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The current COVID-19 pandemic underlines the importance of a mindful utilization of financial and human resources. Preserving resources and manpower is paramount in healthcare. It is important to ensure the ability of surgeons and specialized professionals to function through the pandemic. A conscious effort should be made to minimize infection in this sector. A high mortality rate within this group would be detrimental. This manuscript is the result of a collaboration between the major Italian surgical and anesthesiologic societies: ACOI, SIC, SICUT, SICO, SICG, SIFIPAC, SICE, and SIAARTI. We aim to describe recommended clinical pathways for COVID-19-positive patients requiring acute non-deferrable surgical care. All hospitals should organize dedicated protocols and workforce training as part of the effort to face the current pandemic.
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C O M M E N T A R Y Open Access
Surgery in COVID-19 patients: operational
directives
Federico Coccolini
1,20*
, Gennaro Perrone
2
, Massimo Chiarugi
1
, Francesco Di Marzo
3
, Luca Ansaloni
4
,
Ildo Scandroglio
5
, Pierluigi Marini
6
, Mauro Zago
7
, Paolo De Paolis
8
, Francesco Forfori
9
, Ferdinando Agresta
10
,
Alessandro Puzziello
11
, Domenico DUgo
12
, Elena Bignami
13
, Valentina Bellini
13
, Pietro Vitali
14
, Flavia Petrini
15
,
Barbara Pifferi
13
, Francesco Corradi
9
, Antonio Tarasconi
2
, Vittoria Pattonieri
2
, Elena Bonati
2
, Luigi Tritapepe
16
,
Vanni Agnoletti
17
, Davide Corbella
18
, Massimo Sartelli
19
and Fausto Catena
2
Abstract
The current COVID-19 pandemic underlines the importance of a mindful utilization of financial and human
resources. Preserving resources and manpower is paramount in healthcare. It is important to ensure the ability of
surgeons and specialized professionals to function through the pandemic. A conscious effort should be made to
minimize infection in this sector. A high mortality rate within this group would be detrimental.
This manuscript is the result of a collaboration between the major Italian surgical and anesthesiologic societies:
ACOI, SIC, SICUT, SICO, SICG, SIFIPAC, SICE, and SIAARTI. We aim to describe recommended clinical pathways for
COVID-19-positive patients requiring acute non-deferrable surgical care. All hospitals should organize dedicated
protocols and workforce training as part of the effort to face the current pandemic.
Keywords: Coronavirus, COVID-19, Epidemic, Pandemic, Mass casualties, Management, Resources, Criticalities, WSES
Background
The current COVID-19 pandemic, when the destructive
effects of natural or man-made forces overwhelm the
ability of a given area or community to meet the demand
for health care[1], demands the best disaster/mass cas-
ualty incident (MCI) response. During MCIs, preserving
financial and human resources is crucial. A good
organization and a preventive approach are mandatory
in the phase of MCI response called mitigation. In order
to minimize resource exhaustion, the use of surgical ap-
pliances and staff must be well pondered and balanced
[2]. Surgeons and sub-specialized workers in general are
a valuable resource during MCI. Infection or death of
sub-specialized staff must be minimized to preserve the
ability to face surgical emergencies and associated activ-
ities that will continue to occur or perhaps increase dur-
ing MCI. In fact, any lack of specialized teams occurring
during a pandemic cannot be easily addressed by reinte-
grating retirees or replenishing the ranks with new staff,
which would also be inevitably associated with a lowered
standard of care, hence, the requirement to skeletonize
surgical activities during a pandemic. When possible, all
surgical procedures on all suspected COVID-19 patient
should be postponed until confirmed infection clearance.
Minimal staff should be involved when deferral is not
possible. If a large number of senior surgeons is exposed
to infected patients, the possibility for them to become
infected and require self-isolation is real and could po-
tentially result in a dangerous shortage of senior expert-
ise within surgical teams. Resource usage should be
carefully considered when planning scheduled proce-
dures, particularly with regard to materials, staff, devices,
intensive care beds, blood components, etc. Caring for
© The Author(s). 2020 Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if
changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons
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licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain
permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the
data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data.
* Correspondence: federico.coccolini@gmail.com
1
Emergency Surgery Unit & Trauma Center, Pisa University Hospital, Pisa, Italy
20
General, Emergency and Trauma Surgery, Pisa University Hospital, Via
Paradisia 1, 56100 Pisa, Italy
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Coccolini et al. World Journal of Emergency Surgery (2020) 15:25
https://doi.org/10.1186/s13017-020-00307-2
resource-intensive patients might be controversial dur-
ing MCIs.
This manuscript is the result of a collaboration be-
tween the major Italian surgical and anesthesiologic so-
cieties: ACOI, SIC, SICUT, SICO, SICG, SIFIPAC, SICE,
and SIAARTI. We aim to describe recommended clinical
pathways for COVID-19-positive patients requiring
acute non-deferrable surgical care.
Main text
All known or suspected COVID-19-positive patients re-
quiring surgical intervention must be treated as positive
until proven otherwise in order to minimize infection
spread. Protocolized clearly defined pathways must be
available to healthcare professionals caring for these pa-
tients. Allocating dedicated senior staff to key manage-
ment roles is crucial to minimize COVID-19 spread. All
staff must be specifically trained to don, doff, and dis-
pose of personal protection equipment (PPE) including
masks (level 2 or 3 filtering face piece (FFP) depending
on the aerosol-generating risk level), eye protection,
double non-sterile gloves, gowns, suites, caps, and socks
(Table 1).
In-transit surgical patients proceeding through the
theater block must not stop in the anesthetic bay, recov-
ery room, or any place other than the COVID-dedicated
operating room (OR). They must be taken directly to a
designated OR that must be adequately marked with
clearly visible door signs. In the event that the scheduled
surgical procedure does not require a general anesthetic
and if the clinical situation allows, patients should con-
tinue to wear a protective mask for the entire duration
of the procedure (Fig. 1).
It is important to underline how all non-COVID pa-
tients must be protected. Established separate pathways
must exist to keep suspected/infected patients apart
from non-COVID ones. PPEs or at least masks must be
enforced for all non-COVID patients during all in-
hospital transfers in order to minimize infection risk in
the event that they cross the path or come in proximity
of a COVID patient. Careful planning and segregation of
infected patients may help minimize staff shortages re-
lated to uncontrolled viral spread.
Location
Designated COVID operating areas (COA) must be allo-
cated to COVID patientsurgent/emergent operating.
The OR closest to the entrance of the theater block en-
trance should be the first one designated to COVID pa-
tients. When multiple procedures must be
simultaneously performed, operating rooms must be uti-
lized in order of proximity to the theater block entrance
in order to minimize environmental contamination in
the theater block.
Patient transport
Patient transit to and from the COA must be as quick as
possible. A pre-defined direct path must be kept as short
as possible and away from other patients and people in
general within the hospital in order to minimize the
chances of infection. If inter-hospital patient transfer or
transfer from other buildings within the hospital is re-
quired, a dedicated vehicle should be used. Transfer
personnel should be specifically trained and equipped
with PPEs. The patients compartment in the transport
vehicle is ideally kept separate from the driver. A Bio-
containment unit may be utilized. If a patient is taken to
the COA from any adjacent premise, a stretcher might
be used for transport. All precautionary measures apply
to the use of the stretcher and to the personnel respon-
sible for the transfer (Table 1, Fig. 1) both during and
after transport is completed, with immediate sanitization
required (Tables 2and 3). Utilized lifts must be sani-
tized. If any unexpected contamination occurs during
transport (i.e., patient vomiting or else), adequate dedi-
cated sanitization should take place. A dedicated specif-
ically trained 24/7 cleaning team from the local
contracted cleaning service might prove a valuable
resource.
Any non-intubated patient must wear a surgical mask,
disposable waterproof gloves, disposable cap, and shoe
covers during transport. When possible, the patients
hands should be sanitized before transport. Transport
operators must sanitize hands and wear PPEs before
transfer and should minimize contact with patients.
Coded routes should be followed and hospital public
areas avoided. Anyone crossing the path of an infected
patient should be preemptively alerted in order to
minimize contact. Well-organized logistics will contrib-
ute to minimizing disposables wastage. Dedicated well-
identifiable containers for infectious-risk health waste
(IRHW) should be used for potentially infected dispos-
ables. Lastly, COVID patients should be transported in
the most professional and confidential way possible in
Table 1 Necessary personal protection equipment
Personal protection equipment
FFP2 facial mask
FFP3 facial mask (in case of maneuvers at high risk of generating
aerosolized particles)
Disposable long sleeve waterproof coats, gowns, or Tyvek suits
Disposable double pair of nitrile gloves
Protective goggles or visors
Disposable head caps
Disposable long shoe covers
Alcoholic hand hygiene solution
FFP filtering face piece
Coccolini et al. World Journal of Emergency Surgery (2020) 15:25 Page 2 of 7
order to minimize unjustified alarmism. Dedicated areas
allocated to infected patients awaiting transfer to the
COA must be preemptively identified in the emergency
department. The patients transfer from the emergency
department to the COA should be streamlined in order
to avoid all unnecessary contacts. Each hospital should
provide a step by step, well-defined path pre-allocating
some corridors and elevators to COVID patients.
COVID operating area
It is important to minimize the total number of opera-
tors working in the designated COA. Whenever possible,
it is important to minimize to number of people working
on a single infected case; ideally, this should also apply
to cases spanning over multiple shifts. Operations for
COVID patients might be organized with a dedicated
on-call shift. This might require overnight or out of
hours activities to optimize resource usage. This ap-
proach might facilitate segregation between COVID and
non-COVID patients, who will continue to require
surgical care. PPEs and stock required for hand hygiene
must be constantly replenished within the COA. A spe-
cifically allocated filter area designed for COVID patients
to enter the COA must be equipped with PPEs, hand hy-
giene station, and a dedicated IRHW bins. Handling of
potentially infected linen should be adequately managed
too. The use of machinery intended to facilitate moving
and transferring patients should be minimized. All COA
doors must be kept closed (including accessory rooms,
sterilization spaces), and any equipment not necessary
for the intervention must be moved away from COVID
patients transit route.
Taking charge of the patient in COVID operating area
Special attention should be given to what, in non-
COVID times, is routine practice. Staff taking responsi-
bility for positive or suspected infected patients must be
limited to those who need to be primarily involved in
each operation. A record must be kept of all operators
involved in procedures on potentially infected patients.
Personnel equipped with full PPEs must receive the pa-
tient in the COA, transfer the patient to the operating
room minimizing environmental contamination and,
after time-out, proceed to move the patient on the oper-
ating table in the allocated OR. All non-intubated pa-
tients must wear a surgical mask. Medical records must
remain outside the OR and must be consulted and up-
dated there after adequate doffing. Intraoperative
Fig. 1 COVID-19 surgical patients management flowchart
Table 2 Sanitization sequence
Surface and electromedical sanitization sequence
1. Clean with chloro-derivate solution
2. Rinse and dry
3. Disinfect with chloro-derivate solution in a concentration 0.1% or
1000 ppm; time of contact must be superior to 1 min
ppm parts per million
Coccolini et al. World Journal of Emergency Surgery (2020) 15:25 Page 3 of 7
document consultation is discouraged and should be
minimized.
Operating room preparation
Negative pressure ORs would be ideal to minimize infec-
tion risk [3,4]. However, ORs are normally designed to
have positive pressure air circulation. A high air ex-
change cycle rate (25 cycles/h) contributes to effect-
ively reduce the viral load within ORs [2]. Equipment
kept in each OR must be minimized to what is strictly
necessary on a case to case basis. Once the operation
starts, all efforts must be made to use what is available
in the room and minimize staff transiting in and out the
OR, in order to minimize infection risk. Standard
anesthetic trolleys should be replaced with dedicated
pre-prepared ones with minimal but adequate stock. All
required surgical material (i.e., stitches, scalpel blades)
must be preemptively prepared in a sterilizable steel wire
basket. Dedicated IRHW containers must be used for in-
fected and sharp disposable instruments. Alcoholic solu-
tion for hand hygiene must always be available. Avoiding
non-strictly necessary commonly used non-disposable
devices is recommended. Disposable material in general
should be preferred, including linen. All operators (i.e.,
surgeon, anesthetist, nurses, technicians) should enter
the OR timely, aiming to minimize time spent within the
OR itself. Once in the OR, they should not leave until
the operation is completed, and once out they should
not re-enter.
Personnel dressing
All operators must wear the required PPE before meet-
ing the infected patient. The patients receiving
personnel inside the COA filter area must perform hand
hygiene and wear full PPE.
While taking care of infected patients, gloves should
be changed immediately after contact with infected ma-
terial (objects, surfaces, etc.) or if any damage occurs.
Operator with a beard should exert special attention to
the fit of the mask ensuring adequate protection.
Some procedures likely to generate aerosolized parti-
cles have been associated with increased coronavirus
transmission: tracheal intubation, non-invasive ventila-
tion, tracheostomy, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and
manual ventilation before intubation and bronchoscopy
[5,6]. An FFP3 mask should be therefore worn by oper-
ators working closer to the patient during these
procedures.
Given the conjunctivas susceptibility to viral transmis-
sion, it is important to wear visors or goggles to protect
the eyes from potential exposure of viral particles [7].
Anesthesiologic consideration
Careful anesthesiologic planning is recommended to
minimize any infection potentially associated with unex-
pected complex endotracheal intubation procedures. A
more liberal use of intubation might be justified in pa-
tients with acute respiratory failure, bypassing non-
invasive ventilation techniques (e.g., CPAP or biPAP) in
order to minimize the transmission risks [5]. Disposable
airway equipment should be preferred. Medical and
nursing staff must be equipped with FFP3 filters during
laryngoscopy and intubation [5]. Intubations techniques
with the highest chance of first-time success should be
preferred to avoid repeated airway instrumentation [4,
5]. Awake intubation techniques should be avoided. At
the end of these procedures, all staff directly performing
the procedure must immediately replace the first pair of
gloves and other PPEs in case heavy contamination risk
exists (i.e., in the event that vomiting, coughing, or else
has occurred). Fiberscope intubation, unless specifically
Table 3 COVID-19 surgical patientsmanagement
Key aspects in COVID-19 surgical patient management
All suspected or infected patients must be managed with the maximum
attention.
All personnel in contact with the patient must wear PPE.
Transfers must be protected.
Infected patients must be moved as little as possible through the
hospital.
Transfer routes must be precisely planned and be as short as possible.
The COVID operating area should be in a dedicated and possibly
separate area.
COVID operating room must be dedicated and as close as possible to
the entrance of the theater block.
Disposable material should be preferred.
Minimal material should be used for each intervention.
Transport personnel should be the same from transport origin to
destination.
Once the patient has entered, the OR doors must be closed.
Operators (i.e., surgeon, anesthetist, nurses, technicians) should enter the
OR in a timely manner to minimize exposure to infected patients.
Personnel involved in the intervention should not leave the OR during
the procedure.
High OR air exchange cycles are recommended (> 25 exchanges/h).
Clinical documentation must remain outside the OR
At the end of each intervention all disposable materials must be
disposed of and all surfaces and electromedical devices accurately
cleaned and disinfected.
PPE must be removed and disposed of outside the OR in dedicated
doffing areas ensuring the virus is not transmitted to the healthcare
worker.
OR and surrounding donning/doffing areas must be sanitized as soon as
possible after each procedure.
After each procedure, all involved personnel, whenever possible, should
shower.
Recovery phase after surgery must be done in OR, before transfer the
ward/ICU.
Coccolini et al. World Journal of Emergency Surgery (2020) 15:25 Page 4 of 7
indicated, should be avoided as it may generate aerosoli-
zation [5]. Rapid sequence intubation (RSI) should be
considered to avoid manual ventilation and potential
aerosolization. If manual ventilation is required, small
current volumes should be used. If available, a closed
suction system should be preferred during airway aspir-
ation. Disposable covers should be used whenever pos-
sible to reduce equipment contamination. If a patient is
transferred directly from the intensive care unit, a dedi-
cated transport ventilator should be utilized. In order to
reduce aerosolization risks, the gas flow should be
turned off and the endotracheal tube clamped with for-
ceps when switching from the portable device to the OR
ventilator [4]. When possible, a dedicated ventilator
should be used in the OR for general anesthesia in posi-
tive or suspected positive COVID-19 patients. Invasive
procedures like for example the placement of intercostal
catheters, central venous catheters, or similar should be
performed at the patients bedside, rather than in the
OR. When a general anesthetic is required, a HEPA
(high-efficiency particulate air) filter should be con-
nected to the patient end of the breathing circuit and
another one between the expiratory limb and the
anesthetic machine [2,6]. Alternatively, for pediatric pa-
tients or other patients in whom additional dead space
or the weight of the filter may be problematic, the HEPA
filter must be placed at the expiratory end of the circuit
(before the exhalation re-enters the ventilator). The gas
sampling tube must also be protected by a HEPA filter.
Both HEPA filters and soda lime must be changed after
each case [4]. At the end of the surgery, during the re-
covery phase, the patient must be assisted directly in the
OR until ready to be transferred back to the inpatients
place of stay. The time patients spend returning to wards
must be reduced in order to minimize contact between
COVID-positive patients and the surrounding
environment.
Intraoperative management
The OR door must be kept closed at all times and clear
signs should discourage unnecessarily entering the room.
Supplying materials to the OR during surgery should
also be discouraged. The scout nurse, in collaboration
with the operating surgeon, should anticipate what is
needed during the operation before the same starts. Sur-
geons should preferably perform the operation with
what is available in the OR once the operation started.
Any essential retrieval of necessary equipment should be
done by staff outside the OR. Personnel present in the
OR during surgery must not leave the room. Electrome-
dical devices (i.e., ultrasound) and surfaces must be used
with adequate protective cover and adequately sanitized
at the end of the operation. The surgical team will drape
the patient according to the surgical procedure,
replacing the surgical mask with FFP2 filter and wearing
long shoe covers before doing so. All personnel in direct
contact with the patient must wear a double pair of
gloves at all times, even while operating. After the pa-
tient left the OR, logistics should allow as much time as
possible before the next procedure takes place, to reduce
possible air contamination. This time depends on the
number of air exchanges/hour of the specific room. Air
exchange cycles should be increased whenever possible
to 25 exchanges/h [2]. After the case, all areas at risk
of contamination must be cleaned and disinfected (Table
2). Efforts should be made to minimize the contamin-
ation risk associated with specimens sent to the path-
ology department. No data currently exist on COVID-19
viral load in bodily fluids or tissue samples.
PPE undressing/removal
Staff not directly involved in the patients care should
leave the OR at the end of the operation and remove all
PPEs in a dedicated doffing area following the sequence
described below. A clean area should be accessed only
after the doffing procedure is complete. All used PPEs
must be disposed of through IRHW containers. Scrubs
must be replaced after each procedure following shower-
ing, whenever possible. Personnel responsible for trans-
ferring the patient away from the operating room must
follow separate access routes and wear PPEs different
from the ones worn in the OR.
Instructions for PPE removal
The healthcare professional must take all care not to be-
come infected while removing PPE; this must be done
through an adequate procedure preventing re-
contamination of the operator's clothing and hands. The
first pair of gloves is likely to be heavily contaminated
and must be removed first. All other PPEs must be con-
sidered infected as well and removed with care during
the doffing procedure, especially if the patient had a
cough. Protective suite, shoe cover, and head cap must
be subsequently removed. Face mask and glasses must
be then removed, taking care to handle the face mask by
the ear laces and without touching its external side. The
second pair of gloves must be removed as the very last
PPE and hands disinfection with hydro-alcoholic solu-
tion must be accurately performed immediately after.
Environmental sanitization
The OR and surrounding exchange areas must be sani-
tized as soon as possible after each procedure, with par-
ticular attention to all objects used when caring for
infected patients. Similarly, all areas where COVID pa-
tients have transited must be carefully sanitized too. All
personnel must contribute to maintain a clean environ-
ment including floors and surfaces in general. All
Coccolini et al. World Journal of Emergency Surgery (2020) 15:25 Page 5 of 7
potentially infected single-use materials should be dis-
posed of through IRHW containers. Reusable materials
should be decontaminated, washed, dried, and or disin-
fected/sterilized, based on the likelihood of infection.
Electromedical equipment (i.e., ventilator, radiological
equipment) must be cleaned with chloro-derivate solu-
tion, rinsed and dried, and then disinfected with chloro-
derivate solution in a concentration 0.1% or 1000 ppm
(parts per million) with contact time superior to 1 min
[8,9] (Table 2). Full PPE must be worn during the sani-
tizing procedure. Disposable materials only (i.e., double
gloves, paper towel) should be used for cleaning. Any-
thing disposable kept inside the OR during the operation
must be disposed of through IRHW containers, even if
not used.
Waste disposal
It is advisable to set up a dedicated container for hazard-
ous medical waste immediately outside the OR, to im-
mediately dispose of all contaminated disposable
material and PPEs. Containers should be closed and
sealed before being transferred to the collection point.
All sharps should be disposed of in a dedicated rigid
plastic container. PPE should be worn when closing and
transporting containers and removed immediately after.
Any visibly damaged or contaminated container must be
promptly replaced.
Linen management
Linen can be contaminated and must therefore be han-
dled and transported with care, aiming to prevent infec-
tion spread. Disposable laundry should be preferred,
when possible. All linen (sheets, pillowcases, crossbars,
etc.) should be handled wearing PPE during collection,
not placed on surfaces or floors, but directly inside dedi-
cated containers. These must be sealed and immediately
sent for cleaning and sterilization, limiting them being
left outside the OR.
Conclusion
Instituting precise well-established plans to perform
undeferrable surgical procedures and emergencies on
COVID-19-positive patient is mandatory. Hospitals must
prepare specific internal protocols and arrange adequate
training of the involved personnel.
Abbreviations
MCIs: Mass casualty events; PPE: Personal protection equipment;
FFP: Filtering face piece; COA: COVID operating area; IRHW: Infectious-risk
health waste; HEPA: High-efficiency particulate air; RSI: Rapid sequence
intubation
Acknowledgements
None
Authorscontributions
FC, GP, MC, FdM, LA, IS, PM, MZ, PdP, FF, FA, AP, DD, EB, VB, PV, FP, BP, FCo,
AT, VP, EB, LT, VA, DC, MS, and FCa contributed to manuscript conception
and draft, critically revised the manuscript, and contributed important
scientific knowledge and to giving the final approval.
Funding
None
Availability of data and materials
Not applicable
Competing interest
All authors declare to have no competing interests.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Not applicable
Consent for publication
Not applicable
Author details
1
Emergency Surgery Unit & Trauma Center, Pisa University Hospital, Pisa, Italy.
2
Emergency and Trauma Surgery, Maggiore Hospital, Parma, Italy.
3
General
Surgery Dept., Sansepolcro Hospital, Sansepolcro, Italy.
4
General, Emergency
and Trauma Surgery Dept., Bufalini Hospital, Cesena, Italy.
5
General Surgery
Dept., Busto Arsizio Hospital, Busto Arsizio, Italy.
6
General Surgery Dept.,
Ospedaliera San Camillo Forlanini, Rome, Italy.
7
General and Emergency
Surgery Dept., A. Manzoni Hospital, Lecco, Italy.
8
General Surgery Dept.,
Ospedale Gradenigo, Torino, Italy.
9
ICU Dept., Pisa University Hospital, Pisa,
Italy.
10
General Surgery Dept., Ospedale Civile, Adria, Italy.
11
General Surgery
Dept., Salerno University Hospital, Salerno, Italy.
12
General Surgery Dept.,
Policlinico Gemelli University Hospital, Rome, Italy.
13
ICU Dept., Parma
University Hospital, Parma, Italy.
14
Igiene and Public Health Dept., Parma
University Hospital, Parma, Italy.
15
ICU Dept., Chieti University Hospital, Chieti,
Italy.
16
ICU Dept., San Camillo Forlanini Hospital, Rome, Italy.
17
ICU Dept.,
Bufalini Hospital, Cesena, Italy.
18
Neuro ICU Dept., Papa Giovanni XXIII
Hospital, Bergamo, Italy.
19
General and Emergency Surgery, Macerata
Hospital, Macerata, Italy.
20
General, Emergency and Trauma Surgery, Pisa
University Hospital, Via Paradisia 1, 56100 Pisa, Italy.
Received: 20 March 2020 Accepted: 31 March 2020
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Coccolini et al. World Journal of Emergency Surgery (2020) 15:25 Page 7 of 7
... The pandemic has reinforced the importance of stringent infection control measures and patient safety protocols in anesthesiology. It was concluded, that consideration should be given for postponing non-urgent procedures and promoting non-operative treatment to delay or avoid the need for surgery [5,7,17,20]. In this situation is needed adaptability and flexibility. ...
... For realization of this protocol was needed sufficient number of SARS Cov-2 laboratory tests, personal protection equipment and patient isolation areas [22,25]. Also, there was a need in minimization of clinical visits, optimization of elective surgery time and maximal homework and creation of two interchangeable medical teams which will work during two weeks and then will rest for the next two weeks [5,7,22]. For minimization of clinical visits, the use of telemedicine and remote monitoring tools has become more prevalent during the pandemic. ...
... If possible, use negative pressure operating rooms and turn-off positive pressure. Consider general anesthesia for reducing coughing, for tracheal intubation use video laryngoscope, if intubation is not possible and prolonged mask ventilation is needing, use laryngeal mask [5][6][7]9,20,25]. Later publications had been shown the safety of regional anesthesia for COVID-19 patients [21,23]. ...
... The impact COVID-19 had on urgent surgical procedures has been analyzed by numerous authors 1,4,[6][7][8] . Some studies have also examined the reduced USA described during the first wave of the pandemic compared to a control period [9][10][11][12] . ...
... The The patients' main characteristics from each period are shown on table 1. Figure 2 compares the most common diagnoses requiring surgery in each period. The median length of stay was 5 days (IQR, [3][4][5][6][7][8][9]. Shorter lengths of stay were reported during Periods 2W and V (5 days [IQR, [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11] As shown on figure 3, major complications (Clavien-Dindo grades III-V) were reported in 92 patients (13.9%). ...
... The median length of stay was 5 days (IQR, [3][4][5][6][7][8][9]. Shorter lengths of stay were reported during Periods 2W and V (5 days [IQR, [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11] As shown on figure 3, major complications (Clavien-Dindo grades III-V) were reported in 92 patients (13.9%). Table 2 compares the complications observed across the different study periods. ...
... However, the operating room and its personnel still provide care in emergency cases (Simone et al. 2020;Li et al. 2020a). Even a positive COVID-19 patient should be transferred to the operating room for surgery in emergencies (Coccolini et al. 2020). As part of the surgical team, the operating room nurses in a small and closed space have close contact with COVID-19 patients, which has caused some of these personnel to be contaminated (McDougal et al. 2022). ...
Article
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Background During the COVID-19 pandemic, some patients who were transported to the operating room for emergency surgery had COVID-19; operating room nurses should be in direct contact with these patients in a small and closed space of the operating room. This can lead to unpleasant experiences for these people. Accordingly, this study was conducted to understand the experience of operating room nurses during the surgery of COVID-19 patients. Methods This qualitative study is a descriptive phenomenological study. Sampling was done purposefully and participants were selected based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria. The data of this study was obtained through semi-structured interviews with 12 participants and analyzed using the Colaizzi method. Results Four main themes and 13 sub-themes were presented in this study: (1) feeling heroic (being a savior, self-sacrificing). (2) Exacerbating burnout (emotional exhaustion, feeling of incompetence, physical overtiredness). (3) Psychiatric crisis (destructive anxiety, horror of death, worrying about being a carrier, drastic feeling of pity). (4) Feeling the need for support (need for professional support, need for emotional support, need for social support). Conclusion The results of this study show that operating room nurses experienced conflicting feelings during surgery on patients with COVID-19. So the feeling of being a hero was a heartwarming experience, but the aggravation of job burnout and mental crisis was unpleasant for them. Also, these people have experienced the need to be supported in various aspects.
... The viral infection has significantly impacted the practices of pediatric surgeons and urologists during the pandemic, particularly in the realm of minimally invasive surgery (MIS) and robotics. Current data suggests that surgical procedures should be limited to pediatric patients with urgent or oncological needs [117][118][119][120]. Utilizing advanced technical methods such as aerosol dispersion through suction/filters, appropriate implementation of electrocautery, and the utilization of modern sealing devices can make Robotics and Management Information Systems (MIS) a viable treatment option for children, effectively reducing surgical smoke. ...
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The impact of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic on the everyday livelihood of people has been monumental and unparalleled. Although the pandemic has vastly affected the global healthcare system, it has also been a platform to promote and develop pioneering applications based on autonomic artificial intelligence (AI) technology with therapeutic significance in combating the pandemic. Artificial intelligence has successfully demonstrated that it can reduce the probability of human-to-human infectivity of the virus through evaluation, analysis, and triangulation of existing data on the infectivity and spread of the virus. This review talks about the applications and significance of modern robotic and automated systems that may assist in spreading a pandemic. In addition, this study discusses intelligent wearable devices and how they could be helpful throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.
Chapter
After being identified for the first time in December 2019 in Wuhan, China, the 2019 coronavirus disease (COVID-19) has rapidly spread around the globe. The specific requirements of pregnant women should be taken into account when formulating treatment policies and developing responses to this ever-changing pandemic. Anaesthesiologists, obstetricians, neonatologists, nurses, critical care specialists, infectious disease specialists, and infection control specialists must all work together to care for pregnant women infected with COVID-19. The hospital’s operating rooms and labour rooms should be in their own wing, away from the rest of the facility. Both neuraxial labour analgesia and caesarean delivery drugs and equipment, as well as PPE, should be easily accessible in the operating room. Every member of staff needs to be familiar with the proper methods of gowning and disrobing, as well as the most up-to-date regulations for the safe disposal of biomedical waste. There needs to be a set of procedures in place for dealing with people who have been diagnosed with or are suspected of having COVID-19. In addition, it is important to ensure that routine labour and delivery and operating room procedures are practised using simulation technology.
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The impact of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) on postoperative recovery from oncology surgeries should be understood for the clinical decision-making. Therefore, this study was designed to evaluate the postoperative cumulative 28-day mortality and the morbidity of surgical oncology patients during the COVID-19 pandemic. This retrospective cohort study included patients consecutively admitted to intensive care units (ICU) of three centres for postoperative care of oncologic surgeries between March to June 2019 (first phase) and March to June 2020 (second phase). The primary outcome was cumulative 28-day postoperative mortality. Secondary outcomes were postoperative organic dysfunction and the incidence of clinical complications. Because of the possibility of imbalance between groups, adjusted analyses were performed: Cox proportional hazards model (primary outcome) and multiple logistic regression model (secondary outcomes). After screening 328 patients, 291 were included. The proportional hazard of cumulative 28-day mortality was higher in the second phase than that in the first phase in the Cox model, with the adjusted hazard ratio of 4.35 (95% confidence interval [CI] 2.15–8.82). The adjusted incidences of respiratory complications (odds ratio [OR] 5.35; 95% CI 1.42–20.11) and pulmonary infections (OR 1.53; 95% CI 1.08–2.17) were higher in the second phase. However, the adjusted incidence of other infections was lower in the second phase (OR 0.78; 95% CI 0.67–0.91). Surgical oncology patients who underwent postoperative care in the intensive care unit during the COVID-19 pandemic had higher hazard of 28-day mortality. Furthermore, these patients had higher odds of respiratory complications and pulmonary infections. Trials registration The study is registered in the Brazilian Registry of Clinical Trials under the code RBR-8ygjpqm, UTN code U1111-1293-5414.
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Background: To investigate the contemporary comparative inpatient prognosis among US and Chinese patients with type A aortic dissection (TAAD). Methods: Data from Chinese multi-institutional TAAD registry and the US National Inpatient Sample databases were analyzed. We used multivariable logistic regression models to compare in-hospital mortality and perioperative complication rates between the US and China. Length of stay and overall costs were fitted with quantile regression models. Independent prognostic factors associated with post-operative survival were assessed via Cox proportional hazards models. Results: Among 3,121 eligible TAAD patients, 1,073 were from China (25.0% female; mean ± SD age, 53.9±12.4) and 2,048 were from the US (31.2% female; mean ± SE age, 59.8 ± 0.3). During the study period, the in-hospital mortality rates in China and the US were 15.5% and 13.3%, yet the difference was insignificant after adjustment (aOR, 1.16; 95% CI, 0.69-1.97). While there was no significant difference in overall perioperative complications (aOR, 1.07; 95% CI, 0.52-2.18), the patterns of complications differed between two cohorts. While Chinese TAAD patients experienced significantly longer duration of hospitalization (median difference, +10.4 days; 95% CI, 9.2-11.5), the US TAAD cohort had significantly greater overall hospitalization costs (49.9; 95% CI, 55.4-44.5, in 1000 USD). Conclusions: Notwithstanding significant differences in demographic and clinical characteristics, TAAD patients from China and the US demonstrated comparable in-hospital mortality and overall perioperative complication rates. Future initiatives should focus on expanding surgical eligibility to the elderly Chinese TAAD patients and optimizing the duration of hospitalization without undermining meaningful clinical outcomes. Trial registration: KY20220425-05, April 5th 25 2022
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The operating room is a unique department that has faced many challenges due to its special conditions during the covid-19 pandemic. These challenges can affect the performance of operating room nurses, so the purpose of this study was to investigate the experiences of operating room nurses in military hospitals during the Covid-19 pandemic.
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Vulval cancers account for 0.25% of new cancer cases and 0.2% of new deaths of all sites worldwide making it an uncommon malignancy according to Global cancer Statistics 2020. Covid 19 for two years made the situation worse. Proper investigations, adjuvant therapy and follow-up for complications was a challenge. The present study is a prospective observational study on treatment outcome of Carcinoma Vulva at a tertiary care hospital during COVID-19 pandemic. Twenty patients of non-metastatic carcinoma vulva were recruited over 22 months of Covid 19 pandemic. Surgery was individualized as wide local excision or radical vulvectomy. Inguinal nodes were addressed as per location of tumour. All cases were followed 2 monthly with virtual/physical meetings till 18 months. Changes in accordance with ongoing COVID 19 pandemic were made in carcinoma vulva diagnostic tests, preoperative work up, intra operatively, post-op complication management and follow-up. The mean age of the study participants was 59.85 ± 10.32 years. In the sample population analysed, menopause was experienced on average at the age of 49.47 ± 4.29 years. Thirty five percent (7) of patients had positive lymph nodes during surgery. All 3 patients who died had positive lymph nodes. Also, all three had no taken adjuvant treatment advised to them by the tumour board. Phased resumption of complex surgeries and adaptation to better PPEs helps in the staff acclimatization to the new normal of operating under constant threat of COVID. In our study, 85% patients were disease free at 18 months follow-up. This is similar to outcomes of carcinoma vulva cases in non-Covid times. There was no difference amongst re-exploration, morbidity and mortality rates for cancer surgeries in COVID and non-COVID years highlighting the fact that effective implementation of cancer surgery and peri operative care guidelines is crucial for good surgical outcomes. This study sheds light on good prognosis of carcinoma vulva with proper treatment and follow-up. Covid times were managed with virtual meets and talking with local practitioners. Screening programs, rural awareness camps and more studies are needed in this field.
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The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak has been designated a public health emergency of international concern. To prepare for a pandemic, hospitals need a strategy to manage their space, staff, and supplies so that optimum care is provided to patients. In addition, infection prevention measures need to be implemented to reduce in-hospital transmission. In the operating room, these preparations involve multiple stakeholders and can present a significant challenge. Here, we describe the outbreak response measures of the anesthetic department staffing the largest (1,700-bed) academic tertiary level acute care hospital in Singapore (Singapore General Hospital) and a smaller regional hospital (Sengkang General Hospital). These include engineering controls such as identification and preparation of an isolation operating room, administrative measures such as modification of workflow and processes, introduction of personal protective equipment for staff, and formulation of clinical guidelines for anesthetic management. Simulation was valuable in evaluating the feasibility of new operating room set-ups or workflow. We also discuss how the hierarchy of controls can be used as a framework to plan the necessary measures during each phase of a pandemic, and review the evidence for the measures taken. These containment measures are necessary to optimize the quality of care provided to COVID-19 patients and to reduce the risk of viral transmission to other patients or healthcare workers.
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Importance In December 2019, novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV)–infected pneumonia (NCIP) occurred in Wuhan, China. The number of cases has increased rapidly but information on the clinical characteristics of affected patients is limited. Objective To describe the epidemiological and clinical characteristics of NCIP. Design, Setting, and Participants Retrospective, single-center case series of the 138 consecutive hospitalized patients with confirmed NCIP at Zhongnan Hospital of Wuhan University in Wuhan, China, from January 1 to January 28, 2020; final date of follow-up was February 3, 2020. Exposures Documented NCIP. Main Outcomes and Measures Epidemiological, demographic, clinical, laboratory, radiological, and treatment data were collected and analyzed. Outcomes of critically ill patients and noncritically ill patients were compared. Presumed hospital-related transmission was suspected if a cluster of health professionals or hospitalized patients in the same wards became infected and a possible source of infection could be tracked. Results Of 138 hospitalized patients with NCIP, the median age was 56 years (interquartile range, 42-68; range, 22-92 years) and 75 (54.3%) were men. Hospital-associated transmission was suspected as the presumed mechanism of infection for affected health professionals (40 [29%]) and hospitalized patients (17 [12.3%]). Common symptoms included fever (136 [98.6%]), fatigue (96 [69.6%]), and dry cough (82 [59.4%]). Lymphopenia (lymphocyte count, 0.8 × 10⁹/L [interquartile range {IQR}, 0.6-1.1]) occurred in 97 patients (70.3%), prolonged prothrombin time (13.0 seconds [IQR, 12.3-13.7]) in 80 patients (58%), and elevated lactate dehydrogenase (261 U/L [IQR, 182-403]) in 55 patients (39.9%). Chest computed tomographic scans showed bilateral patchy shadows or ground glass opacity in the lungs of all patients. Most patients received antiviral therapy (oseltamivir, 124 [89.9%]), and many received antibacterial therapy (moxifloxacin, 89 [64.4%]; ceftriaxone, 34 [24.6%]; azithromycin, 25 [18.1%]) and glucocorticoid therapy (62 [44.9%]). Thirty-six patients (26.1%) were transferred to the intensive care unit (ICU) because of complications, including acute respiratory distress syndrome (22 [61.1%]), arrhythmia (16 [44.4%]), and shock (11 [30.6%]). The median time from first symptom to dyspnea was 5.0 days, to hospital admission was 7.0 days, and to ARDS was 8.0 days. Patients treated in the ICU (n = 36), compared with patients not treated in the ICU (n = 102), were older (median age, 66 years vs 51 years), were more likely to have underlying comorbidities (26 [72.2%] vs 38 [37.3%]), and were more likely to have dyspnea (23 [63.9%] vs 20 [19.6%]), and anorexia (24 [66.7%] vs 31 [30.4%]). Of the 36 cases in the ICU, 4 (11.1%) received high-flow oxygen therapy, 15 (41.7%) received noninvasive ventilation, and 17 (47.2%) received invasive ventilation (4 were switched to extracorporeal membrane oxygenation). As of February 3, 47 patients (34.1%) were discharged and 6 died (overall mortality, 4.3%), but the remaining patients are still hospitalized. Among those discharged alive (n = 47), the median hospital stay was 10 days (IQR, 7.0-14.0). Conclusions and Relevance In this single-center case series of 138 hospitalized patients with confirmed NCIP in Wuhan, China, presumed hospital-related transmission of 2019-nCoV was suspected in 41% of patients, 26% of patients received ICU care, and mortality was 4.3%.
Article
Currently, the emergence of a novel human coronavirus, temporary named 2019-nCoV, has become a global health concern causing severe respiratory tract infections in humans. Human-to-human transmissions have been described with incubation times between 2-10 days, facilitating its spread via droplets, contaminated hands or surfaces. We therefore reviewed the literature on all available information about the persistence of human and veterinary coronaviruses on inanimate surfaces as well as inactivation strategies with biocidal agents used for chemical disinfection, e.g. in healthcare facilities. The analysis of 22 studies reveals that human coronaviruses such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) coronavirus, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) coronavirus or endemic human coronaviruses (HCoV) can persist on inanimate surfaces like metal, glass or plastic for up to 9 days, but can be efficiently inactivated by surface disinfection procedures with 62-71% ethanol, 0.5% hydrogen peroxide or 0.1% sodium hypochlorite within 1 minute. Other biocidal agents such as 0.05-0.2% benzalkonium chloride or 0.02% chlorhexidine digluconate are less effective. As no specific therapies are available for 2019-nCoV, early containment and prevention of further spread will be crucial to stop the ongoing outbreak and to control this novel infectious thread. FREE ACCESS ON JOURNAL HOMEPAGE
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Virulent respiratory infectious diseases may present a life-threatening risk for health care professionals during aerosol-generating procedures, including endotracheal intubation. The 2009 Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) brings this concern to the immediate forefront. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have stated that, when performing or participating in aerosol-generating procedures on patients with virulent contagious respiratory diseases, health care professionals must wear a minimum of the N95 respirator, and they may wish to consider using the powered air purifying respirator (PAPR). For influenza and other diseases transmitted by both respiratory and contact modes, protective respirators must be combined with contact precautions. The PAPR provides 2.5 to 100 times greater protection than the N95, when used within the context of an Occupational Safety and Health Administration-compliant respiratory protection program. The relative protective capability of a respirator is quantified using the assigned protection factor. The level of protection designated by the APF can only be achieved with appropriate training and correct use of the respirator. Face seal leakage limits the protective capability of the N95 respirator, and fit testing does not assure the ability to maintain a tight face seal. The protective capability of the PAPR will be defeated by improper handling of contaminated equipment, incorrect assembly and maintenance, and improper don (put on) and doff (take off) procedures. Stress, discomfort, and physical encumbrance may impair performance. Acclimatization through training will mitigate these effects. Training in the use of PAPRs in advance of their need is strongly advised. "Just in time" training is unlikely to provide adequate preparation for groups of practitioners requiring specialized personal protective equipment during a pandemic. Employee health departments in hospitals may not presently have a PAPR training program in place. Anesthesia and critical care providers would be well advised to take the lead in working with their hospitals' employee health departments to establish a PAPR training program where none exists. User instructions state that the PAPR should not be used during surgery because it generates positive outward airflow, and may increase the risk of wound infection. Clarification of this prohibition and acceptable solutions are currently lacking and need to be addressed. The surgical hood system is not an acceptable alternative. We provide on line a PAPR training workshop. Supporting information is presented here. Anesthesia and critical care providers may use this workshop to supplement, but not substitute for, the manufacturers' detailed use and maintenance instructions.
NAEMT National Survey on EMS preparedness for disaster and mass casualty incident response
  • J Goodwin
Goodwin J. NAEMT National Survey on EMS preparedness for disaster and mass casualty incident response. 2017. http://www.naemt.org/docs/defaultsource/ems-agencies/EMSPreparedness/2017-naemt-ems-preparednessreport.pdf?sfvrsn=0..
Preparing for a COVID-19 pandemic: a review of operating room outbreak response measures in a large tertiary hospital in Singapore
  • J Wong
  • Q Y Goh
  • Z Tan
  • S A Lie
  • Y C Tay
  • S Y Ng
  • C R Soh
Wong J, Goh QY, Tan Z, Lie SA, Tay YC, Ng SY, Soh CR. Preparing for a COVID-19 pandemic: a review of operating room outbreak response measures in a large tertiary hospital in Singapore. Can J Anaesth. 2020; [Epub ahead of print].
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