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PART IV: Gaugamela
6: The Persian Army at Gaugamela
(Persian Archers from the palace of Darius I at Susa – Pergamon Museum August 2002)
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Chapter 6
The Persian Army at Gaugamela
More than a year had passed since the battle of Issus. During that time Alexander had marched
through the Levant, taking Tyre and Gaza through prolonged sieges. He was then able to claim
Egypt as his own when deputy, Mazaces, they did eventually defeat Amyntas and his men. But
Sataces departure, together with Amyntas incursion, had taken its toll. So Alexander entered
Egypt, Mazaces, the effective satrap of Egypt,
819
swiftly surrendered the province.
820
In the meantime Darius was biding his time, rebuilding his army and selecting just where he
would make his stand. The place he chose was at the open plain of Gaugamela.
821
THE PERSIAN DEPLOYMENT
With regard to the Persian deployment, there are three important lists in our sources that give
details on the Persian Army units taking part in this battle.
822
Arrian provides two of them and
the third is to be found in Curtius. On the surface, each list is clearly incomplete, and there seem
to be some striking inconsistencies between the three, particularly as regard to some of the unit
commanders. Looked at in context, however, it is possible to reconcile many of these apparent
discrepancies, and produce a reasonably consistent picture of the Persian army at Gaugamela,
both in its structure and disposition.
ARRIAN’S FIRST LIST – THE PERSIAN COMMANDERS
This is presented just after his account of Alexander’s clash with the Persian scouts.
823
According to Arrian, his description of the composition of the Persian forces was related to
Alexander by the captured enemy scouts.
824
The details given, however, make that unlikely.
Most probably, Arrian placed the list here simply for dramatic effect. The passage does not
describe the Persian deployment, and offers no details on individual unit sizes. But it does offer
important insights into the composition of the Persian army and its command structure (tabled
below). Given its nature, list may have come from a mustering list captured after the battle.
From this we learn that:
Bessus, satrap of Bactria, commanded the Bactrians, the Sogdianians, together with
“those Indians who bordered on the Bactrians”.
819819
Mazaces had been Sataces, the former satrap’s deputy, when Sataces left Egypt to join Darius at Sochi, prior to
the battle of Issus. See the discussion of Sataces in Chapter 5 above. The surrender of Mazaces is easy to
understand. It is doubtful his appointment as satrap had ever been officially ratified. His Emperor had been
defeated in battle, and Alexander's conquests in the Levant had cut him off from the rest of the Persian Empire.
820
Arrian III. 1. 2.
821
Arrian III. 8. 7. The battlefield will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
822
Apart from noting that “Darius based his formation ... on the characteristics of his national contingents”,
Diodorus provides no details on the Persian deployment prior to the battle; Diodorus XVII. 58. 1; though he does
offer corroboration on the presence of some units, and their relative place in the battleline. Plutarch and Justin also
offer no details on the Persian deployment, and with only a few details on the course of the battle in Plutarch and
virtually none in Justin. Plutarch Alexander XXXI – XXXIII, Justin XI 13 – 14.
823
Arrian III. 8 3 – 6.
824
Arrian III. 9. 1.
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Mauaces, otherwise unknown,
825
commanded The Sacae,
826
“a Scythian people” who
fought as mounted archers.
Barsaentes, satrap of the Arachotians, “led both the Arachotians and the Indian
hillmen, as they were called”.
Satibarzanes, satrap of the Areians, led only the Areian troops from his own
province.
Phratapherenes, satrap of Parthia and Hyrcania,
827
led the Parthyaeans, Hyrcanians
and Topeirians
828
– “all cavalry”.
Atropates, satrap of the Medes,
829
led the Medes, Cadusians, Albanians and
Sacesinians
830
.
Orontobates, former satrap of Caria,
831
Ariobarzanes, satrap of Persis,
832
and
Orxines, “directed” the tribes bordering on the Red Sea.
Oxathres, son of Abulites, satrap of Susiana,
833
commanded the Uxians and
Susianians.
Bupares, possibly satrap of Babylon,
834
commanded the Babylonians, and “the
Carians who had been transplanted” and the Sittacenians”, who “had been brigaded
with the Babylonians
Orontes, probably satrap of Armenia,
835
and Mithraustes, commanded the
Armenians.
836
Ariaces, rank uncertain, led the Cappadocians.
837
825
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 156. Shayeg’an, M. Rahim, “Prosopographical Notes: The Iranian Nobility during
and after the Macedonian Conquest”, Bulletin of the Asia institute, Vol. 21 (2007), pp. 105 – 106. Hereafter cited as
Shayeg’an, Prosopographical Notes. Shayeg’an also identifies Mauaces as the commander of Sacae mounted
archers at the Granicus, but this appears unsubstantiated. He offers no corroboration for this claim beyond Arrian’s
sole reference to the name at Gaugamela.
826
Here Brunt, citing Herrmann, RE s.v. Sakai) notes that the Sacae were apparently not “nomadic Scyths” but came
from “the Pamir Highlands”, Brunt 1, p. 247, n. 2. At the time of writing, these lay in the Tadzhik region of the
U.S.S.R. The Pamir highlands now lie mostly in Tajikistan, but they do also “penetrate Afghanistan, China and
Kyrgyzstan”, https://www.britannica.com/place/Pamirs.
827
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 223.
828
Identified by Andreas Parpas as “the inhabitants of the satrapy of Tapuria, which is south of the Caspian Sea adjacent to Parthia and
Hyrcania”. Parpas, Andreas P., Alexander the Great in Erbil: The Military Battle of Gaugamela 331 B.C., The Political Victory
at Arbela, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014, p. 207, n. 68. This identification is consistent with
their inclusion with the Parthians and Hyrcanians under Phratapherenes command.
829
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 61 – 62.
830
These are also Sacae who settled in the land they called Sacasene, between Armenia and Albania. Strabo 11. 8.
4, 14. 4. See also Atkinson, J. E., A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus’ Historiae Alexandri Magni Books 3
and 4, Amsterdam, J. C. Gieben, 1980, p. 407. Hereafter cited as Atkinson, Commentary on Curtius Books 3 &
4.
831
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 186.
832
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 45.
833
Heckel, Prosopography, pp. 186 – 187.
834
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 73. Atkinson, Commentary on Curtius Books 3 & 4, p. 407.
835
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 185. Atkinson, Commentary on Curtius Books 3 & 4, p. 407.
836
Otherwise unknown, Mithraustes may have led the Armenian infantry. Heckel, Prosopography, p. 168, citing
the suggestion of “Breve ii.262 (with n. 1)”.
837
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 44.
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Mazaeus, satrap of Syria and Mesopotamia,
838
led the “Syrians of Hollow Syria and
Mesopotamian Syria”.
In various sources, both Orontes, Orxines are each at one times referred to as descended from
“one of the Seven”.
839
The precise meaning of this phrase is much debated.
840
In the context of
the Persian military command, the phrase is clearly used to indicate a member of the Persian elite
whose rank stands above most almost all the other satraps and commanders. This is why the
satraps Orontobates and Ariobarzanes are presented as subordinate to Orxines/Orsines in the
following list from Curtius.
The placement of Orontobates, Ariobarzanes and Orxines here as commanders of the “tribes
bordering on the Red Sea”, is clearly an error. Their actual commands are detailed by Curtius
(below). But the reference to troops from the area of the Red Sea does occur in all three lists,
and most probably refers to troops raised from the descendants of people resettled by the
Persians during and after their conquest of Egypt, just like “the Carians who had been
transplanted”. These, like “those Indians who bordered on the Bactrians” and “the Indian
hillmen”, are just the first hints to the way Darius had padded out his army with a mix of raised
levies of dubious military worth from the fringes of his empire, all for the sake of fielding as
large an army as possible.
At this point Arrian gives no details of individual unit sizes. But he does tell us that at this time
the army was “encamped at Gaugamela”, and totalled 40,000 cavalry, a million infantry, 200
scythed chariots and at least 15 elephants supplied by “the Indians on this side of the Issus”.
841
CURTIUS – THE ORDER OF MARCH
The second list, provided by Curtius, offers more details, but is problematic and in places quite
disparaging of some elements of the army – the significance of this will be discussed shortly.
Curtius presents the list as the Persian line of battle; “iubet aciemque disponit”.
842
However,
reading it, it soon becomes clear that what Curtius is describing is the Persian order of march to
the battlefield. Curtius later says as much since, in his account, this was the order in which the
army, so drawn up, then marched 10 stadia to the battlefield.
843
Over such a distance they must
have marched in columns, not line.
844
So Curtius’ list gives should be read not as the army battle
line, but as the order in which the army marched out from camp to form the final battle line. And
while they may have started with a single column (or perhaps two), from the text it seems clear
838
Heckel, Prosopography, pp. 156 – 157.
839
Orontes, Heckel, Prosopography, p. 185, citing Strabo 11. 14. 15. Orxines (Orsines), Heckel, Prosopography,
p. 186, Curtius IV. 12. 8, X, 1. 23.
840
For a discussion on the use of the phrase, see Briant, Pierre, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the
Persian Empire. (tr. Peter T. Daniels) Winona Lake, Indiana, Eisenbrauns, 2002, pp. 128 – 130. Afterwards cited
as Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander.
841
Arrian III. 8. 6 – 7.
842
Curtius IV. 12. 5.
843
Curtius IV. xii. 5 – 13. That the list represents an order of march is also conceded by Atkinson, who notes that
“On the march the contingents were grouped by satrapy or larger region”. Atkinson, Commentary on Curtius
Books 3 & 4, pp. 401 – 402.
844
Curtius IV. xii. 5 – 13. Curtius’ phraseology at other points affirms this. For example, both the Massagetae, who
Curtius later has leading the Persian attack together with all the scythe-bearing chariots who by then were apparently
stationed in front of Darius, IV. xv. 2. In this list, however, the Massagetae are described as bringing up the rear
(agmen claudere), as also are the various chariot contingents.
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that they quickly divided into multiple separate columns each marching to their already
designated place on the battlefield. Just how many columns there were, and which units
belonged to each is harder to say, but Curtius’ account does give some clues.
Curtius starts his list with a description of the left wing. The first contingent listed appears to be
made up of 1,000 Bactrian Cavalry, 1,000 Dahae Cavalry, and 4,000 Arachosii and Susiani
Cavalry.
100 scythed chariots separated these from the 2nd contingent, led by Bessus, the satrap of Bactria.
This was made up of 8,000 Bactrian Cavalry followed by 2,000 Massagetae Cavalry, behind
which came the infantry troops of different nations each paired with its own cavalry.
845
The third ‘column’ consisted of the Persians, the Mardi and the Sogdiani. Command of these
was divided between Ariobarzanes and Orontobates, who were both under the overall
command of Orsines (Orxines in Arrian’s first list).
846
“These were followed by other nations
not very well known even to their allies”.
Here we find some resolution to the puzzle of Arrian’s placement of these three men in his first
list. As satrap of Persis Ariobarzanes would naturally command the Persians. Orontobates had
previously fought against Alexander in the earlier defence of Caria, where he had been the
satrap. His inclusion as a commander here is understandable, but whether he commanded the
Mardi or the Sogdiani is never made clear. Most likely, he led the Mardi, who are absent from
Arrian’s first list. In that list the Sogdiani were under Bessus, whose territory of Bactria
neighbours their own lands. They are not included in Arrian’s second list, so it is possible that
their command was transferred to Orxines. However, I suspect it is more likely that they never
left Bessus’ command, and that their numbers were included by mistake by Aristobulus in the
count of Bactrian cavalry in Arrian’s second list. If so, their inclusion here is simply an error.
We then have Phradates
847
with 50 Chariots, followed by “a large army of Caspii”, the Indi and
the rest of the Red Sea army, who are derided as “mere names rather than auxiliaries”.
Phradates is the last commander of rank that Curtius mentions.
Other Scythed chariots “to which he had joined the foreign soldiers”.
Then the Lesser Armenians, the Babylonians, the Belitae “and those who dwelt in the
mountains of the Cossaei”.
And finally, the Gortuae, the Phrygians, the Cataonians, and the Parthyaei.
“Such was the form of the left wing”, says Curtius.
The right wing, by contrast, is dramatically smaller, consisting of the Greater Armenians, the
Cadusii, the Cappadocians, the Syrians, the Medes, and 50 Scythed chariots.
We already know from Arrian that Mazaeus commanded the Syrians, so we can infer that the
Syrians cavalry were 3,000 strong.
848
845
My italics here and at other places in this list.
846
See above and n. 430.
847
Phradates, or Autophradates (Arrian III. 23. 7) was the satrap of the Topeirians, and commander of the Caspian
contingent under Phratapherenes. Heckle’s Prosopography, p. 65. Parpas, Alexander the Great in Erbil, pp. 128 and 207,
n.’s 66 and 68.
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As in his account of the battle of Issus, Curtius subsumes the Persian centre into the two flanks.
And there is a striking omission in the absence of any reference to Darius’ personal guard.
There are clear parallels between this and Arrian’s list. But the most interesting element of this
list is to the inclusion of his derogatory remarks, noted in italics above, with regard to the lesser
known contingents of the army. These, in Curtius’ estimation, must be regarded as the least
reliable troops in the army. They appear to have been deliberately are kept behind the front
ranks, and – there presence just for show. Arrian’s references to people like the Indian Hillmen,
and the tribes bordering on the Red Sea, for example, may represent similar, unreliable levies.
The “tribes bordering the Red Sea” may, like the Carians, have been previously transplanted
from their homelands to elsewhere in the empire at the time of the Persian conquest of Egypt.
As such, they may have been seen as less reliable than other elements of the army.
ARRIAN’S SECOND LIST – THE PERSIAN BATTLELINES
Arrian claimed he took this list from Aristobulus, who said he took it from a document captured
after the battle that set out Darius’ order of battle.
849
This is the list I will largely be following
for Darius’ troop dispositions at the start of the battle.
The discussion of Persian cavalry units in chapter one should have already demonstrated that the
presence of a large number of cavalry units in the Persian army, is not only possible but
probable. As to just how accurate Curtius’ figure is for the number of infantry, that is impossible
to say, and, in a way, it is of no real importance. As Marsden notes, Darius would appear to have
decided to rely almost entirely on his cavalry, and to have made practically no use of the bulk of
his infantry.
850
If the number of Persian infantry was large, most must be regarded as having
been present simply for show – “mere names”, as Curtius s.
851
The Persian disposition can then be seen to have been basically as follows.
852
On the left wing, the main line ran, from left to right, Bactrian cavalry, Dahae, Arachotians,
mixed Persian infantry and cavalry, Susians, and Cadusians. In front of the left wing ran a
second line made up of the Scythians, 1,000 Bactrians and 100 scythed chariots.
In the centre, left to right, were placed mainly infantry; the king’s kinsmen (1,000 strong cavalry
according to Diodorus
853
), the Persians with golden apples, the Indians, the transplanted Carians,
and Mardian Bowmen. In his account Diodorus largely corroborates the placement of these
troops although, like Curtius, he refers only to the left and right wings of the army, counting
Darius and the Persian centre in the left wing.
854
) The Uxians, Babylonians, Red Sea peoples
and Sittacensians stood behind these “in deep formation”. Later in the list Arrian adds that
“Greek Mercenaries were stationed to either side of Darius and of the Persian troops with him”.
848
See Curtius’ account of Darius’ use of Mazeaus troops as an advance scout on the roads to Gaugamela prior to
the battle, as discussed above. Curtius IV. 12. 1, 4 – 5
849
Arrian III. 11. 3.
850
Marsden, Gaugamela, p. 34.
851
Curtius IV. xii. 9.
852
Arrian III.11. 3 – 7.
853
Diodorus XVII. 59. 2
854
In Diodorus’ list, the units led by Darius are the kinsman cavalry, the Apple Bearers, the Mardi, Cossaei and
Indians, “as well as all the household troops belonging to the palace”. Diodorus XVII. 59. 2 – 4. While the Cossaei
are added, only the transplanted Carians and Greek mercenaries are left out, unless the later are included in the
palace household troops.
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In front of the centre were the royal squadron (cavalry), fifty chariots. This account also placed a
few elephants in the centre front rank, but if so they were probably withdrawn prior to the
fighting, since we hear no more of them after this reference.
855
From right to left on the right wing, were positioned “the troops from Hollow and
Mesopotamian Syria”, the Medes, Parthyaeans, Sacians, Topeirians, Hyrcanians, Albanians and
Sacesinians. In front of these were the Armenians, Cappadocians, and 50 scythed chariots. The
advance units on both flanks were probably placed adjacent to the ends of the flanks.
Later, in the course of the battle as the armies were moving closer, “Darius and his immediate
followers” are placed next to “the Persians ‘with Golden Apples’, Indians, Albanians
856
, the
‘transplanted’ Carians, and the Mardian archers”.
857
The juxtaposition in this list is almost
identical to the placement of these units in Arrian’s second list. The one apparent anomaly is the
inclusion here of the Albanians, which moves them from their earlier place on the right wing.
This is not a major problem since the Albanians and Sacesinians were the units on the right wing
located closest to the centre. And Arrian here just says that these troops were in “full sight” of
Alexander at this time.
EARLIER LISTS
There are also three earlier lists in Curtius that provide some information helpful to a clearer
understanding of the composition of the Persian army assembled at Gaugamela. These are the
list of contingents assembled by Darius at Babylon in preparation for what would become the
battle of Issus;
858
and the account of the subsequent processional march from Babylon.
859
The
points of note from these lists will be discussed as the need arises in respect of the specific
contingents in Chapter 7, when I address the actual placement of units in the Persian battlelines.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
As I have previously argued the standard size of a Persian cavalry contingent appears to have
been 1,000 men.
860
The known figures for the Persian units at Gaugamela is consistent with this,
with larger units such as the Bactrians being made up of multiples of the 1,000 man contingent.
Also as previously noted, Mazaeus, however, had command of the Persian right wing.
861
This
suggests that Bessus commanded the left wing,
862
while Darius commanded the centre.
Comparing the three lists cited above it is clear that the lists are all incomplete, though each does
give us important information not contained in the other lists. Arrian’s first list gives us the army
command structure. Curtius provides details on the size of many of the army units. While
855
One reason for this may be that the Persian horse had been disturbed by the smell of the elephants, to which they
had not had the chance to become accustomed to, before the battle, making them hard to handle. The withdrawal of
the elephants may be affirmed in Arrian’s account of Parmenio capture of the enemy camp at the battle’s end.
There, along with the baggage train, he finds both elephants. Arrian V. 15. 6.
856
My italics.
857
Arrian III. 13. 1.
858
Curtius III. 2. 10.
859
Curtius III. 3. 8 – 25.
860
See Chapter 1, Persian Cavalry, above.
861
Chapter 1, Persian Cavalry, Diodorus XVII. 59. 5.
862
A point affirmed by the fact that the Massagetae attack was launched at the command of Bessus. See Massagetae
below.
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Arrian’s second list gives us a rough outline of the battle line before the battle, though with some
omissions, especially in respect of the troops in the rear ranks.
Working from these lists I have endeavoured to reconstruct a reasonable approximation of the
placement of specific units within the full Persian battle lines at Gaugamela. The results are set
out in both tabular diagrammatic formats below.
This reconstruction has been based on the following considerations.
THE RE-ARMED ARMY
Darius assembled his reinforced army at Babylon, and we know from Curtius and Diodorus that
during that time he took steps to rearm the troops of his army as well. From these two accounts
we learn the following:
1. Herds of horses were broken and “distributed to the infantrymen” to make the cavalry
“more numerous than before”.
863
2. Cavalrymen and their horses were given armour of “iron plates joined together in one
mesh”; i.e. some form of scale mail.
864
3. Those troops previously armed only with javelins were now given swords and shields
as well.
865
4. Those already using spears and swords had those weapons replaced with new longer
“swords and lances” as a counter to the way Alexander’s troops were armed.
866
5. And a new contingent of 200 scythed chariots was added to the army.
867
The worth of these improvements is hard to judge. Almost two years had passed since the battle
of Issus, so Darius certainly had the time to have all the arms and armour made.
868
But
upgrading the armour and arms of troops does not turn them into heavy cavalry – not without
much rigorous training.
And the use of such armour was not new. Curtius tells us in his account of the aftermath to the
battle of Issus that the Persian “horses and horsemen alike ... (were) weighed down by the linked
plates which covered them as far as the knee”. The weight of this armour slowed their retreat,
allowing them to be overtaken by the Thessalians.
869
Just how many troops were re-armed and how well trained they were in using their new
equipment, is impossible to say. What is clear is that all these efforts made no significant
difference to the outcome of the battle.
REGIONAL CONTINGENTS
The Persian army was clearly made up of regional contingents. From this it is reasonable to
conclude that every unit named in our sources had a contingent present, even if most played no
significant part in the battle.
863
Curtius IV. 9. 4.
864
Curtius IV. 9. 3.
865
Curtius IV. 9. 3.
866
Diodorus XVII. 53. 1.
867
Curtius IV. 9. 4 – 5. Diodorus XVII. 53. 1 – 2. Arrian III. 8. 6.
868
From late November 333 (
869
Curtius III. 11. 15.
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As Murad Ohanyan has demonstrated, from the time of Darius I the Persian Empire was
subdivided for administrative purposes into five regions,
870
as follows:
The Centre – Persia, Elam and Media, plus the Susianians, Uxians, Cossaei, Gortuae and
Mardians.
Northeast – Parthia, Hyrcania, Drangiana, Aria, Bactria and Sogdia, plus the Topeirians and
Dahae.
Southeast – Arachosia, India, Gandara and Maka.
Northwest – Armenia, Cappadocia, Ionia, Lydia, plus the Cataonians, Cadusians, Caspii,
Albanians, Sacesinians.
Southwest – Syria, Babylonia, Arabia and Egypt.
As can be seen in the map
871
of the Persian Empire below; Fig. 15; almost half the Persian army
came from the centre or eastern regions. The eastern contingents include the Areians,
Arachotians, Bactrians, Dahae, Hyrcanians, Indians, Massagetae, Parthyaeans, Sacae,
Sogdianians, and Topeirians. While the Medes, Persians,
872
Susianians, Cossaei, Gortuae,
Uxians and Mardian Bowmen came from the centre of the empire.
North-western contingents included the Armenians, Cappadocians, Albanians, Cadusians,
Caspians, Sacesinians, Cataonians, Phrygians and Syrians. The Southwest could only contribute
the Babylonians, transplanted Carians, Sittacenians, and possibly the Belitae.
Just where the “Red Sea peoples” is a vexed question? Curtius has them following the northern
Caspii and the eastern Indi in the column led by Phradates. No conclusions regarding their place
of origin can be drawn from this list. As discussed above, their placement under the shared
command of Orontobates, Ariobarzanes and Orxines in Arrian’s first list is clearly a mistake.
And in his second list, Arrian places them with the reserve central empire contingents of the
Uxians, Babylonians and Sittacensians. As Rolfe noted earlier in his translation of Curtius,
references to the Red Sea in Greek and Roman writers often included “the real Red Sea, the
Arabian Gulf, the Persian Gulf and even the Indian Ocean”.
873
None of these locations is
compatible with their association with central empire units in the final deployment. That
supports my earlier suggestion that, like the Carians, the Red Sea may well have been people
transplanted from their homeland, whether that was the actual Red Sea or some other coastal
region.
This spread of names is significant because it shows how Darius was by this time reliant on new
troops from the centre and, in particular the east of the empire. Beyond what their commanders
may have told them, almost all of these troops will have been totally ignorant of the
870
Ohanyan M. S., “About the structures and order of administration of the Achaemenid Empire”, Journal of
Armenian Studies, (2019), No. 1, pp. 13 – 14, 16, 19. The tables, diagram and map that Murad presents are based
on ancient Persian Chronicles and Inscriptions dating back to the time of Darius I. For convenience, correlating
with Murad’s map, p. 19, I have amended his lists to also include the minor satrapies and allied territories (in
italics). I have not included the Sacae or the Massagetae, since their territories lie outside the empire.
871
The map at Fig. 15 is a rough representation only, and should not be read as geographically accurate. It is
intended as only a rough guide to regional population distribution.
872
including Darius’ royal squadron, the King’s Kinsmen cavalry and the Persians with golden apples
873
Curtius III. 2. 9, n. c, pp. 74 – 75.
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© Kathleen D. Toohey 12/11/2019
Macedonians and their methods of fighting. The Persians, Bactrians, Cappadocians and
Hyrcanians may have been the exception to this, depending on how many survivors from the
Granicus or Issus were included in their ranks.
COMMANDERS
The command structure in Arrian’s first list, paired with the command references in Curtius, help
fill in some of the gaps and inconsistencies in the three lists.
Left Wing
Bessus
According to Arrian Bessus, the satrap of Bactria, was related to Darius.
874
Arrian offers no
details on the family connections, but it was clearly close enough for Bessus to feel he had a
right to claim the Achaemenid throne after the murder of Darius III under the name
Artaxerxes.
875
Barsaentes
Heckel describes Barsaentes, satrap of the Arachotians, as “a noble Persian” in his
Prosopography. This identification is not unreasonable, given that his name was later linked
with Bessus and Narbarzanes, Darius’ chiliarch, in the ‘arrest’ of Darius after the battle.
876
Ariobarzanes
Ariobarzanes position as commander of the Persian infantry and cavalry contingents on the
Persian left flank, has already been discussed above with regard to Curtius’ Order of March list.
His posting here is consistent with his position as satrap of Persis, and he may have been
included in the left wing along with the Susians as a balance to the large number of troops from
the eastern provinces posted there. He survived the battle but did not accompany Darius in his
flight. Instead he sought to defend his own satrapy by blocking Alexander’s advance through
“the Persian, or Susian, Gates”. When that failed he fled to Persepolis, and died near there when
the city refused to open its gates to him.
877
Oxathres, son of Abulites
As noted above Oxathres was the son of Abulites, the satrap of Susiana. He commanded both
the ,
878
commanded both the Susians from his father’s satrapy and the neighbouring Uxians (See
Chapter 7).
879
Heckel suggests that Oxathres was in command of his father’s forces because
Abulites may have been unfit for such service.
880
In Arrian’s battlelines list, the Susians were
stationed on the right of the Persian left wing, while the Uxians were placed next to the
Babylonians among the troops stationed to the rear of the Persian centre.
881
In my next chapter I
874
Arrian III. 21. 5. Heckel, Prosopography, pp. 71 – 72.
875
Arrian III. 25. 3. Curtius VI. 6. 13. Diodorus 17. 74.22, 83. 7. Heckel, Shayeg’an also cites a recently
discovered Aramaic document from Bactra and a recently reedited Babylonian chronicle that both Bessus use of the
name Artaxerxes in his attempt to claim the throne. Shayeg’an, Prosopographical Notes, pp. 105 – 106.
876
Arrian III. 21. 1. Heckel, Prosopography, p. 69.
877
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 45.
878
Heckel, Prosopography, pp. 186 – 187.
879
Heckel, Prosopography, pp. 2 – 3, 186 – 187.
880
Heckel, Prosopography, pp. 2 – 3, 186 – 187.
881
Arrian III.11. 3 – 5.
241
© Kathleen D. Toohey 12/11/2019
have taken the liberty of moving the Uxians back to the left wing, behind the Susians but still
next to the Babylonians. This is consistent with the fact that they were under Oxathres
command, without causing any significant conflict with the battlelines reported by Arrian.
Oxathres survived the battle and was later appointed satrap of Paratecene.
882
Satibarzanes
Just from his name it is clear, as Heckel notes, that Satibarzanes was a member of the Persian
nobility.
883
In the accounts of Alexander’s campaigns, Satibarzanes is not mentioned prior to
Gaugamela, and with regard to that battle he is mentioned only once in Arrian’s commander’s
list.
884
There is no evidence he had any link to the royal family, and it could be inferred that he
had a relatively minor place in the Persian hierarchy, given that he is one of the few Persian
leaders named whose commands appears to have been limited to just the troops of his own
satrapy of Aria.
Satibarzanes survived the battle. He may have accompanied Darius in his flight or joined him
later because Arrian named him along with Barsaentes as the two who inflicted the fatal wounds
on Darius. However, as Heckel notes this may have been a misreading arising from confusion
between the names of Satibarzanes and Narbarzanes.
885
Centre
Narbarzanes
Narbarzanes, Darius’ chiliarch,
886
can be inferred to have been present at Gaugamela, since he
commanded the right wing of the Persian cavalry at Issus,
887
and was with Darius in his flight
after this battle.
888
Considering his role at Issus, it is reasonable to conclude that Narbarzanes
probably had command of at least the king’s kinsmen cavalry at Gaugamela. In which case it
can reasonably be assumed that he was with Darius from the start of his flight, along with the
kinsmen cavalry.
Oxathres
Like Narbarzanes, Oxathres presence can only be inferred. As noted in Chapter 5, Oxathres was
the brother of Darius III. At the Battle of Issus he led the Persian elite cavalry in defense of his
brother against Alexander’s assault. After Darius’ death he was found among the Persian
captives after Alexander had Hephaestion separate those of noble birth from the lesser ranks.
889
The story, found only in Curtius, comes well after the account of Darius’ murder, so it is not
clear just where and when Oxathres was taken captive.
882
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 187. Arrian III. 19. 2.
883
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 245.
884
Arrian III. 8. 4.
885
For a discussion, see Heckel, Prosopography, p. 245. Shayeg’an, Prosopographical Notes, p. 120, and
Bosworth, Commentary 1, p. 339. Both Shayeg’an and Bosworth accept Satibarzanes as a regicide without
question.
886
Commander of the royal bodyguard, Olmstead, A. T., History of the Persian Empire, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1948, p. 217. Hereafter cited as Olmstead, Persian Empire.
887
Curtius III. 9. 1.
888
Arrian III. 21. 1. Heckel, Prosopography, p. 171. Shayeg’an, Prosopographical Notes, pp. 98, 115.
889
Curtius VI. 2. 9. Heckel, Prosopography, p. 188.
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It seems unlikely he accompanied Darius in his flight, because he would probably have been
murdered along with Darius, had he been there. However, given his role at Issus, it is
inconceivable to suggest he was not with his brother at Gaugamela. The most likely explanation,
then, is that, as at Issus, he commanded the royal squadrons, in this battle posted ahead of
Darius’ chariot. But in the course of the battle, when Darius turned to flight they became
separated, with Oxathres being captured either during or sometime after the battle.
Orontobates
As with Ariobarzanes, the position of Orontobates, the former satrap of Caria, has already been
discussed above under Curtius’ Order of March section. As argued there, Ariobarzanes and
Orontobates were notionally under the command of Orsines, and they were together supposedly
in charge of the Persians, Mardi and Sogdiani. But as discussed above, Ariobarzanes clearly
commanded the Persians, while the Sogdiani, neighbours of the Bactrians, were under the
command of Bessus. Consequently, Orontobates must have been given command of the Mardi
in the Persian Centre, as a concession to his rank as the former satrap of Caria. As Heckel notes,
“nothing is known” of him after the battle, which suggests he may have died during the
combat.
890
Orsines
Orsines was one of the Persian elite, claiming descent from “one of the Seven”, like Orontes
below, and also from Cyrus the Great.
891
But as we have, on the field he was not in direct
command of the Persians, the Sogdianians, or the Mardi. Nor can he reasonably be regarded as
having overall charge of those three contingents and their commanders, given that one was
stationed in the centre and two on the left wing – one directly under Bessus, the commander of
that wing. Nor is it credible that such a distinguished man could have been left in charge of the
“tribes bordering on the Red Sea”. Atkinson has noted that Orsines may have been quite
elderly.
892
If that is correct, and he was present at the battle on the day, he may have been in
Darius’ own entourage, his supposed command being a notional one only with no real authority.
Alternatively, as Bosworth noted, there is evidence that both Orsines and Ariobarzanes had a
close association with the Persis satrapy, with Orsines (Orxines in Arrian) usurping the satrapy
while Alexander was in India.
893
As noted above, we know that Ariobarzanes escaped the battle
with a core of his command intact. Orsines may have stationed himself with Ariobarzanes,
perhaps behind the Persian infantry. In that case, he probably escaped the battle with
Ariobarzanes, and it may have been Orsines who encouraged the satrap to defend the Persian
gates while he went on to Persepolis. If so, it may well have been Orsines who had the citizens
of Persepolis to bar Ariobarzanes entry to the city after Alexander defeated him at the Persian
Gates. If so it will have been his ancestry that gave Orsines the authority to encourage or even
command the citizens to this act.
894
890
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 186
891
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 186 citing Curtius IV. 12. 8 and X. 1. 23.
892
Atkinson, Commentary on Curtius Books 3 & 4, p. 405, also citing Curtius X. 1. 23.
893
Bosworth, Commentary 1, p. 290. Arrian VI. 29. 2, Curtius X. 1. 22 – 29.
894
Darius may well have been aware of both Orsines ambition and the dangers inherent in Orsines ancestral claims.
And this could explain Orsines ambivalent position at Gaugamela.
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Bupares
As both Heckel and Bosworth note, Bupares, is unattested in all of our sources, apart from the
one brief mention in Arrian’s commanders list.
895
Heckel suggests he was Persian and may have
been satrap of Babylon at the time. But if so he must have died in the battle.
896
That would
certainly help to explain his absence from the accounts of events during and after the battle.
Bosworth, however, lent towards an earlier theory that suggested Bupares was only the deputy of
an unnamed, but “aged or infirm”, satrap. This suggestion fails to address both the lack of any
subsequent reference to Bupares, and the fact that the satrap of Babylon prior to the battle was
also left unnamed. Bosworth’s arguments rest mainly, however, on his interpretation of just who
the Mesopotamian Syrians, literally the Syrians “between the rivers” actually were. This he sees
as an archaic and anachronistic confusion of Syria with Assyria, arguing that “there is no
evidence that Mesopotamia ever formed part of any satrapy but Babylonia”.
897
While some of Bosworth’s arguments are compelling, they fail to address two critical facts.
Firstly, that Mazaeus commanded both the right wing and a large contingent of Syrians including
those termed Mesopotamian or “between the rivers” Syrians, whatever that may have meant.
Secondly, Bupares commanded not only the Babylonians, the Sittacenians and the transplanted
Carians.
898
But it was the Carians who stood in the centre front line, while the Babylonians and
Sittacenians were relegated to the rear ranks. And if Arrian is reliable on this point, Bupares’
command was further broken up by the placement of at least the Red Sea peoples. This suggests
that Darius held the Carians to be militarily more reliable and more effective than either the
Babylonians
899
or the Sittacenians. It also suggests that Bupares may not have been regarded as
a particularly competent commander. If so, he was probably placed with the Carians. Direct
command of the other contingents was probably relegated to their own territorial commanders.
Phradates
As noted above, Phradates, or Autophradates, as Arrian calls him,
900
Phradates, or Autophradates
was the satrap of the Topeirians. Another Persian, he was clearly subordinate to Phratapherenes,
satrap of Hyrcania and Parthia. At Gaugamela Phradates was required to cede command of his
Topeirians troops to Phratapherenes. In their place he was relegated to act as commander of the
so called “Caspian contingent”
901
in the back ranks of the army. From this it can be inferred that
he was a man of relatively minor ranking in the Persian hierarchy. And he was clearly not
regarded as sufficiently competent or reliable enough to be trusted with a command position in
the front ranks.
895
Arrian III. 8. 5. Heckel, Prosopography, p. 73.
896
Heckel considers his death necessary to account for Mazaeus’ subsequent appointment as satrap of Babylon.
897
Bosworth, Commentary 1, pp. 291 – 293.
898
As Bosworth explains, “the Carian villages which were located on the east bank of the Tigris opposite Sittacene”,
citing Diodorus XVII. 110. 3, Bosworth, Commentary 1, p. 291. Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, p. 719.
899
This may have been intentional, at least as far as the Babylonians were concerned. Given that Babylon had been
the dominant regional power prior to the rise of Persia, the Babylonian contingent may have been intentionally kept
under strength.
900
Arrian III. 23. 7.
901
Discussed below.
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In the course of Alexander’s subsequent campaigns Phradates surrendered to Alexander and was
restored to his position as satrap of the Topeirians.
902
Right Wing
Mazaeus
Mazaeus, satrap of Syria and Mesopotamia, does not appear to have had any familial ties to
Darius, although he was clearly a trusted confidant and commander. Diodorus refers to him as
one of the Friends, “φίλοων”, of Darius in his account of how Mazaeus was sent to seize and
hold the crossing of the Tigris river.
903
Mazaeus would have been in his late forties or older at
the battle of Gaugamela, with decades of loyal service to the Persian throne.
904
As the battle
neared its end, most likely prompted by news of Darius’ flight, Mazaeus abandoned the fight and
retreated to Babylon, taking with him “the survivors of the defeated army”, or at least those
under his command able to flee.
905
Atropates
In all our accounts the first reference to Atropates, satrap of the Medes, is in Arrian’s list of the
commanders at Gaugamela. He is not mentioned again until well after the battle but can be
reasonably placed with the Medes on the Persian right flank, next to Mazaeus’ Syrians. He
survived the battle and went on to serve Alexander in various roles, including as the satrap of
Media.
906
Phratapherenes
As noted above, Phratapherenes led not only the troops of his own satrapy of Parthia and
Hyrcania, but also his Topeirian neighbours, while their own satrap led the Caspii.
Phratapherenes was a loyal but sensible Persian who wisely switched his loyalty to Alexander
after the death of Darius, which let him keep his position as satrap of Parthia. Although his
territory belonged to the Persian northeast, at Gaugamela Phratapherenes was assigned to
strengthen the Persian right flank to which troops mainly from the western territories were
assigned. There is no evidence he had any link to the royal family, but Darius clearly trusted him
and held him to be a capable commander.
907
Orontes
Like Orsines, Orontes was descended from one of the Seven, in his case Hydranes. His family
had ruled Armenia since “at least the reign of Artaxerxes, and although not specifically identified
as such he almost certainly commanded the Armenian contingent at Gaugamela as satrap of
Armenia.
908
902
Arrian III. 23. 7. Heckel, Prosopography, p.65.
903
Diodorus 17. 55. 1.
904
Heckel, Prosopography, pp. 156 – 157. Shayeg’an, Prosopographical Notes, pp. 110 – 111.
905
Curtius IV. 16. 7.
906
Arrian III. 8. 4. Heckel, Prosopography, pp. 61 – 62. Shayeg’an, Prosopographical Notes, p. 103.
907
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 223.
908
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 185. Atkinson, Commentary on Curtius Books 3 & 4, p. 407. Shayeg’an,
Prosopographical Notes, p. 114. For a more detailed discussion of his career after the battle, see Heckel,
Prosopography, p. 168.
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Mithraustes
Mithraustes was a subordinate of Orontes who probably commanded the Armenian infantry.
909
He is not mentioned again in any of our sources, but given that the infantry was in the rear ranks
of the Persian right wing, he quite likely escaped the battle along with Orontes.
Ariaces
Heckel suggests that Ariaces “is perhaps a corruption of Ariarthes”, the ruler of Cappadocia in
Pontus, and that the Cappadocians at Gaugamela were from that region, and not survivors of the
Cappadocians at Issus.
910
As far as the course of the battle is concerned, the precise
identification of this unit and its commander is not significant. It is sufficient to note that they
came from Anatolia, whether Cappadocia or Cappadocia in Pontus.
If the name of the Cappadocian commander was Ariaces, then his fate is unknown and he may
well have died in the battle as his company was stationed in advance of the Persian right wing. If
they were actually led by Ariarthes, then we know survived the battle.
911
Slain and Survivors
One point of note in Arrian’s accounts of the earlier battles against the Persians was his lists of
the number of Persian commanders or other prominent Persians slain in the battles – seven at the
Granicus and five named at Issus.
By contrast, at Gaugamela we know that almost all of the named commanders, many more than
at the earlier battles, survived.
912
The fate of the rest, at most four, is unknown. Orontobates and
Bupares may well have died in battle. Mithraustes and Ariaces could well have survived.
This remarkable lack of attrition among the survivors could be another critical key to our
understanding of what actually happened at Gaugamela.
909
Otherwise unknown, Mithraustes may have led the Armenian infantry. Heckel, Prosopography, p. 168, citing
the suggestion of “Breve ii.262 (with n. 1)”.
910
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 44. See also Bosworth, Commentary 1, p. 291.
911
Since we know he was still alive in ruling his satrapy after the death of Alexander in 323. Curtius X. 21. 3.
Heckel, Prosopography, p. 44.
912
Bessus, Barsaentes, Ariobarzanes, Oxathres, Oxathres, son of Abulites, Satibarzanes, Narbarzanes, Oxathres,
Orsines, Phradates, Mazaeus, Atropates, and Orontes
246
© Kathleen D. Toohey 12/11/2019
Figure 15: Composite Map of Achaemenid Empire modified to show territorial origins of troops in Darius’ army at Gaugamela.)
95
95
The map outline is based on an online Encyclopaedia Britannica map; https://cdn.britannica.com/24/1724-050-428D0BAE/Egypt-part-Achaemenid-
Empire.jpg; with additional derived from other maps from the following sites:
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_the_Achaemenid_Empire.jpg from The Historical Atlas by William R. Shepherd, 1923.
http://www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/achaemenian_empire_map.htm; http://www.lloydthomas.org/1-IsraelTimeLine/Persian.htm
http://www.drben.net/ChinaReport/Sources/China_Maps/China_Empire_History/Map-Historic-Macedonian_empire_336_323BC.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cataonia#/media/File:Asia_Minor_in_the_Greco-Roman_period_-_general_map_-_regions_and_main_settlements.jpg
https://www.heritageinstitute.com/zoroastrianism/rawlinson/4babylon/images/map_vol2.jpg
