Psychophysiological Transcendentalism in Friedrich Albert Lange’s Social and Political Philosophy

Abstract

In recent literature, it has been suggested that Lange’s social and political philosophy is separate from his neo-Kantian program. Prima facie , this interpretation makes sense given that Lange argues for an account of social norms that builds on Darwin and Smith rather than on Kant. Still, this paper argues that elements of psychophysiological transcendentalism can be found in Lange’s social and political philosophy. A detailed examination of the second edition of the History of Materialism , Schiller’s Poems , and the second edition of The Worker’s Question reveals that Lange sought to develop a systematic foundation of psychophysiological transcendentalism that is presupposed in his social and political philosophy. This allows for a more detailed understanding of Lange’s practical philosophy and assures him a position in the tradition of neo-Kantian socialism.

Full text

Elisabeth Theresia Widmer*
Psychophysiological Transcendentalism in
Friedrich Albert Lange’s Social and Political
Philosophy
https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0030
Published online January 4, 2022
Abstract: In recent literature, it has been suggested that Lange’s social and
political philosophy is separate from his neo-Kantian program. Prima facie, this
interpretation makes sense given that Lange argues for an account of social norms
that builds on Darwin and Smith rather than on Kant. Still, this paper argues that
elements of psychophysiological transcendentalism can be found in Lange’s social
and political philosophy. A detailed examination of the second edition of the
History of Materialism,Schiller’s Poems, and the second edition of The Worker’s
Question reveals that Lange sought to develop a systematic foundation of
psychophysiological transcendentalism that is presupposed in his social and
political philosophy. This allows for a more detailed understanding of Lange’s
practical philosophy and assures him a position in the tradition of neo-Kantian
socialism.
Keywords: Friedrich Albert Lange, psychophysics, transcendental philosophy,
Marburg neo-Kantianism, Darwinism, materialism, left-Kantianism, left-Hegeli-
anism, post-Marxism
1 Introduction
In recent years, historians of philosophy have shown a growing interest in the early
neo-Kantian thinker Friedrich Albert Lange (1828–1875). Intellectuals like Hans
Vaihinger (1852–1933)
1
and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) were deeply inspired
by Lange’s aesthetics (Breazeale 1989; Hill 2003; Hussain 2004; Wilcox 1989).
Lange also left an indelible mark in the fields of psychology, logic, and philosophy
*Corresponding author: Elisabeth Theresia Widmer, Department of Philosophy, University of
Vienna, Vienna, Austria, E-mail: elisabeth.widmer@univie.ac.at
1Vaihinger discusses Lange in Hartmann, Dühring, and Lange: A Critical Essay (1877) and The
Philosophy of As-If (1911).
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 2022; 3(2): 253–275
Open Access. © 2021 Elisabeth Theresia Widmer, published by De Gruyter. This work is
licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

of science (e.g., Beiser 2014, 2018; Bellucci 2013; Eckert 1968; Edgar 2013; Freimuth
1995; Hussain and Patton 2016; Köhnke 1986; Patton 2011; Sieg 1994; Teo 2002).
Even his social and political philosophy was widely read by his contemporaries.
Lange’s political works enjoyed a small resurgence in the 1890s, when the SPD
politician, Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932), tried to revise the socialist party program
with the slogan “Back to Lange”(Retter 2007, p. 103).
2
Influenced by the physiologists Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894) and
Johannes Müller (1801–1858), Lange naturalized the a priori conditions of
experience and offered a psychophysiological interpretation of the Kantian
framework. Lange presented an evolution theory-based explanation of class
struggle in his social and political philosophy and drew on Smith to explain social
behavior. Some scholars conclude that Lange’s social and political philosophy is
not Kantian (Beiser 2014; Klein 1994; Vorländer 1900). Although Frederick
Beiser acknowledges a common “starting point”in Lange’s and Kant’s practical
philosophy, he argues against a connection between Lange’s socialism and his
neo-Kantian program (Beiser 2014, p. 362). According to Beiser, Darwin and
Smith, rather than Kant, influenced Lange’s view of the social realm. Similarly,
the Marburg neo-Kantian Karl Vorländer (1860–1929) has argued against a
“connection between his [Lange’s] socialism and Kantianism”(Vorländer 1974/
1911, p. 122). Likewise, Armin Klein argues: “An ethical justification in a Kantian
sense does not exist in Lange’s thought. Precisely because only his theoretical
philosophy was Kantian, he thought he was not permitted to transfer it in his
ethics”(Klein 1994, p. 138). Prima facie, these views seem plausible if we consider
Lange’s social and political philosophy.
If viewed in isolation from his other works, we get the impression that Lange’s
moral and political philosophy breaks with his Kantianism. With a concept of class
struggles inspired by August Weismann’s (1834–1914) adaptation of Darwinian
evolutionary theory and Adam Smith’s (1723–1790) notion of moral sentiments,
Lange argues that the capitalist class struggle is a result of evolution. His account
of social norms seems to have little to do with Kant. In the second edition of
The Worker’s Question (1870), where Lange deploys his evolutionist explanation
of capitalist class struggle, he views “sympathy”and “egoism”as human
dispositions that result from the “struggle for survival.”In Mill’s Views (1866b),
Lange considers the possibility of interpreting Kant’s categorical imperative as a
psychological principle; however, he ultimately rejects this option and accepts
2“Back to Lange”is a reference to “Back to Kant”, which was the slogan that initiated the
neo-Kantian movement. However, Bernstein did not take up Lange’s thoughts uncritically. He
criticized Lange for not taking historical materialism seriously enough (Bernstein 1892, p. 102).
254 E. T. Widmer

a sensualist foundation of morals. Moreover, Lange claims in the History of
Materialism (2005) that Kant’s“positive”(=practical) philosophy would not suf-
fice in modern times characterized by breakthroughs in the natural sciences.
Because of the metaphysical entanglements of Kant’s deductive approach to justify
the a priori foundation of the moral law, Lange was convinced that his practical
philosophy was not compatible with an enlightened scientific worldview (Lange
2015, p. 254).
3
My central aim in this paper is to show that Lange’s social and political
philosophy builds on his neo-Kantian framework after all. I argue that Lange
implicitly presupposes psychophysiological Kantianism when dealing with
psychophysics and normativity in The Worker’s Question. Even though Lange
did not sufficiently outline the Kantian foundation, I suggest that his social and
political philosophy involves a naturalist justification of the categories and an
aesthetic account of ethical idealism.
The argument unfolds as follows. In the second section, I present Lange’s
prima facie naturalist (Darwinist and Smithian) conception of class struggle
as an alternative to the most influential positions of Marx. In the third section,
I highlight the neo-Kantian aspects of Lange’sphilosophyofscience.Against
proponents of natural-scientific materialism, I show that Lange argued for a
novel adaptation of Kantian transcendentalism inspired by the materialism
controversy. In the fourth step, I emphasize those sequences in his social and
political writings suggesting that Lange presupposed his Kantian foundation.
Thereby, I show that Lange’s political approach is not exhausted if reduced
to Darwin and Smith. I argue that Lange’s naturalism leads to a Kantian
foundation that he previously worked out in the History of Materialism.Inthe
last section, I summarize the main arguments of the paper. I conclude that
Lange’s social and political philosophy is taken too one-sidedly if reduced to
Darwin and Smith. The current study offers a more detailed picture of Lange’s
complex approach and allows viewing him as a philosopher who was part of
neo-Kantian socialism.
3Because Lange supports a psychophysiological conception of the conditions of experience, his
heirs use his philosophy mainly as a negative foil to demarcate their anti-psychologistic thought of
line (Cohen 2001, p. 33; Vorländer 1900). Although Cohen appreciates Lange’s efforts regarding the
social question, he criticizes Lange’s concept of socialism (2005, p. 111). With this difference in
mind, Beiser claims: “If Lange is the father of Marburg neo-Kantianism, then that tradition was
based on patricide”(2014, p. 357). Lange’s naturalist interpretation of Kant has, thus, been
excluded from the “classical”stream of the critical-idealist neo-Kantians in a strong sense (Heis
2018, 3; Ollig 1979, 219).
Psychophysiological Transcendentalism 255

2 Lange’s Naturalist Socialism as an Alternative
to Marx
To understand Lange’s novel approach in The Worker’sQuestion, one needs to
have a clear picture of the intellectual developments at the time. In the 1850s,
Germany was still dealing with the aftermaths of the unsuccessful March
revolution. Marx was put in jail after the French February revolution, and
rationalistic, pantheistic, and atheistic worldviews were blamed for the revolu-
tionary tendencies in Germany (Köhnke 1986, p. 143). What followed was a
reactionary phase. In the mid-1850s, the economic upswing led to a strong liberal
party, “DieDeutscheFortschrittspartei.”Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch (1808–1883)
developed the main ideas for the party. Instead of a proletarian revolution,
Schulze-Delitzsch believed that worker unions and loans would provide the
working class with the means to improve their situation (Herkner 1916, p. 463).
However, in the eyes of Marx and Engels, Schulze-Delitzsch’s approach was
“bourgeois”and failed to address the structural origin of the problem (ibid.).
While these two camps characterized the 1850s, the decade after required a novel
assessmentofthe“social question.”
In the early 1860s, some members of the Fortschrittspartei—including
Lange—were seeking a more left-leaning course of the party. Whereas Marx’s
ideas were too radical for the liberals, Lassalle called for legal reforms and a
democratic organization of the state. This approach evoked the interest of the
liberal party. In 1863, the Fortschrittspartei invited Lassalle to comment on their
new program (Russel 1896, p. 47). Lange, however—whowasdrawntostatistics—
was unsatisfied with the intellectual landscape. In a letter, he says: “Ididnot
come to socialism by studying socialist literature but by studying national
economy and statistics”(Ellissen 1894, p.189). This becomes clear in The
Worker’sQuestion(1865/1870), where Lange provides an evolutionist and natu-
ralist explanation of class struggles. He favors thinkers such as Darwin, Mill,
Malthus, and Smith over Marx and Lassalle.
4
Instead of finding the reasons for
inequality in the logic of capitalism (Marx) or the undemocratic organization of
jurisdiction (Lassalle), Lange offers a theory of socialism that allows for a
naturalist perspective on the social question. This section outlines Lange’s
4The thesis I defend in this paper relies on the second editions of The Worker’s Question and the
History of Materialism. I weigh his later works more heavily for two reasons. First, in my view,
Lange was working towards a systematic account of psychophysiological transcendentalism that
is not yet noticeable in his early works. Second, I take it that his revisions mirror more accurately
what Lange actually had in mind.
256 E. T. Widmer

naturalist approach. Thereby, I aim to show why Beiser, Vorländer, and Klein
suggest excluding Lange’s socialism from his Kantianism.
Lange’s position can be broadly summarized as follows: Class division is
neither a result of the logic of accumulation nor is it caused by the historical
development of positive laws. Instead, it originates in the egoistic human nature
seeking to gain an advantage in the evolutionary “struggle for survival.”Human
nature,however,isalsoequippedwithsympathy—a disposition that evokes the
inclination to constitute an ethical society. Societal progress is not dependent on
a revolutionary transformation but proceeds incrementally and requires legal
reforms. Lange agrees with Marx that one of the main problems of capitalism is
that the “products of labour are treated as [private] commodities.”In his view,
Marx was correct in pointing out that the production of commodities is based
on collective action and, thus, should be treated as such (Lange 1870, p. 11).
However, without denying the crucial role of economic and juridical laws, those
are only effects of an underlying natural cause grounded in human social nature:
egoism.
Lange explains the social nature of human beings with Adam Smith’s
sensualist ethical theory. Like Smith, Lange assumes that the moral character of
human beings consists of two contradicting tendencies: egoism and sympathy.
Whereas our egoist nature is responsible for the inclination to secure a high
position, our sympathetic disposition allows us to ignore personal interests and
to think collectively. Sympathy is, thus, the natural desire opposed to egoism.
Capitalism promotes competition, unequal opportunities and entails a high
degree of luck. Socialism, by contrast, strives for a just distribution of goods,
equal opportunities, and the minimization of the role of chance in a person’s
outcomes. It thus goes back to our sympathetic character. Capitalism and
socialism are both historically contingent. However, the natural cause of human
nature disposed toward class struggle appears to be timeless.
Although both sympathy and egoism are natural dispositions, sympathy is
grounded in our consciousness. It allows us to picture the social realm as it is and
as it should be. Later, I will say more about Lange’s conception of normativity.
For now, it is important to note that Lange is convinced that we can resist the
demands of evolution, which is why he declares himself “nottobeanuncondi-
tional supporter of the Darwinian system”(1870, p. 31). In contrast to orthodox
Darwinian positions such as those found in Ernst Haeckel’s(1834–1919) Natural
HistoryofCreating(1868) or Herbert Spencer’s(1820–1903) The Principles of Ethics
(1879–93), Lange refrains from purely causal explanations. In Lange’s eyes, the
capacity to create and act on self-given laws is the most distinctive feature of
human beings.
Psychophysiological Transcendentalism 257

Lange argues that Malthus’law of population—based on statistics—came
methodologically closer to reality than Marx’s method. Malthus formulated in An
Essay on the Principle of Population (Malthus 1998) a law that claims an imbalance
between food production and the rising number of people in the world. While food
production—due to the limits of crop fields—progresses arithmetically, the human
population increases exponentially. With this principle, Malthus tried to prove
that food shortages were inevitable. In The Capital (1962/1867), Marx criticizes the
Malthusian naturalist explanations of impoverishment that confuses human
malfunction with natural laws. While Lange provides a Darwinist alternative to
Marx’s method of historical materialism that is sympathetic to Malthus’law of
population, Marx’s historical materialist notion of class struggles is meant to
critique Malthus’naturalism. According to Marx, periods of food shortages and
poverty must not be explained by the scarcity of natural resources. Instead, Marx
tries to identify historical laws that reflect economic logic and lead to industrial
“necessities”(Marx 1962 [1867], p. 731).
5
Lange acknowledges the point raised by Marx that Malthus’law of population
played directly into the hands of classical economic theories. For the latter,
Malthus’theory would allow the blame for structural problems to be shifted onto
nature (Lange 1870, p. 14). Yet, Lange prefers Malthus’methodology over Marx’s
and Lassalle’s Hegel-inspired ideas of class struggle. He translates the current
class struggle into Weismann’s Neo-Darwinist account: “The foundational law of
the struggle for survival lies in the physiological nature of a surplus production of
germs of life (Lebenskeime) that are doomed”(1870, p. 48). While nature creates
many versions of an organism, only the version best suited to the environment
continues to exist. This law, Lange continues, “also applies to the societal human
life”(ibid.). The “germs of life”are replaced by the “germs of skills needed for a
leading position”(ibid.). For each leading position, a high number of skilled and
capable people are to be found. Lange believes that this mechanism demonstrates
that the Darwinist principle also applies to the social realm (1870, p. 50).
Judging solely from this section, it may seem plausible to separate Lange’s
neo-Kantianism from his social and political philosophy, as Beiser, Vorländer,
and Klein suggest. Since Lange is drawing on naturalist explanations instead
of Kantian elements, it makes prima facie sense to exclude his neo-Kantian
framework from his Darwinist and Smithian approach in his social and political
5Similarly, Lassalle’sjuridical explanation of class division refrains from naturalist explanations.
For Lassalle, class struggles are an expression of historically contingent power relations. Abuse
may be prevented with a democratic principle that allows the participation of all members of
society (Lassalle 1861). Lange criticizes Lassalle’s account that would show “reactionary ten-
dencies”(Lange 1979/1865, p. 4).
258 E. T. Widmer

philosophy. However, Lange’s view on naturalism or materialism and Kantianism
is more complex. The following two sections show that naturalist explanations are
preliminary steps to Lange’s’psychophysiological transcendentalism.’He, thus,
presupposes this Kantian foundation in his social and political philosophy.
3 Psychophysiological Transcendentalism in
Lange’s Inductive Logic of the Natural Sciences
This section highlights the Kantian elements of Lange’s view on logic in the
natural sciences. Further below, I will argue that he presupposes this founda-
tion in his social and political philosophy. But first, I depict Lange’spsycho-
physiological examination of scientific logic in the context of the “materialism
controversy”(Materialismus-Streit) that peaked in the 1850s.
6
Lange’s
epistemological program may be summarized as follows. He agrees with the
materialists—and even more with the empiricists of the anglophone tradition—
that objective empirical statements require inductive logic. At the same time,
Lange is convinced that necessary logical judgments regarding the conditions of
experience are possible. Due to the latter, Lange remains Kantian as he explains
the foundation of logic based on subjective categories of understanding.
However, in contrast to Kant, Lange—inspired by materialism—argues for an a
posteriori examination of the aprioriconditions of experience. Although Lange
appreciates the materialists for steering philosophy into the right naturalist
direction, he identifies severe shortcomings in their positions and aims to solve
them in a Kantian manner. We now take a closer look at this.
Lange argues that we nolens volens create idealized concepts in science that
play a crucial role in inductive inferences.
7
Lange claims that “inductive logic”was
the only methodology of the sciences that allows for objective statements about the
world (Lange 2015 [1875], p. 274). In contrast to the materialists, however, Lange
does not accept a realist position that leaves mental states and the subjective
conditions of experience unexplored. Lange is convinced that objective statements
need to be viewed in relation to subjective categories.
6Lange tried to overcome the naïve empiricist views of materialists such as Carl Vogt (1817–1895),
Jacob Moleschott (1822–1893), Ludwig Büchner (1824–1899), Immanuel H. Fichte (1796–1879),
and Heinrich Czolbe (1819–1873) by integrating a Kantian notion of necessity with his—to some
extent—empiricist foundation of inductive logic.
7Lange added this discussion in the second edition of the History of Materialism, more specifically
in “Die Physiologie der Sinnesorgane und die Welt als Vorstellung”and “Der Standpunkt des
Ideals.”
Psychophysiological Transcendentalism 259

Lange rejects the Kantian method that tries identifying a priori conditions
through transcendental deduction and argues for the empirical scrutiny of the
conditions of experience. Whereas Kant deduces a priori necessary conditions
of experience, Lange believes that only empirical investigations, hence psycho-
logical and physiological scrutiny, will lead us to necessary judgments about
the conditions of experience. Lange, thus, changes the Kantian framework in
fundamental aspects and avoids claims based on the assumption that we can
derive objective principles from the perceived things without clarifying the natural
laws that structure our perception (2015, p. 287).
However, despite Lange’s empirical orientation, he is eager to find a theory
that investigates the crucial role of mental idealizations in the logical foundation
of science. According to Lange, a theory of scientific knowledge must reflect
all elements—including hypostatization, ideas, and presuppositions—that are part
of scientific inferences. Since we necessarily create ideal concepts that deviate
from our sensual experience, we must accept that these idealizations play an
essential role in our knowledge generation. We have never perceived the “forms
of geometry”nor the “algebraic form”of “magnitude or force in their absolute
accuracy”in nature (2015, p. 263). And yet, we would necessarily draw on
geometrical idealizations to make inferences about natural phenomena.
To underpin this claim, Lange discusses the elliptical form of a planet’s
orbit. The ellipse has never been perceived in its shape, nor is it possible to
know the shape of the planet’s orbit independent of our perception. However, we
create an image or a “hypothesis”based on our mathematical measurements
(2015, p. 263). Even though Lange rejects the Kantian method as a scientific
method, he is convinced that Kant offered the best available explanation
regarding this matter.
Lange illustrates his neo-Kantian or transcendental foundation of inductive
logic with two cases. In the first case, we observe that complementary colors
appear “exceptionally vivid”next to one another (2015, p. 265). If we then
experience a case that refutes this principle, we must find another generic term to
explain the phenomenon. However, a different picture is painted in the second
case, where we learn something about the “quality”of the “physiological
condition of experience”(2015, p. 265). If we look through a telescope that has a
stain on the lens and notice a black spot, we can infer that a black spot will always
(or necessarily) appear when using the telescope. Even though the stain on the
lens is a contingent aspect that we learn a posteriori, it allows for a necessary
judgment because it deals with the condition of the (telescope) experience. If we
then pick up the telescope and find out that the stain on the lens is gone, Lange
notes that it was the “material”aspectofourjudgmentthatwaswrong(because,
e.g., we might have confused the telescope for a different one) (2015, p. 265). The
260 E. T. Widmer

“form of necessity,”however, was correct all along (2015, p. 265). Here, the
Kantian implications of his theory are illustrated: “It would not be possible”to
call “a combination of two sensations knowledge if the foundation for this
combination wasn’t grounded in the organization of our consciousness”(2015,
p. 288). Instead of Kant’s deductive critique, Lange views the aprioriconditions
of experience as natural properties that shape human reasoning and appear in
the way we perceive and think about the empirical world.
With Lange’s naturalization of the aprioriconditions, he develops a position
that is meant as a way out of the “materialism controversy.”The materialism
controversy took place in the 1850s at a time when German universities gained
international recognition. This was a significant development given that in the
early nineteenth century, Germany lagged behind England and France. Publicly
funded grants, the emergence of new disciplines, and the new competitive
culture in academia helped German universities to take part in a “federalist
competition”between Western European countries (Nipperdey 2013, p. 495).
Until the 1850s, the philosophical view on the natural sciences was still shaped
by the direct followers of Kant, the classical German Idealists Schiller, Hegel, and
Fichte. Materialism was a radical scientific worldview that accepted the existence
of a mind-independent world; rejected idealism and the existence of god; and
agreed that objective judgments were only valid if based on inductive inferences
(Gregory 1977, pp. 7–8).
8
In other words, the materialism controversy was an
attempt of philosophers, physicists, and scientists to overcome the German
Idealists’view of the natural sciences.
Lange’s argument against materialism is that we nolens volens create idealized
concepts in science that play a crucial role in inductive inferences.
9
In the History
of Materialism, Lange aims to show the shortcomings of the materialist’s
epistemology by directing most of his attention to the materialist Heinrich Czolbe.
His detailed examination of Czolbe may not be considered a side thought; Lange
attempts to show that materialism is only a preliminary step to Kantianism—a
thought that reemerges in his social and political philosophy. According to Czolbe,
materialism stands for the rejection of a priori deduced principles. Only “inductive
logic”would meet the standards of scientific objectivity (Czolbe 2012, p. 136).
Lange decided as well that “inductive logic”was the only methodology of the
8Vogt advocat ed the most radical view by cla iming that “thoughts connect to the brain just like
the gall connects to the liver and the urine to the kidney”(Vogt 2012, p. 6). This view was
contested by Rudolf Wagner. He thought materialism could co-exist with religious beliefs
(Wagner 2012, p. 46).
9Lange added this discussion in the second edition of the History of Materialism,more specifically
in “Die Physiologie der Sinnesorgane und die Welt als Vorstellung”and “Der Standpunkt des
Ideals.”
Psychophysiological Transcendentalism 261

sciences that allowed for objective statements about the world (Lange 2015, p. 274).
However, he saw a severe problem in Czolbe’s radical empiricist rejection of
apriorism, namely the lack of attention given to mental states that make necessary
judgments possible.
Lange criticizes that the materialist Czolbe would base his epistemology
unknowingly on the “postulate of perceptiveness”(Postulat der Anschaulichkeit).
In Lange’s view, this postulate is a metaphysical claim assuming that we can derive
objective principles from the perceived things without clarifying the laws that
structure our perception (Lange 2015, p. 287). The materialists would face the
following problem: On the one hand, materialism would reject a priori conditions
of knowledge that allow for necessary assertions and hold onto the belief that all
objective principles are derived from sensations. On the other hand, materialism
would claim that the laws of nature—such as the Newtonian laws—are necessary.
“It is true always and forever that a stone, which is not backed up by a base, falls
towards the center of the earth,”claims Büchner (2012, p. 186). According to
Lange, the materialists must accept that they either have to buy into the
empiricist’s stance that knowledge is genuinely hypothetical and necessary
judgments are, thus, not possible.
10
Or—if holding onto the view that necessary
principles are possible—they must bite the bullet and admit that empiricism and
materialism are wrong (Lange 2015, p. 265).
However, by accepting the possibility of necessity on natural grounds,
Lange faces a problem that neither the empiricists nor the Kantians had to face
before. How is it possible that the naturalist conditions of experience can only be
grasped empirically and, at the same time, be justified as a priori necessary
conditions?
Because Lange was aware of this problem, he welcomed the critical reading
of the Kantian framework in the second edition of the HistoryofMaterialism
that offered a solution to this problem. In the first edition, Lange did not see the
possibility of viewing the idea of the thing-in-itself and the categories merely as
methodological concepts. Lange was convinced that the thing-in-itself was based
on a metaphysical claim that assumes the existence of things beyond their
empirical appearance. However, Cohen’sKant’s Theorie der Erfahrung taught him
differently. “[W]e cannot know if a thing-in-itself”exists, but a “consistent
application of the laws of understanding”results in a “problematic something,
10 The classical empiricists such as Hume, Mill, and Smith were more nuanced on this issue,
claims Lange (2015 [1875], p. 287). Mill did not assume that our experience consists of external
things. By accepting that the experienced objects are mediated through sensations, Mill protected
his position from problematic metaphysical claims and argued against the possibility of necessary
judgments.
262 E. T. Widmer

which we take for the cause once we have accepted that our world consists only
of mental representations”(2015, p. 265).
11
Since every perceived object is
dependent on a mental representation that fundamentally shapes how we
experience sensory input, Lange differentiates between objective and subjective
concepts. We proceed objectively when we eliminate “theimpactofprejudiced
pictures and inclinations”and find laws that can be tested and verified (2015,
p. 473). If Lange had agreed to the metaphysical interpretation of the thing-in-
itself, he would have to agree that Kant’s deductive critique leads to a concept
that allows for truths beyond the empirical world. However, Cohen’scritical
interpretation of the absolute has neither metaphysical meaning nor can it be
sensually perceived. Instead, he takes it as a methodological and ideal concept
that allows for objective assertions. Lange claims that we would create an ideal
conception of the thing-in-itself that does not appear purely in the empirical
world but non-ideally in the perceived object.
Regarding the logical principles, however,theissueseemstobemore
difficult. On the one hand, Lange takes them as logical categories that constitute
ourexperience;ontheotherhand,hearguesthatitispossibletoinvestigate
them with empirical methods. In other words: Lange seems to contradict himself,
agreeing to empiricism and idealism at the same time. To solve this issue, Lange
advocates a “problematic”interpretation of the categories of understanding
analogously (2015, p. 288).
Lange argues that while Kant, who calls the categories “Stammesbegriffe,”
would grasp the categories is if they had metaphysical status, we would develop an
idealized notion of the categories that “appear”in substantial judgments (ibid.).
Even though it is in Lange’s view possible to investigate the natural (physiological
and psychological) foundation that constitutes our logical thinking, the categories
are also taken as logical idealizations. A critical or “problematic”reading of the
categories allows Lange to uphold the idea that there is a rational foundation that
constitutes our thinking and, at the same time, to agree with materialism, believing
that these principles are based on our nature. In contrast to Kant, Lange argues that
we neither deduce nor define the categories definitively. Instead, we first assume
them by presupposing an idealized image of the a priori conditions. In a second
step, we empirically scrutinize the psychological conditions constituting our
11 Beiser rightfully points out that Lange did not consequently argue for a critical concept of the
thing-in-itself, which is why we sometimes still find the claim that the thing-in-itself exists in the
second edition of the History of Materialism (Beiser 2018, p. 84). For Edgar, this means that Lange
did not offer a theoretical basis that managed to overcome the tension between his psychophysics
and his Kantian dualism (Edgar 2013, p. 110).
Psychophysiological Transcendentalism 263

thinking. Lange thereby argues for a framework that allows—as Lydia Patton
formulates it regarding Lange’sLogische Studien—for “an account of necessity not
reducible to materialism or psychologism”(Patton 2011, p. 150). For Lange,
necessary judgments are possible, even if the epistemological preconditions are
natural factors that require empirical scrutiny.
I have outlined Lange’s psychophysiological transcendentalism as a Kant-
inspired answer to the materialism controversy. This section has demonstrated
that Lange’s approach combines idealized concepts with empirical research to
identify foundational psychophysiological principles constituting our experience
of objects.
4 Psychophysiological Transcendentalism in
Lange’s Social and Political Thought
I have shown that, for Lange, a thorough reflection of scientific practice leads
necessarily to a Kant-inspired position of critical idealism. Since we rely on
Kantian idealizations when we deliberate objectively in science, we need to
accept an adapted version of the Kantian framework that can explain necessary
judgments while doing justice to the latest insights of psychophysics at the same
time. Instead of the Kantian method based on the transcendental deduction, we
ideally assume and empirically investigate the physiological and psychological
preconditions that allow for logical inferences. In this section, I argue that in The
Worker’s Question, Lange’s naturalist explanation that presupposes an empiricist
or a materialist worldview is likewise just a preliminary step to a Kant-inspired
investigation of the conditions of social experience. What Lange is after is the
scrutiny of the psychophysiological preconditions of our social reality. Egoism
and sympathy appear as temporary concepts or placeholders that require further
scientific scrutiny.
According to Lange, Darwin has shown that humans share one crucial aspect
with plants and animals: the “struggle for survival”(Lange 1870, p. 2). Lange
transfers the evolutionist struggle for survival to the social realm. He claims that
“analogously”to the physical principle, we find the same tendencies in our social
behavior (1870, p. 48). From an evolutionary standpoint, Lange explains this
against the background of the egoistic nature of human beings. The “struggle for
survival”that plays out in the capitalist organization of the social realm is a
manifestation of a human trait. Egoism alone, however, does not suffice as an
explanatory concept. As we can investigate the natural world with the inductive
264 E. T. Widmer

logic of the empirical sciences, we can examine our social behavior and social
reality with the methods of the natural sciences.
To Lange, understanding capitalism means scientifically scrutinizing the
psychophysiological principles that are responsible for injustices in capitalism.
In the second edition of The Worker’sQuestion, Lange draws on psychophysics’
latest developments to explain the mechanisms of our behavior that constitute
injustices in the social realm. As the following paragraphs show, Lange was not
fully satisfied with Darwin, Malthus, and Smith’s account of morality. Similar to
his aim in the History of Materialism, he argues that the psychophysiological
scrutiny of the conditions of social experience would provide the “scientific
foundation”constituting our social experience and behaviour. Knowing the
principles of our actions allows us to counteract unjust behavior.
This becomes clear when Lange builds on the Weber-Fechner law to
formulate a principle of pleonexia. The original Weber-Fechner law says that our
perception of pressure grows linearly to the logarithm of objective growth. The
amount of pressure that is needed to feel a difference depends on the pre-existent
pressure level. The higher the pre-existingpressurelevel,themorepressureis
required in order to feel a difference. Lange translates this principle into one of
thefeelingsofjoyevokedbytheincreaseinmoney.Theprincipleofpleonexia
says that a slight rise in income would significantly impact their well-being for
poor people. However, a considerably higher raise for wealthy people is required
to create the same effect (1870, pp. 115–118).
Lange is operating here on two levels. The Smithian account contains a
naturalist explanation of (un)ethical behavior; Lange is dealing here with a
vague concept of morality. The psychophysiological account is a more precise
way of explaining human actions; it asks about the conditions of social experi-
ence, thereby drawing on Kantian transcendentalism. Lange identifies egoism as
a fundamental character trait that is needed to assert oneself in the capitalist
“struggle for survival.”However, the concept of egoism is too vague to account
for a scientific principle of human cognition. In Mill’sAnsichten,Langeclaims
that Adam Smith offered with his sensualist explanation one of the “most
appropriate concepts,”however, he considers his ethical principle “deficient”
(1866b, p. 21). Lange claims: “Smith’smoralprincipleistooone-sidedinthe
emotions of pain and pleasure”(1866b,p.39).Bysteppingawayfromasimplified
sensualist explanation and agreeing on a scientific explanation of pleonexia,
he, thus, moves away from a vague materialist (sensualist) to a neo-Kantian
(scientific) explanation.
In the History of Materialism, Lange claims: “Materialism has always been
based on the observation of nature; in the present day, however, it […] must place
Psychophysiological Transcendentalism 265

itself on the ground of exact research”(2015, p. 329).
12
Materialism, naturalism,
and sensualism are only correct insofar as they seek to find naturalist explanations
of our actions. Lange’s primary goal in the History of Materialism is to show that
in the history of philosophy, materialist movements—such as the one from the
1850s—often functioned as a critical tool by setting limits to metaphysics.
However, this is not a full concession to materialism on Lange’s part. Lange
counteracts materialism with a Kantian adaptation of transcendentalism that
demands studies of the exact sciences. When Lange pays merits to Smith, who
traces ethical behavior back to egoism (and sympathy), he takes the same
argumentative path. Like the materialists, Smith offers a helpful theory that moves
away from an unfounded conception of actions. However, the Smithian concept of
egoism needs to be replaced by scientificprinciples that explain our social
behavior.
One might object that resemblance between Lange’s theoretical and his
political philosophy alone does not yet prove that he builds on the same
presuppositions as in History of Materialism. However, a closer look into the
Worker’s Question shows that Lange explicitly mentions that he aims to exchange
vague naturalist explanations of human morality for scientific-anthropological
explanations.
At the beginning of the third chapter on “luck and happiness,”Lange outlines
the chapter’s goal. Lange is—among other things—concerned with the “connection
of man’s inner happiness with his outer situation”(1870, p. 83). This is important
“in so far as one wishes to rise above the standpoint of vague moral consider-
ations”(1870, p. 83). Lange is instead concerned with insights that “belong to
natural scientific anthropology”(ibid.). Here, Lange clarifies that materialism
cannot account for the explanation of scientific principles. Instead, Lange takes a
scientific approach that deals with constitutive principles of social behavior that
can be tested and verified. Letting go of vague concepts, however, means letting go
of materialism. Since for Lange, identifying necessary conditions of our (social)
experience presupposes Kantian idealism, the principle of pleonexia leads away
from an empiricist or materialist stance and towards a Kantian position. It is, thus,
only possible to accept the psychophysiological law as a general principle if we
overcome materialism.
However, the philosophical foundation of natural-scientific explanations in
Lange’s social and political philosophy is not the only aspect that displays
Kantian-inspired elements. In his moral philosophy, Lange takes inspiration from
12 As Hermann Cohen correctly points out, Lange’s concept of materialism is to be understood in a
broad sense: “He grasped materialism not in the narrow sense of the psychological question of
body and soul, but in its universal significance for the problem of matter”(2005, p. 37).
266 E. T. Widmer

Kant and Schiller and their discussion of aesthetic consciousness. In the last
chapter of the History of Materialism, Lange argues: “The same principle that
prevails in the realm of beauty, art, and poetry, prevails in the realm of action as
the true ethical norm”(2015, p. 554, italics added). He states that “[o]ne thing is
certain: that man needs a supplement of reality by an ideal world created by
himself, and that the highest and noblest functions of his spirit cooperate in such
creations”(2015, p. 557). Lange believes that ethics or the “world of values”is an
aesthetic hence fictitious but necessary complement to the “world of being”(2015,
p. 557).
Prima facie, this may seem surprising since Lange advocates moral statistics
and is, therefore, a defender of a descriptive notion of morality. Before Lange was
aprofessorinMarburg,heheldachairinZürichthatfocusedonthephilosophy
of the inductive sciences. In a letter from 1862, Lange states: “My ethics are
statistics”(Ellissen 1894, p. 106). Additionally, Lange takes the moral law as an a
posteriori and fictitious product of Western civilization that leads to ethical
behavior but turns out to be wrong (1866b, pp. 57–68).
13
However, in the last
chapter on idealism in the HistoryofMaterialismand Schiller’s Philosophical
Poems,Lange’s aesthetic consciousness bears some systematic resemblance to
Kant’s notion of practical reason.
Imagining a better world is, for Lange, not arbitrary. Like the logical
consciousness, the imaginative consciousness follows a structure that is
reminiscent of Kant’s practical philosophy. Lange claims that there is “one
fundamental idea”in Kant’s ethics that survives an aesthetic foundation of ethics,
namely “Kant’s idea of moral freedom”(1897, pp. 14–15). Although Lange criticizes
Kant’s methodology for being “speculative”and based on outdated metaphysical
assumptions, he views the idea of freedom as a feature that originates in Kant’s
ethics (1897, pp. 14–15). However, since Lange’s concept of freedom still differs
significantly from that of Kant, this statement should be taken with caution.
Lange adopts a Schiller-inspired concept of moral freedom. Despite the moral
agent’s capacity to imagine a counterfactual world, the idea of human beings as
ends-in-themselves does not allow for deductive inferences about the metaphysics
of the intelligible world. Instead, a fictitious idea opens an ideal “standpoint,”
from which society is imagined harmoniously. It is the same origin as the unified
13 According to Lange, the Kantian moral law may reflect the Zeitgeist, but it does not tell us
anything about the form of moral judgments or its function as a rational testing procedure (1866, p.
57−58). However, he endorses Kant’s ethics because it fosters ethical behavior. Lange does not
differentiate between Kant’sGroundworks, the Bible, or, e.g., Mandeville’sThe Fable of the Bees.In
Lange’s view, they would all have a favorable influence on people’s behavior because they help
overcoming selfish behavior (1897, p. 2).
Psychophysiological Transcendentalism 267

notion of the thing-in-itself presupposed in the natural sciences: “The point of
unity, which makes the facts a science and the science a system, is a product of free
synthesis and thus arises from the same source as the creation of the ideal”(2015,
p. 553). Although Lange believes Schiller came much closer to an aesthetic
conception of morality than Kant, he regrets that even Schiller would sometimes
fall back into a Kantian and rationalist notion of the moral law. Most evidently, in
the 10th letter of Schiller’sAesthetic Education of Man (1793), Schiller would
disregard his naturalist foundation and claim that the moral law was based on a
“deduction of reason,”making his theory susceptible to problematic metaphysical
entanglements (1897, p. 21). Because of this mistake, Lange believes that Schiller’s
poems are more instructive since they deal with “figurative”truths (2015, p. 559).
By accepting a concept of figurative truth, Lange introduces another notion of
objectivity that differs from objectivity presupposed in empirical studies. For
Lange, true art is not just fiction but conveys a statement considered objectively
true. “Art”proceeds “objectively”in so far as it manages to bring across a message
in a sensually appealing manner (1897, p. 16). He illustrates this thought by
comparing the “didactic genre”with the “fable”(ibid.). Although both genres aim
to teach a practical life lesson, the fable is, in Lange’s view, a higher form of art
because it manages to wrap up the message more indirectly and appealingly.
In Lange’s estimation, Schiller’s poems—executed in the purest metrical form—
surpass all other genres: The “highest goal”of art is to find the “right form of
language”that speaks the most to our senses (1897, p. 20).
There is another systematic component in Lange’s ethics that recalls Kant: the
“general will”or the concept of the “absolute,”which prompts us to imagine social
norms as a coherent picture of the social realm (1897, p. 10). Although Lange rejects
Kant’s transcendental logic, he believes that the idea of a cohesive whole goes back
to a genuine aesthetic inclination of our consciousness. While we find unjust
norms in empirical social reality, we inevitably create a mental image of a just
society. It is only natural to overlook unjust interests and imagine society as a
unified whole. Our aesthetic nature forces us to exceed the “empirical reality”
(2015, p. 509). And this idea of a cooperative and harmonious society is, in Lange’s
view, the “origin”of “what is everlasting in morality”(2015, p. 509). Lange, thus,
offers an aesthetic alternative to the rational and moral “will”that fundamentally
determines Kant’s ethics.
Another Kantian resemblance is noticeable regarding Lange’s dualist
conception of morality that leads to an inner conflict. The Kantian agent deals with
the battle between sensual inclination and practical reason. The Langean agent’s
struggle, however, is between empirical “reality”(the world as it is) and moral
“fiction”(the world as it ought to be): “An inclination of our nature constantly
wants to combine the truth and the beauty”(1897, p. 2). In Lange’s view, we
268 E. T. Widmer

naturally “detest the shiny robe of a lie,”which is why we are not “satisfied if the
truth appears in a distorted way”(1897, p. 2). The “gleam of the beautiful”is in a
“constant fight”with reality (1897, p. 2). This inner conflict is shown best in
Schiller’s poem “Ideal and Life”(“Ideal und Leben”).
14
Lange argues against
orthodox Kantian interpretations of this poem, such as Kuno Fischer’sSchiller as a
Philosopher (1858). Whereas Fischer believes that the protagonist of this poem is
dealing with the inner conflict between inclination and reason, Lange interprets
it as the struggle one must face in finding pleasure in the “pure form of beauty”
(1897, p. 76). An enlightened agent is not dependent on “articles of faith”; the
aesthetically and scientifically educated agent can differentiate between fictitious
ideals and empirical reality and, thus, must accept their deviation. This differen-
tiation, however, comes with the never-ending conflict between knowing what is
the case and desiring a coherent set of norms that ought to be the case.
By arguing for an ideal of harmony, Lange offers a normative foundation that
is inspired by and distinct from Kant’s rationalistic approach. So far, I have only
shown that Lange has an aesthetic-ethical account that justifies normative
statements. In the preface of The Worker’s Question, however, it prima facie seems
that he moves away from the “Platonic”and thus idealistic aspects of his theory.
“Some reader, who has taken a Platonic affection to the more abstract picture of my
views in the last chapter of the ‘History of Materialism,’may recoil from these
applications and concrete explanations”(1870, p. IV). What is still missing is the
textual evidence showing that Lange presupposes this account in his social and
political philosophy. I shall now argue that Lange implicitly presupposes this
normative foundation in The Worker’s Question.
We find indication for this interpretation in the passages on Lange’s critique of
Lassalle and Marx. Lange identifies a biased view in Lassalle’s“iron rule of wages”
(“ehernes Lohngesetz”) that says that the wage of the working class is always
reduced to the minimum standard (1863, p. 5). Lange is sympathetic to this idea,
mainly because it refutes the classical economists’assumption that the principle of
“supply and demand”would regulate the free market justly. However, he criticizes
Lassalle for not underpinning his thesis with empirical facts. Instead, Lassalle’s
argument relies on “referencing authorities”(1870, p. 167).
Lange identifies the same problem in Marx’s interpretation of the great Irish
famine of 1845–52. As mentioned earlier, Marx was eager to refute Malthus’law of
population. Against the common assumption that the natural catastrophe of the
potato blight was responsible for the significant food shortages in 1846, Marx
14 In the History of Materialism, Lange sometimes refers to this poem as “The Realm of the
Shadows”. In his view, the “beauty”of the realm of the shadows and its “value for human beings”
were more strongly emphasized in this title (1897, p. 60).
Psychophysiological Transcendentalism 269

tried to show that this was yet another effect of capitalism (Marx 1962 [1867], p. 731).
According to Lange, however, Marx’s view was blinkered by his dialectical
understanding of the class struggle that tries to boil all societal disruptions down
to capital accumulation. Even though Marx builds on statistical data, Lange
accuses him of a biased and one-sided depiction of this historical event. Marx and
Lassalle—both influenced by Hegel—are said to suffer from “conflating the
deductive and empirical method”(Lange 1870, p. 237).
15
Here, Lange “interlaces”a“methodological comment”(1870, p. 226). He
claims: “National economy requires both deductive inferences based on assumed
laws, and empirical facts, which only in combination can help to achieve one’s
aim”(1870, p. 227–8). We have seen that Lange advocates a scientifically oriented
perspective on socialism that builds on scientific and “empirical facts.”But what is
the philosophical basis in Lange that allows for deductions based on “assumed
laws”?
These passages need to be interpreted against the background of the
previously introduced aesthetic-ethical foundation of normativity. We find textual
evidence for this claim in Lange’s affirmative notion of “rationality”in The
Worker’s Question. Despite Lange’s reservation against Kantian rationalism,
he claims that human nature is installed with a “call for equality”based on
“rationality”(1870, p. 52).
According to Lange, we naturally feel inclined to create hierarchical societies.
However, our nature exhibits features that prevent us from giving in to this
inclination. It is the “pursuit of reason and freedom,”Lange claims, that naturally
“counterbalances”the self-centered tendencies of our nature (1870, p. 56). Further
below, he argues: “It is the pursuit of reason to improve the circumstances created
by the struggle for survival. Reason requires the reduction of inequalities among
peoples, a better proportion between effort and pleasure, and the abolition of
slavery, where one part of humanity is sacrificed to enable a dignified life (Dasein)
for others”(1870, p. 266). Given Lange’s aversion towards a wrong rationalization
of ethics, it would be inappropriate to believe Lange falls back into Kantian
15 In a footnote in The Worker’s Question, Lange criticizes Hegel’s concept of reason that would
“declare the real for the rational”(1870, p. 245). Already in 1865, Lange identifies in a letter to
Engels a severe problem with Hegel’s“mathematical and natural-scientific education”(Eckert
1968, p. 82). He accuses Hegel of presupposing a notion of nature that leads to a biased view of
empirical facts. Although Engels agrees with Lange that Hegel’s perspective on the natural sci-
ences is—compared to the rest of Hegel’s works—not one of his best works, he disagrees strongly
with Lange’sWorker’s Question. Engels’opinion on Lange’sWorker’s Question was devastating. In
a letter to Marx, he wrote: “Lange is a confused Malthusian and Darwinist thinker who is flirting in
all directions; however, he said some nice things about Lassalle and the bourgeoise cooperatives”
(Eckert 1968, p. 74).
270 E. T. Widmer

rationality. “Rationality”serves Lange rather as an umbrella term for the critical
human consciousness that is responsible for the possibility of the scientific
scrutiny of the conditions of our behavior based on a concept of equality that
distinguishes human nature from animals. While we share with other organisms
our egoistic nature, we can reflect upon our actions and choose otherwise. Since
we—as calculating and aesthetic-ethical beings—inevitably create a universal
image of a better world, the history of humanity is shaped by constant fights
against the biological imperatives of evolution.
Although Lange does not elaborate on the concept of rationality or the
foundation of his normative statements, it seems plausible that he draws on the
notion of aesthetic consciousness when claiming that “the actual solution to
inequalities must be measured by the idea of a harmonious society”(1870, p. 52–3).
As Lange replaces a materialistic with a scientific explanation of egoism, sympathy
is replaced by an aesthetic-ethical principle of harmony. In both cases, Lange
draws on systematic elements inspired by Kant.
One last objection might be that Lange’s inclusion of Kantian elements in
his ideal theory does not necessarily presuppose psychophysiological transcen-
dentalism. Since this position requires a justification of the conditions of experi-
ence on psychological and physiological grounds, it would require an empirical
and scientific justification of aesthetic experience to count as such.
Lange, however, differentiates between ‘primitive’pleasure and more ‘refined’
pleasure. Whereas we find in Kant the distinction of “dutiful actions”and “acts
out of duty”(Kant 2016, p. 397), Lange argues for a sensualist equivalent. He
distinguishes between pleasurable actions because of personal motives and
moral actions we find pleasing because we act under the fictitious idea of a
harmonious society, where everyone is treated equally (Lange 2015, p. 509).
Because the normative realm deals with inner states that are not measurable,
Lange’s idealism ultimately remains subjective and unscientific. But precisely
because of this subjectivist and speculative stance, he deliberately excludes his
aesthetic standpoint from the scientific realm. His aesthetic-ethical Kantianism
is part of his psychophysiological transcendentalism because it necessarily
accompanies it.
Once we know more about the conditions of social behaviour—as Lange tries
to show with the psychophysiological principle of pleonexia—we strive for
action-guiding laws under the idea of harmony that counteract the violation of
this image. Lange’s aesthetic renewal of the Kantian system not only allows to
overcome a metaphysically charged method of deductive reasoning. It also aligns
with a rational foundation of socialism that draws on the newest insights of
psychophysics and aims for a harmonious society. We are interested in discovering
Psychophysiological Transcendentalism 271

the principles shaping our sociality because we—as aesthetic beings—necessarily
create an “image”of equality.
16
Lange does not refer explicitly to Kantianism in his social and political
philosophy. However, in the first edition of the History of Materialism, Lange notes
that he originally had planned to include a section on the “ethical and political
sciences”or a “critique of the national economy”in his systematic Kantianism
(Lange 1866a, XIII). Instead, we find passages in The Worker’s Question suggesting
that Lange’s account presupposes psychophysiological transcendentalism. Un-
fortunately, Lange died before working out his systematic account in The Theory of
Democratic Republicanism (Lange 1897, ix). However, the introduced sections
suggest that naturalism or materialism and Kantianism are not mutually exclusive
in Lange’s account. Instead, it is a necessary preliminary stage for a psycho-
physiological renewal of the Kantian framework:“Often already an epoch of
materialism was only the silence before the storm, which should break out
from unknown crevices and give the world a new shape”(Lange 2015, p. 566).
Lange was undoubtedly not a Kant-philologist who was concerned with merely
repeating Kantian ideas. However, his account would be treated one-sidedly, not
considered in light of his Kantianism. In his theoretical and political philosophy,
Lange had a systematic understanding of transcendentalism in mind that funda-
mentally shaped his works.
5 Summary
Against the standard view that suggests that Lange’s social and political philos-
ophy must be excluded from his neo-Kantianism, I have argued in this paper that
he presupposes a Kant-inspired framework after all. More specifically, my paper
has followed three steps. First, I have set out the Kant-inspired elements of Lange’s
foundation of logical judgments and philosophy of science that he formulated
against German natural-scientific materialism. Second, I have demonstrated that
Lange worked out a naturalist alternative conception of the class struggle that
opposed Marxism. Third, I have argued that the Worker’s Question builds on his
foundation of logic and his aesthetic idealism fundamentally shaped by Kantian
elements.
Ursula Renz states that it is a distinct feature of neo-Kantianism that its
proponents problematized the systematic character of philosophy but seldomly
overcame their systematic thinking (2002, p. 4–3). Although Renz is not targeting
16 Cohen later criticizes Lange’s aesthetic approach to the social question: “Ethics is not poetry,
and the idea has truth value without relying on an image”(Cohen 1896, p. 115).
272 E. T. Widmer

Lange per se, my paper has shown that this statement holds true of him as well.
Lange draws on psychophysiological laws that shape the social realm and
connects rationality with the aesthetic image of a harmonious society. It would be
wrong to argue that his social and political philosophy was merely built on
naturalist thinkers such as Darwin and Smith. Lange was first and foremost an
intellectual who, throughout all his philosophical work, took Kant as a key source
of inspiration. For this reason, we thus can allocate Lange in the long nineteenth-
century movement of neo-Kantian socialism.
Acknowledgments: I am grateful to Martin Kusch, Lydia Patton, Chaira Russo
Kraus, Niels de Haan, and the participants of the “German Philosophy Colloquium,
1860-1914”who have helped to improve this paper.
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