Russian nuclear energy diplomacy and its implications for energy security in the context of the war in Ukraine

Abstract

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the possibility of reducing Europe’s energy dependence on Russian resources has been hotly debated. The fossil fuel industries received most attention as European Union leaders first introduced gradual sanctions on Russian coal and later on oil and gas, while Russia responded with supply cuts. However, Russia’s role as a major player in the global nuclear power sector has remained largely below the sanctions radar, despite dependencies on Russian nuclear technology, uranium supplies and handling of spent nuclear fuel. Here we analyse the state nuclear company Rosatom and its subsidiaries as tools of Russian energy statecraft. We map the company’s global portfolio, then categorize countries where Russia is active according to the degree and intensity of dependence. We offer a taxonomy of long-term energy dependencies, highlighting specific security risks associated with each of them. We conclude that the war and Russia’s actions in the energy sector will undermine Rosatom’s position in Europe and damage its reputation as a reliable supplier, but its global standing may remain strong.

Full text

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https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-023-01228-5
Analysis
Russian nuclear energy diplomacy and
its implications for energy security in the
context of the war in Ukraine
Kacper Szulecki & Indra Overland
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the possibility of reducing
Europe’s energy dependence on Russian resources has been hotly debated.
The fossil fuel industries received most attention as European Union
leaders rst introduced gradual sanctions on Russian coal and later on oil
and gas, while Russia responded with supply cuts. However, Russia’s role
as a major player in the global nuclear power sector has remained largely
below the sanctions radar, despite dependencies on Russian nuclear
technology, uranium supplies and handling of spent nuclear fuel. Here we
analyse the state nuclear company Rosatom and its subsidiaries as tools
of Russian energy statecraft. We map the company’s global portfolio,
then categorize countries where Russia is active according to the degree
and intensity of dependence. We oer a taxonomy of long-term energy
dependencies, highlighting specic security risks associated with each
of them. We conclude that the war and Russia’s actions in the energy sector
will undermine Rosatom’s position in Europe and damage its reputation
as a reliable supplier, but its global standing may remain strong.
The 1973 oil crisis shaped our imagination of global energy politics.
Since then, fear of scarcity has been at the heart of energy security
thinking
1
. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022,
energy security concerns gained a level of prominence not seen since
the 1970s2–4. The war in Ukraine was preceded by steeply rising natural
gas and electricity prices, which already put European consumers under
pressure, threatening the first pillar of energy security: affordability5.
As a result of the invasion, the physical availability of fossil fuels was
also questioned, due to growing fears that Russia would deploy its
‘energy weapon’—manipulating supply and prices to coerce political
concessions and to retaliate against Western economic sanctions
6,7
.
Although those responsible have not been determined, events such
as the sabotage against the Nord Stream pipeline in September 2022
have further demonstrated fossil fuel supply vulnerability.
Russia is the world’s largest exporter of natural gas, second-largest
exporter of oil and third-largest exporter of coal
8
. However, media
coverage and political debates have generally omitted another sector
where Russia is a major player and that is vital for Russia’s global
economic and diplomatic posture: nuclear energy. While the Russian
shelling and takeover of Ukrainian nuclear power plants has caused
an outcry, Russia’s portfolio of foreign orders, including reactor con-
struction, fuel provision and other services, spans 54 countries and
is claimed by Rosatom to be worth more than US$139 billion over
a ten year period9 and has thus far not been covered by Western
sanctions. Although the financial figure is in all likelihood inflated,
Russia’s involvement in and use of nuclear energy as a tool of energy
diplomacy deserves scrutiny.
In this Analysis, we present a dataset of all current and planned
international engagements of the Russian nuclear energy supplier
Rosatom and its subsidiaries AtomStroyExport and TVEL. The dataset
includes information on the different types of agreement, business
models, scales of investments, types of reactor being built or planned
and their nameplate capacity. As a gauge of the level of dependency
upon the Russian nuclear sector that is or will be brought about by
these reactors, we registered their share of the future electricity supply
in the countries where they are located or planned for construction.
Received: 4 May 2022
Accepted: 10 February 2023
Published online: 27 February 2023
Check for updates
Climate and Energy Research Group, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway. e-mail: kacper.szulecki@nupi.no
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Analysis https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-023-01228-5
the direct control over reactors and strategic energy infrastructure
to exert political pressure and to project power globally35.
Minin and Vlček, having studied the behaviour of Rosatom and its
relationship with the Russian state, argue that the company is primarily
a profit-seeking entity with a high degree of autonomy and growing
self-sufficiency
15
. According to Thomas, whatever its grandiose expec-
tations, Rosatom could simply be unable to deliver all the projects
that it has agreed to, let alone expand further
13
. On the other hand,
Aalto et al. observe that ‘potential foreign policy influence’ by Russia
was noted by Finnish and Hungarian opponents of collaboration
with Rosatom33, while Jewell and colleagues argue that some nuclear
sector dependencies display more pervasive energy security impacts,
long-lasting and difficult to deal with (due to lack of flexibility)
than those usually analysed by energy security experts in the
petroleum sector18,36.
Here we consider Rosatom’s potential as a tool for the Russian
state and debate whether this constitutes a ‘nuclear energy weapon’
or simply a projection of soft-power diplomacy. We find that Russian
nuclear energy statecraft can be seen as a spectrum between these
two extremes, but that soft-power diplomacy creates dependencies
that can be further expanded and exploited and thus should not be
overlooked.
Analysing Rosatom’s international activity
Our research, gathered in the dataset available in the Supplementary
Data, indicates that upon Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Rosatom boasted
as many as 73 different projects in 29 countries. The projects were
at very different stages of development from power plants in opera-
tion; through construction of reactors ongoing, contracted, ordered
or planned; to involvement in tenders, invitations to partnerships or
officially published proposals. On top of that, Russian companies have
bilateral agreements or memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with 13
countries for services or general joint development of nuclear energy.
Rosatom’s projects and involvement have varied in ambition and
cost—from India’s Tarapur nuclear power plant (NPP) (US$700 million)
and Iran’s Bushehr-1 (US$850 million) to a gargantuan project in South
Africa (US$76 billion) and those in Egypt (US$30 billion) and Turkey
(US$20 billion). Finally, 13 countries have a variety of research-oriented
agreements with Russian nuclear service providers related to nuclear
research centres. Altogether, Russia’s nuclear energy diplomacy has
been formalized in 54 countries.
While this is impressive, looking into the details of these agree-
ments (particularly the NPP construction projects) reveals a more
modest level of international engagement. Many of the projects have
been stuck at the planning stage for several years or are merely visions
laid out in non-committal MoUs. Competing offers might ultimately
be chosen over those from Rosatom. For instance, the expansion of
the Dukovany NPP in Czechia saw calls from opposition parties and the
Czech secret service to exclude both Chinese and Russian companies
from the tender, citing security concerns37, and Rosatom was explicitly
excluded in 2021 following news of Russian intelligence involvement
in a 2014 explosion at a Czech ammunition depot38. This happened
despite Czechia’s relatively positive attitude towards Rosatom
39
and
the faith of the policymakers in nuclear energy as a foundation for
energy security
40,41
. The Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered further
cancellation of planned Russian-built nuclear power plants in Finland,
Jordan and Slovakia.
However, most cooperation and plans have not been cancelled,
and even EU member states Bulgaria and Hungary have, as of January
2023, not cancelled their planned nuclear plants. To understand the
potential for wielding an ‘energy weapon’ embedded in these relation-
ships, we must relate them to the energy systems of the host countries.
To do this, we have calculated the share of the prognosed national
electricity supply coming from Rosatom-built, owned or operated
reactors planned by 2040 (Table 1 and Methods). The highest share
Because the degree of influence achieved through energy statecraft
is conditioned by the character and level of (inter)dependence, we
discuss the firmness of dependence of different client states, formu-
lated as ‘intensity.’ Finally, we propose a categorization of dependency
types (Methods).
Rosatom’s rise, expansion and comparative
advantages
Rosatom—the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation—is the direct
heir to the Soviet Ministry of Atomic Energy, which was established
in the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Reorganized as a
state corporation in 2007, Rosatom is fully owned by the Russian state,
and the president of the Russian Federation determines the company’s
objectives10,11. Since its inception, Rosatom has become increasingly
active in the international nuclear power market12,13 and has become a
leading provider of key services12,14,15. Construction of as many as ten
reactor units started between 2007 and 2017, and between 2009 and
2018, the company accounted for 23 of 31 orders placed and about a
half of the units under construction worldwide
11
. Through its subsidiary
TVEL, Rosatom also provides fuel supplies, controlling 38% of world’s
uranium conversion and 46% of uranium enrichment capacity16,17
in addition to decommissioning and waste disposal. In sum, Russia
was the supplier in around half of all international agreements
on nuclear power plant construction, reactor and fuel supply, decom-
missioning or waste between 2000 and 2015. Its main nuclear power
competitors—China, France, Japan, Korea and the United States—
accounted for another 40%, combined18.
The 2011 Fukushima accident appeared to have had little impact
on Rosatom
19,20
. Neither were the company’s operations noticeably
impacted by the sanctions against Russia over its occupation of Crimea
and the eastern part of Donbas in 2014, judging by the continuing
expansion of the international project portfolio. This has led some
Western authors to warn of imminent Russian dominance in the
global nuclear technology market21,22, especially if Rosatom manages
to achieve economies of scale in reactor production, something that
has so far been a major challenge for all nuclear energy developers.
Rosatom’s main advantage lies in its capacity to be a ‘one stop
nuclear shop’ for all needs, the only supplier providing an ‘all-inclusive
package’12. This comprises reactor construction know-how, training,
support related to safety, non-proliferation regime requirements
and flexible financing options, including government-sourced credit
lines22. The company is also uniquely able to offload spent nuclear fuel
from overseas customers.
The way Rosatom designs its projects also makes it a convenient
partner for nuclear newcomers
23,24
. While details of contractual agree-
ments vary from case to case, the developer takes care of the entire
process until the plant is ready to use and can be handed over to local
(Russian-trained) nuclear experts to operate. For that reason, nuclear
energy can be considered by countries for which it was previously
unattainable, especially in the Middle East25,26, sub-Saharan Africa27,28
and South America.29
Rosatom is also able to make special offers to strategically impor-
tant partners, such as Turkey30,31. It was for Turkey’s Akkuyu plant
that Rosatom first proposed the innovative business model dubbed
Build–Own–Operate (BOO), under which the Russian company retains
majority ownership of the plant and a guaranteed price on electricity
sales12 but bears all the financial, construction and operational risks11.
The BOO model has triggered worry regarding not only nuclear energy
safety but also military security issues resulting from the peculiar
extraterritorial status of the plants11,12,21,26,32.
Its comparative advantages as a supplier allowed Russia to launch
a global campaign of nuclear energy diplomacy
33
in which Rosatom
and Russian government institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs work in tandem. This potentially gives Russia the capacity to
use the broad network of international projects it is involved in34 and
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of Russian-built (and potentially controlled) nuclear power will be in
Armenia. There, the newly refurbished US$2 billion NPP at Metsamor
can already generate up to 27% of the country’s entire electricity sup-
ply, and, if the remaining reactors are built, the Rosatom-built reactors
combined could provide up to 111% of prognosed electricity demand.
This could mean that Armenia expects to need more electricity than the
International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates or plans to export the sur-
plus. Rosatom’s reactors would also generate a notable share of power
in Hungary (42%), Bulgaria (37%), Belarus (34%) and Uzbekistan (20%).
By contrast, the impact of Rosatom’s projects on the electricity supply
of China and India will be marginal (below 1% and 3% respectively).
Interestingly, among the states where plans for Rosatom’s nuclear
plants are relatively firm and dependence on Russian-built nuclear
energy will be highest (>10% of the electricity supply), we almost only
find states that are either former Soviet republics or former East Bloc
countries (Table 1). All these states have long-standing relationships
with Russia in the nuclear sector. Uzbekistan is a newcomer in the
group, but both pre- and post-1991, it was an important source of
uranium for the Soviet and later Russian nuclear sector and thus has
long-standing ties with the Russian nuclear industry. There is only
one exception: Bangladesh, with a 12% share of the electricity supply.
Following the 2014 annexation of Crimea and particularly after
the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian economic, political and energy
influence has become a fundamental concern in European countries.
42
In countries that plan to base their decarbonization efforts primarily or
entirely on nuclear energy (that is, Hungary and Slovakia), the Russian
NPP share of the electricity supply can underrepresent Russia’s influ-
ence: dependencies on nuclear fuel imports from TVEL/Rosatom
(which also continues to supply Bulgaria, Czechia and Finland and
Poland’s research reactor), combined with power-system inflexibility
and overreliance on a single large nuclear power plant, exacerbates the
vulnerability to supply disruptions. Hungary’s political ties to Russia,
involving deep energy dependence, have caused substantial concern
among its partners in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
43,44
, and Slovakia received Russian planes delivering fuel
despite a ban on flights imposed by EU countries
45
. The case of Ukraine,
which was fully dependent on Russian nuclear fuel until the early 2000s
but managed to switch to US fuel, shows that such a shift is possible
but takes some time46.
Egypt, Iran and Turkey are all nuclear newcomers, energy hungry
and populous (with between 82 and 100 million inhabitants each).
Such states are lucrative markets for low-carbon electricity develop-
ment. Nuclear developments in two of them (Egypt and Iran), have
sparked some international concern, primarily in Israel and the United
States47–49, due to proliferation issues and concerns about political
instability and terrorism. However, their vulnerability to nuclear energy
supply disruptions is clearly lower than in the first group (only 6–10%
of electricity supply is or would be from Rosatom-built reactors). Addi-
tionally, in the case of Turkey, other security issues arise on top of
power-system vulnerabilities, that is, Russian ownership of strategic
infrastructure on the territory of a NATO member state.
Finally, the last pair of Russian nuclear client states, China and
India, already have homegrown nuclear industries, have the lowest
levels of vulnerability to supply disruptions and, in the case of China,
have their own ambitions of international expansion. Rosatom’s
engagement there is of a more symbolic political nature. The same
can be said of the remaining 29 countries where plans for developing
nuclear power are still, at most, preliminary or collaboration is limited
to research facilities.
While share of the power supply is the primary measure of the
vulnerability to accidental or malign disruptions of an energy system,
we argue that Russia’s energy statecraft in the nuclear sector and else-
where cannot be reduced to the threat of supply cuts. As others have
shown, there are mechanisms of influence that go beyond the physical
disruption of power supply6,18,33.
Conceptualizing a multifaceted ‘nuclear energy
weapon’
A different order of interdependencies emerges from an analysis of the
intensity and level of bilateral collaboration in the nuclear sector. This
level is represented by shades of blue in Fig. 1 and summarized in Table 2.
We distinguish between four levels of collaboration: intensive,
medium, low and very low. These levels are not identical with the shares
of power supply presented in Table 1 above. On the one hand, the index
of intensity of collaboration shows us Russia’s energy diplomacy priori-
ties, hence China and India are categorized as engaging in high-level
cooperation, together with other geopolitically important partners
such as Armenia, Belarus and Turkey. On the other hand, it highlights
the fact that the vulnerabilities of partner countries are not solely
technical in nature but also result from personal and informal ties
that can be used for Russian lobbying or espionage. This especially
concerns the ‘medium’ level of cooperation, which includes several
European client states.
The project landscape (Fig. 1) shows that Russia’s ability to wield a
‘nuclear energy weapon’, understood as the consolidation of resources
and control over energy supply, varies greatly across the countries
where Rosatom is engaged. In countries where Russian-built NPPs
will supply a large share of the electricity mix, we can see potential
conditions for using an ‘energy weapon’ in a strict sense, following
Smith Stegen’s conceptualization6. Overreliance on a single provider
Table 1 | Russian nuclear client states categorized according to degree of dependence
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Dependence on Russian-built/
operated nuclear power High (>10%) Medium (4–10%) Low (<3%) Marginal
Form of relationship Operation and/or
ownership
agreement
Operation and/
or ownership
agreement
Construction and operation
agreement Technical/scientiic collaboration or
provision of specialized nuclear services
(states relying on Rosatom/TVEL for nuclear
fuel supplies marked in italics)
States Armenia, Bangladesh,
Belarus, Hungary,
Slovakia, Uzbekistan
Egypt, Iran,
TurkeyaChina, India Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cambodia,
Chile, Congo, Cuba, Czechia, Finland, Ghana,
Kuwait, Mongolia, Paraguay, Poland, Rwanda,
Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Tanzania, Zambia
States that could potentially
join this group Jordan, Nigeria,
Sudan Kazakhstan Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia,
Philippines, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa, United Arab Emirates,
Vietnam
aIndicates a BOO contract. Supplementary Data provides more details.
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and large, centralized power generators that supply a large share of
a country’s electricity is an energy security risk in itself, regardless
of who the provider is. Russian nuclear fuel supplies could become a
problem even in the absence of political intentions, for example, due
to increased demand or temporarily reduced supply due to an accident
or problems paying for fuel due to economic sanctions. The recent
experience of Ukraine, which managed to switch from TVEL-supplied
fuel to Westinghouse supplies, indicates that this threat can be over-
come. Both Westinghouse and Framatome are working towards a
position where they can replace Russian fuel. However, we should keep
three things in mind. First, the process took Ukraine over a decade.
Second, Western production capacity is limited in the short term.
Lastly and most importantly, the United States itself relies on Rosatom
subsidiaries and Russian-controlled supply chains for almost a half of
its uranium supplies; the same applies to 40% of EU imports.50 Although
it would be possible to adapt, an abrupt halt of these supplies would
impact the entire global nuclear energy sector in the short term.
Occasional reactor malfunctions and unplanned maintenance
shutdowns are not uncommon, even without major accidents. In
the extreme cases of Armenia and in Hungary, the dependence on
Russian-built nuclear energy would be so high that any supply disrup
-
tion would be catastrophic. However, even a loss of 10–20% of the elec-
tricity supply can cause a blackout and undermine regular economic
and societal activity.
The situation is different in Groups 3 and 4 in Table 1, where direct
energy dependence is marginal. However, in those cases, Rosatom’s
activity is still creating other types of long-term interdependency.
As Jewell and colleagues point out, ‘these interdependencies are
insufficiently documented and poorly understood’18. We propose
a categorization of these interdependencies and suggest that they
SVK
HUN
CUB
DOM
CRI
BRA
BOL
PRY
ARG
CHL
GBR
SWE FIN
POL
BLR
UKR
SRB
ESP
DZA
TUN
TUR
JOR
KWT
SAU UAE
IRN
EGY
GHA NGA
COG RWA
SDN
UGA
ETH
KEN
BDI
COD TZA
ZMB
ZAF
BGR
AZE
UZB
ARM
KAZ
RUS
Country shade:
level of
cooperation
MoU on nuclear
cooperation
Nuclear centre
(existing or planned)
Russian NPP share
of power supply
Rest of power
supply
Bn US$ investment
30 bn
15 bn
1 bn
2.80
0.04
MNG
CHN
BGD
KHM VNM
IDN
PHL
KGZ
IND
Fig. 1 | Russian nuclear engagements around the world. Authors’ elaboration
based on the dataset presented in the Supplementary Data. bn, billion; ARG,
Argentina; ARM, Armenia; AZE, Azerbaijan; BDI, Burundi; BGD, Bangladesh; BGR,
Bulgaria; BLR, Belarus; BOL, Bolivia; BRA, Brazil; CHL, Chile; CHN, China; COD,
Democratic Republic of the Congo; COG, Republic of the Congo; CRI, Costa Rica;
CUB, Cuba; DOM, Dominican Republic; DZA, Algeria; EGY, Egypt; ESP, Spain;
ETH, Ethiopia; FIN, Finland; GBR, Great Britain; GHA, Ghana; HUN, Hungary; IDN,
Indonesia; IND, India; IRN, Iran; JOR, Jordan; KAZ, Kazakhstan; KEN, Kenya; KGZ,
Kyrgyzstan; KHM, Cambodia; KWT, Kuwait; MNG, Mongolia; NGA, Nigeria; PHL,
Philippines; POL, Poland; PRY, Paraguay; RUS, Russia; RWA, Rwanda; SAU, Saudi
Arabia; SDN, Sudan; SRB, Serbia; SVK, Slovakia; SWE, Sweden; TUN, Tunisia; TUR,
Turkey; TZA, Tanzania; UAE, United Arab Emirates; UGA, Uganda; UKR, Ukraine;
UZB, Uzbekistan; VNM, Vietnam; ZAF, South Africa; ZMB, Zambia. Technical
details are provided in Methods.
Table 2 | Levels of nuclear cooperation with Russiaa
High Medium Low Very low
Iran 2.8 Bulgaria 1.0 Bolivia 0.5 Azerbaijan 0.2
Belarus 2.7 Slovakia 1.0 Ethiopia 0.5 Cambodia 0.2
India 2.7 Nigeria 0.8 Indonesia 0.5 Congo 0.2
China 1.4 Uzb.b0.8 Rwanda 0.5 DRCb0.2
Egypt 1.4 Finland 0.8 S. Arabiab0.5 Kazakhstan 0.2
Hungary 1.4 Czechia 0.7 Algeria 0.4 Mongolia 0.2
Turkey 1.3 Sweden 0.7 Argentina 0.4 UAEb0.2
Spain 1.2 Kenya 0.6 Brazil 0.4 Vietnam 0.2
Armenia 1.1 Sudan 0.6 Poland 0.4 Zambia 0.2
Banglad.b1.1 Tunisia 0.6 Jordan 0.3 Burundi 0.1
Philip.b0.3 Chile 0.1
Serbia 0.3 Costa Rica 0.1
Ghana 0.3 Cuba 0.1
Kuwait 0.3 Dom. Rep.b0.1
Kyrgyz.b0.3 Paraguay 0.1
S. Africab0.3 Tanzania 0.1
Uganda 0.1
UKb0.1
aMethods provide details of scoring system, and the Supplementary Data ‘Scoring’ table
provides source data. bCountry abbreviations: Uzb. is Uzbekistan, DRC is Democratic Republic
of the Congo, S. Arabia is Saudi Arabia, UAE is United Arab Emirates, Banglad. is Bangladesh,
Philip. is Philippines, Dom. Rep. is Dominican Republic, Kyrgyz. is Kyrgyzstan, S. Africa is
South Africa and UK is United Kingdom.
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all come with specific security risks for the client state—and tools of
political influence for the patron state (Fig. 2 and Methods).
The most direct and consequential risk stemming from first-order
infrastructure dependencies (that is, large power share coming
from Rosatom’s reactors) is supply disruption (Fig. 2a). As Smith
Stegen notes6, this does not have to be an overt ‘turning off the tap’ or
‘switching off the light’ and is more likely to be cast as a coincidental
malfunction or unplanned event sufficiently credible to ensure
plausible deniability, as in the case of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline
temporary closure for apparent technical maintenance51 or the 2005
incident in which TVEL allegedly supplied the Ukrainian Energatom
with defective fuel assemblies50.
But even if Rosatom does not fully control flows and there is
only a second-order infrastructural dependency, the presence of
foreign engineers and/or construction workers on critical
national infrastructure sites can increase the likelihood of sabo-
tage (Fig. 2b)
52,53
. Furthermore, we must consider the broad area of
informal practices that emerge around large energy projects and
large state investments. Economic dependencies create opportuni-
ties for large-scale corruption (Fig. 2c). An extreme example related to
Russian nuclear diplomacy is the case of South Africa. Earmarked for
Rosatom’s biggest engagement globally (the price tag for the reactor
rollout was US$72–76 billion), the project resulted in a political scandal.
High-level corruption led to a pushback from South Africa’s media and
civil society
54
. Personal-level dependencies are a gateway to power-
ful lobbying (Fig. 2d), as in the case of Hungary’s Paks-2 reactor
50
, or
espionage, as in the case of two German civil servants working on the
Nord Stream project55.
Finally, institutional (inter)dependencies create the networks
through which energy diplomacy (Fig. 2e) can be formalized and soft
power projected33. Although there is nothing uncommon in this sort
of energy diplomacy, analysts and scholars argue that European
and US inaction will lead to these dependencies becoming more
entrenched12,25,56.
This is part of a broader toolkit of soft power, which enables Russia
to present itself as a technologically advanced, modern, benign global
power, able to support middle- and low-income nations around the
world and offer a non-ideological, ‘see no evil’ approach, that is not
shying away from informal, non-transparent practices, corruption and
not attaching normative clauses about good governance or rule-of-law
requirements to business contracts57. Rosatom’s aggressive strategy
of signing agreements—which are more concrete than mere letters of
intent and MoUs but not yet project contracts
11
—enables Russia to build
a network of contacts and maintain high visibility as the first-choice
provider of nuclear energy technology and financing. The soft-power
arsenal is complemented by knowledge transfers, for example, in the
form of Russian scholarships granted to junior nuclear experts from
Africa and Latin America.
Conclusions
Does Russian global nuclear energy diplomacy constitute a potential
‘energy weapon’ or is it merely an example of economic and soft power?
We believe that in the context of the war in Ukraine and Russia’s use of
energy statecraft for political influence, juxtaposing the ‘hard’ energy
weapon and ‘soft power’ is misleading. Instead, we suggest thinking
of Rosatom’s international activity in terms of a continuum of energy
statecraft tools, as its global presence creates different kinds of (inter)
dependencies through varying intensity of collaboration.
Nuclear energy could be Russia’s overlooked trump card in a
decarbonizing world. But positive assessments of Rosatom’s inter-
national nuclear energy engagements appear more naive after the
invasion of Ukraine, at least in Europe, which is both heavily depend-
ent upon Russian fossil fuels and staunchly opposed to the invasion
of Ukraine. For most Western-aligned states, it will be inconceivable
to enter into any type of new dependence or even non-dependent
cooperation with Russia in the nuclear energy sector. Consequently,
alternative sources and supply chains will need to be found that
eventually will lead to a reduction of the global dependency on
Rosatom’s nuclear fuel-production capacity.
The big question for the future is whether non-Western coun-
tries will also turn away from Russian nuclear power. Currently, many
developing countries take a positive view of Russia and tilt towards
its view of the conflict in Ukraine. Immediately after the invasion of
Ukraine, seven of the 14 countries with high- or medium-cooperation
Tools of political influence
1st order infrastructural
Supply disruption
Sabotage
a
b
c
d
e
Corruption
Lobbying and espionage
Energy diplomacy
2nd order infrastructural
Economic
Personal
Institutional
Soft-power influence through institutional presence and synergies with
Russian diplomatic missions
Personal contacts with local experts, engineers and politicians,
often through training programs and scholarships
Immediate reliance on strategic energy supply infrastructure controlled
by a foreign party through ownership or operation
Dependence on a supplier’s know-how, technological solutions and resources; can involve
foreign experts accessing strategic infrastructure without necessarily controlling it
Multi-billion-dollar credits for construction must be repaid and are often entangled
with agreements on operation and guaranteed buyback of electricity
Interdependencies
Fig. 2 | A conceptualization of interdependencies and corresponding tools of political influence. a–e, Interdependencies are detailed based on tools of political
influence—supply disruption (a), sabotage (b), corruption (c), lobbying and espionage (d) and energy diplomacy (e).
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levels in our analysis did not approve United Nations Resolution ES 11/1
condemning Russian aggression, and several of these (for example,
Bangladesh, China, India, Iran) were categorized as ‘neutral or
Russia-leaning’ shortly after the war began58. Over time, however, the
interruption of energy supplies to the European Union may undermine
the reputation of Russian energy companies as primarily economic
actors independent of national security politics, also outside Europe.
Non-Western perspectives on the war in Ukraine and the reliability
of Russia and Russian technology may also change over time.
Methods
Database construction
To build a comprehensive database of Rosatom projects, we created
a hierarchy of data sources to ensure the inclusion of the most valid
data
59–63
. Rosatom annual reports for 2015–2021 formed the starting
point for the data gathering and enabled us to establish a preliminary
list of all Rosatom projects outside Russia. The annual reports are infor-
mation rich but also contain gaps and discrepancies that we used other
data sources to resolve. The Power Reactor Information Systems data-
base maintained by the International Atomic Energy Agency helped fill
many of the gaps, but some uncertainties remained. To eliminate them,
we used the World Nuclear Association website, the NucNet portal
and academic papers and reports. In the final stage of data gathering,
we filled in the still-missing information (mainly project costs) using
information from the mass media and press releases. The resulting data
cover 108 operating, constructing, planned, contracted, proposed or
cancelled Russian-made nuclear reactors and nuclear centres, fuel
supplies, cooperation agreements and MoUs.
Operationalization of energy dependence
We operationalized energy dependence in terms of the share of
Russian-supported nuclear power in the future electricity mix of cli-
ent states. This is visualized as pie charts in Fig. 1. For the purpose of
this projection, we treat all planned projects as possible to realize, so
it is to be understood as a max scenario. The share was estimated by
summing up the capacity of existing and planned Russian-supported
nuclear power plants, adjusting for the capacity factor and relating the
resulting power generation to the projected national electricity supply
in 2040. We used Rosatom’s own estimation of the average capacity
factor of Russian nuclear power plants, 0.798 (ref.
64
). Estimates of the
national electricity supply in 2040 are taken from the IEA’s regional
projections
65
, adapted to the individual countries in which Russian
nuclear power plants are planned. Although, inevitably, not all dis-
cussed or planned reactors will be completed, this measure is a way of
profiling the potential future dependence of individual client states
on Rosatom-designed, -operated and/or -owned reactors for power
production and the potential risks this involves.
Intensity of international nuclear cooperation
To add another dimension to energy security, we introduce the concept
of the intensity of international nuclear cooperation. This is repre-
sented by the shading of countries in the map in Fig. 1, with the under-
lying scores listed in Table 2. The shading is based on a composite
score that is calculated according to the scorecard in Table 3.
The scorecard in Table 3 is inspired by Jewell et al., who define
international nuclear cooperation as ‘activities in which two or more
states share, exchange or combine material resources, knowledge or
information related to the development of nuclear energy technolo-
gies’18. However, unlike Jewell et al., our aim is not a network analysis
of international agreements but mapping the level of cooperation in
dyadic relationships between Russia and its nuclear client states. We
refer to this as ‘intensity.’ As we were not aware of an existing framework
available for making such an assessment, we developed a system for
scoring different forms of cooperation. This system considers the
volume and level of cooperation and the level of commitment and its
realization. A country can accumulate points across multiple criteria
and nuclear projects. However, scores for each of the categories (types
of agreement or cooperation) are given only once so that, for instance,
multiple nuclear reactors in operation still give a score of 1. This is
to distinguish the measurement of intensity of cooperation from
the analysis of energy system dependency presented in Table 1, as the
latter already captures the magnitude of dependence and the former
is meant to capture the level of cooperation.
We developed the scores in a bottom-up manner on the basis of our
empirical research, so that they reflect the realities of Russian nuclear
energy diplomacy after the invasion of Ukraine. Tracing the evolution
of Rosatom’s agreements and cooperation with client states over time
enabled us to create a hierarchy of variants of cooperation reflecting
the likelihood that early cooperation will develop into a full-scale
project and the interdependencies generated at various stages from an
MoU to operating an actual nuclear power plant. For example, bilateral
agreements are more concrete than letters of intent and MoUs but not
as strong as project contracts. The scores in such a system inevitably
involve an element of subjectivity. The advantage of the system, how-
ever, is that it is transparent and can easily be replicated and/or modi-
fied, and this can be done using the source data in Supplementary Data.
MoUs are loose, open-ended documents that often do not result
in actual projects. Nonetheless, they reflect Russian energy diplomacy
activity and communication. Thus, they are an indicator of attempted
cooperation and priorities in terms of regions and partner countries.
In the context of the war in Ukraine, it is interesting that (and which)
countries choose to maintain even something as non-committal as an
MoU. Finally, while MOUs are not binding or necessarily very important,
normally no further steps are made without this initial one. We have
therefore not removed them entirely from our analysis but given them
the lowest score: 0.1. The same score is given to personnel-training
agreements and projects that were more advanced but were shelved
or frozen— an important category following the invasion of Ukraine.
The remaining categories and their growing scores reflect ever more
concrete agreements and increasingly advanced stages of projects,
all the way to NPPs in operation, which receive the highest score: 1.
Taxonomy of interdependencies and tools of influence
To move beyond just implying security risks and allow for comparison
of energy statecraft across technologies and resources, we propose the
following taxonomy of long-term (inter)dependencies, each of them
related to specific tools available for patron states (Fig. 2).
(A) First-order infrastructural dependency (physical): The immediate
reliance on strategic energy supply infrastructure, which is
the focus of most energy security concern in the oil and gas
Table 3 | Scorecard for intensity of nuclear cooperation with
Russia
Personnel-training agreement 0.1
MoU not mentioning NPP or nuclear research centre 0.1
NPP agreed but shelved 0.1
MoU on construction of a nuclear research centre/research reactor/
small modular reactor 0.2
Strategic documents mentioning construction or renovation of NPP 0.3
Full-scale nuclear reactor concretely agreed or planned 0.4
Research reactor/research centre under construction or operating
(+ fuel supply) 0.4
Nuclear fuel supply 0.7
Full-scale nuclear reactor under construction 0.7
Full-scale nuclear reactor operating 1.0
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved

Nature Energy | Volume 8 | April 2023 | 413–421 419
Analysis https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-023-01228-5
sector and relates to supply security. It is related to the control
of a foreign party over supply channels through ownership or
operation.
(B) Second-order infrastructural dependency (technical): Discussed
by Jewell and colleagues looking specically at the nuclear
sector18. This includes dependence on a supplier’s know-how,
unique technological solutions and resources but also involves
the presence and access of foreign experts to elements of
strategic infrastructures without necessarily controlling them,
which opens the door to sabotage.
(C) Economic dependencies: Large-scale energy projects are
large investments that involve billions of dollars of state and
private-equity funding. On average, Russian nuclear projects
have a value of several billion US dollars with dierent degrees
of co-nancing. Credits for construction must be repaid either
before the plants become operational or through long-term
agreements on operation and guaranteed buyback of electri-
city. Taken together, these dependencies allow Russian nuclear
energy diplomacy to rely on what Stulberg called ‘strategic
manipulation’ as a means of constraining or rewarding certain
choices available to client-state policymakers66.
(D) Personal-level dependencies: Rosatom’s vast global network of
activities also includes building personal contacts with local
experts, engineers and politicians. Training programmes and
scholarships often inuence careers and underpin informal
relations. In peacetime, this creates a pool of sympathetic
and possibly like-minded individuals who may, even without
seeking nancial gain, act as lobbyists or informers or may
be recruited as assets for industrial espionage. In a situation
of conict, such individuals can also be potential espionage
assets.
(E) Institutional ( inter)dependencies: The very presence of Rosatom
and its subsidiaries in over 70 countries, backed by the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Aairs and the president67, adds a further
layer to the other relations described above and creates chan-
nels of communication with relevant counterparts, other insti-
tutions and interest groups in the partner countries. This opens
up channels for soft-power inuence which may, with time,
lead to higher-level dependencies (personal and economic). As
Aalto and colleagues note drawing on the Finnish, Hungarian
and, partly, Turkish cases, Russian nuclear energy diplomacy
has ‘managed to remove some institutional constraints by skill-
fully preparing the ground for the emergence of joint ventures
and other interests’, which, in turn, has ‘enabled Russian actors
to use soft power to shape perceptions in the target country’33.
Data availability
The dataset generated during the current study is available as Sup-
plementary Data.
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Acknowledgements
We thank D. Bekmuratov, A. Isataeva, G. Kolodzinskaia, E. Kostuchenko,
T. Osmonova, A. Otkulbek Kyzy and I. Sadullozoda for assistance with
data gathering and processing. We are grateful to the participants
of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) General
Conference 2021 and the Midwest Political Science Association
(MPSA) 78th Annual Conference for feedback on an early draft of this
paper. This research was enabled by the project ‘Is this Russia’s Kodak
moment? Russian perspectives on the energy transition’ (KODAK),
inanced by the NORRUSS programme of the Research Council of
Norway, grant number 287937 (I.O.).
Author contributions
K.S. contributed with project design and conceptualization of
interdependencies, prepared the irst draft, edited subsequent versions
and participated in the data analysis. I.O. led the data analysis and
conceptualization, edited all versions of the paper and wrote parts of the
text. The authors jointly contributed to the operationalization of energy
security dependency and levels of collaboration in the nuclear sector.
Competing interests
The authors declare no competing interests.
Additional information
Supplementary information The online version contains supplementary
material available at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-023-01228-5.
Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to
Kacper Szulecki.
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Peer review information Nature Energy thanks Pami Aalto, Phil
Chaee, Tuomas Forsberg and the other, anonymous, reviewer(s) for
their contribution to the peer review of this work.
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