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Cite this article: Redhead D, Power EA. 2022
Social hierarchies and social networks
in humans. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 377:
20200440.
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0440
Received: 4 June 2021
Accepted: 4 August 2021
One contribution of 19 to a theme issue ‘The
centennial of the pecking order: current state
and future prospects for the study of
dominance hierarchies’.
Subject Areas:
behaviour, cognition, ecology
Keywords:
social status, social hierarchy, social networks,
social capital, social dynamics
Author for correspondence:
Daniel Redhead
e-mail: daniel_redhead@eva.mpg.de
Social hierarchies and social networks
in humans
Daniel Redhead
1
and Eleanor A. Power
2
1
Department of Human Behaviour, Ecology and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology,
04103 Leipzig, Germany
2
Department of Methodology, London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, UK
DR, 0000-0002-2809-8121; EAP, 0000-0002-3064-2050
Across species, social hierarchies are often governed by dominance relations.
In humans, where there are multiple culturally valued axes of distinction,
social hierarchies can take a variety of forms and need not rest on dominance
relations. Consequently, humans navigate multiple domains of status, i.e. rela-
tive standing. Importantly, while these hierarchies may be constructed from
dyadic interactions, they are often more fundamentally guided by subjective
peer evaluations and group perceptions. Researchers have typically focused
on the distinct elements that shape individuals’relative standing, with some
emphasizing individual-level attributes and others outlining emergent
macro-level structural outcomes. Here, we synthesize work across the social
sciences to suggest that the dynamic interplay between individual-level and
meso-level properties of the social networks in which individuals are
embedded are crucial for understanding the diverse processes of status differ-
entiation across groups. More specifically, we observe that humans not only
navigate multiple social hierarchies at any given time but also simultaneously
operate within multiple, overlapping social networks. There are important
dynamic feedbacks between social hierarchies and the characteristics of
social networks, asthe types of social relationships, their structural properties,
and the relative position of individuals within them both influence and are
influenced by status differentiation.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘The centennial of the pecking
order: current state and future prospects for the study of dominance
hierarchies’.
1. Introduction
Across many socially living species, individuals form social hierarchies.
An individual’s position within such hierarchies reliably governs the extent
of their social influence and access to group resources [1–3]. Many hierarchies
observed across non-human animal communities are generated by agonistic
interactions between individuals, which produce patterns of imbalance and
create asymmetric dominance relationships within groups [4–6]. Success
within such dominance hierarchies is determined by physiological differences,
signals and heuristics that allow these properties of local interaction to construct
relatively stable global hierarchies [7–9]. Analogous dynamics have been
observed within human hierarchies, with certain individuals achieving and
maintaining access to group resources through processes of intimidation,
coercion, manipulation and aggression (see [10–14], for disciplinary reviews).
Social hierarchies are, however, highly multidimensional systems. An
individual’s relative standing within a hierarchy is not always solely determined
by their success across agonistic contests. Empirical evidence from a variety of
non-human animals has highlighted that relative standing may be founded
upon an individual’s competence [14] and leverage [15], and is also inherited
[16]. Similar complexity has been observed among humans, where relative
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License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original
author and source are credited.
standing is commonly founded upon a composite of group
members’perceptions of their personal properties. A diversity
of assets (e.g. material holdings; [17]) and individual qualities
(e.g. skills and knowledge, prosociality; [18]) can help to estab-
lish a person’s relative standing. The perception of a person’s
attributes and behaviour is then derived from the social infor-
mation that people amass about one another—through direct
or indirect interaction [19,20] and gossip [21]. Importantly,
both the relevant qualities of individuals, and the perceptions
of those qualities, are guided and constrained by broad cultural
and socio-ecological factors.
In some contexts, human hierarchies are made particularly
explicit (e.g. formal and institutionalised orders of precedence
or seniority), while in others, they may be somewhat tacit,
instead inferred from the actions and orientations of others.
Humans, then, regularly form and navigate both formal
and informal hierarchies. Within formal hierarchies (e.g. cor-
porations, bureaucratic institutions, military groups), the
positions of individuals are explicitly mandated, and the
distribution of individual roles, responsibilities and social
influence are officially sanctioned and widely known
[11,22,23]. In informal hierarchies, the position of an individual
cannot be directly observed. Rather, the differentiation of indi-
viduals is inferred through observations of their social
interactions, assessments of their access to important group
resources, and peer perceptions of an individual’s social
influence, esteem and power [1,24].
Here, we define social hierarchies as fundamentally latent
processes that describe social relationships between individ-
uals and groups. By this definition, social hierarchies are
inherently socio-relational phenomena; an individual cannot
be high ranking without having a lower-ranking counterpart.
Members of a group may confer status to those observably
high in a given culturally valued attribute (or attributes)
through a form of social exchange, deferring to the individual
in the hope that it will help achieve personal goals [25–27].
These goals may be associated with desires for elevating
one’s own relative standing and access to social, informa-
tional or material resources or for protecting one’sown
interests and well-being [28]. Through processes of learning
and decision-making, individuals tend to converge on their
perceptions of others. This creates heuristics about the indi-
vidual properties that delineate status [29,30]. Given this,
the processes that determine who becomes high status—as
well as the meaning and outcomes of what high or low rela-
tive standing entails—are highly context dependent and
multi-modal, with individuals operating within different,
co-existing hierarchies across their daily lives [31].
We first review the existing literature on social hierarchy
among humans, which is typically focused on either the
macro-level mechanisms or the micro-level factors (e.g. indi-
vidual attributes) that govern status differentiation. We then
outline an emerging body of work that has been largely over-
looked in the evolutionary human sciences, which examines
social hierarchy from a network perspective. In doing this,
we outline how network properties can bolster or constrain
the status of certain individuals and further highlight how
such network characteristics can explain some of the vari-
ation in achievement of high social status observed across
cultural and ecological contexts (see figure 1).
MICRO-MESO LINK
An individual’s attributes and relative
standing are both a cause and a con-
sequence of their network position.
MICRO-MACRO LINK
Distinct individual-level axes of status
emerge across time and socio-ecological
settings based on their utility, as well as
perceptions of their value.
MACRO-LEVEL
The multiple axes on which
status distinction rests may be
centred around providing
functional benefits, or based
upon conventions.
MESO-MACRO LINK
The structure of interpersonal relationships
both guide and are guided by the dimensions
of a group’s social hierarchies.
MESO-LEVEL
Interpersonal relationships are core to
establishing and expressing status
differentiation. An individual’s position
within, and the overall structure of,
social networks will influence their
relative standing.
MICRO-LEVEL
An individual’s many attributes improve
or impair their relative standing. These
attributes may have different associations
with relative standing across time and
socio-ecological settings.
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the dynamic feedbacks operating across micro-, meso- and macro-levels that collectively shape social hierarchies in humans.
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 377: 20200440
2
2. Macro-level processes and the emergence of
social hierarchies
Recently, perspectives on why hierarchies emerge and persist
across a diverse array of ecological and cultural contexts
have begun to converge between the social and evolutionary
sciences. Status differentiation, at its core, helps to facilitate
coordination and collective action [32–35]. Problems of collec-
tive action and coordination abound across all socially living
species and describe situations where individuals benefit
from adjusting their own preferences and actions to align
with the—potentially conflicting—actions and motivations
of those around them [36,37]. Humans have a striking
aptitude for participating in these collaborative actions that
produce higher benefits to all involved parties than if they
were to act alone [38,39]. For example, we coordinate irriga-
tion across entire watersheds and follow abstract rules
about which side of the road to drive on.
The emergence of effective coordination and collective
action within groups is, however, challenging and can often
be undermined by individuals acting in their own self
interest. Such individuals—commonly termed ‘freeriders’
or ‘defectors’—may act selfishly and reap the benefits of a
group’s collective efforts without providing their own contri-
butions [40,41]. Theory and evidence suggest that groups
tackle free riding and reduce the costs of coordination when cer-
tain individuals have disproportionate social influence (i.e.
direct group efforts, and monitor the actions of others [42–44])
and when individuals who contribute to the collective effort
are rewarded (be those rewards social or material [45,46]).
Through these processes, social status—both heightened
social influence and greater access to resources—may well be
attributed to individuals who have qualities, abilities or
motivations that increase their capacity to provide benefits to
other group members [13,19,28,47,48]. The qualities or abilities
that are valued may vary across different socio-ecological
settings, and so too, then, should the axes upon which status
is apportioned. In contexts where skill is particularly funda-
mental to productive returns, status differentiation may rest
on such distinctions, as with the importance given to skill
and knowledge related to hunting in many hunter–gatherer
societies [49]. Where coordination is particularly crucial for
production or defence, charisma and oratorial skills may be
foundational to status hierarchies [50,51]. In contrast, where
returns to production are driven more by assets, rather
than skill or time invested, as in many pastoralist and agricul-
turalist societies, delineations of wealth may be the crucial
axis along which status is marked [52,53]. This wealth is
often the substance of exchange and patron–client relation-
ships, both marking status and also providing for the
possibility of the redistribution of wealth (e.g. of cattle [54]).
While the particular attributes or abilities that confer status
are different across contexts, they could each be interpreted
as providing functional benefits for all group members in the
particular socio-ecological setting.
However, it may also be the case that status hierarchies
rest not on obvious differences in ability, but rather on see-
mingly arbitrary distinctions. Individuals are better able to
calibrate their behaviour when interactions are structured
by rules, or behavioural regularities, that rest on easily dis-
tinguishable attributes [55]. These behavioural regularities
are often termed conventions [56,57]. Just as language and
driving on a specific side of the road are conventions that
facilitate collective action and coordination, so too may social
hierarchies rest on conventions. Rather than being adaptive
responses to a particular aspect of the socio-ecology, then, the
axes on which status differentiation is expressed may at some
level be arbitrary, culturally learned conventions. Social hierar-
chy may have emerged as a near-universal form of social
organisation because of its functional benefits, but that does
not mean that the axes along which an individual’s relative
standing are reckoned need always be functionally beneficial.
In many cases, an individual’s status is based not on
attributes that directly impact their ability to provide benefits
to others, but rather on markers of an individual’s social
worth or on presumed correlates of perceived ability or com-
petency. This creates a contrast between functionally
beneficial status arising from actual ability and convention-
ally assigned status emerging from normative judgements
of an individual’s worth. Consider, for example, artists,
who may certainly be highly skilled, but whose work will
be valued based on—and their status determined by—cultu-
rally specific assertions of worth.
This grounding in normative judgements highlights how
status hierarchies (for humans in particular) may be based on
subjective assessments that take into account the judgements
of others. In line with this, social influence (i.e. our reliance
on others’assessments when forming our own) appears to
play a key role in how closely status and ‘quality’align. As
people rely more on social information, the discrepancy
between status and quality can grow [58,59]. And, once axes
of status differentiation are established, they can readily
become entrenched [60]. This may be true even if such axes
cease to be meaningful in a particular socio-ecological context
(e.g. [61]). Many evolutionary psychologists see such reliance
on seemingly ‘defective’cues or signals to an individual’s abil-
ity to provide benefits to others as cases of evolutionary
‘mismatch’(e.g. [62]). However, it may be more plausible to
interpret such conventions surrounding the conferral of
status as emerging from processes of social learning (e.g. the
formal theoretical literature examining the (cultural) evolution
of inequality reviewed in [32]).
Regardless of whether an individual’s relative standing is
derived from functionally beneficial attributes or heuristics
based on conventions, status differentiation has seemingly
emerged as an effective tool for overcoming problems of collec-
tive action and coordination. This is in part because, insofar as
deference is given to those of relatively high status, those of
high status may still be well positioned to influence others. It
is important to note, however, that while many forms of
social hierarchy observed among human groups do provide
benefits to coordination and collective action, the extent of
inequality within such hierarchies can be consequential (see
[33]). In many cases, those with low relative standing will
receive minimal benefits, and upward mobility across the hier-
archy may be challenging. Alongside this, some human groups
may, to a lesser extent, be organized within hierarchies that are
determined through purely agonistic interactions [63]. Such
hierarchies are centred on individual self-interest and the abil-
ity to inflict harm, providing only individual-level benefits for
those able to reach high relative standing and have limited
impact on a group’s ability to coordinate or act collectively
(although see [47], for evidence that such hierarchies may aid
collective action in the context of inter-group conflict).
To further disentangle the processes that guide the
emergence of these social hierarchies, we turn our attention
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3
to the empirical literature to establish what individual
attributes are associated with increasing, or decreasing, an
individual’s relative standing across societies.
3. The micro-level factors: individual attributes
shape status differentiation
The desire to attain social status has been posited as a
fundamental human motivation. Given this, theory is framed
around individuals first aspiring to attain high social status
and aiming to maintain their status once they occupy privi-
leged positions within a hierarchy [64–66]. The reasoning
behind these arguments is that having high relative standing
grants a wealth of individual benefits, such as improved repro-
duction and survival (reviewed in [67,68]), and greater health
status and subjective well-being (see [69], for a review). For
the most part, the spotlight remains on trying to test hypoth-
eses about the individual-level correlates of high status, with
general neglect of the individual-level attributes, and macro-
level constraints on such attributes, that precipitate low relative
standing. For the remainder of this section, we overview the
individual-level attributes that existing research has suggested
to be important axes of status distinction.
(a) Physiological cues
Empirical examinations of the antecedents of status often
follow experimental designs where the physical character-
istics of an individual—such as their facial symmetry, facial
height-to-width radio and observable muscle mass—are
manipulated. These manipulations aim to portray different
social information about an individual’s qualities, such as
their behavioural dispositions (e.g. their prosociality and
cooperativeness [70–72]) or physical formidability (i.e. their
ability to inflict harm or act with force [73–77]), which are
proposed to impact relatively convergent impressions of
their competence and leadership ability [78,79]. These studies
provide some evidence as to the abstract physiological axes
of, and preferences guiding, status distinction, and some of
these features (e.g. physical strength and size) correlate with
increased social status in observational settings (this has,
however, only been investigated in samples of men [18,80]).
While these experimental examinations are often framed
around relational narratives and aim to reduce complex status
processes to manipulable quantities, their analytical framework
generally treats status as an attribute of the individual. In doing
so, a substantial amount of information about the properties
of the individuals, and their relative standing, is abstracted to
such a degree that the overall generalizability of the findings
is highly constrained. Assessing individual attributes in silo
may also place inordinate weight on characteristics that have
limited importance in real-life settings. That is, many of these
results may be robust when all else is held equal, but it is
impossible for all else to be assumed constant, given that
status is fundamentally a socio-relational process.
(b) Age structure
Community elders are often accorded deference [81], enjoy
positions of high relative standing [82] and occupy positions
of leadership [83]. While age may not necessarily be a causal
determinant of an individual’s relative standing, an individ-
ual’s age carries an abundance of important information
about them. As knowledge and skills are built over the life
course, age should reflect this accumulation. For example,
ethnographic evidence has shown that age tracks individuals’
accumulated wealth among the Siuai [84] and culturally
important knowledge among the Mekranoti [85].
This evidence suggests that status differentiation may have
an age structure. Relative standing may be important only
when comparing individuals of a similar age, who are vying
for access to resources that are particularly meaningful at that
stage in the lifespan. Thus, the axes in which status is differen-
tiated may be unique to, and constrained by, the specific age
class to which an individual belongs. For example, young
adulthood may be when status competition is paramount,
with individuals entering the market for sexual and marital
partners and striving to forge a reputation that provides
them solid grounding for success throughout their lifetime.
Indeed, a correlation between high relative standing, marrying
younger and having more marital partners has been shown
among men in the Tsimane of lowland Bolivia [86].
(c) Gender
Across the majority of human societies, men operate within
public spheres and occupy more privileged positions of pub-
licly visible status than women [87]. It is commonly assumed
that women are unable to attain high relative standing in com-
munities due to the sexual division of labour: with biological
females acting as ‘carers’and biological males as ‘competitors’
caused by differences in pay-offs and investment incentives
[88]. Previous research has also emphasized that sexual
dimorphism in physical strength and size, and sex-specific
differences in how to best obtain and use resources for repro-
ductive success (e.g. female-specific investment associated
with reproduction) created universal patterns of male leader-
ship and status elevation [87,89,90]. Importantly, however,
in contexts where these constraints and associated trade-offs
are effectively less severe, gender dynamics play out in very
different ways (e.g. [91,92]).
While these biological constraints may have played some
part in paving the way for status inequity between the sexes,
the sexual division of labour is a product of complex co-evol-
utionary processes [93]. Women’s involvement in public
status arenas is highly constrained by cultural beliefs and
norms about gender [94]. Women may be as able and willing
as men in any given status domain (e.g. they are able to pro-
vide functional benefits to others), but cultural conventions
about expected gender-specific behaviours or attributes (e.g.
women should express ‘communal’behaviours, such as
being sympathetic and gentle, while men should be agentic
competitors [95]) and gender roles (e.g. women as the home-
maker, and men as the responsible worker or authoritative
leader [96]) may prejudice against high relative standing
for women and female leadership [97,98]. Importantly,
these cultural conventions may result in the same patterns
of association between gender and status as would be pre-
dicted by sexual selection, despite very different underlying
mechanisms. The observed patterns of gender differences
in status may thus be the result of cultural evolutionary
processes that favoured the use of easily observable—and
potentially arbitrary—‘types’(such as man/woman) as
status heuristics [32], rather than being driven by any
underlying biological differences between the genders.
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4
(d) Group identities
Other group identities—such as race or ethnicity, caste, sexual
identity and social class—similarly facilitate or constrain status
attainment [99,100]. Many human communities consist of
different sub-groups, which are marked by seemingly arbitrary
cultural traits (such as types of dress, speech [101]). These mar-
kers are thought to facilitate cooperation [102], by allowing
individuals to easily assort with others who share their
norms and values [103]. Conventions governing cooperation
based on group identity can produce inequality between
groups. Certain groups may obtain privileged positions
based on these arbitrary distinctions, with or without any
overt discrimination [104]. Which group gains a position of
high standing may, for example, be determined by whether
there are asymmetries between these groups, such as differ-
ences in their population size, strength and power, or wealth
[32]. Through these processes, certain individuals may enjoy
elevated status within their group or have constrained
opportunities to better their social position [105–107].
(e) Material wealth
Functional accounts of status differentiation often posit that
status is conferred to those who are able to provide benefits
to others [108]. Given this, individuals with a large amount
of material wealth are commonly found to have high relative
status. In an Inuit community in the Canadian Arctic, for
example, those who can afford the expensive equipment
necessary to harvest traditional foods (e.g. seal, caribou)
can widely share their sizable yields, increasing their relative
status within the community [109]. Substantial material
wealth inequality has been observed across a variety of cul-
tural and ecological settings [110], in part because wealth
may be earned not only through an individual’sown
labour but also through inheritance across generations [111].
Material wealth also allows individuals to acquire cultu-
rally valued goods, tastes or preferences [112]. These lend
themselves to favourable perceptions of the individual’s rela-
tive standing within a community [113]. Those high in wealth
are consequently perceived as being competent in culturally
valued domains—regardless of whether they are actually
competent—with others consequently conferring status to
them [114]. These processes also lead to constraints to the
relative status of individuals who lack wealth, as well as
the cultural capital that accompanies it [115].
(f) Personality and individual differences
Although attributes, such as material wealth, allow individuals
to be able to confer benefits to others, this need not mean that
they are motivated or willing to do so. Thus, an individual’s
status may not be solely determined by whether they have
amassed material wealth, but by how they use it. Indeed,
research has suggested that individuals with more generous,
agreeable and prosocial dispositions occupy positions of high
relative standing [116,117]. Alongside this, studies have exam-
ined how certain personality traits are correlated with status
[118–120]. For example, those high in self-esteem [121,122],
self-monitoring [123,124] and extraversion [125] are often more
likable, socially included, respected and conferred social status.
However, fear, manipulation and coercive behaviours may also
be positively correlated with status. These include narcissism
[126] and different forms of dispositional aggression [127,128].
These individual-level correlates of social status are
regularly conceptualized as broad, latent factors constructed
from a composite of individual attributes [28,65,119]. There
can be methodological and theoretical utility in doing so as
the joint contribution of highly co-varying traits may be the
target of analysis (e.g. composite’s of an individual’s‘pres-
tige’or ‘dominance’[19]). Various dimension reduction
techniques are therefore often used, as high dimensional
analysis may be intractable, as well as hard to interpret
[129]. However, the correlations that many of these personal-
ity trait and individual differences have with status are
often minimal across cultural and ecological settings. Many
of these folk concepts have limited meaning, with their con-
ceptual entities and measurable units taking myriad forms
[130,131], and standard measurement instruments (e.g.
Likert scales) used to measure these constructs do not transfer
across contexts [132].
Many of the individual-level axes that we have discussed
tend to be viewed as stable, time-invariant traits that have
near-universal associations with status differentiation. This
framing may be a consequence of the cross-sectional and
experimental research designs used in many studies. However,
the expression of many of these attributes, and their (bi-
directional) associations with social status, likely vary over
time [60]. This temporal variation may be not only due to
underlying changes in attributes (e.g. a person’s wealth can
change) but may also be due to changes in the composition
of the population (e.g. a person is considered wealthy when
they have more assets compared to other group members). The
expression of any attribute or disposition (e.g. aggression)
may be context specific (i.e. a person’s aggressiveness may
change based on the set of people they are interacting with),
meaning that individuals may be assessed differently by
different observers [133].
4. The meso-level properties: social networks
and status differentiation
Our attention so far, following the literature, has been on
the individual attributes and qualities that play a role in
determining a person’s position within social hierarchies.
By conceptualizing social status as a socio-relational process,
however, we highlight how these individual attributes (or
personal resources) are socially contextualized and socially
realized. The culturally desirable individual attributes,
the emergence of status differentiation and the resources
associated with high or low relative status are embedded
within networks of social relationships and interactions
[66,134,135]. Access to these social resources is often glossed
as an individual’ssocial capital [66,112,136]. While popular,
social capital as a concept remains nebulous, thanks to the
multitude of definitions that it has received [137]. We
approach social capital following Lin [66, p. 29], to mean
‘resources embedded in a social structure that are accessed
and/or mobilized in purposive actions’. This includes tangi-
ble resources, such as borrowing a neighbour’s equipment, or
more intangible ones, such as getting a mentor’s endorse-
ment: either could be crucial in advancing a person’s
relative position. Here, we review how different aspects of a
person’s social connections and social position may also be
associated with their relative status(es).
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 377: 20200440
5
(a) Social structure and social status
Social structure emerges from patterns of social interaction and
social relationships within a population [136]. Social inter-
actions are events in which sets of individuals (e.g. a dyad)
engage in types of behaviours towards one another [5,138].
These behaviours may, for example, be moments of verbal or
non-verbal communication or the exchange of goods. When
individuals are involved in a series of interactions, they form
perceptions of and sentiments towards their counterparts and
createmore generalized patterns of behaviour with one another
[5,138,139]. That is, they form social relationships. Social
relationships may, then, emerge informally through repeat
engagements in particular types of interactions and enduring
sentiments (e.g. friendships [140]), or be dictated by formal
roles (e.g. in employment contexts, or kin relations [138]). Inter-
actions and social relationships are rarely static or randomly
patterned, and their temporal dynamics bring about observable
global properties of a group. Here, we briefly outline the direct
associations that interactions, social relationships and social
structure have with status differentiation.
Among humans, and other animals, hierarchies can be
built up from individual’s perceptions not only of competi-
tive interactions but also of cooperative exchanges of
important resources [141]. These exchanges may be material
(e.g. transfers of food, monetary loans) or informational
(e.g. transmission of gossip or important cultural infor-
mation). For example, in many hunter–gatherer societies,
sharing the spoils of a hunt with others can be a key way
to enhance a hunter’s relative standing [142,141]. Where
material resources can be more readily accumulated, we see
more pronounced patterns of status differentiation through
generous acts, such as the moka exchanges seen in ‘big man’
societies in Melanesia [144]. Indeed, many societies have
patron–client systems where a person’s standing is built
and expressed through acts of largess [145].
As with social status, more subjective or cognitive
representations of social relationships (i.e. who individuals
believe to be their friends) are paramount for humans [139].
Importantly, social relationships are where social capital is
embedded and are thus crucial for determining the structural
properties of social hierarchies and the relative status of individ-
uals [135]. Relationships of different strengths (e.g. acquaintance,
best friend) and types (e.g. ally, kin) provide access to distinct
material and informational resources [66]. For example, individ-
uals may be more willing to loan money to a friend or relative
and may not expect the loan to be repaid in full or within a
strict time-frame, as they would with a stranger [146].
The social networks in which humans—and many socially-
living species [147]—operate are often multilayer [148], with
individuals navigating several social relationships at any
point in time. The ‘layers’within these networks can be comp-
lementary (e.g. friendship and advice-giving) with one
relationship promoting the other, or competing, with one
relationship precluding another (e.g. drug-sharing and employ-
ment [149]). In some cases, then, relationships can be a burden,
creating obligations and constraining action. Therefore, individ-
uals may be selective about the relationships they foster with
others, as each distinct relationship is either directly or
indirectly associated with certain important resources, and obli-
gations, within their network(s). These inter-relations between
network layers may thus be leveraged to attain and maintain
status, with more affective relationships (e.g. friendship, kinship)
providing a platform for, or constraining, instrumental connec-
tions (e.g. help finding a job), and vice versa [135].
(b) Social capital and network position
(i) Direct connections
Alongside an individual’s personal properties, the structural
position they occupy within their social networks may also
shape status attainment. One of the clearest relational associ-
ates with status attainment is the number of relationships that
an individual enjoys [150], referred to in network terms as
degree centrality [151]. For example, in schools, higher status
children and adolescents are often those who have the most
friends [152], or are considered most popular among their
peers [153,154]. Similarly, adults who have the most social
support (e.g. food sharing and food production) partners
are high status in several societies [98,155,156].
Having numerous partners can facilitate the acquisition
and maintenance of high relative standing through the social
capital that these relationships build [157]. This high relative
standing has an important impact on many outcomes, as
there is, for example, ample evidence of a strong positive
relationship between social support and health [158–160]. Indi-
viduals can effectively call upon those who they have ties
with—who are either motivated or obligated to contribute
their resources—for social, political or material support [161].
By accessing the resources embedded within their personal
network, well-connected individuals likely have greater, and
more diverse, resources at their disposal [162]. Individuals
with relatively fewer connections, in contrast, may find
themselves more reliant on their own assets.
(ii) Network position
Partners may be important not only for theresourcesthey hold
but also for the positions they hold and the resources they can,
in turn, access. Resources flow indirectly withinnetworks as an
individual may access and mobilize the resources of a mutual
acquaintance (e.g. friends of a friend [163]). In a recent theoreti-
cal model of hierarchy formation, Kawakatsu et al. [164]
highlight the importance of this process: interactions (or
‘endorsements’) produce stable hierarchies through social
reinforcement, and interactions with better connected individ-
uals provide greater contributions to an individual’s relative
status than with those who are less connected. Empirical evi-
dence of the inheritance of both social status and social
connections in hyaenas suggests such processes may well be
in operation in non-human animals as well [165]. In the context
of social capital, this centrality related social reinforcement
highlights the importance of access to, and mobilization
across, many connections, as more privileged positions pro-
vide greater access to important resources. Empirically, this
idea has been operationalized through several centrality
metrics, such as eigenvector [166], PageRank [167] and Spring-
Rank centrality [168].
Alongside this, individuals who are connected to multiple
unconnected others may occupy privileged positions, as they
serve as ‘brokers’across the divide. Examples of this abound
in formal hierarchies in organizational settings, where the
hierarchy is fixed, and interactions are largely patterned by
an individual’s official position. These examples often high-
light the association between brokering information, and
effective leadership and decision-making within companies
[169,170]. ‘Brokerage’has also been shown to influence
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 377: 20200440
6
relative standing in more dynamic networks, and informal
social hierarchies. For instance, among the Orokaiva in
Papua New Guinea, households positioned on the shortest
paths between many other households within taro gift
exchange networks (i.e. those with high betweenness) typically
accumulate the most political and social support, as they have
power to mediate resource flow and relationships between
unconnected households [171]. By serving as such essential
intermediaries, they are able to reap more of the rewards
of whatever may flow through the network (whether
informational or material [172,173]).
The idea of brokerage and bridging also extends to indi-
viduals who find themselves with connections between
distinct and unconnected groups, bringing novel information
and resources, and fostering advantageous connections
and relationships between previously disconnected others
[174–176]. These brokers have high relative status in contexts
where interaction and relative standing are less formally
mandated (e.g. [177]). For example, Matsigenka teachers in
schools in and around Manu National Park in Peru often
bridge communication, and facilitate the transmission of cul-
tural norms, between Matsigenka and Mestizo communities.
Given the unique resources (both material and informational)
associated with this position, these teachers are highly
respected and are elected as community representatives
[178,179, pp. 113–115].
While, in certain contexts, bridging between unconnected
groups may facilitate brokerage, such positions can also be
fragile and met with suspicion, constraining an individual’s
relative standing [176]. For example, fishers in Hawaii’s
pelagic tuna fishery who bridged between ethnic groups, or
smaller, structurally distinct groups, inspired lower trusted,
and so were less economically productive [180]. The nature
of relationships and setting is important to understanding
the potential benefits—and costs—of brokerage. More gener-
ally, individuals who occupy peripheral positions within a
network are likely to be constrained in their ability to
improve their relative standing. For example, women often
have limited access to well-positioned others and thus are
less able to mobilize the valuable resources that are
embedded more centrally within a network, which can
crucially hinder their ability to build status [181,182].
(iii) Homophily and heterophily
Individuals not only associate with those of similar network
positions but also selectively assort with others who possess
similar, or the same, personal qualities to themselves (i.e.
homophily [183,184]). In the context of status differentiation,
individuals may preferentially associate with others who are
of a similar status, or express similar levels of status-related
individual attributes. This may be due to individual differ-
ences related to status differentiation producing distinct
resources [185]. For example, there is ample evidence of
status homogamy, i.e. homophily between marital partners,
on the basis of educational attainment or earnings [186].
Patterns of heterophily (i.e. preference for making connec-
tions with dissimilar others) are also observed in social
relationships in the context of status differentiation. There is
reason to expect this, as individuals with low relative standing
attach greater value to resources of high status counterparts,
and thus compete to forge relationships and acquire access to
such resources [187,188]. High status individuals, on the
other hand, may prefer to connect with those lower in relative
standing, given their greater bargaining power within such
relationships [189], and are also likely competing with other
high status individuals for these relationships to bolster percep-
tions of their relative value within their communities [156,161].
Heterophilous relationships may be beneficial to both parties,
if status differentials align with different resources, roles or
skills that are themselves complementary (e.g. a land owner
and a gardener).
(iv) Network structure
Global attributes of a network may also influence status
differentiation [190]. The extent to which others are aware
of an individual’s actions and interactions should shape
how consequential those are for altering their relative stand-
ing. In larger or sparser networks (i.e. low density networks
where there are fewer connections between individuals), it
may be harder for status-relevant information to circulate,
leading to fragmentation in the assessments of an individ-
ual’s status. Similarly, networks with clear community
structure (i.e. distinct clusters of individuals) may result in
different communities variably observing and interpreting
an individual’s actions and so arriving at different assess-
ments of their relative standing. A community with a
sparse network and weakly connected components may
also find it hard to coordinate collective action, allowing
for the few well-situated individuals to hold power and
prevent any coalitions that might challenge them, effecti-
vely increasing inequality [191]. The extent to which
resources and connections are concentrated around a few
individuals (i.e. network centralisation and the shape of the
degree distribution), and the linearity of the social hierarchy,
may influence how readily an individual could improve
their position. Through this, the structure and properties
of a network can shape the global characteristics of a social
hierarchy, and further constrain or bias individuals’percep-
tions of status-related personal qualities of others within
their network(s).
5. Feedback loops everywhere: the dynamics
between the levels
Network-based frameworks for understanding human social
hierarchy are distinct in their ability to couple the macro-level
processes and the individual-level characteristics that shape
an individual’s relative standing. These processes may be
directly associated or may develop indirectly through meso-
level properties of a network. For example, it is difficult in
certain communities for women to attain public positions
of high social status. This may be due not to cultural rules
prohibiting female status attainment or to any sexually
dimorphic trait that favours male physiology in producing
public goods. Rather, gender differences in status attainment
could materialize through indirect processes that constrain
female relationships (e.g. ideas of modesty and honour that
shape Bedouin women’s actions and interpersonal relation-
ships [192]) and thus constrict a woman’s leverage within
her social network(s). Particularly given the inherently rela-
tional nature of status, it is important to consider how
feedbacks across scales may further shape status hierarchies
[109].
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7
(a) Success breeds success
Moreso than in other species, humans’assessment of status is
shaped by perception and the (collective) social assessment of
performance and value. This social influence can readily lead
to a positive feedback loop where success breeds success
[193], often referred to as the Matthew Effect [194,195]. This
cumulative advantage can lead not only to the entrenchment
of status differentials but also to status dispersion, as well-
positioned individuals compound the benefits of their station
[59,187,196,197], all of which can further privilege already
advantaged groups [198]. Similar feedbacks may be in oper-
ation for individuals who find themselves in advantaged
network positions. For example, individuals who broker con-
nections between disconnected groups and thus harbour
useful resources may become central to their primary net-
work(s) over time. Importantly, these advantages may help
individuals acquire the attributes that facilitate status
advancement, as when social capital builds human capital
[136]. The corollary here may also be true: those who are rela-
tively marginalized or of lower standing may face greater
hurdles to achieving status, regardless of their attributes.
They may face a ‘reputational poverty trap’[199] where
they are less able to reap the reputational and status benefits
of their actions.
(b) Homophily revisited: network selection and network
influence
As aforementioned, theory suggests that individuals tend to
assort with those who are similar to themselves. The effects
of this assortment may compound over time or generations
to increase inequality in status [197,200]. While status-based
homophily, also referred to as network selection, may certainly
shape the observed patterns of similarity between connected
individuals, a distinct mechanism, network influence (or ‘conta-
gion’), can also cause this observed similarity [201]. That is,
individuals may not preferentially form relationships to similar
others but, over time, may become more similar to their part-
ners because of their relationship [202,203]. This is especially
important to consider when assessing the causal mechanisms
creating similarity in the context of social capital (reviewed in
[204]), where individuals have the resources of their connec-
tions at their disposal. This process was examined in a
longitudinal study among the Tsimane [156], where von
Rueden et al. highlighted that individuals may be motivated
to form certain relationships (e.g. food sharing, alliance for-
mation) with status-dissimilar others through mutual
aspiration to increase (or, for those high in status, maintain)
their status. Through the social capital that such ties create—
especially for the lower-status counterpart—the statuses of
these individuals become increasingly similar over time. Con-
sequently, observed similarity between individuals could be
as a product of either network selection or network influence,
or both.
Clearly, an individual’s qualities, assets and network pos-
ition will shape their ability to attain high social status.
Above, we reviewed the substantial empirical evidence of
strong positive associations between such elements and
achieved status. But we also suggested that, in humans in par-
ticular, there is ample room for status hierarchies to be shaped
by things other than the attributes nominally determining its
structure, most notably, the social relationships that link
individuals together. Not only can those relationships directly
benefit individuals, as we outlined earlier, but so too can
people’s perceptions of such relationships and statuses [205].
The knowledge that others choose to associate with a person
or accord them status can help make an individual’s status
more widely visible to the group and further increase the like-
lihood of these other group members conferring status to that
individual [156]. This use of social information and the referen-
tial feedbacks it can produce can therefore also help to sustain
social hierarchies, whether based on conventions or on func-
tionally beneficial attributes. It is therefore crucial to consider
the dynamic feedbacks—operating across scales—that produce
observed status hierarchies.
6. Conclusion and future directions
The aim of this review has been to frame status differentiation
as a socio-relational process and outline the extant literature
that draws attention to the dynamics of social hierarchy.
In following the literature, our review has highlighted the
macro-level processes and micro-level factors that shape
status differentiation across human societies. We have
argued that while social hierarchy may provide functional
benefits for coordination and collective action, the particular
axes along which status is differentiated need not be func-
tionally beneficial and can instead be culturally learned
conventions. We further extend the literature by integrating
theory and evidence of the meso-level properties that are
key to linking these micro- and macro-level processes (see
figure 1). This has highlighted the utility of taking a net-
work-based approach to understanding and investigating
human social hierarchies. In doing this, we hope to inspire
future research that embraces that complexity associated
with the dynamics of human social hierarchy and considers
status differentiation as an ongoing process.
We see many fruitful avenues for further work building on
this perspective. First, detailed comparative work should be
conducted to document and assess the meaning of social hier-
archies across cultural and ecological settings. Comparison
could also be fruitful across different species: many of the com-
plexities explored here are likely not unique to humans but
may also occur in other social living species. This comparative
work may further unpack the factors that have brought about
observed similarities and differences in the axes of status
differentiation across human (and non-human) communities.
Second, future research should explore how statusis enacted
in practice. Ethnographic (and ethological) research can provide
rich detail on how individuals navigate the various status hier-
archiesthat they are embedded in, and how those are entangled
with other aspects of sociality. How does status differentiation
articulate with the closely related concept of leadership (see
the recent discussion in [44,206,207])? And how might the
association between status and leadership vary across contexts?
These questions will require observational work, which will be
essential, but inevitably challenging, given the many
complexities and feedbacks we have outlined here.
Longitudinal research will be particularly crucial for
future research to examine the dynamics feedbacks that we
have outlined. Having longitudinal data allows researchers
to examine how processes of status differentiation operate
across different timescales. Through this, such research is
better able to determine how functional and conventional
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 377: 20200440
8
forms of status differentiation may emerge within groups.
Alongside this, longitudinal research can further establish
the age structure of social hierarchies and characterize
status dynamics across an individual’s life course.
The practicalities of exploring these research avenues are
daunting, but have recently become more feasible. Advanced
tools for data collection (e.g. [208]) and network inference are
continually being developed and refined. Generative network
models, such as exponential random graph models [209],
stochastic actor-oriented models [210], and latent network
frameworks [211] hold particular promise, as they allow for the
simultaneous consideration of multiple mechanisms operating
across scales. New toolsthat allow for yet more complex network
structure (e.g. multilayer network data) are also being rapidly
developed, holding new promise for the field (e.g. [212]).
Useful guides introducing these new methods and their utility
are an important resource for researchers interested in taking
up this call (e.g. [213–217]). By incorporating these methodo-
logical advances, future research will provide important
advances to our understanding of how status is attained and
maintained, and which factors shape the diversity of social
hierarchies observed among human and non-human groups.
Data accessibility. This article has no additional data.
Competing interests. The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
Funding. Open access funding provided by the Max Planck Society.
D.R. was supported by the Department of Human Behaviour,
Ecology and Culture at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary
Anthropology.
Acknowledgements. The authors would like to thank Elspeth Ready,
Riana Minocher, Elena Miu and John Bunce for providing helpful
feedback on an earlier iteration of the manuscript. We would also
like to thank Linda Schymanski and Ronny Barr in the multimedia
department at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropol-
ogy for creating the infographic presented in the manuscript.
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