Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities

Abstract

This chapter examines Palestinian national protection principles, practices and perceptions under the umbrella of Palestinian Authority (PA), Hamas and mixed Israeli/Palestinian Authority, highlighting the current practices and the gaps in the protection of civilians. Palestinian protection principles and practices are significantly different within the areas of West Bank and Gaza. Unpacking Palestinian security strategies and practices, this chapter examines the prioritization and effectiveness of national and group protection. The chapter outlines PPP of security based on documentation, surveys and interviews with national and international protectors.

Full text

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Palestinian National Protection Strategies
and Realities
The civilian population of Palestine, whether living directly or indirectly
under Israel’s military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, is one of
the least protected populations in the world. The lack of protection is
not only due to Israeli military occupation and the years of economic
blockade, but also due to the selective or ineffective protection by the
Palestinian Authority (PA) and the belligerent protection under Hamas.
The lack of a peace process and the simultaneous encouragement of
resistance and its repression by the Palestinian representatives have also
placed an increasing number of Palestinian and Israeli civilians at risk. To
what extent does or can Palestinian national security institutions protect the
civilian population under their authority? What are the principles, practices
and perceptions of protection under the Palestinian Authority? Protection of
civilians under Palestinian Authority needs to be distinguished between
protection under Hamas authority in Gaza and the varying degrees of
autonomous rule by the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority in the West
Bank. Israel’s military occupation, the divisions of the West Bank into
Areas A, B & C, as well the differing realities in Gaza versus the West
Bank, has made the analysis of protection and responsibility for violence
and accountability complex.
© The Author(s) 2023
T. Sp i t k a, National and International Civilian Protection Strategies
in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20390-9_3
71

72 T. Spitka
Examination of the behaviour of the Palestinian government and
security apparatus cannot be taken out of the context of Israel’s mili-
tary occupation and systematic discrimination which has increasingly
commonly been labelled as apartheid. As noted in a 2022 report by
Amnesty International: ‘Israel’s system of institutionalized segregation
and discrimination against Palestinians, as a racial group, in all areas
under its control amounts to a system of apartheid, and a serious viola-
tion of Israel’s human rights obligations. Almost all of Israel’s civilian
administration and military authorities, as well as governmental and
quasi-governmental institutions, are involved in the enforcement of a
system of apartheid against Palestinians across Israel and the OPT…the
intention to maintain this system has been explicitly declared by succes-
sive Israeli political leaders, emphasizing the overarching objective of
maintaining Jewish Israeli domination by excluding, segregating and
expelling Palestinians’ (Amnesty 2022, p. 267). The findings are echoed
within investigations by other national and international organizations.
Beyond the system of apartheid, Israel monitors and controls all
aspects of Palestinian life including free movement of civilians, officials,
basic goods, trade and communication, making Palestinians completely
dependent on Israel and foreign aid for their survival and well-being.
Finally, separation and segregation are systematically maintained, which
limits cooperation and accountability. Given the Israeli control of Areas
B & C, the Jewish settlements, Israel’s land appropriated for agricul-
ture, nature reserves and military training camps, Palestinians currently
control about 18 percent of the territory of the West Bank, and even this
is not fully. Area C covers 60% of the West Bank territory and is home to
an estimated 180,000–300,000 Palestinians and to a Jewish settler popu-
lation of at least 325,500 living in 125 settlements and approximately
100 illegal outposts (B’Tselem 2022). As noted by B’Tselem ‘Israel
retains control of security and land-management in Area C and views the
area as there to serve its own needs, such as military training, economic
interests and settlement development’ (B’Tselem 2022). Ignoring Pales-
tinian needs, Israel has banned Palestinian construction and development
and encourages the development of Israeli settlements, turning a blind
eye to settler build-up and violence. Under these conditions, Palestinian
management and accountability are also severely limited.

3 Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities 73
The current realities, which offer little hope for better future, make
resistance expected and popular, especially among the youth. Most
current resistance is non-violent including demonstrations and strikes.
Much of the violent resistance comes in the form of rockets, kites or
attempted tunnel attacks from Gaza and lone-wolf terrorist attacks from
the West Bank. The rise in the number of terrorist attacks in 2022 has
increased a sense of insecurity within Israel. During April a Palestinian
gunman entered Israel through a gap in the barrier and shot dead three
people in Tel Aviv. A week earlier, a Palestinian also crossed through the
barrier illegally and shot and killed five people in Bnei Brak. On May 5
in Elad, two Palestinians entered Israel illegally and killed three people in
an axe attack. The last attack took place after Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar
called out in a speech before Palestinian dignitaries and elites in Gaza
for Palestinians to carry out operations inside Israel using every possible
weapon. “Our people under occupation inside [Israel] in the Negev, the
Triangle region, the Galilee, Haifa, Jaffa, Acre, and Lod — whoever has a
gun should prepare it, and whoever does not have a gun should prepare
his cleaver, axe or knife. If they want there to be a religious war, they will
be shattering all the red lines, and we should be on standby” (Memry TV
2022). Israel responded by plans to build a higher wall to replace fencing
and threatened to kill Sinwar.
Protection of the Palestinian population is widely different across
the Occupied territories depending on the location, violent escalations
between Israel and armed groups, specific or ongoing incidents and
operations, proximity to settlements and the politics of the moment.
Despite significant domestic and international investment in the Pales-
tinian security sector, there are fundamental incongruities in civilian
protection under the Palestinian Authority (PA). With over 83,000
security personnel in the West Bank and Gaza combined, the PA
contains one of the highest ratios of security personnel to civilians
in the world, which accounts for more than one-third of its budget
(ECFR 2022). Their specific mandates and serious discords between
the Palestinian Authority’s security forces and the Palestinian resistance
movement undermine effective protection (Tartir 2015). There is also
an ongoing generational friction between young Palestinians thirsty for

74 T. Spitka
change and part of the older generation profiteering, or perceived as prof-
iteering from the system. The generational clashes have led to deadly
confrontations which are discussed in the subsequent chapter focused on
children.
In recent years, the PA has been criticized for its human rights
practices including lack of tolerance of opposition and difference. As
noted by the European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR), [Pales-
tinian] security forces continue to perpetrate human rights violations
including arbitrary detention, torture and the use of excessive force
(ECFR 2022). According to Human Rights Watch, the Fatah-led Pales-
tinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas authorities in Gaza
routinely arrest and torture peaceful critics and opponents (Human
Rights, 2018). Other international observers including Amnesty Interna-
tional noted that Palestinian authorities in the West Bank and the Hamas
de facto administration in the Gaza Strip repressed dissent, resorting
to arbitrary detention, torture and other ill-treatment, and the use of
excessive force against protesters (Amnesty 2018). As in Israel, dissidents,
critics, journalists and human rights activists have all been targeted.
Cycles of violence, political incitement and abuses by the IDF, border
police and private security forces have all contributed to terrorist attacks.
The majority of terrorist attacks emanating from within the West Bank
against Israelis have in recent years been conducted by Hamas or lone-
wolf attackers, unaffiliated with any factions. 1990’s Oslo peace process
managed to reign in the majority of the Palestinian terrorist groups oper-
ating inside the West Bank. Unified National Command, which was
one of the contributing factors to Oslo, was comprised of individuals
from militant groups, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(DFLP), al-Fatah (the militant wing of the PLO) and Hamas (Jackson
2007). However, Hamas and PIJ rejected the Oslo Accords (Jackson
2007). Unified National Command’s primary purpose was to orga-
nize protests and not to conduct terrorist activities. The failure of the
2000 Camp David Summit to reach final agreement and Ariel Sharon’s
provocative visit to the Temple Mount triggered a second intifada. Israel
engaged in gunfire, targeted killings, tank and air attacks, while the
Palestinians engaged in suicide bombings, rock throwing, gunfire and

3 Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities 75
rocket attacks, resulting in high numbers of civilian casualties. The West
Bank security barrier, or the separation wall, was built to thwart terrorist
attacks coming into Israel subsequent to the second intifada, as Israel
fought waves of suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks.
In the aftermath of the 2007 takeover of Gaza by Hamas, the Pales-
tinian security sector was split into the Hamas-controlled security in
Gaza, and the security sector under the control of Fatah in the West
Bank. Hamas, a Sunni-Islamic fundamentalist militant group, violently
suppressed opposition, established an armed resistance wing and set up a
state-like security apparatus. Hamas has progressed far beyond a terrorist
group to become a social movement (Robinson 2003). An offshoot of the
Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas benefited from Israeli assistance in their
drive to undermine the Palestine Liberalization Organization (PLO).
Israel supported the Islamist group, believing it could use the Islamists as
a counterweight to the PLO, which was viewed as the greater threat to
Israeli interests and security (Robinson 2003, p. 124). As noted by the
Hamas representative Muhammad Nazzal, “The Israeli mentality is secu-
rity first, before politics and everything else. It thought its security was
enhanced by allowing us to grow, without thinking what might happen
down the road” (Robinson 2003, p. 124). Since coming to power, Hamas
built not only mosques, but also schools, kindergartens, clinics, hospitals,
charitable associations, sports clubs and other institutions. Connecting
religion, social activities and social services, it has become a powerful
and popular social movement (Robinson 2003).
Although in recent years some of the leadership of Hamas has at times
toned down its hard-line uncompromising militant narrative, the orga-
nization continues to support terrorist acts and is investigated for war
atrocities. Hamas seeks and maintains a complicated role as a state-like
security provider and a resistance movement, which creates contra-
dictions. In May 16, 2018, Sinwar stated that Hamas would pursue
“peaceful, popular resistance”. A week earlier he had encouraged Gazans
to breach the Israeli siege, saying "We would rather die as martyrs
than die out of oppression and humiliation", Hamas seeks and main-
tains a complicated role as a state-like security provider, social and a
resistance movement which creates contradictions. As noted by Berti;

76 T. Spitka
‘the tensions inherent within Hamas’s quest to be an effective secu-
rity provider and a “resistance movement” reflect the broader struggle
between governance and rebellion and between the competing needs of
political accommodation and military struggle faced by non-state armed
providers of governance’ (Berti 2016, p. 1070). The PA and international
organizations have condemned protection strategies and practices under
Hamas. UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Tor
Wennesland noted that there is ‘no justification’ for terrorism or violence
against civilians and ‘the indiscriminate launching of rockets towards
Israeli population centres violates international law and must stop….’
(UN News, 2022). Hamas’s success in carrying out attacks in the West
Bank, has been aimed at provoking the IDF and to humiliate the PA and
undermine its status.
In the West Bank, the PA under President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime
Minister Salam Fayyad have focused on gaining the monopoly on power
and the use of violence. The security reform aimed to transform the
Palestinian security sector has, however, not increased the level of protec-
tion for civilians and led to a deepening of authoritarianism in the OPT.
The emphasis of security under the PA in recent years has been working
in collaboration with Israel to weaken opposition, most notably Hamas.
For Israel, this has indeed been beneficial. Israeli army officials estimate
that the Palestinian security forces are responsible for thwarting 30–40%
of attacks conducted in the West Bank (Lisiecka 2017). The label of
‘terrorist’ has become politicized as Israel has labelled Palestinian chil-
dren, non-violent BDS (Boycott, Disinvestment, Sanctions) supporters
and prominent human rights NGO’s as ‘terrorist’. During 2021, Israel
classified 6 Palestinian human rights NGOs as terrorist organizations,
including those focusing on women’s and children’s rights. Most interna-
tional observers and Palestinians believe that the main Israeli motivation
behind the labelling of six Palestinian NGOs as terrorist organizations
is to weaken the ability of these organizations to document Israeli viola-
tions of human rights and to weaken the PA efforts to take Israelis to the
International Criminal Court (PSR 2021).
The collaboration with Israel’s security forces has cost the PA much
popularity among its population, especially the youth. With ongoing
escalations with Israel, targeted IDF attacks against Palestinians, and

3 Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities 77
settler violence, the Palestinian public feels no tangible effects of the
cooperation with Israel (Lisiecka 2017). As noted by one critic: ‘the
PA security forces largely protect the security of the occupier and not
that of the occupied’ (Tartir 2017, p. 3). The Palestinian population
has become increasingly vulnerable using non-violent means of resis-
tance such as demonstrations. Lack of negotiations and political progress
also do not bode well for democracy or hope for non-violence especially
among the younger population. Although in recent years neither Hamas
nor Fatah have conducted national elections, results of surveys show that
Hamas is currently more popular than Fatah, and if elections were to
be held, Ismail Haniyeh, political leader of Hamas, would likely win
against both President Abbas and Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh
(PSR 2021). However, Marwan Barghouti, also from Fatah but serving
in Israeli prison since 2002, is far more popular than Haniyeh, with the
support from two-thirds of the Palestinian population. Opinion polls
also show that three-quarters of the Palestinian public are unsatisfied with
the current leadership and demand the resignation of President Abbas.
Subsequent to May 2021 war between Hamas and Israel, the popularity
gap jumped up to 39% in favour of Hamas (PSR 2021).
The Protected
The protected civilian populations include those under PA immediate
authority, those under the authority of Hamas as well as other civil-
ians directly affected by the violence or incitement of violence. Thus,
Israeli civilians, whether Jewish or Palestinian, are also directly affected
by Palestinian strategies and policies whether as victims of rocket or
terrorist attacks. There is a wide degree of differentiation between the
protection of civilian populations living in Israel, under the PA within
different areas of the West Bank and Gaza. The level of protection in
the West Bank ranges from relatively effective within the largest urban
centres most notably Ramallah, to non-effective in areas under mixed
Israeli/Palestinian control such as Area B, and among the population
living close to Israeli settlements, to belligerent protection within Gaza.

78 T. Spitka
It’s impossible to examine protection under PA while ignoring Israel’s
military occupation which impacts the daily lives of Palestinians. Within
the first six months of 2021, 60 Palestinians were killed, almost double
the number of 2021. According to the UN, there were 78 Palestinian
fatalities at the hands of Israeli security forces for all of 2021, and 24
such fatalities in 2020 (UN Report 2022). Closetohalfofthe Pales-
tinian male population has experienced imprisonment in Israeli military
prisons (Nafstad, 2018). The majority of Palestinians, including children,
have experienced or at least witnessed violence and have trauma. Many
terrorist (or attempted) attacks against Israelis are made by individuals
whose family or friends were hurt by Israeli soldiers.
The lack of protection is compounded by the complexities of simul-
taneous resistance to the Israeli occupation, which is permitted and
encouraged by the PA, and opposition to the Palestinian governing
authority, which is not tolerated and commonly crushed. Both the
PA and Hamas have worked to rein in and intimidate their political
opposition through harassment, arrests of protestors and violence. The
lack of tolerance of opposition has made Palestinian youth especially
vulnerable given their desire for change. While Hamas has refused to
renounce violence, the document of its principles and policies states that:
‘managing resistance, in terms of escalation and de-escalation, or in terms
of diversifying the means and methods, is an integral part of the process
of managing the conflict’ (Kear 2022, p. 14).
West Bank
Under the Oslo accords, the West Bank was separated into Area A,
under Palestinian control, Area B under mixed authority and Area C,
the majority of the land of the West Bank where the Israeli military
holds exclusive military and administrative control. Protection of civil-
ians under the PA is generally more feasible and effective within Area ‘A’
of the West Bank, where Palestinian police are responsible for providing
protection. As discussed in Chapter 2, the protection issues of most
concern are in areas under joint or Israeli authority, namely in Area C,
where Palestinian civilians live under Israeli military rule without access

3 Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities 79
to social and security services, including the Palestinian police. Protection
is more effective during periods where Israeli and Palestinians protec-
tion authorities cooperate r ather than in periods and locations where
their efforts are in opposition to the other. In recent years, most discus-
sions between Israeli and Palestinian leadership have focused on security
“coordination” (Al-Omari 2016). Coordination between Israeli and PA
authority has, however, not prevented Israel from acting unilaterally.
Forceful Israeli incursions into Area A, among other unilateral acts, have
undermined coordination and the PA’s ability to maintain control over
its population. Most of the deadly violence in the West Bank is at the
hands of the Israeli military or Jewish settlers and takes place during
Israeli incursions into Area A or within Area C, without the engage-
ment of Palestinian security. Since settlers work with the military and are
supported by the government, the violence against Palestinians occurs
without investigation and accountability. Israeli NGO B’Tselem records
daily incidents of settler violence including cutting down olive trees,
killing of herds, theft and injuries.
While protests against Israel and its occupation are welcome, criticism
of the Palestinian Authority is not. In recent years, Palestinian Presi-
dent Mahmoud Abbas has banned protests against his own government
and imposed particularly harsh security measures against any opposition.
Critical political activists, journalists, students and demonstrators have
been beaten and detained. In June 2021, Nizar Banat, an outspoken
Palestinian critic, who was planning to run in elections, was beaten,
arrested and died in custody. Banat was a prominent Palestinian polit-
ical activist, an advocate of free speech and was known for his outspoken
criticism of the PA for its corruption and its security coordination
with the Israel (Sneineh 2021). His death sparked protests among the
Palestinian population. Although fourteen officers from the Palestinian
security services have been charged over the death of Banat, the trial
has been hampered. Family and critics have noted that the PA has been
attempting to delay and disrupt the trial (Memo 2022).
Although, as discussed below, there is no shortage of protection agen-
cies, the main problems are linked to the occupation, divisions between
the West Bank and Gaza and the limited authority and the jurisdiction
of the PA. Protection of minorities, women, children and teens have also

80 T. Spitka
been particularly problematic under Hamas as well as the PA. In Gaza,
Hamas runs schools, clubs and military day camps for kids and youth.
In the West Bank, Palestinian children and teens have been encouraged
to take part in protests in order to educate them about the reality of the
occupation and strengthen the moral strength of non-violent resistance.
As noted by one international observer, there is a general sentiment that
“as a parent you protect the children more by exposing them rather
than shielding them from the violence” (Red Cross Interview 11, 2019).
However, as will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, participation
of youth, including children in violent and non-violent demonstrations,
has placed Palestinian teenagers in a high-risk category.
The Protectors—West Bank
The government and security under the PLO and the PA have been
closely aligned. Arafat’s establishment of security-driven political struc-
tures nourished authoritarianism and blocked accountability (Tartir
2017). Under late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, corruption was
high, and security for Palestinians was low, which has not changed signif-
icantly. The current security sector in the West Bank consists of several
official key players including the PA Government, the Palestinian Civil
Police, Preventive Security Service (PSS), Palestinian National Security
Forces (PSF), Presidential Guard (PG) and the judiciary.
PA Government : The Palestinian security sector employs around half
of all the civil servants, accounts for nearly $1 billion of the PA budget,
and receives around 30% of the total international aid disbursed to the
Palestinians (Tartir 2017). The security sector consumes more of the
PA’s budget than the education, health and agriculture sectors combined.
However, the PA is unpopular and considered to be very weak, and
collaboration with Israel to curtail resistance and terrorism while also
repressing opposition has only boosted its unpopularity. President Abbas
has threatened at least 58 times to end the security cooperation with
Israel due to Israel’s ongoing occupation, but has never done so. In 2014,
President Abbas noted that cooperation with Israel is sacred (Middle East
Monitor 2014). Since most of the funding is external and the PA would

3 Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities 81
not survive without it, it’s unclear to what extent PA is able to change this
policy without losing the support of the IC, including the US. As noted
by an NGO: ‘they [PA] need funding from the EU and the US, but the
US and the EU are not willing to fund the Palestinian security forces
unless the Palestinian security forces cooperate with Israel to maintain
Israel’s security’ (Nafstad 2018).
Palestinian Civil Police (PCP)
The Palestinian civil police are the PA’s main law-enforcement agency
in Area A of the West Bank. PCP handles ordinary police functions
such as combating crime and upholding public order, and is charge of
the PA’s prisons. The civil police have various sub-branches including:
criminal investigation, drug enforcement, public order, traffic, emer-
gency response and a women’s police force (ECFR 2022). The Palestinian
police are also responsible for curbing Palestinian protestors within Area
A or along its borders. Area A is broken up into enclaves between
which there is limited freedom of movement. Palestinian police are also
restricted in moving personnel, vehicles or arms between different PA
autonomy areas without prior Israeli permission (Sayigh 2011). Out of
a total of 8,000 police officers, only 300 are women, which is very low
and far below the international average.
Since 2007, the PCP has received training from the EU’s Police
Mission for the Palestinian Territories, focused on security and justice
reforms (EUPOL COPPS 2023). Some aspects of protection under
the PA have improved in the West Bank, in particular for women. In
2008, Palestinian civilian police established a Family Protection Unit
through EU support and gender training for the police. The protec-
tion unit opened branches in 10 districts within the West Bank and
aspired to build more effective protection from violence against women
and children. The police also supported the establishment of a unified
service centre to provide a coordinated response among service providers
to provide victims of domestic violence protection with accountability
(Palestinian Police 2017). Where PCP has actively tackled violence
against women with investigations and accountability, the number of

82 T. Spitka
femicides and domestic violence cases have dropped. Palestinian women
make up only 3 percent of the police force, however, more than 30
percent of lawyers are women and Palestinian women are beginning
to play a more active role in the justice system within Area A. Still,
violence against Palestinian women and girls remains a serious issue.
In general, Palestinians are most satisfied with the work of the police.
In a 2015 survey conducted by the UN and EUCOPPS, Palestinian
respondents agree by a significant majority (71.6%) that the PCP
does an excellent job in responding their needs of their communities
(UNDP/PAPP/EUCOPPS 2015).
Preventive Security Service (PSS): PSS is a prestigious security
branch in the PA whose main responsibilities include maintaining
internal security within the West Bank and uncovering criminal, secu-
rity or political offences (Levy 2016). The PSS was established by Fatah
operatives who came to prominence in the territories prior to the Oslo
Accords. It reports directly to the Palestinian President and has grown to
become one of the most powerful security forces (ECFR Mapping 2022).
Its missions are almost identical to those of the Palestinian General
Intelligence Service and work closely with the CIA and Israeli security
agencies. Similar to GIS personnel, PSS officers operate in civilian attire,
and they carry out both clandestine and public operations. PSS moni-
tors and impedes the activities of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in an effort
to weaken these organizations’ influence in the West Bank (Levy 2016).
PSS also monitors and tracks critics of the Palestinian Authority. It was
the PSS that arrested and severely beat one of the most prominent critics
of the PA Nizar Banat, who died in their custody.
Palestinian National Security Forces (PSF): The PSF is essentially
the Palestinian army and constitutes the largest branch of Palestinian
security forces. A rough estimate of the total strength in 2007 was 42,000
troops. The numbers were reduced under restructuring, and currently, it
has approximately 10,500 personnel, who receive training and support
from Jordan and the US through its United States Security Coordinator
(USSC) (ECFR 2022). PSF conducts large-scale operations and arrests
in the Palestinian territories against Palestinian terrorist cells. Palestinian
security forces have been known to release arrested terrorists and then

3 Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities 83
quietly tip off Israeli forces in order to mitigate internal public criticism
against handing Palestinians to Israel (Bob 2014).
Presidential Guard (PG): The Presidential Guard (PG) is an elite
force, comprised of around 2,300 personnel, with a mandate that
includes personal protection to the president, counter-insurgency and
rapid intervention tasks. The PG also receives training and suppor t from
Jordan and the US through the United States Security Coordinator
(USSC). The US was highly involved with the training of officers, coor-
dinated by Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton. The PG has been accused of being
an arm of the Israeli occupation and an extension of Abbas’ efforts to
crush political dissent in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Palestine
papers1 confirmed, among other things, that Palestinian Authority forces
supported by the US engaged in torture (Perry 2011).
Palestinian Judiciary: The PA court system is composed of Sharia
courts, military courts, the Court of First Instance, Court of Concilia-
tion, the Courts of Appeal, the High Court of Justice, Constitutional
Court and Electoral Court. Israeli military courts also try Palestinian
residents in security cases and over time have extended t heir jurisdic-
tion to penal, civil, commercial and traffic cases. Also, many disputes
between Palestinians are settled outside of the formal court system within
the tribal justice system. The tribal justice system derives its provisions
from tribal traditions and cultural heritage, but it may undermine the
rule of law and can be detrimental to women’s rights. Critics have noted
that the executive authority in Palestine has also exploited social tradi-
tions and invested in the tribal system in an effort to consolidate their
influence, at the expense of establishing the rule of law (Dodeen 2019).
The Palestinian President has exercised legislative and regulatory powers
outside the framework of the constitution to give himself greater powers
to manage the affairs of the country and to interfere with the work of
the constitutional institutions of the PA (Dodeen 2019). In September
2018, the Palestinian Judges Association announced that 14 (out of 27)
justices of the Supreme [High] Court had submitted their resignations
1 A collection of 1,700 confidential documents about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process leaked
to Al Jazeera in 2011.

84 T. Spitka
in protest against legal amendments proposed by the Judiciary Devel-
opment Committee “undermining the independence of the judiciary”
(ECFR 2022). Although Palestinian women make up 30% of all active
lawyers in Palestine, the judiciary system in Palestine is also far from
representative. Until recently, Articles 98 and 340 of the Penal Code
granted a mitigating circumstance in the punishment for murdering a
woman, if the murderer had been angry because of an act committed by
the woman and classified as a violation of family honour (Dodeen 2019).
The Protectors—Gaza
Civil Police Force: In Gaza, the civil police force was first developed after
the 2007 takeover of Gaza by Hamas. In 2007, the security forces on
PA’s payroll were ordered not to report to work, which led to an imme-
diate collapse of the security sector (Berti 2016). The new force was
rapidly made up of members of the armed wings of Hamas and the
Popular Resistance Committees (PRCs), as well as members of smaller
armed factions in Gaza. It was subsequently rebuilt after the 2009 Israeli
Operation Cast Lead, which heavily targeted the civil police and its
infrastructure. During Cast Lead, the police commissioner, Tawfik Jaber,
was killed along with many others including cadets in an attack that
took place during the police academy’s graduation ceremony. Said Siam,
Hamas’ Minister of Interior, was also killed by a Cast Lead attack on
his brother’s home. According to Israeli secret ser vice Shabak, no distinc-
tion was drawn between the military wing operatives incorporated into
the police force and their activity as terror agents against Israel (Shabak
2015). The UN outlined that the mere fact of being a member of Hamas
is not sufficient to render a person a legitimate military target.
Hamas invested in establishing a police collage and training and
administrative development department in partnership with local and
international NGOs (Berti 2016). Beyond crime prevention, drug and
crowd control, policing also focused on ‘social control’ and ‘moral
policing’, for example, by monitoring women’s attire or by regulating
behaviour deemed as inappropriate (Berti 2016). LGBTQ rights and

3 Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities 85
freedom in Gaza are strictly and violently prohibited, with a possible
death penalty for those suspected of straying from heterosexual norms.
Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades: The military wing of Hamas oper-
ates as an army with numerous units including: elite unit, artillery unit,
tunnel unit, snipers unit and infantry. Qassam Brigades has invested in
weapon production as well as acquisition of rockets, mortars as well
as on anti-tank weapons, and target-designed explosives as part of the
group’s effort to prepare for direct engagement with the IDF (Berti
2016). Hamas’s military wing has also relied on underground tunnels
to smuggle in goods, boost profits and to bolster its military apparatus
for defensive as well as offensive operations against Israel (Ber ti 2016).
Although other militant groups operate within Gaza, any direct threat to
the authority of Hamas is met with armed force.
Hamas has launched tens of thousands of rockets into Israel. Although
many rockets explode in the immediate cities of Sderod, Ashkelon and
Ashdod and within Gaza, some of the rockets launched today can reach
up to 250 kilometres hitting more distant towns including Tel Aviv
and the outskirts of Jerusalem. Approximately 90% of the rockets have
been successfully intercepted by the Iron Dome (Frantzman 2021). Since
2011, the Iron Dome intercepted more than 2,500 rockets. The number
of rockets launched has, however, been on the rise. During one week in
the 2021 conflict in the midst of a violent escalation, the Iron Dome
intercepted 1,200 rockets (Frantzman 2021). Hamas justifies its contin-
uation of violent resistance and the targeting of Israeli civilians to the
ongoing realities including continuing military occupation and its own
lack of sophisticated weapons.
Judiciary: Subsequent to its takeover of Gaza, Hamas appointed
members and supporters of its movement to main leadership positions
within legislative, executive and judicial branches of its government.
Hamas decided not to completely dispense with the penal code and
to instead gradually replace it with Sharia law. ‘In place of the Penal
Codes punishments of imprisonment and fines, it proscribed the hudud
[Quranic limits of capital and corporal punishment] and qasas –the
Shari’a principle of equitable retaliation: he who kills with an axe should
die by an axe’ (Pelham 2010a, b). The Shariah courts have been especially
problematic for women’s rights, which have continued to be denigrated.

86 T. Spitka
In February 2021, the Sharia Judicial Council decided that an unmar-
ried woman may not travel without the permission of her “guardian”,
which would usually refer to her father or another older male relative and
married women would not be able to travel without the permission of
her husband (Akram 2021). Although the ruling was partially overturned
following demonstrations, women continue to experience harassment
when attempting to exit Gaza.
Principles
The PA under President Abbas has made a solid shift to non-violent
resistance against the Israeli occupation, however, without the backing
of Hamas and with no progress in peace talks or change in daily real-
ities under Israeli occupation, has faced disillusionment from much of
the Palestinian public. Hamas, which rules unopposed in Gaza, appears
to still favour violent resistance and fails to make a distinction between
civilian and combatant, which is supposed to be established on the basis
of whether the person is directly engaged in hostilities. Although the
State of Palestine has become recognized by 138 nations and since 2012
is a non-member UN observer state, it lacks control over its territory.
The Palestinian Authority (PA) has limited control in Areas A and B
and has not held national elections since 2006. The principal solution
supported by the international community continues to be the estab-
lishment of the Palestinian state beside the state of Israel. As noted in
the EU/Palestinian Authority Action Plan; ‘Achieving Palestinian state-
hood requires full implementation of the Quartet Roadmap and an end
to violence in order to reach a fair and lasting peace in the Middle
East, on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, and
allowing for the establishment of an independent, viable, sovereign and
contiguous Palestinian state, living side by side with the state of Israel
in peace and security’ (PA Action Plan 2005). However, with no polit-
ical talks and progress, the focus has been humanitarian aid, technical
assistance and de facto freezing of the status quo.
The status quo, however, is unbearable for Palestinian civilians and
unworkable for effective local policing. Area A of the West Bank is

3 Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities 87
broken into 7 urban enclaves, surrounded by Areas B and C, in which
the Palestinian police have no mandate. A significant hindrance for
the Palestinian police is not being able to operate outside of Area A,
leaving Palestinian civilians without any police. The Israeli soldiers, not
speaking the local language and having the reputation of a brutal enemy,
even under best intentions, do not have the mandate, training or the
capacity to deal with Palestinian civilians. As already discussed, a system
of apartheid has become institutionalized where Israeli citizens including
those who are living illegally in Jewish settlements on occupied land have
access to all services including policing, while Palestinian civilians have
no right to services or protection.
Some areas under dual authority are even more problematic. Although
most cities in the West Bank are in Area A under PA, the city of
Hebron has been split into two sectors: H1 is controlled by the Pales-
tinian Authority and H2—which includes the Old City of Hebron—has
remained under the militar y control of Israel. In the area of H2, settler
violence and the failure to enforce the law against those who have
committed violence have been regarded as the major reason for the
departure of an estimated 43 percent of Palestinians residents of Hebron’s
old city (More 2008). Migration of the population of an occupied terri-
tory as a result of threatened or real violence can be equated to ‘a slow
process of ethnic cleansing or population transfer which is prohibited by
International law’ (More 2008).
As noted by Lieutenant Colonel Jan Kristensen: ‘The activity of the
settlers and the army in the H-2 area of Hebron is creating an irre-
versible situation. In a sense, cleansing is being carried out. In other
words, if the situation continues for another few years, the result will be
that no Palestinians will remain there. It is a miracle they have managed
to remain there until now’ (More 2008, p. 49). There is very little that
can be accomplished by the West Bank Palestinian police or security
forces, which are not allowed to operate in the Israeli-controlled areas.
Ramadan Awad, chief of the Palestinian police in Hebron, noted that:
“We have succeeded in some areas but being prevented from working
in the (Israeli-controlled) area has been a major obstacle” (Daraghmeh

88 T. Spitka
2015). Hebron is a microcosm of a composite reality of two populations
that are only nominally separated, and as such, is a model that arouses
concern (Baruch 2019).
Under international guidance and funding, the PA has become tech-
nically more professionalized but its principles and priorities have not
been focused on the protection of the Palestinian civilian population.
Disarmament and security campaigns were conducted to enforce law and
order, collect illegal arms, rebuild the security sector’s physical infrastruc-
ture and draft strategic plans for the sector (Tartir 2015, p. 12). The
technical solutions have not impacted the daily realities of the Pales-
tinians. Under the military occupation which is r uled by discriminatory
rules under the state of emergency. “The constant state of emergency
within Israel and the security legislation in the West Bank are the sources
of authority that permit the production of exceptions within the law”
(Berda 2018, p. 113). Military decrees declare threats, create closed
military zones and launch security actions and restrictions which affect
Palestinian lives daily. As noted by Yael Berda; ‘the entire permit regime
is predicated on the justification that monitoring movement is the key
to preventing terrorist attacks in Israel’ (Berda 2018, p. 45).
The principles of security and protection of civilians are not any
less complicated in Gaza. The current notion is that responsibility to
protect civilians in Gaza is shared between Israel as the occupying power,
Palestinian Authority (PA), and Hamas, which runs the de facto govern-
ment. The triangle of authority means that while the different authorities
point fingers at opposing sides for infringements on human rights and
war crimes, no national authority can be seen as protecting the most
vulnerable population. In its 2017 Document of General Principles and
Policies, Hamas notes that ‘it is a Palestinian Islamic national liberation
and resistance movement. Its goal is to liberate Palestine and confront
the Zionist project. Its frame of reference is Islam, which determines its
principles, objectives and means’ (Hamas 2017). Hamas ‘considers the
Balfour Declaration, the British Mandate Document, the UN Palestine
Partition Resolution’, and whatever resolutions and measures that derive
from them, ‘null and void’ (Hamas 2017). Hamas continues to support
violent as well as non-violent resistance. However, its more recent prin-
ciples outline ‘managing resistance’ and ‘diversifying the means and

3 Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities 89
methods’. Hamas affirmed that its ‘conflict is with the Zionist project not
with the Jews because of their religion. Hamas does not wage a struggle
against the Jews because they are Jewish but wages a struggle against the
Zionists who occupy Palestine’ (Hamas 2017).
Hamas leadership has shifted some of its rhetoric towards making a
distinction between Israeli combatants and non-combatants, and claims
it does not target civilians but its weapons and tools are not sophisticated
enough to target soldiers. In Gaza, policing goes hand in hand with reli-
gion. ‘From the perspective of the Hanieh government, its promotion
of professional policing, on the one hand, and Hamas’s use of the secu-
rity sector to spearhead the Islamization of society, on the other, reflect
distinct but complementary notions of the relationship between policing
and the social order, rather than defining a harsh dichotomy between
them’ (Sayigh 2011, p. 27).
The IDF targeting of officials affiliated to Hamas in Gaza has been
part of international investigation. The commission that investigated the
2014 conflict underlined that the mere fact of being a member of the
political wing of Hamas or any other organization in Gaza is not suffi-
cient in and of itself to render a person a legitimate military target.
‘While the IDF indicated that it did not target Hamas lawmakers, politi-
cians or law-enforcement officials because of their affiliation with Hamas,
but only individuals who directly participate in hostilities or are members
of organized armed groups, under international humanitarian law, a
member of an armed group has to have a continuous combat function
to constitute a legitimate military target’ (HRC Report 2015).
In 2019, the International Commission for Human Rights (ICHR)
pointed to lack of accountability for serious violations by security forces
in West Bank and Gaza. In 2017, the ICHR received 2656 complaints,
1551 from the West Bank and 1105 from Gaza, 72% of which pertained
to the security services (Human Rights Council 2019, p, 220). In the
West Bank, the Office of the Military Prosecution is responsible for
investigating and prosecuting crimes committed by members of the
security forces. A 2018 judicial backing was given to the Palestinian
authorities to consider the police in the West Bank as a military institu-
tion rather than a civilian one. As a consequence, police officers accused

90 T. Spitka
of violations can only be tried in military courts, making it more diffi-
cult for alleged victims of police abuse to access justice (Human Rights
Council 2019). Playing a similar role in Gaza, the Military Prosecu-
tion there told the ICHR that in all of 2016 not a single security force
member had been held criminally accountable (Human Rights Council
2019).
Practice
Although physically separated by walls and fences, violent incidents
and demonstrations and other events in Gaza, West Bank and within
Israel impact on each other and can escalate the conflict. The May
2021 escalation is a good example of the way in which events in
the West Bank impacted on the violence in Gaza and vice versa. The
crisis was triggered over Israel’s Supreme Court’s decision on the evic-
tion of six Palestinian families in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of
Sheikh Jarrah, and Israeli police storming of the compound of the al-
Aqsa Mosque, which led to widespread protests. On May 10th, Hamas
gave Israel an ultimatum to withdraw its security forces from both the
Temple Mount complex and Sheikh Jarrah. When the ultimatum expired
without a response, both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement
PIJ launched rockets from the Gaza Strip into Israel, which resulted in
Israeli retaliation. The May 2022 Israeli bombardment of the Gaza Strip
that lasted 11 days killed at least 257 Palestinians, including 66 chil-
dren (OCHA 2021). Thirteen people were killed in Israel, including
two children. The Israeli bombardment also destroyed 1,148 housing
and commercial units in Gaza and partially damaged 15,000 others,
leaving more than 100,000 civilians displaced in UN-run schools and
other hosting communities (OCHA 2021). The bombing campaign in
Gaza triggered an unprecedented wave of unrest of exceptional intensity
in Israel most notably within the mixed Jewish–Arab cities.
Ongoing policies of apartheid, ethnic cleansing in East Jerusalem and
desecration of holy sites in Jerusalem and the West Bank have resulted
in threatening reaction from Hamas from Gaza, whereas shootings or

3 Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities 91
bombardments of civilians in Gaza have led to civilian uproars and lone-
wolf incidents in the West Bank and within Israel. As noted by Kershner
‘not even during the intifadas, the mass Palestinian uprisings of the past,
did Israel experience such a surge of both Arab and Jewish mob violence’
(Kershner 2021). While Palestinians do experience such violence on a
regular basis, this type of violence, which included Molotov cocktails,
lynching and shootings by Arab and Jewish extreme groups, is new for
the mixed cities within Israel (Kershner 2021). For Palestinians, there
are severe repercussions for non-violent resistance that can be as high
as for violent resistance. This could entail harassment, prison, loss of
one’s employment, freedom of movement, demolition of home, intim-
idation or death. Security officials in the West Bank generally remain
silent or are sent to put down Palestinian protests as they are under tight
control of the PA, which is dependent on external funding. As noted by
critics, the Palestinian security forces ‘remained, in essence, an externally-
controlled process, driven by the national security interests of Israel and
the United States, and characterised by very limited ownership on the
part of Palestinian society’ (Tartir 2015,p.9).
Violence from Jewish Settlements is another area of daily problems.
The term ‘price tag’ is meant to threaten Palestinians with violence or
harassment as the price extracted from Palestinians from actions that
are perceived as harming settlers or the settlement enterprise. ‘Price tag
attacks have included vandalism of property, arson, uprooting of olive
trees, and physical violence towards Palestinians, which is often accompa-
nied by Hebrew graffiti with the words: "Price tag"’ (Just Vision, 2022).
Palestinian police are far removed from Jewish settlements as they are not
allowed to function outside of Area A, and settlers do not enter Area A.
Several areas, including Palestinian suburbs of Jerusalem, are cut off from
Area A and have functioned without any policing. Abu Dis, Azariyeh,
Ram and Biddou and other suburbs of Jerusalem fall outside the jurisdic-
tion of the Israeli and Palestinian police, ‘leaving a vacuum that drew car
thieves and drug dealers’ (Daraghmeh 2015). In 2015, Palestinian armed
police were brought back as unruly violence, commonly linked to drugs,
was beginning to spill into Israel. “We want people to get used to seeing
the police uniform first, and then we will start cleaning up troubles,’”
police spokesman Loay Irzekat said. “We will start with drugs because

92 T. Spitka
it’s the most urgent problem” (Daraghmeh 2015). Palestinian police have
managed to calm situations when they have been permitted to police
as opposed to the use of Israeli military, which commonly escalates the
situation.
A similar situation has been occurring within Area C, which has had
no Palestinian police presence, such that when Palestinian residents face
criminal or other problems they report them to the Palestinian police in
Areas A or B, who require special permission from the Israeli military to
enter Area C. In 2018, a first Palestinian mobile police station began to
operate in Area C towns during the day "to receive citizens’ complaints
and resolve disputes between them” (Jalal 2018). Palestinian officers with
the mobile police station can handle all kinds of incidents including
family disputes, violent crimes and drug trafficking (Jalal 2018).
Monitoring the situation in Hebron, the Temporary International
Presence in Hebron (TIPH) issued a confidential report covering their
20 years of operation. The report, based in part on over 40,000 inci-
dent reports, found that Israel routinely violates international law in
Hebron and that it is in "severe and regular breach" of the rights to
non-discrimination laid out in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights over the lack of freedom to movement for the Palestinian
residents of Hebron (UNDP/PAPP/EUCOPPS 2015). Although the
TIPH would not perform any military or police functions and would not
interfere in incidents, they did contribute towards a feeling of security
among Palestinians in Hebron.
PA security also commonly targets opposition. The Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor documented 1,274 arbitrary
detentions in the West Bank in 2015 and 1,089 summonses by PA’s
Palestinian Security Services. The human rights violations targeted
mostly individuals affiliated with Hamas or who opposed PA policies,
including about 35 journalists and human rights activists, 476 university
students, and 67 teachers/professors (Euro-Med 2016).
The ongoing escalations between Israel and Palestinian militant
groups, most notably Hamas in Gaza, have led to the highest number
of civilian casualties among the Palestinian population living in Gaza.
Rocket attacks from Gaza, breaches of militants through tunnels, kite
firebombs and attacks against Israeli civilians have been used to justify

3 Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities 93
hard military responses by Israeli forces including devastating bombard-
ment campaigns. With a population of 1.8 million, Gaza is one of
the most densely populated areas of the world, with limited law and
order, cut off from the outside world and almost entirely dependent
on foreign aid. Whether Gaza is perceived as an occupied territory or
as part of an independent state of Palestine, no national authority is
currently providing protection for the population of Gaza. Cycles of
violence, including Israeli b ombardment campaigns and incursions into
Gaza, have affected the majority of the population that has nowhere to
flee. Economic blockades, severe fuel and water shortages, and Israeli
restrictions on many items including basic construction materials have
left much of the population vulnerable to not only violence but also
natural elements.
Israel and Hamas have fought four severely violent escalations in
2008, 2012, 2014 and 2021, which are commonly in Israel referred
to as mowing the grass. Beyond targeting senior Hamas leadership and
military infrastructure, the range of targets have included mosques,
schools, hospitals, civilian infrastructure, houses, factories, administra-
tive buildings, farmland, water wells, fishing boats, greenhouses, water
and sanitation infrastructure and international press agencies. As noted
by Kear ‘these wars are delicate balancing acts whereby Israel seeks to
repress Hamas by degrading and/or destroying its military, economic,
and political infrastructure, while remaining careful not to crush Hamas
completely thereby creating an unstable power vacuum’ (Kear 2022).
Civilians living in Gaza not only endure indiscriminate bombard-
ment campaigns and ongoing human rights abuses by both Hamas and
Israel, but also live without basic needs, including fuel and water. The
United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in the Palestinian
Territories noted that with the economy in free fall, 70 percent youth
unemployment, widely contaminated drinking water and a collapsed
health care system, Gaza has become “unliveable”, ‘insisting that all
parties — particularly Israel — bring an end to “this disaster”’ (UN
Special Rapporteur, 2018). Hamas authority has contributed to the lack
of security and protection. During the 2014 Gaza war, armed groups
including Hamas fired from built-up areas and prevented civilians from
evacuating (HRC Report 2015).

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For Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the recruitment of youth including chil-
dren in Gaza, within the West Bank and inside Israel is an ongoing
phenomenon. Inside Gaza, Hamas runs mosques, schools, orphanages,
summer camps, sports leagues, student unions and cultural activities
that are used to socialize young children and youth (Hewitt 2004).
Other radical Islamic groups have been linked to NGOs and schools and
pictures of martyrs are commonly displayed in schools and other public
areas. The Gaza Strip has one of the highest birth rates in the world
with almost three-quarters of the population under 30. The majority
have never left Gaza and are unable to leave without special permission,
which is rarely given.
Another vulnerable segment of Palestinian society is women where
there has been limited progress within Area A of the West Bank. Within
Israel, the 48—Palestinian women suffer the double burden of discrim-
ination from Israel and from within their own Arab society. A couple
of months before being killed by a car explosive, the 28-year-old Johara
Khanifs said that she didn’t feel safe (Amun, 2022). “There is no one to
protect us exposed women, because there is no suitable framework for
us within Arab society”, said Khanifs. "The government discriminates
against us regarding everything connected to the police and the feeling of
security. They don’t do enough to protect people. There’s also discrimina-
tion in the budgets for suitable programs” (Arab 48, 2022). Although the
situation of women will be elaborated in more detail in Chapter 6,the
realities of Palestinian women are far worse in the Occupied Territories,
especially within Gaza.
Security and protection is precarious for opposition, minorities, for
women and gender minorities and youth. Unlike in the West Bank, there
is little attempt to address women’s rights or well-being, and the dire
situation is compounded by a lack of training of police or the judiciary.
International organizations including UN Women do not work with
institutions of the de facto Gaza authorities. In Gaza, Palestinian and
international NGO’s efforts have been limited to offering women legal
consultation and assistance under Sharia law, which offers limited protec-
tion. Gaza has one of the highest incidents of violence against women in
the world (Survey 2011). Homosexuality in Gaza remains illegal and is
punishable by death. The police do not act, domestic violence is not

3 Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities 95
criminalized and the only institutions providing protection on gender
issues are civil society organizations, which are also vulnerable to attack
(UN Women interview 2016).
Perceptions and Justifications on Lack
of Protection
There are wide differences between the perceptions of the Palestinian
population of their own safety and security depending on their location
and the various security providers. Within the West Bank, Palestinian
residents in isolated Jerusalem neighbourhoods and H2 (Hebron) feel
least secure, followed by residents of Area C and Area B. In December
2016, perception of insecurity was 86 percent in isolated Jerusalem
neighbourhoods with only 13 percent feeling secure, while in the H2
areas of Hebron 81% of the population felt insecure and unsafe. Feeling
most secure were Palestinian residents in Area A where 64 percent of the
population felt secure and Area B where 52 percent felt safe and secure.
In Area C, 63 percent of the Palestinian residents did not feel secure
noting that the majority of the security threats were related to the occu-
pation. Indeed, in Area A only 21 percent of the security threats were
related to the occupation while outside of Area A 55 percent of security
threats were not related to the occupation.
For Palestinians living in Area A of the West Bank, it is the Palestinian
Civil Police (PCP) who most contribute to their sense of safety’. ‘On
average, 64% of service users are satisfied with all aspects of service provi-
sion explored, with the clear exception of the ability of the PCP to access
Area C and communities behind the wall’ (UNDP/PAPP/EUCOPPS
2015, p. 6). The 2014 survey of 4,209 Palestinian households found
that the Israeli occupation is considered by nine out of ten members of
the public as the most important challenge facing the PCP, while the
lack of resources, inadequate training and lack of clarity surrounding
the division of responsibilities between the PCP and other security
services and within the PCP itself are seen as lower-level problems
(UNDP/PAPP/EUCOPPS 2015). As noted in the survey of the West
Bank residents, ‘For almost all Palestinians, the PCP is clearly seen as the

96 T. Spitka
legitimate address for issues of public safety and security, with 91.6% of
Palestinians saying that they would contact the PCP if they feel in danger,
suggesting that for most people, the PCP plays a very significant role in
providing their sense of security and safety’ (UNDP/PAPP/EUCOPPS
2015,p.7).
Confidence in the Palestinian security services outside of the police
is very low. In 2007, confidence in preventive security stood at 33%,
general intelligence 34%, executive force 35%, presidential guard 37%
and the national security forces 48% (PSR 2007). Palestinian armed
groups had higher or similar rates of confidence, with Qassam Brigades
at 45% and the al-Aqsa Brigades with 50% confidence ratings (PSR
2007). At the time, the Palestinian Police had the highest positive rating
at 58% (PSR 2007). Although the ratings of the Palestinian police have
improved in the past ten years, frustrations remain in areas outside of
Area A. The majority of Palestinians surveyed indicate that they have
confidence in various aspects of Palestinian police work. For example,
75% think it is professional; 74% think it is qualified to do its work;
75% think it implements court decisions; 65% think it responds to
complaints within a reasonable time; and 61% think it has the capacity
to enforce law and order in their place of residence. Confidence stands
at 70% in Area B, but it declines to 47% in Area C and to 25% in
the isolated Jerusalem neighbourhoods and 21% in H2 in Hebron (PSR
2017). The majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip also
oppose security coordination with Israel. Indeed, the majority of Pales-
tinians view the security cooperation with Israel as something negative
and two-thirds (64%) would like the PA to end it (Lisiecka 2017).
Perception of safety is harder to gauge in Gaza. Although the Pales-
tinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) surveyed the percep-
tion of safety and security in the Gaza Strip at 79%, it is difficult to say to
what extent all residents feel safe to respond truthfully (PSR 2021). Still,
the same survey noted the response of the evaluation of ‘conditions in the
Gaza Strip’ is at 5%, which implies that the perception of security under
Hamas policing is many times higher than the perception of other condi-
tions within Gaza. Also, the provision of security has for Hamas been a
core strategic priority. As noted by Berti, Hamas ‘used the provision of
security as a key tool to boost both its power and its political legitimacy

3 Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities 97
(Berti 2016). However, this brings back the question of whose security as
opposition, minorities as well as women have been intimidated, harassed
and attacked. The survey above also did not note the number of female
respondents and clearly anyone who is LGBTQ would also not feel safe
given that in Gaza being gay is a death sentence. In both Gaza and the
West Bank, Palestinian authorities have routinely failed to hold security
forces accountable for carrying out arbitrary arrests, using excessive force
or torture against detainees (Human Rights 2018).
The double standards for Jews and Palestinians can be found within
Israel as well as in Occupied Palestinian Territories. Israeli Joint List
chief Ayman Odeh remarked: “Fight criminals, not democracy. The sole
responsibility for law enforcement among civilians is the police, not intel-
ligence agencies and the military…The last thing we need is more of the
same attitude: police for Jews and Shin Bet for Arabs” (Spiro, 2022).
Former Palestinian information minister Mustafa Barghouti pointed to
contradictions by the international community including sanctions and
the international criminal court. “We have been providing information
for the past 13 years but investigation has not been started yet. And in
less than two months the ICC has sent 42 investigators to Ukraine” (Al
Jazeera Staff 2022). Barghouti noted that ’Palestinians will never accept
to be the slaves of the system of apartheid’ (Aljazeera interview, May
2022). Frustrated by lack of political progress and accountability, the
majority of Palestinians believe armed struggle is more effective than
negotiations in ending the Israeli occupation (PSR 2021).
Conclusion
The limited public trust in national institutions including the Pales-
tinian security sector has made the Palestinian population even more
vulnerable. Some Palestinian policy advisors have called for defunding
of the Palestinian police and security forces. As noted by Shabaka’s
senior analyst, Yara Hawari, ‘it is clear that across colonized Palestine,
both the Israeli and Palestinian policing and state justice institutions are
damaging Palestinian communities, despite their claims to the contrary.
By increasing surveillance and reinforcing existing harmful structures,

98 T. Spitka
they have confirmed that these institutional and colonial spaces cannot
offer accountability and justice’ (Hawari 2021). Hawari recommends
that Palestinian CSOs and civil society ‘should advocate for and support
policies that shrink the police and carceral systems across colonized
Palestine, including calling for defunding police and security forces and
“EUPOL COPPS should end its collaboration with Palestinian secu-
rity forces and prioritize funding alternative and transformative justice
initiatives’ (Hawari 2021).
Subsequent to the recent Black Lives Matter movement, removing
funds from police departments and reallocating them to non-policing
forms of public safety including community and social services, youth
services, housing, education, healthcare and other community ser vices
has become a popular international demand. Although seemingly radical
at first glance, community policing has become a more welcome and
effective system of public safety. It’s also unrealistic to expect people not
to resist, at the very least not to demonstrate, if they are living under
a system of institutional discrimination that can only be described as
apartheid. Extrajudicial killings, disproportionate military engagement,
collective punishment, ethnic cleansing and war atrocities have all served
to highlight the impor tance of resistance and popularize the extremists.
Other than economic incentives to cooperating Palestinians inside the
West Bank that have only encouraged corruption, Israel has done little
to contribute towards the protection of Palestinian civilians. Its strong
crackdown on non-violent demonstrations and BDS supporters has also
for some youth narrowed the difference between the consequences of
violent versus non-violent resistance.
Outside of the performance of the Palestinian police within Area A
of the West Bank, the current security regime under the Palestinian
Authority is contradictory and problematic, adding to the number of
Palestinian civilians at risk. Though intended to weaken Hamas, PA
cooperation with Israel on security matters has only undermined PA
authority and boosted the popularity of Hamas. The cooperation has
come at the detriment of the safety of Palestinian civilians and violent
means have been used against political opposition. Corruption and
opportunism have come at the expense of security and the well-being
of Palestinian civilians, in particularly the youth. Hamas has managed

3 Palestinian National Protection Strategies and Realities 99
to consolidate its control over the Gaza Strip, launch terrorist attacks
in the West Bank and Israel and retain its popularity. Ongoing esca-
lations between Israel and Palestinian militant groups, most notably
Hamas in Gaza, have led to highest number of civilian casualties among
the Palestinian population as well as within Israel since the second
intifada. Incidents in Jerusalem or Gaza have led to incidents within
West Bank and Israel and vice versa. Given today’s technology and tools,
the borders, walls and fences do not prevent either communication or
terrorist attacks. The only solution to security and safety is political
negotiation and a final settlement, which without serious international
intervention, is far into the future. The formation of Palestinian unity
would also be the most powerful factor that would have an impact on
the potential for transformation.
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