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The persistent effects of early career contracts: evidence from NBA drafts
Applied Economics
Abstract
This article examines the persistent effects of early career contracts using the National Basketball Association (NBA)’s draft data over the period 1995–2019. We use regression discontinuity design (RDD) to compare the differences in career outcomes between the first-round picked rookies and the second-round picked ones. The empirical results suggest that draft rounds per se significantly influence a player’s career outcome in almost all indicators (i.e. career earnings, total points scored, and total years played). Explorations of the mechanisms suggest that differences in rookie contract length and sunk costs influence teams’ human capital investment in rookies.
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Mediation analysis aims at identifying and evaluating the mechanisms through which treatment affects an outcome. The goal is to disentangle the total treatment effect into two components: the indirect effect that occurs due to one or more intermediate variables, known as mediators, and the direct effect that captures all other possible explanations for why a treatment works. This paper reviews the methodological advancements in the literature on causal mediation in economics, specifically quasi‐experimental designs. I define the parameters of interest, the main assumptions and the identification strategies under the counterfactual approach, and present the Instrumental Variables (IV), Difference‐in‐Differences (DID), and Synthetic Control (SC) methods.
The previous research on the role sunk costs play in the National Basketball Association (NBA) has come to mixed conclusions. We use a direct measure of sunk costs, player compensation, and a quasi-experimental method that considers the endogenous relationship between compensation and productivity. Using the spike in salary cap for the 2016–2017 season, from new television broadcasting contracts, we find compensation has a significant effect on playing time. Specifically, we use players signing free agent contracts in 2015–2016 or 2016–2017. For both groups, we analyze the change in salary from the pre-contract season to the post-contract season. Using the difference-in-differences, we find the inflated salary cap, from the new television contracts, increased player compensation by 81.7%, on average. Instrumental variables estimations show the increase in compensation significantly affects playing time. The change in salary yields an additional 1.93 min played per game, which is approximately equal to the effect of a one-standard deviation increase in contemporaneous productivity. Furthermore, we find that our conclusions are robust to the use of various advanced analytical measures or traditional box-score statistics.
By reducing the commitment made by employers, fixed‐term contracts can help low‐skilled youth find a first job. However, the long‐term impact of fixed‐term contracts on these workers’ careers may be negative. Using Spanish social security data, we analysed the impact of a large liberalization in the regulation of fixed‐term contracts in 1984. Using a cohort regression discontinuity design, we find that over the first ten years in the labour market, the reform reduced the number of days worked (by 4.5%) and earnings (by 9%). Over 27 years of labour market career, yearly earnings losses amount to a persistent 7.5%.
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This article explores the dilemma of choosing talent using NBA data from 1987 to 2003. We find there is much uncertainty in selecting talent. If superstars are found, they are usually identified early. However, more false positives exist than correct decisions with high draft picks. Our results suggest the dilemma of choosing talent is not so much a winner's curse but more like a purchase of a lottery ticket. Most times you lose, but, if you are going to win, you must buy a ticket.
Taylor and Trogdon found evidence of shirking under some, but not all, draft lottery systems used in three different National Basketball Association (NBA) seasons. The authors use data from all NBA games played from 1977 to 2007 and a fixed effects model to control for unobservable team and season heterogeneity to extend this research. The authors find that NBA teams were more likely to intentionally lose games at the end of the regular season during the seasons where the incentives to finish last were the largest.
An important goal when analyzing the causal effect of a treatment on an outcome is to understand the mechanisms through which the treatment causally works. We define a causal mechanism effect of a treatment and the causal effect net of that mechanism using the potential outcomes framework. These effects provide an intuitive decomposition of the total effect that is useful for policy purposes. We offer identification conditions based on an unconfoundedness assumption to estimate them, within a heterogeneous effect environment, and for the cases of a randomly assigned treatment and when selection into the treatment is based on observables. Two empirical applications illustrate the concepts and methods.
In this article, we attempt to distinguish between the properties of moderator and mediator variables at a number of levels. First, we seek to make theorists and researchers aware of the importance of not using the terms moderator and mediator interchangeably by carefully elaborating, both conceptually and strategically, the many ways in which moderators and mediators differ. We then go beyond this largely pedagogical function and delineate the conceptual and strategic implications of making use of such distinctions with regard to a wide range of phenomena, including control and stress, attitudes, and personality traits. We also provide a specific compendium of analytic procedures appropriate for making the most effective use of the moderator and mediator distinction, both separately and in terms of a broader causal system that includes both moderators and mediators.
This paper examines in detail the factors that influence the probability of new entrants leaving their first job after completing school, including the differential effects of company provided training, apprenticeships, and training received off-the-job from for profit proprietary institutions. Particular attention is paid to how training effects vary by race, gender and educational attainment. In the paper it is shown that the majority of company provided training spells begin after an employee has been with an employer for at least one year while the majority of off-the-job training spells begin during the first year with an employer. Overall there is no significant difference in the probability of leaving the first employer by gender. Company provided training results in a lower probability of leaving an employer while off-the-job training increases the probability of leaving the first employer. Both of these effects are especially strong for women.
This paper reviews both the theoretical underpinnings and the empirical evidence in support of the under-provision of training. While there is little if any evidence in support of under-provision because of liquidity constraints to the demand side of the market, there is evidence that employers provide and pay for general training, and that the provision of skills encourages labor turnover. The combination of these two facts suggests that the labor market provides less training than optimal. The balance of the existing empirical evidence suggests that policy discussions should focus on the employer rather than on employees. Therefore, we conclude our review by discussing policies which affect the employer’ marginal benefits and marginal costs of training.
Sport is one of the most popular forms of entertainment and its worldwide spread has turned athletes into icons who have economic impact and international visibility as global brands. In our paper we would like to show how marketing strategies in the sports industry, amplified by social networks, have put the athlete at the centre of media attention In the world of football, football players have come to play a key role, since their image is the face of their clubs, and this can affect the number of digital fans, that is, fans who are not bound to a club by constant passion but who can change team depending on the athletes that have been lined up. This could explain why the teams playing in the main football championships are offering higher and higher wages in the attempt to get hold of the best talents around. Based on a dataset with information about over 1,200 athletes who have taken part over five seasons of the Italian Serie A, we try to measure the impact of football players' popularity on salary-setting mechanisms, in the attempt to understand the impact of such variables on football players' athletic qualities and performance.
Unlucky young workers entering the labor market in recessions suffer a range of medium-to long-term consequences. This paper summarizes the findings of the growing empirical literature on this subject and uses it to assess economic models of career development. The literature finds large initial effects on earnings, labor supply, and wages that tend to fade after ten to fifteen years in the labor market, and that are accompanied by changes in occupation, job mobility, and employer characteristics. Adverse initial labor market entry also has persistent effects on a range of social outcomes, including timing and completed fertility, marriage and divorce, criminal activities, attitudes, and risky alcohol consumption. There is also evidence that early exposure to depressed labor market lowers health and raises mortality in middle age, patterns accompanied by a reopening of earnings gaps.
We propose a regression-adjusted matched difference-in-differences framework to estimate pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns to adult education. This approach combines kernel matching with entropy balancing to account for selection bias and sorting on gains. Using data from the German SOEP, we evaluate the effect of work-related training, which represents the largest portion of adult education in OECD countries, on individual social capital and earnings. As the related literature, we estimate positive monetary returns to work-related training. In addition, training participation increases participation in civic, political, and cultural activities while not crowding out social participation. Results are robust against a variety of potentially confounding explanations. These findings imply positive externalities from work-related training over and above the well-documented labor market effects.
This paper studies the differential persistent effects of initial economic conditions for labor market entrants in the United States from 1976 to 2015 by education, gender, and race using labor force survey data. We find persistent earnings and wage reductions, especially for less advantaged entrants, that increases in government support only partly offset. We confirm that the results are unaffected by selective migration and labor market entry by also using a double-weighted average unemployment rate at labor market entry for each birth cohort and state-of-birth cell based on average state migration rates and average cohort education rates from census data.
We estimate the causal effect of ambient air pollution on individual productivity using panel data on the universe of professional soccer players in Germany over the period from 1999 to 2011 matched to hourly information on the concentration of particulate matter near each stadium at the time of kick-off. We exploit exogenous variation in players’ exposure to air pollution due to match scheduling rules that are beyond the control of teams and players. The results of our analysis reveal statistically significant negative effects of air pollution on players’ productivity, measured by the total number of passes per match. Allowing for a non-linear dose-response relationship further reveals that our findings are not driven by extreme levels of air pollution. Rather, negative effects already emerge at moderate levels.
Previous research found that less accommodating caseworkers are more successful in placing unemployed workers into employment. This paper explores the causal mechanisms behind this result using semiparametric mediation analysis. Analyzing rich linked job seeker-caseworker data for Switzerland, we find that the positive employment effects of less accommodating caseworkers are not driven by a particularly effective mix of labor market programs but, rather, by other dimensions of the counseling process, possibly including threats of sanctions and pressure to accept jobs. © 2017 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Empirical studies on the influence of sunk costs in high stakes decisions have come to mixed conclusions. As observational studies have primarily used professional sports labor markets, we analyze the effect of sunk costs, player compensation, on the labor utilization of defensive players in the National Football League (NFL). Our analysis has several advantages. First, we measure the direct impact of increased financial commitment. Second, we analyze the effect of sunk costs when firms have accurate and abundant performance feedback; therefore, our conclusions are not driven by uncertainty. Finally, we control for possible endogeneity by using the exogenous variation in compensation generated when players become eligible for free agency or change teams. Our results indicate sunk costs are significant determinants of player utilization. A 15 % increase in compensation has an equivalent effect on playing time as an increase of five to eleven solo tackles, one to two interceptions and two to five and a half sacks in the previous season for linebackers, defensive backs and defensive linemen respectively. Furthermore, the sunk-cost fallacy is persistent throughout the entire career of an average NFL player.
The National Football League (NFL) draft is used to examine the presence of the sunk-cost fallacy in teams’ playing time decisions. In the NFL, salary cap value represents a significant sunk cost to teams. We use the structure of the NFL draft to conduct a fuzzy regression discontinuity design. Optimal bandwidth local linear results suggest a 10% increase in salary cap value yields an additional 2.7 games started, for players selected near the cutoff between the first two rounds. Despite being no more productive, the first round selections receive a compensation premium, which leads to them starting significantly more games.
Rank-based groupings are uninformative signals of quality when the exact rank is known; therefore, they should be ignored in decision making. However, evidence is presented that rank-based groupings are used to determine the compensation of rookie players in the National Football League (NFL). The NFL draft, which largely determines rookie compensation, provides two signals of player quality, selection number, and round. However, the rounds are simply groupings based on selection number; thus, the rounds should not affect subsequent decisions. Sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD) estimates of discontinuities in rookie compensation at the round cutoffs are shown to be very large and robust. The first to second round discontinuity is −US$240,000 to −US$250,000, or 36% of the average salary of the first selection in the second round. The second to third round discontinuity is −US$60,000 to −US$70,000, or 17% of the average salary of the first selection in the third round. The results show rookie compensation, which comprises a large share of career earnings, is subject to heuristic thinking.
This study represents one of the first quantitative field tests of the sunk-cost effect. We tested whether the amount teams spent for players in the National Basketball Association (NBA) influenced how much playing time players got and how long they stayed with NBA franchises. Sunk costs were operationalized by the order in which players were selected in the college draft. Draft order was then used to predict playing time, being traded, and survival in the NBA. Although one might logically expect that teams play and keep their most productive players, we found significant sunk-cost effects on each of these important personnel decisions. Results showed that teams granted more playing time to their most highly drafted players and retained them longer, even after controlling for players' on-court performance, injuries, trade status, and position played. These results are discussed in terms of their implications for both sunk-cost research and the broader literature on managerial decision making.
We use playing time in the National Basketball Association to investigate whether sunk costs affect decision making. Behavioral economics implies that teams favor players chosen in the lottery and first round of the draft because of the greater financial and psychic commitment to them. Neoclassical economics implies that only current performance matters. We build on previous work in two ways. First, we better capture potential playing time by accounting for time lost to injuries or suspension. Second, we use regression discontinuity to capture changes when a player's draft position crosses thresholds. We find that teams allocate no more time to highly drafted players. (JEL L83, J23, D03)
This paper provides an introduction and "user guide" to Regression Discontinuity (RD) designs for empirical researchers. It presents the basic theory behind the research design, details when RD is likely to be valid or invalid given economic incentives, explains why it is considered a "quasi-experimental" design, and summarizes different ways (with their advantages and disadvantages) of estimating RD designs and the limitations of interpreting these estimates. Concepts are discussed using examples drawn from the growing body of empirical research using RD. ( JEL C21, C31)
A unique dataset collected from the personnel records of a large company is used to study the relationship between on-the-job training and worker productivity. The analysis shows how information contained in a company database is useful for eliminating heterogeneity bias in the estimation of training's impact on wages and job performance. Even when selection bias in assignment to training programs is eliminated, training is found to have a positive and significant effect on both wage growth and the change in job performance scores, thereby confirming the robustness of the relationship between training and productivity. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.
We analyze changes in the composition of top management teams when a key member of the team (the chief executive officer [CEO])
departs. We find that the probability of non-CEO top manager turnover increases markedly around times of CEO turnover. Further,
the magnitude of this increase depends on the relations between the tenure of the manager and tenures of the departing and
incoming CEOs. Departure of a long-tenured CEO has a larger effect on turnover probability for a long-tenured non-CEO manager
than for a short-tenured manager. Succession of a long-tenured manager as CEO has a larger effect on turnover probability
for a short-tenured non-CEO manager than for a long-tenured manager. We argue that these findings are at least partially the
result of complementarities across these groups of coworkers that affect the value of employment relationships between senior
executives and firms.
As a consequence of the rapid growth of temporary agency employment in Germany, the debate on the remuneration of temporary agency workers has intensified recently. The study finds that the earnings gap of temporary help workers in Germany is indeed large and increased during the past decade. Decomposition reveals that the widening gap mainly is driven by changes in relative skill prices and less by differences in the workforce composition. Temps already have to accept a marked earnings decline before entering the temporary help sector. Nevertheless, after leaving the sector temporary help workers no longer have to accept a pay penalty. A recent reform set a high incentive for temporary help agencies to pay their workers according to a collective agreement. Surprisingly, the unionization of the sector could not bring thewidening earnings gap to a halt.
Ž. THE REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY RD data design is a quasi-experimental design with the defining characteristic that the probability of receiving treatment changes discontinuously as a function of one or more underlying variables. This data design arises frequently in economic and other applications but is only infrequently exploited as a source of identifying information in evaluating effects of a treatment. In the first application and discussion of the RD method, Thistlethwaite and Campbell Ž. 1960 study the effect of student scholarships on career aspirations, using the fact that awards are only made if a test score exceeds a threshold. More recently, Van der Klaauw Ž. 1997 estimates the effect of financial aid offers on students’ decisions to attend a particular college, taking into account administrative rules that set the aid amount partly on the basis of a discontinuous function of the students’ grade point average and SAT Ž. score. Angrist and Lavy 1999 estimate the effect of class size on student test scores, taking advantage of a rule stipulating that another classroom be added when the average Ž. class size exceeds a threshold level. Finally, Black 1999 uses an RD approach to estimate parents’ willingness to pay for higher quality schools by comparing housing prices near geographic school attendance boundaries. Regression discontinuity methods have potentially broad applicability in economic research, because geographic boundaries or rules governing programs often create discontinuities in the treatment assignment mechanism that can be exploited under the method. Although there have been several discussions and applications of RD methods in the literature, important questions still remain concerning sources of identification and ways of estimating treatment effects under minimal parametric restrictions. Here, we show that identifying conditions invoked in previous applications of RD methods are often overly strong and that treatment effects can be nonparametrically identified under an RD design by a weak functional form restriction. The restriction is unusual in that it requires imposing continuity assumptions in order to take advantage of the known discontinuity in the treatment assignment mechanism. We also propose a way of nonparametrically estimating treatment effects and offer an interpretation of the Wald estimator as an RD estimator.
Important elements of supply and demand are starkly observable in professional athletics. Demand affects how pay varies with personal productivity, racial discrimination, the nature of factor substitutions, and player mobility. Property rights affect the supply of athletic talent, arms races and incentives to restrict competition. In sports, excess incentives to win can create negative externalities. Collective agreements such as reverse-order drafts, payroll caps and revenue sharing constrain these forces, but redistribute rents from talented players to owners because they punish success. The European approach--promoting better-performing teams and relegating those with the poorest records--punish failure.
This paper shows that in a frictional labour market part of the productivity gains from general training will be captured
by future employers. As a result, investments in general skills will be suboptimally low, and contrary to the standard theory,
part of the costs may be borne by the employers. The paper also demonstrates that the interaction between innovation and training
leads to an amplification of this inefficiency and to a multiplicity of equilibria. Workers are more willing to invest in
their skills by accepting lower wages today if they expect more firms to innovate and pay them higher wages in the future.
Similarly, firms are more willing to innovate when they expect the quality of the future workforce to be higher, thus when
workers invest more in their skills.
Each year, graduate students entering the academic job market worry that they will suffer due to uncontrollable macroeconomic risk. Given the importance of general human capital and the relative ease of publicly observing productivity in academia, one might expect that long-term labor market outcomes for students graduating in unfavorable climates will resemble long-term outcomes for those graduating in favorable climates. In this paper, I analyze the relationship between macroeconomic conditions at graduation, initial job placement, and long-term outcomes for Ph.D. economists from seven programs. Using macroeconomic conditions as an instrument for initial placement, I show that a quality and type of initial job have a causal effect on long-term job characteristics. I also show that better initial placement increases research productivity, which helps to limit the set of economic models that can explain the effect of initial placement on long-term jobs.
Temporary Jobs: Stepping Stones or Dead Ends? In Britain about 7% of male employees and 10% of female employees are in temporary jobs. In contrast to much of continental Europe, this proportion has been relatively stable over the 1990s. Using data from the British Household Panel Survey, we find that temporary workers report lower levels of job satisfaction, receive less work-related training, and are less well-paid than their counterparts in permanent employment. However, there is evidence that fixed-term contracts are a stepping stone to permanent work. Women (but not men) who start in fixed-term employment and move to permanent jobs fully catch up to those who start in permanent jobs. JEL Classification: J21, J30, J63 Keywords: Temporary jobs, fixed term contracts, individual unobserved heterogeneity, jobspecific effects Alison Booth Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) University of Essex Colchester CO4 3 SQ UK Tel: +44 0 1206 873 789 Fax: +44 0 1206 873 151 Em...
- L M Lynch