Partisan selective exposure and politically polarized attitudes toward disruptive protest

Abstract

While many Americans support the right to protest, increased animus has recently been directed at protesters themselves, often along partisan ideological lines and in partisan media content. However, there is a lack of research on attitudes toward treatment of protesters in the context of political violence and selective exposure to likeminded partisan sources of information. This study finds that a significant, positive relationship exists between self-identified Republicans and thinking that disruptive protesters deserve to be “roughed up,” while identifying as a Democrat produced a negative relationship in the same circumstance. Likewise, consumption of conservative partisan media was found to have a positive relationship with the idea of “roughing up” disruptive protesters, while liberal partisan media was found to have a negative relationship. However, selective exposure to attitude-affirming media only had a significant impact among self-identified Democrats, in the sense that Democrats’ selective exposure to left-leaning media was associated with less support for “roughing up” disruptive protesters.

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https://doi.org/10.1177/20570473231171460
Communication and the Public
2023, Vol. 8(3) 191 –205
© The Author(s) 2023
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Introduction
In February 2016, Donald Trump responded to a dis-
ruptive protester at a campaign rally in Las Vegas,
Nevada, saying he would like to, “punch him in the
face” and lamented the passage of the “old days”
when he would have been, “carried out in a stret-
cher” (Corasantini & Haberman, 2016, para. 2–3).
Afterwards, the former president was accused of
condoning violence in response to counter-protesters
at the “Unite the Right” rally in August 2017 and
nation-wide protests following the death of George
Floyd (Cathey & Keneally, 2020). Much of the
animus of Trump and conservative media outlets
have been directed at left-leaning protesters who
Partisan selective exposure and
politically polarized attitudes
toward disruptive protest
Kyle John Lorenzano
Soo Jung Moon
University of West Georgia, USA
Porismita Borah
Washington State University, USA
Abstract
While many Americans support the right to protest, increased animus has recently been directed at protesters
themselves, often along partisan ideological lines and in partisan media content. However, there is a lack of research
on attitudes toward treatment of protesters in the context of political violence and selective exposure to likeminded
partisan sources of information. This study finds that a significant, positive relationship exists between self-identified
Republicans and thinking that disruptive protesters deserve to be “roughed up,” while identifying as a Democrat
produced a negative relationship in the same circumstance. Likewise, consumption of conservative partisan media
was found to have a positive relationship with the idea of “roughing up” disruptive protesters, while liberal partisan
media was found to have a negative relationship. However, selective exposure to attitude-affirming media only had
a significant impact among self-identified Democrats, in the sense that Democrats’ selective exposure to left-leaning
media was associated with less support for “roughing up” disruptive protesters.
Keywords
Partisan media, polarization, political violence, protest, public opinion
Corresponding author:
Kyle John Lorenzano, School of Communication, Film, and
Media, University of West Georgia, Carrollton, GA 30118, USA.
Email: klorenza@westga.edu
1171460CTP0010.1177/20570473231171460Communication and the PublicLorenzano et al.
research-article2023
Original Research Article

192 Communication and the Public 8(3)
engage in disruptive protest tactics or are perceived
as such, which is emblematic of a long-running trend
of elite-driven political polarization (McCarty et al.,
2006). These divisions have also been represented in
cable news and other forms of politically opinion-
ated media (Levendusky, 2013) at a time of increas-
ing political polarization (Bishop, 2009; Levendusky,
2009; Mason, 2015).
Recent public unrest over politics suggests that
divisions between average Americans are growing,
with some scholars warning about increasing sup-
port for political violence (Kalmoe & Mason, 2019,
2022). Concurrently, an increasingly fragmented
media environment has resulted in a significant
body of research on selective exposure, that is, con-
suming media that confirms existing political beliefs
and attitudes (Stroud, 2014). Some scholars have
found evidence that partisan media, and by exten-
sion motivated reasoning, can provoke endorse-
ments of political violence (Chan, 2020). Given
recent concerns over the health of American democ-
racy following the violent insurrection attempt on 6
January 2021, and partisan disagreement over its
seriousness, it is imperative to examine exactly how
wide partisan divisions are among the public and to
what extent the media has a role in making these
divisions even wider.
Kalmoe and Mason (2019, 2022) emphasize that
most Americans do not explicitly endorse outright
political violence, and others have critiqued the idea
that support for political violence is increasing
(Lelkes & Westwood, 2017; Westwood et al., 2022).
Additional research has found that even most parti-
sans do not support political violence, while those
who do possess exaggerated perceptions of out-group
partisans’ own support for violence (Mernyk et al.,
2022). However, in their conception of how partisan-
ship manifests itself beyond dislike or disagreement
with opposing partisans (what they call “lethal parti-
sanship”), Kalmoe and Mason (2019) find that some-
where between 40% and 60% of partisans express
views that rationalize harm against members of the
out-party, an idea that takes influence from Bandura
et al.’s (1996) concept of “moral disengagement.” We
theorize that Trump’s vocal support for disruptive
protesters being roughed up during political rallies,
but more importantly public support for these
statements, are tantamount to the concerning levels
of “moral disengagement” investigated by Kalmoe
and Mason (2019) and others (Cassese, 2021;
Gotowiec, 2019; Soares et al., 2018).
Past research has examined public attitudes
toward protest movements, media portrayals of pro-
tests, and differences in how liberal and conservative
protests are perceived in the United States (Chan &
Lee, 1984; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981; McLeod &
Detenber, 1999; Prior, 2007; Weaver & Scacco,
2013). Recent work by Hsiao and Radnitz (2020) has
found that Republicans disproportionately perceive
higher levels of violence among disagreeable pro-
testers. Soares et al. (2018) have also investigated
relative levels of moral disengagement expressed by
Portuguese demonstrators and the law enforcement
officials who used force against them during anti-
austerity protests. Yet no existing research has
attempted to build up upon Kalmoe and Mason’s
(2019, 2022) work on lethal partisanship, and more
specifically moral disengagement, by examining
partisan differences in public attitudes about how
protesters should be treated and the role that partisan
selective exposure could have in that process.
Using 2016 American National Election Studies
(ANES) survey data, we find that Republican
respondents believe that disruptive protesters are
more deserving of being “roughed up” than their
Democratic counterparts, as well as a positive rela-
tionship between conservative partisan media outlets
and this same belief that disruptive protesters deserve
to be “roughed up.” Moreover, this negative associa-
tion remained significant among Democrats engaged
in selective exposure to left-leaning media, but not
for Republicans engaged in selective exposure to
right-leaning media.
Literature review
“Roughing up” support in relation
to political violence and moral
disengagement
Incidents of political violence in the United States
are not new (Kleinfeld, 2021). Although the 1960s
and 1970s saw increasing left-wing political
violence (e.g. the Weather Underground), recent

Lorenzano et al. 193
political violence in the United States has largely
been attributed to right-wing groups or individuals.
Further evidence has suggested that modern con-
servatism is associated with political violence given
that it is predisposed to absolutist, dogmatic values
that prioritize, “. . . loyalty, authority, and sanctity”
(Webber et al., 2020, p. 109). Recently, Forscher
and Kteily (2020) examined public support for the
alt-right, a far-right group known for taking in part
in collective violence. Based on nationally repre-
sentative survey data, they found that alt-right sup-
porters were more likely than both non-alt-right
Trump voters and non-Trump voters to be higher in
authoritarianism, biased against minority groups,
supportive of white identitarian collective action,
and distrustful of mainstream media. Using a mix-
ture of mobile location data, public social media
metadata, and precinct-level election data from the
2016 presidential election, Van Dijcke and Wright
(2021) found that increased political isolation, prox-
imity to local chapters of extremist groups (e.g. the
Proud Boys), and engagement with alternative
social media sites like Parler were associated with
active participation in the 6th January insurrection.
Cichocka et al. (2022) also found that, among Polish
respondents in their multi-country study, belief in
immigration restrictions as a means of racial self-
preservation was associated with justifying collec-
tive violence against minority groups. However, the
primary focus of the present study is not direct sup-
port or intent to commit political violence per se,
but rather partisan attitudes that would act as a pre-
cursor to political violence.
Kalmoe and Mason’s (2019) conception of “lethal
partisanship” investigates the dangerous expression
of partisanship that includes outright political vio-
lence, but also includes feeling less sympathy over
the death of out-partisans (“schadenfreude”) and
rationalizing harm against out-partisans (“moral dis-
engagement”). Their findings reveal that strength of
partisan identity and trait aggression were associated
with all three facets of lethal partisanship. With
respect to moral disengagement (which was itself
positively correlated with violent attitudes), trust in
Fox News was not significantly associated with it
but MSNBC was significantly negatively associated
with moral disengagement. It was also said that,
“. . . positive feelings for Trump may be related to
an increased acceptance of harassment of outgroup
partisans in public” (p. 28), which is particularly rel-
evant to the present study given the possibility of
there being some partisan component to increased
acceptability of harassment or intimidation of others
during a public event.
It should be said that these public displays of har-
assment could also be construed as forms of incivil-
ity. Although it is generally accepted that incivility
involves a violation of perceived norms, there is an
ongoing scholarly debate concerning which norm
violations can be considered instances of incivility
(Bormann et al., 2022; Muddiman, 2017). As noted
by Stryker et al. (2016), rude language or interactions
can certainly be constituted as forms of political
incivility, but rudeness alone is not sufficient to con-
ceptualize incivility (see also Papacharissi, 2004).
Stryker and colleagues concluded that their partici-
pants generally agreed that non-issued-based threats,
refusals to listen to an opponent, and disrespect con-
stituted incivility, while there was less consensus that
attacking the substance of an issue or opponent’s
position could be considered incivility. Bormann and
colleagues have also theorized that violating norms
of exchanging accurate information (“information
norm”), good faith attempts at comprehensibility
(“modality norm”), responding directly to opponents’
claims without interfering in understanding (“process
norm”), mutual trust (“relation norm”), and recogniz-
ing the context in which an exchange of ideas is tak-
ing place (“context norm”) all constitute different
forms of incivility. Gervais (2014) found that con-
sumption of both uncivil political media and like-
minded uncivil partisan media has translated into a
greater propensity for real-life expressions of incivil-
ity. Conversely, a series of experiments by Druckman
et al. (2019) revealed that exposure to like-minded
uncivil partisan media resulted in participants feeling
less negatively toward the opposing party.
Edwards and Arnon (2021) note that public sup-
port for state force or violence against public demon-
strators varies depending on perceptions of how
non-violent or violent the demonstration is perceived
to be, finding that demonstrations attributed to
opposing partisans were not perceived as more vio-
lent but that both left and right-leaning participants

194 Communication and the Public 8(3)
were generally more supportive of repression of
demonstrators belonging to the opposing party.
However, concerning the media and partisan selec-
tive exposure’s role in partisans’ reaction to footage
of political violence broadcast via news media, work
done by Bosilkov (2021) in the context of Macedonian
politics finds that media coverage of right-wing
members of parliament violently attacking their left-
wing counterparts actually led to depolarizing effects
among partisans, even as right-wing identity and lack
of trust in the media were both associated with greater
affective polarization. Additional research on strate-
gies for reducing political violence has found that
correcting partisans’ overestimates of the out-party’s
support for politically motivated violence and per-
suading partisans to imagine interacting with mem-
bers of the out-party can reduce levels of support for
political violence (Mernyk et al., 2022; Warner &
Villamil, 2017). Yet, taking influence from Kalmoe
and Mason’s (2019, 2022) work on lethal partisan-
ship, it stands to reason that there is a middle ground
between negative feelings toward opposing partisans
and outright support or endorsements of political vio-
lence against the other side. We argue that public
support for former President Trump’s support for har-
assment and intimidation against disruptive counter-
protesters who attended his rallies is an example of
this kind of middle ground, which itself shares paral-
lels with a subset of Kalmoe and Mason’s (2019)
conception of lethal partisanship, that is, moral
disengagement.
The concept of “moral disengagement” originates
with Bandura et al. (1996), which is itself rooted in
social cognitive theory. In general, individuals avoid
behaving in ways that contradict their own moral
standards due to social or self-imposed sanctions that
are invited as a result. However, these sanctions
against one’s own behavior can be dismissed or mini-
mized if the behavior in question can be re-framed as
a moral imperative (“moral justification”), re-worded
using “euphemistic language,” contrasted with more
reprehensible actions (“advantageous comparison”),
blamed on social pressures (“displacement of respon-
sibility”), attributed to the collective rather than to
one’s self (“displacement of responsibility”), re-con-
textualized as not causing harm or even being a net
benefit (“disregarding/distorting the consequences”),
reinterpreted as harming individuals who are per-
ceived as less than human (“dehumanization”), or
blamed on coercion by opponents (“attribution of
blame”) (pp. 365–366). Calls by former President
Trump to harass or physically intimidate others
would seem to share commonalities with these
mechanisms that characterize moral disengage-
ment, in particular the use of euphemistic language.
Furthermore, additional research has also investi-
gated the use of hyper-masculine language by Trump
as an attempt to assert dominance, project strength,
and establish himself as authentic on the national
political stage (Neville-Shepard & Neville-Shepard,
2021; Smith & Higgins, 2020). Empirical findings
presented by Powell et al. (2018) suggest that Trump’s
perceived hyper-masculinity relative to Hillary
Clinton during the 2016 Presidential Election could
have explained his victory.
Along with Kalmoe and Mason (2019, 2022),
additional research on moral disengagement has
been done in the context of political polarization/
violence (Cassese, 2021; Gotowiec, 2019). Cassese
(2021) found that opposing partisans were more
likely to rate their own party as more human than the
out-party and that dehumanizing the out-party was
more prevalent among participants with stronger
partisan identities. Looking more directly at moral
disengagement alongside importance attributed to
common moral characteristics (i.e. moral identity)
and trait aggression, Gotowiec (2019) found that
there was no significant difference between liberals
and conservatives in their levels of moral disengage-
ment, moral identity, or trait aggression. However,
results from a follow-up experiment within this same
study revealed that as moral identity increased, so
did moral disengagement, which was itself a precur-
sor to traits associated with likelihood of harming
individuals with different moral or political values
than themselves. In this subset of existing literature
on moral disengagement and politically motivated
divisions, little to no moral disengagement research
has dealt with treatment of protesters though a study
by Soares et al. (2018) is one notable exception.
Through in-depth interviews conducted with demon-
strators and police officers involved in anti-austerity
protests in Portugal, Soares and colleagues found the
two sides had fundamentally different views about

Lorenzano et al. 195
legitimate use of force during public protests. In the
case of police, the maintenance of public order and
liberty took precedence over the right to protest, and
thus use of force was seen as legitimate response
when these values were under threat. In the case of
the demonstrators, the right to protest was perceived
as not subject to regulation by the state and antitheti-
cal to the state’s claims of legitimate use of force,
given that state powers were derived from the
citizenry.
Public opinion and media coverage of
protests
Americans have expressed different attitudes toward
a variety of social movements since the civil unrest
of the 1960s (Herrnson & Weldon, 2014), with vari-
ous motivations having been contrasted as potential
key factors in the public’s attitude toward protest
movements and protesters themselves (Kinder &
Kiewiet, 1981; Lau et al., 1978; Sears et al., 1980).
The media’s pivotal role in social movements makes
activists deeply attuned to news coverage (Andrews
& Caren, 2010). However, research has historically
shown that the news media often displays biases
against protest movements or refrains from covering
them at all (Chan & Lee, 1984; Gitlin, 1980).
Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) have pointed out that
this imbalanced power dynamic has led to a conten-
tious relationship between protest movements and
the media, but they claim that social movements are
more dependent on media than the other way around.
Accordingly, activists need media because the pub-
licity will help them mobilize the public, validate
their importance, and expand the scope of their con-
flict, but the threshold for accomplishing this goal is
high and often favors movements with a more for-
malized structure (Andrews & Caren, 2010; Gamson
and Wolfsfeld, 1993).
Journalistic norms and routines affect how pro-
tests are covered and framed. In protests stories, the
“protest paradigm” describes the news media’s ten-
dency to portray protest movements as deviant
(Gitlin, 1980), which provides a template for how to
write about protests in the news that includes prac-
tices like relying on official sources of information
and invoking public opinion when reporting
(McLeod & Detenber, 1999; McLeod & Hertog,
1998). Demonstrations that fit within this paradigm
often act as a form of spectacle in news coverage,
especially when the event involves violence, in turn
satisfying the common news values of novelty and
conflict (Rich, 2009).
Issues concerning the accuracy of protest cover-
age fit more broadly into questions of objectivity in
journalism generally. Recently, there has been
greater recognition and scholarly interest in the role
of emotive tone in news, or what is sometimes
referred to as an “emotional turn” in journalism
(Beckett & Deuze, 2016; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2020).
Scholars such as Beckett and Deuze (2016) argue the
centrality of emotion in the production and con-
sumption of news is rooted in economic, technologi-
cal, and behavioral factors that reflect the current
digital media landscape. As noted by Kotisova
(2019), “[e]motions simply are present in journalis-
tic narratives” (p. 3) and have been for some time,
even in so-called “hard news” stories. At the same
time, others have theorized that an increased emo-
tional tone in news can partly explain disinformation
and other “information disorders” that eventually
lead to increased political polarization and dysfunc-
tion (Serrano-Puche, 2021). Analysis of in-depth
interviews with far-right individuals whose com-
ments on online news website were deleted by mod-
erators revealed that their political fears over
immigration shaped their worldview and that this
perspective was lacking in what they believed was
inaccurate coverage in mainstream media, in turn
leading them to seek alternative sources of informa-
tion (Ihlebæk & Holter, 2021). In addition, evidence
suggests that news sources originating online (e.g.
Buzzfeed) are more likely to include emotions in
their coverage than traditional and even alternative
media outlets, at least in the case of reporting on the
ALS Ice Bucket Challenge in 2014 (Kilgo et al.,
2020).
It is worth noting that protest movements are not
inherently liberal or aim to disrupt the status quo.
Conservative movements have aggressively organ-
ized around anti-gun control policy and nationalist
causes with ties to white supremacy (Cathey &
Keneally, 2020). Weaver and Scacco (2013) exam-
ined news about the Tea Party move from Fox News,

196 Communication and the Public 8(3)
CNN, MSNBC, and, as a neutral point, AP News.
The comparison supported evidence of an alignment
between ideological orientation and Tea Party sto-
ries. MSNBC portrayed the Tea Party as “idiots” and
used a marginalization frame most frequently when
covering Tea Party protests. In contrast, the fre-
quency of marginalization in Fox News was far
fewer than others, while the AP News followed the
regular norms of conventional journalism.
Selective exposure
As defined by Stroud (2014), selective exposure
refers to the “. . . motivated selection of messages
matching one’s beliefs” (p. 1). As Stroud (2014)
notes, selective exposure as a means of reducing
cognitive dissonance and reinforcing the psycholog-
ical benefits of only consuming attitude-affirming
messages (e.g. motivated reasoning) originated as
explanatory factors for this phenomenon (Kunda,
1990; Lazarsfeld et al., 1948). Some scholars have
previously cast doubt on the existence or prevalence
of selective exposure (Kinder, 2003; Prior, 2007),
but an increasingly fragmented media landscape has
renewed interest in selective exposure in recent
years (Arceneaux et al., 2012). Also, it is important
to note that preference for attitude-affirming infor-
mation is conceptually distinct from selective avoid-
ance of messages that contradict one’s beliefs. While
Stroud (2014) notes that these two different con-
structs can function similarly and scholars have used
the two terms interchangeably, others like Johnson et
al. (2011) have found that selective exposure was
common among politically knowledgeable individu-
als with strong partisan affiliations who relied on
political websites for information, but that this same
cohort did not selectively avoid counter-attitudinal
information when coming across it online. Selective
avoidance as it is properly understood in the existing
literature is not the primary focus of the present
study—rather, “selective exposure” here is explicitly
defined and operationalized as purposely choosing
like-minded content.
While the nature of selective exposure is still heav-
ily contested, scholars have found evidence of its
existence or related phenomena (Iyengar & Hahn,
2009; Stroud, 2007, 2008); Arceneaux et al. (2012)
found that forcing individuals to watch counter-attitu-
dinal programming led to less trust in the news media
overall (aka oppositional media hostility), but that that
the ability to choose attitude-affirming or apolitical
content (i.e. selective exposure) reduced this effect.
This would seem to suggest that selective exposure
can reduce political polarization or its antecedents,
although conflicting evidence suggests that a “high
choice” media environment coupled with the prolif-
eration of increasingly partisan media outlets leads to
increased selective exposure (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009;
Messing & Westwood, 2012; (Stroud, 2008, 2010);
With respect to counter-attitudinal information expo-
sure, Casas et al. (2022) note that evidence of its rela-
tionship with increased polarization is inconclusive,
as their own study revealed that incentivizing expo-
sure to information that participants did not agree with
failed to result in greater ideological or affective
polarization. At the same time, Hameleers and van der
Meer (2020) found evidence of motivated reasoning
in their participants’ evaluation of partisan news
media even in instances where individuals forcibly
exposed to counter-attitudinal information presented
as a credible fact-checking source. Algorithms and
news recommendations have also been found to rein-
force the incentive for news consumers to consume
news they already agree with, and as a result consume
fewer reputable mainstream sources of information
(Bryanov et al., 2020). However, Peterson and
Kagalwala (2021) suggest that part of the polarization
reinforced by this kind of high-choice media environ-
ment is rooted in partisan individuals’ lack of expo-
sure to counter-attitudinal information, and that
exposure to this kind of information that subverts their
biases against it can effectively reduce pre-existing
hostilities they associate with it.
As noted by Guess et al. (2018), selective expo-
sure to agreeable information allows for the possi-
bility of exposure to both misinformation and
disinformation. The kind of ideological bias likely
to be found in news that is highly agreeable to parti-
sans has been found to be one of the defining fea-
tures of disinformation in a systematic review of the
existing literature on disinformation (Damstra et al.,
2021). As many scholars have established, mis- and
disinformation are distinct concepts—misinforma-
tion characterizes content that is inaccurate without

Lorenzano et al. 197
willfully harmful intent, while disinformation
involves information that is intentionally mislead-
ing and designed to credibly cause harm in some
way (Freelon & Wells, 2020). Recent research on
COVID-19-related misinformation has highlighted
its contribution to vaccine hesitancy and support for
other behaviors meant to mitigate the effects of the
pandemic (Kim et al., 2020; Rocha et al., 2021;
Romer & Jamieson, 2021). Mis and disinformation
scholars have proposed a variety of potential reme-
dies for inoculating individuals against false infor-
mation, such as fact-checking falsehoods, though
various individual-level factors associated with
exposure to or belief in falsehoods speak to the
need for potential solutions to be multi-faceted
(Lewandowsky & Van Der Linden, 2021; Scheufele
& Krause, 2019).
Regardless of the exact causal relationship between
selective exposure and political polarization, as well
as mis/disinformation’s role in this relationship, oth-
ers have focused more directly on the exact cause of
selective exposure and avoidance. Cardenal et al.
(2019) revealed that the direct relationship between
social media as a gateway to information and selec-
tive exposure was non-significant across their entire
sample, but that this same relationship was significant
and positive among left-leaning users. Furthermore,
they also found that exposure to news via Google
decreased selective exposure, relative to when users
would directly visit a news website. Alongside
Cardenal et al.’s (2019) insight about the moderating
effects of political ideology, other factors such as
social identity (e.g. age) and social endorsements or
recommendations have been identified as influen-
tial (Knobloch-Westerwick et al., 2005; Knobloch-
Westerwick & Hastall, 2010). Those with high levels
of group status and generally preferred positive news
about their own in-group, but the self-esteem of those
in low status groups was bolstered by negative cover-
age about out-group members. This would also seem
to corroborate findings that suggest selective expo-
sure to like-minded messages actually contributes to a
stronger, more coherent sense of political identity,
while consumption of counter-attitudinal messages
decreases it (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2011).
In the case of social endorsements, Knobloch-
Westerwick et al. (2005) found that consumers of
online news didn’t simply gravitate toward the like-
minded and avoid the counter-attitudinal—explicit
and implicit content recommendations also influenced
selective exposure. Messing and Westwood (2014)
have argued that endorsements of news messages
from users’ trusted ties on social media have a greater
impact on selection than the political leanings of the
content in question, echoing previous research sug-
gesting that social media exposes users to views and
messages they would otherwise disagree with
(Flaxman et al., 2016; Heatherly et al., 2017). While
some like Arceneaux et al. (2012) have highlighted
the possibility of selective exposure attenuating politi-
cal polarization, others like Barnidge et al. (2020)
have found that more extreme political opinions are
associated with selective exposure and that the
extremity of one’s political views increases chances
of a perceived media bias or hostile media effect.
Previous research has examined the relationship
between selective exposure and specific protest/
social movements (Aruguete & Calvo, 2018; Melki
& Kozman, 2021), reiterating findings by Stroud
(2008, 2009, 2010) and others suggesting a general
preference for attitude-affirming messages and
an avoidance of counter-attitudinal information.
However, these studies focus on the 2019 Lebanon
protests, the 2014 “Umbrella Revolution” in Hong
Kong, and other specific protests associated with a
particular ideology or political valence. Thus far,
no existing studies have examined partisan selec-
tive exposure in the context of treatment toward
disruptive protesters as a facet of moral disengage-
ment. With previous research on moral disengage-
ment, media framing of protest, and selective
exposure in mind, we propose the following
research questions:
RQ1. What is the relationship between partisan
affiliation and a belief that disruptive protesters
are more deserving of being “roughed up?”
RQ2. What is the relationship between partisan
media and a belief that disruptive protesters are
more deserving of being “roughed up?”
RQ3. What is the association between partisan
selective exposure and a belief that disruptive
protesters are more deserving of being “roughed
up?”

198 Communication and the Public 8(3)
Methods
The 2016 ANES Time Series Study dataset was used
to investigate our research questions. All variables
used were taken from both online and face-to-face
versions of the ANES pre-election survey (N = 4270)
and ordinal logistic regression was used to analyze
the data. Because β coefficients from an ordinal
regression cannot be interpreted as they would for a
linear multiple regression, odds ratios (OR) were
generated—an OR greater than 1 represents a higher
likelihood of an association between the variables of
interest, while an OR less than 1 represents a lower
likelihood of an association (ORs equal to 1 repre-
sent no association).
Dependent variable
To gauge respondents’ attitudes toward disruptive
protesters and by proxy their relative levels of moral
disengagement related to treatment of disruptive
protesters, the ANES variable “Roughing up protes-
tors” (POLVIOL_ROUGHUP) was used as part of
the analysis. In this survey question, respondents
were asked, “When protestors get ‘roughed up’ for
disrupting political events, how much do they gener-
ally deserve what happens to them?” (1 = Not at all,
2 = A little, 3 = A moderate amount, 4 = A lot, 5 = A
great deal).
Independent variables
To measure respondents’ political partisan identity,
the ANES summary measure for Party ID (1 = Strong
Democrat, 2 = Not very strong Democrat, 3 = Inde-
pendent Democrat, 4 = Independent, 5 = Independent
Republican, 6 = Not very strong Republican, 7 = Strong
Republican) was used as a measure of partisan
affiliation.
To account for partisan media use in the present
study, two separate continuous variables were cre-
ated based on responses to the ANES media use
questions in the pre-election face-to-face CASI/Web
survey which covered a variety of both news outlets
and entertainment programming from television,
radio, the internet, and print media. When provided
the full list of different news outlets and programs,
respondents were asked which of the following they
consumed regularly, that is, at least once a month
(0 = not selected, 1 = selected). Using these responses,
continuous variables for “Liberal Media” and
“Conservative Media” were created. For Liberal
Media, each of the following sources/programs were
counted if they were consumed within the last
month: All in with Chris Hayes, Jimmy Kimmel
Live!, the Larry Wilmore Show, Anderson Cooper
360, The Rachel Maddow Show, the Late Show with
Stephen Colbert, Morning Edition (NPR), All Things
Considered (NPR), Marketplace (NPR), Fresh Air
(NPR), the Thom Hartman Program, Huffington
Post, Buzzfeed, the New York Times (online or
print), the Washington Post (online or print), and The
Guardian. Because these individual media variables
were combined into a single index for “liberal
media,” tests were conducted to confirm an accept-
able level of reliability across all items (KR-
20 = .849, M = 1.356, SD = 2.241). For Conservative
Media, each of the following sources/programs were
counted if they were consumed within the last
month: The Sean Hannity Show (TV), The Kelly
File, On the Record with Greta Van Susteren, The
O’Reilly Factor, The Rush Limbaugh Show, The
Sean Hannity Show (Radio), The Glenn Beck
Program, The Mark Levin Show, The Savage Nation,
The Hugh Hewitt Show, The Mike Gallagher Show,
The Bill Handel Show, The Schnitt Show, Fox News
(Web), and the Wall Street Journal (online or print).
Like the “liberal media” variable, individual media
variables were combined into a single “conservative
media” index and tests confirmed an acceptable
level of reliability (KR-20 = .864, M = 0.796,
SD = 1.566).
Finally, taking influence from Stroud (2010), two
separate interaction terms were created to represent
Selective Exposure as a means of addressing RQ3.
First, the original ANES “Party ID” variable was
recoded into separate dummy variables for Democrat
and Republican. Respondents who chose 1, 2, or 3
on this scale were classified as “Democrat,” while
those who chose 5, 6, or 7 were classified as
“Republican.” Respondents who identified as true
Independents (4) were coded as neither Democrats
nor Republicans. Using these new dichotomous vari-
ables to represent partisan affiliation, the two

Lorenzano et al. 199
interaction terms were created—one to represent
Democrats who only consumed liberal media
(Democrat × Liberal Media) and one to represent
Republicans who only consumed conservative
media (Republican × Conservative Media).
Control variables
To control for demographic and other socioeconomic
factors, several control variables were included in
each model used to test RQ1–RQ3. The ANES sum-
mary variable for Age was used here, which split
responses into 13 distinct age cohorts coded in
ascending order (1 = Age group 18–20 . . . 13 = Age
group 75 or older). Gender (1 = male, 0 = female),
Race (1 = white, 0 = non-white), Income (1 = under
$5000 . . . 28 = $250,000 or more), and Education
(1 = less than 1st grade . . . 16 = doctorate degree)
were also used as controls.
Results
The pre-election sample (N = 4270) used here com-
prises US adults aged 18 years or older, with the mean
age of participants being 47.92 years old, although
the most common age cohort selected by respondents
was the “55–59” group. Nearly a quarter (22.4%) of
participants possessed a bachelor’s degree—the next
most frequent education cohorts in our sample
included those with “some college” (21%) and a high
school diploma/GED (19%). Women made up a
majority (52.2%) of our sample. The top three most
common income groups in our sample included those
who made $5000 or less (6.4%), $80,000–$89,999
(5.4%), and $30,000–$34,999 (5%). Thirty-four per-
cent of respondents identified as Democrats, 28.8%
as Republicans, and 32% as Independents.1
With respect to RQ1 and RQ2, the “Model 1” col-
umn in Table 1 displays the results from an ordinal
regression testing 1) the relationship between parti-
san affiliation (Democrat or Republican) and “rough-
ing up protesters” and 2) the relationship between
partisan media (liberal and conservative) and
“roughing up protesters.”
When controlling for demographic variables,
Party ID had a statistically significant positive rela-
tionship with a belief that disruptive protesters
deserve to be roughed up (β = .173, p ⩽ .001,
OR = 1.189 (95% CI: 1.154, 1.225)). Because
Republican identity acts at the reference category for
Party ID (1 = Strong Democrat . . . 7 = Strong
Republican), identifying as a Republican and the
belief that protesters are deserving of being “roughed
up” are positively associated with one another. The
directionality of this relationship was mirrored with
respect to conservative media—consumption of
Table 1. Ordinal regression analyses testing party ID and partisan relationship with attitudes toward “roughing up.”.
Model 1 Model 2
β (SE) OR (95% CI) β (SE) OR (95% CI)
Age .003 (.002) 1.003 (1–1.006) .003 (.002) 1.003 (1–1.006)
Gendera.017 (.057) 1.017 (0.911–1.136) .012 (.057) 1.012 (0.906–1.131)
Raceb.133* (.066) 1.142 (1.005–1.299) .150* (.066) 1.162 (1.021–1.323)
Income −.001 (.003) 0.999 (0.992–1.005) −.001 (.003) 0.999 (0.992–1.005)
Education −.008 (.004) 0.992 (0.984–1.001) −.008 (.004) 0.992 (0.984–1.001)
Party IDc.173*** (.015) 1.189 (1.154–1.225) .163*** (.017) 1.177 (1.138–1.216)
Lib Media −.188*** (.015) 0.829 (0.805–0.853) −.146*** (.024) 0.864 (0.825–0.906)
Con Media .098*** (.020) 1.102 (1.060–1.146) .123** (.041) 1.131 (1.045–1.225)
Dem × LibMed – – −.066* (.028) 0.936 (0.885–0.990)
Rep × ConMed – – −.039 (.045) 0.962 (0.881–1.050)
a1 = male; 0 = female.
b1 = white; 0 = non-white.
c1 = Strong Democrat . . . 7 = Strong Republican.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p ⩽ .001.

200 Communication and the Public 8(3)
conservative media was positively associated with
“roughing up” support (β = .098, p ⩽ .001, OR = 1.102
(95% CI: 1.060, 1.146)). Conversely, liberal media
was negatively associated with “roughing up” sup-
port (β = −.188, p ⩽ .001, OR = 0.829 (95% CI:
0.805, 0.853)). Race was statistically significant and
positively associated (β = .133, p < .05, OR = 1.142
(95% CI: 1.005, 1.299)) with “roughing up” support
which, given that “White” acts of the reference cat-
egory, demonstrated that respondents who identified
as white were more likely to report “roughing up”
support. In this model, age, gender, income, and edu-
cation were not statistically significant.
RQ3 is addressed in the results shown in the
“Model 2” column of Table 1. Party ID remained
significant and positively associated with “roughing
up” support (β = .163, p ⩽ .001, OR = 1.177 (95% CI:
1.138, 1.216)). The main effect of liberal media and
conservative media consumption remained signifi-
cant in the same direction as shown in “Model 1.”
However, concerning the question of selective expo-
sure’s impact of attitudes toward disruptive protest-
ers, only the Democrat × Liberal Media interaction
term was significant (β = −.066, p < .05, OR = 0.936
(95% CI: 0.885, 0.990)). Right-leaning selective
exposure had no statistically significant relationship
with the dependent variable (β = −.039, p = .385,
OR = 0.962 (95% CI: 0.881, 1.050)). Race remained
positively associated with “roughing up” attitudes
(β = .150, p < .05, OR = 1.162 (95% CI: 1.021,
1.323)), while age, income, education, and gender
remained non-significant.
Discussion
Political unrest in the United States and statements
about protesters made by Donald Trump served as
the impetus for two broad questions guiding the pre-
sent study—are there partisan differences in the
kind of moral disengagement necessary to endorse
physical aggression against disruptive protesters
and what if any role does consumption and/or selec-
tive exposure to partisan media have in this process?
Recent research on the idea of political and social
“sorting” has found that the amount of ideological
and interpersonal overlap between Republicans and
Democrats has been shrinking in recent decades
(Bishop, 2009; Levendusky, 2009; Mason, 2015;
McCarty et al., 2006). Could attitudes toward treat-
ment of disruptive protesters provide new insights
into partisan antipathy and moral disengagement
about harm directed at the out party?
Results from the present study would suggest
that this is a definite possibility, given the existence
of a positive relationship between self-identified
Republicans and a belief in protesters being “roughed
up,” as well as a positive relationship between con-
servative-leaning media and the “roughing up the pro-
tester” ethos. Furthermore, we found that the more
liberal-leaning programs/outlets respondents con-
sumed, the less likely they were to believe in dis-
ruptive protesters being “roughed up.” This is a
noteworthy contribution to the literature and chal-
lenges previous studies finding symmetrical levels of
moral disengagement and partisan antipathy between
strong partisans on either side of the aisle (Kalmoe &
Mason, 2019; Mernyk et al., 2022). Instead, our
results seem to suggest that a further partisan cleavage
could exist between partisans in the United States that
is reflected both in partisan identity and consumption
of partisan media—namely, those who identify with
the Republican party or those that consume the parti-
san media ostensibly in support of its party platform
show greater support for something approximating
moral disengagement. Furthermore, both standalone
consumption of left-leaning partisan media and selec-
tive exposure to attitude-affirming partisan media by
Democrat-identifying respondents was negatively
associated with “roughing up” support. Previous lit-
erature has suggested that imagined contact with
opposing partisans and correcting misperceptions
about their levels of support for political violence
could effectively reduce attitudes and behaviors asso-
ciated with moral disengagement (Mernyk et al.,
2022; Warner & Villamil, 2017). In the context of
treatment toward unnamed, disruptive protesters, the
results presented here suggest that left-leaning parti-
san identity and consumption of left-leaning partisan
media, separately and together, are associated with a
lack of support for “roughing up” protesters. At the
same time, the relationship between right-leaning
selective exposure to information and attitudes toward
protesters was non-significant, which warrants further
investigation in future studies.
The present study is not without limitations. First
and foremost, caution should be used to interpret the

Lorenzano et al. 201
full implications of these results given that they rely
on cross-sectional data and cannot make any causal
claims concerning the relationships tested in the
research questions presented here. Further efforts at
testing these novel findings in experiments and/or
through time-series analysis2 should be pursed in
future research. Second, it is reasonable to question
whether or not these findings are a feature of the
tumultuous political landscape at the time these data
were collected. However, it is worth noting that the
data analyzed here were collected in the lead-up to
the 2016 US presidential election, far before the
nation-wide protests throughout the summer of 2020
and the attempted insurrection on January 6th at the
US Capitol. Around the time these survey data were
collected, it is possible that similar events in 2014
that resulted in Ferguson, Missouri in reaction to the
death of Michael Brown would have been fresh in the
minds of the electorate at the time and respondents in
this ANES survey. Yet continued public demonstra-
tions and political divisions in the country have
grown since the events of Ferguson; it is equally
arguable that the results presented here signal a trend
extending to our present movement and beyond,
toward further fragmentation and moral disengage-
ment along partisan lines. In addition, the use of a
single-item index for attitudes toward protesters and
as a proxy for moral disengagement should be
acknowledged as a limitation. Alongside the “rough-
ing up” question, the 2016 ANES survey included a
question concerning direct support for political vio-
lence, but otherwise only included items concerning
respondents’ own involvement in protest activities
and did not include the kinds of measures of moral
disengagement used by Kalmoe and Mason (2019)
and others. Finally, further caution should be exer-
cised with these results given the question wording
associated with the “roughing up” question used as
our sole dependent variable here. While it is implicit
in the question wording that the “protester” in ques-
tion is not affiliated with a particular political party or
ideology, it is possible that respondents interpreted
the hypothetical “protester” belonging to a particular
group, especially given the high-profile nature of
Donald Trump’s public condemnation of disruptive
protesters at his political rallies during the 2016 cam-
paign cycle which seems to have served as inspira-
tion for the original ANES question. At the same
time, the lack of any direct reference to a particular
protester or their political affiliations arguably dem-
onstrates the kind of partisan sensitivity associated
with questions surrounding treatment of protesters.
Future research in this area should attempt to form
more explicit questions and multi-item indexes that
attempt to measure moral disengagement in the con-
text of attitudes toward protest and collective action.
Overall, the results here present a novel, if unset-
tling, finding given the current state of US politics.
Clear differences between the two major political
parties and those who identify as Republicans or
Democrats do not inherently result in negative conse-
quences (American Political Science Association.
Committee on Political Parties, 1950), but fundamen-
tal differences about civil treatment of fellow citizens
exercising their constitutionally protected right to
protest, albeit disruptively, would seem to not bode
well for the state of a well-functioning democracy.
Furthermore, the role of partisan media in further
fanning the flames of these divisions arguably poses
a threat to the democratic norms of the United States,
especially at a time when a global pandemic and
growing skepticism about the legitimacy of elections
will continue to pose significant challenges for
American citizens. From a normative standpoint, the
results outlined here should serve as a cautionary tale
for those seeking to deepen the divisions between
themselves and their political opponents, as well as
an important opportunity for political communica-
tion scholars to further understand how much more
deeply divided Americans can be and the potential
factors in explaining those divisions.
ORCID iD
Kyle John Lorenzano https://orcid.org/0000-0003-
0385-0783
Notes
1. Of the respondents, 3.5% chose “Other” and 1.1%
stated no preference whatsoever, while 15 individual
respondents refused the question about Party ID and
10 said they didn’t know.
2. Testing our proposed hypotheses using ANES’ lon-
gitudinal time-series data was not a possibility here,
given that the survey question that acted as our sole
dependent variable here was only asked in the pre-
election survey.

202 Communication and the Public 8(3)
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Author biographies
Kyle John Lorenzano is an Assistant Professor in the
School of Communication, Film, and Media at the
University of West Georgia. His research interests focus
primarily on political communication and social change,
with an emphasis on the relationship between new media
and polarization.
Soo Jung Moon is a Professor in the School of Communi-
cation, Film, and Media at the University of West Georgia.
Her research interests include media effects and digital
literacy.
Porismita Borah is an Associate Professor at the Edward
R. Murrow College of Communication and a graduate fac-
ulty in the Prevention Science program at Washington
State University. She is a member of the Democracy
Research Unit, at the University of Salamanca, Spain. Her
research focuses on the interplay of emerging technology,
politics, and health.