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Public Organization Review (2023) 23:861–881
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-022-00676-z
Abstract
This study combines the type of partners and the number of partnerships’ purposes
to assess municipal partnerships’ eectiveness in bringing international aid. First,
the study test whether inter-municipal cooperation (homogenous partners) is more
eective than inter-governmental cooperation (heterogeneous partners) in increas-
ing international aid at the local level. Second, the study tests whether partnerships
with the sole purpose of raising international aid (single purpose) are more eective
than partnerships with additional purposes (multiple purposes). Using panel data
with 2,431 municipal-year observations, results conrm that inter-governmental
partnerships with multiple purposes are the most eective partnership to increase
international aid.
Keywords Municipal partnerships · International aid · Ecuador · Local
government performance · Wicksellian-eciency
Introduction
Local chief executives consider inter-municipal partnerships as part of their manage-
rial strategies to improve organizational performance across several dimensions, yet
executive experiences with such partnerships are not always successful (Bryson et
al., 2006; Fierlbeck, 2010; Matthews & Missingham, 2009). This variation in success
led to the necessity to research the characteristics of inter-municipal partnerships and
Accepted: 9 October 2022 / Published online: 7 November 2022
© The Author(s) 2022
Inter-municipal vs. Inter-governmental Cooperation: Their
Impact on International Aid
Julio C.Zambrano-Gutiérrez1,2 · Claudia N.Avellaneda2
Julio C. Zambrano-Gutiérrez
julio.zambrano@tum.de
1 School of Social Sciences and Technology, Department of Governance, Technical
University of Munich, Richard-Wagner-Straße 1, Room B.257, 80333 Munich, Bavaria,
Germany
2 O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Aairs, Indiana University Bloomington,
Bloomington, Indiana, U.S.A.
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J. C. Zambrano-Gutiérrez, C. N. Avellaneda
their eect on the performance of public organizations (Bauer et al., 2020; Bryson et
al., 2015; Soukopová & Vaceková, 2018). Joining an inter-municipal partnership is
not a minor strategic decision for local chief ocials. Who the participants and what
the purpose will be are fundamental choices in starting a collaboration (Biddle &
Koontz, 2014; Emerson et al., 2012; Siddiki et al., 2017). This is because diverse par-
ticipants might improve organizational outcomes but also conict in the collaborative
process (Cuppen, 2012; Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007; Jehn, 1994; Jehn et al., 1999).
Also, multiple-purpose partnerships might increase legitimacy and representation but
also ambiguity in the mission of the collaboration (Rainey & Jung, 2015; Vangen &
Huxham, 2012). While previous research has explored separately the eect of the
type of cooperative partners and goal clarity on collaborative settings on organiza-
tional outcomes (Biddle & Koontz, 2014; Klok et al., 2018), scarce attention has been
devoted to examining whether the type of participating organizations (e.g., hetero-
geneous vs. homogeneous) and the number of goals (e.g., single vs. multi-purpose)
pursued in a collaborative arrangement inuence organizational outcomes.
To ll this gap, this study integrates the type of participating partners and the
number of partnership purposes for analyzing the eectiveness of municipal part-
nerships. To do so, the study classies municipal partnerships into a continuum that
ranges from homogeneous partners with a single purpose to heterogeneous partners
with multiple purposes. Specically, this study rst tests whether inter-municipal
cooperation (homogeneous partners) is more eective than inter-governmental (het-
erogeneous partners) cooperation in bringing international aid to municipal coers.
Second, this study also tests whether partnerships with the sole purpose of raising
international aid (single purpose) are more eective than partnerships including addi-
tional purposes, such as waste management (multiple purposes) in raising interna-
tional aid.
The study oers three contributions. First, the research introduces an integrative
framework that combines: (a) the type of participating partners and (b) the number
of partnership purposes to explain the eectiveness of the municipal partnership.
Second, the study advances theory by testing the underpinnings of goal-ambiguity
and transaction cost theories in a dierent setting – the 221 Ecuadorian municipalities
that combine a unitary decentralized system with a relatively new democracy. Third,
the study assesses local government performance based on integrative frameworks at
the partnership and organizational levels (Boyne, 2002; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).
Moreover, non-reimbursable international cooperation is used as a performance indi-
cator to measure “wicksellian-eciency”, which is based on the idea of seeking to
achieve economic benets (e.g., more municipal revenues) with the lowest politi-
cal costs (e.g., without increasing municipal taris) (Breton, 1998). Results from
cross-sectional time series data with 2,431 municipal-year observations conrm that
inter-municipal and single-purpose partnerships are eective strategies to bring in
non-reimbursable international cooperation. Nonetheless, inter-governmental and
multi-purpose types of partnerships outperformed in increasing international aid.
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Inter-municipal vs. Inter-governmental Cooperation: Their Impact on…
Municipalities as Partners Across inter-governmental Agreements
The reasons and factors that drive municipalities to engage in dierent types of part-
nerships have been signicantly discussed. Inter-municipal cooperation refers to a
managerial strategy to cope with societal high expectations about scal pressures,
collective action dilemmas, and the quality of public services (Bel & Warner, 2015;
Feiock 2013; Hulst & Van Montfort, 2007). However, the concept of inter-municipal
cooperation has an ambiguous denition. Some authors dene the term inter-munici-
pal as partnerships between municipalities (Steiner, 2003), while others allow for the
inclusion of other tiers of government and sectors (Hulst & Van Montfort, 2007). This
study refers to inter-municipal cooperation when two or more municipal govern-
ments formally agree to join eorts to manage and provide public goods and services.
Meanwhile, inter-governmental cooperation represents an instance in which one or
more municipal governments formally agree to join eorts with other tiers of govern-
ment to manage and provide public goods and services.
Apart from building a consensus around the conceptualization of municipal part-
nerships, the approach to studying the performance of municipal partnerships varies.
This is in part because performance variables can be measured in dierent ways,
across dierent dimensions (Boyne, 2003), and signal dierent performance results
(see Nicholson-Crotty, Theobald, & Nicholson‐Crotty, 2006). For example, the eec-
tiveness of inter-municipal cooperation has been measured based on the capacity to
reduce costs (Bel & Warner, 2015) and even in terms of accountability and respon-
siveness (Warner, 2006). Another set of studies has highlighted the complexity of
measuring the performance of a collaborative setting (Agrano, 2005; Emerson &
Nabatchi 2015; Moynihan et al., 2011). For example, a community could benet
from more access to new services for fewer costs in a public mental health network,
but it could be incompatible with the organizational mission of some service provid-
ers (Provan & Milward, 2001).
Emerson & Nabatchi (2015) encourage studying the performance of a collabo-
ration in a comprehensive way. A simplied version of their proposition includes
three elements: (1) whether performance measurement happens at the output or out-
come level, (2) whether performance measurement is about the organization (micro-
level) or the collaboration as a whole (macro-level), and (3) identifying the most
salient dimensions to evaluate the intersection between performance levels and unit
of analysis. For example, a participating organization may want to generate ecient
outputs and eective outcomes (see Boyne 2002). In a dierent unit of analysis, the
collaboration to which that participating organization belongs may aim to perform
actions with ecacy and obtain results with external legitimacy. Here, we assess the
performance of municipal partnership at the municipal level (micro-level) by assess-
ing the municipal eectiveness in rising international aid, which is the purpose (i.e.,
single-purpose), or one of the purposes (i.e., multi-purpose) of the municipal partner-
ship (see Table 1 for a detailed explanation).
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J. C. Zambrano-Gutiérrez, C. N. Avellaneda
Whom to Partner with? The Expected Eect of Municipal Partnerships
Voluntary cooperation among governmental jurisdictions holds great potential for
addressing complex problems with a broader scope. While cooperation arrangements
may generate benets by addressing gaps in governance — as existing mechanisms
and institutions fail to produce viable solutions (McKinney et al., 2014) — coop-
erating also involves costs in designing, developing, and maintaining the arrange-
ment (Feiock & Scholz, 2010). Some costs include ceding some degree of autonomy,
as well as complying with rules, agendas, strategies, and contributions in time,
resources, and commitment. Thus, institutional arrangements have to overcome col-
lective action problems (Olson, 1965) and the transaction costs of designing, devel-
oping, maintaining, and enforcing the arrangement rules (Feiock, 2013; Woods &
Bowman, 2018). To overcome these costs, cooperation arrangements adapt to miti-
gate their transaction costs, as well as the defection, coordination, free-rider, and
gain-and-cost-division problems.
Performance
Level
Unit of
Analysis
Description
Output
(quantity)
Municipal
partnership
Ecacy translates into
whether the partnership was
able to manage international
cooperation. The quantity of
non-reimbursable international
cooperation (US dollars)
acquired through municipal
partnerships operationalizes
this performance indicator.
Output
(eciency)
Municipal
government
Eciency corresponds to
actions (outputs) with the
highest economic benet and
the lowest political cost (i.e.,
wicksellian-eciency). Non-
reimbursable international
cooperation (US dollars)
increases municipal rev-
enue without imposing extra
charges on the citizenry (e.g.,
municipal taris).
Outcome
(eectiveness)
Target goals The national government’s
goal is to devolve the respon-
sibility to manage interna-
tional cooperation from the
national to the subnational
governments. Eectiveness is
based on the extent to which
more international cooperation
is available at the municipal
level. Again, the quantity of
non-reimbursable international
cooperation (US dollars)
acquired through municipal
partnerships operationalizes
this performance indicator.
Table 1 Performance dimen-
sions to assess Ecuadorian
municipal partnerships
Source: adapted from Breton
(1998), Boyne (2002), and
Emerson & Nabatchi (2015)
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Inter-municipal vs. Inter-governmental Cooperation: Their Impact on…
In a cooperation arrangement, each participant organization contributes relative
strengths and weaknesses. Participants come with dierent motivations, capacity,
and incentives to address collective action problems. Participants’ incentives depend
on severity of the problem/need, scal health, policy preferences, and design of
agreement (Woods & Bowman, 2018). Consequently, the performance eects of an
existing cooperation arrangement should be a function of the group composition.
Homogeneity/heterogeneity of group composition inuence the costs and benets
of cooperation, making “who with whom” crucial (Zamani, 2016). While cooperative
arrangements among governments range widely in terms of policy objectives, they
also vary in composition (Bowman, 2004; Bowman & Woods, 2007; Piña & Avel-
laneda, 2018). Given the growing reliance of governments on multi-jurisdictional
cooperative agreements (Buenger et al., 2016), it is imperative to understand whether
the homogeneity or heterogeneity of group members aects cooperation performance
through the degree of goal attainment.
Inconsistencies exist as to whether cooperation with stronger/weaker peers
(e.g., heterogeneity) or equal peers (e.g., homogeneity) aects performance levels
(Fiol, 1994; Zamani, 2016). The performance eects of group composition have
received considerable attention in the literature on contests by focusing on situa-
tions in which symmetrical groups compete against each other (see Dechenaux et
al., 2015; Sheremeta, 2018, for overviews). There also exists a growing number of
studies investigating the performance eects of various types of asymmetries, includ-
ing group size (Abbink et al., 2010; Ahn et al., 2011), wealth (Heap et al., 2015), and
level of communication (Cason et al., 2017). Assessing performance eects across
various types of asymmetries — including size, function, power, resources, repu-
tation, ideology, economic development, level of government, etc. — may explain
inconsistencies of results. Each type of group asymmetry is expected to have dier-
ent eects on cooperation eorts.
In studying inter-group contests, Fallucchi et al., (2020) follow Konrad’s (2009)
standard assumption of purely self-interested individuals to experimentally investi-
gate whether asymmetry or symmetry of group composition (e.g., homogeneous or
heterogeneous) contributes to a group’s success. Fallucchi et al. assumed that group
heterogeneity may increase the free-rider problem, as low-ability players may rest on
their laurels and rely on their high-ability peers’ eort: “within heterogeneous groups
only the member with the highest ability should exert any positive eort (the others
should free ride), while in homogeneous groups there is a continuum of optimal eort
combinations” (Fallucchi et al., 2020, p. 7). Interestingly, ndings of Fallucchi et al.,
(2020) indicate that heterogeneity within groups per se has no discernable eect on
group success.
The nature of group composition also may aect group cohesiveness which, in
turn, should aect performance. According to Deutsch’s (1949) theory of cooperation
and competition, cooperatively interdependent, interpersonal relations among mem-
bers increase “we-feeling’’ or cohesiveness, which in turn may result in ingroup-out-
group bias (Deutsch, 1949; Dion, 1973). However, this line of research has focused
on questions concerning the eects of cooperation and competition between groups
on subsequent relations between and within the groups (Kennedy & Stephan, 1977).
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J. C. Zambrano-Gutiérrez, C. N. Avellaneda
This study is interested in comparing performance eects of inter-municipal coop-
eration (a homogenous arrangement) versus inter-governmental cooperation that
involve municipalities and other tiers of government (a heterogeneous arrangement).
Heterogeneous cooperation arrangements should be more successful in mitigating
transaction costs and collective action problems for the following reasons. First,
joined-up governments possess greater technical knowledge, resources, administra-
tive help, and political power. This power translates into more capacity and legiti-
macy to enforce agreement rules. Moreover, because municipalities depend on other
levels of government, localities are expected to build a compliant reputation, thus
reducing the potential behavior of free-rider and promoting group-member cohe-
siveness. In sum, heterogeneous institutions can be expected to provide, on balance,
greater net benets to their participants. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1 Inter-governmental cooperation improves municipal performance
(e.g., in securing international aid) in a higher proportion, compared to inter-munic-
ipal cooperation.
On the other hand, collaborative arrangements between two or more organizations
are likely to pursue ambiguous goals (Rainey & Jung, 2015; Vangen & Huxham,
2012). This is because: (1) participating organizations might have distinct priorities
to invest resources to fulll multiple organizational and collaborative goals, (2) exter-
nal sources might have imposed collaborative goals, and (3) the true purposes to join
a collaboration are unknown or might change over time (Bryson et al., 2016; Chun &
Rainey, 2005; Rainey & Jung, 2015).
Indeed, goals in collaborations have been understood as a paradox in public
administration literature (Vangen & Huxham, 2012). A common driver to establish-
ing successful collaborations is to share core organizational goals that are compatible
with the purpose of the collaboration to facilitate a shared understanding between
participants (Bryson et al., 2015; Emerson et al., 2012). However, reaching a shared
understanding implies reciprocity, trust, and conict management to reconcile dif-
ferent positions. Due to the diculty of accomplishing shared understanding in
collaborative settings, public administration scholars coined the term “mutual under-
standing” to signal that participants in a collaboration do not need to fully agree on
each other’s perspectives to collaborate (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012;
Vangen & Huxham, 2012).
While the relationship between goal ambiguity and collaborative performance is
understudied, the eect of goal ambiguity on an array of organizational outcomes
provided guidance to formulate the second hypothesis in this study. In fact, goal
ambiguity is associated with lower organizational performance (Chun & Rainey,
2005; Favero et al., 2016; Jung, 2011; Latham et al., 2008), increment in turnover
intention, and a reduction in job satisfaction in public sector organizations (Jung,
2014a, b). In an eort to better understand goal ambiguity in public organizations,
Rainey and Jung (2014) proposed a framework to disentangle the sources of goal
ambiguity. Table 2 contains a synthesis of the main elements that contribute to goal
ambiguity and their proposed expected eect on municipal performance.
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Inter-municipal vs. Inter-governmental Cooperation: Their Impact on…
Rainey and Jung (2014) dierentiate between environmental, executive, and
subunits sources to increase goal ambiguity in organizations. This study focuses on
Rainey and Jung propositions for collaborative settings. Specically, collaboration
between other tiers of government can bring dierent sources of democratic account-
ability that could increase the tension between participating organizations about the
prioritization of multiple goals. Furthermore, collaborations without a hierarchical
structure to execute collaborative routines could hinder the coordination and priori-
tization to pursue multiple collaborative goals. Finally, the translation from collab-
orative purpose to operational goals can increase the perceptions of goal ambiguity
for public managers and employees of organizational subunits participating in a
collaborative setting. Collaborating in pursuing more than one goal may result in
managers’ and employees’ prioritization issues, which may be resolved through indi-
vidual-value alignment rather than through organizational-value alignment. Thus, the
second hypothesis for this study can be formulated in the following way:
Hypothesis 2 Municipal partnerships with multiple purposes increase goal ambigu-
ity and are negatively associated with municipal performance (e.g., in securing inter-
national aid).
The Linkage Between International aid Funds and Local Government
Performance: The Ecuadorian case
Local government performance has been comprehensibly analyzed at the organiza-
tional and partnership unit of analysis (Boyne, 2002; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).
On the one hand, Emerson & Nabatchi (2015) proposed a matrix for assessing the
Component Factor Subfactor Expected eect
on municipal
performance
Environmental Constitution-
al and Legal
Principles
for Struc-
ture and
Process of
Governance
Democratic
Accountability
Negative
Inuence of
Formal and
Informal
Political
Authorities
Other
Governments
Undetermined
Executive Executive
Delegation
of Authority
Hierarchical
Complexity
Negative
Subunit Man-
ager’s Goal
Ambiguity
(perceived)
Employee’s
Goal Ambiguity
(perceived)
Negative
Table 2 The expected eect of
multiple goals in the perfor-
mance of a collaboration
Note: Adapted from Rainey
and Jung (2014)
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J. C. Zambrano-Gutiérrez, C. N. Avellaneda
productivity of collaborative governance regimes (e.g., municipal partnerships) at
dierent levels (e.g., outputs, outcomes) and units of analysis (e.g., participant orga-
nizations, collaboration, target goals). On the other hand, Boyne (2002) described
a comprehensive list of performance indicators for organizations by merging the
inputs-outputs-outcomes (IOO) model and the economy-eciency-eectiveness
(3Es) model.
We applied both the collaborative and organizational approaches to assessing the
performance of the Ecuadorian local governments in this study. In fact, the quantity
of non-reimbursable international cooperation (US dollars) is the variable to opera-
tionalize municipal performance. Table 1 provides three reasons to consider acquiring
more international aid as a valid performance indicator for the Ecuadorian case. First,
municipal governments have the discretion to join municipal partnerships to man-
age international cooperation. Municipal partnerships (i.e., mancomunidades) are
strategies for municipal governments to manage international cooperation after the
Ecuadorian legislation devolved this responsibility (competence) from the national
to the subnational governments (CNC, 2011; CRE, 2008). Second, Ecuadorian law
denes non-reimbursable international cooperation (international aid) as a mecha-
nism to receive resources for contributing to or complementing initiatives to fulll
governmental strategic planning (COPFP, 2010, Art. 65). We argue that municipal
governments seek international aid based on the principles of wicksellian-eciency.
Breton (1998) denes wicksellian eciency as the connection between the costs
(e.g., municipal taris) and benets of public goods: the capacity to generate the
highest economic benet with the lowest political cost. It is dierent from economic
eciency because it does not assume perfect competition since governments have the
capacity to inuence prices (tax-prices) and public goods are not homogeneous. Also,
it is dierent from political eciency because it is not about competition between
politicians and mutually exclusive policies. Thus, the main argument is that political
and economic competition (see Stigler 1972 for a detailed denition) are not indepen-
dent and, in fact, both are necessary to increase wicksellian-eciency.
Finally, the eectiveness of the devolution policy regarding international coop-
eration is conditional on the capacity of local governments to manage international
cooperation, which can be measured by the amount of non-reimbursable interna-
tional cooperation (US dollars) available at the municipal level through municipal
partnerships.
Data and Methods
The above hypotheses will be tested in the context of the 221 Ecuadorian municipali-
ties. The Territorial Organization section in the Ecuadorian Constitution allows sub-
national governments to form “mancomunidades” (inter-governmental cooperation
and/or inter-municipal cooperation) for managing their responsibilities (CRE, 2008,
Art. 243). For example, municipal decentralized autonomous governments (munici-
pal GADs for its acronym in Spanish) could form inter-municipal cooperation to
jointly provide solid waste management to their communities.
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Inter-municipal vs. Inter-governmental Cooperation: Their Impact on…
The Ecuadorian Constitution created the National Council of Competences (CNC
for its acronym in Spanish) to regulate and coordinate the devolution of responsibili-
ties from the national to subnational governments (CRE, 2008, Art. 269). The CNC
is responsible for evaluating the fulllment of the inter-municipal and inter-govern-
mental partnerships (COOTAD, 2010, Art. 287) and keeps administrative records,
including membership and purpose(s) of each partnership. The CNC provided a list
of all the subnational government agreements, along with their memberships and
purposes, registered between 2011 and 2018 after an ocial request (CNC, 2019).
The Ministry of Ecuadorian Foreign Relationships and Human Mobility (MREMH
for its acronym in Spanish) maintains a database with information about international
aid and cooperation based on donors’ reports. After an ocial request, MREMH
provided non-reimbursable international cooperation (international aid) in US dollars
at the municipal level for the 2007–2018 period (MREMH, 2019). Given the nature
of the data, it was possible to identify for each year and for each of the 221 munici-
pal GADs the funds granted and assigned for concept of international aid through
their respective partnerships. This study focuses on the donors’ granted monies that
are not directly given to the municipality but to the municipal partnership. In sum,
the unit of analysis for this study is municipality-year’s total international aid funds
assigned to a given municipality but administered by the respective awarded munici-
pal partnership. It is important to note that it is not possible to dierentiate monies
granted through each inter-municipal and/or inter-governmental agreement but only
the aggregated amount for the concept of municipal partnerships.
Additional data to control for municipal traits came from the Ecuadorian Central
Bank (BCE, 2019), the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF, 2019), and the
National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC, 2019). Data from the BCE and
INEC are publicly available, and MEF provided data related to subnational govern-
ments’ budgets after an ocial request. This study includes information for all 221
Ecuadorian municipalities between 2007 and 2018. The nal database is a balanced
panel with 2,431 municipality-year observations.
Dependent Variable
This study uses the amount of international aid yearly assigned to a municipality
through inter-municipal and/or inter-governmental partnerships whose single pur-
pose or one of multiple purposes is securing international aid. This study measures
the performance of a municipality through its partnership eectiveness. The interna-
tional aid is quantied in US dollars and corresponds to the non-reimbursable monies
granted through international cooperation and registered at the MREMH. As men-
tioned before, it is not possible to assess the performance of individual partnerships
due to unavailable data. The unit of analysis is the “municipal year,” which captures
the aggregated value of international aid channeled through all the municipal partner-
ships, whose single goal or one of their multiple goals is securing international aid.
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J. C. Zambrano-Gutiérrez, C. N. Avellaneda
Independent Variables
This study distinguishes the performance of Ecuadorian municipal partnerships
based on their purpose and membership. A municipal partnership can have a single
or multiple purposes. Single purpose means the sole reason to form a partnership
was to manage international cooperation and obtain international aid. Multiple pur-
poses means that managing international cooperation and obtaining international aid
was only one of the partnerships’ purposes or goals. Additional goals or purposes
may include solid waste management, environmental sanitation, and water supply.
A municipality may belong to none, one, or several partnerships. Figure 1 shows an
example of the variation in the number of partnerships within one of the 24 Ecuador-
ian provinces at the municipal level. It could be that municipalities did not have any
partnerships to manage international cooperation and obtain international aid in a
particular year or through the entire period of study (2007–2018). On the other hand,
in our sample 20% of the Ecuadorian municipalities belonged at least to one partner-
ship with the goal of managing international cooperation and securing international
aid.
Because the type of members is a key aspect of a partnership, here we focus on
it. Municipalities can create horizontal and vertical cooperation agreements. On one
hand, inter-municipal cooperation happens when the members of the partnership
are only municipalities, thus illustrating a homogeneous partnership. On the other
Fig. 1 Example of the number of partnerships to manage international cooperation and secure interna-
tional aid at the municipal level in a given Ecuadorian province. Note: Ecuador has 24 provinces. The
gure illustrates the 15 municipalities within the province of Azuay in the Ecuadorian Andean region
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Inter-municipal vs. Inter-governmental Cooperation: Their Impact on…
hand, inter-governmental cooperation includes a more diverse type of members. For
the Ecuadorian case, inter-governmental cooperation includes at least one province
(state-level), one municipality (local-level), and one rural parish (local-rural level) as
members of the partnership.
The number of municipalities participating in a partnership to manage international
cooperation and secure international aid is available in Table 3. Of the 221 Ecuador-
ian municipalities, 84 municipalities joined a partnership during our period of analy-
sis. Inter-municipal cooperation with the single purpose of managing international
cooperation to secure international aid was the most popular type of partnership, as
approximately 55% of participating municipalities joined this type of collaborative
agreement. On the other extreme of the continuum, 14% of participating municipali-
ties joined an inter-governmental agreement with multiple purposes — international
cooperation to secure international aid, in addition to solid waste management, envi-
ronmental sanitation, and water supply. In relative terms, municipalities represent
approximately 36% of the members in the inter-governmental cooperation type of
partnership.
The analysis below includes four dierent types of municipal partnerships. Each
independent variable in Table 4 represents the number of times a municipality has
joined a type of municipal partnership.
Control Variables
During the study’s period of analysis, CNC ocially devolved the responsibility to
manage international cooperation and secure international aid from the national to
subnational governments in September 2011 (CNC, 2011) and implemented since
2012. Therefore, this study controls for this policy change through a dichotomous
indicator, labeled international aid devolution policy, which equals one (1) from 2012
to 2018 and zero (0) otherwise.
In 2013, the Presidential Decree No. 16 introduced unforeseen barriers to civil
society organizations, including international NGOs (PD16, 2013). Civil society
organizations perceived that the national government had a wide range of discre-
tion to renew the legal status of their organizations after Presidential Decree No.16
Inter-municipal Inter-governmental Munici-
palities per
participating
organizations
Single-
purpose
46 20 66 out of 97
Multi-
purpose
612 18 out of 43
Munici-
palities
per
partici-
pating
organi-
zations
52 out of 52 32 out of 88
Table 3 Number of municipali-
ties participating in each type of
partnership as a fraction of total
participating local government
organizations
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J. C. Zambrano-Gutiérrez, C. N. Avellaneda
was in place. As a result, several civil society organizations stop their operations in
Ecuador which reduced the amount of international aid available at the subnational
and municipal levels (see Zambrano-Gutiérrez & Avellaneda, C.N., 2021; Zambrano-
Gutiérrez & Avellaneda, C.N., 2022a for a reference). Legal status regulatory policy
captures this contextual change over time, and it is operationalized with a dichoto-
mous indicator equal to one (1) between 2015 and 2018 and zero (0) otherwise.
The CNC provides information about other subnational government partnerships,
unrelated to international aid, that were operating in a municipality. As a result, this
study includes the number of other partnerships in a municipality to control for other
collaborative eorts that could have an eect on collaborative capacity.
The MREMH database identies donors’ country of origin, donor organizations,
as well as the organization at the municipal level that implemented projects with
international aid funds. For example, the origin of the international aid funds could be
the United States, channeled through the USAID and implemented by a municipality.
This study includes an index to capture donor supply using factor analysis. The donor
supply index has an eigenvalue of 2.74, accounting for 92% of the variance for the
donor variables.
Ecuadorian municipalities rely heavily on transfers from the central government
(see Zambrano-Gutiérrez & Avellaneda, C.N., 2022b for a reference). However,
nancial support from the central government varies over time and across munici-
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Source
Dependent variable
International aid (US$
thousand)
0.27 4.60 (MREMH,
2019)
Independent variables
Single-purpose and
inter-municipal
0.13 0.34 (CNC, 2019)
Multi-purpose and
inter-municipal
0.02 0.12 (CNC, 2019)
Single-purpose and
inter-governmental
0.05 0.24 (CNC, 2019)
Multi-purpose and
inter-governmental
0.04 0.19 (CNC, 2019)
Control variables
International aid devolution
policy (yes = 1)
0.58 0.49 (CNC, 2011)
Legal status regulatory policy
(yes = 1)
0.33 0.47 (PD16, 2013)
Central government interna-
tional aid (US$ thousand)
65.47 342.02 (MREMH,
2019)
Other partnerships (#
partnerships)
0.39 0.62 (CNC, 2019)
Supply index 0.0 1.0 (MREMH,
2019)
Fiscal dependency (%) 67.17 14.88 (MEF, 2019)
Gross domestic product (US$
million)
361.71 1771.36 (BCE, 2019)
Population (thousands) 70.59 240.49 (INEC, 2019)
Table 4 Descriptive statistics
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Table 5 Correlation matrix
Variable 1 23 4 5 678910 11 12 13
1International aid 1
2Single-purpose and inter-municipal -0.0108 1
3Multi-purpose and inter-municipal 0.0383* -0.0496* 1
4 Single-purpose and inter-governmental -0.0088 0.0987* -0.0285 1
5 Multi-purpose and inter-governmental 0.2432* -0.0758* 0.2018* -0.0436* 1
6International aid devolution policy 0.0487* 0.2314* 0.1072* 0.1354* 0.1147* 1
7 Legal status regulatory policy -0.0413* 0.1383* 0.0641* 0.0896* 0.0685* 0.5976* 1
8 Central government international aid 0.0512* -0.0431* -0.0874* 0.0631* 0.0579* -0.1274* -0.3194* 1
9 Other partnerships -0.0281 0.2881* 0.0449* 0.1202* -0.0565* 0.4537* 0.4655* -0.1580* 1
10 Supply index 0.0159 -0.0465* -0.0394 0.2520* -0.0529* 0.0428* -0.0720* 0.4531* -0.0309 1
11 Fiscal dependency 0.0161 0.0529* -0.0798* 0.0317 -0.0168 -0.0965* -0.1387* -0.0881* 0.0111 -0.2114* 1
12 Gross domestic product -0.0055 -0.1266* -0.0614* 0.0171 -0.0627* 0.0838* 0.0699* 0.2264* -0.0473* 0.5305* -0.4414* 1
13 Population 0.0046 -0.0872* -0.0265 -0.0208 -0.0213 0.0129 0.0128 0.1865* -0.0856* 0.6099* -0.2472* 0.5460* 1
Note: * p < 0.05
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J. C. Zambrano-Gutiérrez, C. N. Avellaneda
palities. For that reason, the analysis controls for: (1) central transferences as a pro-
portion of the total municipal revenue (i.e., scal dependence), and (2) the level of
international aid secured by the central governments and then redirected to munici-
palities. Finally, the municipal economy’s size (i.e., GDP) and the municipal popu-
lation control for local capacity to acquire international aid funds. Table 4 provides
descriptive statistics and sources for all variables.
Methods
The Variance Ination Factor (VIF:2.14) suggests that multi-collinearity is not an
issue. Moreover, the correlation matrix (Table 5) reports no serious correlations issues
among the explanatory variables. All models in Table 6 used two-way xed eects
regression to analyze within-municipality changes. Municipal xed-eects allow us
to control for observable and unobservable factors that do not change over time. This
is important because current evidence suggests that group size, function, resources,
reputation, ideology, economic development, and location are factors xed over time
but have eects on partnerships (Abbink et al., 2010; Ahn et al., 2011; Heap et al.,
2015). For example, municipalities can join a partnership because of territorial prox-
imity. Additionally, year xed-eects allow us to include over time trends that can
aect cross-sectional time-series. Standard errors are clustered by municipality to
account for potential correlations between observations from the same municipality
during the analysis period. Control variables are lagged one period to improve iden-
tication of models in Table 5.
Findings
Table 6 reports results to examine whether the integration of partnership member-
ship and purpose inuence the municipal eectiveness in securing international
aid. Based on the results, inter-municipal cooperation with a single-purpose and
inter-governmental cooperation with a multi-purpose are positively associated with
municipal eectiveness in securing international aid. However, municipality mem-
bers of inter-governmental partnerships (with partners from dierent tiers of govern-
ment) with multiple purposes were the most eective cases in attaining international
aid funds. In fact, one extra inter-governmental cooperation with multiple purposes
increases by about 45% the level of international aid in a municipality, holding all
else constant. Meanwhile, inter-municipal cooperation was an eective partnership
to secure international aid if the sole purpose of the partnership was to secure and
manage international aid. For each extra inter-municipal partnership with the single
goal of securing international aid, a municipality tended to increase international aid
by approximately 3%.
Although not the focus of this study, the legal status regulatory policy enacted by
the Ecuadorian government in 2015 had a negative eect on the level of international
aid secured by municipalities. Additionally, one standard deviation increased in the
number of inhabitants in a municipality is associated with a 12% increase in interna-
tional aid funds.
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The supplementary material for this study in Annex 1 contains other model speci-
cations in which each dimension of the municipal partnership is analyzed at a time.
Specically, one model tested the eect of the type of partnerships (inter-municipal
vs. inter-governmental) and another one the eect of purpose (single purpose vs.
multiple purpose). On one hand, inter-governmental cooperation was more eective
for securing international aid than inter-municipal cooperation. For each extra part-
nership involving dierent tiers of government (i.e., province, municipality, and rural
parishes), a municipality increased its international aid by approximately 14%. On
the other hand, multiple purpose cooperation was more eective to raise international
aid, compared to single purpose cooperation. For each extra partnership in which the
purpose was not only to manage international cooperation and secure international
aid but also to accomplish other goals (e.g., solid waste management), a municipality
increased the level of international aid by approximately 27%.
Interna-
tional aid
(logged)
Single-purpose and inter-municipal 0.0317*
(0.0157)
Multi-purpose and inter-municipal 0.0338
(0.0408)
Single-purpose and inter-governmental 0.0017
(0.0182)
Multi-purpose and inter-governmental 0.3738***
(0.0120)
International aid devolution policy 0.0719+
(0.0367)
Legal status regulatory policy -0.1373***
(0.0374)
Central government international aid (logged) -0.0036
(0.0047)
Other partnerships (# partnerships) 0.0241+
(0.0137)
Supply index -0.0088
(0.0158)
Fiscal dependency (%) 0.0003
(0.0007)
Gross domestic product (logged) 0.0010
(0.0206)
Population (thousands) 0.0005**
(0.0002)
Constant -0.0448
(0.1075)
Municipality xed-eects Yes
Year xed-eects Yes
Observations 2431
Municipalities 221
R2(within) 0.0693
Table 6 The eect of type
of members and purpose in
a municipal partnership on orga-
nizational outcomes
Note: control variables lagged
one period
Cluster standard er rors in
parentheses: +p < 0 .10, *p < 0.05,
**p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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J. C. Zambrano-Gutiérrez, C. N. Avellaneda
Discussion
Both extremes in the continuum of municipal partnerships were successful in
improving municipal performance. Both inter-municipal cooperation with a single
purpose and inter-governmental cooperation with multiple purposes contribute to
increasing municipal international aid. Interestingly, while inter-governmental coop-
eration appears more eective than inter-municipal cooperation, partnerships with
a single purpose do not necessarily outperform partnership with multiple purposes.
Thus, this study’s rst hypothesis is supported. Nevertheless, additional research
should explore whether the superior role of inter-governmental cooperation arrange-
ments applies to other (a) settings, (b) levels of governments, and (c) policy goals,
such as waste management, infrastructural works, environmental management, etc.
Interna-
tional aid
(logged)
Interna-
tional aid
(logged)
Inter-municipal cooperation 0.0265
(0.0200)
Inter-governmental cooperation 0.1336***
(0.0372)
Single-purpose cooperation 0.0199+
(0.0113)
Multi-purpose cooperation 0.2378***
(0.0341)
International aid devolution policy 0.0901*0.0784*
(0.0354) (0.0366)
Legal status regulatory policy -0.1302*** -0.1335***
(0.0373) (0.0373)
Central government international aid
(logged)
-0.0004 -0.0020
(0.0046) (0.0047)
Other partnerships (# partnerships) 0.0139 0.0208
(0.0121) (0.0132)
Supply index -0.0201 -0.0113
(0.0165) (0.0156)
Fiscal dependency (%) 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Gross domestic product (logged) -0.0163 -0.0057
(0.0183) (0.0192)
Population (thousands) 0.0005** 0.0005***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Constant 0.0109 -0.0228
(0.0964) (0.1018)
Municipality xed-eects Yes Yes
Year xed-eects Yes Yes
Observations 2431 2431
Municipalities 221 221
R2(within) 0.0589 0.0651
Annex 1 The eect of type
of members and purpose in
a municipal partnership on orga-
nizational outcomes
Note: control variables lagged
one period
Cluster standard er rors in
parentheses: +p < 0 .10, *p < 0.05,
**p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Likewise, further exploration is needed to determine whether performance eects of
inter-organizational cooperation exhibit a tipping point both in terms of the number
of members and levels of government involved in the partnership.
Unlike the rst hypothesis, our second hypothesis fails to be supported. Findings
suggest that in the Ecuadorian inter-municipal and inter-governmental partnership
contexts, multiplicity of goals seems not to obstruct goal achievement, contrary to
those studies that report a negative relationship between goal ambiguity and organi-
zational performance (Chun & Rainey, 2005; Favero et al., 2016; Jung, 2011; Latham
et al., 2008). In fact, the expectation, based on Rainey and Jung (2014) framework
described in Table 2, was that collaboration with other tiers of government boosts
issue prioritization at the partnership level given multiple interests from dierent
organizations. Issue prioritization at the cooperative arrangement, however, may
increase perceptions of goal ambiguity inside the municipality and, consequently,
municipal performance is negatively aected.
Our contradictory results contribute to the theoretical understanding of goal ambi-
guity in collaborative settings. Our nding calls for further research on the perfor-
mance eects of goal ambiguity in collaborative arrangements pursuing goals in a
dierent policy area to see if the results hold. Securing international aid is a tangible
and visible goal, and this salient nature may mitigate the potential ambiguous eects
of adding more goals to the collaborative arrangement. Therefore, more studies
should explore the performance eects of goal ambiguity in collaboration arrange-
ments in dierent settings, other levels of government, and across other policy areas.
Our study shows evidence that municipal partnerships with multiple purposes and
with members from dierent tiers of government are the most eective strategies
to boost municipal performance in securing foreign aid. Attaining extra revenue at
the local level is a necessity in developing and transitioning economies. Resource
scarcity deprives local governments from delivering so much needed goods and ser-
vices. The Ecuadorian case depicted in this study provides dierent perspectives to
better understand the role of goals and the nature of partners in collaborative regimes.
Moreover, Ecuador is an interesting case because it shows evidence from collabora-
tions that were the result of municipal choice instead of mandates. Thus, it could
be that municipalities that have voluntarily chosen their partners to collaborate on
multiple purposes are less likely to “fail into their role in the collaboration” (Bryson
et al., 2006, p. 45) compared to those municipalities forced to participate in a pre-
determined collaborative arrangement.
Unfortunately, due to data availability, it is impossible to disentangle other dimen-
sions of performance in collaboration. For example, the level of equity is unclear
among participating organizations since it is unknown whether the non-reimbursable
international cooperation was fairly and/or equitable distributed across participating
organizations. For instance, it could be that multiple-purpose partnerships were more
successful because the destination of the international aid funds secured through the
partnership was linked to attaining the other goals of the partnership. For example,
the international aid could be used to improve waste management for all the mem-
bers of the partnership. On the contrary, when the partnership solely exists to secure
and manage international aid, chances are the target and distribution are perceived
by donors to be less transparent. As a result, attaining international aid as a single
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J. C. Zambrano-Gutiérrez, C. N. Avellaneda
purpose fails to boost municipal coers in a higher proportion. Finally, further stud-
ies are needed to determine the collaborative governance process of secured monies
from international aid.
Conclusion
This study contributes by applying an integrative framework to predict municipal
performance through cooperation. It extends and expands explanations of collabora-
tion based on goal ambiguity and type of partners. The results also contribute to a
better understanding of collaboration, a trendy strategy and research endeavor that
requires more attention in both developing and transitioning economies. Findings
indicated that the number of goals and type of members aect collaboration out-
comes and thus municipal eectiveness in achieving the pursued goals. In responding
to whom to partner with, our results reveal optimistic implications. Findings suggest
that both inter-municipal (homogenous partners) and inter-governmental cooperation
boost collaboration outcomes and, in turn, municipal performance.
Our results also depict that inter-governmental cooperation targeting multiple
goals is superior to inter-municipal cooperation with a single goal when securing
international aid. In responding to whether single-purpose or multiple-purpose col-
laboration matters, our results suggest that it depends on the nature of the members.
Multi-purpose collaboration overperforms single-purpose collaboration but only
through inter-governmental but not through inter-municipal collaboration. It seems
that heterogeneity in membership brings members with dierent capacities, degrees
of interest, and willingness to bear the costs necessary to attain goals.
We conclude that the nature of partners and the number of goals in a collaborative
arrangement matter for understanding performance in securing international aid both
at the member-level and at the collaboration as a whole (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).
Moreover, inter-municipal and inter-governmental collaboration contribute to boost
international aid. However, inter-governmental and multiple purpose collaboration
arrangements outperform inter-municipal and single-purpose collaboration arrange-
ments in increasing international aid. And the enactment of regulations also tends to
decrease municipal eectiveness in securing international aid. Given the emphasis on
maximizing partnership eorts in the public sector, we recommend new research on
collaboration in dierent policy areas, across other settings, and including other lev-
els of government to explore whether our ndings hold. New research may shed light
on whether contingencies exist in the purpose-collaboration and member nature-col-
laboration relationships.
Funding Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
Declarations All authors certify that they have no aliations with or involvement in any organization or
entity with any nancial interest or non-nancial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in
this manuscript.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long
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as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this
article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
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is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/.
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