![South Korean Sentiment Regarding the U.S. Source: Jin Wung Kim, "The Nature of South Korean Perceptions of the United States of the 1980s," Yoksa Kyoyuk Ronjip [History Education Review], 45-10 (2017), pp. 357-381 (in Korean); Richard Wike, "America's Global Image," (28 June 2017), at <http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/28/americasglobal-image/>](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hwee-Rhak-Park/publication/338084934/figure/fig1/AS:1028059046096906@1622119785824/South-Korean-Sentiment-Regarding-the-US-Source-Jin-Wung-Kim-The-Nature-of-South_Q320.jpg)
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The South Korea–US Alliance under the North
Korean Nuclear Threat: A Reluctant Return to the
“Autonomy–Security Trade-Off”
Hwee-rhak Park
This paper aims to examine the US–South Korea alliance from the per-
spective of the “Autonomy–Security Trade-off”(AST) model, which was
introduced by Michael F. Altfeld in the 1980s. This model could be a
useful tool to ascertain the minimum conditions for the implementation
of the US nuclear umbrella, which is a life-and-death issue for South
Korea (ROK) given the serious North Korean nuclear threat. For this
purpose, this paper introduces the key concept of the model and applies
it to the ROK-US alliance, analyzing the controversy over the deploy-
ment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) to
South Korea as a case study. The analysis found that South Korea
started its alliance with the United States based on the AST model. How-
ever, South Korea became reluctant in yielding its autonomy to the
United States in the 1990s, and initiated “balanced diplomacy”between
the United States and China and the reclaiming of the Operational Con-
trol Authority (OPCON) from the commander of the ROK-US Combined
ForcesCommand(CFC),aUSGeneral,inthe2000s.Itdelayedthe
deployment of the US THAAD for 3 years only because China opposed
the deployment even after North Korea had succeeded to develop its
nuclear weapons. However, South Korea had to return to the original
AST model, albeit reluctantly, because of the emergence of a more seri-
ous North Korean nuclear threat, including hydrogen bombs. It did not
try, with any great effort, to improve its relationship with China, and
reduced the scope of OPCON by appointing a South Korean General as
the Command of the CFC, allowing the deployment of the THAAD. Now
that North Korea has the potential capabilities to strike the US main-
land, South Korea cannot afford to be reluctant in yielding its autonomy
to the United States. In this context, South Korea should not pursue its
balanced diplomacy between the United States and China any longer. To
the contrary, it should participate in the United States’Indo-Pacific
strategy. It may also need to stop its pursuit of appointing its general as
the Commander of the CFC until North Korea gives up its nuclear
weapons. It should also become more willing to increase its cost-sharing
with the United States. In conclusion, South Korea should try to accept
Pacific Focus, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3 (December 2019), 447–472.
doi: 10.1111/pafo.12150
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
447
the recommendations from the AST model as long as its needs the US
nuclear umbrella and wants to protect its people from the North Korean
nuclear threat.
Introduction
The Republic of Korea (ROK, usually referred to as South Korea) has faced a
serious North Korean nuclear threat since, at least, the third North Korean
nuclear test on 12 February 2013. North Korea claimed that it had succeeded in
making a nuclear bomb, and the ROK government assessed the explosion power
of the test as 6–7 kilotons of TNT. North Korea continued its nuclear tests until
a hydrogen bomb was exploded with 108–250 kilotons of TNT on 3 September
2017.
1
The ROK Unification Minister reported to the South Korean National
Assembly that North Korea had 20–60 nuclear weapons on 1 October 2018.
North Korea continued production of its nuclear weapons regardless of denucle-
arization talks with the United States (US) during 2018–2019, and is thought to
have increased its number of nuclear weapons.
South Korea and North Korea are in an armistice of the Korean War, which
began when North Korea started to unify South Korea by force in 1950. It is nat-
ural for South Korean people to worry that North Korea could threaten them or
resume another military attack with nuclear weapons to end the Korean War to
its advantage. North Korea could blackmail South Korea to follow its policy
direction, accept its reunification plan, or surrender by threatening or actually
using its nuclear weapons. South Korea has to make its own nuclear weapons to
deter these North Korean blackmail possibilities, but it is not easy to overcome
the restraints of the international non-proliferation regime. In this sense, South
Korea does not have any better option than to depend on the US nuclear
umbrella, which is the promise of the United States to retaliate against North
Korean nuclear attacks on South Korea should they occur. Therefore, South
Korea should be more loyal to its alliance with the United States than before to
ensure the execution of the nuclear umbrella.
However, South Korea has not been as loyal as required to this alliance with
the United States, despite North Korea developing nuclear weapons. On the con-
trary, South Korea has tried to improve its relationship with China as “a balancer
in Northeast Asia”since the beginning of the 2000s. South Korea signed a “stra-
tegic partnership relation”with China in 2008, and President Park Geun-hye par-
ticipated in a Chinese military parade in commemoration of the victory in the
Pacific War as the only national leader from the US allies in 2015. It has not
1. Michael J. Zagurek, Jr, “A Hypothetical Nuclear Attack on Seoul and Tokyo: The Human Cost
of War on the Korean Peninsula,”38th North (October 4, 2017), at <https://www.38north.org/
2017/10/mzagurek100417/>.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
448 / Pacific Focus
stopped its plan to reclaim the Operational Control Authority (OPCON) over its
forces from the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC), which is commanded
by the US General, despite North Korea’s success in developing nuclear bombs. It
delayed the deployment of the United States’Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
system (THAAD) for about three years, due mainly to Chinese strong opposition to
the deployment. South Korea has not been fully cooperative with the US demand to
share the cost of the United States Forces in Korea (USFK).
South Korea seems to behave as if it does not need the US nuclear umbrella.
Instead of asking the United States to ensure its promise of the extended deter-
rence, South Korea tried to eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat through
dialogue with North Korea. The current South Korean president, Moon Jae-in,
has held three summit meetings with his North Korean counterpart, the Chairman
of the Workers’Party of Korea, Kim Jong-un, since April 2018. He also inter-
mediated the United States-North Korea Singapore Summit meeting between the
US president, Donald J. Trump, and Chairman Kim Jong-un and was held on
12 June 2018. President Moon managed to acquire a promise of “complete denu-
clearization”from Chairman Kim through these meetings. However, North Korea
has not taken any concrete measures for actual denuclearization yet and the sec-
ond US–North Korea summit, which was held in Hanoi, Vietnam, from 27–28
February 2019, broke down in the middle of the proceedings. Most expectations
regarding North Korean denuclearization have disappeared since the collapse of
the Hanoi Summit. South Korea cannot reduce its dependency on its alliance
with the United States, including the nuclear umbrella, if it wants to protect its
people from North Korean nuclear blackmail or an attack.
In a sense, the South Korean Moon Administration has changed its policy into
strengthening its alliance with the United States. It stopped its effort to improve its
relationship with China recently. It consulted closely with the United States on its
North Korea policies, and gave up several projects between the two Koreas after
receiving a negative US response, such as the reopening of Gaesung Industrial
Complex and tourism to Mt. Kumgang in North Korea. It increased cost sharing
for the USFK by 8.2 percent –the highest increase rate since 2004. The South
Korean people and their government seem to understand instinctively that it needs
to comply with US policies as long as it wants to ensure US security assistance
against extreme crisis, such as a nuclear threat or an attack by North Korea.
This inevitable change of the South Korean government’s alliance policy was
already explained in a theory –the “Autonomy–Security Trade-Off”(AST)
model introduced by Michael F. Altfeld in the 1980s. This theory explains the
nature of the asymmetrical alliance between a small nation and a big-power
nation by arguing that a small nation should give up its autonomy to its big-
power ally in order to gain security assistance from this ally.
2
According to this
2. Michael F. Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test,”The Western Political Quar-
terly, 37-4 (December 1984), p. 528.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
The South Korea–the US Alliance under the North Korean Nuclear Threat / 449
theory, the South Korean government should comply with US policy lines and
accept the United States’request as long as it needs US security assistance,
including the nuclear umbrella. Actually, in a way, the current South Korean
government started to follow the findings of the theory, with or without knowing
the theory itself. In turn, I have chosen to explain the US–South Korea alliance
through this AST model under current North Korean nuclear threat, examining
whether the current South Korean government manages its alliance with the
United States in a relevant way. I will suggest several policy implications for
South Korea in its alliance with the United States as a result.
South Korean scholars did not pay much attention to the AST model because
this model emphasizes South Korean reliance on the United States. Instead, they
have focused on the theories that encourage South Korean autonomy in its alli-
ance with the United States, such as preventing entrapment by the United States.
3
They have recommended “balanced diplomacy”between the United States and
China as a South Korean survival strategy even after the North Korean success
of nuclear weapons development.
4
Only a few papers on AST theory were publi-
cized in Korea.
5
However, the South Korean government should not worry about
entrapment in US affairs but instead a possible US abandonment as South Korea
cannot deter a potential North Korean nuclear attack without the US nuclear
umbrella. Especially, the current Moon Jae-in Administration, which is consid-
ered to be a leftist government and have a stronger anti-US sentiment, should be
aware of this AST model if it wants to protect its people from the North Korean
nuclear threat.
In this regard, this paper will use the AST model and find several policy rec-
ommendations for the South Korean government regarding its alliance with the
United States under this serious North Korean nuclear threat. For this purpose, I
will firstly revisit the AST model and analyze the ROK-US alliance through this
model. Then, I will use the deployment of the United States’THAAD to South
Korea as a case study on the AST model.
3. For example, Han Byeol Sohn, “The U.S.-ROK Alliance in the U.S.-China Conflicts,”Sin-A-
Se-A [New Asia], 20-2 (2013), pp. 117–147 (in Korean); Jung Chul Lee, “DPRK-U.S. Confronta-
tion and U.S.-ROK Alliance in Transition,”Han-guk-jeong-chi Yeon-gu [South Korean Politics
Studies], 18-1 (2009), pp. 147–168 (in Korean).
4. For example, Heung-Kyu Kim, “Xi Jinping’s Visit to Seoul in 2014 and ROK-PRC Relations,”
Jeon-rhak Yeon-gu [Journal of Strategic Studies], 64 (2014), pp. 63–89 (in Korean); Jeong-Kyung
Seo, “Where does ROK-CHINA Relations Stand?: Xi’s visit to Korea,”Jung-guk-hak Yeon-gu
[Journal of China Studies], 70 (2014), pp. 259–279 (in Korean).
5. Yong-Sup Han and Sang Hyuk Jeong, “Political, Economical, Military Analysis of the Wartime
Operational Control Authority Transfer Issue: Theory, Evaluation, Countermeasures,”Guk-je-
gwan-gye Yeon-gu [Journal of International Politics], 20-1 (2015), pp. 5–36 (in Korean); Hwee-
rhak Park, “An Impact of the Controversies Over the THAAD to the South Korea-U.S. Alliance
and the South Korea-China Relation: Application of ‘Autonomy-Security Trade Model,’” Guk-je-
gwan-gye Yeon-gu [Journal of International Politics], 21-1 (2016), pp. 33–63 (in Korean).
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
450 / Pacific Focus
Autonomy–Security Trade-off in the US–ROK Alliance
Revisiting Autonomy–Security Trade-off Theory
Creating and maintaining an alliance can be an efficient way to win a war or
generate a favorable position in a balance of power by borrowing the power of
others.
6
In particular, an alliance with a nuclear power, which Stephen M. Walt
categorized as “bandwagoning,”
7
became the only option for survival of small
nations in the Cold War. This was due to a serious ideological and nuclear
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, which almost
monopolized strategic nuclear weapons. Small nations that were threatened by
nuclear-armed enemies had to achieve a balance between the risks of “abandon-
ment”and “entrapment”by the United States or the Soviet Union, which Glenn
Snyder described as the “Security Dilemma.”
8
Small nations threatened by nuclear-armed enemies had to worry more about
the possibility of abandonment than entrapment by their nuclear superpower ally
during the Cold War. They did not have any feasible option to protect their peo-
ple from the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) of other nuclear-power
nations. They asked for nuclear protection from their superpower ally, and the
superpower promised massive nuclear retaliation for its small allies under the
name of a “nuclear umbrella.”In this sense, scholars evaluated that “[the U.S.]
allies’security rested on the threat of nuclear retaliation by the United States as
punishment for an attack on one of its allies.”
9
Although the Cold War ended
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States and its allies contin-
ued their alliances and the nuclear umbrella concept because of the possibility of
another nuclear confrontation in the uncertain future. As long as Russia and
China kept improving their nuclear weapons, these US allies had to constantly
worry about the United States abandoning their alliances.
As explained in the introduction, the AST model could provide desirable pol-
icy directions that small US allies should take in order not to be abandoned by
the United States. The model, which was introduced by Michael F. Altfeld in
1984 and refined by James D. Morrow in 1991, recommends that small allies
“purchase more alliance support”by “giving up some autonomy.”
10
Morrow
proved the effectiveness of the model by using 164 military alliance cases
between 1815 and 1965. He concluded that a stronger alliance partner gained
6. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Brief Edition
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), pp. 197–202.
7. Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,”International Secu-
rity, 9-4 (Spring 1985), pp. 7–8.
8. Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,”World Politics, 36-4 (December
1984), pp. 471–475.
9. Stephan Frühling, “Managing Escalation: Missile Defense, Strategy and U.S. Alliances,”The
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 92-1 (2016), p. 83.
10. Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test,”p. 528.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
The South Korea–the US Alliance under the North Korean Nuclear Threat / 451
autonomy from its weaker partners and provided security assistance to the wea-
ker partners. For small nations, an “alliance requires a critical choice between
conflicting goals of security and autonomy. The pursuit of one exacts sacrifices
on the other.”
11
This trade-off is demonstrated in Figure 1.
As shown in Figure 1, if a small nation increases its autonomy, in other words,
becomes unwilling to yield its autonomy to a big power, the security assistance
from the big power will diminish (Point A). If a smaller nation decreases its
autonomy or becomes willing to give up its autonomy to a big power, it will
receive stronger military assistance from the big-power ally (Point C). A more
balanced policy position for the small nation, which has to choose between
autonomy and security assistance, is shown at Point B. The alliance could
become weak if the small nation thinks that it can defend itself on its own or tries
to increase its autonomy. However, if a small nation faces a very serious threat,
such as a nuclear one, and cannot afford to strengthen its own military forces
against the threat, it has to give up more autonomy to the big-power ally in order
to acquire more military assistance.
This AST model could apply to alliances such as NATO, the Japan–US alli-
ance, and the US–ROK alliance, which were designed to ensure the United
States provides security assistance to the alliance partners. The allies of the
United States have actually been yielding some of their autonomy to the United
States in return for security assistance since the formulation of the alliance. This
trade-off becomes clearer as their common threat strengthens. For example, the
European NATO countries have been providing land, forces, and money for the
combined NATO command, which was led by a US four-star General, in return
for the US security promise, including the deployment of nuclear weapons to
Figure 1. Autonomy–Security Trade-off. Source: Morrow, “An Alternative to the
Capabilities Model of Alliances,”p. 914 [Color figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
11. James D. Morrow, “An Alternative to the Capabilities Aggregation Model of Alliances,”
American Journal of Political Science, 35-4 (1991), p. 930.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
452 / Pacific Focus
them. Japan and South Korea have been providing similar elements in return for
the US promise of security assistance, including the nuclear umbrella in case of a
crisis or a war. As long as the United States monopolizes massive nuclear power
to counter Russian and/or Chinese nuclear weapons, this kind of trade-off
between the United States and its allies will be maintained.
In particular, South Korea has yielded more autonomy than the US European
allies or Japan in its alliance to the United States. Because, it was invaded by
North Korea in 1950, has been in an armistice situation since 1953, and has met
continuous military threats from North Korea. It delegated the command author-
ity over its whole military forces to the US General, Douglas MacArthur, who
was the commander of the United Nations Command during the Korean War. It
still allows the ROK-US CFC Commander, the US General, to exercise the
OPCON authority over its forces if another war breaks out. It even sent tens of
thousands of active forces to Vietnam just because the United States requested
the deployment during the 1965–1973 period, in addition to providing land, legal
protection, and money for the USFK. Such South Korean autonomy yielding has
contributed to the endurance of the ROK-US alliance for about 70 years.
The Traditional ROK-US Alliance and the AST Model
The ROK-US alliance has been one of the most enduring asymmetrical secu-
rity alliances.
12
The United States is bigger than South Korea by 6.4 times in
terms of population, 99 times in terms of territory, 9.6 times in terms of
economy,
13
and 15 times in terms of defense expenditure.
14
South Korea decided
to depend on US security support to achieve economic development under the
constant North Korean threat and potential regional threats. The ROK-US alli-
ance could be seen as a typical case explained well by the AST model.
North Korea did not give up and continuously pursued its ambition to unify
South Korea even after its failure in the Korean War in 1950. It was difficult for
South Korea to defend itself alone because North Korea was supported by China
and Russia, which were very close to the Korean Peninsula; in turn, South Korea
has had to maintain an alliance with the United States to defend itself from North
Korea and al with the North Korean allies during the Cold War. South Korea
managed to improve its relationship with China and Russia after the end of the
Cold War, especially in diplomacy and economy, but they did not give up their
expansionism and supports for North Korea. Now that North Korea has tens of
12. Gi-wook Shin, Hilary Izatt, and Rennie J. Moon, “Asymmetry of Power and Attention in Alli-
ance Politics: The U.S.-Republic of Korea Case,”AUSTRALIAN Journal of International Affairs,
70-3 (2016), p. 236.
13. Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Fact book,”Last modified September 23, 2019, at
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>.
14. SIPRI, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,”2019, at <https://www.sipri.org/databases/
milex>.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
The South Korea–the US Alliance under the North Korean Nuclear Threat / 453
nuclear weapons, including hydrogen bombs, South Korea’s alliance with the
United States, which promises extended deterrence including the nuclear
umbrella, became its only reliable national security option. South Korea should
do everything necessary to strengthen its alliance with the United States as long
as it intends to protect its people from the North Korean nuclear threat.
The fundamental condition for South Korea in strengthening its alliance with
the United States is to yield its autonomy to the United States, according to the
AST model. The United States would provide its security assistance in exchange
for its benefits as a result of South Korean autonomy yielding. Yielding its auton-
omy to the United States could not be a sufficient condition, but a necessary one
for South Korea, to ensure the US nuclear umbrella. The more South Korea
needs the real implementation of the nuclear umbrella in the case of a crisis, the
more willingly South Korea should yield its autonomy to the Unites States,
according to the AST model. Now that North Korea possesses tens of nuclear
weapons, South Korea cannot risk any decrease in the probability of the United
States’execution of its nuclear umbrella promise.
For security assistance, the United States has maintained more than 28,500
troops in South Korea and tried to “raise the confidence of South Korea in
U.S. guarantees by merely functioning as trip-wires, ensuring that American
blood would flow in any major attack.”
15
It promises “extended deterrence for
the ROK using the full range of military capabilities, including the U.S. nuclear
umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities”at every annual
Defense Ministerial meeting.
16
It has run the CFC using both US and South
Korean forces for unified military operations in case of crisis or war on the
Korean Peninsula. The commander of the CFC, the US General, has responsibil-
ity for the deterrence of, and victory in a future war on the Korean Peninsula.
The United States sometimes deployed its strategic military assets to demon-
strate its will and strength for the defense of South Korea.
South Korea, in return, has traditionally provided significant support for the
US Armed Forces and national interest of the United States. It has provided
necessary land for US military bases, placing most of its forces under the com-
mander of the CFC in wartime and paying almost US $1 billion annually to
cover the expenses of the USFK. South Korea even deployed huge numbers of
military forces (the largest was 50,000) to South Vietnam, in which it did not
have any national interest, but only because the United States, its ally, asked
for the deployment. South Korea has been very loyal to its alliance with the
United States for a long time and has willingly given up its autonomy if and
when the United States asked it to.
15. Stephan Frühling, “Managing Escalation: Missile Defense, Strategy and U.S. Alliances,”p. 86.
16. DoD, “Joint Communiqué of the 49th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting,”(October
28, 2017), at <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/20171028-Joint-Communique-
OSD-MND-October-17-Final-version.pdf>.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
454 / Pacific Focus
The Recent South Korean Deviation from the Alliance
South Korea started to be reluctant in yielding its autonomy to the United
States from the late 1990s. The activists for South Korean democracy were
armed with a nationalist outlook in their struggle against the then authoritarian
government of South Korea, and sought to establish a more autonomous and
equal relationship with the United States.
17
The South Korean leftist govern-
ments tried to realize the outlook on the ROK-US alliance. For example, the
Kim Dae-jung Administration, which started in 1998, tried to achieve a rapid
and incautious rapprochement with North Korea without fully consulting the
United Staes. The successor, the Roh Mu-hyun Administration, which began in
2003, continued the reconciliatory policy toward North Korea even when the
United States proclaimed North Korea an “Axis of Evil.”
18
These two adminis-
trations tried hard to reduce South Korean security dependency on the United
States. Furthermore, they tried to improve South Korean relations with China as
a potential substitute for the United States by hoping to be “a balancer in North-
east Asia,”
19
which was officially announced by the Roh Administration. The
administration did not provide any explanation on the specific meaning of the
balancer and was attacked for its inappropriate use of the word by many South
Korean scholars; however, its intention appeared to be the improvement of its
relations with China and to reduce its dependency on the United States. The
ROK-US alliance was assessed “to have been plagued by a low degree of politi-
cal and cultural interoperability during the period from 1998–2006.”
20
The reconciliatory policy toward North Korea, and the self-reliance-centered
approach to the United States by the two administrations, were somewhat adjusted
by the following Lee Myung-bak Administration, which started in 2008. The admin-
istration tried to recover the damaged ROK-US relationship, reflecting South Korean
conservative concerns about the weakening of the alliance.
21
However, the trend of
improving the relationship with China continued. The Lee Administration signed a
“Strategic Cooperative Partnership”agreement with China in 2008.
The subsequent Park Geun-hye Administration, which began in 2013, even
reinforced the pro-China policy despite the successful third North Korean nuclear
test. She participated in the Chinese commemoration of the victory in the Pacific
War, even though she knew that the United States did not like her attendance.
17. Dong Sun Lee, “Democratization and the U.S.-South Korean Alliance,”Journal of East Asian
Studies, 7 (2007), p. 488.
18. Shin, et al., “Asymmetry of Power and Attention in Alliance Politics: the U.S.-Republic of
Korea Case,”p. 240.
19. Chosun Ilbo, Chosun Newspaper (23 March 2005), p. A1.
20. Jiyun Kih and Jaechun Kim, “The Capabilities-based Analysis of Alliance Transformation in
the Asia-Pacific: Focusing on the U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Philippines Alliances,”The Korean Journal
of International Studies, 14-3 (2016), p. 383.
21. Shin, et al., “Asymmetry of Power and Attention in Alliance Politics: the U.S.-Republic of
Korea Case,”pp. 241–250.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
The South Korea–the US Alliance under the North Korean Nuclear Threat / 455
The South Korean reluctance in yielding its autonomy to the United States has
continued under the circumstance of North Korea’s continuous efforts to improve
its nuclear arsenal and missile capabilities and to deliver these nuclear weapons,
as demonstrated South Korea’s reluctance in the deployment of a US THAAD
battery to South Korea during 2014–2017 period.
The current South Korean president, Moon Jae-in, who was inaugurated in
May 2017, inherited most of the policy lines of the Roh Administration, in which
he served as the Chief of Staff for the president. He became the president thanks
to strong support from President Roh’s supporters. However, he visited the
United States just 1 month after his inauguration and agreed “to fully implement
existing sanctions and impose new measures designed to apply maximum pres-
sure on the DPRK [Democratic Peoples’Republic of Korea, North Korea]”and
even “to enhance United States–ROK–Japan trilateral cooperation.”
22
He even
decided to accept the deployment of THAAD.
However, the Moon Administration did not endeavor to strengthen the
ROK-US alliance beyond its verbal promises or rhetoric. It did not stop or delay
the OPCON reclaiming process and did not take any necessary measures to help
the rapid and effective operation of THAAD after the deployment. The adminis-
tration expressed its unwillingness regarding the cost sharing for the USFK by
agreeing to an 8.2 percent increase at the last minute. It tried to ease US pressure
on North Korea contrary to the United States’policy. The Moon Administration
seemed to maintain the minimum cooperative relationship with the United States
and caused doubt as to the real strength of the ROK-US alliance.
Discussion
The ROK-US alliance started in a highly imbalanced manner. South Korea
depended fully on US security assistance during and after the Korean War. South
Korea demanded the alliance relationship because it could not protect its people from
the communists’ambition by itself. South Korea was very poor and did not have
reliable military forces just after its independence from the Japanese colonial rule in
1945. South Korea tried to get as much assistance as possible from the United States
and was determined to accept the demands of the United States in return. The
ROK-US alliance was a typical example of the AST model. However, South Korea
started to become reluctant in yielding its autonomy to the United States as its econ-
omy and national identity grew in the 1990s and reached a level where it considered
becoming a balancer between the United States and China in the 2000s.
Although some South Koreans believe they can have a good relationship with
both China and the United States, the reality of the situation seems different.
22. The White House, “Joint Statement between the United States and the Republic of Korea,”
(30 June 2017), at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-united-states-
republic-korea/>.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
456 / Pacific Focus
South Korea cannot have a strong alliance with the United States while strength-
ening its “strategic partnership”with China, which has become a more aggres-
sive competitor of the United States. The United States considers China its
primary competitor, and holds that “China seeks to displace the United States in
the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model
and reorder the region in its favor.”
23
South Korea considered itself to be torn
between maintaining its alliance with Washington and improving its economic
and political ties with Beijing.
24
However, the AST theory implies that South
Korea should take the US side if a serious threat emerges like the nuclear armed
North Korea, which has been a staunch Chinese ally.
If the common threat between South Korea and the United States grows too big
for the United States to handle without risking its own national security, the United
States may not implement its extended deterrence promise, including the nuclear
umbrella, regardless of South Korean autonomy yielding. For example, if North
Korea can strike a few US cities with nuclear missiles, the United States has to be
hesitant in executing its nuclear umbrella promise for South Korea. The United
States should worry for the safety of its people more than the security of South
Korea. This is the reason why some South Korean politicians and strategists have
demanded the development of their own nuclear weapons. However, the uncer-
tainty regarding the US nuclear umbrella does not mean that South Korea should
take its alliance with the United States lightly. South Korea should take all possible
measures to ensure the implementation of the United States’promises because the
US nuclear umbrella has turned out to be the most effective deterrence measure
against the North Korean nuclear threat and the expansionism of Russia and China.
The North Korean Nuclear Challenge to the US–ROK Alliance
North Korean Nuclear Capabilities
North Korea has conducted six nuclear explosion tests since its first one on
9 October 2006. It declared that it had developed a hydrogen bomb after its sixth
nuclear test on 3 September 2017. The “38 North,”a US-based North Korean
nuclear activity watchdog, evaluated the explosion power to be from 108–250
kilotons of TNT power. It assessed that North Korea had developed 20–25
nuclear weapons just after the test.
25
The South Korean Unification Minister
23. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington,
D.C., December 2017), p. 25.
24. Hyon Joo Yoo, “The China Factor in the U.S.-South Korea Alliance: The Perceived Useful-
ness of China in the Korean Peninsula,”Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68-1
(2014), p. 100.
25. Zagurek, “A Hypothetical Nuclear Attack on Seoul and Tokyo: The Human Cost of War on
the Korean Peninsula.”
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
The South Korea–the US Alliance under the North Korean Nuclear Threat / 457
reported that North Korea might have 20–60 nuclear weapons on 1 October
2018.
26
North Korea could have added more nuclear weapons to its arsenal
because it has continued the enrichment of its abundant uranium resources,
regardless of the denuclearization negotiation; as US expert on the North Korean
nuclear program David Albright once predicted, North Korea could make about
100 nuclear weapons by 2020.
27
North Korea has been trying to gain the capability to strike the United States
with its ballistic missiles. It test-fired the “Hwasung-12”ballistic missile on
14 May 2017, and “Hwasung-14”on 4 and 28 July 2017, using a lofted trajec-
tory. It fired “Hwasung-15”using the same type of trajectory to a distance of
4,475 km and height of 950 km on 29 November 2017, and declared the “com-
pletion of national nuclear power.”The South Korean Ministry of National
Defense assessed that North Korea could strike mainland United States with a
range of 13,000 if the missile used the minimum energy trajectory instead of the
lofted type.
28
A US expert also stated that “the Hwasong-15 can deliver a
1,000-kg payload to any point on the U.S. mainland.”He further evaluated that
the “the missile has been designed to carry simple decoys, or other countermea-
sures, to confuse the U.S. missile defense system.”
29
North Korea has been trying to develop a submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM), too. It test-fired a SLBM and succeeded in delivering the missile to
500 km on 24 August 2016. It recently released a photo of a submarine under
construction on 23 July 2019. The South Korean government assessed that the
weight of it could be 3,000 ton, and it could carry three SLBMs. If North Korea
eventually succeeds in arming genuine SLBMs, it could approach and strike
South Korea, Japan, and even the United States unexpectedly. The US ballistic
missile defense (BMD) systems can intercept the inter-continental ballistic mis-
sile (ICBM) but not the SLBM. The North Korean development of the SLBM
will be a significant game changer in the defense and offense game between the
United States and North Korea.
Recent Negotiations on Denuclearization
The current South Korean president, Moon, has been trying hard to denuclear-
ize North Korean nuclear weapons through dialogues since his inauguration in
May 2017. He held the first summit meeting with North Korean Chairman Kim
26. Associated Press News (2 October 2018).
27. David Albright, “North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities: A Fresh Look,”Institute for Science and
International Security Report, (April 28, 2017), pp. 1–3, at <http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/
north-koreas-nuclear-capabilities-a-fresh-look/10>.
28. Segye Ilbo Segye Newspaper (2 December 2017), p. 04.
29. Michael Elleman, “The New Hwasong-15 ICBM: A Significant Improvement That May be
Ready as Early as 2018,”38 North (30 November 2017), at <https://www.38north.org/2017/11/
melleman113017/>.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
458 / Pacific Focus
in Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone on 27 April 2017, and received the
promise of “complete denuclearization”from the Chairman. He brokered the first
US–North Korea summit in Singapore on 12 June 2018, to discuss the denuclear-
ization. He even visited Pyongyang, the North Korean capital city, and con-
ducted another South–North summit meeting on 18–20 September 2018, and
reaffirmed the “complete denuclearization”agreement while demonstrating a
close personal relationship with the Chairman.
However, North Korea did not take any practical measures to dismantle its
nuclear weapons and insisted that the “denuclearization”agreement that it made
with South Korea and the United States was not on the dismantlement of its
nuclear weapons, but on the withdrawal of the US nuclear umbrella and the US
Armed Forces from the Korean Peninsula. The high expectation for a denuclear-
ized North Korea started to become disappointing, and doubts about the effec-
tiveness of dialogues and negotiations were raised among South Korean people
and US experts on North Korean issues. North Korea was believed to have pro-
duced more nuclear weapons and missiles in spite of the dialogues.
30
The negotiation for the denuclearization almost collapsed at the second US–
NorthKoreasummitmeetinginHanoion27–28 February 2019. The US president
Donald J. Trump walked away from the negotiation table after hearing North
Korea’s proposal, which demanded the lifting of most economic sanctions on North
Korea in exchange for the dismantlement of only its Yongbyon nuclear facilities,
which had become almost obsolete.
31
He exposed his intelligence on North Korean
secret uranium enrichment facilities and demanded the total dismantlement of
chemical and biological weapons in addition to nuclear weapons to Chairman Kim
before leaving the negotiation table.
32
The South Korean president’shardwork
toward the denuclearization of North Korea through negotiations was forced to stop
after only a year’s attempts, and ended up achieving no meaningful results. The
negotiation seems to have provided North Korea with the opportunity to produce
more nuclear weapons and improve its missile technologies.
Challenge to the United States
The United States has been promising to provide extended deterrence, includ-
ing the nuclear umbrella, to South Korea as the responsibility of a big-power
nation in an asymmetrical alliance. The promise of extended deterrence has been
reaffirmed in every joint communiqué of the annual Security Consultation Meet-
ing (SCM) between the US Defense Secretary and the South Korean Defense
Minister. The United States developed a tailored deterrence strategy to implement
its extended deterrence promise for South Korea, and introduced the “Four Ds”
30. Chosun Ilbo Chosun Newspaper (12 March 2019), p. A1.
31. Chosun Ilbo Chosun Newspaper (1 March 2019), p. A1.
32. Chosun Ilbo Chosun Newspaper (5 March 2019), p. A6.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
The South Korea–the US Alliance under the North Korean Nuclear Threat / 459
(Detect, Disrupt, Destroy, and Defend) to realize the strategy.
33
The promise and
readiness of the United States extended deterrence appear to be solid and strong.
However, the decision to execute the promised extended deterrence measures,
including the nuclear umbrella, in a real situation will not be easy. The United
States should consider possible retaliation by North Korea against the US civilian
population
34
when it has to implement its promise of the nuclear umbrella for
South Korea. The stakes could be very high if North Korea threatens to attack a
US territory or cities on the US mainland with nuclear missiles. The United
States could be dragged into a nuclear war against North Korea, and possibly
against China and even Russia. The risk of entrapment in a nuclear war would
become catastrophic from the US perspective. As North Korean nuclear capabili-
ties strengthen, the United States’hesitation regarding extended deterrence, espe-
cially the nuclear umbrella, could increase. If North Korea develops a genuine
ICBM and/or SLBM to deliver nuclear weapons to the US mainland, the United
States could not implement its nuclear umbrella promise for South Korea unless
it is ready to accept the risk of a nuclear attack on its major cities by North
Korea. Although nobody knows whether the United States would implement the
nuclear umbrella promise until the real situation occurs, South Korean reluctance
regarding yielding autonomy to the United States would be a significant factor or
an excuse for the United States not to keep its promise.
Actually, the United States has demonstrated its cautionary attitude toward its
nuclear umbrella promise since North Korea succeeded in development of a
nuclear weapon. The United States changed “the extended deterrence offered by
the U.S. nuclear umbrella”of 2008 to “extended deterrence for the ROK, using
the full range of military capabilities, to include the U.S. nuclear umbrella, con-
ventional strike, and missile defense capabilities”at the 2009 SCM.
35
The
change could be understood as the United States’intention to mitigate the risk of
its nuclear umbrella promise by emphasizing military capabilities other than
nuclear umbrella. The United States also weakened its commitment to the nuclear
umbrella by taking out the word “umbrella”from the joint communiqué state-
ment, as North Korea developed the potential ICBM capabilities in 2017. The
revision just stated that “[the] extended deterrence to the ROK using the full
range of military capabilities, including U.S. nuclear, conventional, and missile
defense capabilities”in the 2018 SCM joint communiqué.
36
The United States
33. Ministry of National Defense, 2016 Defense White Paper (Seoul: MND, 2016), p. 69.
34. Frühling, “Managing Escalation: Missile Defense, Strategy and U.S. Alliances,”pp. 81–95.
35. Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the USA, “Bilateral Relations,”(30 October 2019), at
<http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/us-en/brd/m_4511/view.do?seq=684519&srchFr=&%3BsrchTo=&
amp%3BsrchWord=&%3BsrchTp=&%3Bmulti_itm_seq=0&%3Bitm_seq_1=0&
%3Bitm_seq_2=0&%3Bcompany_cd=&%3Bcompany_nm=&page=53>.
36. USFK, “Joint communique of 50th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting,”(31 October
2018), at <https://www.usfk.mil/Media/News/Article/1679753/joint-communique-of-50th-us-rok-
security-consultative-meeting/>.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
460 / Pacific Focus
may have been concerned at the possible North Korean nuclear retaliation for its
execution of the nuclear umbrella promise in order to defend South Korea. At
that time, North Korea conducted a hydrogen bomb test and a long-range missile
test in 2017, and proclaimed that it had achieved its national nuclear power. The
change of terminology may not necessarily mean the weakening of the US com-
mitment to South Korea, but it could be a sign of the United States’intention to
increase its flexibility regarding its nuclear umbrella promise. It seems to be clear
that the risk of entrapment in a nuclear war made the United States more
cautious.
Challenge to South Korea
As mentioned above, the serious North Korean nuclear threat demands South
Korea acquire stronger US security assistance than in the past. South Korea
could reduce its dependency on US conventional forces thanks to its continuous
investments and improvements regarding its conventional preparedness. How-
ever, it cannot deter nuclear-armed North Korea on its own because it does not
have any nuclear weapons to inflict the same or more damage in response to a
North Korean nuclear attack. Therefore, the US nuclear umbrella has become the
only effective and reliable deterrence option for South Korea.
Based on this reality, a few South Korean opinion leaders –including some
influential politicians, such as Won Yoo-chul, a senior figure in the then-ruling
conservative party–have requested the development of their own nuclear
weapons as a way to rectify South Korea’s vulnerability to the North Korean
nuclear threat in the 2016–2017 period. About 60 percent of South Korean peo-
ple supported this idea in polls conducted in 2017.
37
However, South Korea did
not take any steps for the development of its own nuclear weapons out of fear of
expected opposition and sanctions by the United States and the world, which
should take necessary measures to protect the global non-proliferation policy.
When the two Koreas have nuclear weapons, the risk of miscalculation by either
side would increase dangerously. In other words, if any side makes a misjudg-
ment and decides upon a nuclear attack, the whole Korean Peninsula and Korean
race could be totally destroyed by mutual nuclear attacks and retaliations.
South Korea may need its own nuclear weapons to achieve a nuclear balance
on the Korean Peninsula if the North Korean nuclear threat escalates into a dire
situation and the US nuclear umbrella becomes very uncertain; it should take any
necessary measures when its national survival is at serious risk. The United
States and the world may have to condone the desperate efforts of South Korea.
37. Adam Taylor, “Why doesn’t South Korea have Nuclear Weapons? For a Time, it Pursued
Them,”The Washington Post (31 July 2017), at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
worldviews/wp/2017/07/31/why-doesnt-south-korea-have-nuclear-weapons-for-a-time-it-pursued-
them/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d1007b5699dd>.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
The South Korea–the US Alliance under the North Korean Nuclear Threat / 461
The efforts could force China to be more cooperative in North Korean denuclear-
ization because the nuclear weapon development of South Korea would lead that
of Japan. However, it would be too risky for South Korea to announce its own
nuclear weapons development without a full advance consultation and agreement
with the United States.
Until South Korea has its own nuclear weapons and makes a nuclear balance
on the Korean Peninsula, it cannot deter the North Korean nuclear threat on its
own. It cannot defend its people from the North Korean nuclear threat without
the US nuclear umbrella. As North Korea increases the quantity and improves
the quality of its nuclear weapons, South Korean dependency on the United
States should increase. In this reality, South Korea should try to yield more
autonomy to the United States; this would include actively participating in the
US Indo-Pacific Strategy and providing bigger burden sharing tan Now. These
yieldings could be South Korea’s basic conditions to alleviate the United States’
hesitation regarding the promised nuclear umbrella in the case of a North Korean
nuclear attack on South Korea. The small nation in an asymmetrical alliance
should be afraid of abandonment by its big-power ally, the security guarantor, as
it faces a serious threat.
38
Analysis
The fact that North Korea succeeded in having tens of nuclear weapons failed
to increase the South Korean Moon Jae-in Administration’s willingness in terms
of yielding its autonomy to the United States. The administration did not stop its
pursuit of reclaiming the OPCON from the commander of the CFC, was still
reluctant to share the cost of the USFK, and was hesitant regarding the operation
of the US THAAD in the name of Chinese opposition. It did not seek BMD
cooperation with the US military, though the integration between the South
Korean BMD and the USFK BMD became indispensable in order to shoot down
the attacking North Korean missiles in a prompt and effective way.
39
It took the
UU extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella, for granted and did not
seem to understand the consequence of South Korean reluctance in yielding its
autonomy to the United States.
Actually, the South Korean people’s attitude toward its alliance with the
United States has taken a positive direction, different from the current Moon
Administration’s alliance policy. Although there was a dramatic downfall in their
positive feelings toward the United States in the early 2000s, that trend started to
reverse as North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. A total of
38. Frühling, “Managing Escalation: Missile Defense, Strategy and U.S. Alliances,”p. 83.
39. Hwee Rhak Park, “The Ballistic Missile Defense Construction Strategies of South Korea and
Japan: Self-Reliance versus Cooperation with the U.S.,”Journal of International and Area Studies,
25-2 (2018), pp. 97–99.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
462 / Pacific Focus
70–80 percent of South Koreans came to be in favor of the United States from
2009, when North Korea conducted its second nuclear explosion test. The rate of
favorability toward the United States became higher than that in the 1980s, when
South Korea and the United States enjoyed strong coherence. The change in
South Korean sentiment toward the United States is represented in Figure 2.
The South Korean government’s alliance policies started to yield more auton-
omy to the United States, especially after the third North Korean nuclear explo-
sion test in 2013, reflecting people’s sentiments and the seriousness of the
situation. The Park Administration delayed the reclaiming of the OPCON from
the CFC commander by establishing difficult conditions for the reclaiming. The
conditions were “when critical ROK and Alliance military capabilities are
secured and the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the region
is conducive to a stable OPCON transition.”
40
The successor of the Park Administration, the Moon Administration that was
supported by leftists in South Korea, did not continue his predecessor’s policies
on the ROK-US alliance. President Moon pretended to coordinate his North
Korea policy with the United States by visiting the United States, and meeting
the US president, Trump, briefly in May 2018 and April 2019. However, he actu-
ally tried to make a rapprochement with North Korea and move away from the
United States. He ordered the acceleration of the reclaiming of the OPCON from
the US General. He did not take any successful measures to ensure the effective
Figure 2. South Korean Sentiment Regarding the U.S. Source: Jin Wung Kim, “The
Nature of South Korean Perceptions of the United States of the 1980s,”
Yoksa Kyoyuk Ronjip [History Education Review], 45-10 (2017),
pp. 357–381 (in Korean); Richard Wike, “America’s Global Image,”
(28 June 2017), at <http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/28/americas-
global-image/>
70 66 66 64
52
46
58
70
79 78
84
75
3
33 30 35
44
50
38
28
18 20
14
23
1984 1989 1993 1994 2002 2003 2007 2008 2010 2013 2015 2017
favorable unfavorable
40. DoD, “Joint Communiqué: The 46thU.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting,”(23 October
2014), at <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/46th_SCM_Joint_Communique.pdf>.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
The South Korea–the US Alliance under the North Korean Nuclear Threat / 463
operations of the US THAAD battery. He was very reluctant in cost sharing for
the USFK. His administration was accused of being inactive in blocking illegal
trade with North Korea, and a few South Korean vessels were seized by interna-
tional monitoring teams after engaging in illegal coal and petroleum trade with
North Korea.
41
The president and his confidants do not seem to have abandoned
their previous negative views on the United States, even under this serious North
Korean nuclear threat. In this sense, we can conclude that “the main source of fric-
tion experienced by the ROK-US alliance is not public opinion, but the outlook of
new democratic elites.”
42
A Case Study on the Autonomy Yielding of South Korea to the
United States: The Deployment of the US THAAD to South Korea
THAAD itself is nothing but a weapon system to shoot down incoming ballis-
tic missiles with a range of 200 km. Oddly enough, South Korea seriously
debated on whether to allow the deployment of the US system on its soil for
almost 3 years. The debate was caused by a few rumors regarding the THAAD.
The Chinese intervention also was raised by these rumors, such as the THAAD
could intercept Chinese ICMBs and monitor most of Chinese military activities.
Thus, the issue of the deployment of the US THAAD to South Korea constituted
a South Korean dilemma between the United States and China in terms of auton-
omy yielding to two big competing countries.
Background
The debate surrounding the deployment of THAAD started from accusations
of a few South Korean civilian activists who had opposed South Korean BMD
cooperation with the United States in the early 2000s. They argued that the US
BMD was based on an imperialistic intention, and South Korea should not be a
part of it.
43
They regarded the deployment of THAAD as South Korean partici-
pation in the US BMD and the United States’imperialistic ambition. They spread
ungrounded rumors regarding the THAAD and managed to plant lots of doubts
into South Korean peoples’minds. Even the conservative media explained that
THAAD could intercept Chinese ICBMs heading toward the United States and
could monitor most Chinese military activities using its radar.
44
As a result,
many South Korean people came to oppose the deployment of THAAD.
41. Chosun Ilbo Chosun Newspaper (4 April 2019), p. A5.
42. Lee, “Democratization and the U.S.-South Korean Alliance,”p. 489.
43. Uk-sik Jung, Mi-sa-il Bang-eo-Che-Je [Missile Defense System] (Seoul: Salim, 2003)
(in Korean).
44. Chosun Ilbo Chosun Newspaper (4 June 2014), p. A6.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
464 / Pacific Focus
The THAAD debates in South Korea were reported in Chinese newspapers,
and the Chinese leaders and the public came to share the rumors on the THAAD.
Chinese President Xi Jinping requested the rejection of the deployment of
THAAD to his South Korean counterpart, President Park, when he visited South
Korea in July 2014.
45
Then, the Chinese ambassador to South Korea, the Chinese
defense minister, and key officials in the Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed their
oppositions to the deployment when they visited South Korea in accordance with
President Xi’s request.
The South Korean government, the Park Geun-hye Administration, maintained
an ambiguous attitude toward the deployment of THAAD due to domestic oppo-
sitions and Chinese pressure. It announced a “Three No policy,”which meant
that there had been “no”request from the United States, “no”consultation
between the United States and South Korea, and “no”decision by South Korea
regarding the deployment. However, the administration was forced to make a
decision after North Korean provocations, such as the fourth nuclear test on
6 January 2017, and the test-fire of a long-range ballistic missile on 7 February
2016. It began consultation with the United States and decided to deploy
THAAD on 8 July 2016. It selected Seongju, the southeastern part of South
Korea, as the place for the THAAD battery. It accepted part of the THAAD bat-
tery in April 2017, despite Chinese warnings of retaliation. China actually
restricted its trade with and tourism to South Korea as punishment for the
deployment.
46
The current South Korean president, Moon, was against the deployment when
he was a candidate for the South Korean presidential election in early 2017.
However, he changed his position a day after the North Korean test-fire of
“Hwasung-14”on 29 July 2017, and decided to deploy a complete THAAD bat-
tery. The deployment was completed on 7 September 2017, after a fast-track
evaluation of the effects on the environment. After the deployment, domestic
opposition to THAAD deployment weakened, but Chinese opposition to deploy-
ment and trade retaliation continued, and a few South Korean activists blocked
the road to the THAAD site and continue the blockade until now.
Aspect of Security Assistance by the United States
Contrary to a few rumors, THAAD is very necessary and useful for the inter-
ception of attacking North Korean nuclear missiles. The THAAD system can
protect almost half of the South Korean territory because of its range of 200 km.
The South Korean and US governments “emphasized the military effectiveness
of THAAD and reaffirmed that the system is aimed solely at defending against
45. Chosun Ilbo Chosun Newspaper (17 March 2015), p. A1.
46. Maykyung News Maekyung Newspaper (3 October 2017), p. 3.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
The South Korea–the US Alliance under the North Korean Nuclear Threat / 465
North Korean missile threats and would not be directed toward any third party
nations”at their SCM in 2017.
47
The THAAD system could also be essential in ensuring the implementation of
the US extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella, because the USFK
and the planned wartime reinforcements for it cannot come to South Korea and
conduct their missions without reliable BMD shields. Actually, the USFK
requested the deployment of THAAD to its superiors in Washington
D.C. because it had witnessed the test-fire of the No-dong missile, which used
the lofted trajectory to neutralize the PAC-3 lower-tier BMD in March 2014.
48
The South Korean military and the USFK selected the southeastern part of South
Korea as the THAAD battery site to protect the incoming reinforcements through
Busan, which is the primary South Korean port to the Pacific Ocean.
Aspect of Yielding Autonomy by South Korea
The fact that South Korea delayed the deployment of THAAD for three years
means that South Korea was not willing to yield its autonomy to the United States.
Actually, South Korea had bought its missile surveillance radars from Israel and its
PAC-3 missiles from Germany because it had not wanted to join the United States’
BMD. Although the majority of South Korean people supported the deployment, the
South Korean government did not endeavor to overcome the strong opposition of
some South Korean progressives. For example, the overall supporting opinion versus
the opposing opinion on the deployment was 49.4 versus 42.3 percent, but
72.3 percent of conservatives supported (23.8 percent opposed) and only 25.4 percent
of progressives (70.1 percent opposed) supported the deployment in 2016, when the
debate on the deployment was most heated.
49
However, the minority progressives
dominated the debate and the government did not try hard to persuade this group.
The Chinese intervention on the deployment of THAAD heightened the issue for
South Korea to a choice between the United States and China. Some opinion
leaders in the United States deduced that South Korea might prefer cooperation
with China to that with the United States.
50
Actually, the current Moon Administra-
tion promised to China that it would not allow the deployment of the additional
THADD, not cooperate with the U.S. BMD, and not seek for the tri-lateral military
cooperation among U.S.–ROK–Japan on 31 October 2017, to mitigate the opposi-
tion of China.
51
47. DoD, “Joint Communiqué of the 49th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting.”
48. Kyu-Dok Hong, “Building a Better Strategy for Missile Defense: Lessons from the THAAD
Controversies,”Sin-A-Se-A [New Asia] 22-4 (2015), p. 123 (in Korean).
49. Realmeter, “Survey Result,”(12 February 2016), at <http://www.realmeter.net/%ec%82%ac%
eb%93%9c%ea%b5%ad%eb%82%b4-%eb%b0%b0%ec%b9%98-%ec%b0%ac%ec%84%b1-49-4-
vs-%eb%b0%98%eb%8c%80-42-3//>.
50. Donga Ilbo Donga Newspaper (21 July 2015), p. A34.
51. Chosun Ilbo Chosun Newspaper (1 November 2017), p. A1.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
466 / Pacific Focus
However, South Korea fortunately decided to allow the deployment of the
THAAD to its soil because of consecutive North Korean nuclear weapon and
missile tests. The Moon Administration could not help allowing the deployment
in spite of Chinese trade retaliation, because the security situation became too
serious. The public opinion in South Korea on the deployment also became more
positive than before the deployment with 53 percent : 32 percent (support : oppo-
sition) and 39 percent support from the progressives on June 2017 after the initial
deployment of THAAD.
52
Although it was slightly reluctant, the South Korean
leftist government yielded its autonomy to the United States, because it felt the
desperate need for US security assistance. In other words, even the South Korean
left government came to follow the findings of the AST model regarding the
deployment of the US THAAD battery.
Although the US THAAD battery was deployed to South Korea, it is still not
fully operational. Because a few South Korean activists blocked the road to the
THAAD site, the soldiers had to move by helicopters and endure lot of hardship
in making the battery operational. The Moon Administration did not force the
activists to leave or help make the battery operational. It would be very difficult
for international political theorists to understand why the Moon Administration
acts in this way under such serious North Korean nuclear threat. The current
South Korean Moon Administration may not know what to do in strengthening
its alliance with the US, because it did not have any chance to learn the findings
and recommendations of the AST model. As a result, it seems to have responded
to the situation by reluctantly reflecting the change of public opinion.
Conclusion
South Korea asked for an alliance relationship with the United States to defend
itself from communist countries’expansionism in the wake of the Korean War
from 1950–1953. The national power of South Korea has been very weak com-
pared with that of the United States ever since that time. The ROK-US alliance
started as a typical asymmetrical one, and should be a case for the AST model;
South Korea received US security assistance, such as the nuclear umbrella, in
exchange for yielding its autonomy to the United States. The ROK-US alliance
was very strong as long as this trade-off was respected by both South Korea and
the United States.
The alliance started to change when a few recent South Korean governments
became reluctant to yield the country’s autonomy to the United States, as South
Korea succeeded to become a developed country in the 1990s. The South Korean
Administrations in the 2000s pursued balanced diplomacy between the United
52. Korea Gallup, “Daily Opinion,”No. 263, (15 June 2017), at <https://www.gallup.co.kr/
gallupdb/reportContent.asp>.
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
The South Korea–the US Alliance under the North Korean Nuclear Threat / 467
States and China, and the reclaiming of the OPCON from the Commander of the
CFC, the US General. Some South Korean people demonstrated anti-US senti-
ment and even demanded the withdrawal of US Armed Forces from South
Korea. In this context, the South Korean government delayed its decision to
allow the deployment of the U.S. THAAD to its soil. Some South Korean anti-
US activists spread several rumors, such as that the THAAD would be used to
monitor Chinese military activities instead of North Korean missiles and emits
very harmful radiations to the people in the deployed area. The rumors encour-
aged people’s oppositions to the deployment of the THAAD. The ROK-US alli-
ance became unstable due to South Korean reluctance in giving up its autonomy
to its big-power ally, the United States, as the AST model predicted.
Fortunately, the North Korean nuclear threat seemed to have reminded South
Korea of the importance of its alliance with the United States. Because, South
Korea cannot defend itself from the North Korean nuclear threat without the
United States’extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella. Therefore,
South Korea stopped improving its relationship with China and reduced the
scope of its OPCON reclaiming into appointing its General as the CFC com-
mander instead of dismantling the CFC. South Korean people’s sentiment regard-
ing the United States has improved recently. Even the South Korean leftist
government, the current Moon Jae-in Administration, decided to allow the
deployment of the THAAD battery in spite of strong Chinese opposition. South
Korea returned to the AST model, though reluctantly, because of serious North
Korean nuclear threat.
The problem is that past reluctance and current remaining reluctance of South
Korea to the AST model may have damaged the solidness of the
U.S. commitment to extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella. The
United States may have felt that it did not receive commensurate and sufficient
cooperation from South Korea for its security assistance, and in turn may hesitate
to implement its nuclear umbrella promise unless the South Korean reluctance
reduces. Actually, it has gradually reduced the weight of the term “nuclear
umbrella”in the annual SCM joint communiqués. Although the real implementa-
tion of the nuclear umbrella could be affected by various and unpredictable fac-
tors, it could be somewhat dangerous for South Korea not to keep the term
“nuclear umbrella”in the joint communiqué of the 2018 SCM.
To make matters worse, North Korea demonstrated its capabilities to strike the
US territory of Guam, Alaska, and possibly mainland United States using hydro-
gen bomb-tipped nuclear missiles. It became more difficult for the United States
to automatically implement its nuclear umbrella promise in case of a real North
Korean nuclear attack on South Korea. It would fear a possible North Korean
nuclear re-retaliation, when it implements the nuclear umbrella. The threat of a
total annihilation of North Korea by the US nuclear response could not stop the
suicidal North Korean attack. South Korea cannot afford to be reluctant in yield-
ing its autonomy to the United States, although such yielding cannot guarantee
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
468 / Pacific Focus
the implementation of the promise of the nuclear umbrella by the United States.
The South Korean leftist government could have received this concern from
South Korean median voters and decided to yield its autonomy to the United
States for its political gain.
It is necessary for South Korea to examine the degree of trade-offs between
its autonomy and the US security assistance. If it finds considerable uncertainty
about the implementation of the United States’extended deterrence promise, it
should try to give up more autonomy to the United States. South Korea cannot
afford to risk abandonment by the United States under this serious North
Korean nuclear threat. In this sense, South Korea should try to dismiss its bal-
anced diplomacy between the United States and China, and participate in the
United States’Indo-Pacific strategy. It may need to stop its pursuit of reclaiming
the OPCON from the commander of the CFC, the US General, until the North
Korean nuclear threat is handled appropriately. It should be more willing to
increase its cost sharing in the USFK. It should also make every effort to ensure
the U.S. THAAD battery in South Korea is fully operational. After completing
these steps, South Korea should ask the United States to take some measures to
ensure the nuclear umbrella, such as pre-deploying its nuclear weapons to South
Korea as in Europe.
If South Korea succeeds in denuclearizing North Korea through negotiations,
it does not have to depend on the US nuclear umbrella and yield its autonomy to
the United States for that reason. In this sense, South Korea bent over backward
to sit at the negotiation table with North Korea during 2018–2019. However,
North Korea did not take any practical measures regarding its actual denucleari-
zation in spite of the good gestures of South Korea and the promise for economic
prosperity from the United States. Only the ROK-US alliance was damaged by
the differences in their approaches to North Korea; South Korea focused on
appeasing North Korea, but the United States concentrated on constant eco-
nomic, diplomatic, and military pressure. Now that North Korea has resumed its
antagonistic verbal attacks and test-fire of its missiles, as it did before the negoti-
ation, South Korea should adjust its approach to North Korea and recover a solid
alliance relationship with the United States by fully cooperating with the United
States’pressure-focused approach. It should put the strong ROK-US alliance
before negotiations with North Korea.
Nobody can be sure of the probability of the United States’real implementa-
tion of its extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella, regardless of
South Korean autonomy yielding to the United States, although the yielding was
strongly recommended by the AST model. In this sense, South Korea may need
to consider the development of its own nuclear weapons in preparation for a pos-
sible abandonment by the United States. However, South Korea has to consider
numerous factors, such as the United States’abandonment threat, UN sanctions,
North Korea’s preventive strike, and the degree of feasibility, before making this
decision. In this regard, South Korea can do nothing except for making the most
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University
The South Korea–the US Alliance under the North Korean Nuclear Threat / 469
of the promise of extended deterrence by the United States, until and in spite of
its decision to make its own nuclear weapons. If South Korea can protect its peo-
ple from the North Korean nuclear threat by yielding some of its autonomy to
the United States, this could be the cheapest way to achieve its goal of national
security.
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