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The Significance of Objectifying Acts in Husserl’s Fifth Investigation

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Abstract

This chapter details Husserl’s reconstruction of the concept of presentation ( Vorstellung ) and his transformation of Brentano’s thesis that all acts are either presentations or founded on presentations into the thesis that all acts are either objectifying or based on objectifications. The study reveals that, for Husserl, the intentionality-characteristic of any particular experience depends upon objectivating acts. Since all other kinds of experiences beyond the objectifications in perception (of things) and judgments (of states of affairs pertaining to things) depend on these underlying objectifications, the intentionality of these other kinds of experience—their directedness to an object—can be properly understood only in the light of the notion of objectifying acts. Carefully noted, however, is the fact that although non-objectifying acts are grounded in objectifications, they cannot be reduced to the objectifying acts.

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... 12 See Brough's (2008) excellent exposition of this theme in connection with the "bag"-metaphor. 13 For an overall analysis of these (often neglected) three chapters, see Mayer and Erhard (2019). ...
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