Russia and Disinformation: Origins of Deception

Abstract

This article references the technological advances in alternative and social media outlets, and the ways in which Russia has used them to provide partially accurate information to gain trust from its audience before pushing its own state-sponsored agenda.

Full text

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Panoply Journal
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Winter 2020 | Volume 1

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Panoply Journal | Winter 2020 | Volume I
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Table of Contents
Letter from the Editor 1
Letter from the Board 2
SPECIAL THANKS TO 3
Table of Contents 4
Terrorism & Radicalization; An Overview 5
What is terrorism? 5
What is radicalization? 7
Democracy and terrorism 8
Russia and Disinformation: Origins of Deception 13
Covid-19 Crisis, the New Battleground for the Geopolitics of China and Russia 18
The Strategic Culture of Trump’s America NATO Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Approach 23
Abstract 23
Introduction 24
Methodology 25
Neoclassical Realism: Model and Framework 25
The Concepts of Strategic Culture 29
Sources of Strategic Culture 30
A Neoclassical Realist Approach to Strategic Culture 31
American Strategic Culture 32
Sources of American Strategic Culture 34
The Republican Party and American Strategic Culture 35
President Donald Trump: A Brief Analysis of a Hardline Unilateralist 36
US-NATO Policy in the Trump Administration: Systemic Factors and Strategic Cultural
Aspects 37
Systemic Factors 38
Strategic Cultural Aspects 38
Conclusion 39
Disengagement Is Not an Option: Why Repatriation of ISIS Brides Must Contain a De-
radicalization Component 42
The Impact of Climate Change on Human Security: Wars and Terrorism 53
About the authors 70
Intellectual Independence Policy 71

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Panoply Journal | Winter 2020 | Volume I
Terrorism & Radicalization; An Overview
Since terrorism has been a predominant news item it has been interchangeably linked with Islam
in most cases. Terrorism itself and the processes involved that lead to terrorism is referred to as
radicalization. These are complex and do not fit with a standard profile nor group. A large group
of variables in a person’s life makes it possible for any person to go through a radicalization
process that can eventually lead to terrorism or violent extremism. Although terrorism has been
around for some time, its increasingly predominant position in this century has been fueled by
globalization and technology. The lack of a universal definition in international law makes
terrorism and the process of radicalization a field that will divide the world for decades to come.
What is terrorism?
Although the word terror has been in the English language for quite some time, the first
occurrence of the word terrorism was in French at the end of the 18th century. Terrorism, as the
word we know today, was first coined in the period of the French revolution. In the period of
1793 until 1974, the ruling Jacobin faction executed anyone they perceived as a threat to their
regime (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2017). In the setting of that and coming centuries terrorism
would be defined as the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians,
in the pursuit of political aims (Oxford Dictionary, 2017).
The linguistic definition described above is clear and succinct, but it would prove to be
a point of debate in the 20th and 21st centuries. Nation-states that score low on freedom and
democracy tend to use the terms “civilians” and “unlawful” eclectically as seen fit for that
regime at that moment. The lack of a universal definition in international law echoes through
in the daily news outlets. The act of terrorism in a legal sense can be strictly described in law.
E.g., the United States (US) Law defines terrorism as: “premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents” (United States Code, 2017). In the case of e.g. the Boston Marathon Bombing, no
terrorism charges were filed. Although it was considered an act of terror by some, it was not
classified as a terrorist attack in nature, but more an act of violent extremism.
There is a specific difference between terrorism and violent extremism as was the case
with the Fort Hood shooting in 2009. Just as much as there is a difference between the legal
definition of terrorism and the charges after an event (Washington Week, 2014). The focus on
international terrorism creates a tendency to deem the aforementioned events like terrorism,

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and although there is an overlap in causes, the strict definition of terrorism is an important
aspect of not only national laws but also international law. When it comes to international
organizations, we see a more complex approach regarding the definition of terrorism. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) uses the following definition: “The unlawful use or
threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and terror, against individuals or property in
an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or to gain control over a population,
to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.” (NATO, 2017).
Depending on the country or organization, the definition of terrorism may vary in
terminology including certain aspects that are contextually important to that respective country
or organization. This may vary from international terrorism to domestic terrorism. However,
with regard to international law, it is still a work in progress as there are several concerns in
defining a common definition of terrorism. This varies from how widely the offense should be
defined, the relationship between terrorism and the use of force by states, and the relationship
between terrorism and human rights (Shaw, 2008). Despite the political difficulties entailed
there is progress being made by e.g., the United Nations (UN) in generally condemning
terrorism based on common aspects in the international community (UN, 2011).
Regardless of the differences in variations in these respective definitions of terrorism
per nation-state, they all share certain common denominators. The rule-of-law in most nation-
states prohibits the use of unlawful violence and intimidation in its legal code. The lawful use
of force is commonly used only by law enforcement officials under strict rules and regulations.
Most nation-states also have an electoral system that allows their polity to pursue their political
aims in a peaceful way. The extent of this of course may vary per nation-state and the amount
of democracy and stability in such a nation-state.
The difference in the level of e.g., democracy, civil rights, freedom of speech, and state
stability has resulted in an absence of a universal definition of terrorism. The broadened use of
terrorism in certain nation-states create opportunities for political manipulations that may lead
to human rights violations (UN, 2015). At this moment in time, the closest thing that can be
described as a universal definition of terrorism is the one dating back to the 18th century; the
unlawful use of violence against civilians by groups in pursuit of political aims.

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What is radicalization?
In order to understand terrorism, one must understand the processes that lead to
terrorism. This is often referred to as radicalization. Radicalization is best defined by Brian
Jenkins as: “the process of adopting for oneself or inculcating in others a commitment not only
to a system of beliefs, but to their imposition on the rest of society”. (Jenkins, 2009).
The fact that a large part of the radicalization process is psychologically internalized
makes it hard to detect and track. The process of radicalization involves behavioral patterns that
are hard to detect and are often recognized in hindsight. The possibility of recognizing signs of
radicalization is also dependable on the social cohesion in a person’s habitat. If a specific person
comes from a close-knit community the chances of recognizing signs of radicalization can be
detected earlier than if a person is isolated in a community or society.
The extreme views or beliefs and the term extremist is often used together if not
interchangeable with radicalization. However, they are not the same. An extremist is not per
definition engaged in imposing their ideology on others via violence. As stated before, there
are those who hold extremist views and beliefs that may eventually resort to violence, even
violence that may be extreme to a point that it is regarded as an act of terror. The lack of a
structured framework in international law echoes through in the study and the process of
terrorism as a whole. Society is being confronted with acts of violence, terror, and terrorism,
and is trying to understand the subsequent processes. This often results in using the words
terrorism, terror, radical, and extremist in the same sentence. The risk with this approach is the
constant attack on civil liberties to combat a social problem.
The danger herein is that by using radicalization and extremism interchangeably with
regard to terrorism, the lack of an international consensus will remain. Societies and
governments are being confronted this century with a complex form of terrorism and the desire
to understand terrorism has led to the umbrella term of “violent extremism”. Because
radicalization is a process that crosses through all demographic and social strata the usage of
an umbrella term such as violent extremism covers both ideologies, religions, and their potential
fallout. (European Parliament, 2015).
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, better
known as START, has published preliminary findings of their Profiles of Individual

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Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS). These findings validate some elements of common
wisdom, but also provides new insights. Some of these preliminary findings are that:
- Individuals who spent a longer time radicalizing before engaging in illegal extremist
activities were less likely to commit an act of violence.
- The participation in religious activities, as well as the consumption of radical media,
were negatively correlated with the use of violence among both Far Right and Far Left
extremists.
It also reaffirms that radicalization appears to be a very social phenomenon, regardless of one's
ideology or psychological issues. This suggests that individuals that demonstrate risk factors
are equally predisposed regardless of their background (START, 2015).
The existing research on the relationship between psychopathology and terrorism has
been predominantly unanimous in its conclusion; mental illness and abnormity are not typical
critical factors in terrorist's behavior (Borum, 2010). This excludes an important stereotype
concerning terrorism, but still leaves a large group of people that commit acts of terror and
violence such as the Fort Hood Shooting. The FBI classified this event as an act of “violent
extremism” (FBI, 2011).
Countering violent extremism (CVE) could be regarded as a focus on the prevention of
radicalization in which the result is terrorism.
It is important to properly classify who is a terrorist and who is a violent extremist. The
terrorist has a clear and specific goal, with a specific methodology that is applied to reach that
goal. Research shows the absence of stereotypes such as psychological problems. Those who
commit acts of violent extremism, of which there are many, often are troubled with
psychological problems. The fact that they show commonalities with terrorists, such as being
belonging to a religious group doesn’t warrant that they are included and treated the same. Both
the respective governments and their polity should have a different approach to those who are
susceptible to radicalization with tendencies to commit acts of violent extremism such as mass
shootings.
Democracy and terrorism
Terrorism isn’t an exclusive Islamic market, and not all terrorists are Muslim. The
number of people killed in the 1970-ies and 1980-ies in Western Europe is higher than the

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number killed in Western Europe since 2000 (GTDB, 2020). A military response is not the only
solution for tackling threats, nor should it be excluded. People do not become terrorists
overnight and the process of radicalization is a complex one as it is intrinsically linked with our
civil rights, our freedom of thought, and our freedom of speech.
Globalization has brought us many advantages, but there have also been some
disadvantages. The use of terrorism by various groups has stirred society and society is trying
to understand what makes a terrorist. This process of radicalization in the absence of a universal
definition in international law of terrorism puts society under pressure. Over the past decades,
the internet has become accessible to almost anyone anywhere, and with relative ease, people
can spread ideologies and find these. This allows non-state actors (but also state-actors) to
spread and manipulate information. These combined factors allow relatively small parties to
dominantly spread their information on social media.
Globalization hasn’t brought us terrorism or violent extremism, it has merely confronted
society with itself and the diversity of groups that reside inside societies all over the world.
Those that feel oppressed and have different viewpoints, regardless of them being terrorists or
not, now have the means to communicate with much greater ease than 40 years ago. If we want
to curb radicalization, we need more grassroots initiatives. Of all the research that is out there,
the common variables do show similar push and pull factors in the process of radicalization,
and these factors are not new. They existed back in the 1800s in the streets of Paris and will
exist long afterward. The international debate on getting a consensus with regard to terrorism
is an important one, but society should also start to become more aware of radicalization.
Instead of waiting for a government to undertake action, that might violate constitutional rights,
communities should also undertake action.
There are many different approaches in countering radicalization, of the groups out there
engaged in dealing with Islamic radicalization the following consensus shows that addressing
radicalization in combined fields such as schools, mosques, efforts at home, and online yield
the best result. (CSIS, 2016). Perhaps this shows the cause as well in human behavior, namely
that it is a combination of factors in society today that make the process of radicalization what
it is.
Terrorism and radicalization are here to stay, they are part of the human race. The way
we deal with it is important and perhaps the greatest challenge is to find a proper balance in
addressing the issue in contrast to the disturbance that terrorism tries to bring to society.

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The fact that a lot of information about terrorism comes from hindsight also shows the
need for more awareness of radicalization and grassroots initiatives as radicalization is an
intrinsic process in part.
In the end radicalization and terrorism confront the polity in democratic states with a
pivotal question. Do they want the government to institute different programs that may breach
their civil liberties, or will the polity see it as their democratic responsibility to initiate and
support democratic grass-roots initiatives?
Sergei Oudman

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References
Oxford Dictionary, Terrorism, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/terrorism (Last
visited: 08-08-2020)
U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Code, Section 2656f(d) of Title 22,
http://uscode.house.gov/ (Last visited: 15-02-2020).
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO’s military concept for defence against terrorism,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69482.htm (Last visited, 15-08-2020).
Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (6th ed. 2008).
United Nations Security Council, SG's Statement for UNSG's Symposium on Counter
Terrorism,
http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/SG's%20Statement%20for%20UNSG's%20
Symposium%20on%20Counter%20Terrorism.pdf (Last visited: 16-08-2020).
United Nations Security Council, Special Meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/ASG%20to%20CTC_%20ICT%2017%20Dec
ember%202015%20final%20clean.pdf (Last visited: 25-08-2020).
Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and the U.K., Outside Experts View: Brian Michael
Jenkins,
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/HomegrownTerrorists_
USandUK.pdf (Last visited: 25-07-2020).
START, Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States: Preliminary Findings,
https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/PIRUS%20Research%20Brief_Jan%202015.pdf
(Last visited: 30-07-2020).
Randy Borum, "Understanding Terrorist Psychology," in Andrew Silke, ed. The Psychology
of Counter-Terrorism. Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2010.
European Parliament, Religious fundamentalism and radicalisation,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(20
15)551342, (Last visited: 01-07-2020).
Freedom House, Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/populists-and-autocrats-dual-
threat-global-democracy (Last visited: 01-08-2020)
CSIS, Changing the Narrative: Countering Violent Extremist Propaganda,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/changing-narrative-countering-violent-extremist-
propaganda (Last visited: 12-04-2020)
FBI, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Stein Program on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/speeches/the-post-9-11-fbi-the-
bureaus-response-to-evolving-threats (Last visited: 01-04-2020)
AUC, Terrorism vs. Extremism: Are They Linked?,
https://www.aucegypt.edu/news/stories/terrorism-vs-extremism-are-they-linked (Last
visited: 08-08-2020)

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Briefing European Parliamentary Research Service, United Nations response to violent
extremism,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/582025/EPRS_ATA(20
16)582025_EN.pdf (Last visited: 08-08-2020)
University of South Florida Scholar Commons, Understanding Terrorist Psychology,
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1
575&context=mhlp_facpub (Last visited: 08-08-2020)
Washington Week, Terrorism vs. Violent Extremism: Is There a Difference?,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tvaPCj698gM (Last visited: 08-08-2020)
Our World in Data, Terrorism, https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism/ (Last visited: 08-08-
2020)
CISIS, Turning Point, https://www.csis.org/features/turning-point (Last visited: 08-08-2020)
Global Terrorism Database, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (Last visited: 08-08-2020)

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Russia and Disinformation: Origins of
Deception
As technology advances, providing more complex and creative opportunities for
alternative media, accurate reporting has become synonymous with exercising information
literacy on not only the information provided, but also the source itself. While many rely on
online news feeds and alternative media outlets, when strategically placed, these platforms have
been used to effectively push ideologies and agendas that are not aligned with fact-based
information. Some media outlets, such as RT, provide English-language news directed to
audiences in the United States, the United Kingdom, as well as RT France, RT en Español, and
RT Arabic. RT has also embedded itself on most Roku tv and other smart-tv devices bought at
most local electronic stores globally. What is likely not known by RT’s 4 million YouTube
subscribers and the RT America’s 375,000 Twitter followers is that RT (aka “Russia Today”)
is one of Russia’s state-owned social media networks based in Moscow.
In a journal entry written in the International Communication Association, the level of
sophistication and meticulous application of real and fabricated information woven into RT’s
numerous media platforms are briefly explained.
“RT is known for being the home for controversial voices; it has hosted WikiLeaks’s
Julian Assange, the Holocaust denier Ryan Dawson, InfoWars’s Alex Jones, the leftist George
Galloway, and the Brexit leader Nigel Farage (Pomerantsev, 2015; Yablokov, 2015). At the
same time, RT hosts industry heavyweights like Larry King, Chris Hedges, and Ed Schultz,
whose contributions serve to boost the channel’s legitimacy (Richter, 2017). With such
controversial speakers and prominent news personalities, RT has had an undeniable impact on
the business of journalism and the profile of state-backed news outlets. Yet, we still know very
little about how this organization works.” (Elswah, M., & Howard, P. N., 2020).
While the Obama Administration has openly dismissed Russia as “no more than a
"regional power" whose actions in Ukraine are an expression of weakness rather than strength”,
on the contrary, the past decade shows Russia as a threat to U.S. national security. (Borger, J.,
2014). Russia exercises both soft and hard power to extend its influence internationally, even

Center for International Relations and International Security
in the form of indirect diplomacy through third parties, likely without the third party realizing
it is being used. For example, in 2019, Russia received direct international media attention when
U.S. president Donald J. Trump petitioned the G7 to allow Russia to regain its diplomatic
position in the organization during their summit conference in Biarritz, France. (Borger, J.,
2019).
Despite the claim of a weakened and irrelevant country by the Obama Administration,
Russia has proven for decades to be experts of a labyrinthian system of disinformation and
calculated persuasion for decades. Prior to the dismantlement of the USSR, Operation Infektion
was launched in conjunction with the discovery of AIDS in the early part of the 1980s. After
extensive information provided by former spies who defected to the United States, it was
revealed that the Soviet Union planted propaganda claiming the U.S. created HIV/AIDS. After
well-placed U.S. investigations, the Soviet Union acknowledged the Operation to the Reagan
Administration and vowed to cease such acts against the United States.
Russia’s evolution of disinformation campaigns not only gained its roots from the
Soviet Union, but has taken on a revised mission of a proxy war of words almost consistently
through social media outlets. A 2016 article from John White with the Institute for European
Studies adds to this concept.
“If Russian disinformation can convince some westerners of the truth of Russian
disinformational themes, so much the better, but Russia will settle for a more modest goal. They
want to undermine the credibility of the media, especially the internet, as a medium itself in
western eyes. Russian blogger Anton Nosik calls this “internet pollution.” The Russian
government aims for the more modest goal of making people abroad believe that the internet is
simply informational chaos, utterly unreliable.” (White, J., 2016).
With a specific department in the FSB (previously the KGB) with the sole purpose to
carry out such campaigns, there are likely countless ways in which Russia has used social media
to push for an agenda of confusion and diversion that have yet to be discovered. In previous
disinformation campaigns, Russia seems to use the psychological urge to believe in the initial
information that is presented to its audience to push or indirectly present an alternative agenda.

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Prior to the widespread discovery of the use of disinformation, some target audiences
were absentmindedly prepared to believe the first piece of information given to them in the
media. Countries densely populated and developing countries provide easier delivery of this
type of budding confusion from countries like Russia and China to “throw the stone and hide
their hands”. With the opportunity to deposit stories into the media while websites that are in
support of the agenda assist to bring added attention, it has become more difficult to decipher
what is fact among the information and what is not.
Sarah Oates, in a journal article published by the University of Maryland, College Park,
stated that Russia’s propaganda, “is useful for denying specific facts – such as refusing to admit
that a Russian missile shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 or that the seizure of the Crimean
Peninsula was illegal -- but even more useful for undermining the institution of the media in
general.” (2018).
In recent times, Russia has used disinformation tactics to execute the concept of the
term itself – to spread false information, likely mixed with factual elements to improve the
delivery of deception among a population. As the use and accessibility has grown popular in
demand by the average person, Russia quickly identified Twitter and Facebook as ideal
platforms to assist in disseminating their pro-Kremlin agendas. With the onset of the spread of
COVID-19 in 2020, Russia has been identified by the European Union as planting
disinformation about the virus since January 2020. In an article published on The Guardian’s
website, a classified European Union report was leaked, pointing out pro-Russian media as the
driving force to exacerbate the health crisis prior to it becoming a pandemic.
“The European commission’s chief spokesperson on foreign and security policy, Peter
Stano, said there had been an increase in “disinformation, misleading information, outright lies
and wrong things” since the start of the outbreak.
The commission had noticed, he said, an increase in disinformation from Russia,
providers based in the country and those with links to pro-Kremlin sources.” (Rankin, J., 2020).
In the wake of 2020’s COVID-19 pandemic, Russia was revealed as the culprit,
accusing the United States to be the source of the global spread of COVID-19. Some have taken
it upon themselves to organize media outlets that specifically point out the disinformation from
countries like China, Iran, and Russia.

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On the Washington Examiner website, Tom Rogan wrote on social media, “Here, the
Russians can hope their scaremongering lies will earn attention from a wide array of
individuals, including individuals otherwise largely disinterested in news reporting.” (2020).
Other media outlets such as Yahoo! News, The Daily Beast, BBC, The New York Times, and
Fox News have reported how Russia has used the economic crippling COVID-19 pandemic to
blame the United States and other countries for its conception and spread to kill populations
worldwide. With the sharing of a border with 14 other countries that have been hit hard by the
COVID-19 pandemic, Russia has maintained reporting rather low numbers of coronavirus
cases, compared to its neighboring countries. While its surrounding countries report spikes in
death and positive cases throughout 2020, Russia has yet to provide substantial information on
their fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.
Dominique Batiste

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References
Borger, J. (2014, March 25). Barack Obama: Russia is a regional power showing weakness
over Ukraine. Retrieved April 4, 2020, from
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/25/barack-obama-russia-regional-
power-ukraine-weakness
Borger, J. (2019, August 25). G7: Trump's demands for Russia's readmission cause row in
Biarritz. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/25/g7-
trumps-demands-for-russias-readmission-causes-row-in-biarritz
Elswah, M., & Howard, P. N. (2020). “Anything that Causes Chaos”: The Organizational
Behavior of Russia Today (RT). Journal of Communication, 70(5), 623-645.
doi:10.1093/joc/jqaa027
Oates, Sarah, When Media Worlds Collide: Using Media Model Theory to Understand How
Russia Spreads Disinformation in the United States (August 24, 2018). American
Political Science Association 2018 Annual Meeting, Boston MA. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3238247
Rankin, J. (2020, March 18). Russian media 'spreading Covid-19 disinformation'. Retrieved
from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/18/russian-media-spreading-
covid-19-disinformation
Rogan, T. (2020, February 24). Why, as with AIDS, Russia blames coronavirus on America.
Retrieved from https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/russia-is-blaming-
coronavirus-on-america-and-heres-why
White, J. (2016). Dismiss, distort, distract, and dismay: Continuity and change in Russian
disinformation. Policy Brief, Institute for European Studies.

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Covid-19 Crisis, the New Battleground for
the Geopolitics of China and Russia
The present health crisis is showing the vulnerability of a system that has in China the
main world manufacturer. At the same time, it is showing how China and Russia are
repositioning on the geopolitical chessboard in the aftermath of the crisis. The strength of
their positions will mostly depend on the resilience of the economic and socio-political
systems of the most affected countries.
The Covid-19 crisis has the potential to reshape the geopolitical system in the short and
mid-term. All main world economies are struggling. The democratic system of the Western
bloc is being hardly hit by the inability to find a solution and give answers to their citizens quick
enough to reset life back to normal.
While the present US administration is constantly under scrutiny for the delay of drastic
decisions to control the spreading of the disease, the European diplomatic order is hit by a new
wave of nationalist and populist requests that are highlighting the interests of individual
countries at the damage of the European Union’s dream.
This health crisis has led to a harsh debate within the EU on how to deal with the costs
and consequences of this crisis. Its member states are disputing vehemently on the financial
packages and systems to put in place to counter the effects of this pandemic. At the same time
though, China and Russia have taken advantage of this controversy to step deeper into European
affairs by sending medical supplies and personnel to assist Italy (as the hardest hit so far within
the Union) and its authorities in their efforts to counter the spreading of the virus.
China’s and Russia’s help have been defined and portrayed in their home countries as
humanitarian missions. However, the motives of these missions are being questioned as the
guiding principles are less humanitarian and more strategic.
Throughout the centuries, both countries have based their strength through the
geopolitics of fear, marked by a hard and deep control of their territory and strategic lines of
defense, while at the same time showing an invasive control of their respective external areas
of influence.

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The crisis has made Italy particularly vulnerable. Because of its strategic position in the
Mediterranean Sea, the Peninsula has always been a territory of conquest for foreign powers.
During WWII, Sir Winston Churchill defined it as the soft underbelly through which to defeat
the Nazis. During the Cold War, Italy has been a territory of spies and intrigues for all major
powers involved. Today, although through different shapes and forms, the situation has not
changed. Therefore, both China and Russia have their own strategic reasons to rush to the help
of Italy. Important for them, controversial and dangerous for Italy itself, the EU, and the US.
China has the need to clear its reputation of being the country that has spread the virus.
What better opportunity than rushing to the dying bed of the first G7 country that joined China
in its Belt and Road Initiative in March 2019? The special relationship that the leaders of the 5
Star Movement –one of the main parties in the current Italian Parliament and also the main
party in the government coalition– have with Chinese authorities has often been pointed out
negatively, both in Italy and abroad. The decision of the Italian government to join China’s
project has been harshly criticized within EU and NATO environments. This is an opportunity
for China to strengthen this relationship by: 1) pointing out the perceived lack of help and
support Italy is receiving from Western countries; and 2) selling medical equipment to Italy
through a preferential lane. It is important to remark that China is not giving medical equipment
for free.
The closed and repressive system managed by Chinese governments have often been
the target of Western criticism. In the months prior to this health crisis, the way protests in Hong
Kong and in the Xinjiang region have been managed have often brought Western countries to
be very outspoken against China’s system and lack of respect for human rights. With Europe
and the US being hit by the Covid-19 crisis –more than China has been and regardless of the
methods used to control it–, China is in the position of gaining strategic advantages in the post-
crisis geopolitical order.
The pattern that China is following in Italy is the same path it followed in other regions
of the world, such as Africa or Indo-China: politics through commerce.
Russia is in a similar position. From its perspective, it has important strategic reasons
as well to step into EU territory and set new lines of influence. Through the years that followed
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Western world has publicly shown mistrust in Russia’s
implementation of democratic values. It has often been under the scrutiny of Western
democracies and institutions. However, in the past ten years, the attitude has changed. The more

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Russia played a major role in the energy sector and supplied Europe with gas, the more
European countries were placed in the “without option position.” Made exceptions for some
statements here and there to mark some sort of distance and criticism, they have become less
outspoken and more complacent with Russia’s internal and external policies. They have turned
a blind eye to human rights violations and the management of political and media dissent. The
constitutional changes that allow Mr. Vladimir Putin to be in the position of president for many
years to come have been taken as a regular unfolding of events.
One clear proof is the major role that Russia plays in the Syrian crisis. As the US was
gradually disengaging from the Middle East, Russia turned on the political offensive and openly
set a foot on a ground they were used to stepping on very cautiously before. The lack of real
response to the 2014’s Russian annexation of Crimea was the icing on the cake. That move was
not really opposed by any Western democracies. There were circumstantial statements, but no
real steps to sanction Russia have been taken. Russia’s intelligence operations on British soil in
recent years have shown Mr. Putin’s resoluteness in taking difficult decisions. His actions
follow the steps of his predecessors, starting with Catherine the Great and continued through
the centuries by the czars and the Soviet Union leaders that followed.
Currently, Russia is probably at its utmost geopolitical role. The health crisis that is
hitting the Western world is giving an opportunity that will hardly happen again in the near
future. Russia is aware of this and is using its political power and influence to strengthen old
ties and create new ones.
Just like China is exploiting the special channel it has with the leaders of the Italian 5
Star Movement, Russia is exploiting the feeling of detachment from the EU that a good
percentage of the Italian right-wing voters and politicians have shown in the past few years.
Russia’s understanding of the political opportunities given by the crisis is proved also by
military and intelligence personnel that have been sent to Italy to help control the pandemic.
Since WWII, never before had Russia set its foot on Western soil. What is currently happening
might mark the beginning of a new geopolitical era.
In an attempt to counter China’s and Russia’s mission on Italian soil, Mr. Donald Trump
ordered the US government to help Italy with medical supplies and hospitals on April, 10th. It
has also remarked the importance of the role that the US-Italy alliance has played through the
decades that followed WWII. Mr. Trump’s move was not unexpected. However, the question

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is whether it is still on time to regain a strategic influence. It is still too early to say as both Italy
and the US are still in the full wave of the health crisis.
Through the years that followed WWII, both China, Russia, and the US have followed
the same pattern: gaining strategic positions by building facts on the ground. The three countries
share also the vision of geopolitical greatness they have of themselves.
However, the difference between these three superpowers is to be found in the scrutiny
system present in their respective institutions. While the US is an accomplished democracy,
with a political minority and media system protected in their rights, a check and balance system
that limits the powers of the president, and investigating commissions to ascertain facts and
events, China and Russia are way far from having transparent institutions and systems. Political
minorities and media are not fully protected in their rights to dissent and question their
governments’ policies. A system based on check and balance and investigating commissions
are not fully present in their institutions. The principle of accountability is virtually absent in
their systems. These peculiarities place China’s and Russia’s decision-makers on a fast-track
lane when strategic and resolute decisions have to be taken.
The Covid-19 health crisis has strengthened the role of the “Healthcare Silk Road.” As
the main manufacturer and supplier of healthcare-related items and equipment, China has a new
gold mine to dig, a new oil well to extract from. It can set the timeline and price as it finds more
appropriate. Italy has probably become the first importer of the products of this new version of
the silk road. The US, being now the country with the highest number of deaths due to Covid-
19, is finding it hard to meet its own needs at the same speed as they arise. The American
healthcare system is struggling. Despite the order of Mr. Trump to convert manufacturing
processes to meet the desperate need of ventilators and respirators, the US is not in the position
of defining themselves self-reliant on this issue.
The Covid-19 crisis has shown the strategic role that medical supplies play nowadays.
It has also shown the vulnerability of a geopolitical and economic system that has made China
its main manufacturer. The US, the EU bloc, Japan, and the UK might decide to launch plans
to bring back to their countries the production and manufacture of strategic supplies, including
healthcare ones. However, similar plans will take years to be implemented effectively and turn
these regions self-reliant.

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Currently, from a political perspective, the research for a cure or the discovery of a
vaccine against this type of coronavirus is the main “weapon” the affected countries have to
contain China’s role in the management of the supplies needed for this type of crisis. Although
several promising paths are being walked on, the road ahead might still be long. In the
meantime, China’s manufacturers and political system will benefit from this crisis.
When the pandemic will be managed effectively and life and production will be back to
normal again, the Chinese government will have to answer many questions on how they
managed the health crisis in Wuhan and how they tried to prevent the virus from spreading
globally. They will have to explain also how they collected information about the disease, what
information they collected, how their reports have been written, and what information and how
they have shared them. In several health- and political environments, lots of doubts are being
cast on the transparency and effectiveness of the Chinese management system. One of the main
charges against them could be healthcare-related criminal negligence. However, the strength of
the questions will mostly depend on how the Western countries, and particularly the US and
the EU bloc, will recover in all of their aspects from the pandemic. It will depend on how strong
and effective the resilience of their political and socio-economic system will prove to be.
Russia, although not involved in the spreading of the virus and the exportation of the
health crisis, might be questioned for its misinformation and disinformation operations during
the crisis.
However, from a geopolitical perspective, these charges and questions do not really
count. Through the decades, the two countries have proved to be waterproof against
international criticism. They might have to pay a small price in terms of reputation and
commerce, but it will hardly affect them greatly in the mid and long term.
When the Covid-19 crisis will be over, the world will most likely find itself in a new
geopolitical phase, where the balance and shift of power will be on the side of China and Russia.
With their new footholds around the globe.
Raffaele Petroni

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The Strategic Culture of Trump’s
America NATO Policy: A Neoclassical
Realist Approach
Abstract
Systemic imperatives are considered the major shaping factor of domestic intervening variables
in neoclassical realism. The present article aims to study how the first shapes which variant of
American strategic culture and its subcultures tends to manifest under certain structural
conditions, having as object of research the Trump’s Administration NATO policy from 2017
to 2019. It was found that systemic conditions in the strategic environment, as interpreted by
Trump’s foreign policy executive, favored the expression of a hardline unilateralist subculture
of American strategic culture, heir of the Jacksonian tradition. However, the foreign policy
executive as a whole is diverse and tends to vary between hardline unilateralists who aim to
make NATO more conditional in terms of burden-sharing and conservative nationalists who
reassure allies of US commitments to Europe's collective defense.

Center for International Relations and International Security
Introduction
The Trump presidency has caused a substantive impact on top decision-makers among
NATO allies and researchers around the world due to its resolute position regarding burden-
sharing within the alliance. There could be multiple standpoints to study and decipher Trump’s
position on NATO, some of which includes perspectives on the degree of personal adherence
to international liberalism by the president, or merely structural incentives.
The goal of the present article is to merge two approaches to study this phenomenon:
neoclassical realism and strategic culture. The first approach will allow for a systematization of
how the independent variable (systemic imperatives) interacts with the domestic intervening
variable (strategic culture) to shape US-NATO policy under the Trump Administration.
The present article will be guided by the following research question: how can a
neoclassical realist approach explain the interaction of systemic imperatives with strategic
cultural aspects that shaped Trump’s foreign policy executive (FPE) NATO policy from 2017
to 2019?
Point 2 of the article explains the methodological procedures to reach the goal expressed by the
research question;
Point 3 provides an overview of neoclassical realism;
Point 4 introduces the concepts of strategic culture, the debates within the literature regarding
such concepts, and dissects the sources of strategic culture;
Point 5 proposes an approach, based on the existing literature, to intersect neoclassical realism
and strategic culture;
Point 6 provides the general guidelines of American strategic culture and its main subcultures;
Point 7 briefly studies how the American strategic subcultures penetrated the Republican Party,
and how that partially explains Trump’s perspectives of international affairs;
Point 8 analyzes US-NATO policy through the combination of approaches proposed by the
present article;
Point 9 offers some synthetic remarks about the main results of this study and prospective fields
to explore in neoclassical realism.

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Methodology
The present article constitutes a qualitative research based on bibliographical review,
exploring previous approaches proposed by primary authors on the subject, such as Colin Dueck
and Colin Gray. Scientific articles and specialized books compose the informational input of
the present research, although a governmental document is also used.
This research opts for a deductive method, starting with the general theoretical structure
and narrowing it to explain a particular case. Thus, this article adopts the following steps:
1. Systematization of the theoretical and conceptual approaches;
2. Specification of how neoclassical realism and strategic culture intersect as analytical
devices;
3. Describe American strategic culture and its subcultures and how they operate through
decision-makers and their respective visions and analyses of America’s place in the
world;
4. Analyze Trump’s FPE NATO policy using the approaches proposed.
Neoclassical Realism: Model and Framework
Considered one of the main founding fathers of neoclassical realism, Gideon Rose
(1998) systematized this theoretical model by distinguishing theories of international politics,
whose analytical purpose is to explain patterns of outcomes in the interactions among states in
the international system; from theories of foreign policy, which aim to elucidate State behavior
through the analysis of its foreign policy and decision-making processes. Neoclassical realism
intends to bridge this divide by incorporating internal and external variables under a single
framework. According to Rose, systemic pressures are paramount, thus, relative power,
material capabilities, and place in the international system are the starting point for neoclassical
realists. However, systemic imperatives must be translated by domestic intervening variables,
and often, incomplete information emanating from the international system and ambiguous
evidence make it problematic for leaders and decision-makers to interpret the distribution of
capabilities and read the messages of anarchy.
Given this general picture, it is important to describe the main starting point of
neoclassical realism: systemic imperatives, in accordance with the conceptual delineation of
structural realism. One of the core ordering principles of the international system is anarchy

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(Waltz, 1977), which is the absence of formal structures of command and subordination.
According to Waltz, in an anarchical structural organization: “Authority quickly reduces to a
particular expression of capability. In the absence of agents with system-wide authority, formal
relations of super- and subordination fail to develop.” (p. 88). Hence, distribution of capabilities
becomes the major distinguishing factor of the units that compose the system, and since units
coexist in an anarchical environment, they can use force at any time, and must be prepared to
do so in order to avoid living at the mercy of their most powerful homologous. In such self-
help dynamics where States seek to assure their own preservation, balances of power tend to
form in two categories:
1. Internal balancing: States make internal efforts to strengthen their economic and
military capabilities, and also enhance better strategies;
2. External balancing: engaging in alliances and strengthening them while weakening the
opponents.
Waltz’s structural realism object of study was international outcomes, not unit
attributes, and processes. Therefore, structural constraints explain why a set of patterns of
reactions are expected amongst formally undifferentiated units, in this case, the States. The
process of structural socialization leads States to adopt, emulate, and adapt the best practices of
their peers that have proven to be successful. Waltz uses market analogies to analyze how
impersonal conditions govern the behavior of units and reward successful competitors, and this
process builds models and patterns of expected behaviors from the actors. Nonetheless, even if
Waltz wrote that States who emulated the best practices and strategies in the process of
international socialization tended to maximize their chances of survival, he did not explain what
factors led States to adopt a certain strategy over another. Waltz himself recognizes this
theoretical shortfall: “The clear perception of constraints provides many clues to the expected
reactions of states, but by itself, the theory cannot explain those reactions. They depend not
only on international constraints but also on the characteristics of states. How will a particular
state react? To answer that question, we need not only a theory of the market, so to speak, but
also a theory about the firms that compose it” (p. 122).
Consequently, structural constraints do not seem sufficient to explain why States choose
a strategic decision that will allow it to be successful or to fail in the international arena. It is
essentially this shortfall that neoclassical realists have been seeking to address by assimilating
domestic intervening variables to analyze how States respond to systemic pressures.

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Randall Schweller (2004), for example, sought to explain why states under balance,
failing to recognize a clear and imminent threat or/and react to it, which is a behavior that
contrasts neorealists predictions. Schweller outlines four domestic intervening variables that
help to explain what leads States to under balance: 1. Elite consensus; 2. Regime’s vulnerability;
3. Social cohesion; 4. Elite cohesion. In the same logic, Nicholas Kitchen (2010) proposes
studying a State’s grand strategy and the institutions and individuals who hold the driving ideas
of a country’s foreign policy to assess how domestic intervening variables influence decision-
making in response to the systemic imperatives that shape them. Kitchen argued that one of the
biggest challenges for neoclassical realism is to emphasize structural factors while allowing
their mediation through domestic variables. However, it needs to be clear that, for neoclassical
realists, domestic political processes are analytically subordinate to systemic factors, and the
threats and opportunity they provide states with.
Seeking to address this challenge, Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell (2016) suggested that
when international systemic imperatives provide a considerable level of clarity and minimize
informational uncertainty about the threat or the opportunity, they limit the range of potential
policy options. When there’s less clarity and more uncertainty, there’s a greater margin for
domestic variables to intervene in the policy process.
Aiming to advance the methodological and theoretical configuration of neoclassical
realism, the three mentioned authors proposed a framework of independent and intervening
variables. The independent variables are the systemic factors, the starting point that shapes and
conditions the domestic intervening variables. According to Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell,
the independent variables are:
1. System structure;
2. Structural modifiers: variables that influence elementary structural factors in the
interaction among units. Military technology and geography are structural modifiers
because they alter the distribution of capabilities, the degree of threat faced by a certain
unit, or the effects of anarchy.
3. The relative distribution of power and polarity: conditioned by the structural modifiers,
relative material capabilities and the number of great powers in the system are
substantial variables for neoclassical realism.

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4. Clarity: represents the degree to which threats and opportunities are evident, whether
the system offers information on their time horizon and whether it is possible to
elaborate and distinguish optimal policy responses.
5. Permissive or restrictive strategic environment: “the more imminent the threat or
opportunity and the more dangerous the threat (or the more enticing the opportunity)
the more restrictive the state’s strategic environment is” (p. 52). In reverse, the more
remote and the less acute the threat or opportunity, the more restrictive a State’s strategic
environment is.
On the other hand, the intervening variables are:
1. Leader images: the cognitive constraints of the foreign policy executive (FPE) charged
with the conduction of foreign and defense policies. Values, beliefs, and images guide
the FPE’s interaction with the world and frame its information-processing in crisis
situations and their perceptions.
2. Strategic culture: norms, beliefs, assumptions, and expectations that, through
socialization and institutionalization, shape the strategic understanding of leaders, elites,
and society, and help define what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable strategic
decisions.
3. State-society relations: the interaction and the degree of competition and collaboration
between the central State institutions and societal groups. If the foreign policy executive
is insulated from other political institutions, its policy-making process is less susceptible
to conforming domestic demands and more likely to be in congruence with the
international environment.
4. Domestic institutions: “Formal institutions, organizational routines and processes, and
bureaucratic oversight, often established by constitutional provisions with clearly
specified rules and regulations set the broad parameters within which domestic
competition over policy occurs” (Ripsman et. Al, 2016, p. 75). Institutional architecture
can enhance or constrain the FPE through the division of power, checks and balances,
and public support. Furthermore, the quality of government and the ability of state
institutions to extract society’s potential and turn it into national relative advantage are
recognized as a substantial subset of this intervening variable.

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The Concepts of Strategic Culture
One of the major aspects in the study of strategic culture is the prevalence of varied
definitions, perspectives, and approaches. Therefore, there are different concepts of strategic
culture.
Jack Snyder (1977) was one of the first major considerable proponents of employing
strategic cultural-based analysis to address the insufficiencies of the rational actor and game
theoretical models in studying Soviet strategic nuclear thought and behavior. For Snyder, Soviet
decision-makers were not culture-free game-theoretical agents, because they had been
socialized into a certain institutional configuration under a unique historical and cultural
framework that promoted a set of regular strategic behaviors that Americans could identify.
According to Snyder, strategic culture is “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional
responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community
have acquired through instruction or imitation” (p. 8).
In a similar rationale, the British author Colin Gray (1981), based on the American
example, defined strategic culture as: “modes of thought and action with respect to force,
derives from the perception of the national historical experience, aspiration for self-
characterization (e.g., as an American, what am I?, how should I feel, think, and behave?), and
from all of the many distinctively American experiences (of geography, political philosophy,
of civic culture, and ‘way of life’) that characterize an American citizen.” (p. 22).
Johnston (1995) criticized what he named the “first generation” approach to strategic
culture produced by authors such as Snyder and Gray. Unlike the first generation of authors
who had suggested, the behavior is not constitutive of strategic culture, and the first should be
treated as a dependent variable and the latter as the independent one. Johnston defined strategic
culture as a “system of symbols” (p. 46) comprised of two dimensions:
1. Basic assumptions about the role of war in human affairs, the nature of the adversary
and the threat it poses, and the efficacy of using force.
2. Operational level of strategic culture consisting of assumptions about which strategic
options are the most effective for dealing with the threat environment.
The two dimensions would not always correspond, as Johnston showed in his broad
study of Chinese strategic culture. Therefore, for Johnston, there was a difference between

Center for International Relations and International Security
documental strategy and operational strategy, and he accused the first generation of
“determinism”, arguing that for them, strategic culture determined behavior.
Colin Gray (1999) responded to Johnston’s critique in an article he wrote for
International Security by saying that strategic culture is an expression of ideas and behavior.
For Gray, actors hold cultural ideas and behave culturally, and social actors are shaped by and
actively shape those ideas. Strategic culture cannot be considered an outside force, according
to Gray, the flux between ideas and behavior is continuous. Furthermore, according to Gray
(1999): “Strategic culture need not dictate a particular course of action, indeed domestic and
external constraints frequently will prohibit such behavior.” (p. 68). The British author observed
that strategic culture will be stamped in behaviors of all kinds and can slowly change and be
reinterpreted and readapted.
For the purpose of this article, we can point to Johnston's approach as restrictive, since
it reduces strategic culture to declaratory and documental dimensions, and minimizes its
interactions with material variables (geography, technology, historical experience and, even
structural constraints) that first-generation authors consider as inputs or sources of strategic
culture.
Sources of Strategic Culture
Adopting the first generation’s framework, it is necessary to clarify the factors that act
as inputs to strategic culture, its sources. David Jones (1990, p. 37) systematized three set of
sources of strategic culture:
1. The geography of the State, the ethnic culture of its founding people, and the latter’s
subsequent history;
2. Social-economic and administrative system, and the technological base, which is
significantly important for the development of critical spheres of the State, the military
included;
3. Networks of military-administrative institutions and patterns of political-military
cooperation.
William Kincade (1990, p. 10) argues that “A nation's strategy usually reflects its
geostrategic situation, resources, history and military experience, and political beliefs.” He then
suggests that these factors work as an influential force in shaping how a country perceives,

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protects and promotes its interests and values abroad, shaping its strategic culture, noting that
the latter is not always highly consistent or homogenous, even if, as Jones (1990) wrote, it is
conditioned by permanent operating variables, being geography and geophysical constraints an
example.
Similarly, Jack Snyder (1977) listed an interconnected group of elements that helped
constitute strategic soviet culture and behavior and can be generalized: balance of power and
strategic situation; geographical position; historical legacy; a profile of the decision-making
elite; civil-military relations; institutional arrangements; economic power; and technology.
Darryl Howlett (2005, p. 4) sums up what he considers to be the main sources of
strategic culture pointed by the literature: geography, climate and resources; history and
experience; political structure; the nature of the organizations involved in defense; myths and
symbols; key texts that inform decision-makers of the appropriate strategic action; and
transnational norms, generational change, and the role of technology.
A Neoclassical Realist Approach to Strategic Culture
The intersection of neoclassical realism and strategic culture has been deliberated by the
vast literature comprising the subject, and some authors suggested practical methodologies to
effectively attain the integration of both objects.
John Glenn (2009) suggested attributing strategic culture an epiphenomenal aspect,
allowing it to explain deviations from behaviors expected by the neorealist theory. This
approach attempts to diagnose patterns of State behavior and develop generalizable knowledge
by identifying causal and intervening variables. Epiphenomenal strategic culture supplements
neorealism, because “ideational factors would still be regarded as epiphenomenal, whereas
structural constraints should be deemed the primary cause of state behavior.” (Glenn, 2009, p.
541).
Offering a different methodology from that of Glenn, Colin Dueck (2005) applied
process-tracing to analyze the strategic options chosen by US decision-makers during two
continuous historical periods, 1918-1921 (post-World War I) and 1945-1948 (post-World War
II, proceeded by the Cold War). According to Dueck (2005): “neoclassical realists would argue
that international conditions ultimately drive the process of both strategic adjustment and
cultural change. That is to say, when political-military cultures come under intense international
pressure, they adjust and adapt in the end” (p. 204). Hence, strategic culture is shaped and driven

Center for International Relations and International Security
by systemic imperatives, and Dueck explained how American decision-makers opted for
strategic choices that were in conformity with the classical liberal thought that the US was
founded on. Liberal influence allowed for justifications of both non-entanglement after World
War I and – covert and overt – interventions during the Cold War, projecting the US society
model as an example. Nevertheless, systemic factors conditioned the strategic decision-making
process and the cultural elements that influenced and justified policy choices.
Colin Gray (1999) argued that strategic culture often interacts with internal and external
variables that shape the strategic behavior of security communities. Hence, for this article, we
shall consider strategic culture not as an epiphenomenon of deviant strategic behavior expected
by structural realists, but as an intervening variable that interacts with systemic factors and is
shaped by them. Therefore, we shall base our approach on Dueck’s findings: strategic culture
is driven by systemic imperatives, but does not necessarily contradict them.
American Strategic Culture
One of the main analytic observations that can summarize American strategic culture is
the absence of a single and homogenous approach. The vast literature tends to point to
competing approaches and subcultures within the American strategic culture. According to
Oliver Lee (2008): “the resulting geostrategic policies periodically alternate between
isolationism and interventionism not because of an internal contradiction in America’s strategic
culture but because there are different coalitions of subcultures that alternate in their control of
foreign policy” (p. 281).
Walter Mead (as cited by Sondhaus, 2006) categorized four major subcultures of
American strategic culture and their respective analysis of America’s place in the world and
the appropriate foreign policy to achieve the corresponding goals:
The Hamiltonians a strong foreign policy must be founded on close cooperation between
the Federal Government and businesses, and American interests are better served when
integrated in the global system on favorable terms. One example is Franklin Roosevelt’s
administration, which helped orchestrate international institutions that supported the post-Cold
War American-led order, such as the World Bank, the UN, and NATO.
The Jeffersonians reject foreign policy adventurism and tend to favor safeguarding
domestic security. They tend to view strong standing armies and adventuristic foreign policy as
threats to republican liberty.

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The Jacksonians do not advocate aggressive and militaristic foreign policy but favor
forceful response when America is attacked. Tend to adopt a Hobbesian realist view of
international relations and be skeptical towards international organizations. Favored America’s
intervention in World War I not out of solidarity with European allies, but because Germany
attacked Americans through submarine warfare.
The Wilsonians consider it the duty and strategic interest of the United States to advance
American democratic values in the interests of peace and justice worldwide, using force if
necessary but prioritizing peaceful means. Strongly influenced by classical liberal assumptions
about international relations.
In addition, the literature tended to describe general guidelines that comprised the
“American way of war” which transcended subcultures. Theo Farrell (2005) described 3 biases
that inform American strategic culture and military practices:
1. Technological fanaticism: historically, there have been varied enthusiasm for
technology in the US military. In the 70s, with the introduction of electronics into
weapons platforms and the rise of new battlefield systems based on network technology,
all four services embraced the mentioned enthusiasm.
2. Casualty aversion: rooted in the Vietnam War, it makes political and military leaders
skeptical of deploying ground troops for risky missions.
3. A pragmatic approach to international law: flexibly adjusts the interpretation of legal
rules to the realities of US power.
Farrell’s second bias is compatible with Thomas Mahnken’s (2008) description of
American strategic culture: “No nation in recent history has placed greater emphasis upon the
role of technology in planning and waging war than the United States” (p. 5). Mahnken also
notes how since the Civil War, the American leaders have tended to favor strategies of total
victory over their adversaries and wage wars with unlimited political objectives.
Carnes Lord (1985) mentions that an important aspect of American strategic culture is
the civilian control over the military. The decisive moment for the steady erosion of military
control over strategic planning and decisions proceeded after World War II was McNamara’s
terms at the Pentagon, with the creation of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and
the system analysis staffed primarily by civilians that provided the Secretary a view of military
requirements independent of service bias. The creation of separate defense agencies also

Center for International Relations and International Security
contributed to centralize the management of military programs and activities common to the
services.
Sources of American Strategic Culture
We can trace two intertwined leading variables that framed American strategic culture
and shaped its sources: geography and historical experiences.
The United States was initially populated by puritans and dissenters from the Anglican
church who deconstructed their past connections to the Old World and built new social, moral,
religious, and political foundations in the colonies (Lee, 2008).
George Friedman (2020) divided American geography into two lines: 1. South of
Pennsylvania, where the Appalachians were two hundred miles from the Atlantic coast, and the
flat abundant land made the territory propensity to large plantations; 2. North of Pennsylvania,
where the distance from the mountains to the Atlantic was much less, and the soil wasn’t as
favorable as southwards. “There was room only for family farms, craftsmen, merchants, and
bankers” (p. 38). This division, according to Friedman, is the origin of the subsequent economic
and cultural divisions that would threaten the existence of the United States until 1865. For
example, South of Pennsylvania, the physical geographical conditions made slavery a
productive necessity, while northwards, it was uneconomic.
In the post-Civil War context, between 1890 and 1920, massive industrialization
transformed the United States into a metropolitan manufacturing power in search of overseas
markets (Kincade, 1990). This process underlined the disagreement between the ones who
cherished the notions of the United States as a self-sufficient internally absorbed agrarian
society, echoing George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, and those who believed that the
protection of American economic security and values required global economic and military
projection.
This geo-historical source of American strategic culture penetrated the Republican
Party, and still influences Trump’s position in certain matters of international affairs, including
alliance burden-sharing.

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The Republican Party and American Strategic Culture
In his book, called Age of Iron, Colin Dueck (2020) points out three categories in the
Republican Party and delineates their respective analysis and visions of what the US role in the
world should be:
Conservatives nationalists believe in an active US role overseas (economically,
militarily, and diplomatically). In the 21st century, they favor free trade, alliances, foreign aid,
and high defense spending. However, they differ from their liberal Wilsonian counterparts by
placing less significance on multilateral institutions, approaching them from a pragmatic
approach based on US national interests. They have been the dominant tendency within the
party since World War II, being represented by leaders such as President Eisenhower and
President George W. Bush.
Noninterventionists oppose American military intervention and bases abroad and tend
to be skeptical toward alliances. This segment dominated the Republican Party between the
1920s and 1930s. They defend limited government at home and believe that over-militarized
foreign policy is a threat to civil liberties. During the Cold War, this segment was marginalized
by Republicans as anti-communist policies prevailed. This category is associated with figures
such as President Hebert Hoover, Senator Robert Taft, and Senator Rand Paul.
Conservative Hawkish/Hardline Unilateralists tend to be favorable to high levels of
defense spending and strong responses against terrorism. They are not pacifists, but at the same
time, they are usually skeptical of nation-building efforts, democracy promotion, foreign aid
programs, humanitarian interventions, and multilateral institutions that promote global
governance. For this segment, the maintenance of American sovereignty is fundamental, and
diplomatic engagements and appeasement with US adversaries are usually unwelcome, while
their basic objective is to build and maintain strong defenses and punish any threat to American
citizens. This variant can be represented by Pat Buchanan, President Donald Trump, and
Senator Tom Cotton.
Applying Walter Mead’s categories to Dueck’s systematization would lead us to
describe the conservative nationalists as Hamiltonians, noninterventionists as Jeffersonians, and
hardline unilateralists as Jacksonians.
As Franz-Stefan Gady (2020) noted, during the 1952 Republican presidential primary
between Senator Robert Taft and then-candidate Dwight Eisenhower, two segments of the

Center for International Relations and International Security
Republican Party clashed: noninterventionists, represented by Senator Taft, who proposed
offshore balancing, and thus, avoiding ground troops commitment to Europe; and conservative
nationalists, led by General Eisenhower, who wanted to continue with containment strategy
and reinforce ground troops commitment to Europe collective defense and NATO.
Eisenhower’s victory in the 1952 primaries can be traced as the defining moment of
marginalization of the noninterventionists in the Republican Party, in benefit of containment
strategy supporters and conservative nationalists.
According to John Mearsheimer (2001), there was a major systemic imperative that led
US leaders to keep American ground forces in Europe instead of choosing offshore balancing:
Soviet power. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union controlled the eastern two-thirds of the
continent. Therefore, no local great power could check the Soviet Union without US
commitment to NATO.
This provides reasonable evidence of how systemic and structural imperatives shape
which variant of American strategic culture is more expressive in a certain context to influence
and justify foreign policy decisions.
President Donald Trump: A Brief Analysis of a Hardline Unilateralist
As an embodiment of the Jacksonian strategic subculture, President Trump’s foreign
policy proposals were not driven by moral or internationalist imperatives but animated by the
necessity to protect US soil and interests from direct threats. His assertive speeches stating the
intention to use force to extinguish ISIS are predicated on the hardline unilateralist category of
the Republican Party, a descendant of the Jacksonian tradition, whose one of the most basic
aims is to confront and punish threats against American citizens (Clarke & Ricketts, 2017). His
approach towards NATO can also be considered compatible with the Jacksonian tradition of
the hardline unilateralists, who tend to adopt a Hobbesian perspective of international relations
and frame alliances and institutions so long as they go hand in hand with national interests.
Hence, “America first” is essentially a unilateralist Jacksonian narrative.
President Trump's appeal as a candidate went over with a critical percentage of small-
town, non-college-educated white voters in key swing states such as Pennsylvania, and in the
Midwest to Iowa and Wisconsin (Dueck, 2020, pp. 125-126). Weinschken (2018) shows that
Trump’s performance with white, male, and religious voters triumphed over Clinton’s.

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Even though domestic issues such as economics, Supreme Court appointments,
individual liberties, criminal policing and party loyalties played the leading role in Trump’s
victory in the 2016 election, the group of voters (southern, midwestern, evangelical, agrarian,
rural, and white) who chose him over Clinton tend to be associated with the non-interventionist
subculture of American strategic culture (Lee, 2008), thus, skeptical of liberal internationalism
and non-critical military interventions abroad.
US-NATO Policy in the Trump Administration: Systemic Factors and
Strategic Cultural Aspects
US presidents have successively emphasized the need for greater burden-sharing among
NATO allies. What distinguishes Donald Trump from past presidents is the willingness to take
bigger risks in order to make allies increase their defense spending (Benitez, 2019). In this
sense, according to Benitez, Trump’s observations towards NATO has shown that
conditionality is a policy parameter for the president. Donald Trump has stated that the United
States might back down on its defense commitments in case allies do not meet their financial
commitments.
However, the concrete NATO policy might also have been shaped by a diverse FPE that
carries different views on the subject, with some officials tending to prefer conditional relations
with NATO allies, and others reassuring them of the unchanging US commitments.
Table 1 - Trump's Foreign Policy Executive - Current and Former Officials: Position
Towards NATO (made by the author of this article)
Trump's Foreign Policy Executive - Current and Former Officials: Position Towards
NATO
Official
Position Towards NATO
Former Defense Secretary James Mattis
Reassurance
Former National Security Adviser (NSA)
McMaster
Reassurance
Former NSA John Bolton
Ambiguous
NSA Robert O'Brien
Conditional
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
Conditional
Secretary of Defense Mark Esper
Reassurance
President Donald Trump
Conditional
Vice-President Mike Pence
Ambiguous

Center for International Relations and International Security
As the table above indicates, the Trump administration as a whole does not hold a
homogenous position on NATO policy. This may contribute to non-clarity when it comes to
actual decision-making. Taking that into account, it is possible to note that the harsh speech
about burden-sharing has coexisted with an increase of rotational troops in Poland (BBC, 2019).
Therefore, the lack of a homogeneous position has meant that the policy towards NATO does
not follow a linear logic. Most of the changes regarding NATO policy under Trump’s
presidency have been ideational, and one of the main goals was to make security guarantees
more conditional, but the alliance remains intact (Ashbee & Hurst, 2020).
To capture the underlying imperatives of the Trump administration's NATO policy
under a neoclassical realist framework, it is pertinent to analyze how systemic factors interacted
with strategic cultural aspects in shaping the administration’s decisions.
Systemic Factors
Analyzing objective systemic factors through a neoclassical realist lens allows us to use
the National Security Strategy – NSS – (2017) to examine the Trump administration’s
interpretation of the structural imperatives that might guide its foreign policy. Hence, this
document allows the author to evaluate the general guidelines of how the mentioned
administration depicts systemic inputs, and how that influences its NATO policy.
The NSS describes the strategic environment and points to emerging threats to
America’s power: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorist groups. The
document states that these actors challenge US dominance in the post-Cold War unipolarity.
The NSS emphasizes the challenges posed by China’s economic and military modernization,
while extensively acknowledging Russia’s acquisition of military capabilities as a threat.
Thus, the recognition of the Chinese threat (which predates the Trump Administration)
may have contributed to the rhetoric in regard to NATO, underlying the necessity of relocating
troops to the Asian military theater (Ashbee & Hurst, 2020). Meanwhile, the continuous
Russian threat can be identified as a leading factor in the boosting of troops to Poland.
Strategic Cultural Aspects
We can interpret that China’s rise allowed the hardline unilateralist tradition, descendant
of the Jacksonian strategic subculture, to be manifested by the US demand of greater burden-
sharing in NATO, given the need to relocate troops to Asia. However, the continuity of the

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Russian threat is still a strategic imperative that keeps NATO intact, and Trump’s FPE varied
between hardline unilateralists who want to make the security guarantees in the alliance more
conditional and conservative nationalists who seek to reassure allies of the unchanging US
commitment.
Conclusion
In this article, we analyzed Trump’s Administration NATO policy, combining
neoclassical realism and strategic culture.
The intersection of these two approaches positioned systemic imperatives as the
independent variable and strategic culture as the intervening variable, and it was possible to
identify that the rise of the Chinese threat seemed to justify the President’s harsh rhetoric
regarding NATO, given the necessity to shift troops from Europe and other theaters to Asia.
Simultaneously, the continuous Russian threat seemed to be a leading strategic imperative for
an increase of US troops in Poland.
The harsh speeches towards NATO also result from a hardline unilateralist branch of
the Republican Party that originates from the Jacksonian subculture within American strategic
culture, which has competing approaches.
The task of exploring and simplifying the fundamental intervening variables remains
unfinished. Yet, studying the interaction of systemic pressures with domestic factors has helped
researchers capture the complexity of international phenomena and foreign policy, and how
both converge.
Besides strategic culture, electoral processes, institutional architecture, organizational
processes, and leader’s psychology can be explored to examine how a certain country designs
a certain aspect of its foreign policy. This may contribute to the scientific refining of
neoclassical realism.
Lauro Borges

Center for International Relations and International Security
References
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Transformational Change. Global Affairs, 1-15.
BBC. (2019). Trump: US to Send 1,000 Troops to Poland in New Deal. Available in:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-48585045
Benitez, J. (2019). US NATO Policy in the Age of Trump: Controversy and Consistency. The
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 43(1), 179-200.
Clarke, M., Ricketts, A. (2017). Donald Trump and American Foreign Policy: The Return of
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Dueck, C. (2005). Realism, Culture and Grand Strategy: Explaining America’s Peculiar Path
to World Power. Security Studies, 14(2), 195-231.
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Friedman, G. (2020). The Storm Before the Calm: America’s Discord, the Coming Crisis of
the 2020s, and the Triumph Beyond. New York, USA: Doubleday.
Gady, F. (2020). How the 1952 Republican Primary Killed Offshore Balancing. The National
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Presidential Election. Journal of Political Marketing, 1-24.
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Carrel, P. (2019). Pompeo Says NATO Must Change, or Risk Becoming Obsolete. Reuters.
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nato-must-change-or-risk-becoming-obsolete-idUSKBN1XI179
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idUSKBN1W32LG
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germany-to-task-over-defense-spending/
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by-acting-secretary-esper-in-a-press-conference-at-nato-hq-brussels-bel/

Center for International Relations and International Security
Disengagement Is Not an Option: Why
Repatriation of ISIS Brides Must Contain
a De-radicalization Component
Abstract
The relationship between a state and non-state actors can be a complicated one, even more so,
when the non-state actor is allegedly affiliated with an unprecedented terrorist organization
abroad. 2020 marks six years since the rise and fall of the Islamist group Islamic State (or
Daesh) “Caliphate” in Iraq and Syria. A 2018 study done by the International Centre for the
Study of Radicalization (ICSR) found that 41,490 citizens from 80 countries had gone to Iraq
and Syria to join the terrorist organization. Of that number, researchers found that 4,640 were
women. With the fall of the Caliphate, many of those women ended up in camps and are now
requesting leniency and repatriation from their home countries. This paper argues that should
countries choose to repatriate their female ISIS citizens (and subsequently their children), then
imbued in the repatriation process ought to be a framework for de-radicalization or attitudinal
modification rather than disengagement (behavioral modification).
Keywords: De-radicalization, disengagement, attitudinal modification, behavioral
modification, terrorism, Islamic State, female Jihadi, ISIS brides, repatriation strategies

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With the fall of the Islamic State’s (also known as ISIS or IS) self-declared caliphate in
2019, governments from around the world are confronted with a new dilemma—the ISIS
returnee question. The question of what to do with their citizens who had gone abroad to join
the Islamist group and live under ISIS’ caliphate. The responses from policymakers in regard
to next steps have been to either leave their citizens in detainment camps and prisons in Iraq
and Syria, repatriate them or evade the issue. When leaders do engage in discussions and
dialogue about the ISIS returnee question, it appears that the main focus is on actions
surrounding what to do with the outright and obvious symbol: the male Jihadi fighter.
Effectively overlooking and adding to the invisibility of the ISIS brides and their children, and,
one could argue, amassing a potential security risk in the future.
The foreign ISIS bride as a subject is one shrouded in a penumbra. It is difficult for
many to understand their motives or rationale for leaving nations in the West and joining ISIS.
Because of this policymakers have been unclear as to how to proceed in regards to them and
their reintroduction into society. It is easy to rally support for prosecution or some form of
punitive repercussion to the ISIS male fighter as the world has seen their abhorrent acts proudly
displayed through their propaganda. In ISIS propaganda, the tasks of the women surround the
house, she is to be a pious Muslim, and a dutiful wife and mother. The brides who wish to be
repatriated like UK-born Shamima Begum, and American native Hoda Muthana among others,
also maintain that their role within the terror group never included violent acts, eo ipso, making
them not a threat (Drury 2019, Francis & Longman 2019). As a Canadian ISIS bride argued, “I
don’t believe I did anything wrong. I didn’t kill nobody. I didn’t do any harm to anybody”
(CTV, 2017).
These claims contrast starkly with the images of ISIS brides as part of the morality
police, carrying guns to enforce the rules. Or of their complicity in the systematic and precise
exploitation and genocide of the Yazidi peoples. Magboula Bajo, a Yazidi survivor paints
another picture of the ISIS brides and their actions, “They are also the wives of ISIS members.
They treated us worse than their husbands did to us. Those ISIS women were holding Yazidi
girls for their husbands to rape them and torture them” (Longman, 2020). The case of Jennifer
W in Germany also highlights the cruelness and brutality of the brides.
The role of the ISIS bride, however, has been obfuscating and it is unclear as to how to
conceive and reconcile the two narratives of the ISIS bride and translate that into a coherent
policy. What is clear is that strategies and policies geared towards the repatriation of ISIS brides

Center for International Relations and International Security
ought to include some element of a de-radicalization program and not one with the goal merely
of dis-engagement. The point of this paper is not to argue the pros and cons of repatriation,
merely, it is to illustrate the distinction between “de-radicalization” and “disengagement” and
the objectives of each process, then apply them to the case of the ISIS brides particularly those
from Western nations.
Foreign ISIS brides, often young women, have undergone the process of radicalization;
Doosje et al (2016) and Darcy M.E. Noricks (2009) purports that the method to undo the
radicalization process is not necessarily to put the radicalized individual through the process in
reverse. Radicalization results in individuals becoming progressively motivated or willing to
use violent measures against members of an “out-group or symbolic target” (Doosje et al., 2016,
p. 79). In the case of ISIS, the out-group consists of people in the West, and non-Muslims living
in the Middle East. The Yazidis a minority group have been the predominant victim of ISIS
facing genocide, ethnic cleansing, and various crimes against humanity from the terrorist group
whom deems the Yazidis as “infidels” and “devil worshippers” (Jalabi, 2014). The goal of using
violence against members of an “outgroup” is to enact behavioral changes (Doosje et al., 2016,
p. 79) and accomplish or have their political goals realized (Doosje et al., 2016, p. 79).
There are three phases to the radicalization process: Sensitivity to a radical ideology,
Group Membership, and Action (Doosje et al., 2016, p. 79). In the first phase, the radical group
appeals to individuals by offering them a sense of purpose, identity, and community, reinstating
into the individual feelings of “belonging, respect, heroism, status, and the notion to fight for a
holy cause” (Doosje et al., 2016, p. 81). In addition, the group sets out and provides clearly its
values and norms (Doosje et al., 2016, p. 81). ISIS uses a strict interpretation and reading of
Islamic texts to lay out norms, values, and the procedures for governance, bureaucracy, and
tasks found in day-to-day life, such as how to dress. Oftentimes, those who fall under the
influence of radicalization are facing personal uncertainty (Doosje et al., 2016, p. 81) or
instability. Ambiguity and uncertainty in life and of the future appears to be a motivating factor,
one that opens vulnerable individuals to be influenced and accept radicalized ideologies.
In the second phase—group membership—there is a reciprocation of commitment made
between the individual and the group (Doosje et al., 2016). In other words, “the person feels
attached or fused with the group, and the group is fused with the individual” (Doosje et al.,
2016, p. 81). In this stage, the individual is seeking and motivated to demonstrate their loyalty
to the group (Doosje et al., 2016), and is more open to following and practicing the group’s

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norms and values (Doosje et al., 2016). An example of demonstrating loyalty can be seen on
the social media accounts of ISIS brides who express a desire or readiness to leave their country
to make hijira or “the act of leaving one’s land and family to take up jihad in the name of
establishing an ‘Islamic State’” (Perešin, 2015, p. 22). In this phase, individuals are encouraged
to break ties with family and friends who do not belong to the group (Doosje et al., 2016). After
traveling to Turkey, Hoda Muthana, an ISIS bride from Alabama, had told her father that she
had married an ISIS fighter. When questioned as to how she could get married without her
father’s permission she replied in an interview with BuzzFeed Media that she did not need “the
traditional permission of her father because he was against ISIS” (Counter Extremism Project).
This distancing and breaking ties with family and friends serve two purposes, firstly, it isolates
the person from their familial supports, and secondly, it strengthens the bond and fraternity
between the individual and the group.
The third phase of radicalization is action (Doosje et al., 2016). In this phase, the
individual is influenced by the radical group to employ and manifest violence on others (Doosje
et al., 2016). This is done by dehumanizing and “stressing the non-human” characteristics of
the “other” or out-group (Doosje et al., 2016, p. 82). At this stage, the radicalized person is
prepared to not only employ violence but also willing to lose their life in action (Doosje et al.,
2016). Again using Hoda Muthana as an example, when her husband was killed she expressed
on social media how “jealous” and envious she was of him because he had died waging jihad
and was now a martyr (Hall, 2019). Zehra Duman an ISIS bride from Australia tweeted out a
picture of five women dressed in black burkas armed with weapons with the caption, “US +
Australia, how does it feel that all 5 of us were born n raised in your lands, & now here thirsty
for ur blood?” (Hall, 2019).
As a mechanism to prevent individuals from backing down from committing violence,
radical groups often have the individuals prove that they are committed to action and the cause
(Doosje et al., 2016). Usually, these are done by written or videotaped testament pledging
allegiance to the cause and reaffirming their loyalty and commitment to the ideology. During
the phases of radicalization, a “shield of resistance” is built up making it more difficult for anti-
radical messages from those outside their group to be heard or found persuasive (Doosje et al.,
2016).
Piercing that shield of resistance and working to reverse the effects of radicalization can
take place in the form of deradicalization or dis-engagement. Doosje et al. (2016) describe de-

Center for International Relations and International Security
radicalization as a process in which individuals reject the ideology they once ascribed to. Omar
Ashour (2008) defines de-radicalization or attitudinal modification (Horgan 2008) as a process
that guides an individual to alter or reconsider his position and attitudes about violence
particularly violence against civilians (Ashour 2008; Norick 2009). The goal of this method is
to enact a change in belief from the radicalized individual or group.
In contrast, the goal of disengagement or behavioral modification is to prompt a
transformation or alteration in actions (Norick, 2009). The distinction between the two is key;
the purpose of disengagement is to stop the individual from executing or manifesting violent
acts of terror against civilians. These processes do not reconcile or persuade the individual to
abandon the radicalized ideology, just to not commit violence in the name of pursuing the
groups’ political goals and demands. De-radicalization however, works to actively change the
individuals’ attitudes and to persuade them to reject the radical ideology not just the use of
violence.
According to Horgan (2008) from a counterterrorism point of view, behavioral
modification is viewed at a higher priority than ideological modification due to the fact that
disengagement can occur without having to undergo a de-radicalization process (Horgan 2008;
Norvick, 2009). This may be the case when it comes to the actual ISIS fighters where their role
involved them using violence. When viewing the profile and role of the ISIS bride, however,
this argument does not apply. Instead, the primary method for the ISIS brides ought to be an
attitudinal modification.
The actions and motivations of the foreign ISIS brides are relatively unknown and
incomprehensible. According to Anita Perešin (2015) due to the diversity of the ISIS brides, it
is very difficult to synthesize an accurate portrait of women most vulnerable to the radical
ideology (p. 22). The data she found suggests that these women and girls are often second of
third generation Muslim immigrants, and there is a considerable amount of those who have
converted to Islam who have joined ISIS (Perešin, 2015). The age range of those who attempted
to travel to Syria range between 16 and 24 years old, and there have been some cases of girls
younger trying to migrate to ISIS’ caliphate (Perešin, 2015). What is interesting about the
background of ISIS brides particularly from Western countries is that they have come from
“well-established, moderate and non-radicalized families” (Perešin, 2015). Some of the older
brides are well-educated like Aqsa Mahmood, who was a radiologist in Britain (Perešin, 2015).
More research has to be conducted to examine and explain the factors that made women and

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girls with this average, ordinary profile, vulnerable to radicalization. After speaking to an ISIS
bride in a Syrian camp, James Longman reflects on the puzzling nature of the ISIS brides
writing, “[s]he may be an arch manipulator, or genuinely repentant. But I confess I don’t
understand how someone so obviously bright could have been lured so easily to a place like
Syria” (Longman, 2020).
The women in ISIS territory are not terrorists in the sense of fighters like the male
jihadists. They were not there to support the state with guns or bullets against the “outgroup”
or enemy, but rather, they had two purposes; the first was to give legitimacy to the group and
their initiative. With the women and children there, the caliphate, according to Rukmini
Callimachi in an interview with CBC’s The Current, “became a state rather than just a terrorist
organization that was interested in killing people” (Moran, 2019). Their second purpose was
propagandists and recruiters. Social media such as Facebook, Tumblr, Twitter, Instagram, and
“encrypted audio-visual communications apps like Skype, Viber, Kik and Wickr” (Himel,
2016) were the main mediums through which they used to promulgate their message and
bringing more people to ISIS from the West (Moran, 2019).
These online campaigns were so successful that the International Centre for the Study
of Radicalization (ICSR) estimates that in 2014 the number of foreigners from Western Europe
who went to join ISIS was almost 4,000 (Neumann, 2015). ICSR also reported that the largest
numbers of European foreigners came from France (1,200), the United Kingdom (500-600),
and Germany (500-600) (Neumann, 2015). In that same year, 100 Canadians, and 100
Americans had gone abroad to join ISIS (Neumann, 2015). Estimates for the worldwide total
of foreigners who traveled to ISIS territory was at 20,730 people in 2014 (Neumann, 2015). As
the Centre notes, this total exceeds the number of foreign fighters involved in the Afghanistan
conflict making it “the largest mobilization of foreigner fighters in Muslim majority countries
since 1945” (Neumann, 2015).
Shamima Begum was seen as the “poster girl” for ISIS (Drury, 2019) and as a key
recruiter and propagandist. Hoda Muthana also had a social media presence promoting the
group’s ideology. For one account she called herself the “Umm Jihad” or the “Mother of Jihad”
(Hall, 2019). In an exposé for Buzzfeed News, Ellie Hall (2019) presented a catalog in which
she had been saving tweets allegedly from Muthana. In these tweets Muthana writes to
encourage others to join by traveling to ISIS territory or to conduct violent acts against civilians
for the group:

Center for International Relations and International Security
“There are people that made it here while they were on their bail back in their
hometowns. Don’t wait to come when you’re “safe”” (Hall, 2019).
“…there are soooo many Aussies and Brits here but where are the Americans,
wake up u cowards” (Hall, 2019).
“If you can’t come here then terrorize the kuffar at home. Form and expand the
Khilafah where you are” (Hall, 2019).
“Americans wake up ! Men and women altogether. You have much to do while
you live under our greatest enemy, enough of your sleeping ! Veterans, Patriot,
Memorial Day parades..go on drive by’s + spill all of their blood or rent a big
truck n drive all over them. Kill them” (Hall, 2019).
“For those who plan on coming may Allah grant you makhrija, as for those who
wish to remain, what’s wrong w/ u that u choose the kuffar over us. U know
that one day we will storm into the west and not be responsible for those who
have chosen to reside w/ the kuffar” (Hall, 2019).
Muthana’s tweets are a tiny sample and an example of the way Twitter was used to encourage
and spread ISIS ideology and agenda.
While physically committing violence against the “outgroup” was not initially in the
description of the ISIS bride would be playing, ISIS brides supported and participated in
violence against Yazidis:
“One of the most disturbing aspects of what women did — ISIS wives — is they
were involved in the Yazidi sex trafficking…These are the women from the
Yazidi minority in northern Iraq, who were abducted by the Islamic state, and
were forced into a system of sexual slavery” (Moran, 2019).
It needs to be stressed that just because their main purpose was to stay home did not
mean that they did not actively support or engage. One example is the on-going case in Germany
of Jennifer W., an ISIS bride returnee. In the summer of 2015 Jennifer W. and her husband (an
ISIS fighter), bought a five-year-old girl “from a group of prisoners of war and kept her in their
home as a slave” (Eddy, 2019). During her trial, German prosecutors relayed to the court that
the young Yazidi girl had fallen ill and wet her mattress, the defendant’s husband responded by

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chaining the young girl outside in the heat, “leaving her in great agony to die of thirst…The
defendant let her husband do as he liked, and took no action to save the girl” (Eddy, 2019).
Nations that are seeking to repatriate their citizens who became ISIS brides should not
rely on dis-engagement or behavioral modification tactics; they do not go far enough. A
disengagement strategy may persuade the ISIS brides to cease recruiting or promulgating
propaganda via social media however, it does not prevent or stop them from passing on the
radical ideology to their children who may take up the cause and engage in violence. Thus,
creating a new generation of fighters and ISIS loyalists and a new wave of individuals to
persuade to cease their actions. The only option is to have returning ISIS brides and their
children go through de-radicalization programs, because as Longman writes “any radicalization
that may have been a problem when ISIS finally fell a year ago is only deeper now” (Longman
2020).
A key point in the construction of the ISIS bride is that she is a carrier and purveyor of
ISIS’ radical ideology. That was one of her functions and purpose for the Islamic State: to learn
ISIS’ way of thinking to pass it on not only to others outside her circle but to the next generation.
As Perešin (2015) explains “women talk about joining the state [ISIS], not as a terrorist group,
and expect to be given an important role in creating the new, ideologically pure state, where
they could live ‘honorably’ under a strict interpretation of Shariah law” (p. 24). With the brides
playing a pivotal role in ISIS—and have as a requirement to play that role—immersed
themselves in the violent, militant ideology.
While there is debate about what is needed for a de-radicalization program or how to
measure its success, it could be argued that there are certain elements that the West could adopt
in its program. Borrowing from de-radicalization programs from the Middle East, the first thing
may be to not frame the program as a de-radicalization program. In the case of the Saudi
Arabian government’s program, they employ the term “rehabilitation” (Horgan, 2008). An
interviewee for Horgan’s research told him that he prefers the term ‘reforming’, saying that “if
there is nothing wrong with ‘radicalization’, then it is offensive and misleading to speak of “de-
radicalization’” (Horgan 2008, p. 6). From the perspective of the individual who has become
radicalized and joined the terrorist group, there is nothing evil or wrong with being radicalized.
With that starting point claiming to help them by “de-radicalizing them” you are implying there
is a problem with them and that you are superior to them. It could also work to further isolate
them and make it hard to pierce the shield of resistance.

Center for International Relations and International Security
De-radicalization programs should also include a restorative and rehabilitation aspect.
One that includes the participation of the family and community of the individual. The de-
radicalization effort and its success can be determined by the acceptance of society and societal
attitudes (Abuza 2009; Norick 2009). Many of the brides whom Longman (2020) interviewed
expressed a desire to be accepted back into society and to not be treated as an outcast. The
participation can help to rebuild the bonds to their community thus making them less dependent
on their support network that was presented by the radical group. Perešin (2015) notes that in
the cases of individual ISIS brides who migrated there is no evidence to suggest that their
families supported their move or radicalization (Perešin, 2015). In some cases, family members
pleaded with them to return home, and others traveled to Turkey to bring the ISIS bride back
home Perešin (2015). The overall reaction from most of the families was shock and anger at the
distortion of Islam (Perešin, 2015). These families are key to the de-radicalization process and
with countering ideological support for terrorism (Perešin, 2015; Ranstop & Herd, 2007).
What is clear from the literature and after an examination of the role played by the ISIS
bride is that should they be repatriated; the brides must be enrolled in a de-radicalization
program tailored to them to undo the effects of radicalization. Ignoring this poses a security risk
that could manifest more violence in the future. Disengagement strategies may work in ceasing
the violence and those who commit violence. Nevertheless, this does not stop those who spread
the ideology and promote violent means. ISIS brides ought to go through an ideological
modification (de-radicalization) program, not only to understand that advocating for violence
is harmful and abhorrent, but so that they realize the ideology they were radicalized with is
dangerous and does not spread it to others. Nations in the West especially have the resources to
design rehabilitation and de-radicalization to help the returnees, and more importantly, the
children who were born in ISIS territory who have been exposed to ISIS ideology.
Emily A. Singh

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References
Abuza, Z. (2009). The rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah detainees in South East Asia: A
preliminary assessment. In Bjorgo, T., Horgan, J. (Eds.), Leaving terrorism behind:
Individual and collective disengagement (pp. 193–211). New York, NY: Routledge.
Ashour, O. (2007). Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of the
Egyptian Islamic Group. Middle East Journal. Vol. 61, No. 4. (pp. 596–597).
Canadian ‘ISIS Bride’ in Syria: ‘I should be allowed to go home’. (2019, February 17). CTV
News. https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/canadian-isis-bride-in-syria-i-should-be-
allowed-to-go-
home-1.4301080.
Doosje, E., Moghaddam, F. M., Kruglanski, A. W., de Wolf, A., Mann, L., Feddes, A.R.
(2016, October). Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2016.06.008
Drury, C. (2019, April 2). Shamima Begum: ISIS bride says she was ‘brainwashed’ and wants
second chance. The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-
news/shamima-begum-isis-bride-interview-baby-death-syria-islamic-state-
a8850291.html.
Eddy, M. (2019, April 9). German Woman Goes on Trial in Death of 5-Year Old Girl Held as
ISIS Slave. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/world/
europe/germany-isis-trial.html.
Francis, E., & Longman, J. (2019, February 19). Former ISIS bride who left US for Syria says
she ‘interpreted everything very wrong. ABC News.
https://abcnews.go.com/International/isis-bride-left-us-syria-interpreted-
wrong/story?id=61175508.
Hall, E. (2019, May 4). An Alabama “ISIS Bride” Wants To Come Home Can We Forgive
Her
Horrifying Social Media Posts? BuzzFeed News.
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ellievhall/hoda-muthana-isis-instagram-
twitter-tumblr-alabama.
Himel, M. (2016, September 25). Undercover in ISIS Documentary. CBC.
https://www.cbc.ca/documentarychannel/docs/undercover-in-isis.
Hoda Muthana. (n.d). Counter Extremism Project.
https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists /hoda-muthana.
Horgan, J. (2008, February). De-radicalization or Disengagement? A Process in Need of
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Center for International Relations and International Security
Jalabi, R. (2014, August 11). Who are the Yazidis and why is Isis hunting them? The
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Longman, J. (2020, February 19). Caliphate wives share their stories year after ISIS defeat:
Reporter’s Notebook. ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/International/caliphate-
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share-stories-year-isis-defeat-reporters/story?id=69055474.
Moran, P. (2019, February 14). Canadian women who went to join ISIS ‘not willing to
express
regret’: reporter”. CBC’s The Current. https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-
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regret-reporter-1.5019999.
Neumann, P. R. (2015, January 26). Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000.
ICSR. https://icsr.info/2015/01/26/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-
surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/.
Norick, D. M.E. (2009). Disengagement and De-radicalization: Processes and Programs. In
Davis, P. K., Kim, C. (Eds). Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces
Together
(pp. 299-320). Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Ranstop M., & Herd G. P. (2007). Approaches to countering terrorism and CIST. In Aldis, A.,
Herd, G. P. (Eds.), The Ideological War on Terror (pp. 1-20). New York,
NY: Routledge.
Perešin, A. (2015). Fatal Attraction: Western Muslimas and ISIS. Perspectives on Terrorism,
9(3), 21-38. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/26297379.

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The Impact of Climate Change on Human
Security: Wars and Terrorism
Abstract
The critical security studies should be not to establish "objective truth" but to enable a broader
understanding of security based on respect for specific theoretical and political starting points
in its conceptualization. Issues of environmental security and environmental protection are
issues of overall security because they directly cause: open conflicts, have the potential to
destabilize the regime, can lead to the displacement of the population, and the disintegration of
the states. Regarding the geopolitical consequences of climate change, climate change
consequences, such as global warming, rising sea levels, droughts, melting glaciers, and many
others, significantly impact the world geopolitics. The level of conflict between states depends
on how strong the ties and common interests of the entire region, states and globally. Some
states depend on what the atmosphere will be like in their environment. If they are stable and
economically prosperous, so will they affect neighboring countries. When climate change has
reduced living resources, the economic framework played a much more critical role than
religion in joining terrorist organizations. There is a need for research initiatives on how modern
technologies, on the one hand, and the involvement of the younger generations and minorities
on the other, can be used and increased as ways to strengthen communities' resilience to
disasters and ensure an effective, comprehensive, and sustainable approach. Quality governance
and leadership in the field of climate change is crucial for environmental safety.
Keywords: critical security studies, climate change, environmental security, human security,
conflicts, wars, terrorism

Center for International Relations and International Security
Introduction
While political and military issues remain critical in a broader sense, the concept of
peace and security extends to economic and social threats, including poverty, communicable
diseases, and environmental degradation. All of these are significant factors in undermining
security. At this moment, as a precondition for peace, intellectual, emotional, and spiritual well-
being, and as a resource for socio-economic development and environmental protection,
ecological security appears. From an environmental perspective, environmental management
integration into the more comprehensive development and humanitarian framework is no longer
an option but an imperative of peace and security. In modern countries, the political, security,
and other interests of citizens are modeled, transformed, gained in a content day by day,
following the general changes of civilization. Today, security in environmental protection and
preservation is one of the most critical security factors in the modern world.
In this type of research, a more specific branch between geography and politics is
geopolitics. There are different understandings of the concept of geopolitics. R. Kjellen defined
geopolitics as "the theory of the state as a geographical-spatial phenomenon" (Halden, 2007:
45). It can also be understood as "a perspective based on the analysis of security policy on the
territorial dimension (the position of states) and which takes into account the influence of
geographical factors" (Halden, 2007: 44). The case of climate change can also be applied to this
definition to affect countries' security and position through its many factors. Spykman argued
that geopolitics must deal with a dynamic rather than a static situation (Halden, 2007: 46).
Climate change in every respect leads to dynamic situations such as rising sea levels, melting
glaciers, migration, and the disappearance of states, and therefore, their impact from a
geopolitical point of view is essential. Security threats such as terrorism, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, transnational organized crime, with the consequences of
globalization, global climate change, environmental destruction, uncontrolled and illegal
migration, and instability caused by failed states, often require a rapid, coordinated, and
comprehensive response. Also, the building of an international regime is accompanied by the
evolution of international law. The emphasis is on the humanitarian, social, economic, and
environmental dimensions of security, with the unquestionable importance of the principles of
equality and the promotion of democracy. Various mechanisms are used, and the most
demanding and most intensive are international interventions aimed at stopping conflicts. The
complexity of their launch, the justification criteria, the principle of sovereignty, international
stability - all these are questions that need to be answered before the international intervention.

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The cessation of conflict is not enough to establish long-term stability unless post-conflict
construction and sustainable development follow. It is evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo, Rwanda, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
When we talk about environmental security, the author focuses on the connection
between changes in the environment, human security, violent conflicts, and the issue of
terrorism itself. Discussions on environmental safety are essential for the geopolitics of climate
change because climate change can lead to degradation of ecosystems and human habitats, can
lead to droughts, global warming, floods, storms, can endanger agriculture, horticulture,
livestock, fisheries, and even lead to violent conflicts. According to Homer-Dixon, a lead author
linking environmental degradation and violent conflict, disputes over environmental
degradation are likely to lead to ethnic conflicts caused by migration, to social divisions caused
by environmental scarcity, and to civil conflicts caused by environmental scarcity affecting life,
economic activity, elite behavior, and state responses. Homer-Dixon's research conducted by
ENCOP points to the danger of major wars and other conflicts that can lead to environmental
destruction and can play a crucial role in destabilized states, leading to the provision of shelter
terrorists or criminal groups. It can lead to new geostrategic images in individual regions
(Haldén, 2007: 48-50). In some conflict regions, there is also a connection with terrorist
activities.
It is also important to note that climate change and population growth, ozone holes, and
biodiversity loss fall under environmental safety (Dalby, 2007: 201). Environmental security
was introduced as a term by the UN General Assembly, when, at the suggestion of Michael
Gorbachev, it adopted a Resolution on International Environmental Security in 1987, as a
reaction to the environmental and human tragedy and the Chernobyl disaster. Furthermore, back
in the mid-1980s, the United Nations Environment Organization, UNEP, spoke of refugees due
to climate change. Moreover, in 1990, the International Council on Climate Protection, ICCP,
warned that migration could be the worst consequence of climate change.
Pluralism and social constructivism have opened up new perspectives in the study of
security. The study of human security occupies an increasing space, and more attention is to the
individual's security. The emergence of a new approach in critical security studies in the 1990s
has expanded and deepened the notion of security. Security challenges are no longer considered
military and non-military phenomena that existentially threaten states and other entities. Critical
security studies are a clear departure from the conventional understanding of security. The

Center for International Relations and International Security
notion of human security evolved from a political and security shift in the post-Cold War period.
New forms of conflict have emerged that have changed the notion of security and conventional
notions of war. Human security is a broad term consisting of two categories - "freedom from
scarcity" and "freedom from fear." The first term represents a broader definition and includes
threats such as famine, infection, repression, and protection from a sudden disaster. The term is
supported by the UNDP Development Report in 1944, by the Japanese Government and the
Commission on Human Security. The second term emphasizes threats to the individual (e.g.,
drug trafficking, mines, ethnic conflicts, dysfunction of the state, trade-in small arms). The
"freedom from fear" approach focuses on the immediate necessity and is therefore supported
by the Canadian Government and the European Union (EU). As for international political
relations, they are strongly influenced by climate change such as melting ice, heatstroke, floods,
fires, and the like. Also, global warming today poses a threat to the stability of the international
order. The author presents an example of how climate change can have on human security in
the following chapters.
At the UN Conference on Climate Change in 2010, it was announced that the world's
largest polluters are the United Arab Emirates, Australia, the United States, Canada, the
Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia. These data were derived from a study by the consulting firm
Maplecroft, which covered 183 countries, and examined carbon dioxide consumption and
greenhouse gas emissions from the early 1990s until 2006. In the Maplecroft mentioned above
research, it was announced that the riskiest countries are Bangladesh, India, the Philippines,
Vietnam, and Pakistan. They will be exposed to the most significant consequences of climate
change such as rising sea levels, food shortages, migration, availability of natural resources,
and the like. Bangladesh is considered the most at risk due to extreme poverty, dependence on
agricultural resources, and low government adjustment capacity, while India is in second place,
which, in addition to facing high poverty and dependence on agricultural resources, will become
undesirable for future investment (Zorko, Londero, 2012: 76).
Furthermore, due to water scarcity, some of the world's most important agricultural
countries will be endangered, which will lead to a reduction in production. Some of these
countries are northwestern India, northeastern China, northeastern Pakistan, the Central Valley
in California, and the US Midwest. Lack of food, water, and energy could lead to large-scale
migration, while in underdeveloped countries, it could lead to conflicts over control of natural
resources. The seriousness of the situation is also shown by the fact that the US and British
Department of Defense have been considering defense strategies and overcoming the

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consequences of the devastating consequences of climate change since 2010 (Popović, 2014:
58).
1. Climate change, human security, and armed conflicts
Pluralism and social constructivism have opened up new perspectives in the study of
security. The study of human security occupies an increasing space and more attention to the
individual's security. The emergence of a new approach in critical security studies in the 1990s
has expanded and deepened the notion of security. Security challenges are no longer considered
military and non-military phenomena that existentially threaten states and other entities. Critical
security studies are a clear departure from the conventional understanding of security. It is based
on poststructuralist and constructivist theoretical concepts. This approach raised some
fundamental questions about the state as a possible source of insecurity for citizens, the state's
responsibility for security, and the international community's role in internal conflicts. It
redefined the state's role as a reference object of security, the nature of threats and the scope of
security, and epistemological shifts are also manifested in respect for ideas, values, and social
norms, thus rejecting scientific object epistemological positivism. The Copenhagen School
approach is defined in the book Security: A new framework for analysis (Buzan, Waever & De
Wilde, 1998). There are two main elements to this school: the sectoral approach to the study of
security, which Buzan set out in his book People, States, and Fear (1991), and Waever's concept
of securitization. Buzan's account of the five security sectors - political, environmental,
economic, social, and military - is a well-known analytical framework, while the concept of
securitization treats security as a product of the speech act. It is precisely sectoral analysis,
which epistemologically does not belong to critical studies' postpositivism, which makes the
Copenhagen School the main departure from critical security studies.
Furthermore, environmental destruction and lack of resources can have severe
consequences for human health in societies, when communities are at risk of becoming
vulnerable to external and internal threats that could lead to conflict. However, the abundance
of natural resources can also lead to conflicts over resource control. With global temperature
rise, precipitation changes, rising sea levels, and an increase in the frequency and intensity of
extreme weather events, these changes are a potential threat to peace and security. The
combination of environmental degradation and climate change causes death, undermining
living conditions, and insecurity.

Center for International Relations and International Security
Human security, in its broadest sense, encompasses much more than the absence of
violent conflict. It includes human rights, good governance, opportunities for quality education,
health care, and the creation of conditions for each individual to have the opportunity and
freedom of choice in realizing their potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards
poverty reduction, economic progress, and conflict prevention. The absence of any form of
deprivation, the absence of Fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy
natural environment, are interrelated components of both human and national security.
(Brozovic, 2011)
Environmental security includes a complex of conditions, phenomena, and actions that
ensure the ecological balance on Earth at the local, regional, and global levels; exclusion of any
human activity that has a detrimental effect on the environment; a situation in which there is no
danger of causing damage to the natural environment and the health of the population.
Environmental security has no boundaries and is a global problem, task, and obligation. An
example of the extent to which climate change can have on the concept of human security can
be seen in the following examples.
The first example is the floods in Pakistan that have caused 25 million people to flee the
area, and such a situation has created political and security problems and threats by allowing
the Taliban to consolidate power in the north of the country. Another example can be seen in
the 2011 Arab Spring case, caused by fires and crop destruction in Russia. The third example
is the outbreak of a nationwide revolution in North Africa and the Middle East due to its
disappearance. The scale of the effects of global warming is evident in the example of the
significant droughts faced by Angola and Namibia in 2013 when one of the most extensive
droughts in three decades caused famine in more than 1.5 million people. Climate change can
also be a danger to human lives. One such example was 1952 when thousands of people lost
their lives to respiratory diseases by the "London Smog." Four years later, the Clean Air Act
was passed, which, for the first time, led to positive results in reducing carbon dioxide
emissions. It is a frightening fact that in the last 40 years, more than 2 million people have lost
their lives due to climate change, while in Asia and the Pacific alone, the figure is 77,000 a year
(Zorko, Londero, 2012: 73).
At the same time, climate change is causing state fragility, poverty, social and economic
disparities, and a combination of increasing the likelihood of conflict. Conflicts and forced
migrations are more likely to occur in already sensitive and fragile states (McLeman, 2017:

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105). In this way, the already unstable situations will worsen even more, and with the further
weakening of the state, the governments will not have the resources and opportunities to resolve
them.
As the urbanization and industrialization of the population that consumes too much
water and uses water to irrigate the soil for food production grows, the danger of international
armed conflicts over water sources grows (Dalby, 2007: 201). In this way, an attempt will be
made to obtain limited water supplies for food production, which may be located in someone
else's territory, leading to conflict.
A. Giddens states that although climate change could lead to international cooperation
between states, there are more substantial interests that encourage division. This division can
best be explained by the example of the melting of Arctic ice. When the area was exclusively
covered in ice and used for scientific research, cooperation between the states was high.
However, as it became increasingly possible that new oil, gas, and mineral resources could be
found in the area, cooperation ceased, and there was a division of interests and tensions among
the countries that had been cooperating until then. Energy shortages are another consequence
of climate change that could lead to military conflicts and jeopardize security and disrupt
international cooperation. Reducing emissions could lead to a struggle among states for
resources, and political leaders could use climate change to gain or retain power.
Furthermore, more powerful countries could take advantage of the situation when their
neighboring countries are weakened by the effects of climate change, such as water scarcity.
Some states depend on what the atmosphere will be like in their environment. If they are stable
and economically prosperous, so will they affect neighboring countries. If faced with problems,
these difficulties could spill over into the entire environment. Some of such countries are Brazil
and Mexico, South Africa and Nigeria, Egypt, Pakistan, and South Korea, while the failures of
large countries like China or India would have an even more significant impact. The United
States and China pose a particular threat of armed conflict. The Western Balkans are in a
decades-long economic depression, with internal conflicts affecting the coherence of organized
crime, revolutions, terrorism, ethnonationalism, and violence as the least desirable factor of
implosion. (Hadžić, 2020) The United States is already planning to fight for energy resources
but remains concerned about how vital resources will be available after the effects of climate
change, while China's economy requires raw materials and has the most crucial impact in the
Middle East and Africa. The U.S. Department of Defense stressed the importance of controlling

Center for International Relations and International Security
major sea routes as 75% of the world's oil and 90% of merchandise is transported by sea. As a
result of such efforts, the U.S. relocated water bases to Eastern and Central Europe, Central and
Southwest Asia, and Africa. In addition to a large percentage of copper, cobalt, and uranium,
these areas also have more than three-quarters of the world's oil and gas reserves (Giddens,
2009: 207).
Countries where terrorism, international crime, drugs, and money laundering are
present, and if these countries are also oil producers, are at high risk of violent conflict. Twenty-
three countries in the world receive high revenues from oil and gas, and none of them "is a
democracy is nothing but a name" (Giddens, 2009: 217).
It is also essential to note that scientists, researching 175 countries and 234 conflicts,
have concluded that since 1950, El Nino has caused every fifth war globally due to fires or
droughts that cause crop failure. According to a 2009 U.N. survey, 18 of the 35 wars fought
after 2000 were due to natural resources (Popović, 2014: 59). If we consider that such a scale
of conflict has existed before, it is questionable how many conflicts will be caused by natural
resources when in the future, climate change leads to increasingly drastic consequences caused
by scarcity. Future scenarios predict that depletion of natural resources could lead to significant
conflicts in areas such as China caused by environmental pressures due to accelerated
industrialization and urbanization that would further increase political tensions and regional
disparities (Dalby, 2007: 201). Potential tensions and conflicts between states and previous ones
indicate the importance of regulating natural resources protection.
In central Nigeria, this forgotten conflict, years of fighting between livestock and
farmers, has killed more than 60,000 people in the last fifteen years - almost four times more
than the terrorist organization Boko Haram. So climate change is a threat, and livestock farmers
in Nigeria have fewer meadows to graze. We can conclude that the effects of climate change
and other social, economic, and political components contribute to the spread of violent
conflicts. This topic is not new, but it is becoming more and more serious. As early as 2008,
psychologist H. Welzer warned in his book "Climate Wars" of the collapse of the social order
due to climate change.
A 2012 U.S. Secret Service document warned that "many countries, necessary for the
U.S will be challenged by water shortages or floods in the next ten years. It will increase the
risk of instability and lead to regional tensions." We can conclude the recognition of climate
change's security-political dimension. Moreover, the development of civil society awareness,

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particularly of the younger generation and new technologies in climate change and
environmental security, is not desirable in most countries. The global environmental events
should have two functions: if they are massive, they will have an impact on electoral
engineering, but also from the perspective of the climate background. If everyone leaves the
protest conscientiously applying some principles in everyday life, it can positively impact the
climate. Greta Thunberg’s protest is impressive because she adheres to her principles, so for
example, she travels in environmentally-friendly transportation.
However, it is difficult to draw a direct line between climate change and violent conflict.
The reasons why conflicts escalate into bloodshed are too complicated. We are closer to
understanding the problem if we view climate change as an "amplifier" of threats. Rob van Ritt,
who explores the connection between climate and conflict in the World Future Council (WFC),
argues that "Threats that already exist - lack of resources, extreme poverty, hunger, terrorism
or extreme ideologies - are further exacerbated by climate change." (WFC, 2016)
Simultaneously, the effects of climate change from drought to floods are not only felt
local. Moreover, extreme weather events affect the growth of food prices globally, which
increases the risk of conflict. Every time the price of food on the world market increases, there
are demonstrations, unrest, and then permanent social and political instability in thirty to forty
countries at the same time. D. Smith cites North Africa and the Middle East: "In Syria, Egypt,
and Yemen, climate change is recognized in the mosaic of causes of conflict." Thus, Syria is an
ideal example of how climate change causes conflict: the world's most considerable drought in
the mid-2000s. Years forced the masses of peasants to give up farming and flee to overcrowded
cities. There was a shortage of water, and food became expensive. The suffering and social
chaos intensified previous tensions, which later spiraled out of control and escalated into the
war we see today.
Of particular concern is how nuclear-weapon states, such as Pakistan, deal with the
effects of climate change. Pakistan is mainly affected by climate change. An example of this is
the floods, which are becoming more dramatic from year to year. In addition to the fact that
these floods endanger people's existence, they also directly impact nuclear facilities' safety. The
2014 floods caused 2,000 landslides across southeastern Europe, spreading damage to nuclear
power plants. In the last two years alone, the number of disasters has increased significantly in
the Western Balkans, affecting 15 times more people and causing economic losses 30 times
more than in the period from 2000 to 2013. While recovery measures, primarily funded by

Center for International Relations and International Security
international donors, have managed to restore normal living conditions, the possibility of
disasters remains high in the Western Balkans region.
Furthermore, we can problematize the frequency of migrations, i.e., mass escapes from
changing environments. It is obvious: the economic and thus social consequences of climate
change are dramatic. "On average, all regions will lose about ten percent of economic
performance, tropical countries up to twenty percent - due to global warming, declining
productivity in the agricultural sector, but also due to declining labor productivity - significant
figures" (Kalkul, 2016).
An actual example is the already mentioned floods in Pakistan from April 2016. If entire
regions become impoverished in a globalized world, this can increase migration and cause
congestion within a country's borders or increase tensions internationally. We can recall the
refugee debate in Germany, wherein a relatively short period, a year, two days, a million people
came to the country, which brought great fragility and instability to politics. The loud public's
discourse within mass psychology is often a reflection of the discourse of the power structures,
and this, of course, is aided by the detection, external and internal, of enemies. (Hadžić, 2020)
That is why it is challenging to predict the reaction of society to mass migrations of people.
In the mid-1980s, the United Nations Environment Organization, UNEP, spoke of
refugees due to climate change. Moreover, in 1990, the International Council on Climate
Protection, IPCC, warned that migration could be the worst consequence of climate change. At
the same time, we often have forgotten groups, i.e., more impoverished and marginalized social
groups, to which climate change has taken away the last resources to be able to emigrate
somewhere at all. Within that framework, the already mentioned Mass Floods in the Western
Balkans in 2014 can serve as an example. Official figures say more than 1.6 million people
have been affected in Serbia and Bosnia, just a week after the floods began. The 2014 floods
resulted in the loss of 79 lives, the evacuation and displacement of close to a million people,
tens of thousands of houses, livestock, agricultural land, schools, hospitals, and businesses, with
significant damage in Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina and Serbia. At the same time,
significant risk reduction requires an understanding of the vulnerabilities of communities and
the economy, with a thorough understanding of which sectors and population groups are at risk.
For example, farmers, migrants, and the elderly require special insurance schemes. These
differences must be understood and treated appropriately in all future development plans for

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the Western Balkans. Real estate is one of the consequences of climate change before we talk
about "climate refugees" and others.
What can be done, especially given that - at best - decades are needed before the results
start to show the climate policy results? The director of SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute), D. Smith, calls for a United Nations-led institution to address security risks
and pass on the findings to various U.N. organizations: the Security Council, the Coordination
Organization for Humanitarian Aid, UNOCHA or the World Food Program Division. However,
the author suggests that it is indisputable that the work of these organizations in the coming
years will, in one way or another, be affected by the security risks that come with climate
change. change. Moreover, technological change is undoubtedly one of the keys to ensuring
that climate change can be addressed without compromising economic growth. For this to be
the case, it is vitally important that climate and innovation policies provide the right incentives
for developing and diffusion of „climate-friendly‟ technologies. The role of government
policies and regulations becomes critical since most environmental problems require collective
action to effectively address the problems. Similarly, the nature and extent of innovations that
lower the cost and/or improve the efficiency of environmental controls depends heavily on the
actions of government agencies at all levels. In the absence of government mandates or
incentives to mitigate the problem, there are few if any markets for new technologies whose
sole purpose is to reduce emissions to the environment (air, water or land). (Rubin, 2011)
2. Climate change and terrorism
The closest interpretation of today's understanding of terrorism is that terrorism is
violence aimed at inciting fear and crushing resistance to achieve a political goal first. However,
the common characteristic of all definitions is that the basis of terrorism is terror, i.e., violence.
The group of Al-Qaeda, ISIS, is mostly mentioned and appears as an example of such a terrorist
group. (Hadžić, 2020) The author maintains that Climate change strengthens terrorism. The
terrorist group Boko Haram has killed between 20,000 and 25,000 people in the last ten years.
Furthermore, this terrorist group has also done enormous material damage: the World
Bank estimates the damage at nearly six billion dollars. Two million people had to flee their
homes or were expelled. In Borno's Nigerian province, 30 percent of all private houses were
destroyed, and thousands of public buildings.

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However, Boko Haram is not the only problem for the security of the Sahel. The quarrels
mentioned above between cattle breeders and farmers are becoming more frequent. The reason
is partly that some are mostly Christians and other Muslims, and above all, they come from
different tribes. Another reason is climate change, which causes water shortages, and people
are left without the necessary means of subsistence. For example, about 30 million people
depend on water from Lake Chad.
The link between climate change and conflict was also discussed at the Munich Security
Conference. Conflicts do not have only one cause. We can say that climate change is one of the
causes of violent conflicts. In some conflict regions, there is also a connection with terrorism.
Recently, the Security Council took the position that "among other factors, climate change is
negatively affecting the stability of West Africa and the Sahel." The region around Lake Chad
is a textbook example of how climate change destroys people's essential living resources -
preparing the ground for violent conflict. About 30 million people depend on water from Lake
Chad, which stretches between Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. About 90 percent of the
lake has dried up in the last 40 years. It is primarily caused by climate change. But not just
climate change. About 90 percent of the people in the region around Lake Chad are fishermen,
farmers, or pastoralists and depend on water from the lake. According to Vivekananda, climate
change expert Berlin-based think tank Adelphi, climate change is not the only cause of the
conflict. At the same time, the marginalization of certain groups, tribal thinking, bad policies,
and lack of state services have significantly contributed to this: "When climate change has
reduced living resources, the ground has been created for violence and the disintegration of the
state. A group of young men appeared, who did not have the opportunity to make sure they had
enough to live. When armed groups offered them a way out, they were ripe for recruitment."
(Vivekananda, 2016)
A study by the NGO Mercy Corps (2016) confirms the above claims. Mercy Group
spoke with 47 former Boko Haram fighters about their membership. Religion played a minor
role. Economic reasons played a much more important role in joining: the desire for income,
credit raising, and marriage. At the same time, if we analyze ISIL, Sputnjik published data on
militants’ salaries during the first years of their control over Ninava and Anbar’s provinces.
Local sources from Mosul then testified that the salary of foreign militants was as high as $
1,300. At that time, they also received a house or an apartment, a car, and fuel, which was a
luxury for ordinary citizens. The terrorists were also assigned a woman. As for the wages paid
to local terrorists, they were half as low, about six hundred dollars. At one time, the militants

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earned a lot thanks to the fact that they controlled oil sources and exported this fuel in its raw
form to neighboring countries. (RTRS, 2017)
The author argues that communities and societies that are particularly sensitive and
receptive to these are already weakened by conflict and bad governments. Climate change
throws such societies into political instability and food shortages and causes large migration
waves. Such movements further destabilize, which can lead to violent conflicts. This
unbreakable chain exists in other regions, such as Mali or Sudan. Even in seemingly stable
countries, such as Jordan, the effects of prolonged drought in the van, a nation with a massive
influx of refugees from Syria, could upset the balance and lead to instability. (Vivekananda,
2016)
The war in Syria and climate change are also linked. A United Nations study vividly
illustrates this connection: the extreme droughts of the 2000s, the 40 percent reduction in water
in the Euphrates River, poor water management in Syria, and numerous failed harvests led to a
mass exodus from the countryside. Consequence: mass unemployment, social inequality,
poverty, and crime. When the Arab Spring arrived in Syria in 2011, the country was in an
explosive state - the brutal oppression of the opposition ultimately led to an explosion of
violence. As early as 2012, a joint US secret service document predicted that "there would be
water shortages or floods in many countries that are important to the United States." It could
increase the risk to the stability of those countries and lead to regional tensions.
However, there is a lack of international security activities and initiatives. There is no
focused, operational response in the Sahel or the Middle East to help communities adapt to
climate change and avoid violent conflict risks. (Smith, 2019) Finding timely answers would
help communities and groups, it would also save funds, and if terrorism on the ground were at
least partially suppressed, it would be much cheaper than purely military responses.
Conclusion
The critical security studies, and the role of scientists in the field, should be not to
establish "objective truth" but to enable a broader understanding of security based on respect
for specific theoretical and political starting points in its conceptualization. Issues of
environmental security and environmental protection are issues of overall security because they
directly cause: open conflicts, have the potential to destabilize the regime, can lead to the
displacement of the population, and the disintegration of the state. If climate change is not

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mitigated by the end of the 21st century, it will lead to unmanageable economic, social, and
political conditions, and the opportunities for stable international and domestic policies will be
significantly damaged. Such drastic changes will affect security dynamics that will be difficult
to sustain with the current international system. Regarding the geopolitical consequences of
climate change, we have shown that the consequences of climate change, such as global
warming, rising sea levels, droughts, melting glaciers, and many others, significantly impact
the geopolitical picture of the world. Such changes already impact armed conflicts, the
disappearance of states, and mass migration. Millions of people will be looking for new areas
where more favorable conditions prevail. Such migrations will require elaborate state tactics
and a peaceful solution to the flow of problems. However, if such a peaceful solution is not
reached, the scale of the conflicts and catastrophes that will ensue is questionable. As global
warming, excessive rainfall, and severe droughts affect agriculture, food supplies will fall,
increase food prices, and increase poverty. Such a situation could potentially lead to conflicts
and wars and terrorism itself. At the same time, in the future, significant struggles could be
waged over drinking water supplies. Those parts of the world that are already struggling with
drinking water quantities are likely to experience its complete loss in a few decades. There can
also be armed conflicts in countries that seek to retain resources for which there is greater
demand than supply.
The level of conflict between states depends on how strong the ties and common
interests of the entire region, states and globally. Some states depend on what the atmosphere
will be like in their environment. If they are stable and economically prosperous, so will they
affect neighboring countries. When climate change has reduced living resources, the economic
framework played a much more critical role than religion in joining terrorist organizations.
Thus, in addition to a country's exposure to the effects of climate change, the ability of
governments to adapt and combat the harmful effects of climate change is also essential.
What needs to be understood is that time and nature are unpredictable, and as much as
people thought they were acting fast, we need to act even faster because nature can overtake us.
That is why we need constant readiness to solve all the problems of climate change globally.
States must unite and act together because the consequences of climate change are not the
responsibility of just a few states but the whole world. There is also a need to raise awareness
among citizens and civil society. Knowledge about the probability of future disasters and their
possible impacts needs to be developed and shared, so it is necessary to invest in developing
new technologies. Besides, risk assessments involving spatial and socio-economic analyzes to

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understand hazard exposure and vulnerability should be mapped, analyzed, exploited, and
shared by all. Within the discourse of human security, the population should have free access
to public data in order to be able to make decisions about their risks and responsibilities based
on information. There is a need for research initiatives on how modern technologies, on the one
hand, and the involvement of the younger generations and minorities on the other, can be used
and increased as ways to strengthen communities' resilience to disasters and ensure an effective,
comprehensive, and sustainable approach. The government, or the state's leadership, are not
willing to invest their time, effort, and primarily money to solve a problem that is very unlikely
to reach its maximum during their term. Successful transnational cooperation is of great
importance for the environmental policy of the world as a whole. Quality governance and
leadership in the field of climate change is crucial for environmental safety. It is a concept that
contributes to acceptable governance practices in a global security environment.
Faruk Hadžić

Center for International Relations and International Security
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Center for International Relations and International Security
About the authors
Sergei Oudman graduated from American Military University with a Master's degree in
International Relations and Conflict Resolution and currently works as a researcher and adviser
internationally for both private companies and non-profit organizations. He currently serves on
the board of directors of CIRIS. You can reach him at: oudman@ciris.info .
Dominique Batiste is a U.S. Army veteran who served as a Military Police Officer and a former
Louisiana State Police officer in the Department of Public Safety. She holds a Bachelor’s degree
in Political Science and International Relations from American Public University and is
currently a student at the University of San Diego in the MAIR program. She is also the journal
director at CIRIS. You can reach her at: dominique@ciris.info .
Raffaele Petroni is an accomplished Security Advisor and Emergency Response Instructor
with a demonstrable track record gained in security and emergency management, risk
assessment, international development, horizon scanning, corporate security, deployment
assessment, crisis management/analysis and delivery of training sessions. You can reach him
at: raffaele.petroni@gmail.com .
Lauro Borges holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and International Relations (2015-
2018) from the University of Beira Interior, Portugal. He is currently a Master’s student in
Strategy, University of Lisbon, specializing in strategic culture and its interaction with
geopolitical forces. You can reach him at: laurojovem90@gmail.com .
Emily Singh is a graduate from the University of Waterloo’s Masters of Peace and Conflict
Studies. She is currently a Student Member at the ADR Institute of Ontario and the ADR
Institute of Canada. You can reach her at: ea4singh@uwaterloo.ca .
Faruk Hadžić is an independent researcher from Bosnia and Herzegovina. He holds a BSc in
Psychology, Economics and a MSc in Security Studies, Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement.
You can reach him at: faruk.hadzic01@gmail.com .

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