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Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on the Stability and Safety
of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, 7-11 June 2021, Glasgow, Scotland, UK
Reducing ship evacuation time: the role of a rail platform
for integrating novel LSA lifeboats on ship architectural
structures
Nikolaos P., Ventikos, National Technical University of Athens, Greece, niven@deslab.ntua.gr
Theano I., Zagkliveri, National Technical University of Athens, Greece, zagkliveri@gmail.com
Ioannis, Kopsacheilis, National Technical University of Athens, Greece, ioakops@gmail.com
Manolis, Annetis, National Technical University of Athens, Greece, mannetis@mail.ntua.gr
Christos D. Pollalis, National Technical University of Athens, Greece, c.pollalis@gmail.com
Panagiotis, Sotiralis, National Technical University of Athens, Greece, pswtiralis@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
Ship evacuation is a complicated process, when it comes to fire or flooding scenarios, which is
facilitated by an increased availability of onboard systems. The present paper proposes a solution which
aims at improving the availability and the accessibility of novel lifeboats in case of an unforeseen event
on large passenger vessels. A detailed analysis of the required components and their technical
specifications is performed, along with performance requirements, maintenance plan, operational profile,
and preliminary cost estimation. The paper concludes with the solution’s assessment by calculating the
required evacuation time of a sample cruise vessel through simulations.
Keywords: availability, accessibility, ship evacuation, novel LSA, reducing evacuation time, SafePASS
1. INTRODUCTION
Evacuation of cruise vessels is a multi-
variable process as it involves the interaction of a
large number of passengers and crew with various
systems under the effect of rapidly changing
conditions (e.g., ship exposed to adverse weather
conditions, occurrence of flooding or fire). An
extensive literature analysing the potential
problems during the evacuation process of large
passenger vessels can be found, focusing on the
required evacuation time and the possibility of
encountering bottlenecks, among others (Vassalos
et al., 2003). Nowadays, a series of alternative
designs are introduced to address these problems
(SOLAS, 2005) (Bureau Veritas, 2010), while
highly sophisticated software is widely used as
well, as a mean to assess in a performance-based
approach these alternatives that would promote
safer evacuation strategies in case of an
emergency (Guarin et al., 2014). In this sense, a
novel solution is proposed which can be installed
on large cruise ships allowing the relocation of the
LSA away from a hazardous event (i.e., fire) and
preventing its incapacitation during evacuation.
Its effectiveness in terms of reduced evacuation
time will be validated through relevant numerical
simulations for a set of scenarios.
Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on the Stability and Safety
of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, 7-11 June 2021, Glasgow, Scotland, UK
The solution has been conceptualized within
the scope of the SafePASS Horizon 2020
Research Project, dealing with the integration of
novel LSA lifeboats on novel ship architectural
structures. It is one of the solutions proposed in
the context of the project, all aiming at reducing
the evacuation time, by integrating also novel
LSA concepts on large passenger vessels and
cruise ships. Focusing on the rail platform
solution, it aims at improving the availability and
the accessibility of the novel LSA lifeboats in case
of an unforeseen event where the lifeboats are
incapacitated or the movement of passengers and
crew members within the aft-most and fore-most
Main Vertical Zones (MVZ) may be restricted. In
such emergencies, it is of vital importance that all
LSA will be available in order for the total number
of passengers and crew members onboard to
evacuate safely. For this purpose, it is suggested
that the container boxes carrying the LSA
lifeboats could be placed on rail platforms that
will be able to move longitudinally and relocate in
a different position, where the embarkation of
passengers and crew would be safe. The
infrastructure that should be installed must follow
a design in accordance with LSA regulations
(IMO, 2017 and best human modelling practice
(IMO, 2004) and maintain the vessel’s elegance,
as it mainly refers to cruise vessels.
Following the introduction, a detailed
component and technical specifications analysis is
performed. Afterwards, the operational and
human analysis is demonstrated, along with an
overview of the installation and system
integration. A couple of restrictions are identified,
while the assessment of the solution concludes the
paper, regarding calculations of the evacuation
time in several scenarios through simulations.
2. COMPONENT ANALYSIS AND
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
To begin with, the container carrying the novel
LSA should be secured on the rail platform with
specified arrangement. The platform shall move
on wheels, using an electric motor, which will be
powered by a power supply driven in an energy
chain, or by mounted batteries in case of
emergency, while a locking mechanism should be
available as well for the deployment phase.
Concerning the controls of operation, a button
shall be available for on-site operation, as well as
two remote panels and a wireless control. One
control panel should be stationed locally, near the
installation, for the crew to operate if needed,
while another must be stationed at the bridge. Τhe
ability of hydraulic manual handling should be
provided, as well. The entire conceptual design is
illustrated in Figure 1, to enhance the solution’s
understanding. The solution is analyzed further
into its subsystems, components, and parts.
LSA container. It contains the novel LSA
lifeboats, and it shall be provided from the
manufacturer. Twist locks and corner castings is
suggested to be utilized in order to secure the
container on the rail platform.
Rail platform. It is the main system of the
proposed solution. It shall house the subsystems
necessary for its operation inside a frame
construction. These concern the following:
▪ Frame construction: It shall house all
subsystems and ensure structural integrity.
▪ Wheels and drivetrain: The wheels of the
platform must support the load requirements
and follow certain standards. The drivetrain
must be characterized by high reliability,
with four wheels, two on each rail.
▪ Hydraulic brake system: A high reliability
hydraulically powered brake system should
cover the safety demands. The brakes should
be strong enough to support any loads
applied to the system (rotational loads,
rolling hazard in seaway when moving to
position, bowsing arrangement, etc.)
▪ Lock mechanism: A locking mechanism is
needed for securing the rail platform at a
certain longitudinal position along the rails.
Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on the Stability and Safety
of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, 7-11 June 2021, Glasgow, Scotland, UK
This can be achieved through the locking of
the wheels or even hydraulically controlled
support legs. The latter will also act as a
restraint of the whole structure against
rotational loads in case of extreme rolling
behavior of the vessel or other circumstances.
Figure 1: Conceptual design of proposed solution
▪ Batteries: To achieve autonomy in case of
power outage, the rail platform must be
equipped with a set of batteries to power the
electric motor and enable its movement. The
capacity will be instructed by the power
demand of the motor, which depends on the
overall weight of the assembly.
▪ Electric motor: The movement of the rail
platform shall be achieved by an electric
motor. The power demand depends on the
overall weight and the speed of the platform.
▪ Manual hydraulic handling mechanism: If
both the control panels and the mounted
button fail to respond, the installation should
allow the designated crew members to move
the platform manually and avoid
incapacitation, despite its significant weight.
Rail installation. The rail platform shall move
on a pair of rails. The installation must be secured
on deck, with a suitable assembly, while an
installation of energy supply is also needed. These
are described below:
▪ Rails: Depending on the load specifications
and the wheel dimensions, the model of the
rails shall be chosen, respectively. The rails
can be embedded on the deck (in case of
newbuildings) in an elegant manner or can be
installed through an assembly with a steel
plate placed above the deck (for existing
ships). In both cases, the rails should be
placed in a way that they are not considered
a hazard for passengers in every-day life of
the vessel.
▪ Energy supply chain: To supply electrical
energy on the rail platform, an energy supply
chain shall be arranged at the side of the
railway, with all necessary cabling.
▪ Linear slide assembly: A slide assembly
should be arranged accordingly under the
platform (or at its side), in order to allow
longitudinal movement only. This
Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on the Stability and Safety
of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, 7-11 June 2021, Glasgow, Scotland, UK
arrangement restrains the platform to move in
any other direction and out of tracks. A
conceptual design is illustrated in Figure 2.
This is important, especially when ships are
exposed to rough weather.
Figure 2. Indicative linear slide assembly
Controls. For the deployment and operation
of the rail platform a set of controls should be
available:
▪ Mounted button: A control button should be
available to control the rail platform if the
remote panels are out of order.
▪ Remote control panel: Placed locally, a
control panel should be available for on-site
deployment by the designated crew
member(s).
▪ Bridge control panel: A control and
monitoring panel should be placed at the
bridge for controlling the platform, in
association with crewmembers on site, in
order to avoid incapacitation. This serves the
evacuation process if quick decision making
is required.
▪ Wireless control: For on-the-move control of
the platform.
After presenting the main components, an
analysis of the technical requirements of a case
study rail platform follows. Assumptions are
taken for the design approach, regarding
dimensions and operational characteristics. The
below technical specifications were assessed and
validated by a group of experts, including LSA
and equipment manufacturers, as well as shipyard
engineers, within the context of the project.
2.1 Dimensions, weight, and materials of
the rail platform
The basic characteristics are specified for the
considered case study, several of which are
assumptions. Firstly, the rail platform has an
overall length of approximately 12 meters, and
approximately a width of 3 meters, following the
novel LSA’s dimensions. The weight of a
conventional lifeboat of 50 persons capacity is
over 3 tons (SOLAS, 1974), and thus, since the
novel LSA is inflatable, the weight of the novel
LSA lifeboats container is assumed to be
approximately 500 kg to 1 ton. Consequently, the
total weight of the cart would be 300 kg or less,
according to the load demand. In any case, the cart
should be able to carry at least a 20% surplus of
the LSA’s weight. The materials are mainly
aluminum, regarding the frame construction, for
achieving low weight, and steel for the rails and
the wheels, in order to enhance their structural
integrity.
2.2 Wheels, bearings, rails, and slide
assembly
The wheels shall be of double flange
cylindrical treads type and fabricated from forged
steel. The wheels shall be tested using ultrasounds
and shall be mounted in such a manner to facilitate
their replacement.
The rails will be A-Shape according to DIN
536 standard of steel material. The profile would
be of minimum A-45 with dimensions 55x125x45
and weight 22.00 kg/m. Their design, along with
the wheels, is illustrated in Figure 3. They shall be
fixed on deck with bolted connections, in order to
be easily replaced for maintenance. In this case
study, the length of the rails is taken as 50 meters
(i.e., equal to the longitudinal distance of a fire
Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on the Stability and Safety
of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, 7-11 June 2021, Glasgow, Scotland, UK
zone), as not to interfere with the fire protection
transverse configuration (refer also to section 6).
Thus, an overall weight of the rail installation is
calculated as 2.2 tons.
Figure 3. Rails
The linear slide assembly will be arranged
under the rail platform, positioned between the
rails. The assembly consists of the guide support
structure, four guides with four self-lubricated
bearings and the rails. The two linear drives (rails)
should be also fixed on the deck (or intermediate
plate) with bolted connections, in order to be
easily replaced for maintenance. Figures 2 and 4
explain extensively the slide assembly
arrangement. The weight of the linear drives,
since they are also 50 meters long as assumed
earlier, is calculated as approximately 2 tons. The
carriage of the assembly should be arranged with
bolted connection on a respective arrangement
under the platform. The assembly should
withstand a load of 10 to 15 kN, considering the
weight of the platform and the LSA. The carriage
should speed up to 0.5 m/s as the speed of the
platform (refer also to the next paragraph).
Figure 4. Rails for guides (slide assembly)
All bearings shall be of suitable heavy-duty
adequate antifriction type. All the bearings shall
have adequate load carrying capacity and shall be
arranged so that they might be removed for their
maintenance.
2.3 Operation characteristics
In cruise ships, the presence of a large number
of passengers imposes safety requirements,
despite the fact that a designated crew party shall
oversee the platform movement. Therefore, the
speed should not exceed 0.5 m/s. Such a speed
will result in 100 seconds (max 2 minutes) time
for the platform to move from one side to the
other, assuming the 50 meters long rail
installation. This specified timeframe may seem
long enough but cannot be further reduced
because of the aforementioned safety reasons.
2.4 Motor and electrical equipment
The cart will be electrically powered, while a
battery pack should also be available for
emergency situations. A complete description of
specifications for the motor and the batteries is
possible after being fully defining basic
dimensions and load requirements.
The configuration of the power supply should
be arranged through a power supply chain.
According to the load carrying requirements and
the weight of the cart, the power of the motor
should be approximately 1 kW. The motor should
be properly mounted on the frame in order to
transmit the required torque to the axle, while it
should be able to develop a counteracting torque
for braking purposes. The motor should be placed
beneath the top plate, to be close to the axle and
near the edge, to be accessible for maintenance.
Batteries should be able to supply the required
power to motor for at least 5 full routes, regardless
of the standby autonomy. This is approximately a
minimum of 10 minutes of use and at least 1 hour
of standby autonomy. Batteries should be placed
inside a properly sealed box in order to be
protected from moisture and other environmental
conditions.
Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on the Stability and Safety
of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, 7-11 June 2021, Glasgow, Scotland, UK
2.5 Safety measures
All the equipment should meet the safety
requirements based on safety regulations on ships
and cruise vessels. Safety measurements should
be applied in order to minimize the exposure of
human to risk. Electronically and mechanically
controlled brakes should be placed on the cart in
case of battery failure. An emergency stop button
should be placed on the control panels and on the
rail cart. Limit switches should be placed at the
end of the rails to prevent over-travel of the cart.
Safety arrangements including protective covers
for the moving parts, should be considered for the
moving cart. Protective covers should be placed
both on side and front of the rail platform.
3. INSTALLATION AND SYSTEM
INTEGRATION
In general, the installation per se does not
directly challenge any SOLAS regulations, it does
not deviate from prescriptive requirements, and
thus, there is no need to be assumed as an
alternative design or arrangement. This was also
confirmed by experts from classification societies
in the context of SAFEPASS project. The rail
installations have not a specified installation site
for all vessels. They could be placed both on
existing cruise ships, via retrofits, and
newbuildings. It is evident that in existing vessels
there are many restrictions for design alternations,
whereas in a newbuildings, the design
possibilities are endless.
3.1 Necessary interventions for existing
cruise ships
Based on the case study considered, there
should be four rail platforms, namely two on port
and two on starboard side, one towards the stern
and one towards the bow. The default position of
the platform can be anywhere along the rail
installation. For the present case study and the
respective simulations, the default position for all
platforms shall be in the middle of the rails, i.e.,
the middle of the MVZ, as assumed earlier (refer
also to section 6). The installation of rails should
be fixed on deck. An additional steel plate may be
placed also on deck to partly hide the rails and to
support movement. In general, a proper
integration to the existing ship design is needed,
regarding the following: (a) deck reinforcements,
(b) electric supply, (c) movable furniture for
allowing platform and passengers and crew
movement, (d) appropriate modifications at the
promenade, and (e) increased protection for
storage (initial) area to prevent early
incapacitation of LSA. In addition, since the
proposed system is meant to be installed on cruise
vessels, appropriate aesthetic interventions should
be considered for the final solution to be elegant.
3.2 Newbuildings
In case of newbuildings, the rails could be
recessed on the floor. Easily detachable material
could be placed on top of the rails so people can
walk over them. Side walls could be placed at the
carts’ initial position that will hide the installation
when positioned in its default position.
4. SERVICE AND MAINTENANCE
In order to be safely operated in emergency
conditions, both the rail platform, with the
respective set of rails, and the novel LSA lifeboats
should have a service and maintenance plan that
will involve the following:
▪ The rail platform should be visually
inspected according to the service and
maintenance plan. All moving parts should
be checked to prevent an unexpected failure.
▪ Rails should be inspected for defects and
failures in order to prevent the risk of rail
breakage and unwanted results, such as
distortions due to loading of the underlying
Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on the Stability and Safety
of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, 7-11 June 2021, Glasgow, Scotland, UK
deck, defects due to wear (increase of its
surface), defects due to wear in the wheel/rail
contact area and rail cracks.
▪ Bearings should be checked and replaced
according to the manufacturer’s instructions.
▪ Batteries should be checked, measured, and
replaced according to the manufacturer’s
instructions.
▪ Wheels should be checked for distortions and
fatigue.
▪ The electric motor should be checked for
malfunctions based on its performance.
Maintenance should be done according to the
manufacturer’s guidelines.
In general, based also on the feedback from
equipment experts in the context of the project,
the service and maintenance requirements are not
particularly demanding and could be integrated
into the general LSA equipment maintenance
procedures with ease.
5. OPERATION AND HUMAN
MODELING
The following considerations regarding
integration with human modelling must be taken
into account: (a) the LSA slides’ entrances should
be arranged evenly with deck, (b) designated
points for the LSA deployment be defined, and (c)
furniture placed near the rail installation must be
easily removed. Additionally, a description of the
operational phases-scenarios follows:
▪ 1st scenario – Normal cruise condition with
no emergency: The novel LSA and their
container remain stationed in the prefixed
default location.
▪ 2nd scenario – Evacuation drill: LSA
platform becomes operational and moves by
the designated crew members as required
from the evacuation drill scenario.
▪ 3rd scenario – Evacuation with no imminent
incapacitation of the novel LSA: The LSA is
deployed in its default location.
▪ 4th scenario – Evacuation with imminent
incapacitation of the novel LSA: The LSA is
moved accordingly (from crew or from
bridge officers in association with crew) to
avoid incapacitation, and it is then deployed.
6. DESIGN LIMITATIONS
Present section presents some design
limitations that were identified, properly
addressed and led to necessary adjustments of the
suggested solution.
The first one refers to the occupied space from
the rail platform and rail installation. In more
detail, for the retrofit case, the used space is
calculated as approximately 600 m2 for all four
installations. For the newbuilding case, the rails
could be recessed, so the space is much less, i.e.,
160 m2 for the rail platforms only. In any of these
cases, compared to the design of conventional
lifeboats, the freed space is increasing, which was
also confirmed from the group of experts. It was
also noted that even in the retrofit case, a local
redesign of the space configuration could lead to
the reduction of the used space.
The second one refers to the problems for
anticipating the large rotational loads which may
be applied during the LSA’s deployment or in
case of extreme rolling behavior of the vessel.
This is addressed by including in this first design
approach the linear slide assembly and the
hydraulic lock through support legs. However, a
final design should incorporate all necessary load
calculations and address weaknesses in the
installation, if any.
Additionally, from the previous sections, the
overall weight for all four installations is
calculated as 26.4 tons. Despite that it is a
significant number, during the solution
assessment, all experts found it to be affordable,
especially when considering the entire weight of
the vessel.
Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on the Stability and Safety
of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, 7-11 June 2021, Glasgow, Scotland, UK
Last but not least, common rules for the design
of large passenger ships, instruct not to interact
with the limits of the MVZ, in order to ensure the
containment of a fire spread. Thus, the length of
the rail installation in an enclosed space is not
exceeding the length of an MVZ (i.e., 50 m).
However, if the rail platform system is to be
installed in an external space (i.e., balcony) a
greater length could be assumed. This could have
a greater impact in the reduction of the evacuation
time, as it could introduce greater flexibility in the
LSA relocation.
7. COST BUDGETING
Present section presents a preliminary cost
budgeting in Table 1 for one installation. The
prices are strongly depended on the materials that
will be used, the standards of the manufacturing,
the manufacturing country, the final load and
power requirements and the control level. The
prices were validated by experts, including LSA
and equipment manufacturers, as well as
engineers from shipyards, within the context of
SafePASS project. During the validation, the
overall cost of all four installations, nearly
300,000 €, was found affordable, in the context of
the entire cost of a retrofit or newbuilding. The
cost analysis does not contain elements from the
environment of the installation (decoration,
furniture, side walls). These cannot be specified
and are not assumed as part of the container-
platform-rails system.
Table 1. Budget analysis
COST DESCRIPTION
PRICE (€)
Study and design
5,000.00 €
Material and component costs
54,000.00 €
Manufacturing costs
6,500.00 €
Transport costs
2,000.00 €
Installation costs
6,000.00 €
Start-up and commissioning
3,000.00 €
Total Costs
76,500.00 €
8. SIMULATION MODEL
The efficiency of the proposed solution was
examined by a ship evacuation model. Pathfinder
by Thunderhead Engineering was the evacuation
software that used, which is an agent-based
mesoscopic (Guarin et al., 2014) evacuation
analysis software. The model utilizes a sample
large cruise ship, implementing decks 2 to 16 of
the ship structure, and calculates the time needed
for passengers and crew to assemble in the muster
stations, and from the muster stations to the
embarkation areas.
Table 2. Simulation Parameters
PARAMETER
IMPLEMENTATION
Population composition
MSC.1 / Circ. 1533
Walking speed
MSC.1 / Circ. 1533
Initial distribution of
passengers and crew
MSC.1 / Circ. 1533
Response duration
MSC.1 / Circ. 1533
Vessel’s capacity
3700 persons (2700
passengers, 1000 crew)
Embarkation deck
Deck 7
Dynamic position of the
ship
Not considered
Fire propagation
Not considered
Human behavior factor
Not considered
Number of simulations run
50
In the context of the SafePASS project,
simulations will be performed for multiple
flooding and fire scenarios, environmental
conditions, and passenger behaviors. At this
analysis, the considered parameters are describing
below. The IMO Guidelines, MSC1. / Circ. 1533
(IMO, 2016) on evacuation analysis specifies
values for the population of the passengers and the
crew, based on two factors, gender and age, the
initial distribution and the response duration, the
walking speed on flat terrain and stairs, and a
specific door flow rate. In this analysis, the
provided values were used. The basic parameters
of the simulations are presented in Table 2.
Additionally, the following parameters were
defined: (a) ship condition: fire, (b) Hs (m): 0, (c)
Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on the Stability and Safety
of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, 7-11 June 2021, Glasgow, Scotland, UK
daytime: day, (d) at port: no. The fire was started
in an A/C room at Deck 7, MVZ 4, and the
adjacent rooms became inaccessible.
The developed baseline scenario testing the
proposed solution was not incorporating the rails,
but utilizing the existing LSAs, twenty LSAs with
a capacity of 150 persons and two Marine
Evacuation Systems (MES) of 474 persons each,
were needed. The alternative scenario
incorporating the rail solution includes four novel
LSAs with a capacity of 1000 persons each. This
scenario represents the 4th operational scenario
presented earlier (refer to section 5), where the
LSA is moving to a more optimal position. In
Figure 5, the default (middle of the MVZ 5) and
final positions of the novel LSA are shown. The
length of the rail installation assumed equal to the
length of the MVZ (refer to section 6), which
represents a minimum length to test if there is a
significant impact on the evacuation time.
Figure 5. Initial and final position of the LSA
9. RESULTS
According to MSC.1 / Circ. 1533, the
calculation of the total evacuation time is
calculated by the sum of the Response duration
(R), the Total travel duration (T), the Embarkation
and Launching duration. The mathematical model
for calculating the Total evacuation time is:
1,25 (𝑅 + 𝑇)+ 2 3
⁄ (𝐸 + 𝐿)≤ 𝑛, where 𝑛 =
60 for ro-ro passenger ships and for passenger
ships other than ro-ro passenger ships, if the ship
has no more than three MVZ and 𝑛 = 80 if the
ship has more than three MVZ. Also, E+L
duration should not exceed 30 minutes to comply
with SOLAS Chapter III. Regulation 21.
The simulation results in terms of the time to
reach LSAs for passengers and crew are shown in
Figure 6 for both scenarios.
Figure 6. Cumulative plot for required time to
reach LSA for baseline scenario (blue) and
alternative scenario (orange)
For both scenarios the mustering time
considered the same to examine the time needed
from the muster stations to the LSAs. The
presumed outcome was verified by the
simulations, as the average time of 50 runs was
equal to 2751,4 [s] for the conventional solution,
while for the rail installation was 2371,0 [s],
meaning the reduction was approximately 14%. A
further reduction to the total evacuation time is
expected by using the novel LSAs, where the
embarkation and launching time will be
significantly less than using conventional LSAs.
Also, the resulting values are within IMO
Guidelines. In the context of the project, a more
detailed simulation analysis is performed,
including ship’s motion characteristics,
unforeseen event effects and factors related to
human behavior. For instance, reduction to speed
due to fire effluents is not considered, as this paper
refers only to a preliminary testing of the solution
Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on the Stability and Safety
of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, 7-11 June 2021, Glasgow, Scotland, UK
and since it affects both scenarios. However, it
will be included in later simulations, in the context
of SAFEPASS project.
10. CONCLUSIONS
Present paper is introducing a novel solution
for increasing availability and accessibility of
novel LSA lifeboats in case of an emergency on
large passenger vessels and reducing the required
evacuation time. The component analysis and
technical specifications may differ depending on
the LSA design and the operational requirements,
but in any case, should follow the basic design
approach presented earlier, including all safety
requirements. Maintenance is not considered to be
demanding and may be incorporated into the
general LSA equipment maintenance procedures.
The integration of the solution is feasible not only
in newbuilding cases as there are no space
limitations, but also in retrofits since the required
installation space is less than the existing one for
the conventional LSAs. Weight and cost are also
not considered as weaknesses of the solution,
while they could be further minimized in a later
detailed design by industry experts. The
validation of the solution through evacuation
simulations of a sample cruise ship presented
earlier, illustrates that there is significant
reduction of the required evacuation time by
adopting such a system. Finally, the synergy of
the rail platform with the additional proposed
design solutions that are developed in the context
of SAFEPASS will further reduce the overall
evacuation time.
11. ACKNOWLEDMENTS
This work was performed within the EU
H2020 program “SafePASS- Next generation of
life SAving appliances and systems for saFE and
swift evacuation operations on high capacity
PASSenger ships in extreme scenarios and
conditions”, which was funded by the EU under
Grant Agreement ID: 815146. The opinions
expressed herein are those of the authors and
European Commission is not responsible for any
use that may be made of the information it
contains.
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Design and Arrangements of Life-Saving
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Guarin L., Hifi Y., Vassalos D., 2014, “Passenger
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IMO, 1974, International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Chapter III,
“Life-saving appliances and arrangements”.
IMO, 2004, “Human element vision, principles
and goals for the organization”, Resolution
A.947(23).
IMO, 2006, “Guidelines on alternative design and
arrangements for SOLAS Chapters II-1 and III
(MSC.1/Circ.1212).”
IMO, 2016, “Revised Guidelines on Evacuation
Analysis for New and Existing Passenger
Ships (MSC.1/Circ.1533).
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