Available via license: CC BY 4.0
Content may be subject to copyright.
S301
ISSN 1019-3316, Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2022, Vol. 92, Suppl. 4, pp. S301–S307. © The Author(s), 2022. This article is an open access publication.
Russian Text © The Author(s), 2022, published in Sovremennaya Evropa, 2022, No. 3, pp. 132–144.
The Influence of NATO Regional Missile Defense
on European Security
O. O. Krivolapov#
Institute for US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 121069 Russia
e-mail: o.krivolapov@iskran.ru
Received December 27, 2021; revised February 23, 2022; accepted March 15, 2022
Abstract—The problem of missile defense is considered by Russian researchers, first of all, as part of the stra-
tegic stability problem in relations between Russia and the United States. At the same time, the impact
of regional missile defense (theater missile defense) on regional security remains largely unexplored.
The US and NATO leadership continue to claim that Russia has deployed intermediate-range missiles in the
European part of the country. As a response to this step, in addition to other measures of regional deterrence
towards Russia, it is planned to strengthen NATO’s regional missile defense system. The purpose of this arti-
cle is to determine the potential impact of enhancing NATO’s theater missile defense on regional security.
The answer to this question is important for understanding the prospects for European security. This article
provides a critical analysis of Western experts’ scenarios of actions of Russia and NATO around the Bal-
tic countries the place and role of theater missile defense in these scenarios and compares the doctrinal
guidelines of the United States and Russia regarding regional nonnuclear deterrence. There are situa-
tions in which NATO’s enhanced regional missile defense could strengthen regional deterrence, and
there are situations where this is less likely. Taking into account the doctrinal guidelines of both sides,
conclusions are drawn about the destabilizing potential of NATO’s regional missile defense enhance-
ment and that, in strengthening regional stability, there is no alternative to arms control and transparency
regimes.
Keywords: regional missile defense, theater missile defense, NATO, Russia, deterrence, political–military
crisis, nonnuclear deterrence, left-of-launch, escalate-to-de-escalate
DOI: 10.1134/S1019331622100100
INTRODUCTION
An important part of the problem of international
security is the issue of European security. Relations
between Russia and NATO, and between Russia and
the United States, are at their lowest point since the
Cold War. The expert community is intensively look-
ing for ways to reduce the risks of a direct military
clash between both sides.1 One of the central places
among many issues in relations between Russia and
NATO is the problem of missile defense. Official
Moscow speaks of the Aegis Ashore missile defense sys-
tems in Europe as part of the problem of strategic sta-
bility, as a potential threat to the strategic nuclear
forces of the Russian Federation. The Russian side is
also considering missile defense as part of the issue of
bringing NATO’s infrastructure closer to Russia’s bor-
ders. The missile defense problem has a very import-
ant regional dimension. The collapse of the INF
Treaty increased the likelihood of the deployment of
intermediate and shorter-range missiles in Europe.
In this context, the role of regional missile defense sys-
tems (theater missile defense) is growing.
The problem of missile defense is mainly studied by
scientists and experts in Russia and the United States
as part of the strategic stability in Russian–American
relations (Rogov, 2021; Esin, 2017; Thielmann, 2020).
Such an impact of theater missile defense on regional
stability is much less discussed (Dvorkin, 2019).
Unlike strategic missile defense systems, theater mis-
sile defense systems have much more successful inter-
cepts during tests. The interpretation of this fact as an
#Oleg Olegovich Krivolapov, Cand. Sci. (Polit.) is a Senior Researcher
in the Department of Military-Political Research, RAS Institute for
US and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN).
1Recommendations of the Participants of the Expert Dialogue on
Reducing the Risks of a Military Confrontation between Russia
and NATO in Europe, Institute for US and Canadian Studies,
Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Europe of the Rus-
sian Academy of Sciences, December 2020. http://iskran.ru/
rossiya-nato-novye-rekomendacii-ekspertov/. Cited February 1,
2022. Expert dialogue on reducing the risks of military confron-
tation between Russia and NATO in Europe. Seven recommenda-
tions, Institute for US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of
Sciences, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, Feb-
ruary 2022. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/group-
statement/the-exp ert-dialogue-on-nato-r ussia-risk-reduction-
seven-recommendations/. Cited February 1, 2022.
Security Challenges
S302
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES Vol. 92 Suppl. 4 2022
KRIVOLAPOV
indicator of the higher reliability of these systems is
one of the reasons why the stabilizing potential of the-
ater missile defense for the regional situation is hardly
called into question. Another reason is the view of
missile defense as an purely defensive tool that con-
tributes to stabilization, especially in a nonstrategic,
regional context.
Many experts admit that a nuclear conflict between
the Russian Federation and the US/NATO is possible
as a result of the escalation of a nonnuclear conflict in
the development of a political–military crisis in
Europe. In the array of research literature on this
topic, there are a number of articles that mention the
factor of theater missile defense. Almost everywhere
this mention goes at the level of separate theses within
the framework of articles devoted to more general
issues. For example, within the framework of relations
between the US and allies in Europe (Früling, 2016;
Kühn, 2018), prospects for deploying intermediate-
range missiles (Kühn, 2019; Simon, Lanoszka, 2020),
Russian long-range high-precision weapons (John-
son, 2017), and the escalate-to-de-escalate doctrine
(Kort et al., 2019; Anderson, McCue, 2021; Kroenig,
2018; Kofman, Fink, Edmonds, 2020). There are
practically no studies specifically devoted to analy-
sis of the factor of regional missile defense in the
context of the actions of the United States and
NATO aimed at regional deterrence of Russia in
Europe. This article is a development of the
author’s research on the impact of US regional mis-
sile defense architectures on regional stability
(Krivolapov, 2021).
The purpose of this article is to determine how the
strengthening of the NATO missile defense architec-
ture can affect regional security. In this regard, it is
necessary to answer the following questions: (1) Will
the strengthening of the regional missile defense
(a) help to deter the offensive operation of the Russian
troops in the region, presumed by Western experts and
NATO leadership, carried out by Moscow using non-
nuclear missiles and with the subsequent threat of
using nuclear weapons within the framework of the
Russia’s alleged escalate-to-de-escalate doctrine? or
(b) deter the use of nuclear missiles by Russia in the
framework of the above scenario? (2) Will strengthen-
ing theater missile defense of the NATO bloc destroy
or strengthen regional stability? Outside the scope of
this article are topics such as the impact of missile
defense in Europe on the strategic balance between
the Russian Federation and the United States, as well
as the ways of escalating the nuclear conflict between
Russia and the United States/NATO from the regional
to the strategic level.
We will only talk about the regional missile defense
of NATO, which refers to systems designed to protect
against ballistic missiles with a range of less than
5500 km, as well as against cruise missiles of various
ranges.2 They could be used to strengthen the theater
missile defense architecture. The need to take into
account the missile defense systems of NATO coun-
tries (including the American missile defense systems
present in Europe) is due to the existence of long-term
US plans to integrate them into a single architecture
through the NATO missile defense command and
control center at Ramstein Air Base (Germany).3
The offensive missiles of the Russian Federation,
which will be discussed in this article, include opera-
tional–tactical missiles (range of 100‒500 km), sea-
and air-launched cruise missiles (SLCM, ALCM),
hypersonic aeroballistic missiles, and being developed
ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles and
hypersonic sea-, air-, and ground-launched missiles
(range of less than 5500 km).
The concept of “deterrence,” which is one of the
main ones for this study, has two interpretations. The
first is deterrence by punishment. The second is deter-
rence by denial, namely, the creation of military capa-
bilities to prevent the success of potential aggression
(Mazarr et al., 2018, pp. 7–8). The former is most
often associated with the deployment of offensive
weapons, the latter with defensive ones.
“Regional deterrence” is associated with the
actions of the parties in the framework of a regional
confrontation. The region refers to Europe, in partic-
ular, its Baltic subregion. Unlike strategic deterrence,
regional deterrence involving theater missile defense
and nonnuclear missiles does not imply the destruc-
tion of Russia or the NATO bloc as such as a result of
first and retaliatory strikes. Since there is the risk of
escalation of a conventional armed conflict between
Russia and NATO to the nuclear level, answers to the
above questions about the effectiveness of deterrence
of offensive deterrence and missile launches are also
required in the regional context.
Another key concept is a “political–military cri-
sis.” Its main components are the risk of an armed
clash (including an inadvertent one, as a result of a
misunderstanding of the intentions of one of the par-
ties or both parties due to a lack of information and
poor communication between them), psychological
pressure from outside on the leadership of a country
involved in the crisis, an exceptionally low level of
trust between the parties in confrontation with each
2Taking into account the missile systems available to Russia, we
mean the following missile defense and air defense/missile
defense systems of NATO countries: Aegis, Patriot, SAMP/T
with the corresponding models of anti-missiles SM-2, SM-6,
PAC-3, and Aster. NATO documents only talk about air and
missile defense, which includes all these systems. In addition,
the SM-6 interceptor is officially declared as part of the poten-
tial in the field of defense against hypersonic weapons (See Vice
Admiral Jon A. Hill, Director, Missile Defense Agency Before
the Senate Armed Services Committee, June 9, 2021, p. 16).
It can also be used as an offensive missile to destroy ground and
surface targets at ranges up to 240 km.
3Missile Defense Review, U.S. Department of Defense, 2019,
pp. 71, 77.
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES Vol. 92 Suppl. 4 2022
THE INFLUENCE OF NATO REGIONAL S303
other, and fear of a sudden attack by at least one of the
parties (Schelling, 2008, pp. 95–101). Accordingly,
“regional stability” in this article refers to the situation
of the absence of a political-military crisis.
THE CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL
DETERRENCE
Russian missiles with a range of less than 5500 km
were officially named among the missile threats to US
troops and their allies in the 2019 Missile Defense
Review. Representatives of the administration of
J.Biden at the hearings in Congress repeated this
position. The June 2021 NATO Brussels Communi-
qué reflects in this regard the intention to strengthen
NATO air defense/missile defense.4 Washington con-
siders these offensive missiles to be part of the Russian
potential of anti-access/area denial, A2/AD, which in
the event of a regional political and military crisis in
Europe will give Russia an advantage.5 Although the
US military calls air defense/missile defense systems
and coastal defense missile systems the basis of the
A2/AD potential, offensive missiles have an auxiliary
role, consisting in preventing the free movement of
NATO troops and the arrival of reinforcements to
Europe from the United States. Accordingly, one of
the tasks of regional missile defense, including NATO
air defense/missile defense, is to impede the A2/AD
strategy.6
As the most likely scenario for the use of these mis-
siles and anti-missile weapons in Europe, military and
civilian experts of the NATO countries considered
Russian aggression against the Baltic countries (Kelly,
Gompert and Long, 2017, pp. 140–163, 167–180;
Hodges et al., 2020; Brauß and Rácz, 2021). Accord-
ing to their estimates, although the total number of
conventional armed forces (CAFs) of NATO countries
is higher than the total number of Russian СAFs, in
the Baltic subregion Russia has a numerical superior-
ity over NATO forces, and many A2/AD assets are
deployed there. This, according to Western experts,
creates the conditions for a rapid local Russian offen-
sive against the Baltic countries, and to support such
an offensive, Moscow will use nonnuclear sea-, air-,
and ground-launched missiles with a range of less than
5500 km. According to the authors of the reports and
representatives of the military–political leadership of
the United States and NATO, Russia, having taken
control of a certain territory in the Baltic states, will
threaten to use tactical nuclear weapons in order to
4Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in Brussels, June 14, 2021.
5Missile Defense Review, US Department of Defense, 2019, p. 18.
6Statement of Ms. Leonor Tomero, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy before the
Senate Armed Services Committee on Missile Defense, June 9,
2021. p. 6; Missile Defense Review, U.S. Department of
Defense, 2019, pp. 71, 77.
prevent the rest of NATO countries from interfering in
what is happening and pushing Russian troops back.
Regional missile defense in Europe is officially a
tool for maintaining not only nonnuclear, but also
nuclear deterrence, as it is written in the main current
NATO policy documents.7 In the United States, Stra-
tegic Command officers and Defense Department
officials place theater missile defense among the tools
to counter Russia’s alleged “escalate-to-de-escalate”
doctrine (Kort et al., 2019: 78; Anderson, McCue,
2021: 44, 45). A number of civilian experts agree that
theater missile defense can be quite successfully used
as a means of countering the escalate-to-de-escalate
doctrine (Kroenig, 2018, pp. 17–18; Kofman, Fink,
Edmonds, 2020, pp. 26, 65, 75).
In analyzing the possible role of a regional missile
defense system in deterring the use of short- and inter-
mediate-range nuclear missiles, one should take into
account the conditions under which the Russian Fed-
eration can use nuclear weapons. Official representa-
tives of the Russian Federation deny that Russia has
the escalate-to-de-escalate doctrine.8 According to
the Fundamentals of Russian Nuclear Deterrence
Policy of 2020, Moscow will use nuclear weapons in
one of four situations.9 Considering the nature of the
situations described, the presence of a regional missile
defense system in the adversary is unlikely to become
a deterrent to the use of, for example, nuclear opera-
tional-tactical missiles.
Even if we adhere to the scenario proposed by the
NATO leadership and Western experts and assume
that Russia has the escalate-to-de-escalate doctrine,
it is necessary to take into account the fact that if even
one nuclear warhead overcomes such a missile defense
system, this could lead to severe consequences for the
defending side. Building an effective missile defense
(including regional) from nuclear missiles is still ques-
tionable (Zolotarev, 2019). Accordingly, it is hardly
possible to deter the use of these nuclear-armed mis-
siles effectively with the help of theater missile
defense.
Much more complicated is the situation with the
role of a regional missile defense system in deterring an
offensive by the Russian Federation using nonnuclear
weapons in the framework of the scenario under con-
sideration.
According to the 2019 Missile Defense Review, a
regional missile defense system will deter missile
7See Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, May 2012; Brussels Summit Communi-
qué … 2021.
8Ambassador Antonov called the words about the development
of the escalate-to-de-escalate doctrine by the Russian Federa-
tion erroneous, TASS, Apr. 9 (2019).
9Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 355 of
June 2, 2020 “On the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the
Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence,” para-
graph 19.
S304
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES Vol. 92 Suppl. 4 2022
KRIVOLAPOV
attacks against the United States and its allies
deployed in various regions of the world and give
Washington additional time and options to respond to
aggression, beside striking.10 Civilian experts argue
that the presence of a regional missile defense system
will raise the threshold for aggression using nonnu-
clear weapons, in particular, from the Russian side.11 It
is concluded that regional missile defense is among the
tools for controlling escalation along with intermedi-
ate-range missiles (Kaushal, 2019, p. vi; Früling, 2016,
p. 93; Karako, 2016). Accordingly, the success of the
entire deterrence of the alleged Russian aggression
depends on the success of deterring the use of these
missiles by Russia.
Theater missile defense systems are proposed to be
deployed in such a way as to protect only command
centers, forward deployed troops, military bases,
warehouses, Aegis Ashore systems, transport hubs, and
large population centers (Karako, 2016, pp. 6–7;
Früling, 2016, p. 91; Kuhn, 2018, pp. 60, 69).
In view of the foregoing, it is possible to answer
questions about the contribution of theater missile
defense to deterring the use of nonnuclear missiles by
Russia in the framework of the scenario envisaged by
NATO. For the purposes of this analysis, we will
accept the thesis that the Russian leadership has both
the intention to attack and enough time to prepare it.12
To guarantee success, the Russian side will carry out a
quick operation only if there are sufficient means to
overcome the NATO missile defense system.
Although tests of theater missile defense systems
are much more successful than tests of strategic missile
defense, taking into account the experience of the
combat use of the Patriot systems by Saudi Arabia in
2015–2020 (Williams, Shaikh, 2020, pp. 24–25), the
Russian side may well proceed from the possibility of
overcoming this system with the missiles that Russia
has.13 This means that NATO’s theater missile defense
systems will not be able to deter the use of these non-
nuclear missiles in such a scenario if the Russian Fed-
eration has a clear offensive intention and confidence
in overcoming these missile defense systems. This is
the confidence that the number of missiles available to
10See Missile Defense Review, U.S. Department of Defense,
2019, pp. 27, 29–30.
11The expert community of Western countries has different views
on the effectiveness of theater missile defense as part of regional
deterrence. A detailed analysis of these discussions and a critical
analysis of the arguments of the US administration and various
expert groups was given by the author earlier (Krivolapov, 2021).
12Western experts, generally do not consider situations that Mos-
cow may perceive as threatening to the national security of the
Russian Federation. For example, the emergence of NATO
plans to deploy nonnuclear short-range and intermediate-range
missiles or elements of strategic missile defense in the Baltic states.
13The potentially low effectiveness of the Patriot systems against
the Kalibr and Iskander missiles was discussed by some Western
experts. For example, (Kühn, 2019, p. 158; Simon and Lano-
szka, 2020, p. 20).
Russia is sufficient to guarantee the destruction of the
intended targets, and its hypersonic missiles are even
more likely to overcome the existing NATO regional
missile defense systems. This takes into account that
hypersonic missiles are very expensive and there can-
not be a large number of them.
In theory, a situation is also possible where the
Russian side does not have the opportunity to allocate
the required amount of any part of the missile arsenal
(either hypersonic or other missiles) to accomplish
tasks of guaranteed destruction of a limited number of
the most important targets within the framework of
support the specified attack. Based on the logic of
Western experts, Moscow is interested in a quick oper-
ation. Thus, NATO’s theater missile defense systems,
which outnumber Russia’s missile system capabilities,
could deter a Russian offensive. Then Russia will con-
tinue the corresponding missile systems’ buildup in the
subregion. In such a situation, another question arises:
will a regional missile defense system enhance regional
stability?
IMPACT ON STABILITY
In the works of T. Schelling and other deterrence
theorists, situations are analyzed where the steps
described in the scenarios of Western experts (inva-
sion, missile strikes) are not always the result of a uni-
lateral initiative. Sometimes this is a consequence of a
situation where the alleged aggressor finds itself in
conditions that it, for some reason, perceives as hope-
less for itself (Mazarr et al., 2018, pp. 1–2). There is
a risk of sliding into war due to actions that are origi-
nally designed to deter the aggressor (Schelling, 2008,
p. 225).
Deterrence as such is associated primarily with the
obstruction of the intention, which has already been
formed by a potential aggressor. Stability implies situ-
ations where neither side has an incentive for aggres-
sion, that is, the absence of a crisis. Consider a situa-
tion where Russia initially has no intention of either
invading or launching missile strikes. In this case, its
armed forces near the Baltics are built only to provide
protection against potential aggression from the alli-
ance. In the immediate vicinity are St. Petersburg, the
base of the Baltic Fleet in Kronstadt, and Kaliningrad
oblast, which is vulnerable to blockade. With this in
mind, will the strengthening of the theater missile
defense architecture by NATO in the Baltic countries
and Poland lead to tension?
On the one hand, this strengthening may not lead
to an aggravation of the situation. According to West-
ern experts, in the units of the armed forces of the Rus-
sian Federation near St. Petersburg, near the border
with Estonia and Latvia, as well as in Kaliningrad
oblast, there are a total of 33 batteries of air
defense/missile defense systems (S-300 and S-400).14
14Details are available in (Muzyka, 2021, pp. 39, 50).
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES Vol. 92 Suppl. 4 2022
THE INFLUENCE OF NATO REGIONAL S305
Comparable Patriot systems have not yet been
deployed in this subregion. In 2022, the delivery of two
Patriot batteries purchased by Poland is expected (Fri-
sel et al., 2021, p. 91). Germany already has these sys-
tems (up to 14 batteries) (Friesel et al., 2021, p. 103),
as does the United States (up to 12 batteries in Ger-
many). The other countries of the alliance have fewer
such missile defense systems. Thus, in total, NATO
has about 26 batteries theoretically available for a
quick transfer to the Baltic countries.15 Russia has a
numerical superiority in these systems in the subre-
gion under consideration. Based on this, it can be
assumed that a small addition of such complexes to the
area by NATO may not lead to tension. For example,
Russia practically did not react in any way to the pur-
chase of Patriot systems by Poland and Sweden.
At the same time, deployment of a larger number
(more than four batteries) of such systems to the area
in order to equalize the air and missile defense capa-
bilities of the parties can be perceived by Moscow as
preparation for more decisive actions or an attempt to
exert pressure.16 Then this will lead to pulling in addi-
tional Russian missiles to the region (Kühn, 2019:
158), including, possibly, hypersonic ones.17
Additional deployment of these offensive missiles
by Russia may be dictated by support for the concept
of nonnuclear deterrence. According to the military
doctrine of the Russian Federation of 2014, nonnu-
clear deterrence is a set of foreign policy, military, and
military–technical measures aimed at preventing
aggression against the Russian Federation by nonnu-
clear means.18 This includes “demonstration of readi-
ne ss to fulfil t he t hreat of cau sin g damage in ret aliato ry
or preemptive actions by nonnuclear means to the vital
interests and facilities of potential aggressor states,
which obviously exceeds the benefits from the imple-
mentation of aggression” (Burenok and Achasov,
2007, p. 12). As Western experts admit, theater missile
defense can limit or exclude some options for nonnu-
clear deterrence for Moscow at the regional level, in
particular, “violate the principle of ‘dosing’ and guar-
anteed fulfilment of assigned ‘de-escalatory’ activities”
(Johnson, 2017, p. 74). Overcoming air defense/mis-
15This scenario does not consider the possibility of pulling in
additional ships with Aegis systems and SM-2 and SM-6 inter-
ceptors to the Baltic Sea to cover ports, since the alleged pres-
ence of SLCMs makes them a priori a more de-stabilizing factor
than Patriot systems.
16For comparison, during the most dangerous periods of confron-
tation with Iran (May 2019 and March 2020), the United States
deployed only 1–3 additional batteries in the Middle East to
cover key facilities.
17The appearance of hypersonic weapons in the region during a
crisis in itself can de-stabilize the situation. Because when using
hypersonic missiles in a regional context, the opposing side (1)
has practically no time to react, (2) the target of these missiles is
unknown, and (3) the equipment of such missiles is not known
for certain, whether it is nuclear or nonnuclear.
18Military doctrine of the Russian Federation, November 2014,
p. 4.
sile defense is an important factor in ensuring nonnu-
clear deterrence (Kokoshin, 2014, p. 201).
Thus, two scenarios are possible. If the Russian
side is confident in the ability of its offensive missiles
already available near the Baltic to overcome NATO’s
regional missile defense systems to carry out nonnu-
clear deterrence, the likelihood of additional deploy-
ment of Russian offensive missiles in the region is
objectively reduced, as is the likelihood of escalation.
If there is no such confidence in Moscow (for exam-
ple, a low number of missiles), then the likelihood of
additional deployment of Russian missiles in the
region increases.
In a crisis situation, there is a high probability of
misunderstanding of each other’s intentions. There
may be fears in NATO about the Baltic states, and in
Moscow there may be fears about the possibility of
blockading Kaliningrad, even if neither is the inten-
tion of the respective party. Under these conditions,
the actions of any of them to pull in forces and capa-
bilities to the subregion will be interpreted precisely as
the preparation of aggression. So, the action–reaction
cycle will continue.
During a crisis, if the leadership of the Russian
Federation considers that the enemy is ready to deliver
a strike (including a limited one), then, within the
framework of the concept of nonnuclear deterrence, a
decision can be made to deliver “highly effective selec-
tive strikes, not associated with losses of population
and manpower of the enemy” (Burenok and Achasov,
2007, p. 13). Among the possible targets of these non-
nuclear strikes may be such objects in NATO countries
as ships and aircrafts with SLCMs and ALCMs, ships
with missile defense systems, radars (Ponomarev,
Poddubny and Polegaev, 2019, p. 100), ground-based
electronic intelligence centers, large ships of a similar
functions, communication and control centers
(Kokoshin, 2014, p. 201). The decision on demon-
stration strikes will be made only if the current situa-
tion is perceived as extremely dangerous, and then
the presence of missile defense systems at these
objects will not be able to deter the use of nonnuclear
missiles against them.
The volume of this article does not allow a full
study in this context of the factor of deployment of
short- and intermediate-range missiles in NATO
countries. For a more complete picture of the doc-
trines of both sides in the field of nonnuclear regional
deterrence, it is necessary to point out that the United
States also has a concept that provides for the use of
nonnuclear high-precision weapons against an enemy
prepared for a missile attack (left-of-launch measures
as part of missile defense strategy).19 It also applies to
regional missile defense.20 The employment of these
19Missile Defense Review, US Department of Defense, 2019, p. 60.
20US Missile Defense Policy, Prepared Remarks by Dr. Robert M.
Soofer before the Senate Armed Services Committee, June 9, 2021,
p. 2.
S306
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES Vol. 92 Suppl. 4 2022
KRIVOLAPOV
measures is possible both after the immediate start of
the conflict and before its start.21
CONCLUSIONS
Taking into account the analysis of the scenario of
the Russian offensive in the Baltics presented by West-
ern experts, the strengthening of NATO’s regional
missile defense system (including air defense/missile
defense) will not help deter the use of these nuclear-
armed missiles by Russia as a response to one of the
four conditions described in the Fundamentals of
Russian Policy in the field of nuclear deterrence
of 2020, and even as a response within the framework
of the Russia’s alleged escalate-to-de-escalate con-
cept. The positions of Western military officials and
civilian experts are not convincing here. At the same
time, such a strengthening of NATO’s theater missile
defense in most cases will help deter the use of nonnu-
clear missiles by Russia. Here, the views of representa-
tives of the military–political leadership and the
expert community of NATO countries are more well-
reasoned. However, it must be taken into account that,
in a situation where the potential of theater missile
defense exceeds the potential of offensive missiles, a
threat to regional stability is still created.
On the one hand, a large number of Russian air
defense/missile defense systems near the Baltic and
the low assessment of the effectiveness of NATO mis-
sile defense against Russian missiles may reduce the
likelihood of a sharp response from Moscow to
strengthening this missile defense system. On the
other hand, a comparison of the doctrinal provisions
of the United States and the Russian Federation in the
field of regional nonnuclear deterrence showed that a
significant strengthening of the air and missile defense
architecture (more than four additional batteries of the
Patriot systems) can be perceived in Moscow as a
preparation to counter its concept of nonnuclear
deterrence and demand additional deployment of mis-
sile systems to the subregion.
At the same time, Western experts and the mili-
tary–political leadership of NATO periodically repeat
that for the effectiveness of Russia’s regional deter-
rence, it is necessary not only to strengthen the theater
missile defense system, but also nonnuclear offensive
missiles with a range of less than 5500 km. Despite the
fact that both sides have the concept of preemptive
nonnuclear strikes against an enemy ready to attack,
and there is also a misunderstanding in the field of
nuclear doctrines of at least one of the parties (for
example, disputes about escalate-to-de-escalate), the
strengthening of the NATO regional missile defense
architecture (including air defense/missile defense)
21Unclassified Report to Congress, Declaratory Policy, Concept
of Operations, and Employment Guidelines for Left-of-Launch
Capability, U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
May 10, 2017, p. 1.
will rather have a negative effect on regional stability.
There is a risk of an action–reaction cycle in the area
of arms buildup in the region, and in the area of an
exchange of limited nonnuclear missile strikes against
the enemy. Thus, despite at first glance, the purely
defensive nature of theater missile defense systems,
these systems cannot be recognized as a reliable means
of stabilization in the region under consideration. This
means that there is no reasonable alternative for
strengthening the regional stability than arms control
options and transparency regimes.
FUNDING
This article was prepared within the project “The Post-
Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Compe-
tition and Cooperation” supported by the grant from
Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian
Federation program for research projects in priority areas of
scientific and technological development, Agreement no. 075-
15-2020-783.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The author declares that he has no conflicts of interest.
OPEN ACCESS
This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-
bution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or
format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images
or other third party material in this article are included in the
article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated other-
wise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included
in the article’s Creative Commons license and your intended
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly
from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
REFERENCES
Anderson, J. and McCue, J., (2021) Deterring, countering,
and defeating conventional-nuclear integration,
Strateg. Stud. Quart., vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 28‒60.
Brauß, H. and Rácz, A., (2021) Russia’s Strategic Interests
and Actions in the Baltic Region, Berlin: German Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations.
Burenok, V. and Achasov, O., (2007) Neyadernoye sder-
zhivaniye [Non-Nuclear Deterrence], Voennaya Mysl,
no. 12, pp. 12‒15.
Esin, V. (2017) Amerikanskaya i rossiyskaya sistemy protiv-
oraketnoy oborony i strategicheskaya stabil’nost’ [The
U.S. and Russian Missile Defense Systems and Strate-
gic Stability], Vestn. Moskov. Univ. Ser. 25. Mezhdun-
arod. Otnosh. Mir. Polit., no. 4, pp. 3‒41.
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES Vol. 92 Suppl. 4 2022
THE INFLUENCE OF NATO REGIONAL S307
Dvorkin, V. (2019) Vliyaniye sistem PRO na strategich-
eskuyu stabil’nost’ i per-spektivy yadernogo razoru-
zheniya [Impact of Missile Defense Systems on Strate-
gic Stability and Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament],
Mir. Ekon. Mezhdunarod. Otnosh., no 8, pp. 5‒12.
https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2019-63-8-5-12
Frisel, E.H., et al. (2021) Western Military Capability in
Northern Europe. Part II: National Capabilities, Stock-
holm: FOI.
Früling, S. (2016) Managing escalation: Missile defence,
strategy and US alliances, Int. Affairs, vol. 92, no. 1,
pp. 81‒95.
Hodges, B., Bugajski, J., Wojcik, R., and Schmiedl, C.
(2020) One Flank, One Threat, One Presence. A Strategy
for NATO’s Eastern Flank, Washington, DC: Center for
European Policy Analysis.
Johnson, D. (2017) Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike
Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds,
Livermore: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Karako, T. (2016) Looking East: European Air and Missile
Defense after Warsaw, Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic & International Studies.
Kaushal, S. (2019) A Critical Enabler for Power Projection:
Options for a UK Missile Defense Capability in an Age of
Escalation Control, London: Royal United Services In-
stitute.
Kelly, T., Gompert, D., and Long, D. (2017) Smarter Pow-
er, Stronger Partners, Vol. 2: Trends in Force Projection
Against Potential Adversaries, Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation.
Kofman, M., Fink, A., and Edmonds, J., Russian Strategy
for Escalation Management. Evolution of Key Concepts,
Arlington: CNA, 2020.
Kokoshin A. (2014) Strategicheskoe yadernoe i neyadernoe
sderzhivanie: prioritety sovremennoi epohi [Strategic
nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence: priorities of the
modern era] Vest nik RAN, vol. 84, no. 3, pp. 195‒205.
https://doi.org/10.7868/S0869587314030086
Kort, R., Bersabe, C., Clarke, D., and Di Bello, D. (2019)
Twenty-first century nuclear deterrence operationaliz-
ing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Joint Forces
Quart., no. 3 (94), pp. 74–79.
Krivolapov, O. (2021) Diskussii o roli amerikanskoy PRO
teatra voyennykh deystviy v regional’nom sderzhivanii
Rossii i Kitaya [Debates on the Role of the U.S. The-
ater Missile Defense in Regional Deterrence of Russia
and China], Vestn. Moskov. Univ. Ser. 25. Mezhdunarod.
Otnosh. Mir. Polit., no. 1, pp. 58‒84.
https://doi.org/10.48015/2076-7404-2021-13-1-58-84
Kroenig, M. (2018) A Strategy for Deterring Russian Nuclear
De-Escalation Strikes, Washington, DC: Atlantic Council.
Kühn, U. (2018) Preventing Escalation in the Baltic. A NATO
Playbook, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
Kühn, U. (2019) Between a rock and a hard place: Europe
in a post-INF world, The Nonproliferation Rev., vol. 26,
nos. 1–2, pp. 155–166.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2019.1593677
Mazarr, M., et al. (2018) What Deters and Why. Exploring
Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Ag-
gression, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
Muzyka, K., (2021) Russian Forces in the Western Military
District, Arlington: CNA.
Ponomarev, S., Poddubny, V., and Polegaev, V. (2019)
Kriterii i pokazateli ne-yadernogo sderzhivaniya: voy-
ennyy aspekt [Criteria and Indicators Of Non-Nuclear
Deterrence: Military Aspect], Voen. Mysl’, no. 11,
pp. 97‒100.
Rogov, S. (2021) Global and regional stability in the nucle-
ar world, Herald Russ. Acad. Sci., vol. 91, no. 3,
pp. 374–385.
https://doi.org/10.1134/S101933162103014X
Schelling, T. (2008) Arms and Influence, New Haven: Yale
Univ. Press.
Simon, L. and Lanoszka, A. (2020) The post-INF European
missile balance: thinking about NATO’s deterrence strat-
egy, Tex as Na t. S ecur it y R ev., vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 13‒30.
http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/10224
Thielmann, G. (2020) Incorporating missile defense in
strategic arms control, Deep Cuts Issue Brief, no. 12.
Williams, I. and Shaikh, S. (2020) The Missile War in Ye-
men, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & Interna-
tional Studies.
Zolotarev, P. (2019) Yadernyye aspekty voyennoy politiki i
rossiysko-amerikanskiye otnosheniya [Nuclear Aspects
of Military Policy and Russian–American relations],
Rossiya i Amerika v XXI Veke, no. 1. https://rusus.jes.su/
s207054760004694-0-1/. Cited June 12, 2020.
https://doi.org/10.18254/S207054760004694-0
Translated by S. Avodkova
