THE IMPACT OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE, AND CONTRASTING IMAGES OF THE FUTURES ON THE FORMULATION OF FUTURE PLANS - Doctoral dissertation A. Fergnani

Abstract

Individuals are often exposed to polarized representations (images) of collective futures, i.e. either predominantly positive or predominantly negative, by the media. This limited exposure is further exacerbated by news sources’ recommendation algorithms. Although contradictory evidence suggests that both positive and negative images of the futures may favorably affect cognition and behavior, drawing from social cognitive theory, possible selves, and mental contrasting, it is hypothesizeable that this limited exposure is less conducive to motivation to formulate future plans than an exposure to contrasting images of the futures, i.e., the juxtaposition of both positive and negative images of the futures. In a series of two studies, the current research conciliates previous research and tests this hypothesis by exploring the effect of different exposures to images of the futures, that is, positive, negative, and contrasting, on individuals’ formulation of future plans, and explores the mediating and moderating mechanisms of this phenomenon. We found that all three kinds of exposure to images of the futures were positively associated with formulation of plans with no significant difference across conditions. We also found that the mediating and moderating mechanisms were statistically not significant. Implications of the findings and further research directions are discussed.

Full text

Doctoral Dissertation, Alex Fergnani

THE IMPACT OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE, AND CONTRASTING IMAGES
OF THE FUTURES ON THE FORMULATION OF FUTURE PLANS
ALESSANDRO FERGNANI
A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
2022
Thesis Advisor
Associate Professor Zhaoli Song
Examiners:
Associate Professor Daniel J. McAllister
Associate Professor Kai Chi (Sam) Yam

DECLARATION
I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has been written by me in its
entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the sources of information which have been
used in the thesis.
This thesis has also not been submitted for any degree in any university previously.
_____________________
ALESSANDRO FERGNANI
15th December , 2022

2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It is a great journey for me during my Ph.D. study at the National University of
Singapore. I am grateful to a number of wonderful people who have played important
roles in my pursuit of this doctoral degree.
First, I would like to express my wholehearted appreciation and sincere gratitude
to my supervisor, A/P. Zhaoli Song for his guidance and support. Prof. Song has been
extremely supportive even when my ideas were outlandish and provided me with
exceptional resources to succeed in academia.
I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to my other dissertation
committee members Prof. Daniel J. McAllister and Prof. Sam (Kai Chi) Yam, for their
tremendously useful comments and guidance during the entire dissertation project.

3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT:…………………………………………………………………………………….6
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION:………………………………………………………………………………7
Statement of the problem:………………………………………………………………………..7
Contributions of the dissertation:………………………………………………………………...9
Structure of the dissertation:……………………………………………………………………10
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW:……………………………………………………………………...11
The construct of images of the futures and its impact on individuals’ cognition and behavior:...11
Positive images of the futures:………….………………………………………………………15
Negative images of the futures:………………………………………………………………...17
Contrasting images of the futures:……………………………………………………………...19
CHAPTER THREE
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT:……………………………………………………………23
Direct effects:…………………………………………………………………………………...23
Mediating mechanisms:………………………………………………………………………...23
Moderating mechanisms: ………………………………………………………………………27
CHAPTER FOUR
STUDY ONE: ………………………………………………………………………………….32
Methods: ……………………………………………………………………………………….32
Results: …………………………………………………………………………………………36
CHAPTER FIVE
STUDY ONE: ………………………………………………………………………………….40

4
Methods: ……………………………………………………………………………………….40
Results: …………………………………………………………………………………………42
CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION: …………………………………………………………………………………45
Interpretation of the results from the two studies: ………………………………………………45
Practical implications: …………………………………………………………………………...46
Limitations and future research directions: …………...…………………………………………48
Conclusion: ……………………………………………………...………………………………49
REFERENCES:………………………………………………………………………………….50
APPENDIX A:…………………………………………………………………………………...60
APPENDIX B: …………………………………………………………………………………..71

5
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure 1(a-c):…………………………………...……...……………………………………76-78
Table 1:…………………………………………………………………………………………79
Table 2:…...…………………………………………………………………………………….80
Table 3(a-c):…….……………………………………………………………………….… 81-83
Table 4:…………………………………………………………………………………………84
Table 5:…...…………………………………………………………………………………….85
Table 6:…………………………………………………………………………………………86
Table 7(a-c):…..………………………………………………………………………..…...87-89
Table 8:…………………………………………………………………………………………90

6
ABSTRACT
Individuals are often exposed to polarized representations (images) of collective futures, i.e. either
predominantly positive or predominantly negative, by the media. This limited exposure is further
exacerbated by news sources’ recommendation algorithms. Although contradictory evidence
suggests that both positive and negative images of the futures may favorably affect cognition and
behavior, drawing from social cognitive theory, possible selves, and mental contrasting, it is
hypothesizeable that this limited exposure is less conducive to motivation to formulate future plans
than an exposure to contrasting images of the futures, i.e., the juxtaposition of both positive and
negative images of the futures. In a series of two studies, the current research conciliates previous
research and tests this hypothesis by exploring the effect of different exposures to images of the
futures, that is, positive, negative, and contrasting, on individuals’ formulation of future plans, and
explores the mediating and moderating mechanisms of this phenomenon. We found that all three
kinds of exposure to images of the futures were positively associated with formulation of plans
with no significant difference across conditions. We also found that the mediating and moderating
mechanisms were statistically not significant. Implications of the findings and further research
directions are discussed.

7
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the problem
Different, often contrasting, representations of the future are common in the media, in the
entertainment industry, and in prominent intellectual debates concerned with the most relevant
issues of our era, including the rise of artificial intelligence, the expansion of social media, and
biotechnological advancements. Major writers, scholars, and pundits are often publicly questioned
about their views on how the collective future of a society will unfold. Their competency in their
subject of expertise is also often evaluated on the basis of the refinement of their forecasts.
However, as these views might differ, different “images of the futures” coexist, that is, imaginary
projected expectations about the collective state of things concerning a society or the whole
humankind in the long-term future (Fergnani & Song, 2020a). These widespread images range
from the negative and the dystopian, to bright and sanguine utopias. On one hand of this spectrum,
Harari (2015), for instance, warns of the rise of artificial intelligence as an instrument of power in
the hands of few corporations, which might lead to an Orwellian future of control where
individuals are deprived of their free will. A similar, if not bleaker, viewpoint is harbored by one
of the most prominent entrepreneurs of our era, Elon Musk (Shead, 2020). These images are
corroborated by the movies and entertainment industry, which has been consistently favoring the
portrayal of dystopian over utopic science fiction on screen (Fergnani & Song, 2020b). These are
decidedly negative images of the futures.
In contrast, techno optimists (e.g., Kurzweil, 2005) have built an ideological cult,
singularitarianism, based on the prediction of an upcoming point of desirable disruption in human

8
history when technology will be so advanced as to solve humanity’s long-standing pressing
problems. This is a decidedly positive image of the future.
As underscored by these examples, images of the futures are thus often presented in their extreme,
polarized manifestation, regardless of the likelihood of occurrence. Underlying these diametrically
different images of the futures are opposite assumptions about their impact on individuals’
cognition and behavior in the present. Behind positive images of the futures is the assumption that
their portrayal is advisable in that they spur individuals to action, bringing about desirable future
outcomes via a self-fulfilling prophecy. Behind negative images of the futures is the assumption
that their portrayal is advisable as they warn individuals of disasters, thus preventing doomsday
futures. These assumptions have permeated, with varying levels of conscious realization, streams
of literature in the social sciences and humanities. Indeed, the former is often strongly advocated
by proponents of futures studies, following the seminal influence of Polak (1973), who argued that
positive images of the futures precede and accompany societal flourishment. The latter have been
advocated by prominent philosophers such as Jonas (1979), who argued that negative images of
the futures should always be favored over positive ones in order to warn of consequences of present
actions. This position has permeated several major writers of dystopian literary fiction including
H. G. Wells, George Orwell, J. G. Ballard, Aldous Huxley, and others.
However, which kinds of images of the futures are more effective in changing individuals’
cognition and behavior beneficially in the present remains an uninvestigated empirical question,
which is often overlooked by the very purveyors of such images. Although the impact of images
of the futures on the present has been underscored by a number of scholars spanning the social
sciences (e.g., Beckert, 2013, 2016; Bina, Mateus, Pereira, & Caffa, 2017; Boulding, 1956;
Gaonkar, 2002; Johnson, 2011; Polak, 1961; Shiller, 2019; Slaughter, 1991; Mau, 1967; Ono, 2003)

9
and despite the pervasiveness of different kinds of images of the futures in the global collective
imaginary, this issue remains unstudied. Yet this inquiry is important as individuals are repeatedly
exposed to polarized, often extreme, images of the futures through online media and entertainment
sources. This restricted exposure is exacerbated by the recommendation algorithms of online
media and entertainment providers. Thus, how such exposure affects individuals’ cognition and
behavior becomes a crucial question to drive policy recommendations.
Contributions of the dissertation
In view of the above, in the current research we investigate the impact of different portrayals of
images of the futures on individuals’ reported future planning. Specifically, we consider how the
exposure to positive, negative, and contrasting images of the futures differently affect the
formulation of plans. We conciliate previous conflicting findings on the impact of positive and
negative future thinking on human cognition and behavior by hypothesizing that both positive and
negative images of the futures affect the formulation of plans via different mechanisms. We
integrate theoretical insights from social cognitive theory, possible future selves, and mental
contrasting to further hypothesize that contrasting images of the futures - that, is the juxtaposition
of positive and negative images of the futures - positively affect the formulation of plans to a
greater extent than positive or negative images of the futures presented alone, and further
investigate the mediating and moderating factors affecting this mechanism drawing from appraisal
theory of emotion and regulatory fit theory.

10
Structure of the dissertation
The dissertation is organized as follows. In the next section (Chapter 2), the construct of images
of the futures is defined and explained. Then, an array of contradictory theoretical positions and
research findings suggesting the effectiveness of positive, negative, and contrasting images of the
futures on individual’s cognition and behavior is reviewed. We then explain the reasons why the
theoretical standpoint espoused in this dissertation is that contrasting images of the futures have a
greater impact on individuals’ formulation of plans than either positive or negative images alone.
Chapter 3 further develops this argument, along with its mediating mechanism, in a series of
hypotheses. Then, Chapters 4 and 5 respectively describe the methods and results of two studies
undertaken to test these hypotheses. Finally, Chapter 6 interprets and discusses the findings of the
two studies taken together.

11
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
The construct of images of the futures and its impact on individuals’ cognition and
behavior
The construct of images of the futures
1
has not been studied in psychology. Yet traces of this
construct are present in other streams of the social sciences (Borup et al., 2006; Verschraegen &
Vandermoere, 2017). For Polak (1973), images of the futures are long-term future projections of
immanent aspects of humanity, such as society, religion, or history, which are collectively shared
in a society. In the context of studies about the futures, of which images of the futures are a major
object of investigation (Dator, 2019) images of the futures are also considered as shared long-term
future projections of a collective of individuals or the whole humankind including multiple
elements such as social, economic, technological, and environmental concerns (see e.g. Gidley,
1998; Hicks, 1996a, 1996b; Ono, 2003). Hence, images of the futures can also be considered a
kind of social imaginary insofar as social imaginaries are collective agents embedded in language,
stories, and symbolic representations of an era (Gaonkar, 2002).
Thus, in the context of this research, we consider images of the futures as imaginary projected
expectations about the collective state of things concerning a society or the whole humankind in
the long-term future (Fergnani & Song, 2020a), were “state of things” concurrently stands for the
five major dimensions of a collective of individuals according to the STEEP acronym
2
. This
1
In this dissertation, the term “futures” in “images of the futures” is in the plural form, although
some previous literature has used the singular form “images of the future” (e.g., Ono, 2003; Polak,
1973), because we assume there are more than one latent futures.
2
STEEP stands for Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental, and Political (Chermack,
2011; Hines & Bishop, 2015).

12
definition differs from the definition previously ascribed to this term in psychology, that is, free
thoughts/simulations of episodic future events (Oettingen, 2012). In other words, using the
typology of futures thinking developed by Szpunar, Shrikanth, and Schacter, (1997) by “images
of the futures” we mean semantic simulations, i.e., “constructions of detailed mental
representations of general or abstract states of the world (p.57), at the collective level. Specifically,
images of the futures differ from episodic future events in that the latter are concerned with the
imagined future self in specific situations, while the former are concerned with imagined external
worlds. However, images of the futures are related to episodic future events because they elicit
imagination about the self in the futures, albeit independently of specific episodes.
The importance of collective images of the futures in shaping individuals’ cognition and
behavior in the present has been increasingly acknowledged, albeit with different angles, across
the social sciences (Borup et al., 2006; Verschraegen & Vandermoere, 2017). Indeed, while
scholars have underlined how specific aspects of images of the futures, e.g. economy, technology,
society, etc. can shape individuals’ cognition and behavior, these aspects are often inextricably
linked to their relation with other aspects of these collectively shared projections. To illustrate the
point, let’s consider how fictional images of the futures of the economy shape economic decisions
in the present regarding credit, investment, innovation, and consumption (Beckert, 2013, 2016)
possibly engendering self-fulfilling prophecies in view of the expectations that certain futures will
unfold (Beckert, 2016). They are placeholders during decision making, a force of simplification in
condition of increased uncertainty where the past is not a good predictor of the future, guiding the
activity of economic actors with emotionally loaded representations (Beckert, 2016). They affect
a society at large contagiously, facilitated by the ease of communication of social media as a
conduit, and ultimately determine economic fluctuations (Shiller, 2019). Yet these economic

13
projections are inextricably linked to their social, technological and political reverberations, as
imagining prosperous economic conditions to come, for instance, entails imagining their positive
effect on technological advancement and socio-political harmony.
Another illustrative example is fictional images of technology, which inspire generations of
scientists, innovators, and inventors to explore new domains of knowledge, think of new solutions
to current problems, and devise new technological prototypes (Bina et al., 2017; Johnson, 2009;
2011), especially when the same vision is repeatedly reiterated in several sources (Bell et al., 2013).
These projections are inextricably linked to their imagined beneficial impact on the social
problems they may solve.
The interconnected nature of all aspects of images of the futures is equally valid in the case of
primarily social imaginaries. Social images of the futures shape individuals’ identity, purpose,
expectations, and sense of quotidian everyday practices (Gaonkar, 2002). They may also reframe
geopolitical spaces, ideologies and affiliations (Gaonkar, 2002). They are cohesive magnets,
mobilizing collective effort to achieve social goals and accomplish social projects (Jasanoff & Kim,
2009; Slaughter, 1991). Yet these images are also connected with the alleged economic and
political agendas they imply to pursue.
The above examples make it clear that it is important to study how images of the futures of
different kinds, in all of their aspects concurrently taken into account, shape individuals’ cognition
and behavior. Yet the mechanisms by which this occurs are unclear. While the impact of images
of the futures characterized as above on individuals’ cognition and behavior has been widely
theorized, it has been left virtually uninvestigated in empirical research. Indeed, the psychology
literature on futures thinking has focused on simulations of personal future events (Klein, 2013;
D’ Argembeau, & Mathy, 2011; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008). The marketing and hospitality

14
literatures have focused on vision of future consumptions (see e.g., Phillips, Olson, &
Baumgartner, 1995; Walters, Sparks, & Herington, 2007). These differ from images of the futures
as they are concerned with circumscribed future projections of the self in specific situations, rather
than future projections of the external environment.
In view of the above, in this research we focus on the impact of images of the futures on
individuals’ cognition and behavior. Specifically, we consider the impact of different kinds of
images of the futures, i.e., positive, negative and contrasting images, on the formulation of future
plans as well as on the cognitive-emotional mechanism by which this occurs. We define
“formulation of plans” as a reported intention to change and/or carry out behavior to alter personal
life arrangements related to career, interpersonal relations, personal development and health, and
closed others, in the short term and/or long term future. The formulation of future plans is
important because any projection of the future is to be considered of value insofar as it changes
individuals’ intentions to change their planning behavior towards the future as a consequence of
the imagination of such future. Because of the absence of previous empirical psychology research
on images of the futures, the rest of the literature review draws from previous research on futures
thinking to lay the conceptual foundation to theorize about the relationship between images of the
futures on individuals’ cognition and behavior, before turning to the proposition of causal
relationships between the three kinds of images of the futures as above and formulation of future
plans. Specifically, three contradictory theoretical positions are reviewed regarding the impact of
positive, negative and contrasting images of the futures on individuals’ cognition and behavior.

15
Positive images of the futures
A first theoretical position is concerned with the superior beneficial effects of the exposure to
positive images of the futures, rather than negative images of the futures, on individuals’ cognition
and behavior in the present. This standpoint is suggested by a range of empirical findings.
First, positive images of the futures might be more cognitively salient. Indeed, desirable future
life events are generally considered more likely to occur than undesirable ones (Klar, Meding, &
Sarel, 1996; Lench, 2009; McKenna, 1993; Weinstein, 1980). Karniol & Ross (1996) theorized
that individuals tend to disregard potentially negative futures because these don’t align with their
system of values and preferences. Individuals have also been found to take longer to generate
negative personal futures than positive personal futures (Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003). It is possible
that the same mechanism extends to images of the futures in that individuals, controlling for
dispositional factors, tend to systematically ignore negative images of the futures, and to pay
selective attention to positive images of the futures. Indeed, it has been found that individuals tend
to be biased in their conception of the future in that they concurrently harbor positive images of
their personal future and negative images of their country (Shrikanth, Szpunar, & Szpunar, 2018).
Individuals also tend to conjure more positive rather than negative consequences of potentially
disruptive phenomena, such as social media and artificial intelligence, when thinking about their
personal future, and more negative rather than positive consequences of the same phenomena when
thinking about the collective future (Shrikanth et al., 2018).
Thus, it is arguable that given that the exposure to bright images of the futures leads individuals
to envision themselves in such futures, they might be selectively attentive to such images while
ignoring negatives ones due to subconscious desirability concerns. Indeed, individuals tend to

16
think about the future using general personal knowledge (Argembeau, & Mathy, 2011). On this
account, it would be advisable to exploit these biases and expose individuals to positive rather than
negative images of the futures in order to enhance their hope for the future as well as their
motivation to make it happen.
Secondly, positive images of the futures might be more effective than negative images to drive
actions via the pursuit of positive affect. Indeed, the above reported biases occur because positive
images elicit positive affective reaction, which humans tend to favor, while negative images elicit
negative affective reaction, which is often avoided (Lench, 2009). Recent meta-analytical findings
show that imagining a brighter future of the self leads to an increase in positive affect, while
worrying about a negative future of the self leads to an increase in negative affect (Schubert, Eloo,
Scharfen, & Morina, 2020) It has also been postulated that utopian thinking may increase
collective action via feelings of hope and abstraction (Badaan, Jost, Fernando, & Kashima, 2020).
A range of clinical findings also point to the strong association of vividness of mental imagery of
personal futures with optimism (Beaty, Seli, & Schacter, 2019; Blackwell et al. 2013; Meevissen,
Peters, & Alberts, 2011) and well-being (King, 2001).
If the same mechanism extends to images of the futures, it is arguable that individuals are spurred
to change their cognition and behavior as a consequence of the exposure to positive rather than
negative images of the futures in order to make the envisioned positive outcomes occur at a
personal level in a quest to preserve positive affect. Indeed, correlational evidence of this was
presented by Polak (1973) who investigated the evolution of images of the futures throughout
history, contending that positive images of the futures precede and accompany the flourishment of

17
human cultures, and that when collective images of the futures are negative or absent, a culture
declines and may collapse
3
.
Negative images of the futures
A second, and opposite, theoretical position is concerned with the superior beneficial effects of the
exposure to negative rather than positive images of the futures on individuals’ cognition and
behavior in the present. This standpoint is in turn supported by a range of findings.
First, negative images of the futures might be of intrinsic value. Evolutionarily, individuals might
have been prone to take action in the present in view of upcoming negative futures. For instance,
when harvesting more food in view of an upcoming season of scarcity. Indeed, a body of evidence
points to the importance of imagination about the future as an adaptive mechanism to plan behavior
in several contexts (see Schacter, 2012; Szpunar, 2010 for reviews). As with the argument that
positive images of the futures are relatively more effective via positive affect, the same could be
argued for negative images via worry. The emotional state of worry has been found to be perceived
as a response strategy to future threats, serving as a preparation to avoid even more negative
emotions to come (Newman, & Llera, 2011). In this view, worry appears a desirable feature rather
3
Polak’s thesis has been criticized in that he conflated mythological/religious images with images
of the future. The former images have a primarily escapist function, the letter serve as projections
of present conditions of humanity into a future that is predicted to occur. Indeed Morgan (2002)
underlines that images of the future did not exist in ancient and medieval societies, as they
originated in the Renaissance. Here, ideas of progress and utopia emerged, offering projections of
attenable improvement of the human conditions on earth, and thus substituting eschatological
promises previously provided by religion. Therefore, the correlation between positive images of
the future and cultural flourishment noted by Polak might have not been due to the positive effect
of positive collective imaginaries.

18
than something to be avoided, the manifestation of which spurs individuals to take action in order
to change the present, and future, for the better. This point is corroborated by Loewenstain et al.
(2001), who maintained that the perception of risk induces emotional responses such as fear for
the future. Thus, emotions such as fear and worry seem to be at least in part responsible for aversion
to risk. Indeed, cognitively impaired individuals, whose emotions are attenuated, disregard future
consequence and seem to behave sub-optimally in risky situations (Loewenstain et al., 2001).
On this account, it would be advisable to exploit humans’ tendency to respond to negative images
of the futures via worry or fear and subsequent risk aversion in order to spur their effort to change
the future for the better and to increase their hope in doing so.
Second, and once again opposite to the above reviewed findings, negative images of the futures
might be more effective to catalyze action because they are more cognitively salient. Individuals
tend to remember negative rather than positive events when recalling the collective past (Liu et al.,
2009), possibly because the primary source of information about the past, the media, is skewed
towards negativity (Soroka, & McAdams, 2015). As there is a consistent body of evidence showing
that the same neural mechanism is responsible for both remembering the past and imagining the
future (Berntsen, & Bohn, 2010; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007, 2008; Szpunar, 2010), it may
be possible that the negativity bias towards the past extends to futures thinking. There is also ample
evidence of negativity bias in human cognition (Rozin & Royzman, 2007), that is, in the presence
of negative and positive events of equal magnitude, individuals tend to be more aroused by, exhibit
more attention to, and be prone to more detailed thinking about the former than the latter. This is
likely due to the adaptive function of negativity bias to fetch more information about negative
circumstances in order to avoid undesirable consequences or promptly evacuate undesirable
situations when necessary (Rozin & Royzman, 2007). As a consequence, individuals are more

19
likely to change their cognition and behavior via the exposure to negative rather than positive
situation-specific information (Soroka, 2006).
Third, negative images of the futures might be more effective than positive ones because the
latter are relatively more likely to promote idealization, and thus, inaction. Indeed, thinking about
personal futures has to be divided into two subclasses: expectations and fantasies (Oettingen &
Mayer, 2002). The former are futures states or events judged as likely to occur. The latter are a
form of wishful thinking. It has been found that mentally elaborating expectations is more
conducive to increased effort and effective problem solving than fantasies (Oettingen & Mayer,
2002; Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998). Due to their less pronounced saliency, positive
images of the futures may not arouse individual’s attention and/or mental re-elaboration as much
as negative images of the futures, and may thus be perceived as fantasies rather than expectations,
irrespective of the original purpose of the purveyor of such images, whereas negative images of
the futures may be more likely to be perceived as expectations rather than fantasies. This would
undermine the efficacy of positive images of the futures in affecting cognition and behavior.
Indeed, the prevalence of newspapers’ articles and inaugural presidential addresses containing
positive views about the future has been correlated with subsequent economic downturn, arguably
because they promote fantasies about a collectively preferred future at a social level and stymie
efforts to attain it (Sevincer, Wagner, Kalvelage, & Oettingen, 2014).
Contrasting images of the futures
A third theoretical position, which is espoused by the current study, maintains that the exposure to
contrasting, alternative images of the futures has a greater impact on individuals’ cognition and
behavior in the present than either positive or negative images of the futures alone.

20
The reasons behind this are attributable to concurring arguments from three theoretical
frameworks. The first is social cognitive theory. This theory maintains that one of the fundamental
determinants of personal agency is the belief of exercise of control on the external environment
(Bandura, 1993, 1997, 2001).
4
This argument in turn stands upon an earlier conceptualization
within social learning theory: individual behavior is contingent upon the expectation that actions
in the present lead to favorable rewards in the future insofar as results are controllable (the belief
of control is internal) while when results of behavior are considered outside of one’s control (the
belief of control is external) this leads to inaction (Rotter, 1966).
The perceived control of the environment stands on two grounds: 1) the extent to which personal
capabilities are believed to produce changes (self-efficacy) and 2) the extent to which the
environment is modifiable (Bandura, 1993).
The exposure to contrasting images of the futures reminds individuals that the future remains
open to different possible scenarios and opinions of construal, a reminder that is elicited by the
exposure to neither primarily positive nor primarily negative images of the futures alone. Thus,
the perceived control of the environment via modifiability, the second of the two above mentioned
mechanisms, is activated. This may in turn enhance the motivation and hope for future change.
Indeed, Bandura (1993, 1997, 2001) suggested that it is the mental contrast between different
images of the futures which reminds individuals of the modifiability of the external environment,
thus impacting cognition and behavior to a greater extent than positive or negative images of the
4
In social cognitive theory, the major component of personal agency is self-efficacy, which refers
to the “judgements of how well one can execute courses of action required to deal
with prospective situations” (Bandura, 1982: 122). This differs from controllability of the
environment. Indeed, one could have faith in his or her own capabilities while at the same time
being cognizant of the impossibility of the larger social environment to be changed, or in the
possibility to change the environment while being cognizant of his or her incapability to do so.

21
futures presented alone. This mental contrast enhances motivation to change the environmental in
that one perceives the possibility to align it to one’s desires.
This hypothesis is corroborated by a second theoretical framework, mental contrasting
5
. After
having mentally contrasted a desired future of the self to a less desirable present reality, individuals
have been shown to be more responsive in a series of outcomes, including commitment to future
goals, performance, and tolerance, among others (Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 2001; Oettingen,
2012). It is due to the simultaneous mental contrasting of different possibilities that induces
individuals to act in the present in order to decrease the discrepancy between the desirable and the
undesirable, as mental contrasting activates the desired future but also the obstacles to attain it in
the present, thus determining the commitment to subsequent cognitive and behavioral outcomes,
and regulating goals pursuit (Oettingen, 2012). Although mental contrasting is based on the
comparison between present and future, this framework is relevant to the current research as it is
the contraposition of opposing images that drives its effects on the above outcomes. This
contraposition is similar to the comparison between positive and negative images of the futures.
Finally, this hypothesis is also corroborated a third theoretical framework: possible selves, which
overlaps with and extends social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1997). Possible selves are imaginative
future representations of what the self would like to become, could become, and is afraid of
becoming, which serve as incentives or disincentives for motivation and subsequent behavior in
the present (Markus & Nurius, 1986). Individuals mentally simulate possible futures selves when
imagining the exertion of control on the environment in the future (Markus & Nurius, 1986). By
5
This concept is part of a larger theoretical framework called fantasy realization theory, which
not only specifies the effect of mental contrasting on cognitive and behavioral outcomes, but also
the difference of effects between fantasies and expectations on such outcomes (Oettingen, 2012).

22
envisioning a multiplicity of actualized possible selves within contrasting images of the futures,
individuals are more likely to perceive the malleability of their own future, and thus to be enhanced
in their motivation to change it. Indeed, Bandura (1997: 25) speculates that envisioning both
positive and negative future selves might be more influential on individual motivation than
envisioning either of the two separately.

23
CHAPTER THREE
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Direct effects
It has been explained that positive, negative, and contrasting images of the future may all affect
individuals’ cognition and behavior, although via different mechanisms. Positive images of the
futures primarily do so via cognitive saliency and pursuit of positive affect. Negative images of
the future primarily do so via avoidance of future misfortunes and cognitive saliency. Contrasting
images of the future primarily do so via heightened perceived control of the external environment,
mental contrasting, and imagination of possible selves. Thus, based on the above literature review,
it is hypothesizeable that positive, negative as well as contrasting images of the futures affect
individuals’ formulation of plans, as follows:
H1. The exposure to positive images of the futures is positively associated with
formulation of plans.
H2. The exposure to negative images of the futures is positively associated with
formulation of plans.
H3. The exposure to contrasting images of the futures (both positive and negative)
is positively associated with formulation of plans.
Mediating mechanisms
The aim of this research is to conciliate the conflicting evidence and theoretical frameworks above
discussed, and to propose that contrasting images of the futures affect individuals’ formulation of
plans to a greater extent than either positive or negative images of the futures separately. This is
possible because positive and negative images of the futures may activate, respectively, two

24
different psychological mechanisms affecting the formulation of plans. Contrasting images of the
futures, on the other hand, activate both of these mechanisms, as well as a third mechanism.
Specifically, both positive and negative images of the futures affect individuals’ formulation of
plans via different appraisal mechanisms. According to appraisal theory, in the stage of primary
appraisal, i.e., appraisal regarding the degree of significance of the situation to the subject,
stressful situations are appraised as either challenges (opportunities) or threats (Folkman &
Lazarus, 1985): “threat refers to the potential for harm or loss; challenge refers to the potential for
growth, mastery, or gain” (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985: 152). The future also has the potential to
elicit appraisal as this is anticipatory in nature (Folkman & Lazarus,1985). Appraisal is
inextricably linked with emotions, as emotions are evoked as a consequence of and simultaneously
with primary appraisal, i.e. the attributed meaning to a situation for one’s personal well-being
(Lazarus, 1991; Smith, & Kirby, 2009), in other words, appraisal is a necessary and sufficient
condition for emotions (Lazarus, 1991)
6
. Thus, appraisal appears to be a sufficiently parsimonious
construct to activate different cognitive behavioral responses to different images of the futures
while fully encapsulating the various potential explanations behind the impact of positive/negative
6
Besides proponents of appraisal theory of emotions and in sharp contrast to cognitive theories of
decision making, several authors have also underscored that the future may elicits opposite
emotional reactions, depending on the kind of future imagined, that serve as a source of assessment
to further drive behavior in uncertain situations (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Seligman, Railton,
Baumeister, & Sripada, 2016). Emotions elicited in such context are often alternatively described
as hope (Peterson, 1999), and anxiety/worry/fear, depending on the source [e.g. Peterson, 1999
(anxiety); Newman & Llera, 2011 (worry); Loewenstain et al., 2001(fear)], respectively. Indeed,
if hope provides the prospect that a desirable future will come into being (Boyatzis & Kleio, 2006),
the contrary is true for anxiety (worry/fear) (Peterson, 1999). These arguments are parallels to
hypotheses H. 1.1-1.2, as the elicitation of emotion is embedded within appraisal theory (Lazarus,
1991; Smith, & Kirby, 2009).

25
images of the futures on human cognition provided in the above literature review, i.e., emotions,
saliency, evolutionary utility.
As a consequence, it is hypothesizeable that positive images of the futures activate opportunity
appraisal, as they are construed as desirable for one’s well-being, which leads to formulation of
plans by pursuit of such situation, and that negative images of the futures activate threat appraisal,
as they are construed as undesirable for one’s well-being, which leads to formulation of plans by
avoidance of such situation, as follows:
H1a The positive association between the exposure to positive images of the futures
and formulation of plans is mediated by opportunity appraisal.
H2a The positive association between the exposure to negative images of the
futures and formulation of plans is mediated by threat appraisal.
The above psychological mechanism differently affects the formulation of plans due to the
exposure to either positive or negative images of the futures. However, neither positive nor
negative images of the futures activate the perceived control of the external environment, as
reviewed above. In contrast, the exposure to contrasting images of the futures, i.e. both positive
and negative at the same time and as a summation of both, activates the two opposed mechanisms
above hypothesized i.e. both opportunity and threat appraisal, but also a third mechanism: the
perceived control of the external environment. This is due to the conscious comparison between
the two appraisal states (and their ensuing cognitive emotional states). Thus, the following
hypothesis is proposed:
H3a The positive association between the exposure to contrasting images of the
futures (both positive and negative) and the formulation of plans is partly mediated
by perceived control of the external environment.

26
The exposure to contrasting images of the futures thus shifts subjects’ appraisal from primary to
secondary, that is, from the assessment of the significance of the situation for the self to the
determination of coping mechanisms to face such situation. Indeed, Aspinwill (2005) underscores
that any “concrete plan to bring about a desired future […] depends to the degree to which those
future outcomes are amenable to personal control” (p. 208). Therefore, it is hypothesizeable that
the overall effect of the exposure to contrasting images of the futures on the formulation of plans
will be greater than that of the exposure to either of the two separate conditions as above, as follows:
H4 The positive association between the exposure to contrasting images of the
futures (both positive and negative) and formulation of plans is stronger than the
positive association between the exposure to either positive or negative images of
the futures and formulation of plans separately.
This theoretical standpoint is also at the basis of the increasingly impactful practice of futures and
foresight, an action-research oriented discipline that investigates possible, plausible and preferable
futures in order to actively shape the future and achieve more optimal outcomes within
governments, organizations and communities in the present (Bell, 1997; Fergnani, 2019). Through
futures and foresight facilitation techniques, individuals are encouraged to realize that the future
is open to possibilities, rather than dictated by images imposed by others. The exposure to
alternatives is what may shift individuals’ images towards the most beneficial outcome (Hicks,
1994, 1996a; Ono, 2003) for both themselves and a society as a whole (Slaughter, 2020). Indeed,
students who have attended futures and foresight courses have been found to exhibit higher levels
of optimism towards the future of the external environment (Chen & Hsu, 2020),

27
Moderating mechanisms
Besides the hypothesized main and mediating effect, the impact of the exposure to different kinds
of images of the futures on the formulation of plans can be attenuated/accentuated by moderating
factors.
The first moderating factor is the preexisting level of expectations regarding positive outcomes,
i.e. personal optimism (Gavrilov-jerkovic, Jovanovic, Zuljevic, & Brdaric, 2014), in that positive
images of the futures are more effective to foster the formulation of plans for individuals with high
personal optimism, while negative images of the futures are less effective to foster the formulation
of plans for such individuals. This occurs via accentuated(attenuated) elicitation of appraisal in
both cases (stronger opportunity appraisal for the former case, while weaker threat appraisal for
the latter case). Thus, the following moderating hypotheses involving either positive images or
negative images of the futures are proposed:
H1b The positive association between the exposure to positive images of the futures
and individual formulation of plans is moderated by individual personal optimism,
such as the effect of the exposure to positive images of the futures on formulation
of plans is stronger when individuals are high in personal optimism.
H1c The positive association between the exposure to positive images of the futures
and individual opportunity appraisal is moderated by individual personal optimism,
such as the effect of the exposure to positive images of the futures on opportunity
appraisal is stronger when individuals are high in personal optimism.
H2b The positive association between the exposure to negative images of the
futures and individual formulation of plans is moderated by individual personal

28
optimism, such as the effect of the exposure to negative images of the futures on
formulation of plans is weaker when individuals are high in personal optimism.
H2c The positive association between the exposure to negative images of the futures
and individual threat appraisal is moderated by individual personal optimism, such
as the effect of the exposure to negative images of the futures on threat appraisal is
weaker when individuals are high in personal optimism.
The second moderating factor is the kind of regulatory focus that determines individuals’
orientation towards future goals and thus future behavior. Indeed, individuals differ in the manner
they perceive their ideal future self and thus in the manner in which they plan to pursue such self,
between promotion focus and prevention focus (Higgins, 1998). Individuals with a promotion
focus are moved by goals via the pursuit of the accomplishment of such goals, while individuals
with a prevention focus are moved by goals via the pursuit of the avoidance of risk, and thus, of
safety (Higgins, 1998; Shah, Higgins, and Friedman, 1998). Individual motivation and
performance are enhanced when the task at hand corresponds with the respective orientation, i.e.
promotion vs prevention focus (Shah et al., 1998). Thus, it is hypothesizeable that individuals with
a promotion (prevention) focus will be more likely to formulate plans when presented with positive
(negative) images of the futures because these images “match” with their regulatory focus
orientation. This occurs via the effect of regulatory focus on appraisal (and their ensuing cognitive
emotional states). Indeed, different regulatory focus orientations have been found to be associated
with distinct emotional vulnerabilities (Higgins, 1998). Thus, the following moderating
hypotheses involving either positive images or negative images of the futures are thus proposed:
H1d The positive association between the exposure to positive images of the futures
and individual formulation of plans is moderated by individual regulatory focus,

29
such as the effect of the exposure to positive images of the futures on formulation
of plans is stronger when individuals are high in promotion focus.
H1e The positive association between the exposure to positive images of the futures
and individual opportunity appraisal is moderated by individual regulatory focus,
such as the effect of the exposure to positive images of the futures on opportunity
appraisal is stronger when individuals are high in promotion focus.
H2d The positive association between the exposure to negative images of the
futures and individual formulation of plans is moderated by individual regulatory
focus, such as the effect of the exposure to negative images of the futures on
formulation of plans is stronger when individuals are high in prevention focus.
H2e The positive association between the exposure to negative images of the futures
and individual threat appraisal is moderated by individual regulatory focus, such
as the effect of the exposure to negative images of the futures on threat appraisal is
stronger when individuals are high in prevention focus.
From the above, it also follows that individuals exposed to contrasting images of the futures will
have a different appraisal response depending on 1) their personal optimism and 2) their regulatory
focus. Indeed, depending on their respective differences in personal optimism and regulatory focus,
individuals will have a predominant appraisal mechanism which will in turn drive the formulation
of plans, alongside the heightened perceived control of the environment. Thus, the following
moderating hypotheses are proposed:
H3b The positive association between the exposure to contrasting images of the
futures (both positive and negative) and individual formulation of plans is partly

30
mediated by opportunity (threat) appraisal when individuals are high in promotion
(prevention) focus.
H3c The positive association between the exposure to contrasting images of the
futures (both positive and negative) and individual formulation of plans is partly
mediated by opportunity (threat) appraisal when individuals are high (low) in
personal optimism.
Additionally, the impact of the exposure to contrasting images of the futures on one’s level of
perceived control of the environment can also be attenuated/accentuated by the general beliefs of
specific individuals regarding their capability to influence courses of action, that is, self-efficacy.
Indeed, according to social cognitive theory, self-efficacy both differs and can interact with control
of the environment (Bandura, 1997). Specifically, the stronger one’s self-efficacy, the stronger the
effect of exposure to contrasting images of the futures on one’s perceived control of the
environment, independently of one’s regulatory focus. These moderating mechanisms thus follows:
H3d The positive association between the exposure to contrasting images of the
futures (both positive and negative) and formulation of plans is stronger when
individual self-efficacy is high.
H3e The positive association between the exposure to contrasting images of the
futures (both positive and negative) and perceived control of the external
environment is stronger when individual self-efficacy is high
7
.
7
The moderating effect of personal optimism on the impact of contrasting images of the future on
control of the external environment has not been postulated as these two constructs are independent,
i.e. one may be optimistic because he or she believes that someone else will affect outcomes
positively, while at the same time harboring low beliefs of self-control of the environment (see
Aspinwall, 2005).

31
The full theoretical model above proposed is presented graphically on Figure 1 (Panel a: overall
model; Panel b: positive images of the futures to formulation of plans mechanism; Panel c:
negative images of the futures to formulation of plans mechanism; Panel d: contrasting images of
the futures to formulation of plans mechanism).
A series of two studies examines the effect of the exposure to different kinds of images of the
futures on individuals’ formulation of plans, as well as its mediating and moderating factors. The
first study investigates the effect with generic images of the futures of the external environment.
The second study investigates the effect with domain-specific images of the futures, and
specifically, with the case of the futures of artificial intelligence in organizational contexts.
Artificial intelligence has been chosen as focal topic for the second study to further corroborate
the ecological validity of the effects of images of the future on human cognition due to the current
widespread exposure of images of the futures about this topic in the global discourse.
------------------------------------
Insert Figure 1 about here
------------------------------------

32
CHAPTER FOUR
STUDY ONE
Methods
Sample and design
Power analysis revealed that to accomplish power of .8, with a medium effect size (f = .25) and an
alpha of .5, a total sample size of 180 participants is required. A sample of 280 North American
subjects between 20 and 60 years of age was collected via Prolific (https://www.prolific.co/). To
measure the effect of exposure to different images of the futures on formulation of plans and its
mediating and moderating factors, a randomized, single factor (four levels), pretest-posttest design
was used. The four conditions were: exposure to positive images of the futures, exposure to
negative images of the futures, exposure to contrasting images of the futures, and a control group,
consisting of four groups of 70 subjects.
Procedure
To avoid interaction between the pretest and the manipulations, all participants were administered
a pretest survey where their baseline regulatory focus, personal optimism, and self-efficacy
(moderators) were determined. Then, participants were divided in four groups and randomly
assigned to one of the four groups as above. Afterwards, participants were asked to read a written
text presenting some images of the futures. The three experimental manipulations consisted in the
exposure to hypothetical long-term future scenarios of the environment where the subjects will be
living (images of the futures). This technique, akin to experimental vignette methodology, allows
a high degree of control on the internal validity of the study to infer causation (Aguinis & Bradley,
2014). Scenario vignette was chosen as a treatment as it allows for a greater control on the

33
multifaceted content of images of the futures, as explained in section 2.1 above, compared to other
less controllable forms of exposure to images of the futures, i.e., images or video clips. The full
scenario vignettes used are available in Appendix A. According to construal level theory,
individuals imagine distant futures at high level of abstraction, and tend to evaluate it based on
desirability concerns, whereas more proximal futures are evaluated according to their feasibility
(Liberman & Trope, 1998). Accordingly, to prevent individual from evaluating the feasibility or
plausibility of the future in the scenario vignettes and induce them to perceive the scenario
vignettes as fait accompli, the scenarios’ descriptions were deliberately in the long-term future,
i.e., two decades from the time of the experiment (Dator, 2009). Additionally, to avoid that positive
images of the futures were perceived as fantasies, which may have confound the result of the study
insofar as positive images of the futures may be more likely to be perceived as fantasies rather than
expectations compared to negative images of the futures, all the vignettes were framed as experts’
predictions.
To prevent the intensity of the manipulations to differ, each condition was exposed to two images
of the futures. In the positive image of the future condition, participants were asked to read two
passages presenting two experts’ opinions on the long-term future construing the external
environment as politically stable, economically flourishing, socially welcoming, technologically
advanced, and environmentally clean. In the negative image of the future condition, participants
were asked to read two passages presenting two experts’ opinions on the long-term future
construing the external environment as politically unstable, economically recessive, socially
conflictual, technologically stagnant, and environmentally deteriorated. The scenarios vignettes
were to the uttermost possible extent equal in syntax across conditions, with opposite wordings
according to the specific condition. In the contrasting images of the future condition, participants

34
were asked to read two passages presenting two experts’ opinions on the long-term future. One of
them was positive and one was negative, as above. The three treatment conditions – positive,
negative and contrasting –portrayed polarized images of the futures to 1) reflect what is shown in
the current global discourse and 2) single out the effect of predominantly positive(negative) images
of the futures, rather than relatively positive(negative) images of the futures as independent
variables. To control for the order of images of the futures in the contrasting image of the future
condition, the order of the two images was reversed in half of this group’s participants. In the
control group, participants were asked to read a news article of equal length to the treatment
conditions but unrelated to the future or the purpose of the study. To control for the
positivity(negativity) of images of the futures, these articles presented positive or negative news
unrelated to the future in half of the participants in the control group. An example of a full text
used in the control group is also available in Appendix A
Two questions meant to assess the comprehension of the scenario narratives were used as
manipulation checks directly after the exposure to the text in the three treatment groups. The
questions used in each condition are available in Appendix A. Only subjects who failed both
questions were excluded from the study. They remaining subjects were 54 (positive image of the
future condition), 47 (negative image of the future condition) and 49 (contrasting images of the
future condition). To make the images of the futures relevant to participants future, participants
were asked to imagine their future selves in the respective scenarios. Immediately after these
interventions, all participants were asked to respond to a survey to assess all the mediating
variables in the hypotheses presented in section 3 as above as well as formulation of plans (posttest).

35
Measures
Self-efficacy (moderator): participants’ self-efficacy was assessed with the self-efficacy scale
developed by Gavrilov-jerkovic (2014). Specifically, participants were asked to assess the
truthfulness of a series of 5 statements on a 5-points Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all true) to
5 (exactly true). Sample items include e.g. “In difficult situations I will find a way”. This scale has
been improved and shrunk from previous measures of self-efficacy via factor analysis to minimize
its overlap with optimism.
Promotion & prevention focus (moderator): To assess individuals’ promotion and prevention
focus orientation, the 18 items Promotion/Prevention Scale was used (Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda,
2002). Sample items include “I typically focus on the success I hope to achieve in the future” to
be assessed from 1 (not at all true) to 5 (very true).
Personal optimism (moderator): individuals’ dispositional level of optimism was measured with
the 4 items personal optimism scale (Gavrilov-jerkovic et al., 2014). This scale has been improved
and shrunk from previous measures of optimism via factor analysis to minimize its overlap with
self-efficacy as well as other similar constructs. Sample items include: “I am facing my future in
an optimistic way”.
Opportunity & threat appraisal (mediator): participants’ opportunity and threat appraisal were
assessed using a variation of the work appraisal Likert scale (Drach-Zahavy & Erez, 2002). The
variation of all items made them relevant to projected future scenarios. Sample items include:
“This future scenario seems like a challenge to me’’, and ‘‘This future scenario provides
opportunities to exercise my skills’’.
Perceived control (mediator): participants’ perceived control of the environment was assessed
using a subset (12 out of 16 items) of the 6-points Work Locus of Control Likert Scale developed

36
by Spector (1988). These remaining items are relevant to personal advancement and motivation in
life and work in the future. Sample items include: “Making money is primarily a matter of good
fortune”, and “Career and life advancements occur to those who perform well”.
Formulation of plans (dependent variable): To measure individuals’ formulation of plans,
Oettingen and Schnetter’s (2001) technique was used. Specifically, participants were asked to
complete 8 sentence stems. Four of these stems suggested formulation of plans, e. g., “Specifically,
I will…”, while the other four did not, e. g., “In general, I will…”. The instructions given to the
participants were “Please carefully read all sentence stems. Then complete the four sentence stems,
and only those four, that match the way you think about your future”. The number of completed
sentence stems suggesting the formulation of plans was counted as the dependent variable. The
full set of items used in the above measures is available in Appendix A
--------------------------------------
Insert Tables 1-4 about here
--------------------------------------
Results
Results were analyzed with separate T-tests and OLS regressions using R. Specifically, separate
T-tests and OLS regressions with categorical variables were used for testing direct effects,
Separate T-tests were used to test the differences between the effects of the three treatment groups
on the dependent variable, OLS regressions with categorical variables were used for testing
moderators, Sobel tests were used for mediator analysis, and computation of indexes of indirect
mediation and confidence intervals were used for moderated mediation models. Descriptive
statistics of and correlations between the variables are displayed in Table 1. The summary of T-

37
Tests and regression results is displayed in Tables 2, 3(a-c) and 4. The reliability of the scales used
in the survey was acceptable (self-efficacy Cronbach’s α = 0.79; personal optimism Cronbach’s α
= 0.76; promotion focus Cronbach’s α = 0.87; prevention focus Cronbach’s α = 0.76; opportunity
appraisal Cronbach’s α = 0.73; threat appraisal Cronbach’s α = 0.85; perceived control Cronbach’s
α = 0.83). There was neither difference between the two subgroups (positive/negative news versus
neutral news) of the control condition (t = 1.3, p = ns) nor between the two subgroups (positive
then negative vs negative then positive images of the future) of the contrasting images of the future
condition (t = -0.3, p = ns) as measured via independent T-tests on the dependent variable.
The effects of the three treatment conditions on the dependent variable, i.e., formulation of plans,
were analyzed with categorical regressions against the control group, i.e., by assigning dummy
variables to the three treatments conditions. All three conditions had a positive and statistically
significant effect on the formulation of plans (positive image of the future condition β = 0.37, p <
0.05, Table 3a Model 4; negative image of the future condition β = 0.33, p < 0.05, Table 3b Model
4; contrasting images of the future condition β = 0.37, p < 0.05, Table 3c Model 3), thus supporting
the first three hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 (see also analogous results as measured with three
independent T-tests between the three treatment groups and the control group, Table 2).
However, none of the three hypothesized mediating mechanisms was statistically significant
(opportunity appraisal and positive image of the future condition β = 0.00, Sobel test Z = 0.28, p
= ns; threat appraisal and negative image of the future condition β = 0.00, Sobel test Z = -0.09, p
= ns; perceived control and contrasting images of the future condition β = 0.00, Sobel test Z = -
0.03, p = ns), thus, hypotheses H1a, H2a and H3a were not supported (see Table 4).
However, it should be noted that the exposure to the positive image of the future condition was
negatively associated with threat appraisal and strongly statistically significant (β = -0.77, p < 0.01)

38
while its negative association with opportunity appraisal was not statistically significant (β = -0.03,
p = ns) (see Table 2a Model 1); and that the exposure to the negative image of the future condition
was significantly positively associated with threat appraisal (β = 0.42, p < 0.01) as well as
significantly negatively associated with opportunity appraisal (β = -0.68, p < 0.01) (see Table 4b
Model 1). The exposure to the contrasting images of the future condition was also significantly
negatively associated with opportunity appraisal (β = -0.3, p < 0.05), while its positive association
with threat appraisal was not statistically significant (β = 0.05, p = ns), and its negative association
with perceived control was also not statistically significant (β = -0.01, p = ns) (See Table 4c Model
1).
Additionally, there was no statistically significant difference between the effects of the three
treatment groups on formulation of plans, as measured by separate T-tests between the three groups
(contrasting images of the future vs positive image of the future t = 0.1, p = ns; contrasting images
of the future vs negative image of the future t = 0.23, p = ns; positive image of the future vs
negative image of the future t = -0.2, p = ns; see Table 2). Thus, H4 was also not supported.
Moderators analysis also did not reveal statistically significant results in any of the three groups
(positive image of the future condition: moderation with personal optimism β = 0.09, p = ns,
moderation with promotion focus β = 0.33, p = ns, see Table 3a Model 6, 7; negative image of the
future condition: moderation with personal optimism β = 0.6, p = ns, moderation with prevention
focus β = -0.24, p = ns, see Table 3b Models 6, 7; contrasting images of the future condition:
moderation with self-efficacy β = 0.28, p = ns, see Table 3c Model 5), thus not supporting
hypotheses H1b, H2b, H1d, H2d and H3d.
However, personal optimism did moderate the relationship between exposure to the negative
image of the future condition and threat appraisal (β = 0.34, p < 0.05) by acting as a buffer against

39
the latter (see Table 3b Model 3). Thus, H2c was supported. Yet, personal optimism did not
moderate the relationship between the exposure to the positive image of the future condition and
opportunity appraisal (β = -0.19, p = ns) (see Table 3a Model 3); regulatory focus neither
moderated the relationship between exposure to the positive image of the future condition and
opportunity appraisal (β = -0.11, p = ns) (see Table 3a Model 2) nor the relationship between
exposure to the negative image of the future condition and threat appraisal (β = -0.35, p = ns) (see
Table 3b Model 2); and self-efficacy did not moderate the relationship between the exposure to
the contrasting images of the future condition and perceived control (see Table 3c Model 2), so
that H1c, H1e, H2e and H3e were not supported.
Finally, analyses of the first-stage moderated mediation models in the contrasting images of the
futures condition hypothesized in H3b and H3c also did not result in the support in these
hypotheses (mediation with opportunity appraisal moderated by promotion focus, index of
moderated mediation = -0.01, CI95%[-0.04; 0.11]; mediation with threat appraisal moderated by
prevention focus, index of moderated mediation = 0.00, CI95%[-0.05; 0.05]; mediation with
opportunity appraisal moderated by personal optimism, index of moderated mediation = 0.00,
CI95%[-0.07; 0.03]; and mediation with threat appraisal moderated by personal optimism, index of
moderated mediation = 0.00, CI95%[-0.05; 0.02] (see Table 4).
These results, taken together, suggest that there is a direct effect of exposure to any future
scenario, which induces individuals to think about their own future and thus about the necessity to
plan for it, regardless of the content and polarity of the scenario narratives presented.

40
CHAPTER FIVE
STUDY TWO
Methods
Sample, design and procedure
In the first study, the effect of different kinds of images of the futures of a generic external
environment on formulation of plans were assessed. In the second study, the same hypothesized
mechanism was investigated using domain-specific images of the futures. Experimental data from
a total sample of 200 bachelor students at the National University of Singapore Business School
was collected. They were divided into four groups, with each included 50 individuals. The four
groups were administered the pretest and posttest using the same procedure as in study 1. However,
the scenario vignettes differed in that they presented different representations of the futures of
artificial intelligence in organizational contexts. Specifically, in the positive image of the future
condition, participants were asked to read two passages presenting two experts’ opinions of the
long-term future of artificial intelligence construing this focal issue as beneficial to the economic
flourishment of the society where they will be living due to the creation of new jobs, fruitfully
complementing human tasks in organizations. In the negative image of the future condition,
participants were asked to read two passages presenting two experts’ opinions of the long-term
future of artificial intelligence construing this focal issue as detrimental to the economic
flourishment of the society where they will be living due to the elimination of new jobs,
substituting human professions in organizations. The scenario vignettes were to the uttermost
possible extent equal in syntax, with opposite wordings according to conditions. In the contrasting
images of the future condition, participants were asked to read two passages presenting two experts’
opinions of the long-term future of artificial intelligence. One of them was positive and one was

41
negative, as above. The full scenario vignettes used are available in Appendix B. An example of
the text used in the control group is available in Appendix B. In this study, the same measurements
of Study 1 were used (see Appendix A).
One question meant to assess the comprehension of the scenario narratives waw used as
manipulation check directly after the exposure to the text in the three treatment groups. The
questions used in each condition are available in Appendix B. Only subjects who did not fail the
question were retained. They remaining subjects were 48 (positive condition), 44 (negative
condition) and 43 (contrast condition).
--------------------------------------
Insert Tables 5-8 about here
--------------------------------------

42
Results
The data was analyzed as in study 1. Descriptive statistics of and correlations between the variables
is displayed in Table 5. The summary of regression results is displayed in Tables 6, 7(a-c) and 8.
The reliability of the scales used in the survey was acceptable (self-efficacy Cronbach’s α = 0.74;
personal optimism Cronbach’s α = 0.75; promotion focus Cronbach’s α = 0.87; prevention focus
Cronbach’s α = 0.75; energy Cronbach’s α = 0.88; worry Cronbach’s α = 0.86; perceived control
Cronbach’s α = 0.77). There was neither difference between the two subgroups (positive/negative
news versus neutral news) of the control condition (t = -0.53, p = ns) nor between the two
subgroups (positive then negative vs negative then positive images of the futures) of the
contrasting images of the future condition (t = 0.53, p = ns) as measured via independent T-tests
on the dependent variable.
The effects of the three treatment conditions on the dependent variable, i.e., formulation of plans,
were analyzed separately with categorical regressions against the control group, i.e., by assigning
dummy variables to the three treatments conditions. Only the positive image of the future condition
(β = 0.39, p < 0.05) and negative image of the future condition (β = 0.59, p < 0.001, Table 7a
Model 4, Table 7b Model 4) had a positive and statistically significant effect on the formulation
of plans, not the contrasting images of the future condition (β = 0.2, p = ns, Table 7c Model 3),
thus supporting hypotheses H1, H2 but not H3 (see also analogous results as measured with three
independent T-tests between the three treatment groups and the control group, Table 6). This
precluded any test of the mediation and moderated mediation models hypothesized in H3a, H3b,
H3c, H3d, and H3e. None of the two remaining hypothesized mediating mechanisms was
statistically significant in their effect on formulation of plans (opportunity appraisal and positive
image of the future condition β = -0.08, Sobel test Z = -1.48, p = ns; threat appraisal and negative

43
image of the future condition β = 0.00, Sobel test Z = 0.24, p = ns), which did not support
hypotheses H1a and H2a (See Table 8).
However, it should be noted that the positive association between the exposure to the positive
image of the future condition and opportunity appraisal was statistically significant (β = 0.39, p <
0.05) (see table 7a Model 1) while its negative association with threat appraisal was not (β = -0.06,
p = ns), and that the positive association between the exposure to the negative image of the future
condition and threat appraisal was strongly statistically significant (β = 0.59, p < 0.001) (see Table
7b Model 1) while its negative association with opportunity appraisal was not (β = -0.02, p = ns).
The association between the exposure to the contrasting images of the futures condition and
opportunity appraisal and the association between the exposure to the contrasting images of the
futures condition and threat appraisal were not statistically significant (β = -0.06, p = ns; β = 0.12,
p = ns, respectively), and the association between the exposure to the contrasting images of the
futures condition and perceived control was also not statistically significant β = 0.00, p = ns) (See
Table 7c Model 1).
Additionally, as measured by independent T-tests between the groups, while there was no
statistically significant difference between the effects of the positive image of the future and
negative image of the future conditions on formulation of plans (t = 1.16, p = ns; ) there was a
statistically significant difference between the negative image of the future condition and
contrasting images of the future condition (t = 2.27, p < 0.05) but not between the positive image
of the future and contrasting images of the future conditions (β = 1.21, p = ns) (see Table 6). This
did not support hypothesis H4 and suggests that the contrasting images of the future condition has
no statistically significant effect on the formulation of plans.

44
Finally, moderators analysis did not reveal statistically significant results in any of the two
statistically significant conditions (positive image of the future condition: moderation with
personal optimism β = -0.05, p = ns, moderation with promotion focus β = -0.34 , p = ns, see
Table 7a Models 6; negative image of the future condition: moderation with personal optimism β
= -025, p = ns, moderation with prevention focus β = 0.06, p = ns, see Table 7b Models 6, 7), thus
not supporting hypotheses H1b, H2b, H1d, and H2d. However, personal optimism did moderate
the exposure to the negative image of the future condition and threat appraisal (β = -0.44, p < 0.05)
(see Table 7b Model 3), thus supporting H2c, but not the exposure to the positive image of the
future condition and opportunity appraisal (β = -0.05, p = ns) (see Table 5a Model 3); and
regulatory focus neither moderated the exposure to the positive image of the future condition and
opportunity appraisal (β = 0.3, p = ns) (see Table 7a Model 2), nor the exposure to the negative
image of the future condition and threat appraisal (β = -0.64, p = ns) (see Table 7b Model 2). Thus,
H1c, H1e and H2e were not supported.

45
CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION
Interpretation of the results from the two studies
The results of the two studies, taken together, show that no matter the modality of exposure to an
image of the future, individuals tend to be spurred to formulate plans to prepare to such future.
This, together with the absence of statistically significant results in the investigation of the
mediators of such mechanism, further suggest that the exposure to an image of the future of the
external environment may “prime” us to think about our own future irrespective of the content of
such image. Indeed, the priming effect in this case may be a kind of perceptual priming (Molden,
2014), that is, individuals may be primed to fill sentence stems related to their future plans as they
have been previously exposed to a stimulus that reminded them of the necessity of such plans, the
prime in this case being images of the futures. It is likely that this direct effect of the treatment
trumped any emotionally relevant mediator. Although this was not completely corroborated by the
results shown in Study 2 (contrasting condition), it is likely that what shown in Study 2 might due
to the smaller sample size, as the contrasting condition did exhibit an effect above and beyond the
control group on individuals’ formulation of plans, but not statistically significant. Alternatively,
it is also possible that because Study 2 was subject-specific, participants exposed to the contrasting
condition in this study were torn by the contrast of the issue at stake (artificial intelligence futures)
and thus spurred into neutrality of opinions, which may have not occurred in Study 1 as the images
of the future thereby presented were general. More studies with larger sample sizes are needed to
ascertain this.
Additionally, it should be noted that the dependent variable was barely correlated with other
variables in the study, despite being the only established measure of formulation of plans in the

46
psychology literature (Oettingen & Schnetter, 2001), and that the two studies have shown that the
three treatment conditions were significantly associated with emotions and appraisal responses.
These two observations, taken together, suggest that the measure of the dependent variable used
in the two studies may not be sensitive enough to exhibit variance as a consequence of the variance
in emotional/primary appraisal.
Alternatively, a growing body of literature suggests that emotional and calculative thinking
processes are used concurrently rather than separately, in what has been referred to as “parallel
competitive” model of reasoning (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2018). It has been suggested that
this model is more realistic than previous theories (called “default-interventionist”) as it takes into
account the concurrently reflexive and reflective nature of reasoning and acknowledges that
intuition can both inhibit and facilitate analysis (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2018). If one owes
to this perspective, emotional and primary-appraisal processes might be difficult to entangle from
intention and behavior as there is no clear-cut mediation at play. This may explain the presence of
direct effect in almost all the treatment conditions examined, the presence of statistically
significant associations of almost all the treatment conditions with primary appraisal and emotions,
and also the absence of mediating mechanisms.
Theoretical and practical implications
None withstanding the mechanism involved in the effect of images of the future on future planning,
the results above may still have some practical implications. Indeed, in the first study, negative
images of the future had a strong and statistically significant effect on threat appraisal, while
positive images of the future had the oppositive effect. A similar pattern was corroborated by study
2 with regards to the emotion of worry. This suggests that although the three different exposures

47
to images of the futures do not differ in their ability to influence the intensity of individuals’ plans
formulation, insofar as threat appraisal is positively associated with negative emotions such as
worry, the exposure to negative images of the future does have some negative externalities in that
it induces unpleasant states of mind, compared to the exposure to positive pr contrasting images
of the futures. Thus, in the presentation of future prospects, writers, leaders, and public intellectuals
may take these findings into account and, when in need to discuss negative images of the future,
may at least counterbalance them with positive ones. An additional caveat to this is that both
studies have shown that personal optimism can moderate the relationship between the exposure to
such negative images of the future and threat appraisal/worry by acting as a buffer. This may point
to the necessity to foster such trait in individuals to counterbalance the inevitable exposure to
negative collective prospects, abundant in the media.
Furthermore, these results presented can be treated as pre-theoretical for management and
organization studies, in that although they do not point to significant organizational implications,
they do open up an avenue of research that is bound to affect the way organizational members
determine their career-related purpose and motivation. Indeed, any organization either embraces
or advocates, explicitly or implicitly, certain images of the future of the environment around it.
The way the future is contextualized and socially constructed within the borders of the organization
is meant to affect employees’ intentions and behavior with regards to their future professional
prospects. The findings presented show that this indeed occurs and that emotions and primary
appraisal are also involved, even if the mechanism by which this happens has not been uncovered.
Indeed, if anything, the repeated exposure to a certain image of the future in organizational context,
where employees spend the vast majority of their time, should be stronger than what elicited in
laboratory settings as above.

48
Limitations and future research directions
This study is not without limitations. First and foremost, the dependent variable, while an
established measure in the psychology literature (see Oettingen & Schnetter, 2001) is only a proxy
of execution of formulated plans, and future studies should measure more directly behavioral
variables related to plans execution. Additionally, this measurement does not account for the kind
of plans formulated, which may vary across condition in both subject matter and emotions
expressed. Although at first sight the collected data (completed sentences stems) did not show
particular variation in this regard across the four treatment groups, this was not ascertained
objectively. Future studies may do so via text analytic techniques. Furthermore, as noted, to rule
out that the dependent variable was not sensitive enough, further studies should consider
alternative measures of the variable via, for instance, text analytic procedures aimed at extracting
plan formulation from the verbosity of the text produced by participants.
Perhaps most importantly, it is possible that the hypothesized more potent effect of the
juxtaposition of polarized images of the future on formulation of plans above and beyond
exclusively positive and exclusively negative images of the future did not show up because
subjects did not deem these polarized images realistic enough. This could be ruled out by future
studies by exposing subjects in the contrasting condition to several qualitatively different images
of the futures, rather than two polarized images of the future. Indeed, this technique has been
proposed in part to prevent participants to discard future scenario for their implausibility
(Chermack, 2011).
Lastly, as mentioned, because the research presented here is to be treated as pre-theoretical,
future studies should more directly assess the effect of the exposure to existing organizational
images of the future on employees intentional and behavioral outcomes. This may be done by

49
categorizing organizational images of the futures into positive, negative, contrasting, and perhaps
more typologies via managers interviews, and then by subsequently analyzing the impact of these
different categories on employees’ behavioral outcomes via nested cross-sectional studies.
Conclusion
In view of the widespread presence of projections of our collective futures in the media and of the
importance of their effect on human cognition and behavior, this research has studied the effect of
the exposure to different kinds of images of our collective future on individuals’ formulation of
their personal plans in the future with two experiments. Although it was been hypothesized that a
juxtaposition of both positive and negative images of the future would have a stronger effect on
plans formulation than either of the two images presented alone, it was found that all three
conditions had an impact, above and beyond the control group, on individual plans’ formulation,
with most of the effect sizes being statistically significant. Concurrently, in one of the two studies,
negative images of the future activated threat appraisal while positive images of the future acted
as a buffer against it, suggesting some tentative practical implications for the exposure of
individuals to images of the collective futures. The limitations of the research, primarily concerned
with the weakness of the dependent variable measured, have been discussed as well as potential
avenues for future research.

50
REFERENCES
Aguinis, H., & Bradley, K. J. (2014). Best Practice Recommendations for Designing and
Implementing Experimental Vignette Methodology Studies. Organizational Research
Methods, 17(4): 351-371.
Aspinwall, L. G. (2005). The Psychology of Future-Oriented Thinking: From Achievement to
Proactive Coping, Adaptation, and Aging. Motivation and Emotion, 29(4): 203-235.
Badaan, V., Jost, J. T., Fernando, J., & Kashima, Y. (2020). Imagining better societies: A social
psychological framework for the study of utopian thinking and collective action. Social
and Personality Psychology Compass, e12525.
Bandura, A. (1982). Self-Efficacy Mechanism in Human Agency. American Psychologist,
37(2): 122-147.
Bandura, A. (1993). Perceived Self-Efficacy in Cognitive Development and Functioning.
Educational Psychologist, 28(2): 117-148.
Bandura, A. (1997). Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control. New York, NY: W. H. Freeman
and Company.
Bandura, A. (2001). Social Cognitive Theory and Clinical Psychology. In N. J. Smelser, & P. B.
Baltes (Eds.). International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (pp.
14250-14254). Elsevier.
Barry Kappes, H., & Oettingen, G. (2011). Positive fantasies about idealized futures sap energy.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47 (2011) 719–729.

51
Beaty, R. E., Seli, P., & Schacter, D. L. (2019). Thinking about the Past and Future in Daily Life:
An Experience Sampling Study of Individuals Differences in Mental Time Travel.
Psychological Research, 83(4): 805-816.
Beckert, J. (2013). Imagined futures: fictional expectations in the economy. Theory and Society,
42(3): 219-240.
Beckert, J. (2016). Imagined Futures: Fictional Expectations and Capitalist Dynamics.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bell, W. (1997). Foundations of Futures Studies. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,
Volume 1.
Bell, F., Fletcher, G., Greenhill, A., Griffiths, M., & Mclean, R. (2013). Science fiction prototypes:
Visionary technology narratives between futures. Futures,50: 5-14.
Berntsen D, & Bohn A. (2010). Remembering and forecasting: The relation. Memory &
Cognition, 38(3): 265-78.
Bina, O., Mateus, S., Pereira, L., & Caffa, A. 2017. The future imagined: Exploring fiction as a
means of reflecting on today’s Grand Societal Challenges and tomorrow’s options.
Futures, 86: 166-184.
Blackwell, S. E., Rius-Ottenheim, N., Schulte-van Maaren, Y. W., Carlier, I. V., Middelkoop, V.
D., Zitman, F. G., Spinhoven, P., Holmes, E. A., & Giltay, E. J. (2013). Optimism and
mental imagery: a possible cognitive marker to promote well-being? Psychiatry
Research, 206(1): 56–61.
Borup, M., Brown, N., Konrad, K., & Van Lente, H. (2006). The sociology of expectations in
science and technology. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 18(3-4): 285-
298.

52
Boulding, K. (1956). The image: Knowledge in life and society. Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press.
Boyatzis, R. E., & Kleio, A. (2006). The ideal self as a driver of emotional change. Journal of
Management Development, 25(7): 624-642.
Chermack, T. J. (2011). Scenario planning in organizations: How to create, use, and assess
scenarios. San Francisco. CA: Berrett-Koehler.
Chen, K., & Hsu, L. (2020). Visioning the Future: Evaluating Learning Outcomes and Impacts of Futures-
Oriented Education. Journal of Futures Studies, 24(4): 103-116.
Dator, J. (2009). Alternative Futures at the Manoa School. Journal of Futures Studies, 14(2): 1-
18.
Dator, J. (2019). Jim Dator: A Noticer in Time. Springer.
D’ Argembeau, A., & Mathy, A. (2011). Tracking the Construction of Episodic Future Thought. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 140(2): 258-271.
Drach-Zahavy, A., & Erez, M. (2002). Challenge versus threat effects on the goal–performance
relationship. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 88: 667–682.
Fergnani, A. (2019). Corporate foresight: A new frontier for strategy and management. Academy
of Management Perspectives, In Press.
Fergnani, A., & Song, Z. (2020a). Images of the futures of organizations: A grounded study of
science fiction films set in the future. Manuscript submitted for publication.

53
Fergnani, A., & Song, Z. (2020b). The six scenario archetypes framework: A systematic
investigation of science fiction films set in the future. Futures, 124: 102645.
Folkman, S., & Lazarus, R. S. (1985). If It Changes It Must Be a process: Study of Emotion and
Coping During Three Stages of a College Examination. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 48(1): 150-170.
Gaonkar, D. P. (2002). Toward new imaginaries: An introduction. Public Culture, 14(1): 1-19.
Gavrilov-jerkovic, V., Jovanovic, V., Zuljevic, D., & Brdaric, D. (2014). When Less is More: A
short Version of the Personal Optimism Scale and the Self-Efficacy Optimism Scale.
Journal of Happiness Studies, 15: 455-474.
Gidley, J. M. (1998). Prospective youth visions through imaginative education. Futures, 30(5):
395-408.
Harari, Y. N. (2015). Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow. London, UK: Harvill Secker.
Hicks, D. (1994). Preparing for the Future: Notes and Queries for Concerned Educators.
London, UK: Adamantine Press Limited.
Hicks, D. (1996a). Retrieving the dream: How students envision their preferable futures.
Futures, 28(8): 741-749.
Hicks, D. (1996b). A lesson for the future: Young people’s hopes and fear for tomorrow.
Futures, 28(1): 1-13.
Higgins, E. T. (1998). Promotion and prevention: Regulatory focus as a motivational principle.
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 30: 1-13.

54
Hines, A., & Bishop, P. (2015). Thinking about the future: Guidelines for strategic foresight.
Houston, TX: Hinesight.
Hodgkinson, G. P, & Sadler-Smith, E. (2018). The dynamics of intuition and analysis in
managerial and organizational decision making. Academy of Management Perspectives,
32(4): 473–492.
Johnson, B. D. (2009). Science Fiction Prototypes Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying about the Future
and Love Science Fiction. Intelligent Environments, 2: 3-8.
Johnson, B. D. (2011). Science Fiction Prototyping: Designing the future with science fiction.
Morgan & Claypool.
Jasanoff, S. and Kim, S.-H. (2009). Containing the atom: sociotechnical imaginaries and nuclear
regulation in the U.S. and South Korea. Minerva, 47(2):119–146.
Jonas, H. (1979). Das Prinzip Verantwirtung Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische
Zivilisation. Suhrkamp.
Karniol R., & Ross, M. (1996). The Motivational Impact of Temporal Focus: Thinking About
the Future and the Past. Annual Review of Psychology, 47: 593-620.
King, L. (2001). The Health Benefits of Writing About Life Goals. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 27(7): 798-807.
Klar, Y., Meding, A., & Sarel, D. (1996). Nonunique invulnerability: Singular versus
distributional probabilities and unrealistic optimism in comparative risk judgments.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 6: 228-245.

55
Klein, S. B. (2013). The complex act of projecting oneself into the future. WIREs Cognitive
Science, 4: 63-79.
Kurzweil, R. (2005). The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology. New York,
NY: Viking.
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Cognition and Motivation in Emotion. American Psychologist, 46(4):
352-367.
Lench, H. C. (2009). Automatic Optimism: The Affective Basis of Judgement About the
Likelihood of Future Events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 138(2):
187-200.
Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (1998). The role of feasibility and desirability considerations in near
and distant future decisions: A test of temporal construal theory. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 75(1): 5-18.
Liu, J. H., Paez, D., Slawuta, P., Cabecinhas, R., Techio, E., Kokdemir, D., Sen, R., Vincze, O.,
Muluk, H., Wang, F., & Zlobina, A. (2009). Representing world history in the 21st
century: The impact of 9/11, the Iraq war, and the nation-state on dynamics of collective
remembering. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 40: 667–692.
Lockwood, P. , Jordan, C. , Kunda, Z. & (2002). Motivation by Positive or Negative Role
Models. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83 (4), 854-864.
Loewenstain G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001). Risk as Feelings.
Psychological Bulletin, 127(2): 267-286.
Markus, H., & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible Selves. American Psychologist, 41(9): 954-969.
Mau, J. (1967). Social change and images of the futures. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman.

56
McKenna, F. P. (1993). It won’t happen to me: Unrealistic optimism or illusion of control?
British Journal of Psychology, 84: 39–50.
Meevissen, Y. M. C., Peters, M. L., & Alberts, H. J. E. M. (2011). Become more optimistic by
imagining a best possible self: Effects of a two week intervention. Journal of Behavior
Therapy and Experimental Psychology, 42: 371-378.
Molden, D. C. (2014). Understanding Priming Effects in Social Psychology. The Guilford
Press
Morgan, D. (2002). Images of the future: a historical perspective. Futures, 34: 83-893.
Newby-Clark, I. R., & Ross, M. (2003). Conceiving the Past and Future. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 29(7): 807-818.
Newman, M. G., & Llera, S. J. (2011). A novel theory of experiential avoidance in generalized
anxiety disorder: A review and synthesis of research supporting a contrast avoidance
model of worry. Clinical Psychology Review, 31(3): 371-382.
Oettingen, G., & Mayer, D. (2002). The Motivating Function of Thinking About the Future:
Expectation Versus Fantasies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38(5):
1198-1212.
Oettingen, G., Pak, H., & Schnetter, K. (2001). Self-Regulation of Goal Setting: Turning Free
Fantasies About the Future Into Binding Goals. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 80(5): 736-753.
Oettingen, G. (2012). Future thought and behavior change. European Review of Social
Psychology, 23: 1-63.

57
Ono, R. (2003). Learning from young people’s image of the future: a case study in Taiwan and
the US. Futures, 35: 737-758.
Peterson, J. B. (1999). Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief. New York: Routledge.
Phillips, D. M., Olson, J, C. & Baumgartner, H. (1995). Consumption Visions in Consumer
Decision Making. In F. R. Kardes & M. Sujan (Eds.). Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 22 (pp. 280-284), Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research.
Polak, F. (1973). The image of the future. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of
reinforcement. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 80(1): 1-28.
Rozin, P., & Royzman, E. B. (2007). Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and Contagion.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5(4): 296-320.
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., & Buckner, R. L. (2007). Remembering the past to imagine the
future: the prospective brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 8: 657-661.
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., & Buckner, R. L. (2008). Episodic Simulation of Future Events:
Concepts, Data, and Applications. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1124:
39-60.
Schubert, T., Eloo, R., Scharfen, J., & Morina, N. (2020). How imagining personal future
scenarios influences affect: Systematic review and meta-analysis. Clinical Psychology
Review, 75: 101811.
Seligman, M., Railton, P., Baumeister, R., & Sripada, C. (2016). Homo Prospectus. Oxford,
England: Oxford University Press.

58
Sevincer, A. T., Wagner, G., Kalvelage, J., & Oettingen, G. (2014). Positive Thinking About the
Future in Newspaper Reports and Presidential Addresses Predicts Economic Downturn.
Psychological Science, 25(4): 1010-1017.
Shah, J., Higgins, E. T., & Friedman, R. S. (1998). Performance Incentives and Means: How
Regulatory Focus Influences Goal Attainment. Attitudes and Social Cognition, 74(2):
285-293.
Shead, S. (2020). Elon Musk has a complex relationship with the A.I. community. CNBC.
Retrieved from: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/13/elon-musk-has-a-complex-
relationship-with-the-ai-community.html
Shiller, R. J. (2019). Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic
Events. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Shrikanth, S., Szpunar, P. M., & Szpunar, K. K. (2018). Staying Positive in a Dystopian Future:
A Novel Dissociation Between Personal and Collective Cognition. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 147(8): 1200-1210.
Slaughter, R. (1991). Changing images of futures in the 20th century. Futures, 23(5): 499-515.
Slaughter, R. (2020). Farewell Alternative Futures? Futures, 102496.
Smith, C. A., & Kirby, L. D. (2009). Putting appraisal in context: Toward a relational model of
appraisal and emotion. Cognition and Emotion, 23(7): 1352-1372.
Soroka, S. N. (2006). Good News and Bad News: Asymmetric Response to Economic
Information. The Journal of Politics, 68(2): 372-385.
Soroka, S. N., & McAdams, S. (2015). News, politics, and negativity. Political Communication,
32: 1-22.

59
Spector, P. E. (1988). Development of the Work Locus of Control Scale. Journal of
Occupational Psychology, 61: 331-340.
Spielberg, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., Lushene, R., Vegg, P. R., & Jacobs, G. A. (1977). State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory for Adults: Self Evaluation Questionnaire. Mind Garden.
Szpunar, K. K., Shrikanth, S., & Schacter, D. L. (1997). Varieties of Futures-Thinking. In G.
Oettingen, A. T. Sevincer, & P. M. Gollwitzer (Eds.), The Psychology of Thinking about
the Future (p. 52-67). New York: NY: The Guilford Press.
Szpunar, K. K. (2010). Episodic Future Thought: An Emerging Concept. Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 5(2): 142-162.
Taylor, S. E., Pham, L. B., Rivkin, I. D., & Armor, D. A. (1998). Harnessing the Imagination:
Mental Simulation, Self-Regulation, and Coping. American Psychologist, 53(4): 429-
439.
Verschraegen, G., & Vandermoere, F. (2017). Shaping the future through imaginaries of science,
technology and society. In G. Verschraegen, F. Vandermoere, F. L. Braeckmans & B.
Segaert (Eds.), Imagined Futures in Science, Technology and Society (pp. 1-11). New
York, NY: Routledge.
Walters, G., Sparks, B., & Herington (2007). The Effectiveness of Print Advertising Stimuli in
Evoking Elaborate Consumption Visions for Potential Travelers. Journal of Travel
Research, 46(1): 24-34.
Weinstein, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 39(5): 806-820.

60
APPENDIX A
Material used in Study 1
1. Scenario vignettes
Positive image of the future condition:
The following passages are experts’ predictions about the long-term future of the human species.
Please read the passages carefully. While reading the text, trying to imagine yourself living in the
future described.
Some experts maintain that:
despite short-term crises triggered by events such as financial downturns, regional wars, or
pandemics, several experts maintain that the overall trajectory of our civilization is bringing us
towards a bright future of endless possibilities, roughly by the half of this century and within the
lifetime of most currently-living human beings. The vast majority of individuals will enjoy an
unprecedented quality of life thanks to the decrease of the cost of products. The predominance of
economic cooperation is increasingly trumping local conflicts, which decreases the probability
of war (locally and globally). The internet is also making social ideologies more homogeneous,
which is bound to flatten out extreme political positions. Social and ideological conflict is
therefore decreasing. This will combine with technological advances to unleash an era of
abundance and well-being for the great majority of the globe. Specifically, advances in medicine
are progressing apace, leveraging on genetic engineering, virtual surgery, stem cells treatments,
and 3D printed organs, among other developments. Thus, medicine will become increasingly
cheap while at the same time increasingly capable to cure any human ailments. Additionally,
advances in nanotechnology will allow us to revert the damages made to the environment, what is
called “geoengineering”, thus preventing the excessive impact of climate change.
In the same vein, other experts maintain that:

61
advances in artificial intelligence can liberate human beings from drudgery of work, allowing
us to commit to more diverse and meaningful tasks. This change is expected to occur within
our lifetime, in two or three decades from now. This, coupled with universal basic income schemes,
which are increasingly implemented all over the globe, will free workers from unwanted
imposition, and incentivize them to curate their health and design their own job in a more
empowering economy. Basic income and less unemployment will in turn incentivize less
political extremisms and violent conflicts. As most of working individuals will be less concerned
with striving for a living, a new wave of entrepreneurial ventures will ensue, which will contribute
to increase the choice of available products and services and to decrease their cost via competition
in the market economy. Boundless career opportunities will be afforded by the many new
ventures created by such entrepreneurs. Additionally, individuals will be more conscious of their
consumption choices, which will drive entrepreneurs and companies to strive to produce
environmentally friendly products, which will further benefit the environmental ecosystem. In
such a future, individuals will also be more concerned about each other’s mental well-being.
Empathy and care for others will become a collective realization. Ethical treatments of different
races, gender, and orientations will thus be embedded in our everyday lives, professional and social
alike, with little ideological conflict in the political arena.
Negative image of the future condition
The following passages are two very different experts’ predictions about the long-term future of
the human species. Please read the passages carefully. While reading the text, trying to imagine
yourself living in the future described.
Some experts maintain that:
despite short-term crises triggered by events such as financial downturns, regional wars, or
pandemics, several experts maintain that the overall trajectory of our civilization is bringing us
towards a bright future of endless possibilities, roughly by the half of this century and within the
lifetime of most currently-living human beings. The vast majority of individuals will enjoy an
unprecedented quality of life thanks to the decrease of the cost of products. The predominance

62
of economic cooperation is increasingly trumping local conflicts, which decreases the probability
of war (locally and globally). The internet is also making social ideologies more homogeneous,
which is bound to flatten out extreme political positions. Social and ideological conflict is
therefore decreasing. This will combine with technological advances to unleash an era of
abundance and well-being for the great majority of the globe. Specifically, advances in
medicine are progressing apace, leveraging on genetic engineering, virtual surgery, stem cells
treatments, and 3D printed organs, among other developments. Thus, medicine will become
increasingly cheap while at the same time increasingly capable to cure any human
ailments. Additionally, advances in nanotechnology will allow us to revert the damages made to
the environment, what is called “geoengineering”, thus preventing the excessive impact of climate
change.
In sharp contrast with the above, other experts maintain that:
advances in artificial intelligence may result in algorithms taking control of human choice, with
adverse conditions for our mental well-being. This change is expected to occur within our
lifetime, in two or three decades from now. Monopolistic conglomerate will exploit vast amount
of data on consumer decision making to drive consumption of their products, and these purchases
might not be optimal to maximize consumers’ health and work-life balance. Widespread work-
related dissatisfaction and anxiety will in turn incentivize more political extremisms and
violent conflicts. As most of working individuals will be affiliated with conglomerate
organizations, entrepreneurial ventures will be stifled, which will in turn incentivize consumption
of a limited pool of products and services provided by such conglomerates. Therefore, career
opportunities will be rather limited for new generations. Additionally, the strong political ties of
these conglomerates will likely allow companies to focus on maximizing outputs without concern
for producing environmentally friendly products, which will further damage the environmental
ecosystem. In such a future, it is likely that individuals will also be less concerned about each
other’s mental well-being, as empathy and care for others will become secondary problems vis-
à-vis unsatisfactory professional opportunities. Ethical treatments of different races, gender, and
orientations will thus be disregarded by many as frivolous concerns, which will in turn increase
ideological conflict in the political arena.

63
Contrasting images of the future condition:
The following passages are two very different experts’ predictions about the long-term future of
the human species. Please read the passages carefully. While reading the text, trying to imagine
yourself living in the future described.
Some experts maintain that:
despite short-term crises triggered by events such as financial downturns, regional wars, or
pandemics, several experts maintain that the overall trajectory of our civilization is bringing us
towards a bright future of endless possibilities, roughly by the half of this century and within the
lifetime of most currently-living human beings. The vast majority of individuals will enjoy an
unprecedented quality of life thanks to the decrease of the cost of products. The predominance
of economic cooperation is increasingly trumping local conflicts, which decreases the probability
of war (locally and globally). The internet is also making social ideologies more homogeneous,
which is bound to flatten out extreme political positions. Social and ideological conflict is
therefore decreasing. This will combine with technological advances to unleash an era of
abundance and well-being for the great majority of the globe. Specifically, advances in
medicine are progressing apace, leveraging on genetic engineering, virtual surgery, stem cells
treatments, and 3D printed organs, among other developments. Thus, medicine will become
increasingly cheap while at the same time increasingly capable to cure any human
ailments. Additionally, advances in nanotechnology will allow us to revert the damages made to
the environment, what is called “geoengineering”, thus preventing the excessive impact of climate
change.
In sharp contrast with the above, other experts maintain that:
advances in artificial intelligence may result in algorithms taking control of human choice, with
adverse conditions for our mental well-being. This change is expected to occur within our
lifetime, in two or three decades from now. Monopolistic conglomerate will exploit vast amount

64
of data on consumer decision making to drive consumption of their products, and these purchases
might not be optimal to maximize consumers’ health and work-life balance. Widespread work-
related dissatisfaction and anxiety will in turn incentivize more political extremisms and
violent conflicts. As most of working individuals will be affiliated with conglomerate
organizations, entrepreneurial ventures will be stifled, which will in turn incentivize consumption
of a limited pool of products and services provided by such conglomerates. Therefore, career
opportunities will be rather limited for new generations. Additionally, the strong political ties of
these conglomerates will likely allow companies to focus on maximizing outputs without concern
for producing environmentally friendly products, which will further damage the environmental
ecosystem. In such a future, it is likely that individuals will also be less concerned about each
other’s mental well-being, as empathy and care for others will become secondary problems vis-
à-vis unsatisfactory professional opportunities. Ethical treatments of different races, gender, and
orientations will thus be disregarded by many as frivolous concerns, which will in turn increase
ideological conflict in the political arena.
Example of text used in the control group:
Please read the following passage carefully.
Vitamin C (ascorbic acid) is a nutrient your body needs to form blood vessels, cartilage, muscle
and collagen in bones. Vitamin C is also vital to your body's healing process. Vitamin C is an
antioxidant that helps protect your cells against the effects of free radicals — molecules produced
when your body breaks down food or is exposed to tobacco smoke and radiation from the sun, X-
rays or other sources. Free radicals might play a role in heart disease, cancer and other diseases.
Vitamin C also helps your body absorb and store iron. Because your body doesn't produce vitamin
C, you need to get it from your diet. Vitamin C is found in citrus fruits, berries, potatoes, tomatoes,
peppers, cabbage, Brussels sprouts, broccoli and spinach. Vitamin C is also available as an oral
supplement, typically in the form of capsules and chewable tablets. Most people get enough
vitamin C from a healthy diet. Severe vitamin C deficiency can lead to a disease called scurvy,
which causes anemia, bleeding gums, bruising and poor wound healing. If you take vitamin C for
its antioxidant properties, keep in mind that the supplement might not offer the same benefits as

65
naturally occurring antioxidants in food. The recommended daily amount of vitamin C is 90
milligrams for adult men and 75 milligrams for adult women.
Research on the use of vitamin C for specific conditions shows:
• Cancer. Eating a diet rich in fruits and vegetables might lower your risk of many types
of cancer, such as breast, colon and lung cancers. However, it's not clear whether this
protective effect is related to the vitamin C content in the food. Taking oral vitamin C
supplements doesn't appear to offer the same benefit.
• Common cold. Taking oral vitamin C supplements won't prevent the common cold.
Evidence also shows that the benefits of regularly taking vitamin C supplements to
reduce the duration or severity of a cold are minimal.
• Eye diseases. Taking oral vitamin C supplements in combination with other vitamins
and minerals seems to prevent age-related macular degeneration (AMD) from
worsening. Some studies also suggest that people who have higher levels of vitamin C
in their diets have a lower risk of developing cataracts.
Most people get enough vitamin C from a balanced diet. People who might be susceptible to
vitamin C deficiency may benefit from the use of vitamin C supplements. When taken at
appropriate doses, oral vitamin C supplements are generally considered safe. Taking too much
vitamin C can cause side effects, including:
• Nausea, vomiting and diarrhea
• Heartburn
• Stomach cramps or bloating
• Fatigue and sleepiness, or sometimes insomnia
• Headache
• Skin flushing
In some people, oral vitamin C supplements can cause kidney stones, especially when taken in
high doses. Long-term use of oral vitamin C supplements over 2,000 milligrams a day increases

66
the risk of significant side effects. Tell your doctor that you're taking vitamin C supplements before
having any medical tests. High levels of vitamin C might interfere with the results of certain tests,
such as stool tests for occult blood or glucose screening tests.
2. Manipulation check questions
Positive and negative images of the future conditions
In the future scenarios narrated above, human societies will likely face what outcome?
a. They will likely enjoy more social, ideological and interpersonal conflicts (correct answer
for the negative condition)
b. They will likely enjoy less social, ideological and interpersonal conflicts (correct answer
for the positive condition)
c. They will likely have the same number of social, ideological and interpersonal conflicts of
today
d. Not stated
In the future scenarios narrated above, human beings will likely face what outcome?
a. They will likely enjoy more abundant and diverse career opportunities conflicts (correct
answer for the positive condition)
b. They will likely enjoy less abundant and diverse career opportunities (correct answer for
the negative condition)
c. They will likely have the same number and kind of career opportunities of today
d. Not stated
Contrasting images of the future condition
The two future scenarios narrated above are:

67
a. In disagreement regarding social, ideological and interpersonal conflicts in the future
(correct answer)
b. In agreement regarding social, ideological and interpersonal conflicts in the future
c. Presenting similar information regarding social, ideological and interpersonal conflicts in
the future, with some disagreement over the details of what kind of conflict we will
experience
d. Not stated
The two future scenarios narrated above are:
a. In disagreement regarding humans' well-being in the future (correct answer)
b. In agreement regarding humans' well-being in the future
c. Presenting similar information regarding humans' well-being in the future
d. Not stated
3. Measurements
Self-efficacy (1, 3, 6-8) & personal optimism (4, 5, 7, 9) (Gavrilov-jerkovic, 2014).
1. For each problem I will find a solution.
2. In difficult situations I will find a way.
3. I master difficult problems.
4. I am facing my future in an optimistic way
5. I can hardly think of something positive in the future. (reverse coded)
6. I can master difficulties.
7. I worry about my future. (reverse coded
8. I always find a solution to a problem.
9. It often seems to me that everything is gloomy. (reverse coded)

68
Promotion focus (12, 14, 15, 17, 21, 23, 25-27) & prevention focus (10, 11, 13, 16, 18-20, 22,
24) (Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002).
10. In general, I am focused on preventing negative events in my life.
11. I am anxious that I will fall short of my responsibilities and obligations
12. I frequently imagine how I will achieve my hopes and aspirations.
13. I often think about the person I am afraid I might become in the future
14. I often think about the person I would ideally like to be in the future.
15. I typically focus on the success I hope to achieve in the future
16. I often worry that I will fail to accomplish my goals.
17. I often think about how I will achieve success
18. I often imagine myself experiencing bad things that I fear might happen to me
19. I frequently think about how I can prevent failures in my life.
20. My major goal right now is to achieve my ambitions.
21. My major goal right now is to avoid becoming a failure.
22. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to reach my “ideal self”—to fulfill my
hopes, wishes, and aspirations
23. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to become the self I “ought” to be—to
fulfill my duties, responsibilities, and obligation.
24. In general, I am focused on achieving positive outcomes in my life.
25. I often imagine myself experiencing good things that I hope will happen to me.
Opportunity appraisal (28, 30, 32, 35, 36) & threat appraisal (32-34, 37, 38). Adapted from
(Drach-Zahavy & Erez, 2002).
26. These future scenarios seem like a challenge to me.
27. These future scenarios provide opportunities to exercise my skills.
28. These future scenarios provide opportunities to overcome obstacles.
29. These future scenarios provide opportunities to strengthen my self-esteem.
30. These future scenarios seem like a threat to me.
31. I’m worried that these future scenarios might reveal my weaknesses.

69
32. I’m worried that these future scenarios might threaten my self-esteem.
33. Overall, I think I’ll succeed in these future scenarios.
34. I think that I have the abilities necessary for success in these future scenarios.
35. Overall, it seems that I cannot succeed in future scenarios like these.
36. I’m worried that I lack the abilities to be successful in these future scenarios.
Control. Adapted from (Spector, 1988).
37. In their life, people can pretty much accomplish whatever they set out to accomplish.
38. If you know what you want in life, you can find the kind of life you aspire to.
39. If people are unhappy with a decision made by others that affects them, they should do
something about it.
40. Getting the life you want is mostly a matter of luck. (reverse coded)
41. Making money is primarily a matter of good fortune. (reverse coded)
42. In order to get a really good life you need to have family members or friends in high
places. (reverse coded)
43. Job promotions are usually a matter of good fortune. (reverse coded)
44. When it comes to landing a really good job, who you know is more important than what
you know. (reverse coded)
45. To make a lot of money you have to know the right people. (reverse coded)
46. It takes a lot of luck to have an outstanding career. (reverse coded)
47. Most people have more influence on others than they think they do.
48. The main difference between people who make a lot of money and people who make a
little money is luck. (reverse coded)
Formulation of plans (Oettingen & Schnetter, 2001).
All in all, I will______________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

70
Until_________________________________________________________________________
I will________________________________________________________________________
Specifically, I will____________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
In general, I will______________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
I will not___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
In principle, I will____________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
I will not_________________________________________________________________but
instead_____________________________________________________________________
If______________________________________________________________________then I
will________________________________________________________________________

71
APPENDIX B
Material used in Study 2
1. Scenario vignettes
Positive image of the future condition:
The following passages are experts’ predictions about the long-term future of artificial intelligence
and its impact on jobs and careers. Please read the passages carefully. While reading the text, trying
to imagine yourself living in the future described.
Several experts maintain that:
overall, developments in artificial intelligence and robotics will be beneficial to the economic
flourishment of our society of the future. This is because even if some jobs will be automated, with
all probability, this will be offset by the creation of a vast number of new jobs. All in all, the
jobs created will far outnumber those displaced. Indeed, jobs that will emerge include
professionals who will work to maintain, update, and manage artificial intelligence software, and,
most importantly to advise individuals on how to fruitfully complement human tasks with artificial
intelligence in organizations. There has not been a better time for people to develop their
careers. In the next few decades, not only job opportunities will increase in number, but also
in variety.
In the same vein, other experts maintain that:
once artificial intelligence will augment the capabilities of individuals, new jobs will be not only
more varied but also more fulfilling. Indeed, workers will take advantage from the fact that
artificial intelligence will take up “drudgery” work, so that they will be able to focus on more
rewarding and compelling tasks, such as creative endeavors, social entrepreneurship, communities
development, and advocacy, for instance. This will in turn create job opportunities for less
skilled workers to contribute in such endeavors by bringing a “human touch” where artificial
intelligence won’t be able to contribute much.

72
Negative image of the future condition:
The following passages are experts’ predictions about the long-term future of artificial intelligence
and its impact on jobs and careers. Please read the passages carefully. While reading the text, trying
to imagine yourself living in the future described.
Several experts maintain that:
overall, developments in artificial intelligence and robotics will be detrimental to the economic
flourishment of our society of the future. This is because even if some jobs will be created, with
all probability, this will be offset by the displacement of a vast number of jobs. All in all, the
jobs displaced will far outnumber those created. Indeed, although some jobs will emerge for
professionals who will work to maintain, update, and manage artificial intelligence software, as
these software will improve and be able to emulate human capabilities, such jobs will employ a
limited number of workers. The vast majority of jobs will be likely performed by artificial
intelligence. The next few decades will be very difficult for people to develop a career because
job opportunities will be far less.
In the same vein, other experts maintain that:
as artificial intelligence will displace humans, this will deprive a lot of workers not only of jobs
but also of their sense of fulfilment. Indeed, artificial intelligence will progress up to the point it
will be at the forefront of fields where humans are now leading, such as creative endeavors, social
entrepreneurship, communities development, and advocacy. As artificial intelligence will be better
than us in what is now considered human, we will come to regard artificial intelligence as
unparalleled and ourselves as inferior.
Contrasting images of the future condition:

73
The following passages are two very different experts’ predictions about the long-term future of
artificial intelligence and its impact on jobs and careers. Please read the passages carefully. While
reading the text, trying to imagine yourself living in the future described.
Some experts maintain that:
overall, developments in artificial intelligence and robotics will be beneficial to the economic
flourishment of our society of the future. This is because even if some jobs will be automated, with
all probability, this will be offset by the creation of a vast number of new jobs. All in all, the jobs
created will far outnumber those displaced. Indeed, jobs that will emerge include professionals
who will work to maintain, update, and manage artificial intelligence software, and, most
importantly to advise individuals on how to fruitfully complement human tasks with artificial
intelligence in organizations. There has not been a better time for people to develop their
careers. In the next few decades, not only job opportunities will increase in number, but also
in variety.
In sharp contrast with the above, other experts maintain that:
developments in artificial intelligence and robotics will be detrimental to the economic
flourishment of our society of the future. This is because even if some jobs will be created, this
will be offset by the displacement of a vast number of jobs. All in all, the jobs displaced will
far outnumber those created. Indeed, although some jobs will emerge for professionals who will
work to maintain, update, and manage artificial intelligence software, as these software will
improve and be able to emulate human capabilities, such jobs will actually employ a limited
number of workers. The vast majority of jobs will be likely performed by artificial intelligence.
The next few decades will be very difficult for people to develop a career because job
opportunities will be far less.
Example of text used in the control group:
Please read the following passages carefully.

74
Vitamin C (ascorbic acid) is a nutrient your body needs to form blood vessels, cartilage, muscle
and collagen in bones. Vitamin C is also vital to your body's healing process. Vitamin C is an
antioxidant that helps protect your cells against the effects of free radicals — molecules produced
when your body breaks down food or is exposed to tobacco smoke and radiation from the sun, X-
rays or other sources. Free radicals might play a role in heart disease, cancer and other diseases.
Vitamin C also helps your body absorb and store iron.
Because your body doesn't produce vitamin C, you need to get it from your diet. Vitamin C is
found in citrus fruits, berries, potatoes, tomatoes, peppers, cabbage, Brussels sprouts, broccoli and
spinach. Vitamin C is also available as an oral supplement, typically in the form of capsules and
chewable tablets. Most people get enough vitamin C from a healthy diet. Severe vitamin C
deficiency can lead to a disease called scurvy, which causes anemia, bleeding gums, bruising and
poor wound healing. If you take vitamin C for its antioxidant properties, keep in mind that the
supplement might not offer the same benefits as naturally occurring antioxidants in food. The
recommended daily amount of vitamin C is 90 milligrams for adult men and 75 milligrams for
adult women.
2. Manipulation check questions
Positive and negative images of the future conditions
In the future scenarios narrated above, human beings will likely face what outcome?
a. a. They will likely enjoy more abundant and diverse career opportunities (correct answer
for the positive condition)
b. They will likely enjoy less abundant and diverse career opportunities (correct answer for
the negative condition)
c. They will likely have the same number and kind of career opportunities of today
d. Not stated

75
Contrasting images of the future condition
The two future scenarios narrated above are:
a. In disagreement regarding humans' jobs and careers in the future (correct answer)
b. In agreement regarding humans' jobs and careers in the future
c. Presenting similar information regarding humans' jobs and careers in the future
d. Not stated

76
FIGURE 1. Complete Theoretical model
(Panel a: positive images of the futures to formulation of plans mechanism)

77
FIGURE 1. Complete Theoretical model
(Panel b: negative images of the futures to formulation of plans mechanism)

78
FIGURE 1. Complete Theoretical model
(Panel c: contrasting images of the futures to formulation of plans mechanism)

79
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 1)
Note. N = 218, SD = standard deviation, IOF = image(s) of the future
Reliability coefficients appear along the diagonal, shaded area reports variables’ means in each treatment condition, means of IOF
conditions/control group refer to the percentage of the condition relative to the whole sample
*P < .05. **P < .01.
Mean
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1. Positive IOF
.24
-
-
2. Negative IOF
.22
-
-
-
3. Contrasting IOF
.23
-
-
-
-
4. Control Group
.31
-
-
-
-
-
5. Self-efficacy
3.72
.78
4.28
3.47
3.64
3.50
(.79)
6. Promotion Focus
3.79
.69
3.91
3.53
3.90
3.79
.47**
(.87)
7. Prevention Focus
3.37
.66
3.22
3.35
3.37
3.52
-.30**
-.04
(.76)
8. Personal Optimism
2.97
.83
3.03
2.80
3.18
2.88
.51**
.40**
-.50**
(.76)
9. Opportunity Appraisal
3.53
.71
3.72
3.08
3.45
3.76
.52**
.48**
-.10
.31**
(.73)
10. Threat Appraisal
2.80
.96
2.11
3.31
2.95
2.89
-.50**
-.32**
.50**
-.54**
-.50**
(.85)
11. Perceived Control
3.27
.61
3.46
3.07
3.35
3.26
.39**
.41**
-.30**
.42**
.34**
-.45**
(.83)
12. Formulation of Plans
1.89
.87
2.01
1.97
2.02
1.64
.06
.14*
.06
.00
-.05
.02
.06
-

80
TABLE 2. T-tests of direct effects and differences between treatment groups (Study 1)
Note. IOF = image(s) of the future
*p ≤ .05.
Positive IOF
Negative IOF
Contrasting IOF
Positive IOF
Negative IOF
t = -.2
Contrasting IOF
t = .1
t = .23
Control group
t = 2.27*
t = 1.96*
t = 2.57*

81
TABLE 3 (Panel a). Summary of Regression Results – Positive Image of the Future Condition (Study 1)
Note. N = 124, SE = standard error, IOF = image(s) of the future
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported, categorical regressions are computed against the control group
*p < .05. **P < .01.
Opportunity
Appraisal
Formulation
of Plans
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
Positive IOF
-.03
.11
.37
.61
.51
.41
.37*
.16
-.93
.96
.11
.62
Opportunity Appraisal
-.08
.13
Promotion Focus
.46**
.1
-.01
.17
Personal Optimism
.32**
.09
-.09
.14
Positive IOF x Promotion Focus
-.11
.15
.33
.24
Positive IOF x Personal Optimism
-.19
.13
.09
.20
R2
.00
.16**
.08**
.04*
.00
.04*
.02

82
TABLE 3 (Panel b). Summary of Regression Results – Negative Image of the Future Condition (Study 1)
Note. N = 117, SE = standard error, IOF = image(s) of the future
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported, categorical regressions are computed against the control group
*p < .05. **P < .01.
Threat
Appraisal
Formulation
of Plans
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
Negative IOF
.42**
.16
1.74
.71
-.60
.42
.33*
.16
1.2
.8
.15
.59
Threat Appraisal
.03
.09
Prevention Focus
.84**
.13
.22
.16
Personal Optimism
-.84**
.1
-.09
.13
Negative IOF x Prevention Focus
-.35
.2
-.24
.25
Negative IOF x Personal Optimism
-.34*
.14
.06
.19
R2
.04**
.33**
.47**
.02*
.00
.02
.01

83
TABLE 3 (Panel c). Summary of Regression Results – Contrasting Images of the Future Condition (Study 1)
Note. N = 119, SE = standard error, IOF = image(s) of the future
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported, categorical regressions are computed against the control group
*p < .05. **P < .01.
Perceived Control
Formulation
of Plans
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
Contrasting IOF
-.01
.11
.1
.6
.37*
.14
-.67
.83
Perceived Control
.00
.12
Self-efficacy
.26**
.09
-.02
.13
Contrasting IOF x Self-efficacy
-.04
.16
.28
.22
R2
.00
.05*
.04*
.00
.04*

84
TABLE 4. Summary of Mediation and Moderated Mediation Results (Study 1)
Note. SE = standard error, CI = confidence interval, IOF = image(s) of the future
Indirect
Effect
SE
Sobel Z
Positive IOF-Opportunity Appraisal-Formulation of Plans
.00
.01
0.28
Negative IOF-Threat Appraisal-Formulation of Plans
.00
.04
-.09
Contrasting IOF-Perceived Control-Formulation of Plans
.00
.00
-.03
Moderator
Indirect
Effect Index
95% CI
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Contrasting IOF-Perceived Control-Formulation of Plans
Self-efficacy
.00
-.08
.07
Positive IOF- Opportunity Appraisal -Formulation of Plans
Promotion Focus
-.12
-.62
.24
Personal Optimism
-.02
-.27
.18
Negative IOF- Threat Appraisal -Formulation of Plans
Prevention Focus
.04
-.08
.22
Personal Optimism
.00
-.11
.1
Contrasting IOF-Opportunity Appraisal-Formulation of Plans
Promotion Focus
Personal Optimism
-.01
.00
-.04
-.07
.11
.03
Contrasting IOF-Threat Appraisal-Formulation of Plans
Prevention Focus
Personal Optimism
.00
.00
-.05
-.05
.05
.02

85
TABLE 5. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 2)
Note. N = 183, SD = standard deviation, IOF = image(s) of the future
Reliability coefficients appear along the diagonal, shaded area reports variables’ means in each treatment condition, means of IOF
conditions/control group refer to the percentage of the condition relative to the whole sample
**P < .01.
Mea
n
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1. Positive IOF
.26
-
-
2. Negative IOF
.24
-
-
-
3. Contrasting IOF
.24
-
-
-
-
4. Control Group
.26
-
-
-
-
-
5. Self-efficacy
3.89
.73
4.46
3.62
3.80
3.65
(.74)
6. Promotion Focus
3.86
.60
4.00
3.72
3.90
3.81
.52**
(.87)
7. Prevention Focus
3.40
.60
3.35
3.42
3.43
3.41
-.14
-.02
(.75)
8. Personal Optimism
3.18
.80
3.10
3.14
3.30
3.09
.40**
.38**
-.51**
(.75)
9. Opportunity Appraisal
3.14
.86
3.51
3.00
2.80
3.04
.44**
.32**
-.09
.25**
(.88)
10. Threat Appraisal
3.05
.93
2.93
3.20
3.10
2.99
-.33**
-.26**
.47**
-.52**
-.30**
(.86)
11. Perceived Control
3.17
.53
3.13
3.20
3.20
3.18
.25**
.23**
-.22**
.40**
.22**
-.32**
(.77)
12. Formulation of Plans
1.81
.81
1.90
2.10
1.72
1.52
-.01
.07
.04
-.02
-.07
-.01
-.03
-

86
TABLE 6. T-tests of direct effects and differences between treatment groups (Study 2)
Note. IOF = image(s) of the future
*p < .05. **P ≤ .01.
Positive IOF
Negative IOF
Contrasting IOF
Positive IOF
Negative IOF
t = 1.16
Contrasting IOF
t = 1.21
t = 2.27*
Control group
t = 2.52**
t = 3.51**
t = 1.23

87
TABLE 7 (Panel a). Summary of Regression Results – Positive Image of the Future Condition (Study 2)
Note. N = 98, SE = standard error, IOF = image(s) of the future
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported, categorical regressions are computed against the control group
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Opportunity Appraisal
Formulation
of Plans
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
Positive IOF
.47**
.14
-.77
1.05
.6
.5
.39*
.15
1.69
1.11
.55
.65
Opportunity Appraisal
-.08
.1
Promotion Focus
.13
.19
.42*
.02
Personal Optimism
.34**
.13
.06
.14
Positive IOF x Promotion Focus
.3
.26
-.34
.28
Positive IOF x Personal Optimism
-.05
0.18
-.05
0.2
R2
.08**
.17**
.17***
.05
.00
.07
.03

88
TABLE 7 (Panel b). Summary of Regression Results – Negative Image of the Future Condition (Study 2)
Note. N = 94, SE = standard error, IOF = image(s) of the future
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported, categorical regressions are computed against the control group
‘p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Threat Appraisal
Formulation
of Plans
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
Negative IOF
.21
.19
2.41*
1.14
-1.14’
.69
.59***
.16
.37
1.1
1.39’
.71
Threat Appraisal
.06
.09
Prevention Focus
.88***
.19
.07
.18
Personal Optimism
-.84***
.14
.06
.15
Negative IOF x Prevention Focus
-.64
.33
.06
.31
Negative IOF x Personal Optimism
-.44*
.21
-.25
.22
R2
.00
0.18***
.29***
0.1
.00
.1**
0.1**

89
TABLE 7 (Panel c). Summary of Regression Results – Contrasting Images of the Future Condition (Study 2)
Note. N = 93, SE = standard error, IOF = image(s) of the future
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported, categorical regressions are computed against the control group
Perceived Control
Formulation
of Plans
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
Contrasting IOF
-.00
.1
.22
.63
.2
.16
1.4
1.05
Perceived Control
-.01
.17
Self-efficacy
.23
.12
.2
.2
Contrasting IOF x Self-efficacy
-.06
.16
-.32
.27
R2
-.01
.03
.00
-.01
0

90
TABLE 8. Summary of Mediation and Moderated Mediation Results (Study 2)
Note. SE = standard error, CI = confidence interval, IOF = image(s) of the future, mediation/moderated mediation results of the
contrasting images of the future condition are not reported as the main effect was not statistically significant.
Indirect
Effect
SE
Sobel Z
Positive IOF-Opportunity Appraisal-Formulation of Plans
-.08
.05
-1.48
Negative IOF-Threat Appraisal-Formulation of Plans
.00
.02
.24
Moderator
Indirect
Effect Index
95% CI
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Positive IOF-Opportunity Appraisal-Formulation of Plans
Promotion Focus
-.18
-1.14
.44
Personal Optimism
.00
-.17
.2
Negative IOF-Threat Appraisal-Formulation of Plans
Prevention Focus
-.1
-.5
.15
Personal Optimism
-.03
-.25
.12