Social insecurity of water in (South) African cities

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CHAPTER 6
SOCIAL INSECURITY OF WATER IN (SOUTH) AFRICAN
CITIES
Mafaniso Hara, Bongani Ncube and Darlington Sibanda
Figure 6.0 Khayelitsha, an informal settlement in Cape Town, South Africa
(photo: O Ernst CC BY-SA 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Khayelitsha,_Baden_Powell_Drive_(South_Africa).jpg)

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6.1 INTRODUCTION
Urbanisation is a growing challenge all over the world. In former colonies (Africa, Southeast
Asia, and South America), cities are increasingly attracting people from rural areas who come
in search of jobs in the formal economy, better economic opportunities, and improved
lifestyles. In South Africa, the removal of the apartheid era influx controls has meant that black
South Africans are no longer temporary residents in cities, but citizens who have equal rights
to cities and therefore have greater degrees of freedom to establish their own homes within or
outside of the ambit of the state and/or the residential property market in cities (Bhan, 2016,
Napier, 2013, Royston, 2013, Thompson and Tapela, 2018). The implications and
consequences of this have been an increased number of households in urban areas and a
hyper-growth in the demand for housing and social services. The state (particularly
municipalities and local government), as a result, struggles to deliver services to meet these
burgeoning needs and demands. In South Africa, the net effect has been an increase in
backlogs of historically disadvantaged individuals/households trapped on waiting lists or
databases awaiting service delivery or state-funded housing, and/or dependent on informal
rental and tenure markets. For example, Thompson and Tapela (2019) point out that between
2001 and 2011, formal dwellings increased from 68% to 78% and informal dwellings
decreased only slightly from 16% to 14%. On the other hand, the South African Institute of
Race Relations, (SAIRR, 2017) argue that informal dwellings also increased from 1 453 018
in 1996 to 2 193 968 in 2016, a growth of 51%. Bore-Saladin and Turok (2013) point out that
1 in 5 households in metros live in shacks, and the Cape Metro (Cape Town) had the biggest
increase (53%) in such informal dwellings followed by the Johannesburg Metro (17%). These
figures mask the actual prevalence of informality, with regard to access to services such as
water and sanitation that are linked to dwellings in urban areas, due to rapid urbanisation.
While metros show the greatest increase in the informality of housing and tenure, findings
show that this urbanisation trend is spreading to non-metropolitan cities and towns and smaller
towns across South Africa (Thompson and Tapela, 2019). Once people move into urban
areas, the next step is trying to “move up the ladder”, which includes access to free
government housing, informal settlement upgrades, formalisation of tenure and tenure
security (Hornby et al., 2017). For residents living under informal tenure, infrastructure
upgrades provide the opportunity to link housing upgrades with secure and improved water
and sanitation as part of a progressive realisation of their Constitutional (human) rights to
secure access to water and sanitation services. Unfortunately, the reality is that cities find
themselves continuously struggling to provide space and services. In a study on the impacts
of urban land use planning for climate adaptation, Anguelovski et al. (2016, 336) found that ‘in
a comparison of eight cities land use planning interventions for adaptation can
disproportionately impact low income and minority groups by creating or exacerbating different
forms of socio-spatial inequality.’
During times of drought and water stress the poor and vulnerable communities are usually the
hardest hit. We argue for the importance of a spatial planning approach that takes cognisance

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of the importance of the rights of the urban poor, marginalised and vulnerable citizens in terms
of addressing their rights, tenure and access to water and sanitation by decision-makers in
cities.
6.1.1 Water Insecurity and Our Assumptions
Our contention is that the problem of water insecurity for the urban poor is a social issue. The
problem, therefore, is not only prevalent during times of water shortages in cities, but is ever-
present. Thus, the adage of “social scarcity of water” (Tapela, 2012) is an apt descriptive
reference for this existing situation regarding water for the poor in cities. The disjuncture
between people’s basic water requirements and the inability of water service agencies (e.g.
local government) to fulfil this basic requirement for the poor is largely a social-political product
and governance issue, the result of which is the social exclusion of the marginal urban
populations. This exclusion is influenced by the political, economic, and power dynamics
underpinning the institutions that structure social relations, rights, and access to water. Thus,
water social insecurity revolves around issues of inequality (social, economic, and political),
governance and governing systems (formal and informal), markets, transparency and
accountability, and systems of rights and tenure.
We base our arguments mainly on the political economy of access to water and water
provision services in cities, particularly in developing countries. We use the City of Cape Town
in South Africa, where water scarcity and the threat of ‘Day Zero’ recently made global
headlines, as our case study. Generally, it is useful to look at what drives the water insecurity
for the poor in post-colonial cities, and the persistently skewed spatial planning and resource
allocation related to water and sanitation. What role does policy play in the provision and
distribution of water in cities, and who meaningfully participates in policy development and
water governance? What role can regional and global conventions (e.g. SDGs, and the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) water protocol) play in national policy
development processes and equitable access to water?
6.1.2 Policy and Legislation for Water Provision in South Africa
One of the key aims of South Africa’s flagship National Development Plan (2012) was to
eliminate poverty and reduce inequality. Access to water and sanitation were important factors
contributing to the achievement of these aims. With the recognition of the need to address
inequality, South Africa also revised the National Water Resource Strategy 2 (NWRS2 2013)
with the major focus on ‘sustainable, equitable and secure water for a better life and
environment for all.’ Unfortunately, the NWRS2 also failed to bring water to those who are
resource-poor (Hedden and Cilliers, 2014). The government then came up with a Water and
Sanitation Master Plan (2019) which is a “Call to Action” document that sets out the critical
priorities to be addressed by the water sector in the period from 2018 to 2030. The “Call to
Action” provides the basis for, and a more detailed analysis of, the key issues and Schedule
of Actions. Water experts believe, though, that the government and stakeholders in the water

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sector cannot achieve the plan alone, nor by trying to manage the proposed actions in the
traditional top-down approach.
The provincial government of the Western Cape developed its own Western Cape Sustainable
Water Management Plan (2017-2022). Unfortunately, the 2014-2018 drought left the Province
and the city of Cape Town reeling under severe water shortages. One of the glaring causes
for the failed management of the water shortage crisis was the lack of integrated planning
between the provincial government, the city and the national government (Enqvist and
Ziervogel, 2019). The result was a blame game that remains unresolved, although efforts were
made to find joint solutions when the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS), in
partnership with the Western Cape Government, hosted a high-level Water Indaba in 2017
(GreenAgri, 2017). After the drought, the City of Cape Town became more aggressive in
dealing with water issues. The Strategic Water Vision for the City states that ‘Cape Town will
be a water sensitive city by 2040 that optimizes and integrates the management of water
resources to improve resilience, competitiveness and liveability for the prosperity of its people’
(City of Cape Town, 2019).
While the principles spelt out in the City of Cape Town’s Water Vision mention ‘inclusivity’ and
‘work together across boundaries’ explicitly, the city remains starkly divided (Enqvist and
Ziervogel, 2019). Access to services such as water and sanitation remain heavily skewed, with
informal settlements and backyard dwellers at the bottom of the water ladder. The big
question, therefore, is: What mechanisms, regarding access to water and sanitation services
(within the mix of formal and informal tenure arrangements) in cities, will ensure that the urban
poor and marginalised are included?
6.1.3 (Global) Water Vision for 2050
Global effort towards addressing access to water and sanitation, and ensuring sustainable
development, has been ongoing for several decades. The United Nations (UN) declared the
period 1981-1990 as the International Drinking Water supply and Sanitation Decade. In 1987,
the United Nations Commission on Environment and Development defined sustainable
development as “development that meets the needs of the present while safeguarding Earth's
life-support system, on which the welfare of current and future generations depends” (UNCED,
1987, 16). This subsequently led to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) whose water
aspects were based on the Dublin Principles (Brown, 2010). Water and sanitation were
embedded in MDG 7 (Ensure Environmental Sustainability) with the main target being to
reduce by 50% the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and
basic sanitation.
The year 2015 saw the commissioning of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, with
the goals for water and cities being entrenched in SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation) and
SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities). An important fact raised by the United Nations
Development Programme in South Africa (UNDPSA) is that SDGs are integrated, meaning

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that they recognise that action in one area will affect outcomes in others and that development
must balance social, economic and environmental sustainability (United Nations no date).
Goal 6 of the SDGs seeks to ensure the availability and sustainable management of water
and sanitation for all. Goal 11 also seeks to make cities and human settlements inclusive,
safe, resilient, and sustainable. In addition, Goal 5 (Gender Equality) and Goal 16 (Peace,
Justice and Strong Institutions) are also central to the way that communities live. All these
goals underpin the importance of involving everyone, including the urban poor and women.
Both the MDGs and SDGs emphasised poverty eradication, access to clean water and
inclusion of the urban poor. The MDGs showed that a goal-setting approach raised both public
and policy support and channelled funds effectively towards urgent global problems, but the
challenge was to encourage politicians to have the political will to go beyond the goals that
had been set (Griggs et al., 2014). The SDGs are included in most national governments’
policies, including South Africa. Nations are required to report on their achievement of the
targets and indicators in the goals (Global Change, 2014).
6.1.4 Conceptual Framework
We use the ‘Hydro-social Contract’ (Lundqvuist et al., 2001) (Figure 6.1) as the key conceptual
framework for analysing and understanding the social insecurity issues around the provision
of water and sanitation in cities.
Figure 6.1 The Hydro-social contract (adapted from Lundqvuist, 2001)
A ‘hydro-social contract’ refers to an implicit contract that exists between the State, Society
and Markets (Lundqvuist, 2001). The term refers to the pervading values and often-implicit

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agreements between communities, governments and business on how water should be
managed for the benefit of everyone. Turton and Meissner (2002, 2) define the hydro-social
contract as:
The unwritten contract that exists between the public and the government that comes
into existence when the individual is no longer capable of mobilizing sufficient water for
their own personal survival, and that acts as a mandate by which the government
ultimately takes on and executes this responsibility. This hydro-social contract thus acts
as the basis for institutional development, and also determines what the public deems to
be fair and legitimate practice such as the desire for ecological sustainability, to which
politicians react.
For South Africa the right to minimum basic water and sanitation are enshrined in the
Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996) and the National Water Act (Republic of South
Africa, 1998), thereby actualising the hydro social contract in law. The hydro-social framework
is useful in defining the key elements that require scrutinisation when analysing the social-
political issues in relation to water and sanitation delivery for the poor and marginalised in
urban societies. It is, however, important to note that the framework assumes de-politicisation
of the issues and the implementation approach, which is far from reality. For example, the
South African hydro-social contract is certainly not neutral – having been moulded by a
racially-based historical political economy that governed resource allocation (Thompson and
Tapela, 2019). Therefore, historical water provision for blacks under apartheid was not
apolitical or de-politicised. In effect, the black democratic government had also to try to deal
with the backlog in the provision of water and services for blacks who had been marginalised,
thereby also politicising the “contract”. Given this political history, the complexity of dealing
with equity in water allocation and service delivery should not be under-estimated. Equally,
the colonial history in most developing countries has resulted in class stratification, which also
politicises and skews resource allocation and service delivery in urban areas. In this chapter,
the conceptual point of departure in understanding the hydro-social contract is that there are
unequal power relations underlying the exercising of rights and responsibilities, and also that
the framework is not value-free in terms of ethics, principles, ideologies, interests and
motivations. The hydro-social contract is transacted through the socio-ecological fabric of
space through time. Space, in this context, refers to the linkages between land, housing, water
resources, water and sanitation infrastructure and social-economic-political institutions that
are crafted by the state, markets and society (Thompson and Tapela, 2019; Cleaver, 2012).
Recognition of tenure is key-most among the common denominators that determine the
patterns by which citizenry practically negotiates and attains (or does not attain) secure access
to water and sanitation services (Thompson and Tapela, 2019).
6.2 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH USED
This chapter uses a case study approach so as to understand the challenges of water
provision for the poor within cities. Cape Town City is presented as the key case study. We

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also use three other African cities, namely Harare, Lusaka and Nairobi to draw lessons from
the African context. The summary case study texts of the four African cities are given below.
We also draw lessons from these case studies, and provide recommendations at the end of
the chapter.
6.3 CAPE TOWN
Cape Town is located in the Western Cape Province, South Africa. Like most urban areas in
South Africa, Cape Town was faced with two main challenges after 1994: to overcome spatial
divisions created during the colonial and apartheid era, while at the same time addressing the
endemic poverty that these divisions had produced for over three centuries (Swilling and de
Wit, 2010). According to Swilling (2010), nearly half of Cape Town has been built in the last
25 years. This is despite the fact that there is a huge challenge regarding ‘availability of and
access to, suitable and well-located land for integrated human settlements’ (City of Cape
Town, 2013/2014: 18).
The population of the City grew by almost 30% in a ten-year period from 2 893 240 in 2001 to
3 740 026 according to the 2011 Census (Statistics South Africa, 2011). Recent estimates by
the City of Cape Town indicate that the population may reach 4 232 276 by 2023 (Western
Cape Provincial Government, 2017). A significant portion of population growth is attributed to
in-migration from other provinces as well as other countries (Statistics South Africa, 2019).
Access to water services has improved for most of the population in the city. For instance, the
2011 Census indicated that 75.8% of the population had access to water inside their houses,
which was a growth of 5.7% from the 2001 Census. Unfortunately, the lack of accurate data
and the complex mushrooming of informal settlements paints a different picture of the real
situation on the ground (Sibanda and Tapela, 2016).
Access to water services remains skewed due to the legacy of racial inequality (Enqvist and
Ziervogel, 2019). Informal settlements remain sites of deprivation, despite the fact that their
inhabitants use fairly small quantities of water compared to other water users. Table 6.1 shows
water usage in the City of Cape Town by category in 2017.
Even at the height of the drought, informal settlements used only 3.6% of all water supply in
the city. The bulk of the water was used by formal settlements (houses), followed by retail and
offices.

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Table 6.1 City of Cape Town water use in 2017 (City of Cape Town 2017)
CATEGORY 2015/2016% 2016/2017%
Houses (formal) 55.6 55.0
Flats and complexes 9.2 9.5
Domestic other 1.8 1.8
Informal settlements 4.7 3.6
Retail and offices 11.0 12.8
Industry 3.9 4.2
City-owned facilities and departments 5.2 4.9
Government 2.5 2.2
Other 6.2 6.0
6.4 HARARE
According to the 2012 population census, Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe, had a
population of 2 123 132 people residing in the city (Zimbabwe National Statistic Agency,
2012). The population with access to safe drinking water was pegged at about 94% during the
census. However, the situation on the ground paints a completely different picture. In 2008,
Harare was struck by one of the worst cholera outbreaks ever recorded in the city. Studies in
2015 revealed that the outbreak was explicitly linked to ‘an array of socio-material processes
(particularly the collapse of Zimbabwe’s public health and hydraulic infrastructures); the
failures of urban governance; the electoral violence of 2008; economic strategies of survival;
and to the arbitrary, spectacular and violent actions of the state’ (Chigudu, 2019, 182). A
number of alternative water sources were provided to combat the cholera outbreak. However,
Manzungu and Chiroreso (2012), found that the water sources used by a household were
related to the household's socioeconomic status, with low-income households using less
expensive sources of water like shallow and deep wells that were largely unprotected and
unsafe.
Harare, like other major urban centres in Zimbabwe, has a history of evictions and the
demolition of informal settlements, which has resulted in citizens being moved to what are
termed ‘emerging settlements.’ A case in point is Hopley Farm in the city, where residents,
especially the poor, are described as ‘the underclass who are denied their right to the city
through displacement, dispossession of their land, and exclusion in accessing formal service’
(Matamatanda, 2020, 485). The settlement lacks running water and sanitary services.
Residents improvise in order to access water, resorting to unsafe water sources such as
shallow wells. In some instances, access to clean water is charged at USD1 per day, an
amount that the poor cannot afford to pay (Matamatanda, 2020, 480).

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6.5 LUSAKA
Lusaka Province, in which the capital city of Zambia (Lusaka) is located, had a projected
population of about 3.36 million by 2020 (Zambia Central Statistical Office, 2012). The
increase in the population has been accompanied by an increase in water demand, as in any
other big city. In the late 1980s, Zambia implemented reforms for the commercialisation and
privatisation of water and sanitation services. Families in low-cost housing were to pay less
than those in higher-income housing. However, the unintended consequences of this were
that, although the water tariffs were low, they were still unaffordable for the majority of the
residents. As a result, the quality of water and access to safe water in the urban sector has
declined. Poor households rely on public taps, boreholes, and wells rather than water supplied
through residential pipes (Dagdeviren 2008). Most of the residents depend on the shallow
wells because of their proximity and lower costs. As a result, there are increased incidences
of water-borne diseases among residents who use such water (Levy et al., 2017). Poor
sanitation is also directly related to poor water quality. For example, Kennedy-Walker et al.
(2015) found that ‘the level of sanitation access, safe management of excreta, sanitation
service provision and associated knowledge in Peri-Urban Areas (PUAs) of Lusaka was poor.’
Sixty percent of the population resides in these areas, and 90% of them use pit latrines
(Kennedy-Walker et al., 2015).
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, Zambia has embarked on water sector reforms to
‘address a number of challenges including the poor institutional and legal framework,
deterioration of water and sanitation services, inadequate human resource capacity, low
coverage of water and sanitation services, inadequate stakeholder and community
participation, limited and ever-decreasing capital investments, and the need to adapt to
emerging international trends in water management’ (Chitonge, 2011, 3). The Zambian water
governance system has remained highly sectorial however, with insufficient institutional and
legal frameworks and mechanisms to ensure the equitable provision of water and sanitation.
The structure is centralised and lacks effective stakeholder participation (Uhlendahl et al.,
2011), resulting in large sections of the population remaining without safe water and sanitation
services.
6.6 NAIROBI
Due to rapid urbanisation, the City of Nairobi is expected to spill into neighbouring peri-urban
areas thereby becoming a metropolis. Nairobi is an economic hub for East Africa and had a
population of 4.7 million in 2020. The population is growing rapidly at over 3.5% annually12
due to rural-urban migration. It has the largest population density in Kenya at 4 515 per square
kilometre (National Council for Population and Development NCPD, 2013). Besides the major
water supply deficit, Nairobi faces unpredictable droughts and flooding. According to the Smith
School of Enterprise and the Environment (2014), the city’s current water supply is 23% lower
12 (https://www.macrotrends.net/cities/21711/nairobi/population

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(170 000 m3/day) than water demand, and this is expected to increase to a 63% deficit by
2035. Non-revenue water is as high as 42% due to aging infrastructure and illegal connections
(Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, 2014). Due to the insufficient and unreliable
supply, most households and enterprises invest in alternative sources of water supply.
Estimates indicate that of the over 3 500 boreholes located in Nairobi County in 2014, less
than half (47%) had abstraction permits, nearly two thirds (63%) were unmetered, and four in
five (78%) users did not pay for water (Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment ,2014).
In addition, because of informal settlements relying on pit latrines, groundwater is
contaminated and largely unsafe for domestic use.
Figure 6.2 Shared pit latrines such as this one in Mathare, Nairobi are often sources of
groundwater pollution
(photo: SuSanA Secretariat CC BY 2.0 via Wikimedia Commons
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Shared_toilet_facility_in_Mathare_(Nairobi)_(5163671304).jpg)
Nairobi has also seen a proliferation of informal water markets. A recent study found that more
than half of the residents in Mathare, a large informal settlement, accessed water from informal
water vendors and about 36% of households depended exclusively on them. Unfortunately,
the water quality was inconsistent, and the water sometimes tasted bad (Sarkar, 2020)

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6.7 CAUSES OF WATER SOCIAL INSECURITY
The causes of water insecurity in cities such as Cape Town (and most other African cities) are
the result of historical and economic dispossession, governance problems, informal
economies, lack of recognition of ‘the right to the city’ for the poor, and unfulfillment of the
hydro-social contract.
6.7.1 Historical Socio-Economic Dispossession
The perpetuation of social, economic and political inequality in South Africa is a result of the
colonial past, apartheid and neoliberal policies post 1994. Here, we draw on Marxist (Marx
1867) ideas and notions of “accumulation by dispossession” in our analysis of water
governance regimes (e.g. Bond, 2012 and Loftus, 2007 for South Africa, and Swyngedouw,
1997 more generally). The apartheid regime was based on policies that dispossessed the
rights and resources of blacks for accumulation by whites. This was on a grander and more
brazen scale than the colonial project. Although a lot has been achieved in terms of water
delivery for the poor since the institution of democracy in 1994, the continuation with neoliberal
policies after 1994 has resulted in stalled progress and an increase in problems of service
delivery. Policies such as “full cost recovery” and, “ring-fenced financing” have prevented the
achievement of the government’s policy on free basic water for all, which was based on
progressive social protection thinking. This has resulted in the state’s inability to deliver on its
Constitutional obligations (Republic of South Africa, 1996) and legislative mandate (National
Water Act 1998). As Linton and Budds (2014) remind us, ‘water flows towards power and
money’, and even more so under globalisation and ‘economic efficiency’ principles. The poor
cannot compete with the well-to-do and politically powerful on equal terms, especially in South
Africa, which is one of the most unequal societies in the world. According to Li (2009), the
current policies in South Africa amount to ‘let live and let die’ and limit our ability to think
differently about water security and how best to achieve sustainable, equitable and efficient
water access for every citizen in the whole society.
There is a need to understand how we got to the current situation. On the eve of the first non-
racial democratic elections in 1994, an estimated 1.06 million households, comprising 7.7
million people, already lived in informal settlements. The socio-political control wielded through
state-driven, racial discrimination under apartheid firmly entrenched the underlying South
African urban structural form. The apartheid era policy implications weigh heavily on the
current relationship between the state, citizenship and space (Robinson, 1997). The unequal
access to water services was inherited from colonialism and apartheid. The hastened
urbanisation post-1994 only reinforced and made worse a situation that was already bad as a
result of the spatial segregation ruthlessly instituted and enforced under apartheid (OECD,
2011). Davis (2006: 60-61) postulated that Malan (2000) had painted a bleak and rather
pessimistic picture of the rapid rate of urbanisation in Cape Town soon after 1994, and how
this related to the provision of water and other services:

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After…the hated pass laws were scrapped, it was as if a distant dam had broken,
allowing a mass of desperate and hopeful humanity to come flooding over the
mountains and spread out across the Cape Flats. They came at the rate of eighty,
ninety families a day, and built homes with their bare hands, using wooden poles, tin
sheeting, bits and pieces of trash rescued from landfills and plastic garbage bags to
keep out the rain. Within two years, the sand dunes had vanished under an enormous
sea of shacks and shanties, as densely packed as a mediaeval city, and populated
by fantastic characters-bootleggers, gangsters, prophets, Rastafarians, gun dealers
and marijuana czars, plus almost a million ordinary people.
Another dimension which has seen tremendous growth in South African cities, and to some
extent other African countries, is the backyard housing sub-sector. The 2011 national census
indicated that the proportion of backyard renters grew by 32% between 2001 and 2011, to
constitute 25% of all households (SALGA, 2013). Given this massive and unplanned growth
in informal housing and demand for water, sanitation and other services, the number of people
utilising toilets, taps, drains and cooking facilities on specific sites across neighbourhoods can
stretch the carrying capacity of the existing infrastructure. Here, as in any informal urban
setting, the importance of informal water economies becomes obvious. Thus, self-dug
wells/boreholes, informal vendors and sharing of water become important in the provision of
water. The numbers and proportions of people joining this informal water economy are
therefore bound to have increased massively with increased urbanisation. It is no wonder then,
that the last decade has seen growing unrest and violent demonstrations against the lack of,
and/or poor service delivery in South Africa (Tapela et al., 2015, Sibanda, 2018). Despite the
aforementioned, formal households used the lion’s share (55%) of the water in Cape Town in
the 2016/2017 financial year. Retail businesses and offices were the second-biggest water
consumer at 12.8%, and informal settlements used only about 3.6% (see Table 6.1).
Research findings by Sibanda (2018) indicated that informality leads to poor access to water
and sanitation services. This is because the ‘package’ of services is normally linked to formal
property titles. In some cases, municipalities do not provide services to informal settlements
on private land or disputed tenure settlements (Sibanda, 2018). The quality of water services
is also affected by the geographic location of some of the informal settlements. Taing’s (2017)
research in Cape Town showed that officials preferred providing informal settlements with un-
sewered sanitation because the conditions of the ground on which the settlement is located
were not ideal due to various reasons. Among these reasons were the high capital costs for
construction of new sewer and treatment plants, and the fact that informal settlement
occupants might interpret this as the granting of official tenure rights. This is also the case with
water services.
The blanket approach to water and sanitation services delivery which the state followed after
1994 ignored serious pertinent issues for people in different tenure arrangements (Sibanda,
2018). It is important to address questions such as: how do the rights to adequate housing,

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water and sanitation coalesce or contradict each other? And, given that tenure arrangements
are fluid and complex in urban and rural settings, how do they impact other rights such as
basic services?
In other African cities, for example, Harare, Lusaka and Nairobi, the growth in the number of
self-dug wells/boreholes is a response to a deepening water crisis (Manzungu and Chioreso,
2012). The ability of households to respond to these dire situations is however dependent on
the socioeconomic status of the households, which means that the situation for poor
households is usually very precarious. Lack of basic services has sometimes been blamed on
the ‘informality’ of informal settlements in regard to the legality (or illegality) of such dwellings.
For example, for Kibera, one of the largest informal settlements in Africa, Mutisya and Yarime
(2011: 203) state that “the Kenyan government owns all the land on which Kibera stands,
though it continues to not officially acknowledge the settlement, no basic services, schools,
clinics, running water or lavatories are publicly provided. The services that do exist are
privately owned.” For the government, the whole settlement is ‘illegal’.
Even beyond the problematic land-water legalities, strict legal approaches and policy
formulations on water service delivery easily result in criminalization that hits the poor hardest.
The question becomes: ‘What forms of policy review and (gendered) government support
could stimulate whatever works, and prevent negative excesses in water governance and
service delivery?’ Royston and Narsoo (2006) allude to this fact by stating that invisibility and
lack of recognition carry the risk of side-lining many vulnerable people, households, and
communities from development opportunities.
6.7.2 Governance Challenges
Governance is overwhelmingly viewed as the exercise of political, economic, administrative
and legal authority in the management of a nation's affairs (World Bank, 1994, Killian, 2020)
or the politico-administrative way of public policy-making, reforming and organising (OECD,
2019, Bang and Esmark, 2013). African cities are dynamic and therefore need adaptive
governance to accommodate rapid urbanisation and population growth, so as to enable ‘social
mobility’ among the poor (Turok, 2012). In addition, in the context of shared water sources –
as is the case in informal settlements in most cities in South Africa and most African cities –
the issues and questions are: ‘What type of access rights exist?’, ‘Who controls access?’,
‘What are the rules for access?’, ‘Who makes and changes the rules?’, ‘How are the rules
enforced?’, etc. Although boundaries (physical, social, economic, political, etc.) influence and
determine who can access a particular service and at which times (Ostrom, 2013), the role of
unwritten socioeconomic boundaries is far more important in informal settlements (Manzungu
and Chioreso, 2012, Cleaver, 2012). In some instances, access to water for tenants renting in
someone’s house might depend on the rules that the landlord put in place (Sibanda, 2018).
Sharing water points such as community standpipes can involve a complex mix of rules and
processes, with control to some standpipes exercised by the use of a lock that indicates
restricted access, or some form of access arrangements (Sibanda, 2018, Tapela et al., 2015).

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After 1994, South Africa embarked on legislative and policy reviews, resulting in instruments
such as the National Water Act (1998), the Water Services Act (1997), the National Water
Resource Strategies 1 (2004) and 2 (2013) and water allocation reforms (2008 and 2011).
The main objectives of these instruments were to give mandate and effect for water
governance that culminated in the Water and Sanitation Master Plan (2019), which provides
for:
භ Universal and equitable access to reliable water supply and sanitation services;
භ Protection, management and development of the nation’s water resources in a
manner that supports justifiable and ecologically sustainable economic and social
development; and
භ Transformation of access to water to redress the racial imbalances created by
apartheid.
Figure 6.3 Issues of access to, and control of shared water resources in informal
settlements – such as this community standpipe in Khayelitsha, South Africa – are often
complex
(photo: Justmee3001 CC BY-SA 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Washing_clothe.jpg)

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Despite all of these internationally acclaimed policies and legislative instruments, South Africa
is still struggling to provide equitable water and sanitation services to the poor, in both the rural
and urban areas. The Water and Sanitation Master Plan (2019) proposes a paradigm shift that
includes the recognition that, in order to achieve water security, there will be a need to “ensure
equitable access to the limited water resources and to deliver reliable water and sanitation
services to all.” According to Winter (2019), the master plan unfortunately does not go far
enough to address the impending water crisis, and he further stated that ‘the DWS and
stakeholders in the water sector cannot achieve the plan alone or by trying to manage the
proposed actions in the traditional top-down approach. The challenge is too big’.
The Policy Draft for the City of Cape Town (2013) acknowledges that, ‘although the City has
made good progress in decreasing the service delivery gap in informal settlements, the
organic growth and form of informal settlements, makes it difficult to provide municipal utility
services such as water, sanitation, electricity and waste removal at the required minimum
basic national standards’. In addition, the City claims that ‘informal settlements are
characterised by lack of formal tenure, lack of public space and public facilities, inadequate
access to municipal services, and non-compliance with planning and building regulations’. The
situation is similar to cities such as Lusaka, Harare and Nairobi, although the historical and
political narratives may be different (Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019).
One of the problems in South Africa is the dual, overlapping and sometimes unclear
governance mandates for water resources and water and sanitation services. These cause
persistent confusion between the national Department of Water and Sanitation and the cities.
For example, water resources management is a function of the national government, while
water services provision is a function of municipalities (and cities) and local government. The
Cape Town Water Supply Systems are located outside the jurisdiction of the city since the
system is governed by the DWS. In times of crisis like the recent 2017/18 drought, the DWS
response was slow and while the City of Cape Town might have needed to take greater
responsibility for urgent action, they were limited by their legislative mandate (Ziervogel, 2019).
Thus, during the threat of Day Zero in Cape Town, ‘officials’ frustration with DWS included
delayed responses including announcements of restrictions and delays in funding
infrastructure projects as well as national government’s lack of leadership on the drought’
(Ziervogel, 2019, 12). Other areas of confusion include unclear regulatory and governance
mandates for alternative water sources, such as the authorisations required for boreholes and
rainwater harvesting.
In Zimbabwe, the provision of water services in cities was a traditional function of
municipalities, but political play started to interfere with the systems. Manzungu and Chioreso
(2012: 121-122) reiterate:
Because national government wanted to take over control of revenue from the
profitable water account, it (the central government) took over the provision of water

155
and sanitation services in local authorities in the early- to mid-2000s. The decision by
the government to return water and sanitation to local authorities in February 2009,
provided yet another twist in the relationship between central and local government.
The new councils that were elected in March 2008, found themselves saddled with a
giant malfunctioning water and sewer reticulation system.
Thus, the political play between the central government and municipalities has resulted in the
total destruction of the water and sanitation system and has led to untold suffering, especially
for the poor and marginalised. The Zimbabwe Peace Project Fact Sheet 2 (2019) says SDG
Goal 6 ‘remains a pipe dream unless there is more commitment and political will on the part
of local and central government to improve the situation.’
6.7.3 Need to Recognise Informal Water Economies
In cities, it is the poor who are affected most by continued water insecurity. It is important to
start recognising the growth in informal water economies in any urban setting. Self-dug
wells/boreholes (Figure 6.4), informal water vendors and sharing of water could well provide
for more than half of all users, certainly for those without proper access to public supplies (and
those who cannot easily afford public water). Both these numbers and the proportions are
bound to continue to increase with the growing and projected future urbanisation. In Harare
for instance, the failure by the City to provide portable water has resulted in many households
drilling their own boreholes and selling water to those who are in need, and can afford it (Nhapi,
2009, Manzungu and Chioreso, 2012). Similar examples are found in Dar es Salaam (Smiley,
2013), Nairobi (Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, 2014) and Lusaka
(Dagdeviren, 2008).
For Cape Town, Ziervogel (2019) argues that a ‘systems approach’ is required. For instance,
during the drought in Cape Town ‘many citizens and organisations installed their own “micro”-
water sources, including boreholes, rainwater tanks and greywater systems’ (Ziervogel, 2019:
17 and Figure 6.4). Even beyond the problematic land-water legalities, strict legal approaches
on water service delivery easily end up in criminalisation that hits the poor hardest. A good
example is the need to register boreholes in the City of Cape Town as well as the national
Department of Water and Sanitation (2018) guidelines for all borehole and WellPoint use
gazetted and effective from 12th January 2018. The question therefore remains – what forms
of (gendered) government support could stimulate whatever works and prevent excesses?

156
Figure 6.4 An advertisement painted on a wall in Khayelitsha, Cape Town gives
evidence for the informal water economy in informal settlements
(photo: K Day 2021)
6.7.4 The Right to the City
The Lefebvre (1995) ‘right to the city’ discourse proposes the development of a platform for
the masses to claim the enjoyment of full rights in urban spaces like anybody else. This also
plays into water issues, particularly in the context of water insecurity, as the poor would
continue to view this as a denial of access to adequate supply and quality of water. Those who
perceive themselves to be excluded from such citizens’ rights have different ways of
expressing their need for their rights to be recognised. In South African cities, protests have
happened in various ways. McFarlane and Silver (2016) argued that rallying around the poor
sanitation issue and responding to this through throwing human waste in public spaces such
as Cape Town International Airport, as happened on 25th June 2013, becomes ‘poolitics’. This
means that services such as water and sanitation cease to be just tangible and physical
elements but start representing other ways of ‘seeing’ (McFarlane and Silver, 2016) and
become sites of contestation and symbols upon which the excluded rally to demand their
rights.
Thompson and Tapela (2019) argue that institutional and governance issues are compounded
by the analytical/ideological bias in policy analysis towards ‘Cities without Slums’, rather than
the ‘Rights to the City’ approach. The authors provide the example of the City of eThekwini

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(South Africa) where this ideology found concrete application in the Slum Eradication Policy.
Another example is ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (‘Drive out the rubbish’ or ‘Restore Order’)’,
implemented by the Zimbabwean government in 2005. According to Potts (2006), the
campaign ‘was designed to eradicate ‘illegal’ housing and informal trading’. Unfortunately, the
results were that the livelihoods of ‘hundreds of thousands of poor urban residents’ were
impacted negatively. The author further points out that some of the root causes of the
campaign were ‘an ideological adherence to modernist planning and the associated image of
a ‘modern’ city; and a desire to decrease the presence of the poorest urban people, by driving
them out of the towns, because of an incapacity to provide sufficient and affordable food and
living space for them’.
The policies around slums and informal settlements in cities across the world, therefore, need
to be rethought, and require legislators to grapple with the best ways to realise the political
content and promise of the hydro-social contract. The problem is how to shift the narrative and
discourse toward inclusion. In South Africa, this seems a contradiction in context, given that
the National Water Act (1998) and various policies, including the Water and Sanitation Master
Plan of 2019, confirm and reaffirm the hydro-social contract by providing for free basic water
for every citizen. The question becomes: ‘Why has the fulfilment of the NWA only partially
succeeded?’
6.7.5 The Politicised Nature of the Hydro-Social Contract
While municipalities and local governments in South Africa generally claim to be addressing
the backlogs to water and sanitation, housing and infrastructure provision, such
pronouncements need to be viewed through the analytical lens of the ‘hydro-social contract’
and the reaffirmations of this by the Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996) and the
National Water Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998). Contrary to the assumptions that the
framework should be ‘apolitical’, in reality, there are always politics around the provision of
water to the poor. Implementation of the ‘contract’ is not value-free and is constructed through
the socio-ecological fabric of space through time.
Thus, despite South Africa’s progressive national legislation and policies that re-affirm the
hydro-social contract, neoliberal and market-led policies, (for example those under the
Democratic Alliance-led Western Cape province and Cape Town City) have led to lukewarm
support for, and implementation of measures to fulfil the free basic water provisions for the
poor, thereby reinforcing the structural inequalities. Thus, in refusing to provide water and
sanitation services for Marikana, an informal settlement on privately owned land in Philippi,
and Drift Sands, an informal settlement built on a wetland within the Drift Sands Nature
Reserve, the City of Cape Town argues that it cannot build infrastructure for these informal
settlements until the legal issues of the illegal land occupations have been resolved (pers.
Comm, City of Cape Town Official, January 2020). In this context, the dual economy (formal
and informal economic sectors) policy lens fails to take cognisance of the fact that the vast
majority of the marginalised poor are not so much excluded, as included on highly adverse

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terms (Thompson and Tapela, 2019). The problem is more often, not that the poor are
excluded from particular institutions, resources or larger processes, but that they have been
included on inequitable or invidious terms. This is because institutional arrangements and
governance practices politicise and marketise ‘the contract’ – in effect failing to sufficiently
deal with, and address the underlying historical structural distortions. Boelens (2008) and
Goldin et al. (2016) suggest that, contrary to the apolitical assumptions of the hydro-social
contract, water rights are in most instances generated, constituted and distributed according
to the prevailing economic policies, the governing class and gender.
6.8 LESSONS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AFRICA
In this chapter, we argue that the recognition of the urban poor should take cognisance of the
importance of addressing their rights, tenure and access to water and sanitation. While the
Hydro-social contract provides a framework for analysing these issues, the de-politicisation of
the framework is not usually practical or realistic. Also, water problems faced by most cities
have a lot to do with distorted and disjointed policy and legal frameworks that persistently fail
to address historical imbalances and inequities at the expense, or detriment of the poor.
African governments need to consider some of the strategies that are required in order to
solve water problems as a matter of urgency. The 2020 Covid-19 pandemic has further
exposed shortcomings in water and sanitation provision in many cities. There is a need to
develop more permanent solutions to the problems of water and sanitation for cities. Some
areas that need urgent attention are described below.
6.8.1 Water Governance and Legislative Reforms
African countries need to revise or update water legislation. South Africa launched the National
Water and Sanitation Master Plan in 2019 for addressing the long-standing water issues. The
plan outlines ‘a plan of action that needs to be implemented by the entire water sector in South
Africa to achieve government’s goals and objectives.’ There is an urgent need to create
enabling processes such as hastening the passing of the Water and Sanitation Bill and the
implementation of the National Water and Sanitation Resource Strategy in reaction to the
pandemic. Similarly, other countries need to address the issues of equity and access to water
and sanitation for marginalised communities.
6.8.2 Achieving the SDGs
All countries that are signatory to Agenda 2030 are involved in tracking the implementation of
SDGs. South Africa uses the StatsSA Goal Tracker, which is a robust system of tracking and
reporting on the SDGs. The system shows positive outcomes in terms of South Africa’s
progress on Goal 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation), although the Covid-19 pandemic could
reverse or slow the gains. For countries such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi, Covid-
19 came at the back of drought and Cyclone Idai disasters, due to which so many people were
already struggling to rebuild their lives (Oxfam, 2020). It is even more critical for these
countries to have accurate data beyond statistics that will enable them to solve long-standing

159
and growing problems, such as the practical complexities of access to water and sanitation
for townships and informal settlements.
6.8.3 Informal Arrangements
Informal arrangements with regard to water and sanitation are likely to be with us for a long
time to come. While there is a need to try and provide adequate water and sanitation for all
citizens, there is also a need to recognise informal tenure and find strategies for allowing these
to exist and making them work parallel to formal tenure systems. As already seen, cities like
Nairobi are putting these systems in place. As governments and all stakeholders work on
strategies, they need to include ways of improving various tenure systems so that they work
for the benefit of improving water and sanitation for people using them.
6.8.4 Transparency and Accountability
There is a need for governments to instil accountability and integrity in the water sector. During
disaster periods such as the Covid-19 pandemic, systems might slip as people focus on
addressing the challenges at hand, while other people might simply want to make quick money
out of such misery. The report by Corruption Watch and the Water Integrity Network in March
2020 on South Africa (titled ‘Money down the Drain: corruption in South Africa’s water sector’),
is an example of the problems of corruption and maladministration in the water sector, which
in the end hurt the poor the most. It is therefore important that governments remain alert to
some of these malpractices and build systems and institutions that are accountable to
communities and society.
6.8.5 Community Engagement
There is a need to engage communities through social structures and civil society in order to
create genuine dialogue in water service provision. For example, questions regarding where
to locate communal taps and toilets and how to manage and maintain these. A lot of decisions
that hurt the poor are taken without community engagement. The Harare Hopley Farm is a
case in point (Matamanda, 2020). There is also the issue of the relocation (de-densification)
of people from some townships and informal settlements as a way of dealing with problems of
social distancing – as announced by the Minister for Human Settlements in South Africa at the
start of the Covid-19 pandemic. Media reports indicated clear signs of a lack of consultation
with affected communities. Community engagement can create trust between communities
and the government and could lead to workable solutions for the provision of water and
sanitation, particularly during disaster periods.
6.8.6 Effective Intergovernmental Cooperation and Partnerships
Water and sanitation management cannot be effectively implemented without collaboration
between the different government departments and the private sector. Having human
settlements and water and sanitation under one ministry was a step in the right direction in
South Africa. However, the roles of other large water use ministries such as agriculture and
mining are critical. The private sector must also be an important player in this process.

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6.8.7 Funding Mechanisms for Water and Sanitation
The South African National Water and Sanitation Master Plan recognises that ‘Without
sufficient revenue from transfers and tariffs the sector will be unsustainable’. Dealing with
pandemics such as cholera and Covid-19 requires other emergency sources of funding. While
the governments are scrambling to find funding for dealing with the various issues such as
health infrastructure and equipment, there could be a role for water-based private companies
and philanthropies. This type of funding is likely to require fewer conditionalities and more
flexibility in terms of using such funds for dealing with emergencies arising from the disasters.
Figure 6.5 Access to clean water is severely limited in Hopley Farm, Zimbabwe
(photo: Majuru 2018)
6.8.8 Service Provision, Municipalities, and Covid-19
Municipalities are responsible for service provision, including water and sanitation services.
However, many municipalities are struggling to carry out their mandates effectively and
efficiently, as evidenced by the growing service delivery protests in South Africa. In Zimbabwe
water services in cities have been destroyed by political interference (Manzungu and
Chioreso, 2012), leading to a total collapse of water supply systems in some cities. It is high
time that local governments and the water sector ministries find common ground in water and
sanitation service provision and how these could be improved. Particularly at times of
emergency, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, ratepayers and communities need efficient and
effective water and sanitation services.

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6.9 CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown that urbanisation is a growing problem all over the world, as a result
of cities increasingly attracting people from rural areas in search of employment, better
economic opportunities, and improved lifestyles. This has resulted in the mushrooming of
unplanned informal settlements and high-density residential areas, with the attendant
problems of poor infrastructure and inadequate services. For the poor in these marginalised
areas, access to adequate water quantity and quality is one of the most critical problems. We
adopted the ‘Hydro-social Contract’ as the key conceptual framework for analysing and
understanding the social issues around the provision of water and sanitation in cities. We used
the City of Cape Town to demonstrate that water insecurity for the poor in cities is largely a
social construct rather than a technical issue. The problem is, therefore, not only prevalent
during times of water shortages, as was the case in 2017-2018 in Cape Town when the city
suffered a water crisis, but that this is an ever-present phenomenon. The key causes of water
‘social insecurity’ are historical and economic dispossession, water governance problems,
lack of recognition of ‘the right to the city’ for the poor and the politicisation of the hydro-social
contract. We argue for the importance of an inclusive spatial planning approach by cities that
takes into cognisance the importance of the Constitutional and human rights of the
marginalised and vulnerable urban poor regarding access to the minimum basic required
water and sanitation. There are also global conventions and Sustainable Development Goals
that require all signatory countries to address inequities and social exclusion to water and
sanitation. If countries operationalised and achieved these goals, it could go a long way in
reducing the burden of water insecurity for the urban poor. Thus, Agenda 2030 recognises the
need to address equity and social inclusion in the provision of adequate quantity and quality
water for all citizens. Based on this, our view is, therefore, that the water vision for global cities
(especially African cities), should be:
Well-governed inclusive cities, whose planning is human-centred, with an ability to
provide adequate water services and sanitation for the poor and marginalised.
This global water vision will place the poor at the centre of water provision while ensuring
inclusivity through effective engagement and participation. We believe this can be achieved if
cities like Cape Town can lead the way in adopting water sensitive planning that includes the
environment and all its people.

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