmohammadi (2018) identifies “a
variety of trends and developments” “within a framework of basic principles” and fundamental
oreign policy development and application. This assertion strengthens and
supports Wastnidge’s submissions as regard roles of institutions in formulating the Islamic
P a g e
| 512
Copy Right: © Author (s)
and military personnel; survival of US allies and an enabling conditions for
ribution in shaping the international system that suits US culture; prevention of
styled international trade; and
establishment of “product relations” were identified as “shapers” of US foreig
n policy. Like
explaining how
US intends to
A rather critique of US foreign policy, Carnegie Endowment for Internation
al Peace (CEIP)
(2020) decried the former benign hegemony’s foreign politics for gaining more than
middle class in a
d for: a link between middle
–
class anxieties and foreign policy; a foreign policy that advances the interests of the middle class;
class among other agitations.
us between US foreign policy on one hand and international trends
most states’ foreign policies
quite erron
eous to
instructive, however to take not
e of
the differences in submissions of CEIP (2020) and Ates (2020): while CEIP accuses the makers
class (an internal factor), Ates dwells
ting foreign policies of
the institutions responsible for
formulating Iranian foreign policies are largely religious and cultural institutions. The religious
establishing the link between transnational
link between Shiites worldwide and the Iranian authorities.Golmohammadi (2018) identifies “a
variety of trends and developments” “within a framework of basic principles” and fundamental
oreign policy development and application. This assertion strengthens and
supports Wastnidge’s submissions as regard roles of institutions in formulating the Islamic

African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)
16(1) (June, 2023):509-530 p-
ISSN: 2787
Available online at
https://www.ajpasebsu.org.ng/
https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajpas.v16i1.29
state’s foreign policy. Golmohammadi rightly avers that a chance for change in Iran’s fore
policy is very unlikely.
Messous (2014) traces the
history of
establish a correlation between Iran’s unique history and country’s ambition to become and
atleast
maintain regional major power
that understanding Iran’s foreign policy must be precipitated by understanding “history, national
identity, political actors” and geo
Policy (2015) x-
rayed Iranian foreign policy under
to ending the country’s regional as well as international isolations. The Institute rightly submitted
that Rouhani achieved de-
isolation interest by striking a
allayed the fears and suspicions of the Gulf neighbours.
(iii)
Us Foreign Policy And Arab World
Powerful states often compete for relevance in Africa and Middle
Moller (2016) attempted an examination
towards the Middle-Eas
t in the after
relation with Europe, on one hand; and US relation with the Arab World, on the other, reveals a
Gulf in trade, and cultural
ties with
(Europe). In terms of security relation, however, US maintains a plethora of “agreements, basing,
and access rights, the prepositioning of equipment, and other hard forms o
Arabs. They, confusingly, averred that the US has been making a tacit and explicit commitment
to the myriad of allies in Arab World. While Byman and Moller assesses the risk and cost US
foreign policy towards the Arabs, Williams and
foreign policy and Arab Spring. The article identifies “Ten Short
US. First, that US had learned to be “willing to consider policy options beyond ‘MAINTAIN
THE STATUS QUO’” – by l
essen its devotedness to any Arab State in favour of democracy.
The article successfully cited instances of the paradigm shift in the cases of Egypt (an ally) and
Libya (a sworn enemy) where in the case of the former, President Barrack Obama was reported
to
have said; “the status quo is not sustainable” as President Mubarrak had ruled Egypt for three
African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)
P a g e
ISSN: 2787
-0367;e-ISSN: 2787-0359
Copy Right: © Author (s)
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https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajpas.v16i1.29
state’s foreign policy. Golmohammadi rightly avers that a chance for change in Iran’s fore
history of
“Persia” to more than 2,000 year before 1935 and tries to
establish a correlation between Iran’s unique history and country’s ambition to become and
maintain regional major power
status with nuclear arsenals. The study rightly maintains
that understanding Iran’s foreign policy must be precipitated by understanding “history, national
identity, political actors” and geo
-
political trends in the region. Lowy Institute f
rayed Iranian foreign policy under
President
Rouhani, which paid much attention
to ending the country’s regional as well as international isolations. The Institute rightly submitted
isolation interest by striking a
nuclear deal with world powers and
allayed the fears and suspicions of the Gulf neighbours.
Us Foreign Policy And Arab World
Powerful states often compete for relevance in Africa and Middle
-
East, as such Byman and
Moller (2016) attempted an examination
of the “interest, risk, and costs” of US foreign policy
t in the after
-mat
of Cold War. An informative comparison of US
relation with Europe, on one hand; and US relation with the Arab World, on the other, reveals a
ties with
US in the case of the later (Arab World) as against the former
(Europe). In terms of security relation, however, US maintains a plethora of “agreements, basing,
and access rights, the prepositioning of equipment, and other hard forms o
f cooperation” with the
Arabs. They, confusingly, averred that the US has been making a tacit and explicit commitment
to the myriad of allies in Arab World. While Byman and Moller assesses the risk and cost US
foreign policy towards the Arabs, Williams and
Popken (2012) established a nexus between US
foreign policy and Arab Spring. The article identifies “Ten Short
–
Time Lessons learned
US. First, that US had learned to be “willing to consider policy options beyond ‘MAINTAIN
essen its devotedness to any Arab State in favour of democracy.
The article successfully cited instances of the paradigm shift in the cases of Egypt (an ally) and
Libya (a sworn enemy) where in the case of the former, President Barrack Obama was reported
have said; “the status quo is not sustainable” as President Mubarrak had ruled Egypt for three
P a g e
| 513
Copy Right: © Author (s)
state’s foreign policy. Golmohammadi rightly avers that a chance for change in Iran’s fore
ign
“Persia” to more than 2,000 year before 1935 and tries to
establish a correlation between Iran’s unique history and country’s ambition to become and
or
status with nuclear arsenals. The study rightly maintains
that understanding Iran’s foreign policy must be precipitated by understanding “history, national
political trends in the region. Lowy Institute f
or International
Rouhani, which paid much attention
to ending the country’s regional as well as international isolations. The Institute rightly submitted
nuclear deal with world powers and
East, as such Byman and
of the “interest, risk, and costs” of US foreign policy
of Cold War. An informative comparison of US
relation with Europe, on one hand; and US relation with the Arab World, on the other, reveals a
US in the case of the later (Arab World) as against the former
(Europe). In terms of security relation, however, US maintains a plethora of “agreements, basing,
f cooperation” with the
Arabs. They, confusingly, averred that the US has been making a tacit and explicit commitment
to the myriad of allies in Arab World. While Byman and Moller assesses the risk and cost US
Popken (2012) established a nexus between US
Time Lessons learned
” by the
US. First, that US had learned to be “willing to consider policy options beyond ‘MAINTAIN
essen its devotedness to any Arab State in favour of democracy.
The article successfully cited instances of the paradigm shift in the cases of Egypt (an ally) and
Libya (a sworn enemy) where in the case of the former, President Barrack Obama was reported
have said; “the status quo is not sustainable” as President Mubarrak had ruled Egypt for three

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consecutive decades and in latter’s case, Obama advised Gadhafi to step aside. Although there is
merit in authors’ submission, however, they were short of citi
Arabian Monarchies/dictatorial regimes with
second lesson, which is rather instructive, revealing and germane, is that the Shiite minority
emerged winners of the spring as the F
Egypt and, possibly, the situations in Yemen and Syria. The Third and Fourth lessons being; the
strengthening of Arab League as evidenced in its role in regional conflict resolutions and
institutional
isation of the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The Fifth lesson is the
exposure of the fact that Brazil and India are not in support of
That, the pro-
democracy movement leaders were not prepared to take over the ma
leadership; and emergence of “justice” as “a top demand” were identified as the Sixth and
Seventh lessons from the spring. Possibility of counter
“rebels must be media –
savvy”; and that Arab Spring is a brai
and Southern Sudan are the Eight; Nineth and Tenth lessons learned.
Theoretical Exposition
In other to articulate the essence of this paper, therefore, the need for the use of an academic
amplifier becomes inevitable. Si
this paper do not share a geographical border (to warrant border conflict and the attendant need
to protect an interest which may be defined in relations to protection of territorial integrity
do they, symmetrically, compete for economic hegemony either on regional or global scale, the
only rational explanation to their conflict should be centred around “interest defined in terms of
power”. Incidentally, however, the main thrust of the th
defined in terms of power” (Morgenthau, 1978). Interest, viewed from either of the divides, can
be defined in terms of “lust” for un
level or at least the nee
d to maintain the same, in one hand; and the “lust” for regional power
status or at least the need or desire to lead the Islamic world, on the other hand. These two, rather
non-
crisscrossing, interests meet and clash as the US prioritizes the leadership of
when Iran aligns and identifies with Russian federation and China.
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consecutive decades and in latter’s case, Obama advised Gadhafi to step aside. Although there is
merit in authors’ submission, however, they were short of citi
ng examples of several other
Arabian Monarchies/dictatorial regimes with
which
US is still maintaining the status quo. The
second lesson, which is rather instructive, revealing and germane, is that the Shiite minority
emerged winners of the spring as the F
reedom and Justice Party (FJP) had formed government in
Egypt and, possibly, the situations in Yemen and Syria. The Third and Fourth lessons being; the
strengthening of Arab League as evidenced in its role in regional conflict resolutions and
isation of the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The Fifth lesson is the
exposure of the fact that Brazil and India are not in support of
“Arab Spring pro
democracy movement leaders were not prepared to take over the ma
leadership; and emergence of “justice” as “a top demand” were identified as the Sixth and
Seventh lessons from the spring. Possibility of counter
–
revolution/spring proved to vey high;
savvy”; and that Arab Spring is a brai
n child of what transpired in Iraq
and Southern Sudan are the Eight; Nineth and Tenth lessons learned.
In other to articulate the essence of this paper, therefore, the need for the use of an academic
amplifier becomes inevitable. Si
nce the independent variables - US and Iran –
this paper do not share a geographical border (to warrant border conflict and the attendant need
to protect an interest which may be defined in relations to protection of territorial integrity
do they, symmetrically, compete for economic hegemony either on regional or global scale, the
only rational explanation to their conflict should be centred around “interest defined in terms of
power”. Incidentally, however, the main thrust of the th
eory of political realism is “interest
defined in terms of power” (Morgenthau, 1978). Interest, viewed from either of the divides, can
be defined in terms of “lust” for un
-
parallel military, political, and economic power at global
d to maintain the same, in one hand; and the “lust” for regional power
status or at least the need or desire to lead the Islamic world, on the other hand. These two, rather
crisscrossing, interests meet and clash as the US prioritizes the leadership of
when Iran aligns and identifies with Russian federation and China.
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consecutive decades and in latter’s case, Obama advised Gadhafi to step aside. Although there is
ng examples of several other
US is still maintaining the status quo. The
second lesson, which is rather instructive, revealing and germane, is that the Shiite minority
reedom and Justice Party (FJP) had formed government in
Egypt and, possibly, the situations in Yemen and Syria. The Third and Fourth lessons being; the
strengthening of Arab League as evidenced in its role in regional conflict resolutions and
isation of the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The Fifth lesson is the
“Arab Spring pro
-democracy”
democracy movement leaders were not prepared to take over the ma
ntle of
leadership; and emergence of “justice” as “a top demand” were identified as the Sixth and
revolution/spring proved to vey high;
n child of what transpired in Iraq
In other to articulate the essence of this paper, therefore, the need for the use of an academic
in the context of
this paper do not share a geographical border (to warrant border conflict and the attendant need
to protect an interest which may be defined in relations to protection of territorial integrity
), nor
do they, symmetrically, compete for economic hegemony either on regional or global scale, the
only rational explanation to their conflict should be centred around “interest defined in terms of
eory of political realism is “interest
defined in terms of power” (Morgenthau, 1978). Interest, viewed from either of the divides, can
parallel military, political, and economic power at global
d to maintain the same, in one hand; and the “lust” for regional power
status or at least the need or desire to lead the Islamic world, on the other hand. These two, rather
crisscrossing, interests meet and clash as the US prioritizes the leadership of
another state(s)

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(1) An Overview of the us-
Iran
And after 1979
Revolution
From the CIA-
orchestrated overthrow of the Iran’s Prime Minister in 1953” writes
BBC.Com
(2014) “to a phone call between Presidents Obama and Rouhani and possibly
direct talks on Iraqi’s security” to current confrontations between US and Iran, perspectives
on war (though indirect) and peace (as necessitated by “Iran (and) six world powers
Ge
rmany, France, the United Kingdom, Russia Chin
(Mousavian&Mousavian, 2018) are discernible from the bilateral relations between the two.
The self-
styled international Police (Cartley, 2017) and “goddess of liberty” (Palmer and
Perkin
s, 2010) and her best ally, the UK facilitated a military coup that unseat the
democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq and restored full political
powers to the Shah. Although BBC, a UK state agency, is conspicuously silent on the role of
t
he Kingdom’s intelligence agency
CIA’s role claiming that the “agency’s documents
coup” that terminated what the two preach. However, the factually established involv
of CIA and of the Kingdom’s spy apparatus in the orchestration of the Persian coup d’état
points to the extent to which powerful states (having appropriated the major ingredient of
international politics –
power to dictate to others) could go in prop
or norms and extending their interests which are defined in terms of civilisation and or
abasing the same culture and norms by defining it in term of roughness. Just a year earlier, in
his attempt to amplify the third item of his
(1978, p.4-15), asserts thus:
Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective
category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a
meaning that i
s fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the
essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place.
Thucydides' statement, born of the experiences of
"identity of interests is the surest of bon
individuals" was taken up in the nineteenth century by Lord Salisbury's
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Iran
Relations before
Revolution
orchestrated overthrow of the Iran’s Prime Minister in 1953” writes
(2014) “to a phone call between Presidents Obama and Rouhani and possibly
direct talks on Iraqi’s security” to current confrontations between US and Iran, perspectives
on war (though indirect) and peace (as necessitated by “Iran (and) six world powers
rmany, France, the United Kingdom, Russia Chin
a and the United States
(Mousavian&Mousavian, 2018) are discernible from the bilateral relations between the two.
styled international Police (Cartley, 2017) and “goddess of liberty” (Palmer and
s, 2010) and her best ally, the UK facilitated a military coup that unseat the
democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq and restored full political
powers to the Shah. Although BBC, a UK state agency, is conspicuously silent on the role of
he Kingdom’s intelligence agency
– a co-plotter (ALJAZEERA, 2009) –
and emphasises on
CIA’s role claiming that the “agency’s documents
acknowledged its
role in Iran’s 1953
coup” that terminated what the two preach. However, the factually established involv
of CIA and of the Kingdom’s spy apparatus in the orchestration of the Persian coup d’état
points to the extent to which powerful states (having appropriated the major ingredient of
power to dictate to others) could go in prop
agating their culture and
or norms and extending their interests which are defined in terms of civilisation and or
abasing the same culture and norms by defining it in term of roughness. Just a year earlier, in
his attempt to amplify the third item of his
six principles of political realism, Morgenthau
Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective
category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a
s fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the
essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place.
Thucydides' statement, born of the experiences of
ancient Greece, that
"identity of interests is the surest of bon
ds whether between states or
individuals" was taken up in the nineteenth century by Lord Salisbury's
P a g e
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orchestrated overthrow of the Iran’s Prime Minister in 1953” writes
(2014) “to a phone call between Presidents Obama and Rouhani and possibly
direct talks on Iraqi’s security” to current confrontations between US and Iran, perspectives
on war (though indirect) and peace (as necessitated by “Iran (and) six world powers
–
a and the United States
(Mousavian&Mousavian, 2018) are discernible from the bilateral relations between the two.
styled international Police (Cartley, 2017) and “goddess of liberty” (Palmer and
s, 2010) and her best ally, the UK facilitated a military coup that unseat the
democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq and restored full political
powers to the Shah. Although BBC, a UK state agency, is conspicuously silent on the role of
and emphasises on
role in Iran’s 1953
coup” that terminated what the two preach. However, the factually established involv
ement
of CIA and of the Kingdom’s spy apparatus in the orchestration of the Persian coup d’état
points to the extent to which powerful states (having appropriated the major ingredient of
agating their culture and
or norms and extending their interests which are defined in terms of civilisation and or
abasing the same culture and norms by defining it in term of roughness. Just a year earlier, in
six principles of political realism, Morgenthau
Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective
category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a
s fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the
essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place.
ancient Greece, that
ds whether between states or
individuals" was taken up in the nineteenth century by Lord Salisbury's

African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)
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remark that "the only bond of union that endures" among nations is "the
absence of all clashing interests.
Also, Morgenthau (1965,P.192) in Ochim (2011,
Men and women are by nature political animals: they are born to pursue power
and the fruits of power. He speaks of ‘animus dominsndi’ i.e the human ‘lust’ for
power. The quest for power dictates a search not only for relative advantage
also for secure political space within to maintain oneself and exert considerable
influence, free from the dictates of others
Eventually, the human ‘animus dominandi’ inevitably brings men and women into conflict with
each other, that ultimately cr
eates conditions of power politics
theoretical exposition clearly explicates the variables surrounding the Iran
The US and UK action in Iran clearly buttresses Morgenthau’s submission as the action has
succeeded
in culturing us to believe that it is not democracy, in itself, that the western powers are
trying to sell to the other parts of the globe. What they want is, actually, using democracy to
achieve their interests. A state can practice any form of governmen
so far
as it opens off its economic bo
non-
democratic and authoritarian state, that transacts lucrative business with the former benign
hegemon, can do everything to its
This submission is anchored by the way US handle’s Saudi’s “role in Yemen’s catastrophic civil
war” (Hannah, 2019).
US, Iran, and Israel, before the coup d’état and the attendant revolution
an Islamic Republic, were tri-
la
alliance, opine Parham and Kraemer (2015), necessitated “counter
unexpected corollaries. First, the d
enviable majority in the region as the US and Israel choose to align with and empower Shiite
minority that nurse the ambition of ruling the Sunni majority Muslim world and, above all, the
regional
disintegration. The duo, however, assert that while the trilateral relation lasts, it was
noteworthy in the following pragmatic aspects:
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remark that "the only bond of union that endures" among nations is "the
absence of all clashing interests.
Also, Morgenthau (1965,P.192) in Ochim (2011,
p.108) asserts thus:
Men and women are by nature political animals: they are born to pursue power
and the fruits of power. He speaks of ‘animus dominsndi’ i.e the human ‘lust’ for
power. The quest for power dictates a search not only for relative advantage
also for secure political space within to maintain oneself and exert considerable
influence, free from the dictates of others
Eventually, the human ‘animus dominandi’ inevitably brings men and women into conflict with
eates conditions of power politics
’(
in Ochim 2011, p.108). this
theoretical exposition clearly explicates the variables surrounding the Iran
-
US relations.
The US and UK action in Iran clearly buttresses Morgenthau’s submission as the action has
in culturing us to believe that it is not democracy, in itself, that the western powers are
trying to sell to the other parts of the globe. What they want is, actually, using democracy to
achieve their interests. A state can practice any form of governmen
t and still become US friend
as it opens off its economic bo
rders for US firms to operate freely (Aljazeera, 2019). A
democratic and authoritarian state, that transacts lucrative business with the former benign
hegemon, can do everything to its
citizens, as well as to other sovereign states and still go free.
This submission is anchored by the way US handle’s Saudi’s “role in Yemen’s catastrophic civil
US, Iran, and Israel, before the coup d’état and the attendant revolution
that transformed Iran into
la
teral allies that dominate the Middle-E
ast affairs. The trilateral
alliance, opine Parham and Kraemer (2015), necessitated “counter
-
natural” shifts loaded with
unexpected corollaries. First, the d
iscontent and suspicion from the Sunni Muslims that are of
enviable majority in the region as the US and Israel choose to align with and empower Shiite
minority that nurse the ambition of ruling the Sunni majority Muslim world and, above all, the
disintegration. The duo, however, assert that while the trilateral relation lasts, it was
noteworthy in the following pragmatic aspects:
P a g e
| 516
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remark that "the only bond of union that endures" among nations is "the
Men and women are by nature political animals: they are born to pursue power
and the fruits of power. He speaks of ‘animus dominsndi’ i.e the human ‘lust’ for
power. The quest for power dictates a search not only for relative advantage
, but
also for secure political space within to maintain oneself and exert considerable
Eventually, the human ‘animus dominandi’ inevitably brings men and women into conflict with
in Ochim 2011, p.108). this
US relations.
The US and UK action in Iran clearly buttresses Morgenthau’s submission as the action has
in culturing us to believe that it is not democracy, in itself, that the western powers are
trying to sell to the other parts of the globe. What they want is, actually, using democracy to
t and still become US friend
rders for US firms to operate freely (Aljazeera, 2019). A
democratic and authoritarian state, that transacts lucrative business with the former benign
citizens, as well as to other sovereign states and still go free.
This submission is anchored by the way US handle’s Saudi’s “role in Yemen’s catastrophic civil
that transformed Iran into
ast affairs. The trilateral
natural” shifts loaded with
iscontent and suspicion from the Sunni Muslims that are of
enviable majority in the region as the US and Israel choose to align with and empower Shiite
minority that nurse the ambition of ruling the Sunni majority Muslim world and, above all, the
disintegration. The duo, however, assert that while the trilateral relation lasts, it was

African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)
16(1) (June, 2023):509-530 p-
ISSN: 2787
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i.
US and Iran concerns of soviet expansion into the middle
straddling a region bridging the As
ii.
The multitude of US business interests entrenched in Iran, especially in its
petroleum and arms industries;
iii.
Iran’s pivotal position in Israeli “alliance of the periphery”, firmly coupled with
US concerns for both countries;
iv. The non-
Arab cultural, linguistic, and historic Judeo and Persian national
identities distinct in an otherwise predominantly Sunni
v.
Common energy interests as Iran became the near
Israel, as well as those in comme
Discernible from the above
are: The shared protective interests against the then expansionist
Soviet; US had multiple interests in Iran; the Israeli need for a periphery as an ally in the Muslim
dominated region; and Iran was once a major oil supplier to Israel and also a major reg
market for Israeli goods and services. On the significance of the quoted items, as promoted by
Parham and Kraemer (2015), while the first item common “concern of Soviet expansion” could
hold water as of significance to all, levelling the second item
sided as it favours only the US
positioned the “alliance of the periphery” under the rubric of the merits of the trilateral relations.
This is so as while the Isra
eli interest was, and still, is to have a regional power as its periphery
ally, Iran also needed, and still needs, a nearby power with stronger international connections as
an ally. If this, a rather idealistic assumption, were to materialise, the internat
emanating from middle-
east would have been reduced from a tripartite dimension of Sunni
Shiite – Israeli-Iran – Arabs-
Israeli, on one side, to a single dimension of Arabs
interests in the middle-
east, on the other side. Then
Iran relations impact positively on international peace.
Apart from the significance and or otherwise of the forenamed dynamics of the Gulf, this piece
also observes that, the issues have
that Iran and Israel -
the major US ally in the middle
formidable alliance due to their similarities (see item four: Judeo and Persian national identities).
A realist visage of
the situation tends to service a rather diametric conclusion. The latter’s
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US and Iran concerns of soviet expansion into the middle
-
east, with Iran securely
straddling a region bridging the As
ia minor to the Indian Ocean;
The multitude of US business interests entrenched in Iran, especially in its
petroleum and arms industries;
Iran’s pivotal position in Israeli “alliance of the periphery”, firmly coupled with
US concerns for both countries;
Arab cultural, linguistic, and historic Judeo and Persian national
identities distinct in an otherwise predominantly Sunni
-
Arab region; (and)
Common energy interests as Iran became the near
-
exclusive oil provider for
Israel, as well as those in comme
rce, the military, and intelligence.
are: The shared protective interests against the then expansionist
Soviet; US had multiple interests in Iran; the Israeli need for a periphery as an ally in the Muslim
dominated region; and Iran was once a major oil supplier to Israel and also a major reg
market for Israeli goods and services. On the significance of the quoted items, as promoted by
Parham and Kraemer (2015), while the first item common “concern of Soviet expansion” could
hold water as of significance to all, levelling the second item
as “significant” tends to be one
sided as it favours only the US
-
Israeli side. On the third item, the two were right to have
positioned the “alliance of the periphery” under the rubric of the merits of the trilateral relations.
eli interest was, and still, is to have a regional power as its periphery
ally, Iran also needed, and still needs, a nearby power with stronger international connections as
an ally. If this, a rather idealistic assumption, were to materialise, the internat
east would have been reduced from a tripartite dimension of Sunni
Israeli, on one side, to a single dimension of Arabs
east, on the other side. Then
ceforth, scholars will conclude that the US
Iran relations impact positively on international peace.
Apart from the significance and or otherwise of the forenamed dynamics of the Gulf, this piece
also observes that, the issues have
a combined potentiality
of conditioning an idealist to conclude
the major US ally in the middle
-east -
would, in the near future form a
formidable alliance due to their similarities (see item four: Judeo and Persian national identities).
the situation tends to service a rather diametric conclusion. The latter’s
P a g e
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east, with Iran securely
The multitude of US business interests entrenched in Iran, especially in its
Iran’s pivotal position in Israeli “alliance of the periphery”, firmly coupled with
Arab cultural, linguistic, and historic Judeo and Persian national
Arab region; (and)
exclusive oil provider for
rce, the military, and intelligence.
are: The shared protective interests against the then expansionist
Soviet; US had multiple interests in Iran; the Israeli need for a periphery as an ally in the Muslim
dominated region; and Iran was once a major oil supplier to Israel and also a major reg
ional
market for Israeli goods and services. On the significance of the quoted items, as promoted by
Parham and Kraemer (2015), while the first item common “concern of Soviet expansion” could
as “significant” tends to be one
Israeli side. On the third item, the two were right to have
positioned the “alliance of the periphery” under the rubric of the merits of the trilateral relations.
eli interest was, and still, is to have a regional power as its periphery
ally, Iran also needed, and still needs, a nearby power with stronger international connections as
an ally. If this, a rather idealistic assumption, were to materialise, the internat
ional tensions
east would have been reduced from a tripartite dimension of Sunni
-
Israeli, on one side, to a single dimension of Arabs
-Israeli clash of
ceforth, scholars will conclude that the US
-
Apart from the significance and or otherwise of the forenamed dynamics of the Gulf, this piece
of conditioning an idealist to conclude
would, in the near future form a
formidable alliance due to their similarities (see item four: Judeo and Persian national identities).
the situation tends to service a rather diametric conclusion. The latter’s

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assumption enjoys an ability to stand the test of rationality if we take into cognisance, the
following arguments: the two countries are aspiring (in an otherwise manner) to lead t
in terms of technological and military capabilities with Israel having an edge over Iran and is
determined to maintain and expand the lead; the Khomeinists show no sign of reneging or
backing out (El-
Ghobashy& Sly, 2019) on achieving their nation
overtaking Israel -
, the Zionists , with the support of the west would certainly do everything
possible (including enlisting the support of the Sunni majority through US
maintain the status quo. In a nutshe
renege, in the foreseeable future, on its mission to be top of issues in the region. This takes us
back to Morgenthau’s assertion that “the only bond of union that endures ‘among nations is’ the
abs
ence of all clashing interests”
alliance is the religious extremity. The Jews considers all but themselves as second class and
unfavoured children of God (Pet therapy, n.d.) in relation to the Sh
kind of hypocrisy allowed in their religion” (Global Security, 2019) renders the situation akin to
that of the two proverbial bulls that will always find it difficult to drink, at the same time, in the
same bucket; Also see
ms to support the latter submission is the Sunni Shiite dichotomy that
always a
vails itself to offer a myriad o
Back to the significance of the trilateral relations, as argued by Parham and Kraemer (2015),
item four has been
addressed by Morgenthau’s submission that the only alliance that
ingredients of endurance is
that surrounded
exclusive oil provider for Israel”, the assumption cannot hold water as there a
west-
friendly states in the Gulf now than ever before. While extant literature proves to be
insensitive of pre-
Mossadeq Iran
relationship point to a bleak picture of this bilateral
presentation of the relations looks thus:
Table 001: Selected incidents in US
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assumption enjoys an ability to stand the test of rationality if we take into cognisance, the
following arguments: the two countries are aspiring (in an otherwise manner) to lead t
in terms of technological and military capabilities with Israel having an edge over Iran and is
determined to maintain and expand the lead; the Khomeinists show no sign of reneging or
Ghobashy& Sly, 2019) on achieving their nation
al interests –
defined in terms of
, the Zionists , with the support of the west would certainly do everything
possible (including enlisting the support of the Sunni majority through US
maintain the status quo. In a nutshe
ll, neither Iran nor Israel, as sovereign States, seems to
renege, in the foreseeable future, on its mission to be top of issues in the region. This takes us
back to Morgenthau’s assertion that “the only bond of union that endures ‘among nations is’ the
ence of all clashing interests”
.
Another indicator to the unlikelihood of Iran
alliance is the religious extremity. The Jews considers all but themselves as second class and
unfavoured children of God (Pet therapy, n.d.) in relation to the Sh
iites’ doctrine of “Taqiyya” “a
kind of hypocrisy allowed in their religion” (Global Security, 2019) renders the situation akin to
that of the two proverbial bulls that will always find it difficult to drink, at the same time, in the
ms to support the latter submission is the Sunni Shiite dichotomy that
vails itself to offer a myriad o
f alternatives to US and Israel.
Back to the significance of the trilateral relations, as argued by Parham and Kraemer (2015),
addressed by Morgenthau’s submission that the only alliance that
that surrounded
by dearth of clashing interests. On the issue of “near
exclusive oil provider for Israel”, the assumption cannot hold water as there a
friendly states in the Gulf now than ever before. While extant literature proves to be
Mossadeq Iran
-
US relations, a large volume of literature on the countries’
relationship point to a bleak picture of this bilateral
relation from 1951 to date. A tabula
presentation of the relations looks thus:
Table 001: Selected incidents in US
-IRAN Relations from 1951 to 2019
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assumption enjoys an ability to stand the test of rationality if we take into cognisance, the
following arguments: the two countries are aspiring (in an otherwise manner) to lead t
he region
in terms of technological and military capabilities with Israel having an edge over Iran and is
determined to maintain and expand the lead; the Khomeinists show no sign of reneging or
defined in terms of
, the Zionists , with the support of the west would certainly do everything
possible (including enlisting the support of the Sunni majority through US
-Saudi ties) to
ll, neither Iran nor Israel, as sovereign States, seems to
renege, in the foreseeable future, on its mission to be top of issues in the region. This takes us
back to Morgenthau’s assertion that “the only bond of union that endures ‘among nations is’ the
Another indicator to the unlikelihood of Iran
-Israeli holy
alliance is the religious extremity. The Jews considers all but themselves as second class and
iites’ doctrine of “Taqiyya” “a
kind of hypocrisy allowed in their religion” (Global Security, 2019) renders the situation akin to
that of the two proverbial bulls that will always find it difficult to drink, at the same time, in the
ms to support the latter submission is the Sunni Shiite dichotomy that
Back to the significance of the trilateral relations, as argued by Parham and Kraemer (2015),
addressed by Morgenthau’s submission that the only alliance that
possess the
by dearth of clashing interests. On the issue of “near
exclusive oil provider for Israel”, the assumption cannot hold water as there a
re pro-west or
friendly states in the Gulf now than ever before. While extant literature proves to be
US relations, a large volume of literature on the countries’
relation from 1951 to date. A tabula

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S/N YEAR/MOTH ISSUE
1.
1951 A statist Mohammed was nominated and elected, by the members of the
lower chamber of Iranian parliament as Prime Minister (PM). He
immediately nationalised Iranian oil company, an action that set him
against the west.
2.
1952 The Shah refused to allow the PM to appoint some of his elected cabinet
members, an issue that led to the PM’s resignation. The PM’s resignation
resulted in a five days intense rioting and la
with no option than to reinstate the PM and concede to his demands.
Between this period and July, 1953, PM Mossadeq passed several reforms
that took awa Shah’s “unconstitutional powers”.
3. 1953 The US and UK intelligence agencies facilitated a military coup against the
PM, deposed him and restored powers to the Shah.
4. 1955 Iran became a signatory to Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) a US
ba
cked Baghdad pact and a facsimile of NATO which was convoked to
contain Soviet expansion.
5. 1964 A religious leader and ferocious critic of the Shah, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini was forced to exil
exile.
6. 1979 The US-
backed Shah was forced to flee to Egypt.
7.
1979 Khomeini returned from exile and grasped political power.
8.
1979 Iran was proclaimed Islamic Republic under Theocratic Guardianship and
terminates its membership of the US
9.
1980 Iranian students took 63 US citizens into hostage at the US embassy in Tehran
and demanded the extradition of Shah to Ira. This, forces US to, unilaterally,
impose sanctions on Iran.
10. 1981 US-
backed Iraq under Saddam Hussein invaded Iran. An action that led to a
close to eight (8) years war.
11.
1958 /1956 Few hours after former US President Jimmy Carter left office, the
remaining 52 hostages, having spent 444 days in captivity,
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S/N YEAR/MOTH ISSUE
1951 A statist Mohammed was nominated and elected, by the members of the
lower chamber of Iranian parliament as Prime Minister (PM). He
immediately nationalised Iranian oil company, an action that set him
against the west.
1952 The Shah refused to allow the PM to appoint some of his elected cabinet
members, an issue that led to the PM’s resignation. The PM’s resignation
resulted in a five days intense rioting and la
wlessness leaving the Shah
with no option than to reinstate the PM and concede to his demands.
Between this period and July, 1953, PM Mossadeq passed several reforms
that took awa Shah’s “unconstitutional powers”.
3. 1953 The US and UK intelligence agencies facilitated a military coup against the
PM, deposed him and restored powers to the Shah.
4. 1955 Iran became a signatory to Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) a US
cked Baghdad pact and a facsimile of NATO which was convoked to
contain Soviet expansion.
5. 1964 A religious leader and ferocious critic of the Shah, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini was forced to exil
e in the neighbouring Iraq. He
spent 14 years in
backed Shah was forced to flee to Egypt.
1979 Khomeini returned from exile and grasped political power.
1979 Iran was proclaimed Islamic Republic under Theocratic Guardianship and
terminates its membership of the US
-Sponsored CENTO.
1980 Iranian students took 63 US citizens into hostage at the US embassy in Tehran
and demanded the extradition of Shah to Ira. This, forces US to, unilaterally,
impose sanctions on Iran.
backed Iraq under Saddam Hussein invaded Iran. An action that led to a
close to eight (8) years war.
1958 /1956 Few hours after former US President Jimmy Carter left office, the
remaining 52 hostages, having spent 444 days in captivity,
P a g e
| 519
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1951 A statist Mohammed was nominated and elected, by the members of the
lower chamber of Iranian parliament as Prime Minister (PM). He
immediately nationalised Iranian oil company, an action that set him
1952 The Shah refused to allow the PM to appoint some of his elected cabinet
members, an issue that led to the PM’s resignation. The PM’s resignation
wlessness leaving the Shah
Between this period and July, 1953, PM Mossadeq passed several reforms
3. 1953 The US and UK intelligence agencies facilitated a military coup against the
4. 1955 Iran became a signatory to Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) a US
-
cked Baghdad pact and a facsimile of NATO which was convoked to
5. 1964 A religious leader and ferocious critic of the Shah, Ayatollah Ruhollah
spent 14 years in
1979 Iran was proclaimed Islamic Republic under Theocratic Guardianship and
1980 Iranian students took 63 US citizens into hostage at the US embassy in Tehran
and demanded the extradition of Shah to Ira. This, forces US to, unilaterally,
backed Iraq under Saddam Hussein invaded Iran. An action that led to a
1958 /1956 Few hours after former US President Jimmy Carter left office, the

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were released.
12.
1985 US, via Israel, sold weapons to Iran in exchange for Iranian facilitation in
freeing US hostages from Hezbollah. The transaction which violates terms
and co
nditions of the November 1979 sanctions was without the approval
of the congress, hence it became illegal. The illegally raised funds were
use by the White House to sponsor Nicaraguan rebels
term “Iran-
Contra scandal”.
14. 2019 Iran threatens to resume work on Uranium enrichment.
Source: Aljazeera,(Retrieved) 10thJune, 2019
(2) Us-
Iran Relations: Measuring Military
Capabilities
Research shows that there are several and, perhaps, conflicting standards and
measuring military capability of a state (Giegerich, Childs & Hackett, 2018; GEF, 2019
2018; & Reuters, 2019).
The structure of the force, level of modernisation, the degree of
readiness of individual units, and extent to which the enem
are some of the required efforts a state is expected to, persistently, put in place for measuring of
its armed forces in relation to its enemy (Dunn, 2014). Generally, the measures are, mainly,
“input measures” that tak
es into cognisance what goes into the making of an effective national
military capability and how such effectiveness can be compared across countries in “a
comparative-
static sense without” doing any military balance analysis or pretending that it can
explain how any given “force-
on
criterion is the “output measures” which considers the amount of resources a national military
receives in form of defence budget translate the same into “war fightin
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1985 US, via Israel, sold weapons to Iran in exchange for Iranian facilitation in
freeing US hostages from Hezbollah. The transaction which violates terms
nditions of the November 1979 sanctions was without the approval
of the congress, hence it became illegal. The illegally raised funds were
use by the White House to sponsor Nicaraguan rebels
–
Contra. Hence the
Contra scandal”.
14. 2019 Iran threatens to resume work on Uranium enrichment.
Source: Aljazeera,(Retrieved) 10thJune, 2019
Iran Relations: Measuring Military
Research shows that there are several and, perhaps, conflicting standards and
measuring military capability of a state (Giegerich, Childs & Hackett, 2018; GEF, 2019
The structure of the force, level of modernisation, the degree of
readiness of individual units, and extent to which the enem
ies’ armies can sustain an onslaught
are some of the required efforts a state is expected to, persistently, put in place for measuring of
its armed forces in relation to its enemy (Dunn, 2014). Generally, the measures are, mainly,
es into cognisance what goes into the making of an effective national
military capability and how such effectiveness can be compared across countries in “a
static sense without” doing any military balance analysis or pretending that it can
on
-
force” encounters will actually turn out in practice. Another
criterion is the “output measures” which considers the amount of resources a national military
receives in form of defence budget translate the same into “war fightin
g capabilities” (Pet
P a g e
| 520
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1985 US, via Israel, sold weapons to Iran in exchange for Iranian facilitation in
freeing US hostages from Hezbollah. The transaction which violates terms
nditions of the November 1979 sanctions was without the approval
of the congress, hence it became illegal. The illegally raised funds were
Contra. Hence the
Research shows that there are several and, perhaps, conflicting standards and
criteria for
measuring military capability of a state (Giegerich, Childs & Hackett, 2018; GEF, 2019
; WEF,
The structure of the force, level of modernisation, the degree of
ies’ armies can sustain an onslaught
are some of the required efforts a state is expected to, persistently, put in place for measuring of
its armed forces in relation to its enemy (Dunn, 2014). Generally, the measures are, mainly,
es into cognisance what goes into the making of an effective national
military capability and how such effectiveness can be compared across countries in “a
static sense without” doing any military balance analysis or pretending that it can
force” encounters will actually turn out in practice. Another
criterion is the “output measures” which considers the amount of resources a national military
g capabilities” (Pet

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therapy, n.d.). Thus, the following tabulations potent the capability to guide us to measure the
milita
ry capabilities of US and Iran:
Table 002: General indices / capabilities
S/N. SUBJECT IRAN
1.
GFP Rank 14 of 137 1 of 137
2. Total Population 83,024,745 329,256,465
3. Manpower
Availability 47,324,105 144,872,845
4. Fit-for-
Service 39,842,164 199,664,970
5. Reaching Military Age 1,394,476
6. Active Personnel 523,000 1,281,900
7. Reserved Component 350,000 860,000
8. Total Military Personne
l 873,000 2,141,9000
9. Defence Budget 6,300,000,000 (US$) 716,000,000,000 (US$)
10. External Dept 7,995,000,000 (US$) 17,910,000,000,000
11. Foreign Reserve 120,600,000,000 (US$) 123,300,000,000 (US$)
12. Purchasing Power 1,757,500,000,000 (US$) 19,850,000,000,000 (US$)
Source: GFP, Strength in numbers, 12
Table 003: Air Force Capabilities
S./N. SUBJECT IRAN US
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therapy, n.d.). Thus, the following tabulations potent the capability to guide us to measure the
ry capabilities of US and Iran:
Table 002: General indices / capabilities
S/N. SUBJECT IRAN
US
GFP Rank 14 of 137 1 of 137
2. Total Population 83,024,745 329,256,465
Availability 47,324,105 144,872,845
Service 39,842,164 199,664,970
5. Reaching Military Age 1,394,476
4,188,274
6. Active Personnel 523,000 1,281,900
7. Reserved Component 350,000 860,000
l 873,000 2,141,9000
9. Defence Budget 6,300,000,000 (US$) 716,000,000,000 (US$)
10. External Dept 7,995,000,000 (US$) 17,910,000,000,000
11. Foreign Reserve 120,600,000,000 (US$) 123,300,000,000 (US$)
12. Purchasing Power 1,757,500,000,000 (US$) 19,850,000,000,000 (US$)
Source: GFP, Strength in numbers, 12
th Jun, 2019
Table 003: Air Force Capabilities
S./N. SUBJECT IRAN US
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therapy, n.d.). Thus, the following tabulations potent the capability to guide us to measure the
2. Total Population 83,024,745 329,256,465
Availability 47,324,105 144,872,845
Service 39,842,164 199,664,970
l 873,000 2,141,9000
9. Defence Budget 6,300,000,000 (US$) 716,000,000,000 (US$)
10. External Dept 7,995,000,000 (US$) 17,910,000,000,000
(US$)
11. Foreign Reserve 120,600,000,000 (US$) 123,300,000,000 (US$)
12. Purchasing Power 1,757,500,000,000 (US$) 19,850,000,000,000 (US$)

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1.
Total Aircrafts 509 13,398
2. Fighters / Inte
rceptors 142 2,362
3.
Attack Aircraft 165 2,831
4.
Transporters 89 1,153
5.
Trainers 104 2,853
6.
Helicopters 126 5,760
7.
Attack Helicopters 12
8.
Serviceable Airports 319 13,513
Source: GFP, Strength in Numbers, 12
Table 004: Ground Forces Capabilities.
S./N. SUBJECT
1.
Tank Strength 16,34 6,287
2.
Armoured Fighting Vehicles 2,345 39,223
3. Self-
Propelled Artillery 570 992
4.
Towed Artillery 2,128 864
5.
Rocket Projectors 1,900
Source: GFP, Strength in numbers, 12
Table 005: Naval capabilities
S./N. Total Naval Capabilities 398 415
1.
Aircraft Carriers 0 24
2.
Submarines 34 68
3.
Frigates
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Total Aircrafts 509 13,398
rceptors 142 2,362
Attack Aircraft 165 2,831
Transporters 89 1,153
Trainers 104 2,853
Helicopters 126 5,760
Attack Helicopters 12
971
Serviceable Airports 319 13,513
Source: GFP, Strength in Numbers, 12
th Jun, 2019
Table 004: Ground Forces Capabilities.
S./N. SUBJECT
IRAN US
Tank Strength 16,34 6,287
Armoured Fighting Vehicles 2,345 39,223
Propelled Artillery 570 992
Towed Artillery 2,128 864
Rocket Projectors 1,900
11,056
Source: GFP, Strength in numbers, 12
th Jun, 2019
S./N. Total Naval Capabilities 398 415
Aircraft Carriers 0 24
Submarines 34 68
Frigates
6 22
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S./N. Total Naval Capabilities 398 415

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4.
Destroyers 0 68
5.
Corvettes 3 15
6.
Patrol Crafts 88 13
7.
Mine Warfare Craft 3 11
8.
Merchant Ports Strength 739
9.
Major Ports & Terminals 3 33
Source: GFP, Strength in numbers, 12
Table 006: Other capabilities
S./N. SUBJECT
Labour Force Strength 30,500,000 160,400,000
Oil Production (Barrels/day) 4,469,000 9,352,000
Oil Consumption ((Barrels/day) 1,870,000
Proven Oil Reserve (Barrels) 158,400,000,000 36,520,000,000
Roadway Coverage (Km) 172,927 6,586,610
1.
Railway Coverage (Km) 8,442
2.
Waterway Coverage (Km) 850 41,009
3.
Coastline Coverage (Km) 2,440 19,924
4.
Shared Boarders (Km) 5,894 12,048
5. Square Lan
d Area (Km) 1,648,195 9,826,675
Source: GFP, Strength in Numbers, 12
These tabulations are lacking in nuclear capabilities of the countries in question. However,
Palmer and Perkins (2010, p 738
globally. Russian Federation and UK are the second and third most senior “members of the
nuclear club”. In essence the August 6
“dropped a single bo
mb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima”, signals the inception of another pace
of strategic thought. The single dropped claimed and or wounded “some 150,000” lives and
decimated almost 755% of the total buildings in the city. This Japanese incident, in parti
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Destroyers 0 68
Corvettes 3 15
Patrol Crafts 88 13
Mine Warfare Craft 3 11
Merchant Ports Strength 739
3,611
Major Ports & Terminals 3 33
Source: GFP, Strength in numbers, 12
th Jun, 2019.
S./N. SUBJECT
IRAN US
Labour Force Strength 30,500,000 160,400,000
Oil Production (Barrels/day) 4,469,000 9,352,000
Oil Consumption ((Barrels/day) 1,870,000
19,000,000
Proven Oil Reserve (Barrels) 158,400,000,000 36,520,000,000
Roadway Coverage (Km) 172,927 6,586,610
Railway Coverage (Km) 8,442
224,792
Waterway Coverage (Km) 850 41,009
Coastline Coverage (Km) 2,440 19,924
Shared Boarders (Km) 5,894 12,048
d Area (Km) 1,648,195 9,826,675
Source: GFP, Strength in Numbers, 12
th Jun, 2019.
These tabulations are lacking in nuclear capabilities of the countries in question. However,
Palmer and Perkins (2010, p 738
-762)
assert that US posses highest number of nuclear warheads
globally. Russian Federation and UK are the second and third most senior “members of the
nuclear club”. In essence the August 6
th, 1945 incident where a US B-
29 military aircraft
mb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima”, signals the inception of another pace
of strategic thought. The single dropped claimed and or wounded “some 150,000” lives and
decimated almost 755% of the total buildings in the city. This Japanese incident, in parti
P a g e
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3,611
These tabulations are lacking in nuclear capabilities of the countries in question. However,
assert that US posses highest number of nuclear warheads
globally. Russian Federation and UK are the second and third most senior “members of the
29 military aircraft
mb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima”, signals the inception of another pace
of strategic thought. The single dropped claimed and or wounded “some 150,000” lives and
decimated almost 755% of the total buildings in the city. This Japanese incident, in parti
cular,

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and such other factors as economic hegemony and control of certain international regimes,
among others, earned the North American former UK colony a special in world affairs. Iran,
comparison, commands respect for it specialty in asymmetric and rath
warfare. The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) naval unit specialised in using unmanned
submarine craft to plant mines. In an event of war, and if IRGCN succeeded in planting such
mines, it will take US and other international p
years to demine the Sea (Ochmanek, et al.,2017).
(3)
THE IMPLICATIONS OF US
AND SECURITY
Having navigated, very briefly, the mentality behind the US behaviour in the
the centrality of Iran to US foreign policy, the US
2019, and compared the military and related capabilities of the two states, it is consequential to
assess the implications of the aforeme
of the security implications of US
of war between US and Iran can, with certainty, actuate clashes within Iraq. The influential
Muqt
ada Alsadar, a cleric that commands a deadly militia warned that an attempt to involve Iraqi
in any US-
Iran conflict will be viewed in terms of direct assault on the country. The political
situation in Iraq is “still defined by zero
Another implication of US-
Iran conflict on international peace is its ability to set, once again,
Washington on an impingement with Beijing, New Delhi, and Ankara and Japan and South
Korea. The trio are, at present, the major
sanctions (Gross, Hass, Madan, Maloney, &Feltman, 2019).
Again, the US-
Iran relations potent the ability to impact on international peace and security when
viewed from the opinion that Iran commands a
region. Ali Vaez, an Iran specialist with the
Iran using its “pretty strong hands” that, also, potent capabilities to “exact cost on US and its
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and such other factors as economic hegemony and control of certain international regimes,
among others, earned the North American former UK colony a special in world affairs. Iran,
comparison, commands respect for it specialty in asymmetric and rath
er unconventional naval
warfare. The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) naval unit specialised in using unmanned
submarine craft to plant mines. In an event of war, and if IRGCN succeeded in planting such
mines, it will take US and other international p
owers with commercial interest in the Gulf several
years to demine the Sea (Ochmanek, et al.,2017).
THE IMPLICATIONS OF US
-
IRAN RELATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Having navigated, very briefly, the mentality behind the US behaviour in the
comity of nations,
the centrality of Iran to US foreign policy, the US
-
Iran sweet and sour relationships from 1951 to
2019, and compared the military and related capabilities of the two states, it is consequential to
assess the implications of the aforeme
ntioned variables on international peace and security. One
of the security implications of US
-
Iran tension is its ability to “disrupt fragile peace”. An event
of war between US and Iran can, with certainty, actuate clashes within Iraq. The influential
ada Alsadar, a cleric that commands a deadly militia warned that an attempt to involve Iraqi
Iran conflict will be viewed in terms of direct assault on the country. The political
situation in Iraq is “still defined by zero
-sum, battle-for-surviva
l politics” (Alaaldin, 2019).
Iran conflict on international peace is its ability to set, once again,
Washington on an impingement with Beijing, New Delhi, and Ankara and Japan and South
Korea. The trio are, at present, the major
buyers of Iranian crude –
the sole target of US renewed
sanctions (Gross, Hass, Madan, Maloney, &Feltman, 2019).
Iran relations potent the ability to impact on international peace and security when
viewed from the opinion that Iran commands a
cluster hit organisation within the Middle
region. Ali Vaez, an Iran specialist with the
International Crisis Group
, hints at the possibility of
Iran using its “pretty strong hands” that, also, potent capabilities to “exact cost on US and its
P a g e
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and such other factors as economic hegemony and control of certain international regimes,
among others, earned the North American former UK colony a special in world affairs. Iran,
er unconventional naval
warfare. The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) naval unit specialised in using unmanned
submarine craft to plant mines. In an event of war, and if IRGCN succeeded in planting such
owers with commercial interest in the Gulf several
IRAN RELATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE
comity of nations,
Iran sweet and sour relationships from 1951 to
2019, and compared the military and related capabilities of the two states, it is consequential to
ntioned variables on international peace and security. One
Iran tension is its ability to “disrupt fragile peace”. An event
of war between US and Iran can, with certainty, actuate clashes within Iraq. The influential
ada Alsadar, a cleric that commands a deadly militia warned that an attempt to involve Iraqi
Iran conflict will be viewed in terms of direct assault on the country. The political
l politics” (Alaaldin, 2019).
Iran conflict on international peace is its ability to set, once again,
Washington on an impingement with Beijing, New Delhi, and Ankara and Japan and South
the sole target of US renewed
Iran relations potent the ability to impact on international peace and security when
cluster hit organisation within the Middle
-East
, hints at the possibility of
Iran using its “pretty strong hands” that, also, potent capabilities to “exact cost on US and its

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allies
in the region”. This piece, however, agrees with the above assertion. The damaging of the
Saudi and Emirati ships in the Gulf and the landing of a Katyasha rocket close to the vicinity of
US embassy in Baghdad which Iraqi officials blamed on one
militias in Iraq –
and to cap it all, the submission of a Lebanese based pro
that the “attacks were messages from Tehran” to Washington sent through the Abu Dhabi’s and
Riyadh’s “mailboxes” support the submissi
back by arming and aiding these groups, the implication on international peace is that, the Shiites
in Sunni-
ruled states will continue to strike, hence creating another dimension of conflicts in the
fragile region. Or, in another sense, a Libya
there is a high possibility of proliferation of light firearms to other relatively peaceful countries
around the globe.
The soured relationship has anothe
nations globally and the number of states that violate their responsibility to maintain nuclear
middle-
east from one to two. Historically, the Iranian nuclear programme started in 1957 when it
sig
ned an agreement with the US under Eisenhower’s “Atom for Peace” initiative. The US built
the Iranian first nuclear facility
reactor fuelled by “highly enriched uranium”. Between 2006 and 2010, thr
were imposed on Iran in an attempt to force the Persian state to abandon its nuclear programme.
Paradoxically, however, Iran uses the western impose hibernation and alienation during the
period to increase the capacity, volume, and c
increased the level of enrichment from the initial 5% to 20%; increased the stockpile from a “few
hundred” kg to 8,000 kg; and the number of centrifuges sky
point bein
g made is that, whenever Iran is under a sanction, the level of its nuclear programme
increased, and that the withdrawal of US from the JCPOA may only succeed in helping Iran to
consolidate on the programme. And if Iran succeeded in becoming a member of th
nuclear club, the number of countries that violated the provisions of Middle
Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) may, automatically raised from one (Israel) to two (Israel and Iran)
(Mousavian&Mousavian, 2017; Yee, 2019).
African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)
P a g e
ISSN: 2787
-0367;e-ISSN: 2787-0359
Copy Right: © Author (s)
https://www.ajpasebsu.org.ng/
https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajpas.v16i1.29
in the region”. This piece, however, agrees with the above assertion. The damaging of the
Saudi and Emirati ships in the Gulf and the landing of a Katyasha rocket close to the vicinity of
US embassy in Baghdad which Iraqi officials blamed on one
, the Irani
an hands
and to cap it all, the submission of a Lebanese based pro
-
Hezbollah newspaper
that the “attacks were messages from Tehran” to Washington sent through the Abu Dhabi’s and
Riyadh’s “mailboxes” support the submissi
ons (El-
Gobashy, et al., 2019). If Iran continues to hit
back by arming and aiding these groups, the implication on international peace is that, the Shiites
ruled states will continue to strike, hence creating another dimension of conflicts in the
fragile region. Or, in another sense, a Libya
-
Nigeria issue will recreate itself. This means that
there is a high possibility of proliferation of light firearms to other relatively peaceful countries
The soured relationship has anothe
r implication of moving-
up the number of nuclear armed
nations globally and the number of states that violate their responsibility to maintain nuclear
east from one to two. Historically, the Iranian nuclear programme started in 1957 when it
ned an agreement with the US under Eisenhower’s “Atom for Peace” initiative. The US built
the Iranian first nuclear facility
– Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) –
in 1967 with 5
reactor fuelled by “highly enriched uranium”. Between 2006 and 2010, thr
ee different sanctions
were imposed on Iran in an attempt to force the Persian state to abandon its nuclear programme.
Paradoxically, however, Iran uses the western impose hibernation and alienation during the
period to increase the capacity, volume, and c
entrifuge of its uranium enrichment. For instance, it
increased the level of enrichment from the initial 5% to 20%; increased the stockpile from a “few
hundred” kg to 8,000 kg; and the number of centrifuges sky
-
rocketed from 3,000 to 22,000. The
g made is that, whenever Iran is under a sanction, the level of its nuclear programme
increased, and that the withdrawal of US from the JCPOA may only succeed in helping Iran to
consolidate on the programme. And if Iran succeeded in becoming a member of th
nuclear club, the number of countries that violated the provisions of Middle
Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) may, automatically raised from one (Israel) to two (Israel and Iran)
(Mousavian&Mousavian, 2017; Yee, 2019).
P a g e
| 525
Copy Right: © Author (s)
in the region”. This piece, however, agrees with the above assertion. The damaging of the
Saudi and Emirati ships in the Gulf and the landing of a Katyasha rocket close to the vicinity of
an hands
– Iranian-backed
Hezbollah newspaper
that the “attacks were messages from Tehran” to Washington sent through the Abu Dhabi’s and
Gobashy, et al., 2019). If Iran continues to hit
back by arming and aiding these groups, the implication on international peace is that, the Shiites
ruled states will continue to strike, hence creating another dimension of conflicts in the
Nigeria issue will recreate itself. This means that
there is a high possibility of proliferation of light firearms to other relatively peaceful countries
up the number of nuclear armed
nations globally and the number of states that violate their responsibility to maintain nuclear
-free
east from one to two. Historically, the Iranian nuclear programme started in 1957 when it
ned an agreement with the US under Eisenhower’s “Atom for Peace” initiative. The US built
in 1967 with 5
-megawatts
ee different sanctions
were imposed on Iran in an attempt to force the Persian state to abandon its nuclear programme.
Paradoxically, however, Iran uses the western impose hibernation and alienation during the
entrifuge of its uranium enrichment. For instance, it
increased the level of enrichment from the initial 5% to 20%; increased the stockpile from a “few
rocketed from 3,000 to 22,000. The
g made is that, whenever Iran is under a sanction, the level of its nuclear programme
increased, and that the withdrawal of US from the JCPOA may only succeed in helping Iran to
consolidate on the programme. And if Iran succeeded in becoming a member of th
e global
nuclear club, the number of countries that violated the provisions of Middle
-East Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) may, automatically raised from one (Israel) to two (Israel and Iran)

African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)
16(1) (June, 2023):509-530 p-
ISSN: 2787
Available online at
https://www.ajpasebsu.org.ng/
https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajpas.v16i1.29
Conclusions
US-Iran conflict -
in relation to the latter’s nuclear enrichment policy
the longest conflicts of 21st
century. Spanning a period of two decades, the conflict defied
negotiation efforts during the first decade of its emergence (2003
unrelated to the static positions adopted by the direct parties
American state insists on its maximalist demand for zero uranium enrichment; zero centrifuges;
zero plutonium; and zero Intercontinental Con
the Persian state, on the other hand, insists on exercising its rights, as conferred by Article III
(1,2,3&4) of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The article empowers both nuclear and non
nuclear state si
gnatories to the treaty to enrich uranium for civil/non
this era of bilateral non-
compromise and regimes of sanctions, Iran had, successfully, built three
ICBMs: The Shaab-
2 (500 km) which can range to as far as Turkmenistan, Geor
Federation and more than half of Caspian Sea in Eastern Europe, parts of Turkey, Iraq, Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Afghanistan in middle
to Yemen, more than half of the Red Sea, parts of Egyp
of Turkey and Black Sea, parts of Ukraine, Russian Federation and India, the entire Uzbekistan,
Pakistan, Jordan, Syria, and a tip of Peoples Republic of China; Sajjil (2,000 km) with the
capacity of messaging Iranian
anger to the countries of Horn of Africa, Egypt, Ukraine, Russia,
China, and Sudan. The Imameeyah extremists were, also within the same scope of ten years, able
to move its nuclear programme to an alarming height.
Reversely, as evidenced, during the trium
necessitated by the 6 and 1 –
Persians copped out on their determination to join the nuclear club. This development,
understandably, was a result of
nuclear bomb”, after emergence of Barrack Obama and Hassan Rouhani as US and Iranian
Presidents respectively, and above all the US recognition of Iran rights under NPT.
From our discussion, so far
, it becomes factual that the US
and only became sour after Shah and revolutionists’ introduction of statist political economy
African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)
P a g e
ISSN: 2787
-0367;e-ISSN: 2787-0359
Copy Right: © Author (s)
https://www.ajpasebsu.org.ng/
https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajpas.v16i1.29
in relation to the latter’s nuclear enrichment policy
-
has proved to be one of
century. Spanning a period of two decades, the conflict defied
negotiation efforts during the first decade of its emergence (2003
-2013)
. The failure is not
unrelated to the static positions adopted by the direct parties
–
US and Iran. While the North
American state insists on its maximalist demand for zero uranium enrichment; zero centrifuges;
zero plutonium; and zero Intercontinental Con
tinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) development,
the Persian state, on the other hand, insists on exercising its rights, as conferred by Article III
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The article empowers both nuclear and non
gnatories to the treaty to enrich uranium for civil/non
-
military purposes. Within
compromise and regimes of sanctions, Iran had, successfully, built three
2 (500 km) which can range to as far as Turkmenistan, Geor
Federation and more than half of Caspian Sea in Eastern Europe, parts of Turkey, Iraq, Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Afghanistan in middle
-
east; Ghadr (1,600 km) that can deliver hell
to Yemen, more than half of the Red Sea, parts of Egyp
t and Mediterranean Sea, more than 80%
of Turkey and Black Sea, parts of Ukraine, Russian Federation and India, the entire Uzbekistan,
Pakistan, Jordan, Syria, and a tip of Peoples Republic of China; Sajjil (2,000 km) with the
anger to the countries of Horn of Africa, Egypt, Ukraine, Russia,
China, and Sudan. The Imameeyah extremists were, also within the same scope of ten years, able
to move its nuclear programme to an alarming height.
Reversely, as evidenced, during the trium
ph of negotiation efforts (2013
-
Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia, and US; Iran
Persians copped out on their determination to join the nuclear club. This development,
understandably, was a result of
the paradigm shift from US policy of zero enrichment to “no
nuclear bomb”, after emergence of Barrack Obama and Hassan Rouhani as US and Iranian
Presidents respectively, and above all the US recognition of Iran rights under NPT.
, it becomes factual that the US
-
Iran relations were originally sweet
and only became sour after Shah and revolutionists’ introduction of statist political economy
P a g e
| 526
Copy Right: © Author (s)
has proved to be one of
century. Spanning a period of two decades, the conflict defied
. The failure is not
US and Iran. While the North
American state insists on its maximalist demand for zero uranium enrichment; zero centrifuges;
tinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) development,
the Persian state, on the other hand, insists on exercising its rights, as conferred by Article III
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The article empowers both nuclear and non
-
military purposes. Within
compromise and regimes of sanctions, Iran had, successfully, built three
2 (500 km) which can range to as far as Turkmenistan, Geor
gia, Russian
Federation and more than half of Caspian Sea in Eastern Europe, parts of Turkey, Iraq, Kingdom
east; Ghadr (1,600 km) that can deliver hell
t and Mediterranean Sea, more than 80%
of Turkey and Black Sea, parts of Ukraine, Russian Federation and India, the entire Uzbekistan,
Pakistan, Jordan, Syria, and a tip of Peoples Republic of China; Sajjil (2,000 km) with the
anger to the countries of Horn of Africa, Egypt, Ukraine, Russia,
China, and Sudan. The Imameeyah extremists were, also within the same scope of ten years, able
-
2015) that was
Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia, and US; Iran
– the
Persians copped out on their determination to join the nuclear club. This development,
the paradigm shift from US policy of zero enrichment to “no
nuclear bomb”, after emergence of Barrack Obama and Hassan Rouhani as US and Iranian
Presidents respectively, and above all the US recognition of Iran rights under NPT.
Iran relations were originally sweet
and only became sour after Shah and revolutionists’ introduction of statist political economy

African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (AJPAS)
16(1) (June, 2023):509-530 p-
ISSN: 2787
Available online at
https://www.ajpasebsu.org.ng/
https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajpas.v16i1.29
policies and “third worldism” precipitated on anti
of comparative military capabilities of the two favours, largely, US and Iran portents a capacity
to use “long hands” in the region in the event of
Recommendations
The paper therefore recommends that Iran and USstay off each other area of influence to prevent
an escalation of tensions and eventual war, for peace and security of the
Above all, the US-
Iran relation has a bleak implication on inte
China and Russian Federation are likely to openly or covertly help Iran. It will also have
negative impact on the global energy industry, especiall
should manage their relations
and
lead to conflict and war.
The gains
effects of war, a caveat.
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