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J. S. Asian Stud. 08 (01) 2019. 13-24 DOI: 10.33687/jsas.008.01.3319
13
Available Online at EScience Press
Journal of South Asian Studies
ISSN: 2307-4000 (Online), 2308-7846 (Print)
https://esciencepress.net/journals/JSAS
THREAT ASYMMETRY AND TRANSITION IN DETERRENCE: TECHNICAL
ASSESSMENT OF INDIA’S BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SHIELD
Furqan Khan, Khadijah Saeed
Department of International Relations at the National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan.
*Corresponding Author Email ID: Furqankhans66@gmail.com
A B S T R A C T
The global change in perception following the Cold War from deterrence by punishment in the form of Mutually
Assured Destruction (MAD) to deterrence by denial has multiplied the utility of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).
India’s willingness to acquire and develop the advanced BMD shield is inspired, especially by Reagan’s Star Wars and
the global shift in using it as an instrument of deterrence by denial. But as the application of its offensive-defensive
paradox, India is raising a multi-layer air defense system to enhance its freedom of action and to acquire impunity in
carrying out what New Delhi believes as its ‘limited war’ strategy against Pakistan. However, despite having a
number of air defense systems in place including the recently acquired advanced S-400 air defense system, India is
unable to shield itself completely from the counter-force or counter-value strikes by Pakistan as evident by the
Balakot debacle. This is not only because India lags behind in BMD technology but also because of its inability to
afford a comprehensive pan-national BMD shield. Therefore, the paper argues that, India’s attempt to build a multi-
layer air defense system, rather than ensuring balance of power, destabilizes it and the delicate deterrence in place.
This is because the threat asymmetry allows Pakistan to develop advanced nuclear capabilities including BMD
evading delivery vehicles like MIRV as the offensive firepower to communicate the threat as an effective deterrence.
Resultantly, the employment of BMD in South Asia disturbs strategic parity, fractures deterrence, drags down
nuclear threshold and hence raises the cost of conflict between Pakistan and India with an elevated threat of
annihilation.
Keywords: Air Defense, Counter-Force, Counter-value, Deterrence, Limited War, MAD, BMD, Offensive-Defensive
Paradox, Pre-emptive, Star Wars.
INTRODUCTION
Cold War and the ensuing technological advancement re-
sketched the strategic deterrence mechanism of major
powers. The developments of the Cold War shaped the
evolution of strategic calculations and deterrence
maneuvering in the nuclear sphere where states relied
on MAD for ensuring a peaceful strategic environment.
MAD was based on the “maintenance of strategic nuclear
forces that could survive the first strike in sufficient
numbers to pose an unacceptable threat to the
adversary’s population and industrial centres” (Flex,
1985: 33). However, the gradual uncertainty in war and
nature of the nuclear conflict with sophisticated ballistic
and cruise missiles have challenged the concept of
simple nuclear missile deterrence and MAD. Kumar
argues that “missile defences were initially seen as an
ideal way out of the MAD trap. While threats of assured
destruction and massive retaliation have primarily
guided deterrence equations between nuclear powers,
the propriety of leaving space for mutual vulnerability is
now finding few takers” (Kumar, 2010: 10). Hence, with
Reagan’s Star War speech, the US and other major
powers emphasized raising the utility of BMD in
ensuring security against a ‘ragged retaliation’ from the
adversaries.
From Nike Zeus Missiles in the 1950s to the MIM PAAC-4
Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) in 2019, the United States has developed a
J. S. Asian Stud. 08 (01) 2019. 13-24 DOI: 10.33687/jsas.008.01.3319
14
comprehensive missile defence shield to protect its
interests at home and abroad. Proponents of the BMD in
the US doubt the perception of nuclear deterrence and
believe that expecting nuclear restraint from the so-
called ‘rogue sates’ is “historically misguided and
strategically unsound” (Tow & Choong, 2001: 380). The
desire to build a missile defense system is equally
inspired by the “missile renaissance” identified by
sophistication in missile technology including speed,
precision and credible strike capabilities of the latest
cruise and ballistic missiles in the post World War II era
(Karako, 2017: 50). Such sophistication is identified by
advancement in multiple delivery systems including
“guided and unguided rockets, artillery and mortars,
supersonic and subsonic long-range cruise missiles with
improved guidance and evasion, guided and
manoeuvring re-entry vehicles, depressed trajectory
ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles Improved in range,
survivability and mobility, anti-ship missiles of various
kinds, missile boosted hypersonic glide vehicles, and
missile boosted anti-satellite weapon systems”(Karako,
2017: 49). Therefore, India plans to build a similar
comprehensive missile defense shield to offset the threat
of advanced ballistic and cruise missiles from Pakistan
as well as to improve its standing as the security
provider with enhanced freedom of action vis-à-vis its
regional adversaries. Additionally, China also happens to
be India’s primary source of insecurity and hence a
reason to deploy an advance weapon system along its
border to offset air challenge from China and improve its
ability to strike or counter-strike, the like of which is
carried out against Pakistan in Balakot. The tensions
with China in Eastern Ladakh last year has increased
prospects for India to deploy an advance BMD system
along the disputed Line of Actual Control (LaC) with
China, which already has acquired the Russian S-400
ABM system; a system that is yet to join India’s
multilayered BMD shield as the most advanced weapon
system by the next few years.
BMD is a reaction to the mentioned sophistication in
missile technology but in South Asia, India’s attempt to
introduce a BMD system can be seen in the context of the
multiplied utility of the BMD which transcends the
defensive purposes of the weapon and is more likely to
be used as a strategic backup to its offensive military
posture against regional adversaries, especially Pakistan.
Besides this, to counter the BMD system and maintain
the strategic parity and stability of the deterrence,
regional adversaries are encouraged to enhance the
lethality of delivery vehicles including missiles. For
example, India’s move to develop its BMD shield
prompts Pakistan to arm its missiles with Multiple
Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV).
Secondly, even if India deploys a sophisticated BMD
technology, the system remains unlikely to shield Indian
forces from the counter-offensive strikes by Pakistan or
China. This is because of the limited scope, reduced
efficiency, and nascent nature of India’s BMD on the one
hand, and the growing arsenal in Pakistan’s conventional
and nuclear inventory on the other. Thirdly, the
possession of an advanced BMD system gives Indian
leadership a false sense of security and hence of more
(sense of) impunity to carry out the often-desired
surgical strikes in Pakistan, which increases the chances
of High Intensity Conflict (HIC) between the two
countries. For instance, India’s Balakot strikes and
Pakistan’s counter-strikes in February 2019 brought
New Delhi and Islamabad almost into a full fledge
nuclear confrontation (Lewis, 2019).
Therefore, the research article is divided into four parts.
The first part gives a brief overview of India’s BMD
development program and its technological evolution.
The second part explains the theoretical shift in the
utility of deterrence from the Cold War deterrence by
punishment to the deterrence by denial, its
manifestation, and consequential drawbacks for
deterrence in the South Asian context. In the third part,
the article highlights India’s multi-tier BMD complex, its
fundamental strategic parameters, and possible
deployment mechanism vis-à-vis Pakistan and China.
The fourth part highlights the misuse of BMD as a
defensive weapon system in encouraging offensive
freedom of action with a theoretical underpinning on
BMD as a defensive security measure or offensive means
of power. Because of the utmost reliance on its nascent
BMD, the fourth part explains regional implications of
India’s BMD, its possible countermeasures by Pakistan,
and Balakot strikes as the case study to explain the
illustrated consequences of India’s miscalculated
strategic adventure.
Finally, the paper concludes with the argument that the
introduction of advanced BMD systems inspired by the
transition in the utility of deterrence brings the existing
arms race between Pakistan and India to a new stage
with dilemma-bound countermeasures that not only
drags down the nuclear threshold but also increases the
J. S. Asian Stud. 08 (01) 2019. 13-24 DOI: 10.33687/jsas.008.01.3319
15
risk of strategic annihilation in South Asia.
INDIA’S BMD DEVELOPMENT
Indian BMD program is part of the Integrated Guided
Missile Defence Program (IGMDP) which was launched
by Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) in 1983 to build a
comprehensive range of advanced guided missiles.
IGMDP is the mother program for all the mainstream
Indian guided missiles including short, mid and long
range Agni ballistic missile, the surface to air Prithvi
missile, a multi-target handling surface to air Akash
missile system, the anti-tank ‘fire and forget’ Nag missile
and the short range SAM Trishul (DRDO, 2008: 233). The
quest for developing a credible Missile Defense Shield
began in the early 1990s, possibly in reaction to
Pakistan’s acquisition of M-9 and solid-fuelled M-11
SRBMs from China. Initially, India acquired the S-300
SAM system from Russia to ensure the safety of major
Indian cities but a credible permanent solution was
desired with a willingness to develop its own BMD
system. At that time, India possessed enough deterrence
in place including Prithvi and Agni; a reliable source of
deterrence by retaliation. However, New Delhi was
inspired by a global change in perception from
deterrence by retaliation to deterrence by denial.
However, the Indian Defence Research and Development
Organization (DRDO) fell short in technology to
independently develop any such system. Therefore,
India approached a number of friendly countries for
cooperation in developing the BMD system (Kumar,
2008: 179).
After getting disappointed from Russia, India decided to
seek assistance from Israel whose Arow-1 ABM system
with long range Green Pine radar attracted the DRDO
experts. However, India failed to acquire the system due
to the involvement of US technology in developing Green
Pine radars (Sharma, 2009: 5). Nevertheless, India
succeeded in developing “target acquisition and fire
control” Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) jointly with
Israel. The LRTR was capable of tracking multiple
targets simultaneously and hence became principle
radar for the Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) which makes the
first tier of the multi-tier Indian BMD shield.
Besides LRTR, India also required guidance radar to
track incoming hostile airborne targets. For this, India
jointly developed guidance and tracking radar with
Thales, a French firm. Following successful work on
radars, DRDO acquired formal permission for developing
the anti-ballistic missile system in 1998. However,
international concerns and scrutiny of the nuclear
programmes of India and Pakistan kept the Indian
government from publicizing the ambitious project. In
the meantime, the withdrawal of the US from the anti-
ballistic missile defence (ABM) treaty in 2000 provided
India with an opportunity to place itself as BMD capable
nuclear power. The ABM treaty ensured mutual
vulnerability as the basis of nuclear deterrence in the
Cold War whose dismissal reflected a departure in
favour of deterrence by denial and encouraged states to
employ Anti Access/ Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
Frank O’Donnell and Yogesh Joshi argue that “Moving
away from the Cold War concept of nuclear deterrence,
the super power was now endorsing defense against
nuclear weapons. India saw this policy reversal as an
opportunity to develop its own capabilities” (O'Donnell
& Joshi, 2013). Besides advocating Bush’s plans for
developing comprehensive BMD, India grabbled the
opportunity to gain maximum advantages and publicly
endorsed its own BMD programme; thereby leading
them to test the Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) and Advance
Air Defense (AAD) in November 2006 and December
2007 respectively.
FROM DETERRENCE BY PUNISHMENT TO
DETERRENCE BY DENIAL: THE ROLE OF BMD
Deterrence is an important element of nuclear strategy
where the adversary is discouraged to carry out
undesired action. It is effective only if the threat of
responsive annihilation is communicated on the pretext
of hostile intent. This is because ‘deterrence works on
the enemy’s intentions” and its effectiveness is the
outcome of psychological acknowledgement of the
retaliatory outburst to any contemplated action
(Schmidt, 2018). Such a strategic objective is achieved in
two different ways i.e. Deterrence by Punishment and
Deterrence by Denial. In the Deterrence by Punishment,
the adversary is threatened for costs higher than the
benefits of the hostile offensive. It is usually placed in
response to credible threats, which requires a
combination of capability and will. The capability should
be effective enough in delivering a “combination of risk
and cost” to the enemy’s doorstep (Schmidt, 2018).
Deterrence by Punishment demands capabilities that cut
across the full spectrum of threat with weapons reaching
swiftly to the enemy, defeating its defences, destroying
main targets and devastating its military and population
J. S. Asian Stud. 08 (01) 2019. 13-24 DOI: 10.33687/jsas.008.01.3319
16
with counter-force and counter-value strikes (Mitchel,
2015). The MAD concept of the Cold War served as
Deterrence by Punishment for both the United States
and USSR, based on a mutual realization that of imposing
“unacceptable damage” to each other from massive
nuclear forces on both sides (Sokolski, 2014: 278).
The second way is Deterrence by Denial where the
adversary is denied from taking any target desired and
goals anticipated by hostile forces usually by physical
means.
Being a defensive weapon system, the BMD is a vital
instrument of Deterrence by Denial whose feasibility is
measured in terms of the degree of effectiveness against
the incoming ballistic missiles. With the technological
evolution in modern weapon systems, the concept of
deterrence has transformed from deterrence by
punishment to deterrence by denial in the latter part of
the Cold War. The methodology of missile interception
from using nuclear warheads to the use of ‘hit-to-kill’
technology with kinetic energy to destroy ballistic
missiles in the exo-atmospheric midcourse phase over
the decades following World War II has opened up new
avenues for the use of BMD technology. The use of Nike
Zeus by the United States to kill German V2 in the
“Wizard Program” laid the foundation for the tradition of
killing incoming ballistic missiles in the 1960s (Schmidt,
2018). The role of BMD in esteeming deterrence can be
measured by the technical assessment of the threat
posed by varieties of modern ballistic missiles. Such
missiles are classified into SRBMs, IRBMs and ICBMs by
range, regular re-entry vehicles, maneuvering re-entry
vehicles and hypersonic glide vehicles by type of
warhead, conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear
by payload, fixed site, mobile launch, submarine and air
launched by platform, and finally, liquid or solid fuelled
by the propellant (Schmidt, 2018). The diversity in
ballistic missiles forms a larger counter-defensive
complex; thereby delivers promising annihilation in the
first strike which leaves the deterrence by punishment
in quicksand. This pushed nations for developing
ballistic missile technologies to prevent or at least
mitigate the threat posed in the first strike by highly
advanced nuclear ballistic missiles.
BMD: Hole in the Strategic Deterrence
BMD is taken for wielding the defences against
adversary’s attacks and hence a significant contribution
to the deterrence strategy. Its use in defensive context
glorifies its role as “non-escalating means” working in
the realm of a pool of deterring capabilities (Schmidt,
2018). However, a BMD can only reduce the degree of
penetration intended by the adversary’s ballistic
missiles. It cannot, however, achieve 100 percent
interception capability which, rather than enforcing
deterrence, results in a higher risk of successful ballistic
missile attacks and consequences which brings more
unacceptable costs for having a BMD system. This
reduces the credibility of the threats and hence the
deterrence. This is because a successful deterrent does
not only require the communication of intent but also
the capability to which any BMD falls short in delivering
a complete efficiency. Hence deterrence by denial effects
of the BMD augments rather than mitigate the gravity of
conventional or nuclear conflict.
Moreover, improvement in the BMD drives
modernization and lethality of the delivery vehicle on
part of the adversary. The adversary tries to develop
capabilities that render the BMD system obsolete by
leaking into the defences. The capabilities include MIRV
technology, the high altitude nuclear blast or the
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attack and using swift or
manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles with unpredictable
flight paths that reduce interception probabilities,
resulting in the successful delivery of threat. For
example, the United Kingdom (UK) deployed UGM-23
Polaris SLBM in response to the BMD around Moscow
whose defended footprint stretched about 450 nm in
front of Moscow while 950 miles beyond it. Also, a BMD
not only reduces the threshold of conflict but also
multiplies the lethality of weapons used by the
adversary. Hence a credible BMD has the ability to deter
the use of certain weapons but can also result in an
aggravated conflict. Therefore, BMD fluctuates the
deterrence stability or the ‘Holy Grail’ of arms controls
(Krepton, 2018).
Indian Multi-Tier BMD Complex
In November 2006, India became the fourth nation on
earth to have successfully tested the indigenously
developed BMD system. The system consists of two
layers that are designed to intercept any conventional or
nuclear missile threat at both endo-atmospheric and
exo-atmospheric altitude. The systems include Prithvi
Air Defense (PAD) and Advanced Air Defense (AAD).
J. S. Asian Stud. 08 (01) 2019. 13-24 DOI: 10.33687/jsas.008.01.3319
17
Prithvi Air Defense (PAD)
Prithvi Air Defense is the first indigenous BMD system
employed by India in November 2006. The system is
armed with two-staged missiles that can intercept
missiles at an exo-atmospheric altitude of 80km. PAD
can engage any ballistic missile of class that ranges from
300km to 2000 km with a speed five times the speed of
sound (Mach 5). The system is guided by an inertial
navigation system (INS) in the midcourse by the Long
Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) while in the terminal
phase by the active radar homing.
LRTR is also known as the Swordfish which was jointly
developed by India and Israel and sketched around the
EL/M-2080 Green Pine radar of the Arrow-2 missile
defense system. However, India’s LRTR is target
acquisition and fire control radar sufficiently modified in
“transmit-receive modules, signal processing computers
and power supply” (Bhutani, 2017).
Advanced Air Defense (AAD)
Advance Air Defense is the second tier of the Indian BMD
shield and is designed to intercept incoming missiles at
the Endo-atmospheric altitude of almost 30 km. The
system employs a two-staged missile interceptor
propelled by solid fuel. AAD relies on the same
navigation system as that of PAD i.e. INS with ground
based radars provides midcourse information and is
guided by active radar homing in the terminal phase.
The system is subjected to multiple test missions since
December 2007 on ballistic missile Prithvi II, with
improvement in varying dimensions, from guidance
system to the range of interception and maneuverability.
Inspired by the successful tests of the Advance Air
Defense, the Indian scientists have developed a more
advanced version of the missile known as the Surface-to-
Air Ashwin Advanced Air Defense system.
S-400 ABM
India has signed for the acquisition of five regiments of
advanced Russian S-400 air defense systems in 2018.
According to official sources, India will get the delivery
of its S-400 batteries by the end of 2021 (Gady, 2020).
Each battalion of the S-400 ABM system comprises eight
launchers, equipped with radars, a command and
control post with an additional capacity of 16 missiles of
variable characteristics. The system has the capability to
engage 36 air-bone targets simultaneously with a
maximum speed of 15 Mach or 17000 km/hour (Anti-
aircraft missile system S-400 Trimuph, 2020). The
system comprises of multi-layered radar umbrella that
preserves the system’s capability to engage targets at
long-ranges.
According to Dr Carlo Kopp, the leading aerospace
expert from the Australian Air Power, S-400 system
employs the ‘optional acquisition radars’ bearing
capability to engage and defeat modern stealth aircrafts
such as the F-22 raptor of the US and Russian Su-35
flanker. The system operates at multiple frequencies
such as VHF and L-band; thereby engaging fighter jets
with stealth coating. This is because most of the stealth
aircraft have been designed to overcome the low-
detection capability of the X-band radars (Kopp, 2014).
Being an advanced air defense system with a 600km
detection range, S-400 enhances India’s ‘Defensive
Counter Air (DCA)’ operations by proactively tracking
and engaging hostile airborne targets even beyond in the
hostile territory. For instance, the system can detect
Pakistani aircrafts soon after they take off from the
airbases and engage them hundreds of kilometres within
the Pakistani territory. Apart from that, the system can
affect the credibility of Pakistan’s full spectrum
deterrence by threatening the Low Yield Nuclear
Missiles NASR (Hatf-IX) which is to counter the Indian
offensives as part of their so-called Cold Start Doctrine.
Therefore, the S-400 ABM system is expected to threaten
Pakistan’s ability to respond to Indian aggression.
BMD AND INDIAN STRATEGIC PARAMETERS
India’s perception on BMD development is taken in view
of the volatile nuclear strategic environment in the
region. The country is vulnerable to a variety of ballistic
and cruise missiles of varying capacities from two
nuclear armed adversaries, Pakistan and China. China’s
military modernization and fast growing nuclear arsenal
of Pakistan keeps India in fear of being disadvantaged in
a ‘joint fighting capability’ in case of war with Pakistan
and China. Therefore, India believes in keeping a
sufficient BMD force to hold sway in defeating Chinese
Area Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities in
Western Pacific while broadening prospects for a limited
war with Pakistan in South Asia (Agnihotri, 2013: 11).
Indian experts mention the possibility of a ‘Bolt-from-
the-Blue’ strike as a rationale for having proactive
defences which make little sense in terms of the
credibility held by Pakistan’s Strategic Forces and
J. S. Asian Stud. 08 (01) 2019. 13-24 DOI: 10.33687/jsas.008.01.3319
18
effective Command and Control. Rajesh Basrur explains
that a “limited BMD can also deter a state with
revisionist intentions that would want to carry out a
Bolt-from-the-Blue strike. In other words, if generating
dissuasion in the mind of the aggressor is central to
nuclear deterrence, a limited BMD shield could
potentially achieve that in the South Asian context”
(Basrur, 2002: 7).
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM OF INDIA BMD
Indian experts frame the deployment of BMD system in
the following possible mechanisms.
i. Deployment of a comprehensive land and sea-based
BMD system across the country to deal with the
offensive first strike.
ii. The second option is to secure the “critical
population centres, command and control centres,
nuclear forces and vital economic zones” (Nagal,
2016: 6).
iii. Thirdly, the deployment of BMD in a “selective
coverage of command and control centres, nuclear
forces and important metropolitan cities” (Nagal,
2016: 6).
iv. Fourth is to deploy BMD to protect strategic
command and control centres, nuclear assets and
the capital New Delhi.
v. Lastly, deployment to protect the instrumental
command and control centres and New Delhi to
retain the second strike capability.
The first two options require a comprehensive Area
BMD while the rest of the three demands Point BMD
system. Generally, Area BMD is preferred over the Point
BMD for it ensures the safety of large metropolitan cities
and strategic installations whose location is bound to
remain uncertain(Wilkenning & Watman, 1986: 27-29).
However, deployment of BMD by India along the first
two mechanisms remains highly unlikely for a number of
reasons. The cost-exchange ratio and technology
required for fielding such a comprehensive coverage
squarely ground Indian capacity and capability. India
cannot afford a “pan-national missile interception
capability” due to financial constraints (O'Donnell &
Joshi, 2013) This is also because Pakistan and China hold
a variety of ballistic and cruise missiles which make the
systems vulnerable to the ground and air attacks,
especially in the border regions.
In addition to this, no BMD can detect and intercept a
low-flying cruise missile that can knock out Indian BMDs
with an intended Destruction of Enemy Air Defense
(DEAD) mission from Pakistan or China. Joshi and
O’Donnell argue that “India also realized that a limited
BMD, especially to secure its political leadership and
nuclear command and control against a first strike,
would augment the credibility of its second-strike
nuclear posture”(O'Donnell & Joshi, 2013) Therefore,
India will choose selective coverage of important
strategic command and control centres and the capital
so as to retain the capability to respond to the first strike
with a vital retaliatory nuclear force.
India also intends to offset the gap between its No First
Use policy against Pakistan’s First Use of nuclear
weapons by using missile defense shield to avoid
annihilation of its capability of assured destruction in a
first strike. Such a calculation, however, remains prey to
the uncertainty of the missile defense shield since no
BMD can effectively counter 100 percent of the incoming
hostile targets. Attendant to the fact, however, India will
be able to secure its retaliatory capability and the
command and control elements necessary to launch a
second strike. Christopher Clary is a US scholar
maintains that “Indian policymakers must be willing to
make the calculation that whatever safety comes from
missile defenses of dubious effectiveness outweighs the
risk that come from a Pakistani nuclear arsenal that is
larger than it would be without Indian missile defences”
(Joshi, 2012). This explains the threat of enhanced
offensive weaponry and an increase in the nuclear
arsenal which is exclusively the result of advanced BMD
systems introduced by India in the South Asian region.
This is because the threat asymmetry leaves Pakistan at
disadvantage vis-a-vis India’s growing defensive
measures and pushes Islamabad for new means of
delivering the threat as the strategic necessity of
deterrence to maintain balance in the region. The
DRDO’s scientific advisor Vijay Kumar Saraswat’s
assessment suggests that at least two regiments of the
BMD will cover about 400 sq. Km which is enough
coverage to protect New Delhi. According to reports of
India Today, India initiated arrangements for protecting
New Delhi under the program “Defense for Delhi” in
2003 which also includes Mumbai, for the city hosts a
number of significant “nuclear storage facilities”
(Ferguson & McDonald, 2017: 11).
Hence, Indian will choose not to defend the entire
territory but limited strategic, political and military
installations for second strike against any “unauthorized
J. S. Asian Stud. 08 (01) 2019. 13-24 DOI: 10.33687/jsas.008.01.3319
19
and accidental launch” or a “Bolt-from-the-Blue” strike
by the adversary (Nagal, 2016: 6). Therefore, these
defences are likely to defend hardly some selective
potential civilian and military installation but still leaves
vast majority of India’s critical strategic installations
vulnerable to a full-fledged nuclear or even conventional
Pakistani counter-offensive’.
LESS A SHIELD THAN A SWORD
Apparently, the BMD Shield is used to defend against
incoming ballistic missiles and other airborne targets.
However, interestingly, the system being defensive in
nature is an offensive advantage to the state in
possession. This is because; BMD is the shield that
provides capability against hostile missiles but is also a
sword that augments state’s capabilities to survive the
first strike and hence encourages it for offensive strikes
with little concern about a tit-for-tat retaliation.
BMD serves as the offensive strike deterrent for the US
forces in Europe. This has been inspired by the maxim
that ‘If you have the Shield, it is easier to use the Sword’.
It means a credible BMD offsets any concerns for
retaliation strike and encourages the holder state to
fearlessly go preemptive against the enemy with weak
defensive or even offensive infrastructure. For instance,
the Russian Foreign Minister while referring to the
Missile Defense Shields of the US placed in Poland and
Romania stated that “the military realize that missile
defense is part of the strategic arsenal of the United
States. And when a nuclear shield is added to a nuclear
sword, it is very tempting to use this offensive defense
capability” (Masters, 2014). This is because it allows the
US not only to deter any hostile attack by Russia into
Europe and the US but also encourages the US to carry
out offensive strikes against Russian installations and
hence offensively ensure defensive requirements with a
defensive weapon system.
The logic fits more on India where the leadership is
vocal about India’s intentions to carry out surgical
strikes inside Pakistan. In such a situation, a multi-tiered
BMD provides India a credible assurance of their
survival to any anticipated conventional or nuclear
counter-strike by Pakistan in response to a ‘preemptive
strike. Therefore, a BMD with India either acts as a
sword or a facilitator to use the sword with more
impunity and hence shield against the adversary’s
striking capability. The Simpson Center report for
Canada and the presence of the BMD system says that
“shield may be protective, but linked to swords they are
part of the offensive and provocative system” (Regehr,
2003; p. 27). Vary of US hegemonic policies, a prominent
US political scientist Noam Chomsky explains that “BMD
is widely recognized as a ‘Trojan Horse’ for the real
issues: the coming weaponization of space with highly
destructive offensive weapons placed in or guided from
space. BMD itself is an offensive weapon. That is
understood by close allies, and also by potential
adversaries” (Chomsky, 2007; p. 123). In the same book,
he explains that the Canadian military planner advised
the government that “BMD [in Canada] is arguably more
in order to preserve the US freedom of action than
because the US really fears North Korean or Iranian
threat”(Chomsky, 2007; p. 123). This shows the dubious
role of the BMD and its use by revisionist powers. In this
case, it ensures India’s freedom of action in South Asia,
more specifically against Pakistan.
On account of the dubious role of weapons, their
offensive or defensive character in war and peace and
their application on BMD, the following section provides
critical discourse based on the provision of security and
assessment of threat by the state at receiving end.
OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE PARADOX AND THE NATURE
OF BMD
The terms ‘Offensive’ and ‘Defensive’ renders different
meanings for different players involved in an adversarial
dilemma. Dietrich Fischer in his book, Preventing War in
the Nuclear Age, unfolds the complexity by defining
terms in pure nature that “purely defensive arms
increases the security of the country acquiring them but
do not reduce the security of any other state” while
“purely offensive arms threaten the security of the
potential opponents, but do not (absolutely) strengthen
the security of the country acquiring them” (Fischer,
1983: 47). Parallel to the latter case, any Indian BMD,
indigenous or acquired, will not only fell short of
securing Indian assets against hostile air attack but will
also create security dilemma for Pakistan.
It means the Indian argument that the air defense
systems serve as a ‘defensive’ deterrent in Indian
strategic calculation is unconvincing (Fischer, 1983: 49).
Similarly, President Obama’s advocacy to supply
‘defensive lethal weapons’ to Ukraine against Russia also
sparked a debate for if a defensive weapon can also be
‘lethal’? Colin Clark tried to defend the terminology and
argued that ‘‘any weapon is defensive if you are using it
J. S. Asian Stud. 08 (01) 2019. 13-24 DOI: 10.33687/jsas.008.01.3319
20
to defend yourself or your country. And since Putin is
aggressor here, if we supply weapons (be that Juvenile
anti-tank missiles) to those fighting against him they are,
by definition, defensive” (BBC, 2015). He went on to add
that if Russia provides arms to the rebels then ‘‘he
(Putin) might simply say he is ‘defending’ the rights of
Russians” (BBC, 2015).
This also suggests that any weapon, irrespective of its
characteristic features, can be labelled as offensive or
defensive depending upon the intent; thereby rendering
the term ambiguous in its exclusive investigation.
REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF INDIA’S BMD
The expeditious military modernization, especially the
introduction of advanced BMD, catalyses the existing
arms race in South Asia. Feeling disadvantaged from
the rapid advancement of India’s military capabilities,
Pakistan is likely to augment its military power with
more offensive weapons. The acquisition of advanced
BMD prompts Pakistan to increase its nuclear stockpile
and Low Yield Nuclear Weapons (LYNWs) which will
drag down the nuclear threshold between the
countries: thereby increasing the chances of nuclear
confrontation. This is because India’s military
modernization is reducing Pakistan’s conventional
deterrent and hence leading to a nuclear arms race
(Khan, 2017; p. 196). Referring to this, the former US’
Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Levoy posits that
“India’s military modernization program has led to a
growing disparity between the Indian and Pakistani
conventional military capabilities”, which will lower the
nuclear threshold (Levoy, 2008; p. 134).
The acquisition of S-400 system is likely to ignite a new
wave of instability in South Asia. As predicted by a
professor at King’s College London, Harsh V. Pant, that
“Indian BMD will fuel instability and affect bilateral
relations between India and Pakistan, which might
further lower the nuclear threshold and tempt Pakistan
to go for a nuclear first-strike. The offence/defence
paradox explains that in the mind of a state without
BMD, the threat of a pre-emptive strike will increase”
(Ehtisham, 2017). Such pre-emptive strike could come
from India which increases the chances of what New
Delhi believes as the ‘limited war’ with Pakistan. For
example, the former India defense minister George
Fernandez while ‘unveiling Limited War Doctrine’ states
that India can execute a limited war against Pakistan in
the presence of a sufficient BMD as credible deterrence
by denial(Mohan, 2000). Hence, soon as India acquires
sufficient BMD capability as a deterrent by denial, it can
embark on a misadventure which could threaten the
strategic stability in South Asia.
The long range interception and diverse featured
capabilities of S-400 challenge the existing inventory of
the Pakistan Armed Forces. However, every weapon
renders multiple weaknesses with possible
countermeasures that can be employed to neutralize its
capability. The long range S-400 ABM, though, is an
advanced weapon system but holds enough space for
counter-measures. This is because of the rigorous Indo-
Pak border region along the Line of Control (LoC) where
dense jungles, hills and mountains can impede and
distort the tracking capability of the radar of S-400. The
system overcomes this impediment by employing the
40V6 mast assembly but this largely reduces its ‘shoot
and scoot’ capability; thereby making it vulnerable to a
counter strike (Raza, 2018). The exaggerated 40N6E
missile of S-400 with a range of 400kms is yet to be
displayed and is unlikely to be added to the exported
version of the system even if showcased by Moscow.
Therefore, the primary weapon used by S-400 is a 48N6
missile with a range of 240km which cannot engage
airborne targets at above 27km altitude and hence will
fail to intercept modern ballistic missiles. S-400 is useful
in targeting US ballistic missiles which lags almost
30kms from the Russian shores but is less likely to
benefit India in countering Pakistan’s ballistic missiles
due to a travel distance of not more than 5 minutes.
Moreover, the S-400 missile system holds a shelf life of
just 10 years which means that India will waste US$ 5.2
billion in case the system is not used in a war until 2030
(Raza, 2018).
COUNTERMEASURES TO S-400 AND OTHER INDIAN
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS
Responding to the acquisition of S-400 ABM by India,
Pakistan pledged to “develop capabilities which render
any BMD system ineffective and unreliable” and “to
address threats from any kind of destabilizing weapon
system” (Ali, 2018). This suggests a possible strategy
and countermeasures that Pakistan intends to employ in
future so as to neutralize the threat of the Indian BMD
shield. Instead of acquiring a similar multi-billion dollar
BMD system as a deterrent, Pakistan can employ the
following tactics to neutralize or at least minimize the
threat posed by S-400. This can be done by employing
J. S. Asian Stud. 08 (01) 2019. 13-24 DOI: 10.33687/jsas.008.01.3319
21
both the
i. Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) and
ii. Destruction of Enemy Air Defense (DEAD)
capabilities.
On part of the DEAD strategy, Pakistan can knock out the
S-400 battery sites through multiple means. India is
likely to deploy three out of five batteries along the
Pakistani border to protect its military installations. It
means the system will be static and can be destroyed
through Human and Remote Intelligence (H&RI).
Pakistan can employ its air-launched cruise missiles
with enough stand-off range to be fired from safe
airspace to knock out the system.
India cannot acquire 100 percent escape from the
Chinese and Pakistani nuclear-tipped missile strikes.
Balraj Nagal posits that China and Pakistan will rely on
“saturation strikes, mixing of conventional and nuclear
missiles and extensive use of decoys to confuse the
interceptors, and will attack space, cyber and ground
systems” to offset India’s BMD capabilities (Nagal, 2016;
p. 5). This is important because India’s nascent BMD will
face challenges of “differentiating between conventional
and nuclear missiles” which will complicate options for
India to counter-strike (Nagal, 2016; p. 5).
The DEAD capability can be assured by acquiring the SY-
400 short-range precision-attack ballistic missile system
and the YJ-12 air-launched missile from China with an
intended strike to hit the Enemy Air Defense (EAD).
Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems (MLRS) such as the
Chinese A-300 with a CEP of only 30-45 meters can be
used to neutralize the S-400 batteries. Anticipating this
threat, India will presumably deploy the system at least
300km off the western border, enabling Pakistan Air
Force to penetrate.
Pakistan can counter the threat by enhancing its Ababeel
based MIRV technology with a multiple numbers of
decoys on board along with nuclear warheads. Also, the
threat can be mitigated by developing Hypersonic Glide
Vehicle (HGV) which can penetrate the multi-layered air
defence installations (Raza, 2018). Moreover, Pakistan is
also accumulating a huge inventory of drones (having
very small signatures) that can enable Pakistan to
overwhelm the S-400 ABM in a ‘swarm attack’ where the
target is saturated to respond. This is evident by the
immediate Sino-Pak deal for the acquisition of 48 Wing
Long-II high-end armed drones following the Indo-
Russian S-400 deal on October 5, 2018 (Dhillon, 2018).
FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY AND THE BALAKOT
DEBACLE
Terming as a ‘booster dose’ for the Indian forces, the
Indian Air Force chief reflects India’s utmost reliance on
the shoulders of its nascent air defense system (Singh,
2018). One of the associated repercussions with its BMD
shield is that it will give India a false sense of security;
hence enabling New Delhi to go ahead with the pre-
emptive strikes against Pakistan. For instance, India
attempted to test Pakistan’s conventional deterrence by
conducting ‘missed’ airstrikes across the LoC into
Balakot which, despite claims of killing over 300
terrorists, inflicted minor damage to the forest (Vijayan
& Drennan, 2019). Pakistan called India’s air defense
bluff by responding the very next morning by
successfully striking the intended whereabouts of the
Indian military headquarters in Kashmir. In the hot
pursuit by the Indian air force, the Pakistan air force
shot down a Su-30 MKI and a Mig-21 of the IAF,
capturing a Mig-21 pilot who was later handed over to
India as a sign of peace gesture (Safi & Malik, 2019). This
was not only humiliation for India’s offensive firepower
but also for its air defense system which, rather than
detecting and targeting Pakistan air force, ‘mistakenly’
shot down its own Mi-17 helicopter in friendly fire. In
the nutshell, India, besides underestimating Pakistan’s
counter-offensive capabilities, exaggerated its offensive
strike capabilities and hence the whole episode turned
into a nightmare for New Delhi.
Now, it is also a miscalculated assertion that S-400 will
become the ultimate safeguard of India in case of a
hostile situation between the two countries. India’s
acquisition of the S-400 ABM system “neither
destabilize(s) Pakistan’s defensive fence nor make(s)
ineffective its offensive strike” capabilities (Jaspal,
2018). Just as described in the previous section, Pakistan
can counter the threat of the S-400 system by increasing
the size of the attack with cost effective weapons
including air-launched cruise missiles like Ra’ad and YJ-
12 and SRBM SY-400, MIRV equipped Ababeel with
multiple decoys, deploying MLRS such as the Chinese A-
300.
Moreover, the three batteries, if deployed at the western
border, are unlikely to cover the entire Indian landmass
which renders possibilities for counter-value strikes on
Indian cities through IRBMs such as Ababeel and
Shaheen-III (Ahmad, 2016). Therefore, India should be
careful in exaggerating its capabilities and avoid falling
into the trap of a false sense of security to avoid
J. S. Asian Stud. 08 (01) 2019. 13-24 DOI: 10.33687/jsas.008.01.3319
22
catastrophic results in case of a hostile situation with its
neighbours, especially Pakistan.
CONCLUSION
India’s attempt to introduce BMD in evolving South
Asian strategic environment induces complications for
the delicate deterrence and regional strategic stability.
In face of its regional ambitions to achieve impunity in
terms of its military freedom of action as well as to
emerge as the security provider in the region, India has
been inspired by the global shift in perception from
deterrence by punishment to the deterrence by denial.
Over the years, New Delhi has sought to develop a
comprehensive BMD system that is supposed to shield
India from a counter-offensive in response to its
aggression vis-à-vis Pakistan. However, the inability of a
BMD system to completely offset the advanced ballistic
and cruise missile, especially of the nascent Indian BMD
shield, denies New Delhi the ability either to shield itself
from the counter-offensives of its immediate adversaries
Pakistan and China or enjoy the privilege to carry out its
often desired ‘surgical strikes’ with impunity. The
Balakot Debacle is the practical demonstration of India’s
inability to communicate the delivery of threat that
could sufficiently be able in deterring Pakistan’s
response. Instead, Pakistan’s successful counter-
offensive wielded the argument that India is not in a
position to keep Pakistan at bay and exercise impunity
without consequences, even in the presence of an
advanced BMD.
Moreover, the more India attempts to employ advanced
weapons such as the S-400 air defense system, the more
will regional adversaries like Pakistan increase their
offensive capabilities including its nuclear stockpile and
advanced delivery vehicles such as the MIRV technology
counter-measure to maintain strategic balance in South
Asia. Hence, India’s military modernization, especially its
willingness to use advanced BMD systems to enhance its
military capabilities of pre-emptive strikes vis-à-vis
Pakistan, will accelerate the existing arms race and increase
the cost of hostile engagement with terrible consequences
for regional peace and stability in South Asia.
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