The Global Legitimacy Game
... Transnational NGOs have come under fire as critics have increasingly challenged the legitimacy of their role in international institutions (Kellow 2000;Anheier and Themudo 2002;Ford 2003;Van Rooy 2004;Jordan and van Tuijl 2006). Supporters of neoliberal globalization see them as largely unaccountable. ...
... NGOs are therefore often seen to function as a proxy for global civil society (Wapner 1996;Keohane and Nye 1998). While there are a variety of bases other than representation on which NGOs can claim the right to participate in international forums -such as particular expertise, moral authority or force of conviction -the main focus of controversy is on the credibility of claims made by NGOs to represent others (Van Rooy 2004). Since FoE claims to bring local and national interests from its supporters to the international level, the questions about whom they represent seem pertinent. ...
The first in-depth study of Friends of the Earth as an international network. It analyses its development, places it in the context of literature on NGOs and social movements, explains its internal conflicts with a particular focus on relations between groups from the North and the South, assesses which key national organisations lead FoEI and analyzes its campaigns on food and climate change.
... Under such conditions, we can expect legitimation through the application of democratic norms, including norms of transparency and accountability, as well as participation and inclusion. Furthermore, a significant literature emphasizes that the increased access and participation of non-state actors beyond member states lead to politicization and contestation, which, in turn, are expected to increase the diversity of legitimation and delegitimation practices (Van Rooy 2004;Symons 2011;Zürn 2014). As far as the UNFCCC is concerned, few other intergovernmental GGIs are as open and inclusive, and we should therefore expect a great diversity of legitimation and delegitimation. ...
This book explores processes of legitimation and delegitimation of global governance institutions (GGIs). How, why, and with what impact on audiences, are GGIs legitimated and delegitimated? The book develops a comprehensive theoretical framework for studying processes of (de)legitimation in global governance and provides broad comparative analyses to uncover patterns of (de)legitimation processes. It covers a diverse set of global and regional governmental and nongovernmental institutions in different policy fields. Variation across these GGIs is explained with reference to institutional setup, policy field characteristics, and broader social structures, as well as to the qualities of agents of (de)legitimation. The approach builds on a mixed-methods research design that uses both quantitative and qualitative new empirical data. Three main interlinked elements of processes of legitimation and delegitimation are at the center of the analysis: the varied practices employed by different state and non-state agents that may boost or challenge the legitimacy of global governance institutions; the normative justifications that these agents draw on when engaging in legitimation and delegitimation practices; and the different audiences that may be impacted by legitimation and delegitimation. This results in a dynamic interplay between legitimation and delegitimation in contestation over the legitimacy of GGIs.
... However, as we plot the trend lines of the core budgets of two IOs for which there is a strong scholarly consensus that they have experienced legitimacy crises, we find only minimal support for the expectations grounded in the conventional theory (Figure 1.1). In the aftermath of the Dutch and French referenda against the European constitutional treaty, the EU is said to have undergone a legitimacy crisis (e.g., van Apeldoorn, 2009, p. 21), just as did the World Bank and the WTO during civil society protests at the turn of the millennium (e.g., Esty, 2002;van Rooy, 2004;Elsig, 2007). The WHO suffered a legitimacy crisis during the 1990s (Godlee, 1994;Chorev, 2013). ...
Global Legitimacy Crises addresses the consequences of legitimacy in global governance, in particular asking: when and how do legitimacy crises affect international organizations and their capacity to rule. The book starts with a new conceptualization of legitimacy crisis that looks at public challenges from a variety of actors. Based on this conceptualization, it applies a mixed-methods approach to identify and examine legitimacy crises, starting with a quantitative analysis of mass media data on challenges of a sample of 32 IOs. It shows that some, but not all organizations have experienced legitimacy crises, spread over several decades from 1985 to 2020. Following this, the book presents a qualitative study to further examine legitimacy crises of two selected case studies: the WTO and the UNFCCC. Whereas earlier research assumed that legitimacy crises have negative consequences, the book introduces a theoretical framework that privileges the activation inherent in a legitimacy crisis. It holds that this activation may not only harm an IO, but could also strengthen it, in terms of its material, institutional, and decision-making capacity. The following statistical analysis shows that whether a crisis has predominantly negative or positive effects depends on a variety of factors. These include the specific audience whose challenges define a certain crisis, and several institutional properties of the targeted organization. The ensuing in-depth analysis of the WTO and the UNFCCC further reveals how legitimacy crises and both positive and negative consequences are interlinked, and that effects of crises are sometimes even visible beyond the organizational borders.
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... The extensive literature on NGO partnerships reveals much about power in these relationships, with governments, funders and communities, and how they can understand and represent the interests of people on whose behalf they work. It shows both how NGOs are profoundly affected by these relationships, but also how they themselves are able to affect partnerships (for example Tvedt, 2002;Groves and Hinton, 2004;Van Rooy, 2004;Wallace et al., 2006;Pinkney, 2009;Banks and Hulme, 2012;Wallace and Porter, 2013;. The literature shows that it is through the development of an understanding of NGOs in terms of their discursive landscape, that it is possible to see clearly how different NGOs negotiate this landscape, and how this negotiation affects their representation of women's interests within the development system. ...
Development and social change is a broad optic from which to view human
history. While contested in many ways, it is an inescapable problematic to
evaluate the prospects for humanity. We now live in an era which can
provide for the well-being of all. The forces of production are at the very
peak of possibilities and they are only constrained by relations of produc�tion which prevent a consistent move towards greater equality for all and
a continuous deepening of democracy. Social progress is only possible if
these constraints are addressed and the unprecedented concentration of
wealth and power since around 1990 is reversed. The second crisis loom�ing is that of the environment, where climate change and the depletion of
national resources lead to enrichment of a fear in the short term at the cost
of the longer-term sustainability of humanity as a whole.
... Additionally, global transformations have generated cross-cutting issues such as global warming that became more intrusive in local politics, and hence required an increased level of local legitimation, which could obviously be found more easily in the city context. The globalization process also generated a sense of common purpose among civil actors, triggered internal unification and an increasing the sense of solidarity and empowerment (Van Rooy 2004). For the first time, a number of ad hoc coalitions and campaigns have been organized on a transideological basis, going beyond the traditional political barriers of previous forms of national mobilization and targeting a number of controversial aspects of globalization. ...
... A propitious global political environment in the aftermath of the Cold War and the empowering successes of transnational civil society in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and South Africa(Kaldor 2003; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999;Van Rooy 2004): In this new era of fluidity and optimism, the demonstration effects of successful national and transnational campaigns were powerfully felt. Concomitantly, in the scholarly literature the growth of anti-statism on both the right (neoliberalism) and the left (post-structuralism) encouraged a new enthusiasm for, and openness to, civil society initiative.• ...
... In theorizing how to re-establish symmetry between rule-makers and rule-takers in global politics, proponents of the civil society view commonly turn against cosmopolitan models of democracy, because even if cosmopolitan democrats reformulate sovereignty in functional rather than territorial terms, they still regard electoral representation and the juridicalization of international organizations through some idea of an overarching cosmopolitan law as essential for the democratization of global governance (Archibugi, 2000(Archibugi, , 2002Held, 2002, 2005). Being sceptical of the import of these traditional 'statist' features into global politics, advocates of the civil society view wish instead to democratize global decision-making through the increased involvement of civil society actors, which are supposed to represent (in a non-electoral way) marginalized groups and stakeholder interests and concerns in the decision-making (Charnovitz, 2006;Dryzek, 2006Dryzek, , 2009Dryzek, , 2011Keck, 2004;Macdonald, 2008;Macdonald and Macdonald, 2010;Peruzzotti, 2006;Scholte, 2002Scholte, , 2005Scholte, , 2014Dryzek, 2012, 2014;Van Rooy, 2004). ...
In the theoretical literature on global democracy, the influential transmission belt model depicts transnational civil society as a transmission belt between the public space and the empowered space (decision-making loci), assuming that civil society actors contribute to the democratization of global governance by transmitting peoples’ preferences from the public space to the empowered space through involvement in the political decision-making. In this article, two claims are made. First, I argue that the transmission belt model fails because insofar as civil society has formalized influence in the decision-making, it is illegitimate, and insofar as it has informal influence, it is legitimate, but civil society’s special status as transmitter is dissolved. Second, I argue that civil society is better understood as a transmission belt, not between the public space and the empowered space, but between the private space (lifeworld) and the public space. It is here that civil society is essential for democracy, with its unique capacity to stay attuned to concerns in the lifeworld and to communicate those in a publically accessible form.
... Playing quite a new role in this process is civil society-the combination of individuals, organizations, and movements that belong neither to the state nor to the private sector (UN, 2004). Civil society has played an increasing part in international negotiations in the last few decades (Glasius, 2002;Hajnal, 2002;Van Rooy, 2004), but in the field of Internet governance it was never limited to lobbying, providing expertise, awareness raising, or street action (Glasius, 2002), becoming instead an inherent part of the policy and decision- making process (Bond, 2006;Frangonikolopoulos, 2012;Milan & Hintz, 2013;Mueller et al., 2004). ...
Human rights have long been discussed in relation to global governance processes, but there has been disagreement about whether (and how) a consideration for human rights should be incorporated into the workings of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), one of the main bodies of Internet governance. Internet governance is generally regarded as a site of innovation in global governance; one in which civil society can, in theory, contribute equally with government and industry. This article uses the lens of boundary object theory to examine how civil society actors succeeded in inscribing human rights as a Core Value in ICANN's bylaws. As a “boundary object” in the negotiations, the concept of human rights provided enough interpretive flexibility to translate to the social realities of the various stakeholder groups, including government and industry. This consensus-building process was bound by the organizing structure of the boundary object (human rights), and its ability to accommodate the interests of the different parties. The presence of civil society at the negotiating table demanded a shift in strategy from the usual “outsider” tactics of issue framing and agenda setting, to a more complex and iterative process of “productive contestation,” a consensus-building process fueled by the differences of experience and interests of parties, bound together by the organizing structure of the boundary object. This article describes how this process ultimately resulted in the successful adoption of human rights in ICANN's bylaws. © 2018 The Authors. Policy & Internet Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Policy Studies Organization.
... Moreover, the notion that international legitimacy may be (re-) produced by states and governments alone appears less and less convincing. The IR literature has therefore begun to discover NGOs as speakers of a global civil society or (trans-) national political communities, and even the citizens subjected to international regulations themselves; not states but rather citizens and political communities are thus considered as addressees of international regulations and obligations (van Rooy 2004;Brunnengräber et al. 2005;Collingwood 2006). Hence Steffek (2007) conceptualizes legitimacy as a threefold relationship between international organizations and regimes, their member states and (trans-) national 'constituencies.' ...
Based on an interpretive study of mass media discourses in four Western democracies, this contribution probes the uses and impact of metaphorical concepts in legitimacy-related political communication. It assumes that the media function as a discursive battleground, thus not merely disseminating information but rather creating a space for – as well as contributing their own – positive or negative evaluations of specific policies, political authorities, or entire political orders. Following Max Weber and Rodney Barker, claims of an evaluative kind – legitimation statements – may be regarded as discursive practices through which legitimacy is ascribed (or contested), and it can be shown that figurative language plays a key role in the discursive construction of (il-)legitimacy. The paper offers a critical analysis of metaphorical concepts used in US, British, German, and Swiss discourses on the legitimacy of the four national political orders and their core institutions, the supranational regime of the European Union, as well as the intergovernmental arrangements of the G7/8 regime. A corpus of articles and statements drawn from two high-quality newspapers per country over a period of ten years (1998-2007) is the basis of this study. The source domains and entailments of metaphorical statements – such as evaluations of the G7/8 as a "rich men's club annual jamboree" – will be identified, compared, and assessed: Which metaphorical concepts underpin the public (de-)legitimation of the examined political orders, and what do they reveal about the legitimacy (deficits) and normative foundations of national and international governance arrangements in the age of globalization?
... As Mac Ginty and Richmond (2015: 233) note 'hybridity offers insights into the conditions for legitimacy in context as well as the mediation of power; hybrid forms of peace are connected to both emancipation as well as to the defence of existing customs and power structures'. Both appeals to local power structures based on elite deals and to international norms that would open these beyond pure corporate self-interest have a legitimacy and push each other to articulate the basis for their authority in a form of 'legitimacy game' (for this notion see Van Rooy, 2004). In this game, again in contrast to the political settlement, what might give the state legitimacy is understood to be up for grabs, and itself to be negotiated rather than assumed. ...
The project of ensuring that political settlements are inclusive is key to the attempts of negotiating transitions from conflict over the last 25 years. Examining such transitions, we point to the emergence of the ‘formalised political unsettlement’ as a persistent outcome. The formalised political unsettlement translates the disagreement at the heart of the conflict into a set of political and legal institutions for continuing negotiation. As the conditions of its emergence will not change and the formalised political unsettlement may be here to stay, we point to the opportunities for navigating between elite inclusion and broader societal inclusion that it offers.
... In principle, civil society involvement may affect transparency and accountability, representation (both are procedural legitimacy aspects), and problem-solving capacity (outcome legitimacy) of governance institutions and negotiations therein. Transparency may be increased by CSOs publicizing, or pushing for publication of, details of policy-making processes (Van Rooy, 2004;Yamin, 2001). CSO involvement can also lead to greater public visibility of stakeholders' bargaining positions and existing policy options (Grigorescu, 2007). ...
... It can introduce new viewpoints into discussions and spark more substantial deliberation, not just predicated on putative state interest. And it can inject arguments based on (contestable) ethical claims regarding the global common good (Glasius 2005;Van Rooy 2004;Scholte 2001). Thinking about how such 'supplementary democracy' (Van Rooy 2004: 137) through global civil society can be strengthened is both more creative and more realistic than proposals that would make a set of international NGOs represent global civil society, which would in turn represent the global demos. ...
... To begin with, it is hard to see how the additive approach can accommodate the condition of bindingness in theorizing about global democracy by focusing on legitimacy by 'voice' rather than by 'vote'. Civil society actors are claimed to have the appropriate kind of strong grassroots links to engage in the representation and/or expression of local stakeholder concerns (van Rooy, 2001(van Rooy, , 2004. With such a move from representing 'who' to representing 'what', civil society actors get their democratic force by representing positions, ideas or discourses rather than individuals (Keck, 2004;Peruzzotti, 2006;Charnovitz, 2006). ...
... To begin with, it is hard to see how the additive approach can accommodate the condition of bindingness in theorizing about global democracy by focusing on legitimacy by 'voice' rather than by 'vote'. Civil society actors are claimed to have the appropriate kind of strong grassroots links to engage in the representation and/or expression of local stakeholder concerns (van Rooy, 2001(van Rooy, , 2004. With such a move from representing 'who' to representing 'what', civil society actors get their democratic force by representing positions, ideas or discourses rather than individuals (Keck, 2004;Peruzzotti, 2006;Charnovitz, 2006). ...
The social and political space is no longer entirely mapped in terms of territorial places and borders. What is characteristic of our globalizing era is the growth of problems that transgress traditional territorial boundaries and which are no longer addressed by nation-states alone (Scholte, 2000: 3). In fact, the pace of the political development of governance beyond the nation-state after the Second World War is without parallel in history, with the establishment of international organizations (IOs) such as the United Nations (UN), the European Commission (EC), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Up until the beginning of the 1990s, the justification of IOs was mainly measured in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, but since then the political climate has drastically changed. After this normative turn, scholars and practitioners have questioned the idea that the capacity to deliver effective policies is a sufficient requirement for legitimacy. There is wide agreement that international organizations suffer from a ‘democratic deficit’ and that prospects for democracy beyond the state need to be addressed in this context. It is argued that there is too wide a gap between governance as effective and efficient collective action problem-solving and governance as the democratic legitimation of policy-making. This gap has fueled the debate about making global governance institutions (GGIs) more democratic by strengthening their legitimacy, a demand which has placed civil society and transnational actors (TNAs) at center stage. Governance has become a hosting metaphor identifying non-state actors that participate as mobilizing agents broadening and deepening policy understanding beyond the traditional, exclusivist activities of states and their agents.
... Even if cosmopolitan democrats attempt to rethink sovereignty in functional rather than territorial terms, the argument goes, they still emphasize electoral representation and focus on the juridicalization of international organizations (IOs) through some idea of an overarching cosmopolitan law (Held 2002, p. 32;Archibugi, 2000Archibugi, , 2002. Being sceptical of the import of these 'traditional' features into global politics, an increasing number of democratic theorists instead stress the role of civil society for enhanced democracy in transnational and global decisionmaking, for example, via the involvement of NGOs, which are said to represent (in a non-electoral way) or speak for marginalized groups through 'voice' rather than vote (Steffek and Nanz, 2008;Scholte, 2005;Keck, 2004;Peruzzotti, 2006;Charnovitz, 2006;van Rooy, 2004). ...
In an era of intensified globalisation the changing role of the nation state in the global political and economic order has become an ever more salient concern. The changing role of the state’s responsibilities and capabilities is often subsumed under the terms ‘multilevel’ or ‘multilayered’ governance, which alludes not only to the inclusion of public authorities at several territorial and institutional levels but also to the increased formal and informal influence and participation of non-state and private actors in public regulations. These developments have fuelled debates about the role of regional, international and global institutions, both as formal organisations that establish and enforce rules and as shared sets of norms and expectations that shape interaction between political and economic actors. They have has also fuelled debates about the subjects who are supposed to be the political actors in these institutional structures.
... Most importantly, such actors are supposed to represent (in a non-electoral way) or speak for marginalized groups (Scholte, 2005). In other words, the representation of political subjects and the expression of stakeholder concerns are made through 'voice' rather than vote (Keck, 2004;Peruzzotti, 2006;Charnovitz, 2006;van Rooy, 2004). ...
In recent years, we have witnessed deliberative democracy take a 'civil society turn' to address the democratic deficit of global governance. In light of the present circumstances of world politics, it is argued that civil society offers a rich soil for reformulating democracy globally. This article engages in this debate with particular focus on democratic agency. It investigates the notion of democratic agency built into this deliberative civil society view with regard to its democratic qualities. This is done by problematizing a common feature underlying this view, here called the 'separability premise', which presumes that it is possible to define democracy as two or more separate core democratic qualities or mechanisms - most importantly, inclusive participation, accountability, authorization and deliberation - and that democracy increases the more one or more of these are strengthened. The article defends the thesis that the proposed political subject is not equipped to be a democratic agent insofar as the deliberative civil society view does not fulfil two basic requirements for an arrangement to qualify as minimally democratic, namely, political equality and political bindingness. The article concludes that insofar as we wish to hold on to a deliberative conception of democracy, something along the lines of Habermas's two-track view is still our best bet for accommodating these two conditions, even in a transnational context, since it is able to avoid the problems connected with the separability premise.
... Global civil society organizations have developed into intricate players in a 'global legitimacy game' (Van Rooy, 2004; see also Demars, 2005). Transnational corporations have to engage with them, otherwise their reputation might be tarnished and their bottom line hurt. ...
In the wake of the 2008 global food crisis and export restrictions imposed by major food exporters, Gulf states announced plans for foreign agro-investments, including major land deals, in the name of national of food security. Media reporting has often conveyed an inaccurate picture of these land deals since project implementation has lagged far behind official announcements. This essay analyzes Gulf states' land deals against the backdrop of domestic politics, strategic vulnerabilities, and earlier agro-investments in the Sudan during the 1970s. Approaches among Gulf states diverge considerably, most notably in the case of Saudi Arabia and Qatar that have created new governance institutions to coordinate food security policies and land investments. Gulf states have also increased their profile on the world stage and now their prominent role in the global land grab requires them to navigate new political spaces, including engagement with global civil society, water politics in countries where they are investing, and in emerging global governance initiatives related to food security and investment in land.
Students’ relations with postindependence Ghanaian military regimes have generally been portrayed as positive, yet comparative analysis of the relational dynamics across regime types—military and civilian—is inadequate. This article addresses this knowledge gap using a historical content analytic approach based on original archival and interview data. We argue that strategic and group interests ambiguously influenced students’ entanglement with military and civilian governments, though revolutions initially attracted more support because of their populist political ideologies and development aspirations. This fluctuating pattern of relations, which birthed Ghana’s Fourth Republic, implies that students were concerned mainly with national development beyond ideologically oriented regime leanings. The article thus modifies the predominant scholarly view of African youth, which holds that students have aided or been predisposed to nondemocratic governance and political instability.
Our article focuses on the farmers’ protests, one of the longest sets of protests in independent India (September 2020 - December 2021). Indian farmers carried out an arduous protest movement on the borders of the nation’s capital, New Delhi, against the three farm laws passed by the Parliament under the ruling right-wing government of the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP). These laws, which claimed to liberalize India’s agricultural markets and encourage contract farming, were perceived by farmers and farmer organizations as an attempt to corporatize Indian agriculture, threatening the farmers’ livelihoods and autonomy. We examine three animative scenarios staged as part of their demands to repeal the farm laws- first, farmers’ demonstrating in bitter cold - living in temporary tenements, sharing food and stories; second, the violent clashes that unfolded on January 26, 2021 eroding support for the movement; and finally, farm leader Tikait’s emotional breakdown on national television, which infused fresh calls for solidarity and strength into the movement. We cite these events to draw attention to the embedded structures of inequality that pervade contemporary protests, rehearsing historical communitarian and democratic ethics in the present moment. We see these scenarios as offering an expansive vocabulary of dissent that must be accounted for in any contextual analysis of contemporary protests. We engage with questions of ‘perceived’ legitimacy to ask if there is an acceptable way of protesting. What motivates people to extend their support and solidarity? What determines the grounds of a movement’s legitimacy: claims made, or the manner in which they are performed or perceived? We argue that legitimacy is not determined or shaped in or for perpetuity; it is constantly shifting, and its coordinates need analytical attentiveness and reinterpretation.
This book explores processes of legitimation and delegitimation of global governance institutions (GGIs). How, why, and with what impact on audiences, are GGIs legitimated and delegitimated? The book develops a comprehensive theoretical framework for studying processes of (de)legitimation in global governance and provides broad comparative analyses to uncover patterns of (de)legitimation processes. It covers a diverse set of global and regional governmental and nongovernmental institutions in different policy fields. Variation across these GGIs is explained with reference to institutional setup, policy field characteristics, and broader social structures, as well as to the qualities of agents of (de)legitimation. The approach builds on a mixed-methods research design that uses both quantitative and qualitative new empirical data. Three main interlinked elements of processes of legitimation and delegitimation are at the center of the analysis: the varied practices employed by different state and non-state agents that may boost or challenge the legitimacy of global governance institutions; the normative justifications that these agents draw on when engaging in legitimation and delegitimation practices; and the different audiences that may be impacted by legitimation and delegitimation. This results in a dynamic interplay between legitimation and delegitimation in contestation over the legitimacy of GGIs.
In recent decades, civil society organizations (CSOs) have ostensibly attained increased access to the United Nations (UN) and other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and, in turn, increased opportunities for collaboration with IGOs. However, in most cases, CSO access to IGOs remains limited and highly regimented. Little scholarship has been undertaken to examine barriers to effective CSO–IGO collaborations. Virtually, no empirical research has examined the degree or nature of the interaction between the UN and international civil society via the dynamic of the flagship programme designed to facilitate such collaborations—the consultative status framework. This exploratory study partially addresses the latter gap in the scholarship by undertaking a qualitative macro-scale examination of CSOs within the UN Economic and Social Council’s (ECOSOC) consultative status programme, the primary vehicle in the UN–civil society dynamic. Specifically, the study sought to identify barriers to UN–civil society collaboration within the consultative status programme as perceived by participating CSOs. Findings of a survey sent to a random sample of 10% of CSOs holding UN–ECOSOC consultative status revealed that barriers to participation in the programme varied with some obstacles far more common than others. The degree of barriers reported by CSOs also strongly reflected the level of accreditation they held within the programme. Additionally, survey respondents offered insight as to how impediments in the collaboration could potentially be addressed.
This chapter frames the phenomenon of hybrid diplomacy with the larger context of contemporary global politics. It first analyses the changes occurred in international affairs, especially for what concerns the system of global governance. Within such pluralistic framework, the chapter then examines the specific role played by non-state actors, especially civil society organizations and their transnational networks, in international relations. Special attention is paid to the format of the public-private partnerships, both in its national and international types, that are considered a major vector for global change and global policy.
While INGOs are known for having to balance competing demands in their quest for legitimacy, this article discusses a similar balancing act for local organisations working directly with communities in the field. Building on the social constructivist view that legitimacy is actor and context dependent, we examine how various parties perceive the legitimacy of three land rights advocacy organisations in Kenya. While regulatory and cognitive legitimacy have societal relevance, we found them to be of secondary importance to local communities, who primarily value pragmatic and political legitimacy sources such as adequate representation, demonstrable output, responsiveness, and visibility in the field.
2021 Open Access ebook edition of this Edelman and Borras book on Transnational Agrarian Movements.
Understanding and identifying the functions, roles, responsibilities, accountability, and decision-making processes within the representative structures of any community is important. Yet, most of the existing studies in South Africa do not provide sufficient knowledge or insights about the representative structures and communities of refugees and asylum-seeking populations in the country. In general, there is inadequate discussion on the topic in the literature. This research focused on the representative and protection structures that are available to Somali, Ethiopian, and Congolese refugees and asylum seekers in the urban centres of Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Musina. Within this overarching objective, indicators such as leadership, legitimacy, representation, management skills, networks/partnerships, accountability, transparency, and effectiveness were used to gather information regarding refugees and asylum-seeking representative structures. This empirical research also has provided a detailed description of the manner in which refugee-led organizations, associations and self-help groups.
Networks play an important role in the Indigenous rights movement’s strategies and in Indigenous groups’ engagements with industry actors, the State, and NGOs. We seek to extend the concept of Governance Generating Networks (GGN) to incorporate Indigenous grassroots movements, and evaluate multiscale interactions and processes of network-generated governance across scales. We compare the NoDAPL movement led by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe in the U.S. with grassroots Indigenous-environmentalist networks of water defenders in the Komi Republic, Russia. These GGNs emerged to protest oil pipelines within two contrasting sociopolitical systems, yet demonstrate substantial similarities in respect to local grievances and global engagement. We find that the resonance of these movements across scales was substantial. These reactions exhibited dissonance between scales, when national and regional actors responded in diverging ways. The two Indigenous-led movements were also able to amplify their agendas and transfer strategic alliances to other places and issues.
The objective of this article is to design a game theory-based model to outline the role of the government, firm and civil society for environmental sustainability. The study used the dynamic game theory of complete information. Based upon the equilibrium analysis, the study highlights that when the punishment for non-compliance with environmental responsibility is smaller, the role of civil society would be higher for environmental sustainability. On the other hand, when the environmental responsibility cost is higher, then the role of a government is also higher for the implementation of environmental responsibility and to ensure the punishment. However, the authors found from model analysis that if the cost is low, the probability of firm to fulfill environmental responsibility is higher. In real life, the high cost of environmental responsibility is the main reason that the firm does not fulfill environmental responsibility. Under the high cost, the firm often has the phenomenon of bribery to the government and other means to avoid environmental responsibility. This article is a valuable policy guide for policy makers to cope with global environmental challenges.
The Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) started operation in January 2016 in the context of severe criticism from the U.S. government and transnational civil society organizations, but with the support from major Asian and European states. The establishment of this new global governance institution (GGI) raises intriguing questions concerning legitimacy and (de)legitimation. What legitimacy challenges has the AIIB as a new institution experienced and how has the Bank tried to boost its legitimacy? What specific legitimation and delegitimation practices have been applied by what actors and with what effects? Contributing to research on legitimacy in global governance, this article develops a framework for analyzing legitimacy struggles. It highlights the dynamic relations between legitimation (practices intended to boost beliefs that the rule of a political institution is exercised appropriately) and delegitimation (practices challenging the appropriateness of a political institution’s exercise of authority). The framework includes a systematic study of different agents of (de)legitimation (including GGIs, states, and nonstate actors), practices of (de)legitimation (categorized as institutional and discursive), and institutional sources of (de)legitimation (related to procedure as well as performance). The case study, based on in-depth qualitative content analysis of documents produced by the AIIB and other actors, demonstrates how legitimizers and delegitimizers respond to each other. Being a new GGI, legitimacy struggles on the AIIB have to a large extent focused on its institutional design referring to (the lack of) democratic procedures. Legitimizers tend to stress technocratic performance, whereas delegitimizers are more concerned with fair performance.
The objective of this article is to design a game theory-based model to outline the role of the government, firm and civil society for environmental sustainability. The study used the dynamic game theory of complete information. Based upon the equilibrium analysis, the study highlights that when the punishment for non-compliance with environmental responsibility is smaller, the role of civil society would be higher for environmental sustainability. On the other hand, when the environmental responsibility cost is higher, then the role of a government is also higher for the implementation of environmental responsibility and to ensure the punishment. However, the authors found from model analysis that if the cost is low, the probability of firm to fulfill environmental responsibility is higher. In real life, the high cost of environmental responsibility is the main reason that the firm does not fulfill environmental responsibility. Under the high cost, the firm often has the phenomenon of bribery to the government and other means to avoid environmental responsibility. This article is a valuable policy guide for policy makers to cope with global environmental challenges.
Fringe stakeholders with limited resources, such as grassroots organizations (GROs), are often ignored in business and society literature. We develop a conceptual framework and a set of propositions detailing how GROs strategically gain legitimacy and influence over time. We argue that GROs encounter specific paradoxes over the emergence, development, and resolution of an issue, and they address these paradoxes using cognitive, moral, and pragmatic legitimacy strategies. While cognitive and moral strategies tend to be used consistently, the flexible and paradoxical use of pragmatic strategies has important consequences, both for GROs’ legitimacy and for their potential influence over powerful organizations associated with them. We enrich our framework with the help of two illustrative cases and discuss the implications of the framework for GROs’ legitimacy strategies in business and society literature.
This paper draws on nearly two decades of research on health consumer and patients’ organizations (HCPOs) in the United Kingdom. In particular, it addresses questions of representation and legitimacy in the health policy process. HCPOs claim to represent the collective interests of patients and others such as relatives and carers. At times they also make claims to represent the wider public interest. Employing Pitkin’s classic typology of formalistic, descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation, the paper explores how and in what sense HCPOs represent their constituencies. We found that policymakers themselves are less concerned with formal mechanisms adopted by groups and are more concerned with credibility, in particular whether HCPOs carry the confidence of their constituents. While some concerns about legitimacy remain, particularly in relation to funding from commercial interests, we argue that HCPOs bring a unique perspective to the policy process and to focus purely on formalistic representation provides only a partial understanding of their representative role and a constrained view of their collective moral claims.
In global governance, cooperation between intergovernmental and civil society organizations takes many forms, including multi-stakeholder initiatives, private–public partnerships, sub-contracting, political alliances, hybrid coalitions, multi-sectoral networks, pluralist co-governance, and even foreign policy by proxy. This chapter identifies the main transformations taking place in global governance to make it more accessible to non-state actors, examines the key characteristics of policy partnerships between international organizations) and non-governmental organizations, and discusses the risks and opportunities entailed in this interaction. In particular, the openings from the United Nations and the European Union are analysed, together with the reasons why civil society organizations seek partnership with such institutions.
Perhaps the most common claim associated with the literature around globalization is the assertion that globalization entails the demise of the nation-state, summarized in notions such as an emerging ‘borderless world’ and a ‘hollow state’ (Cohen and Kennedy, 2000). The power and mobility of global finance and multinational corporations, the cultural fragmentation of national populations, the emergence of powerful agents of governance at supra-national and local levels, citizen disaffection from electoral politics, and the growth of global civil society, are all viewed as wearing away at the power or efficacy of the state. In addition, a crucial problem pointed to by critics of globalization is that, as Martin and Schumann (1998: 211) put it, economics appears to be devouring politics. At the same time, many commentators find signs that growing world interconnectedness is bringing with it new and encouraging political tendencies that promise to invigorate democracy and cosmopolitanism. The questions of the fate of the political and of democracy in a globalizing world are, then, the pivotal considerations of this chapter.
Civil society organisations (CSOs)1 are on the rise in international politics, certainly in numbers and, many would argue, also in political importance. Transnational civil society now interacts with virtually all international organisations. There are, however, various degrees of institutionalisation and formalisation of this interaction (Charnovitz, 1997; Steffek and Nanz, 2008). The United Nations (UN), for example, made formal arrangements for civil society participation from the very beginning of its existence in the 1940s (Alger, 2002; Willetts, 2000). The European Union (EU) also has a tradition of consultation with a variety of civil society actors, ranging from the social partners to advocacy groups and religious congregations (Greenwood, 2007a; Smismans, 2004). In global economic governance, the World Bank has established extensive contact with civil society for more than two decades, both in Washington DC and in the various countries where its projects are implemented (Brown and Fox, 2001; Acuña and Tuozzo, 2000). The world trade regime and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) traditionally have had much less interaction with civil society, but since the 1990s even these organisations are slowly opening up (Scholte, 2002; Woods and Narlikar, 2001; Esty, 1998). Overall, the frequency and extent of consultation between international organisations and organised civil society have increased greatly.
While significant debate exists with respect to the historical novelty of contemporary processes of internationalisation and globalisation (cf. Held and McGrew, 2002; Scholte, 2005), there is a general consensus that circumstances have fundamentally altered the way governance is enacted beyond the nation state.1 And, regardless of one’s normative view, the argument that many contemporary issues necessitate coordinated action across national borders is persuasive. Trade relations and human rights issues, for example, can benefit from coordinated action among nation states. Increasing attention is being paid to the way in which the everyday lives and opportunities of the world’s citizens are being shaped by the decisions and deliberations of International Governmental Organisations (IGOs). As such, concerns are being raised about the poor level of democratic accountability of such institutions to those who are affected. One does not have to be a convicted normative cosmopolitan to accept that as key decisions are increasingly hammered out in such global institutions, those same institutions need to demonstrate forms of democratic accountability to the citizens affected.
As non-governmental organisations (NGOs)1 are playing an increasingly important role in international governance, their legitimacy and accountability have become issues of concern to academic researchers, public commentators and activists alike. While early academic studies on the influence of NGOs in world politics saw them as being — at least on some issues — ‘the conscience of the world’ (Willets, 1996, p. 11), attitudes towards these organisations have become much more sceptical. Some empirical examples may illustrate this trend. In 2007, six collaborators of the French humanitarian NGO ‘L’Arche de Zoé’ were arrested in Chad as they were about to put 103 children on a flight to France. They were charged with child abduction and sentenced to eight years hard labour by a Chadian court for the attempted airlift. Following intense diplomatic interaction with France, the President of Chad pardoned them in 2008. The NGO staff argued that the children they were attempting to ‘rescue’ were from the war-torn Darfur region in Sudan, and that they were orphans. However, officials of international aid organisations who investigated the case found most of the children to be Chadian and to have at least one living parent. The French government and other humanitarian NGOs publicly criticised the action by ‘L’Arche de Zoé’ as illegal, irresponsible and amateurish.
Global governance is not the preserve of states and state-controlled international organizations only. A number of non-state actors — like transnational corporations (TNCs), a broad variety of transnational civil society actors, philanthropic foundations and diaspora groups — are increasingly recognized as important players on the global scene. Moreover, the participation of such transnational actors (TNAs) in global governance is increasingly put forward as a solution to democratic deficits at the global level. However, the democratic credentials of these actors are also challenged. The democratic legitimacy of transnational NGOs, in particular, has been questioned, though much of the criticism applies to other types of actors as well. Debates on the democratic legitimacy of TNAs often suffer from a lack of conceptual clarity, both as to the type of actors referred to and the actual meaning of democratic legitimacy. This chapter aims at contributing to clearing the analytical ground in this field through a systematic discussion of dimensions distinguishing different types of TNAs as well as different dimensions of democratic legitimacy applicable to these actors.
In recent times the study of ‘groups’ has become a much more fashionable form of scholarship. This is particularly evident if one broadens the terminology from simply interest groups to encompass civil society organisations (CSOs), social movement organisations (SMOs) or nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). The study of ‘groups’ is again prominent amongst social scientific scholarship.
Political Dynamics of Transnational Agrarian Movements by Marc Edelman and Saturnino M. Borras, Jr. has just been published in a UK edition (for outside North America). It will appear in a Canadian edition (for US and Canada) in April. The book offers a state-of-the-art review of scholarship on transnational agrarian social movements (TAMs), a synthetic history of TAMs from the early twentieth century to the present, and an analytical guide to TAM research. Translations will be available soon from China Agricultural University (Beijing) in Chinese, Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas (Mexico) in Spanish, Universidade Estadual Paulista (Brazil) in Portuguese, Universitá della Calabria in Italian, Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in Russian, University of Gadjah Mada in Bahasa Indonesia, Kyoto University in Japanese, and University of Chiang Mai in Thai.
This article explores transnational activism within Education for All (EFA), looking specifically at the strategic use of information and research by transnational advocacy organizations. Through a comparative case-study examination of two prominent civil society organizations within the EFA movement—the Asia South Pacific Association for Basic and Adult Education (ASPBAE) and ActionAid International—I discuss how information about education is gathered, generated, and disseminated for advocacy purposes. I explore how informational strategies are shaped both by political opportunities in global educational governance and by the internal dynamics and cultures of these organizations.
The 1999 Seattle protests, which brought thirty thousand people to the streets in opposition to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and set off a series of other protests against the multilateral economic institutions, helped spark significant academic interest in global civil society and its potential to act as a transformative force in global economic governance. In this article, however, I argue that many of the civil society actors that have sought to engage with and influence the WTO have been transformed in the process. They have both become more technocratic and increasingly moved toward advocating positions that accord with the neoliberal trade paradigm. I draw on Bourdieu's field theory to explain why and how this transformation has occurred. I argue that, in order to understand these changes among parts of civil society, we need to see multilateral trade governance as a social field, which civil society actors enter into as they seek to impact outcomes at the WTO. The case of the WTO challenges existing theories that conceive of global civil society as an exogenous force that acts upon the institutions of global governance, showing instead that global civil society is not in fact independent or autonomous but shaped and influenced by the institution it targets.
This paper argues that public opinion theory has been guided by a confused, arguably contradictory relationship between the public and the state. Guided by an elitist view toward the masses, traditional theories argue that the public can act only in opposition to the state yet cannot be trusted to run society on its own. Such a normative ideal, while perhaps inherently troubling, is more irrelevant in a world defined by globalisation. In particular, several social movements and governments in Latin America offer an alternate approach to conceptualising the relationship between the public sphere and the state – a model whereby the two work in tandem to run society. Such moves, critically examined here, are particularly responding to neoliberal economic policies.
From 7 to 18 December 2009, Copenhagen was the site of the 15th UN Climate Change Conference (COP15). Official delegates representing 192 states gathered to discuss how to meet the challenge of global climate change. While formal decision-making power rested with state representatives, a large number of non-state transnational actors (TNAs) were active in Copenhagen. Not only did a transnational epistemic community of scientists play an important role; representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were also granted access to the conference as observers. As such, they were heard in plenary discussions, hosted side events and press conferences, and were invited to contribute specialist submissions to negotiations. The participation of many of the NGO activists from around the world was made possible by funding from philanthropic foundations supporting an environmental agenda. Moreover, business interests had a strong presence at the conference. On the official conference website (http:// en. cop15. dk/ ), a number of transnational corporations (TNCs) (such as BMW, Honda, Mercedes-Benz, and SAS) were presented as sponsors of the event. Climate Consortium Denmark was the official focal point for Danish business-related activities leading up to the conference. Representatives of TNCs participated in a number of panels and workshops. Other types of TNAs tried to influence the conference from outside. Various transnational social movements mobilized people for demonstrations and other protest activities, questioning the legitimacy of the state representatives and their ability to agree on international cooperation to meet the challenge of climate change. On 12 December, an estimated 40,000 people joined a mostly peaceful march toward the suburban conference center.
The involvement of non-state organizations in global governance is widely seen as an important step toward global democracy. Proponents of “stakeholder democracy” argue that stakeholder organizations, such as civil society groups and other non-state actors, may represent people significantly affected by global decisions better than elected governments. In this article we identify a particularly promising sociological variant of this argument, test it against new evidence from a large-scale survey among stakeholder organizations with varying levels of involvement in international organizations (IOs), and find that the suggested stakeholder mechanism for producing democratic legitimacy in global governance does not work. Stakeholder involvement is unproductive for democratic legitimacy in IOs as perceived by stakeholders themselves. We suggest alternative explanations of this finding and argue that empirical analysis is useful for adjudicating normative arguments on the viability of stakeholder democracy in global governance.
Scholars have recently begun to study civil society on the regional level more systematically. When regionalization of civil society is studied, it is often understood within processes of regional governance in which state actors craft regional institutions and policy frameworks to solve common problems. Yet, most studies dealing with civil society in regional governance have a state-centric approach, focusing on the marginalization of civil society organizations (CSOs) in such processes, treating them as rather passive actors. This is especially true for research on southern Africa. Contrary to previous studies, this article shows under what circumstances CSOs are granted space in regional policy-making related to the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It is concluded that, in light of CSOs' material and economic weakness, one of the key factors determining their advocacy success on the regional level is production of knowledge and strategic use of communication tools. Even though many challenges remain, for example, the power structures inherent in the SADC, the case of civil society advocacy around the SADC is a sign of a new form of participatory regional governance in the making, which is more democratic than present modes of regional governance in Africa.
Two important reasons for the activation of civic engagement are increased participation which would lead to better governance and co-production of citizens which could improve welfare production. The paper analyses measures taken to activate engagement by first discussing the scope of possible measure governments command for this effort. It then turns to engagement and activation in Finland and Germany to apply this perspective. The analysis of what government actually do allows to identify at least three shortcomings of the concept of civic engagement: its broadness, reference to the common good and the tension between participation and welfare.
The transnational agrarian social movement Via Campesina is campaigning to have the United Nations negotiate and implement a Declaration, and eventually an International Convention, on Peasants' Rights. This article analyzes the origins and demands of the campaign and the place of the claimed rights in international law. Peasant organizations hope to follow in the footsteps of indigenous peoples' movements that participated in the negotiations preceding the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The peasants' rights campaign has succeeded in linking its demands to discussions of the right to food in the United Nations, where concern is growing over the approach of the 2015 target for realizing the Millennium Development Goals, in particular the halving of the numbers of people suffering from hunger. The campaign is likely to face stiff resistance from powerful UN member states, but could achieve substantial advances even if the path to a convention is difficult or never completed.
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