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Whom to trust? Media exposure patterns of citizens with perceptions of misinformation and disinformation related to the news media
Abstract
This study tests how perceptions of misinformation and disinformation in one’s general news media environment relate to media trust and media consumption patterns, relying on survey data from 10 European countries. The results show that perceptions of misinformation and disinformation are both related to reduced trust in the news media. Furthermore, they go hand in hand with reduced consumption of traditional TV news, but with no changes in newspaper and (mainstream) online news use. Finally, those with stronger perceptions of misinformation and disinformation are more likely to consume news on social media and alternative, non-mainstream outlets. This pattern is stronger for those with higher perceptions of disinformation. These findings indicate that news users who distrust the veracity and honesty of the news media may turn to alternative outlets that reflect anti-establishment worldviews.
... Participants acknowledged that users have a role in verifying information shared on social media platforms but also recognized the limitations of individual media literacy. Therefore, the study underscores the importance of investing in media literacy programs in educational institutions, incorporating media literacy into journalistic practice, especially as a part of fact-checking efforts, and promoting media literacy on social media platforms through tags, tips, and other interventions tailored for social media environments (Cunliffe-Jones et al., 2021;Hameleers et al., 2022;Mutsvairo and Bebawi, 2019;Tully and Singer, 2024). ...
... While these differences may be connected to differing trust in institutions, more research is needed to examine the causes or sources of these differences in perspectives. For instance, research shows that plummeting levels of media trust are linked with information disorder in the Global North and more selective consumption of news from social media platforms that are exposed to multiple messages, including dis-and misinformation (Hameleers et al., 2022), but is this the case in young democracies such as Kenya and Senegal? ...
While misinformation is very prevalent in Africa, we have a limited understanding of how key stakeholders, such as journalists, fact-checkers, policy experts, and educators, perceive responses to misinformation to address its spread. Based on an analysis of 46 interviews with media professionals and other key stakeholders from Kenya and Senegal, we find divergent perceptions of what regulatory interventions are needed to slow the spread of misinformation in the two countries. In Kenya, stakeholders advocated for self-regulation rather than government intervention to curb misinformation, while in Senegal, they called for more government regulations to address its spread. Additionally, interviewees perceived regulatory approaches, such as proposed laws to address misinformation, as reactive solutions, often resulting from a specific incident in the country, and educational approaches, such as requiring media literacy education in schools, as sustainable solutions with potentially longer-term outcomes.
... There is limited research on misinformation and trust, with some mixed findings. Some cross-sectional studies have found that higher perceptions of misinformation are associated with lower trust in the media, while one study of multiple countries, including the United States, did not find a relationship between perceptions of misinformation and trust in news media [14][15][16][17][18][19]. A gap in the literature is that these studies were not drawn from representative samples and only measured trust in media. ...
... However, we found that perception of a lot of mis-and disinformation was associated with reduced levels of trust in cancer information from family or friends, government health agencies, charitable organizations, and religious organizations and leaders. This finding supports other studies that found that mis-and disinformation is associated with reductions in trust in media but extends this prior literature by finding an impact on trust in other sources of cancer information [14][15][16][17][18][19]. Moreover, this finding is consistent with the Comprehensive Model of Information Seeking, which identifies trust as a mechanism linking mis-and disinformation to health behaviors [12,13]. ...
Background
Mis- and disinformation on social media have become widespread, which can lead to a lack of trust in health information sources and, in turn, lead to negative health outcomes. Moreover, the effect of mis- and disinformation on trust in information sources may vary by racial and ethnic minoritized populations.
Objective
We evaluated how trust in multiple sources of cancer information varied by perceptions of health mis- and disinformation on social media and by race and ethnicity.
Methods
Cross-sectional, nationally representative survey data from noninstitutionalized adults in the United States from the 2022 Health Information National Trends Survey 6 (HINTS 6) were analyzed (N=4137). The dependent variable measured the level of trust in cancer information sources. The independent variables were perceptions about health mis- and disinformation on social media and race and ethnicity. Multivariable logistic regression models were adjusted for survey weight and design, age, birth gender, race and ethnicity, marital status, urban/rural designation, education, employment status, feelings about household income, frequency of social media visits, and personal and family history of cancer. We also tested the interaction effect between perceptions of social media health mis- and disinformation and participants’ self-reported race and ethnicity.
Results
Perception of “a lot of” health mis- and disinformation on social media, relative to perception of “less than a lot,” was associated with a lower likelihood of high levels of trusting cancer information from government health agencies (odds ratio [OR] 0.60, 95% CI 0.47-0.77), family or friends (OR 0.56, 95% CI 0.44-0.71), charitable organizations (OR 0.78, 95% CI 0.63-0.96), and religious organizations and leaders (OR 0.64, 95% CI 0.52-0.79). Among White participants, those who perceived a lot of health mis- and disinformation on social media were less likely to have high trust in cancer information from government health agencies (margin=61%, 95% CI 57%-66%) and family or friends (margin=49%, 95% CI 43%-55%) compared to those who perceived less than a lot of health mis- and disinformation on social media. Among Black participants, those who perceived a lot of health mis- and disinformation on social media were less likely to have high trust in cancer information from religious organizations and leaders (margin=20%, 95% CI 10%-30%) compared to participants who perceived no or a little health mis- and disinformation on social media.
Conclusions
Certain sources of cancer information may need enhanced support against the threat of mis- and disinformation, such as government health agencies, charitable organizations, religious organizations and leaders, and family or friends. Moreover, interventions should partner with racial and ethnically minoritized populations that are more likely to have low trust in certain cancer information sources associated with mis- and disinformation on social media.
... Although the notions of trust occupy much space in the debates, discussions and scholarship of the news media and its role in society, relationship with its audience, and sustainability, there is no universally accepted definition of trust in news media (Fisher, 2018;Fisher et al., 2020;Park et al., 2020). It is not a new phenomenon, rather it has recently come to the forefront of public discourse and academic debates amid the high prevalence of fake news, misinformation, disinformation, propaganda campaigns and questions regarding the socially responsible functions of media outlets (Brosius et al., 2021;Hameleers et al., 2022;Ognyanova, 2019). Over the past centuries, the notions and meaning of trust evolved, and scholars from various disciplines tried to understand it in a myriad of ways as it is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. ...
... Jackob, 2012;N. G. E. Jackob, 2010;Käuts et al., 2013); specific media outlets, brands, programs, or newsrooms (Daniller et al., 2017); media coverage (Kass, 1996;Strämbäck et al., 2020), media content (Grosser et al., 2016;Newman, & Fletcher, 2017;Williams, 2012); and journalists (Blobaum, 2014). ...
Public trust in news media has been declining worldwide in past few decades. This phenomenon is no exception to the case of news media in Bangladesh. Although the notions of trust occupy much space in the public debates, academic discussions and scholarships of the news media and its role in society, the relationship with its audience, and sustainability, there is little work on the topic in the context of the country. Against this backdrop, this study examined the factors that influence trust in news media among young people in the country. A total of 430 individuals from rural and urban areas took part in this study through a web-based questionnaire survey. The findings of the study reveal that the level of trust in news media among the young is very low; males tend to have less trust compared to females, and people living in urban areas have less trust in news media compared to rural areas. Overall, the factors such as political biases in news content, biases toward media owners' business interests, lack of accuracy in news content, poor writing, editing and storytelling; lack of use of reliable sources, providing unimportant/irrelevant news, and the tendency of sensationalizing news and information affect trust in news media. We conclude that the low trust in news media and journalists is alarming for democracy and the sustainability of the news media industry of the country.
... national and regional television, and print media) and negatively with alternative, online and extranational media exposure. At the same time, most people continue to use mainstream media even when they distrust it, whether to engage critically with its content or because alternative media cannot fully substitute mainstream media (Hameleers et al., 2022;Pasitselska, 2022). Furthermore, examining the relationship between trust and exposure on a more granular level of specific media channels or individual outlets typically yields stronger positive correlations between trust and exposure (e.g. ...
... In terms of social media use, growing media cynicism predicted growth in social media use in Germany while, in Israel, results were consistent with the vast literature on trust in the media. Whereas trust is usually positively correlated with exposure to mainstream news media, it is commonly negatively correlated with social media usage (Hameleers et al., 2022). Hence, at least for the Israeli case, the lower media trust was, the greater the use of social media for information about the war (alongside growth in media scepticism -also a predictor of social media use). ...
This study, conducted in Germany and Israel in May 2021, compares German and Israeli news media consumption concerning the Russian–Ukrainian war using a structured online questionnaire. A total of 1,310 and 509 valid questionnaires were completed in Germany and Israel, respectively, examining differences in how news consumers used media to access information. Specifically, objective and subjective proximity to Ukraine and Ukrainians, interest in politics and media perceptions were examined as potential predictors of use patterns of various media. For most variables, Germans and Israelis similarly sought news about the war, especially in mainstream news media. In Israel, objective and subjective proximities to Ukraine were the most significant predictors for consuming mainstream news media, with interest in politics and media trust being less important. In Germany, the latter factors predicted mainstream news media consumption more strongly than ties and subjective proximity, while trust in the mainstream media was not a significant predictor. Finally, the authors found that the lower the trust in mainstream media, the larger the volume of social media consumption about the war.
... Studies exploring the intricate relationship between media trust and consumption patterns have consistently highlighted that when individuals perceive the presence of disinformation and disinformation in news content, their trust in traditional news media diminishes. This erosion of trust is often a result of concerns about the accuracy, integrity, and credibility of the information presented by media outlets, prompting individuals to seek alternative sources for information dissemination and consumption Hameleers et al. (2022). And, when citizens develop a sense of distrust in mainstream media outlets, they often exhibit a tendency to disengage from these traditional sources of information and seek out alternative channels and platforms for news and content consumption Tsfati & Cappella (2003). ...
... Distrust in media reports can also lead to the spread of disinformation and false news through unofficial channels, such as social media. When people do not believe the information being provided by mainstream media houses, they may turn to alternative sources for information Hameleers et al. (2022), which can be unreliable and further fuel distrust and skepticism. ...
Media is an essential tool for disseminating information to the masses and educating them while maintaining professional ethics and piety. The responsibility of providing accurate information and preventing the spread of disinformation or erroneous coverage rests with mainstream media. During a natural disaster or pandemic like COVID-19, media reporting becomes even more critical as people require up-to-date information on government policies and guidelines. Media plays a vital role in uniting people during times of crisis to help them fight against a catastrophe effectively. However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, several cases have been observed in India where the media failed to fulfil its responsibilities, leading to criticism for inaccurate information and spreading hoaxes. The purpose of the study is to look at the selected cases of fake news in mainstream media during the first four months of COVID-19 in India and the societal consequences around it. The research methodology includes a qualitative approach. The selected cases were studied to look deeper into media coverage during the pandemic. Personal interviews with media professionals were conducted to further unfold the underpinnings. The findings are helpful for stakeholders to understand the importance of responsible journalism during times of crisis and recommendations would certainly help us fight the menace of fake news.
... In line with this, different (experimental) studies show that accusations of disinformation can reduce trust in the targeted media channel (e.g., Egelhofer et al., 2022;van der Meer et al., 2023). As misinformation labels are a more subtle accusation that stays closer to the truth, it may be a more credible strategy of delegitimization (also see Hameleers, Brosius, & de Vreese, 2022;Tandoc & Seet, 2022). ...
... Next to deepfakes not being very prominent in general (also see Brennen et al., 2021, fake news perceptions are only salient among a small group of populist citizens, whereas misinformation beliefs are widespread in society, e.g., Hameleers et al., 2022). Additionally, since it is much more labor-intensive to create a fake video than a fake (textual) fact-check, it is possible that respondents may rather question the credibility of the manipulated fact-check than the video itself. ...
Mis-and disinformation labels are increasingly weaponized and used as delegitimizing accusations targeted at mainstream media and political opponents. To better understand how such accusations can affect the credibility of real information and policy preferences, we conducted a two-wave panel experiment (Nwave2 = 788) to assess the longer-term effect of delegitimizing labels targeting an authentic video message. We find that exposure to an accusation of misinformation or disinformation lowered the perceived credibility of the video but did not affect policy preferences related to the content of the video. Furthermore, more extreme disinformation accusations were perceived as less credible than milder misinformation labels. The effects lasted over a period of three days and still occurred when there was a delay in the label attribution. These findings indicate that while mis-and disinformation labels might make authentic content less credible, they are themselves not always deemed credible and are less likely to change substantive policy preferences.
... Although the notions of trust occupy much space in the debates, discussions and scholarship of the news media and its role in society, relationship with its audience, and sustainability, there is no universally accepted definition of trust in news media (Fisher, 2018;Fisher et al., 2020;Park et al., 2020). It is not a new phenomenon, rather it has recently come to the forefront of public discourse and academic debates amid the high prevalence of fake news, misinformation, disinformation, propaganda campaigns and questions regarding the socially responsible functions of media outlets (Brosius et al., 2021;Hameleers et al., 2022;Ognyanova, 2019). Over the past centuries, the notions and meaning of trust evolved, and scholars from various disciplines tried to understand it in a myriad of ways as it is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. ...
... Jackob, 2012;N. G. E. Jackob, 2010;Käuts et al., 2013); specific media outlets, brands, programs, or newsrooms (Daniller et al., 2017); media coverage (Kass, 1996;Strämbäck et al., 2020), media content (Grosser et al., 2016;Newman, & Fletcher, 2017;Williams, 2012); and journalists (Blobaum, 2014). ...
Public trust in news media has been declining worldwide in past few decades. This phenomenon is no exception to the case of news media in Bangladesh. Although the notions of trust occupy much space in the public debates, academic discussions and scholarships of the news media and its role in society, the relationship with its audience, and sustainability, there is little work on the topic in the context of the country. Against this backdrop, this study examined the factors that influence trust in news media among young people in the country. A total of 430 individuals from rural and urban areas took part in this study through a web-based questionnaire survey. The findings of the study reveal that the level of trust in news media among the young is very low; males tend to have less trust compared to females, and people living in urban areas have less trust in news media compared to rural areas. Overall, the factors such as political biases in news content, biases toward media owners' business interests, lack of accuracy in news content, poor writing, editing and storytelling; lack of use of reliable sources, providing unimportant/irrelevant news, and the tendency of sensationalizing news and information affect trust in news media. We conclude that the low trust in news media and journalists is alarming for democracy and the sustainability of the news media industry of the country.
... Various forms of digital abuse, particularly hate speech, has been linked to considerable realworld harm, with research indicating that online hate speech may materialize subsequent acts of violence in offline environments (Awan and Zempi 2015; Olteanu et al. 2018). Similarly, disinformation has been utilized strategically to manipulate group perceptions and undermine public trust (Hameleers, Brosius, and de Vreese 2022;. ...
As social media has become a predominant mode of communication globally, the rise of abusive content threatens to undermine civil discourse. Recognizing the critical nature of this issue, a significant body of research has been dedicated to developing language models that can detect various types of online abuse, e.g., hate speech, cyberbullying. However, there exists a notable disconnect between platform policies, which often consider the author's intention as a criterion for content moderation, and the current capabilities of detection models, which typically lack efforts to capture intent. This paper examines the role of intent in content moderation systems. We review state of the art detection models and benchmark training datasets for online abuse to assess their awareness and ability to capture intent. We propose strategic changes to the design and development of automated detection and moderation systems to improve alignment with ethical and policy conceptualizations of abuse.
... Traditional news outlets must work to uphold their credibility and provide accurate and unbiased reporting on complex problems. This is because a decrease in trust in the news media is correlated with perceptions of misinformation and disinformation (Hameleers, Brosius, and de Vreese 2022), which media organizations must also contend with. Public perceptions of declining levels of trust in journalism have emerged from multiple sources, including Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2020; the Afrobarometer surveys; the Edelman Trust Barometer and the Gallup Confidence in Institutions surveys. ...
... Combining the results of the analysis of 2480 article contents, it was obtained that on the Facebook pages of the three major Korean newspapers, the audience preferred news reports with high social significance [18]. Hameleers, M. et al. combined empirical research to find that citizens who are perceptive of misinformation reported in the news media prefer to watch news on social media and non-mainstream media and that this behavior is more pronounced the higher the perceptual ability [19]. ...
This paper analyzes the network expression and audience participatory discourse system under the mainstream media communication mode, combines the audiovisual multimodal audience cognitive participation and the multimodal features of the mainstream media, and proposes a multimodal deep learning model based on mainstream media communication. Based on the picture vision and human emotion migration methods, the picture vision feature migration module and the text emotion migration module are constructed respectively, and the multimodal feature fusion model is built by applying the gradient enhancement decision tree. Linguistic modality analysis of mainstream media communication discourse is carried out by analyzing the development characteristics of audience participatory cultural communication modes. The influence of different mainstream media communication discourses on the audience’s participatory culture is examined through logistic regression analysis while screening network discourse access. The regression analysis shows that the mainstream media communication modes represented by social software and microblogging have a significant impact on the development of the audience’s participatory culture, with p-values of 0.0452 and 0.0068, respectively, and thus the mainstream media need to strengthen content innovation, focus on specific audience groups, and make full use of new media platforms to provide audiences with richer, more accurate and professional news services.
... Beyond that, the generalization of fact-checking actions has also altered newsroom routines in traditional media. On the one hand, these media outlets should convey trust, as perceptions of disinformation are determined by reduced trust in news media (Hameleers et al. 2022). On the other hand, they have to be able to verify false visual content in multimedia format (Thomson et al. 2022). ...
Regional and local media outlets have much more credibility than news organizations placed at a national level, according to polls. In a context fueled by the spread of disinformation, audiences seem to trust close journalistic sources, while national and international leaders are seen as polarized. However, local journalism has few resources for fact checking. In this context, we explore some of the strategies developed by local news organizations to avoid the proliferation of fake news. This study uses a multiple-case study on four local media outlets from similar media systems (Spain and Portugal) as a qualitative research strategy. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with local journalists and secondary data analysis, we examine how these media outlets deal with fake news, shedding light on internal fact-checking resources and other original strategies applied. From our interviews, their journalists are aware of the problem, asking for more training; whereas their organizations have different approaches to the digital platforms where most of disinformation circulates. These findings contribute to the scant literature on the role of the local field in disinformation, arguing that the social mission of local journalism may be a guarantee against fake news if their journalists are trained.
... Algunos trabajos académicos han estudiado las causas de la pérdida de confianza de los informativos y en las estrategias para la recuperación de la credibilidad (Kim & Vishak, 2018Lee et al., 2020;Besalú & Pont-Sorribes, 2021;Onuch et al., 2021;Hameleers et al., 2022;Medina et al., 2023). No obstante, aún hoy, los niveles de credibilidad de las noticias presentadas en un medio de comunicación tradicional, especialmente la televisión, son más altos que las noticias difundidas en un medio de comunicación social (Skarpa & Garoufallou, 2021). ...
El presente estudio analiza cómo 517 informativos de La 1 de Televisión Española (TVE) han tratado el fenómeno desinformativo en el periodo 2013-2022. Para ello se recurre al análisis de contenido de 559 unidades informativas filtradas por los términos bulo, noticia falsa, fake news y desinformación. Se ha observado la evolución temporal de los vocablos, las temáticas, las fuentes, los actores implicados y los enfoques utilizados en las noticias. La terminología desinformativa irrumpe con mayor intensidad a partir del año 2017, coincidiendo con la responsabilidad atribuida al fenómeno desinformativo sobre los resultados de las elecciones presidenciales en Estados Unidos y el Brexit. Otra correlación se establece en 2020 con la declaración de pandemia por la COVID-19. La desinformación está asociada, principalmente, a las informaciones de política, en la sección nacional de los telediarios. Respecto al tratamiento que realizan los periodistas sobre los términos desinformativos, evoluciona de la información a la pedagogía.
... This difference in the moderation effect's direction might be attributed to differences in the volume of news consumed from both sources, influenced by individuals' perceptions of online misinformation. A study on media credibility by Hameleers et al. (2022) revealed that individuals who perceive higher levels of misinformation typically engaged less with traditional TV news and more with social media. Hence, those seeking news and information about AI on traditional media less due to heightened concerns about misinformation tended to be less exposed to the positive framing effects on AI from media coverage and thus have less trust in AI; the opposite seems true for social media. ...
Public opinion on new technologies, like artificial intelligence (AI), is influenced by media coverage. However, it remains unclear as to what extent seeking news and information about AI on legacy media as opposed to social media can shape trust in AI. A cross-national survey conducted across Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and India investigated the impact of information seeking behaviour on trust in AI, as well as the moderating role of concern about misinformation online. Results indicate a positive relationship exists between seeking AI information on social media and trust across all countries. However, for traditional media, this association was only present in Singapore. When considering misinformation, a positive moderation effect was found for social media in Singapore and India, whereas a negative effect was observed for traditional media in Singapore. These findings have implications for the adoption of novel technologies and highlight the importance of understanding the role of media in shaping public trust.
... La idea de que la labor periodística es de máxima relevancia para una democracia saludable es ampliamente aceptada por los académicos (McNair, 2012;Schudson, 2008). Sin embargo, con todos estos cambios, surge la cuestión de si esta relevancia también está presente en la vida cotidiana de los ciudadanos (Carlson et al., 2021;Hameleers et al., 2022). Por eso, la primera pregunta de investigación es la siguiente: ...
En el ámbito académico y profesional está arraigada la idea de que la labor periodística es de máxima importancia para el buen funcionamiento de la sociedad. Sin embargo, los profundos cambios que ha traído la digitalización de la esfera pública llevan a cuestionar si esta relevancia sigue también presente en la vida cotidiana de los ciudadanos. Por ello, esta investigación analiza la percepción de los españoles sobre la importancia del periodismo, la confianza en las noticias y su valoración del cumplimiento de las funciones del periodismo. Examina, además, si hay diferencias en estas cuestiones entre los usuarios cuyas fuentes de información son principalmente los medios de comunicación tradicionales (prensa en papel, radio y televisión) y aquellos que se informan a través de fuentes digitales (medios digitales y redes sociales). El estudio se basa en las encuestas realizadas en 2019, 2020 y 2021 por YouGov para el Reuters Institute Digital News Report (DNR) a un panel de unos 2000 usuarios digitales españoles. Los participantes son internautas adultos, que han consumido noticias en el último mes, representativos de la población online según criterios sociodemográficos y geográficos. Los resultados muestran que los usuarios españoles cuyas fuentes de información son principalmente los medios de comunicación tradicionales tienden a valorar mejor el cumplimiento de los roles del periodismo (difundir información, interpretarla, vigilar al poder) y a confiar más en las noticias que aquellos que se informan a través de fuentes digitales. Sin embargo, estos usuarios «digitalistas» otorgan mayor relevancia al periodismo que los usuarios «tradicionalistas» (70,6% lo consideran extremadamente o muy relevante frente al 59% de los que se informan por medios tradicionales). Parte de la desconfianza manifestada por los digitalistas se debe al grado de cumplimiento de las funciones que tradicionalmente se ha otorgado al periodismo. Al sentir que su cumplimiento es menor, los digitalistas confían menos en una labor que consideran importante. Por último, los españoles consideran que los medios deben informar con pluralidad (76%), neutralidad (70%) y ecuanimidad (62%), sin que puedan establecerse patrones claros entre ambos tipos de usuarios.
... Today, convergence is part of the circulation of audiovisual programs and products in such a way that there is no single access route or means. This characteristic of information as something circular and non-linear determines a pattern of consumption in which misinformation finds easy and fast paths to spread [20]. ...
The recent COVID-19 health crisis has shone a spotlight on disinformation as the circulation of false information became more and more prominent. What the World Health Organization (WHO) has defined as an ‘infodemic’ poses a great risk for democracies and for society in general. In this context, public television channels, with their regional scope, actively participate in the fight against misinformation. This research aims to identify and classify the different verification initiatives and technological tools, as well as the different strategies and codes used in fact-checking tasks by European broadcasters belonging to the CIRCOM network. The methodology undertakes an exploratory approach and employs a questionnaire that is applied to a sample of the members of the network. Managers and professionals with executive profiles were asked about the management, operation and strategies used in the verification process. In light of the results obtained, it can be concluded that the current verification processes are based on human efforts, rather than technological tools, amounting to a total dependence on content curation by the writing teams in the newsroom. Thus, it is evidenced that in most cases, there is neither a specific department for verification, nor sufficient resources, despite the fact that all those surveyed regard disinformation as a priority issue, a threat to democratic integrity and a responsibility of public service media.
... The recoded responses ranged from 1 = none at all to 4 = a lot (mean = 2.95; SD = 0.86). We follow the approach of existing studies which use self-reported items to measure perceived misinformation exposure [43][44][45]. ...
Despite the mass availability of COVID-19 vaccines in the United States, many Americans are still reluctant to take a vaccine as an outcome from exposure to misinformation. Additionally, while scholars have paid attention to COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy, the influence of general vaccine hesitancy for important viruses such as the flu has largely been ignored. Using nationally representative data from Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel survey (Wave 79), this study examined the relationship between perceived misinformation exposure, COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy, flu vaccine acceptance, political ideology, and demographic trends. The findings suggest that those who accepted the flu vaccine were less likely to be COVID-19 vaccine-hesitant. In addition, moderation analyses showed that perceived misinformation exposure increases COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy for conservatives and moderates but not for liberals. However, perceived misinformation exposure influences COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy among conservatives only if they are also flu vaccine-hesitant. Perceived misinformation exposure has no role in COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy if individuals (irre-spective of political ideology) are regular with their flu vaccine. The results suggest that the effect of misinformation exposure on negative attitudes toward COVID-19 may be associated with generalized vaccine hesitancy (e.g., flu). The practical and theoretical implications are discussed.
... There is also a remarkable amount of disagreement over the classification of the term fake news in the research literature, as well as in policy (de Cock Buning 2018;ERGA 2018ERGA , 2021. Some consider fake news as a type of misinformation (Allen et al. 2020;Singh et al. 2021;Ha et al. 2021;Pennycook and Rand 2019;Shao et al. 2018b;Di Domenico et al. 2021;Sharma et al. 2019;Celliers and Hattingh 2020;Klein and Wueller 2017;Potthast et al. 2017;Islam et al. 2020), others consider it as a type of disinformation (de Cock Buning 2018) (Bringula et al. 2022;Baptista and Gradim 2022;Tsang 2020;Tandoc Jr et al. 2021;Bastick 2021;Khan et al. 2019;Shu et al. 2017;Nakov 2020;Shu et al. 2020c;Egelhofer and Lecheler 2019), while others associate the term with both disinformation and misinformation (Wu et al. 2022;Dame Adjin-Tettey 2022;Hameleers et al. 2022;Carmi et al. 2020;Allcott and Gentzkow 2017;Zhang and Ghorbani 2020;Potthast et al. 2017;Weiss et al. 2020;Tandoc Jr et al. 2021;Guadagno and Guttieri 2021). On the other hand, some prefer to differentiate fake news from both terms (ERGA 2018; Molina et al. 2021;ERGA 2021) (Zhou and Zafarani 2020;Jin et al. 2016;Rubin et al. 2016;Balmas 2014;Brewer et al. 2013). ...
Online social networks (OSNs) are rapidly growing and have become a huge source of all kinds of global and local news for millions of users. However, OSNs are a double-edged sword. Although the great advantages they offer such as unlimited easy communication and instant news and information, they can also have many disadvantages and issues. One of their major challenging issues is the spread of fake news. Fake news identification is still a complex unresolved issue. Furthermore, fake news detection on OSNs presents unique characteristics and challenges that make finding a solution anything but trivial. On the other hand, artificial intelligence (AI) approaches are still incapable of overcoming this challenging problem. To make matters worse, AI techniques such as machine learning and deep learning are leveraged to deceive people by creating and disseminating fake content. Consequently, automatic fake news detection remains a huge challenge, primarily because the content is designed in a way to closely resemble the truth, and it is often hard to determine its veracity by AI alone without additional information from third parties. This work aims to provide a comprehensive and systematic review of fake news research as well as a fundamental review of existing approaches used to detect and prevent fake news from spreading via OSNs. We present the research problem and the existing challenges, discuss the state of the art in existing approaches for fake news detection, and point out the future research directions in tackling the challenges.
... The alternative versus mainstream media landscape is also the subject of intensive academic discourse. Data from 10 countries examined by Hameleers et al. (2022) describe the dynamics in the relation between mis-/disinformation and distrust in news media. Several authors investigate how alternative media position themselves against mainstream media and highlight criticism of content and objectivity in both directions (Mayerhöffer, 2021;Wu, 2021). ...
This chapter describes the structural features of the disinformation scene in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and its key narratives that have influenced the political debate. Both member states of the EU and NATO, the two countries share a significant part of history, as well as strong parallels in the development of their economic and media systems. Due to language similarities and a high share of the bilingual population, disinformation can spread freely across borders and online media outlets. Hence by studying the background of controversial websites operating in both languages we effectively cover the existing market and online space where the same actors can influence audiences from both states.
... The alternative versus mainstream media landscape is also the subject of intensive academic discourse. Data from 10 countries examined by Hameleers et al. (2022) describe the dynamics in the relation between mis-/disinformation and distrust in news media. Several authors investigate how alternative media position themselves against mainstream media and highlight criticism of content and objectivity in both directions (Mayerhöffer, 2021;Wu, 2021). ...
... The rise of the pseudo-media ecosystem and audiences turning towards alternative outlets (Hameleers, Brosius, and de Vreese 2022) results from various concurrent factors. Their growth has benefited from an increasing distrust in news media (Müller and Schulz 2021), in parallel to the declining public trust in other democratic institutions (Freelon and Wells 2020). ...
Information disorder involves wide-ranging content that challenges democratic rules and social harmony. Pseudo-media that relies on conspiracy theories and misleading versions of the social reality contribute to feeding the disinformation ecosystem by reinforcing biased messages with expressive patterns and polarising practices. This article focuses on the content published (N = 1,396) by seven far-right wing Spanish pseudo-media. Based on qualitative and quantitative methods, it analyses headlines, types of text and sources, as well as the distortion strategies of journalistic conventions. Results show that the emotional component is expressed by means of polarised headlines that rely on clickbait to gain attention and build a particular jargon, exacerbated by disinformation and populist practices. The absolute dependence of conspicuous headlines is evidenced by the limited resources of pseudo-media, whose production lies in a mix of opinion text and the processing of online content. Plagiarism from mainstream—mainly conservative—media, social networks and website siblings fuel these outlets that play the role of the ambiguity, mimicking journalistic conventions and mocking them by means of disinformation practices, with a particular focus on reframing social issues, progressive policies and measures to manage the pandemic.
... Hence, perceiving the media as misinforming might drive levels of avoidance even further (Benton 2019;Wenzel 2019). Direct assessments of this relationship are sparse, but Hameleers, Brosius, and de Vreese (2022) find misinformation perception to be negatively related to TV and newspaper usage (but not to social media and alternative news source usage). We will therefore investigate the role of misinformation perceptions as a driver of types of news non-attendance. ...
Low levels of news seeking can be problematic for an informed citizenry. Previous research has discussed different types of news non-attendance but conceptual ambiguities between low news usage, general news avoidance, and news topic avoidance still exist. By using a longitudinal design conducted with a chatbot survey among Dutch users (n = 189), this study provides first empirical evidence that helps clarify conceptual differences. First, it estimates the prevalence of these different types of news non-attendance. Second, it tests to what extend cognitive restrictions, quality assessments, and personal relevance are relevant predictors in explaining engagement in three types of non-attendance to news. Third, the study investigates how news usage behaviors (e.g., news curation, news snacking, and verification engagement) may serve as potential user-driven counter strategies against news avoidance. We find evidence for the conceptual differences. Only small shares of news non-attendance are explained by avoidance motivations. Especially news curation and verification engagement can mitigate common drivers of news avoidance, while news snacking reinforces them.
In this editorial, we explore the urgent challenges created by the rise of infodemics —a term used to describe the epidemic spread of fake news, misinformation, and disinformation through social networks initially associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. This issue has drawn significant attention from various academic fields, including computer science, artificial intelligence, mathematics, physics, biology, sociology, and psychology, among others. This special issue is dedicated to advancing infodemics research across various academic domains. The selected papers include relevant contributions advancing the state of the art in the area, ranging from network analysis for identifying influential nodes and communities in networks to language processing for text classification and filtering relevant messages within extensive corpora.
Media are means of mass communication that serve to transmit information and data. There are various laws and regulations related to the regulation and rules of reporting in the media, with the aim of protecting the public interest, which is important due to the power of the media to shape the opinion of the public about a certain concept, event or group of people. Bearing in mind that the representation of persons with various disorders in the media leads to the development of prejudices, the aim of this review paper was to show the ways of depicting persons with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) in the media. The available literature was searched using the Google Scholar Advanced Search web browser. The criteria for selecting the papers were that the papers were of a research nature, that they focused on people with ASD and their representation in the media of any type, and that they were published in the period from 2015-2023. Raising the awareness of the general public about this neurodevelopmental disorder stands out as the biggest advantage of more frequent media coverage of ASD. However, the observed increased frequency of people with ASD in the media can lead to the dissemination of untrue information and encourage the development of prejudices and stereotypes, the absence of diagnosing ASD and preventing access to timely treatment due to the promotion of pseudoscientific types of treatment. In the final part of the paper, recommendations are given for conducting research in our environment, with the aim of determining the context of domestic media reporting on ASD. It is necessary for the media, when reporting about people with ASD, to contact experts in that field, in order to reduce the spread of misinformation about people with ASD.
Research about the epistemic crisis has largely treated epistemic threats in isolation, overlooking what they collectively say about the health of news environments. This study integrates the literature on epistemic problems and proposes a broadly encompassing framework that departs from the traditional focus on falsehoods: Epistemic vulnerability. This framework is an attempt to more fully capture the erosion of authority and value of political information that has put stress on the public spheres of many democracies. The study develops the EV index to capture this phenomenon at the system level in a comparative manner. Using OLS regression, I test the relationships between the EV index and various structural characteristics of political and media systems. Findings are remarkably consistent with established typologies of media systems. Northern European countries exhibit greater epistemic resilience , while the US, Spain, and Eastern Europe are more vulnerable. The study also offers strong evidence that populism, ideological polarization, and political parallelism contribute to higher levels of epistemic vulnerability. Conversely, public media viewership and larger party systems are associated with more epistemically resilient news environments.
This chapter analyzes how pseudo-media allegedly present themselves as information providers, by adopting visual traits and imitating the six journalistic role performance dimensions identified in conventional media. The results of a qualitative and quantitative analysis show that the most mimicked is the watchdog role. However, pseudo-media distort the essence of it by focusing their critical task in disrupting progressive policies, while offering the loyal-facilitator role to far-right representatives. This trend is also observed in the civic role performance, aimed at giving a voice to anti-abortion groups, or opposed to measures against COVID-19 and, to a lesser degree, imitating the service role to promote their activities. Although polarization and clickbait reinforce all roles, they are particularly notable in intervention and infotainment. This latter one, the second most imitated, particularly exacerbates sensationalism and violence.
Decades after the scientific debate about the anthropogenic causes of climate change was settled, climate disinformation still challenges the scientific evidence in public discourse. Here we present a comprehensive theoretical framework of (anti)science belief formation and updating to account for the psychological factors that influence the acceptance or rejection of scientific messages. We experimentally investigated, across 12 countries (N = 6,816), the effectiveness of six inoculation strategies targeting these factors—scientific consensus, trust in scientists, transparent communication, moralization of climate action, accuracy and positive emotions—to fight real-world disinformation about climate science and mitigation actions. While exposure to disinformation had strong detrimental effects on participants’ climate change beliefs (δ = −0.16), affect towards climate mitigation action (δ = −0.33), ability to detect disinformation (δ = −0.14) and pro-environmental behaviour (δ = −0.24), we found almost no evidence for protective effects of the inoculations (all δ < 0.20). We discuss the implications of these findings and propose ways forward to fight climate disinformation.
The transformation that the communicative environment has undergone in recent decades poses a challenge for the media in relation to their audiences, as trust is sensitive to social, economic, cultural, and technological changes. The aim of this research is to deepen the understanding of the reasons and factors that influence the loss of trust in the media by audiences who traditionally trusted news more (young people and adults aged 25-54), examining the relevance of disinformation and polarization in discrediting the media. Firstly, the state of the issue is reviewed from the theoretical point of view and the data provided, among others, such as the Digital News Report and several studies about the global loss of trust in other institutions, with special reference to the Edelman Trust Barometer. Secondly, the article adopts a qualitative methodology to investigate the motivations and expectations of citizens regarding the media. Specifically, three discussion groups were held in various Spanish cities. To ensure representativeness, sociodemographic diversity was considered, including gender, age, and educational level criteria, among others. Among the findings, it stands out that one of the main reasons for distrust towards the media is the perception that news is biased for political or economic reasons. The Covid-19 pandemic, which was rife with disinformation, has influenced attitudes towards the media and the way news is consumed. Once the pandemic was overcome, trust in the media decreased and participants sought alternative sources of information. However, some differences in perceptions and consumption habits are noted depending on age and educational level. Finally, the research indicates that distrust extends well beyond the media ecosystem, affecting all institutions.
Given the well-documented negativity bias and attitudinal entrenchment associated with sharing and debating news in social media, a reasonable and already substantially investigated assumption is that those getting news about the European Union (EU) mostly from social media would be more sceptical of its institutions than others. Empirical research on this topic has thus far largely deployed experimental and observational methods to investigate this assumption. We contribute to the existing literature with an instrumental variable approach well-suited to establishing causal relationships in non-experimental data. However, we find no blanket causal relationship between relying on social media for news about the EU polity and becoming less trustful of its institutions. EU policies aiming to tackle negative effects of social media news consumption, therefore, need to be tailored to different demographic groups.
The rapid spread of fake news has become a serious concern over the internet. In recent years, social media platforms are widely used for news consumption. These platforms are excellent for their low-cost accessibility and rapid dissemination of news. Contrariwise, it encourages the rapid propagation of ’fake news,’ or low-quality news containing intentionally misleading content. The quick dissemination of fake news has the potential to have devastating consequences for individuals and society as a whole. Therefore, to overcome this problem, this paper proposed an artificial intelligence framework that incorporates ensembles of deep learning features for the classification of fake news. Deep learning approaches such as Multilayer Perceptron (MLP), Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), and Bidirectional Long Short Term Memory (BILSTM) have been used to extract local and sequential features. To obtain relevant features at the word level, these approaches are initialized using pretrained GLOVE word embedding, which results in, three base learners as GLOVE+MLP, GLOVE+CNN, and GLOVE+BiLSTM. Moreover, to extract features at the sentence level, Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) are adopted, which results in, three more base learners as BERT+MLP, BERT+CNN, BERT+BiLSTM. In total, six models are employed as base learners. Later, predictions from the best of these models are ensembled and performance is computed using ensembling techniques. Overall, we have investigated nine ensembling techniques, including weighted voting, bagging, boosting, stacked ensembles like SVC, and logistic regression. The performance is computed using four publicly available datasets regarding the macro average f1-score. We observed that soft weighted voting-based ensemble outperformed other models on three datasets achieving an f1-score of 92.99% (McIntyre), 95.22% (Kaggle), and 78.3% (Gossipcop).
Analytical thinking safeguards us against believing or spreading fake news. In various forms, this common assumption has been reported, investigated, or implemented in fake news education programs. Some have associated this assumption with the inverse claim, that distractions from analytical thinking may render us vulnerable to believing or spreading fake news. This paper surveys the research done between 2016 and 2022 on psychological factors influencing one’s susceptibility to believing or spreading fake news, considers which of the psychological factors are plausible distractors to one’s exercise of analytical thinking, and discusses some implications of considering them as distractors to analytical thinking. From these, the paper draws five conclusions: (1) It is not analytical thinking per se, but analytical thinking directed to evaluating the truth that safeguards us from believing or spreading fake news. (2) While psychological factors can distract us from exercising analytical thinking and they can also distract us in exercising analytical thinking. (3) Whether a psychological factor functions as a distractor from analytical thinking or in analytical thinking may depend on contextual factors. (4) Measurements of analytical thinking may not indicate vulnerability to believing or spreading fake news. (5) The relevance of motivated reasoning to our tendency to believe fake news should not yet be dismissed. These findings may be useful to guide future research in the intersection of analytical thinking and susceptibility to believing or spreading fake news.
Rozważania przedstawione w niniejszej monografii dotyczą społecznego aspektu cyberbezpieczeństwa. W toku analizy zwrócono szczególną uwagę na wielowymiarowy wpływ działań i manipulacji w cyberprzestrzeni na jednostkę i społeczeństwo oraz kształtujące się w ich efekcie nowe relacje władzy. Badaniem objęto obszar mediów społecznościowych, które odgrywają istotną rolę w zapewnieniu ochrony w cyberprzestrzeni. Rolę mediów, w tym mediów społecznościowych, należy rozpatrywać, przyjmując, że nie służą one jedynie transmisji informacji i treści symbolicznych, ale przyczyniają się do wytworzenia nowych form działania, interakcji i relacji społecznych, a efekt ich oddziaływania można upatrywać w konsolidacji władzy i wzmocnieniu różnorodnych podmiotów. W niniejszej publikacji przyjęto zatem podejście konstruktywistyczne i skupiono się na wpływie social mediów na społeczeństwo, przede wszystkim w sferze społeczno-politycznej. Przedmiotem prezentowanych badań są zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa występujące w cyberprzestrzeni, a szczególnie w przestrzeni mediów społecznościowych, z wyszczególnieniem zagrożeń o charakterze społecznym, politycznym i informacyjnym. W badaniach teoretycznych analizie poddano szereg zagrożeń obecnych w cyberprzestrzeni, scharakteryzowano je oraz wskazano ich uwarunkowania i wpływ zarówno na jednostkę, jak i na społeczeństwo, z podkreśleniem implikacji dla bezpieczeństwa. W celu ich kompleksowego poznania należało poddać szczegółowej deskrypcji ekosystem serwisów społecznościowych ze wskazaniem jego złożoności i nieregularności wynikających z wzajemnych interakcji technologii i jednostki. Opisano także procesy zachodzące w strukturach społecznych i systemach biznesowych i politycznych, które mają bezpośrednie przełożenie na relacje władzy i kontroli oraz bezpieczeństwo personalne, narodowe i międzynarodowe. Zrozumienie funkcjonowania ekosystemu serwisów społecznościowych pozwoliło wyróżnić wiele zagrożeń o charakterze społecznym, politycznym i informacyjnym, które poddano szczegółowej analizie. W badaniach empirycznych skoncentrowano się na przedstawieniu roli serwisów społecznościowych w czasie krytycznych wydarzeń społeczno-politycznych oraz na diagnozie obecności w cyberprzestrzeni wybranych zagrożeń: (1) agresji werbalnej (jako przykładu zagrożenia o charakterze społecznym), (2) polaryzacji (jako przykładu zagrożenia o charakterze politycznym), (3) dezinformacji i fake newsów (jako zagrożeń o charakterze informacyjnym).
Każde z wymienionych zagrożeń stanowi oddzielny przypadek i jest w rozprawie poddane analizie teoretycznej – na podstawie literatury przedmiotu – oraz empirycznej. Przed omówieniem badań empirycznych zagrożenia rozpatrywane są z uwzględnieniem konstruktu teoretycznego opartego na analizie następujących wymiarów: czynników warunkujących powstanie zagrożenia, wpływu mediów społecznościowych na jego rozwój oraz konsekwencji dla społeczeństwa demokratycznego.
This article provides a discussion of some of the recent research on media trust focusing on arguments for why media trust matters. What are the arguments for why trust is important? Are there reasons to accept these arguments? We identify three distinct arguments in the literature. First, that it is important for media organizations and for the media as an industry. Secondly, that media trust is essential for democratic citizenship and for bringing forth informed individuals with the capacity for political engagement. Lastly, that media trust is similar to other forms of (social) trust and connected to a wider existential discussion on ontological security. None of these arguments are totally convincing when inspected more closely and in light of empirical research. The article thus concludes that there is a lack of strong arguments for why falling levels of trust in the news media are legitimately described as a crisis or a problem. A supposed “trust crisis” mainly exists when viewed from what must be described as a rather narrow ideological and normative perspective.
The eruption of coronavirus disease in Nigeria in early 2020 created desperation for information. Everyone was eager to know something about the health issue, which killed people within days of infection. Questions requiring immediate answers ranged from what the symptoms were, to what self-help remedy was appropriate. The media, as expected, became a reliable platform to seek knowledge. The coronavirus disease came at a time when social media proliferated. So, most people depended on this innovation for information on the disease. This was where falsehood, masquerading as news, tainted the minds of Nigerians. This paper, anchored on the Framing Theory, sought to examine how fake news and misinformation influenced the management of Covid-19 in Nigeria. It also set out to establish whether, in the perception and experiences of the population, the Nigerian media still command the trust of the people as reliable primary sources of news. The research purposively drew 30 interviewees and discussants from Nigeria’s six geo-political zones. The outcome showed that while some Nigerians were not personally affected by fake news or misinformation, they were quite aware of its negative impact on people they could identify. This study recommends further investigation on why Nigerians still believe in the mass media despite infiltration and the influence of fake news. The general opinion points toward the need to make media content more credible through professionalism and legal control.
This study explored the perceptual components of the third-person effects of fake news during the 2017 presidential election in South Korea. Specifically, we examined self-other disparities in perceptions of the effects of fake news using data from an online panel survey. The results indicated that the participants considered the influence of fake news to be greater on others than on themselves. We also found political interest and fact-checking to be significant predictors of the self-other disparities associated with perceptions of fake news. The findings of this study offer fresh insights into third-person effects in the age of post-truth politics.
In the midst of heated debates surrounding the veracity and honesty of communication, scholarly attention has turned to the conceptualization of mis- and disinformation on the supply-side of (political) communication. Yet, we lack systematic research on the conceptualization of perceived mis- and disinformation on the demand-side. Original survey data collected in ten European countries ( N = 6,643) shows that news consumers distinguish general misinformation from disinformation. Yet, the high correlation between the two dimensions indicates that disinformation perceptions may be regarded as a sub-type of misinformation perceptions in which intentional deception is a core element. This paper aims to make a contribution to the misinformation and media credibility literature by proposing a first conceptualization of perceived untruthfulness corresponding to increasing levels of cynicism and skepticism toward the factual status and honesty of information.
The explosive usage in recent years of the terms “fake news” and “posttruth” reflects worldwide frustration and concern about rampant social problems created by pseudo-information. Our digital networked society and newly emerging media platforms foster public misunderstanding of social affairs, which affects almost all aspects of individual life. The cost of lay citizens’ misunderstandings or crippled lay informatics can be high. Pseudo-information is responsible for deficient social systems and institutional malfunction. We thus ask questions and collect knowledge about the life of pseudo-information and the cognitive and communicative modus operandi of lay publics, as well as how to solve the problem of pseudo-information through understanding the changing media environment in this “truth-be-damned” era of information crisis.
This study examines the articulation of public opinion about so-called fake news using a national survey (N = 510) of U.S. adults conducted in 2018. We coded respondents’ open-ended answers about what is “fake news” and found that while some respondents adopt a politically neutral, descriptive definition, others provided a partisan, accusatory answer. Specifically, the weaponization of fake news is evident in the way respondents use the term to blame adversarial political and media targets. Perceptions of fake news prevalence, partisanship strength, and political interest were associated with a higher likelihood of providing a politicized and accusatory response about fake news. Accusations were polarized as a function of partisan identity and positively correlated with affective polarization. Results are discussed in light of the linguistic distinction of the term and what it means in the context of news media distrust and polarization.
Online disinformation is considered a major challenge for modern democracies. It is widely understood as misleading content produced to generate profits, pursue political goals, or maliciously deceive. Our starting point is the assumption that some countries are more resilient to online disinformation than others. To understand what conditions influence this resilience, we choose a comparative cross-national approach. In the first step, we develop a theoretical framework that presents these country conditions as theoretical dimensions. In the second step, we translate the dimensions into quantifiable indicators that allow us to measure their significance on a comparative cross-country basis. In the third part of the study, we empirically examine eighteen Western democracies. A cluster analysis yields three country groups: one group with high resilience to online disinformation (including the Northern European systems, for instance) and two country groups with low resilience (including the polarized Southern European countries and the United States). In the final part, we discuss the heuristic value of the framework for comparative political communication research in the age of information pollution.
In this paper, we address the question of whether disinforming news spread online possesses the power to change the prevailing political circumstances during an election campaign. We highlight factors for believing disinformation that until now have received little attention, namely trust in news media and trust in politics. A panel survey in the context of the 2017 German parliamentary election (N = 989) shows that believing disinforming news had a specific impact on vote choice by alienating voters from the main governing party (i.e., the CDU/CSU), and driving them into the arms of right-wing populists (i.e., the AfD). Furthermore, we demonstrate that the less one trusts in news media and politics, the more one believes in online disinformation. Hence, we provide empirical evidence for Bennett and Livingston’s notion of a disinformation order, which forms in opposition to the established information system to disrupt democracy.
Based on an extensive literature review, we suggest that ‘fake news’ alludes to two dimensions of political communication: the fake news genre (i.e. the deliberate creation of pseudojournalistic disinformation) and the fake news label (i.e. the instrumentalization of the term to delegitimize news media). While public worries about the use of the label by politicians are increasing, scholarly interest is heavily focused on the genre aspect of fake news. We connect the existing literature on fake news to related concepts from political communication and journalism research, present a theoretical framework to study fake news, and formulate a research agenda. Thus, we bring clarity to the discourse about fake news and suggest shifting scholarly attention to the neglected fake news label.
Over the last decade, a network of far-right alternative online media has emerged globally. At the same time, legacy news media have suffered a decline in trust and revenues. In this context, the present article analyses how journalistic authority is questioned and challenged in far-right alternative media, highlighting how these websites claim authority as media critics. The study rests on a qualitative analysis of 600 news articles published on far-right alternative online sites containing evaluations of legacy news media or journalists; it identifies five different positions of authority employed by far-right media critics, constituted around particular forms of knowledge: (i) the insider position (knowledge of the professional journalistic field); (ii) the expert position (factual legitimacy built on statistics and facts); (iii) the victim position (experiential legitimacy as media victim); (iv) the citizen position (democratic legitimacy/representing the people) and (v) the activist position (street legitimacy through confrontation and active resistance).
In many countries, studies show declining levels of trust in news media at large. However, there still is no valid and accepted measure of generalized trust in news media. To establish and test a suitable measure, we chose two elaborate scales of related concepts: the scale on trust in media coverage of a specific topic by Kohring and Matthes and a credibility scale by Yale, Jensen, Carcioppolo, Sun, and Liu. We adapted both to measure generalized trust in news media and conducted a survey in Germany to (a) evaluate the dimensional structures of both adapted scales and (b) analyze their predictive validity by testing their explanative power on alternative media use. Both adapted scales yield well-fitting models but should be carefully treated with respect to discriminant validity. The adapted Kohring and Matthes scale successfully predicts alternative media use and can therefore be recommended for further research on generalized trust in news media.
Many democratic nations are experiencing increased levels of false information circulating through social media and political websites that mimic journalism formats. In many cases, this disinformation is associated with the efforts of movements and parties on the radical right to mobilize supporters against centre parties and the mainstream press that carries their messages. The spread of disinformation can be traced to growing legitimacy problems in many democracies. Declining citizen confidence in institutions undermines the credibility of official information in the news and opens publics to alternative information sources. Those sources are often associated with both nationalist (primarily radical right) and foreign (commonly Russian) strategies to undermine institutional legitimacy and destabilize centre parties, governments and elections. The Brexit campaign in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump in the United States are among the most prominent examples of disinformation campaigns intended to disrupt normal democratic order, but many other nations display signs of disinformation and democratic disruption. The origins of these problems and their implications for political communication research are explored.
During the last decennia media environments and political communication systems have changed fundamentally. These changes have major ramifications for the political information environments and the extent to which they aid people in becoming informed citizens. Against this background, the purpose of this article is to review research on key changes and trends in political information environments and assess their democratic implications. We will focus on advanced postindustrial democracies and six concerns that are all closely linked to the dissemination and acquisition of political knowledge: (1) declining supply of political information, (2) declining quality of news, (3) increasing media concentration and declining diversity of news, (4) increasing fragmentation and polarization, (5) increasing relativism and (6) increasing inequality in political knowledge.
The goal of this work is to introduce a simple modeling framework to study the diffusion of hoaxes and in particular how the availability of debunking information may contain their diffusion. As traditionally done in the mathematical modeling of information diffusion processes, we regard hoaxes as viruses: users can become infected if they are exposed to them, and turn into spreaders as a consequence. Upon verification, users can also turn into non-believers and spread the same attitude with a mechanism analogous to that of the hoax-spreaders. Both believers and non-believers, as time passes, can return to a susceptible state. Our model is characterized by four parameters: spreading rate, gullibility, probability to verify a hoax, and that to forget one's current belief. Simulations on homogeneous, heterogeneous, and real networks for a wide range of parameters values reveal a threshold for the fact-checking probability that guarantees the complete removal of the hoax from the network. Via a mean field approximation, we establish that the threshold value does not depend on the spreading rate but only on the gullibility and forgetting probability. Our approach allows to quantitatively gauge the minimal reaction necessary to eradicate a hoax.
This study examines the actions of readers as press critics and, therefore, as potentially powerful shapers of journalism’s cultural capital. An analysis of 2 years’ worth of online reader comments on the ombudsman columns of three national news organizations reveals readers’ support of - and even nostalgia for - mainstream journalism values such as objectivity, echoing earlier research suggesting the stability of the journalistic field in the face of challenges from new players such as bloggers. But commenters’ critiques of journalistic performance also employed social, and not only professional, values, representing a potential challenge to journalist autonomy.
The dimensions that individuals apply in evaluating the trustworthiness or credibility of news media bear great theoretical and practical relevance. In previous research, however, there is no standardized scale for the measurement of trust in news media. Thus, the purpose of this article is to present the development and validation of a multidimensional scale of trust in news media. A theoretically derived model is tested on a representative sample via confirmatory factor analysis. After some modifications, the model is then validated on another independent sample. These results confirm the hypothesis that trust in news media can be considered a hierarchical factor (of second order) that consists of four lower order factors, including trust in the selectivity of topics, trust in the selectivity of facts, trust in the accuracy of depictions, and trust in journalistic assessment. This model is the first validated scale of trust in news media in communication research.
This article explores a possible association between skepticism toward the media and audience exposure patterns. Hypotheses predicting a relationship between media skepticism and news media consumption are tested on four large sample data sets. Findings show that media skepticism is negatively associated with mainstream news exposure but positively associated with nonmainstream news exposure.
A telephone survey of 416 randomly selected registered voters examined the distinctive contributions of cynicism and skepticism to citizens’ media satisfaction, external political efficacy, and apathy. Results suggest that cynicism and skepticism reflect dissatisfaction with media coverage, but have opposite effects on external efficacy. Cynicism has no relationship with apathy, while skepticism decreases it. Satisfaction with news media increases efficacy and apathy. Although cynicism’s relationship to efficacy is of concern, these findings undercut the argument frequently made that dissatisfaction with media coverage is responsible for cynicism and political apathy.
In recent decades, audience options for current affairs information have been multiplying. Globalization and media segmentation present citizens with a variety of news outlets for political information in addition to those offered by the mainstream communication channels, which once dominated every nation state. In this article, survey data gathered in Israel (N ??1,122) are analyzed to examine the association between mainstream media skepticism and exposure to sectorial and extranational news media. Findings show that skepticism toward the mainstream news media is indeed related to sectorial and extranational news consumption; however, it is not related to consumption of such nonmainstream media exclusively. Results are discussed in light of theories of the public sphere.
The literature discussing the impact of media and journalism upon democracy, typically criticizes both media and journalism for their content and their negative effects on some aspects of democracy. In turn, this raises the question of identifying news standards by which the quality of news journalism might be evaluated. But neither the proposed news standards nor the criticism levelled against them specify with sufficient clarity the model of democracy to be used as a normative departure. This article argues that the question of proper news standards cannot be addressed in isolation from the question of different normative models of democracy. In order to discover news standards by which the quality of news journalism can or should be evaluated, it analyzes four normative models of democracy and their demands upon citizens: procedural democracy, competetive democracy, participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. Building upon that analysis, the article asks: What normative implications for media and news journalism follow from the distinctive perspectives of procedural, competitive, participatory and deliberative democracy?
Right‐wing online news media have emerged in many countries as an important force in the media landscape, positioning themselves as an alternative to a perceived political and media mainstream. This article studies these sites as a cornerstone of right‐wing digital news infrastructures in six Western democracies (Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Drawing on content analyses of websites and social media accounts on Facebook and Twitter as well as on audience metrics, the article analyses content supply and audience demand structures, as well as organizational and thematic characteristics of seventy alternative right‐wing online news sites. We find that a country's media and political context, in particular the representation of right‐wing positions in the political and legacy media sphere, can explain variation in the supply of—and demand for—right‐wing news across countries, but is mitigated by transnational audiences. At the same time, we can account for cross‐national heterogeneity of news sites, ranging from sites with a “normalized” appearance to more radical sites that clearly set themselves apart from legacy news outlets in terms of their thematic categories, their funding strategy, and their organizational transparency, leading to various types of digital right‐wing “alternatives” to mainstream news.
Alongside the recent rise of political populism, a new type of alternative media has established in past years that allegedly contribute to the distribution of the populist narrative. Using a large-scale quota survey of German Internet users (n = 1346) we investigate political and media use predictors of exposure to alternative media with an affinity to populism (AMP). Results reveal substantial differences between occasional and frequent AMP users. While both groups heavily use Twitter and Facebook for political information, occasional AMP users exhibit hardly any specific political convictions (except that they feel less personally deprived than non-users). Contrary to that, frequent AMP exposure is related to higher personal relative deprivation, stronger populist attitudes and a higher likelihood to vote for the right-wing populist party AfD. Against this background, frequent AMP use can be interpreted as partisan selective exposure whereas occasional AMP exposure might result from incidental contact via social media platforms. These findings are discussed regarding the role of alternative and social media in the recent populism wave.
A common feature among populist parties and movements is their negative perspective on the media’s role in society. This paper analyzes whether citizens with a populist worldview also hold negative attitudes toward the media. From a theoretical point of view, the paper shows that both the anti-elite, anti-outgroup and people centrism dimension of populism contradicts the normative expectations toward the media. For instance, the assumption of a homogeneous people and the exclusion of a societal outgroup is incompatible with a pluralistic media coverage. The results of a representative survey in Germany predominantly confirmed a relation between a populist worldview and negative media attitudes. However, the three populism dimensions influenced the evaluations not in a consistent way. A systematic relation could only be found for antielite populism, which is negatively associated with all analyzed media evaluations such as media trust or satisfaction with the media’s performance. This indicates that in a populist worldview, the media are perceived as part of a detached elite that neglects the citizens’ interests. However, the results confirm the assumption of a natural ally between populism and tabloid or commercial media. Individuals with people centrist and anti-outgroup attitudes have higher trust in these media outlets.
This study aims to investigate the relationships between citizens’ populist attitudes, perceptions of public opinion, and perceptions of mainstream news media. Relying on social identity theory as an explanatory framework, this article argues that populist citizens assume that public opinion is congruent with their own opinion and that mainstream media reporting is hostile toward their own views. To date, only anecdotal evidence suggests that both assumptions are true. The relationships are investigated in a cross-sectional survey with samples drawn from four Western European countries (N = 3,354). Multigroup regression analysis supports our hypotheses: False consensus and hostile media perceptions can clearly be linked to populist attitudes in all four regions under investigation. Moreover, our findings show a gap between hostile media perceptions and congruent public opinion perceptions, which increases with increasing populist attitudes to the point that the persuasive press inference mechanism is annulled.
Here I propose that the phenomenon of “fake news” is indicative of the contested position of news and the dynamics of belief formation in contemporary societies. It is symptomatic of the collapse of the old news order and the chaos of contemporary public communication. These developments attest to a new chapter in the old struggle over the definition of truth—governments waging propaganda wars, elites, and corporations vie to dominate news coverage, and mainstream journalism’s continuous efforts to claim to provide authoritative reportage of current events. The communication chaos makes it necessary to revisit normative arguments about journalism and democracy as well as their feasibility in radically new conditions. Conventional notions of news and truth that ground standard journalistic practice are harder to achieve and maintain amid the destabilization of the past hierarchical order.
Despite signs of declining press trust in many western countries, we know little about trends in press trust across the world. Based on comparative survey data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Study (EVS), this study looks into national levels of trust in the press and identifies factors that drive differences across societies and individuals as well as over time. Findings indicate that the widely noted decline in media trust is not a universal trend; it is true for only about half of the studied countries, with the United States experiencing the largest and most dramatic drop in trust in the press. Political trust has emerged as key factor for our understanding of trust in the press. We found robust evidence for what we called the trust nexus—the idea that trust in the news media is strongly linked to the way publics look at political institutions. The link between press trust and political trust was considerably stronger in politically polarized societies. Furthermore, our analysis indicates that the relation between press trust and political trust is becoming stronger over time. We reason that the strong connection between media and political trust may be driven by a growing public sentiment against elite groups.
This new edition to the classic book by ggplot2 creator Hadley Wickham highlights compatibility with knitr and RStudio. ggplot2 is a data visualization package for R that helps users create data graphics, including those that are multi-layered, with ease. With ggplot2, it's easy to:
• produce handsome, publication-quality plots with automatic legends created from the plot specification
• superimpose multiple layers (points, lines, maps, tiles, box plots) from different data sources with automatically adjusted common scales
• add customizable smoothers that use powerful modeling capabilities of R, such as loess, linear models, generalized additive models, and robust regression
• save any ggplot2 plot (or part thereof) for later modification or reuse
• create custom themes that capture in-house or journal style requirements and that can easily be applied to multiple plots
• approach a graph from a visual perspective, thinking about how each component of the data is represented on the final plot
This book will be useful to everyone who has struggled with displaying data in an informative and attractive way. Some basic knowledge of R is necessary (e.g., importing data into R). ggplot2 is a mini-language specifically tailored for producing graphics, and you'll learn everything you need in the book. After reading this book you'll be able to produce graphics customized precisely for your problems, and you'll find it easy to get graphics out of your head and on to the screen or page. New to this edition:<
• Brings the book up-to-date with ggplot2 1.0, including major updates to the theme system
• New scales, stats and geoms added throughout
• Additional practice exercises
• A revised introduction that focuses on ggplot() instead of qplot()
• Updated chapters on data and modeling using tidyr, dplyr and broom
Trust has long been considered an important factor that influences people’s relationship with news. However, the increase in the volume of information available online, together with the emergence of new tools and services that act as intermediaries and enable interactivity around the news, may have changed this relationship. Using Reuters Institute Digital News Report survey data (N = 21,524), this study explores the impact of individual trust in the news media on source preferences and online news participation behaviour, in particular sharing and commenting, across 11 countries. The results show that those with low levels of trust tend to prefer non-mainstream news sources like social media, blogs, and digital-born providers, and are more likely to engage in various forms of online news participation. These associations tend to be strongest in northern European countries, but are weaker elsewhere. Seeking alternative views and attempting to validate the credibility of news may be among the motivations behind these associations.
Journalism practised within alternative media has typically been understood as being entirely different to, and separate from, journalism practised within mainstream media. However, in recent years, such “binary opposition” has been rejected by a number of authors who argue that there may be more crossover of media practice than has previously been acknowledged. By the means of an exploratory empirical study, utilising qualitative research methods, this article examines the extent of this potential crossover of both practice and personnel between journalism conducted in alternative and mainstream media. The study provides some empirical evidence to support the contention that there can be movement along what might be termed a continuum of journalistic practice. The article concludes by suggesting that consideration of the perspectives of “hybrid” practitioners, who have a range of journalistic experiences across alternative and mainstream media, can inform our understanding of journalism itself.
Scholars warn that avoidance of attitude-discrepant political information is becoming increasingly common due in part to an ideologically fragmented online news environment that allows individuals to systematically eschew contact with ideas that differ from their own. Data collected over a series of national RDD surveys conducted between 2004 and 2008 challenge this assertion, demonstrating that Americans’ use of attitude-consistent political sources is positively correlated with use of more attitudinally challenging sources. This pattern holds over time and across different types of online outlets, and applies even among those most strongly committed to their political ideology, although the relationship is weaker for this group. Implications for these findings are discussed.
Abstract Since the 1980s the rise of so-called ‘populist parties’ has given rise to thousands of books, articles, columns and editorials. This article aims to make a threefold contribution to the current debate on populism in liberal democracies. First, a clear and new definition of populism is presented. Second, the normal-pathology thesis is rejected; instead it is argued that today populist discourse has become mainstream in the politics of western democracies. Indeed, one can even speak of a populist Zeitgeist. Third, it is argued that the explanations of and reactions to the current populist Zeitgeist are seriously flawed and might actually strengthen rather than weaken it.
Stargazer: Well-Formatted Regression and Summary Statistics Tables
- M Hlavac
Navigating the ‘Infodemic’: How people in six countries access and rate news and information about coronavirus. Reuters Institute Report. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism
- R K Nielsen
- R Fletcher
- N Newman