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Spinoza, legal theory, and artificial intelligence: a conceptual analysis of law and technology

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Moa De Lucia Dahlbeck
Moa De Lucia Dahlbeck
Moa De Lucia Dahlbeck
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Abstract

This paper sets out to show the relevance of Benedict Spinoza’s (1632–1677) views on law to the contemporary legal discourse on law and technology. I will do this by using some of the reactions toward the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in legal practices as illustrative examples of the continued relevance of the debate on law’s nature with which Spinoza was concerned in the fourth chapter of the Theological Political Treatise. I will argue that the problem of how to make laws efficient is being manifested in legal debates on how to regulate social and scientific practices that involve the use of certain—especially advanced—AI. As such, these debates are based on the idea that AI technology complicates the valid application of law in so far as it challenges the legal idea of the individual who corresponds with the unlimited legal subject. This complication is manifested, for instance, when we consider the rule of law criteria (predictability and transparency) for valid law-making and application in light of the fact that self-learning machines and autonomous AI hold an intentionality that lies beyond the scope of the lawmaker’s cognition. My discussion will lead to the suggestion that Spinoza’s legal theory may help us make sense of the problems perceived by legal discourses on AI and law as illustrations of a conceptual paradox embedded within the concept of law, rather than problems caused by the technological development of new forms of intentionalities.
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Vol.:(0123456789)
SN Soc Sci (2022) 2:156
https://doi.org/10.1007/s43545-022-00458-w
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Spinoza, legal theory, andartificial intelligence:
aconceptual analysis oflaw andtechnology
MoaDeLuciaDahlbeck1
Received: 17 March 2022 / Accepted: 22 July 2022 / Published online: 9 August 2022
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022
Abstract
This paper sets out to show the relevance of Benedict Spinoza’s (1632–1677) views
on law to the contemporary legal discourse on law and technology. I will do this by
using some of the reactions toward the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in legal
practices as illustrative examples of the continued relevance of the debate on law’s
nature with which Spinoza was concerned in the fourth chapter of the Theologi-
cal Political Treatise. I will argue that the problem of how to make laws efficient is
being manifested in legal debates on how to regulate social and scientific practices
that involve the use of certain—especially advanced—AI. As such, these debates
are based on the idea that AI technology complicates the valid application of law
in so far as it challenges the legal idea of the individual who corresponds with the
unlimited legal subject. This complication is manifested, for instance, when we con-
sider the rule of law criteria (predictability and transparency) for valid law-making
and application in light of the fact that self-learning machines and autonomous AI
hold an intentionality that lies beyond the scope of the lawmaker’s cognition. My
discussion will lead to the suggestion that Spinoza’s legal theory may help us make
sense of the problems perceived by legal discourses on AI and law as illustrations
of a conceptual paradox embedded within the concept of law, rather than problems
caused by the technological development of new forms of intentionalities.
Keywords Artificial intelligence· Legal subject· Self-learning machines· Spinoza
and law· AI and law
* Moa De Lucia Dahlbeck
modelucia@uade.edu.ar
1 Universidad Argentina de la Empresa (UADE), Lima 775, C1073CABA, Argentina
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
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