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Does Cultural Appropriation Cause Harm?
Dianne Lalonde, Western University, dlalond3@uwo.ca
Politics, Groups, and Identities Online First (Oct 2019)
Please cite published version.
Abstract: Cultural appropriation is often called a buzzword and dismissed as a concept
for serious engagement. Political theory, in particular, has been largely silent about
cultural appropriation. Such silence is strange considering that cultural appropriation is
clearly linked to key concepts in political theory such as culture, recognition, and
redistribution. In this paper, I utilize political theory to advance a harm-based account of
cultural appropriation. I argue that there are three potential harms with cultural
appropriation: (1) nonrecognition, (2) misrecognition, and (3) exploitation. Discerning
whether these harms are present or absent offers a means of placing specific instances
of cultural appropriation on a spectrum of harmfulness. I conclude by considering how
cultural appropriation, and associated appropriative harms, may be avoided.
Keywords: cultural appropriation, culture, cultural property, recognition, exploitation,
mascots, multiculturalism
Indigenous imagery and names have long been appropriated in the production of mascots,
logos, and company names, and there is a similarly extensive history of Indigenous Peoples
fighting against these appropriations. As early as 1968, the National Congress of American
Indians “began a campaign to address native stereotypes found in sports and media” (as
quoted in Black 2002, 605). Sports teams appropriating their names and mascots from
Indigenous Peoples is still commonplace though, and includes the Washington Redsk*ns,
Edmonton Eskimos, and Cleveland Indians. In particular, the Washington Redsk*ns derive their
name from a colonial term wherein Indigenous Peoples were labeled “red” as a racial identifier
and it is commonly considered a racial slur. Legal battles over the Redsk*ns name have been
ongoing for more than 25 years. At one point, it seemed like the activism against the Redsk*ns
had worked as the United States Patent and Trademark Office canceled the Washington
Redsk*ns trademark registration in 2014 citing it as disparaging (Baca 2004; Phillips 2017). Still,
many of these team names and mascots have proven durable as even that trademark decision
was later vacated in 2018 since the law it depended on was found unconstitutional. Through all
this, the Washington Redsk*ns have retained their name and their logo that is meant to look
like an Indigenous man with brown skin and feathers in his hair. Fans often dress up as the
Redsk*ns logo and other mascots by donning feather headdresses, braids, and painted skin (see
Figure 1).
Figure 1. A photo from the 2014 Indians’ home opener against the Minnesota Twins. A protest
against the Cleveland team’s name and Chief Wahoo logo was organized by the local chapter of
the American Indian Movement (AIM). Pictured left is Robert Roche, a Chiricahua Apache tribe
member. Pictured right is a Cleveland Indians baseball fan who is not Indigenous. The Chief
Wahoo logo was later retired in October 2018, due in part to AIM’s efforts, although the
Cleveland Indians have not changed their name.
Note: Image is reprinted with permission. Photo taken by Peter Pattakos (2014).
While the number of sports teams with appropriated Indigenous imagery and names
has dropped, there are still a significant amount of these teams present and debate continues
about whether these teams, and appropriation more generally, is harmful and, if it is harmful,
in what way. That there remains so much confusion about appropriation is disturbing as
“[p]erhaps the scariest of racial stereotypes and prejudices arise when the public cannot
recognize such ills” (Black 2002, 608). Political theory is uniquely situated to clarify this
confusion due to it being concerned with political issues of recognition and redistribution.
This paper aims to fill the gap of political theory work on cultural appropriation by
contributing to current literature in three main ways. First, this paper uses the politics of
recognition to consider the potential harms of nonrecognition, misrecognition, and
exploitation. These harms relating to lack of recognition have not been sufficiently explored in
cultural appropriation literature and, accordingly, the political dimension of these harms has
been missing. Second, it confronts political theory with the issue of cultural appropriation and
how it impacts political understandings of culture, recognition, and redistribution. It serves as a
call to action for political theory, and political science more broadly, to investigate cultural
appropriation. Third, this paper offers a means of determining the harmfulness of cultural
appropriation through the exploration of whether an instance of cultural appropriation results
in nonrecognition, misrecognition, and exploitation. Rather than a strict demarcation, this
paper argues that there is a spectrum between the most to least harmful instances of cultural
appropriation.
In what follows, this paper first situates itself in current understandings of culture,
cultural property, and cultural appropriation. Defining these terms will allow for a more
thorough analysis of the potential harmfulness of cultural appropriation. Next, it explores the
specific harms that cultural appropriation may result in: nonrecognition, misrecognition, and
exploitation. These harms are explored through a continuation of the example of companies
and sports teams appropriating Indigenous imagery and names. Introducing the politics of
recognition, specifically G. W. F. Hegel and Frantz Fanon, to cultural appropriation offers a new
way to understand and describe what cultures experience when their cultural property is
appropriated. Lack of recognition can result in serious harms to cultures as they are silenced,
made invisible, and stereotyped. After, the harm of exploitation is unpacked, and specific
instances are presented. This section addresses how cultural appropriation is related to
dispossession and can result in the loss of potential economic revenue and commodification.
These three harms are then combined to explore the overall harmfulness of appropriation.
Finally, suggestions are offered about how best to avoid cultural appropriation and
appropriative harms.
Before moving on, it is important to note that harmful cultural appropriation claims
most often come from marginalized cultures and that these claims carry a heightened
normative importance. Marginalization occurs when a group is treated as insignificant,
unimportant, and unworthy of respect. Means of marginalization are both direct and indirect
including discrimination, social exclusion, and violence. Marginalized groups are particularly
susceptible to cultural appropriation as they are denied the recognition and resources afforded
to others and, indeed, we see the vast majority of cultural appropriation claims coming from
marginalized cultures. As such, it is important to consider the context of cultural appropriation
claims and how they relate to broader socio-economic and political struggles; not to do so
would be to fundamentally misconstrue the debate as one occurring between two parties with
the same opportunities and, therefore, to play into the further oppression of marginalized
groups.
Defining culture, cultural property, and cultural appropriation
In order to consider whether cultural appropriation is harmful, it is necessary to understand
cultural appropriation and the closely associated concepts of culture and cultural property.
Since a more thorough examination of these terms is beyond the scope of this paper, I pull
from common definitions while qualifying and identifying potential problems as necessary.
Charles Taylor describes culture as having “a language and a set of practices which define
specific understandings of personhood, social relations, states of mind/soul, goods and bads,
virtues and vices, and the like” (1992, 205). I would add that cultures are not static, but hybrid.
Whether it be due to interactions with new peoples, technologies, or environments, cultures
rarely remain the same throughout time. A culture that attempted to stay eternally true to one
definition of itself would seem to be problematic as it would involve essentializing the culture
to match one reified definition and policing cultural members to match that definition (Appiah
2005; Benhabib 2002). Culture does not, however, need to be defined in an essentialist way if
the hybrid nature of culture is recognized. Alan Patten, for instance, promotes a non-
essentialist definition of culture that focuses on social lineage or how culture is “constituted by
the exposure by some group of people to a common and distinctive set of formative
conditions” (2011, 741).
There are a number of normative justifications for culture including those from
communitarians (Taylor 1992) and liberals (Kymlicka 1995), in addition to others who are
concerned with the resulting oppression when people’s freedom to things like culture is
interfered with or denied (Pettit 1997). These accounts take the view that culture carries
meaning for individuals and so the ability to engage with one’s culture must be secured. Will
Kymlicka, for instance, argues that culture is a primary good (1995). Primary goods are:
various social conditions and all-purpose means that are generally necessary to enable
citizens adequately to develop and fully exercise their two moral powers [capacities for
a sense of justice and a conception of the good], and to pursue their determinate
conception of the good. (Rawls 2001, 57)
Since primary goods are something that all individuals want, even on a “thin” conception of the
good, it is possible to assess how just a society is based on the distribution of these primary
goods. Culture being denied, degraded, or destroyed is thus harmful, while culture being
protected helps to promote an individual’s ability to pursue their idea of the good and,
therefore, their agency.
A strong element in the persistence and growth of culture is cultural property. It is in
part through cultural property that cultures are able to protect and embody their specific
understandings of the world, including the possible sacredness of certain pieces of property.
Janna Thompson defines cultural property as:
Something is the cultural property of a collectivity if and only if a) it was legitimately
acquired by the collective or its members – that is, not taken without consent or
justification from others — or possession of it has been made legitimate by changes in
circumstances; b) the item plays an important role in the religious, cultural or political
life of people of the collectivity by functioning as a symbol of collective ideals, a source
of identity for its members, as a ceremonial object, a focus of historical meaning, an
expression of their achievements, or as a link with founders or ancestors. (2003, 252)
Questions around cultural property include how a culture could own property and how
ownership is ascertained (Brown 2003; Coombe 1998; Mezey 2007). While a fuller discussion
on determining cultural property is not possible here, I do not believe it should hinder our
consideration of appropriative harms. Understanding how and why cultural appropriation could
be harmful may indeed help us in more detailed conversations around ownership of cultural
property. Furthermore, there are instances, as detailed herein, where it is accepted that
something is cultural property but the harmfulness of appropriating that property is denied.
Cultural appropriation is often defined as the “taking – from a culture that is not one’s
own – of intellectual property, cultural expressions and artifacts, history and ways of
knowledge” (Keeshig-Tobias 1992). There are at least three forms of cultural appropriation
identified in the literature: subject appropriation, content appropriation, and tangible object
appropriation (Young 2008). Subject appropriation consists of a representation of culture by an
outsider, for instance a cultural outsider writing a book about the culture. Content
appropriation involves an outsider presenting cultural property as their own or utilizing pieces
of cultural property for their work. Appropriation of Indigenous imagery and names for team
names and mascots is an example of content appropriation. Finally, tangible object
appropriation occurs when an outsider takes physical items from the culture. Tangible object
appropriation is one of the most well-known forms of cultural appropriation. Its history stems
from the taking of land, artifacts, and human remains; many of which are now in museums.
Three potential harms of cultural appropriation
The harms detailed below are intertwined, though not necessarily so, and mutually reinforcing.
I separate out these harms, however, as they are not reducible to one another. That is to say,
the exploitation cultures experience is not exclusively due to cultural nonrecognition or
misrecognition. Likewise, there may be cases where cultures experience nonrecognition or
misrecognition without consequent exploitation. Distinguishing between these harms and
whether or not each is occurring can help in determining the potential harmfulness of cultural
appropriation.
Recognition
To understand why nonrecognition and misrecognition are harmful, one must first have an idea
of what recognition is and what it confers. Theorists of recognition largely draw on Hegel. In
comparison to a social ontology that views individuals as formed prior to social interaction,
Hegel notes that identity is formed in dialogue with others (1977). He writes that “[s]elf-
consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-
consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or ‘recognized’” (Hegel 1977,
178). What Hegel is referring to is the way in which knowledge of oneself relies, in part, on
recognition from others. It is through engagement with others and other’s perceptions that an
individual comes to form an understanding of themselves. That is not to say other’s
formulations about the individual fully determine that individual’s consciousness. Rather, the
individual reworks and plays with these materials. Hegel’s contribution to political theory was
to assert the impact that others have on consciousness. Individuals are not formed in
separation from others around them, they are a negotiated presence amongst them.
Since a sense of personhood relies on recognition, denial of recognition can feel like
self-negation and carries significant personal and social consequences. Nancy Fraser argues that
“[t]he ‘struggle for recognition’ is fast becoming the paradigmatic form of political conflict in
the late twentieth century. Demands for ‘recognition of difference’ fuel struggles of groups
mobilized under the banners of nationality, ethnicity, ‘race,’ gender, and sexuality” (1995, 68).
These demands come in response to the denial of recognition through nonrecognition and
misrecognition. For our purposes, we will focus on cultural nonrecognition and misrecognition.
Nonrecognition occurs when a culture is rendered voiceless or invisible through structural
power relations. Misrecognition, on the other hand, arises when cultural groups are routinely
labeled in a skewed and disrespectful way. Often, misrecognition involves the production and
use of stereotypes. Taylor argues that both nonrecognition and misrecognition constitute harm
as:
our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition
of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if
the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or
contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm,
can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced
mode of being. (1992, 25)
Fanon further captures how people suffer psychological harm when others ignore or demean
them since this lack of recognition or distorted recognition can become internalized and result
in self-loathing (2008).
Nonrecognition
There are two main processes of nonrecognition that can be present with cultural
appropriation: voicelessness and invisibility. The aphonia or voicelessness that occurs in
nonrecognition can be seen as a form of epistemic injustice as cultural members’ epistemic
contributions regarding their culture and cultural property is prejudicially denied or ignored
(McConkey 2004). In cultural appropriation, it is specifically cultural property ownership claims
that are denied. While it is possible, and necessary, to question cultural property and
appropriation claims, nonrecognition involves ignoring the claim and appropriating the material
without regard to the culture. Cultures reasonably have a concern here as their proposed
property claims are being prejudicially discounted. Of particular concern is the background
relations of power as it is mainly the property claims of marginalized cultures that are not
respected. Akin to the land taken through past and current colonial acts, cultural property is
believed to be unowned and available. Deborah Root argues the assumption of availability in
cultural appropriation is due to a sense of entitlement – “If we think we already own
something, why would we ask anybody’s permission to take it?” (1996, 72). We is relevant here
as it is the privileged who determine what is available for the taking while other voices are
silenced or ignored.
Invisibility, in comparison to voicelessness, focuses on how cultural groups are erased in
the media and more broadly in society. Referring back to the appropriation of Indigenous
imagery and names by sports teams, it is important to consider the overall lack of media
representations of Indigenous Peoples, both in quantity and quality (Mastro et al. 2015). The
psychology of invisibility developed by Stephanie Fryberg and Sarah Townsend shows how a
lack of representation in the media can limit the social identities available to a person (2008).
Individuals are formed in part through their engagement with the social environment and the
possible ways of being that are presented to them. Lack of media representation can,
therefore, constrain the amount of ideas or images individuals have to orient themselves in the
world (Fryberg and Eason 2017). Some groups, like white individuals, have an abundance of
contemporary representations in media, so they have multiple references for ways of being
(e.g., artist, doctor, teacher, scientist). In comparison, Indigenous Peoples are commonly
portrayed as eighteenth century figures like Pocahontas or a warlike figure. A content analysis
of the 345 most viewed US primetime television shows between 1987 and 2008 found that only
3 regular characters out of 2336 (0.001%) were Indigenous (Tukachinsky, Mastro, and Yarchi
2015). There is a dual consequence for this lack of recognition that impacts both Indigenous
Peoples and other’s understandings of Indigenous Peoples:
These historical omissions keep Natives from recognizing that the struggles their group
experiences are based on an ongoing process of oppression, rather than their own
individual shortcomings; and non-Native individuals may not recognize the ways in
which their attitudes and actions may be biased by a sterilized history that romanticizes
the relationship between Native Americans and European Americans. (Fryberg and
Eason 2017, 556)
Nonrecognition results in cultural members and their epistemic contributions not being
acknowledged. It propagates dispossession as cultural property is seen as available for the
taking and it heightens misrecognition as there are not various voices and ways of being
available to combat stereotypes.
Misrecognition
Misrecognition occurs when a culture is essentialized or confined to a set of properties. Often,
misrecognition takes the form of stereotypes. When these stereotypes are pervasive, they are
extremely difficult to contest as they seem natural and, thus, unnoticeable. Daniel Hausman
finds that:
Stereotyping harms members of some identifying group mainly by affecting the beliefs
and hence the actions of non-group members … it operates on a structured group
mainly by influencing the attitudes of group members or by changing the material
circumstances with which the group must deal. (2008, 161)
The possible consequences of stereotyping are threefold: (1) it causes non-group members to
view the group stereotypically, (2) it influences group members to view themselves and the
group in a stereotypical manner, and (3) it changes the sociopolitical environment within which
the group lives and works.
Consider the case of sports teams appropriating their names and mascots from
Indigenous Peoples. These teams tend to promote the image of Indigenous Peoples as warlike
fighters or noble savages (Black 2002). A study by John Chaney, Amanda Burke, and Edward
Burkley found that individuals often have a negative implicit bias toward these mascots as
people find them unpleasant (2011). Their finding contradicts claims that these mascots honor
and appreciate Indigenous Peoples. Their study further sought to see if the negative implicit
bias towards mascots would lead to stereotyping of American Indian people. To do so, they
measured participants’ implicit bias towards American Indian mascots and then told
participants that they would be working with an American Indian partner to complete a variety
of tasks. They found that a negative stereotype bias toward American Indian mascots predicted
how participants assumed their American Indian partner would enjoy nonacademic tasks
(cultural and environmental tasks) over academic tasks (math and verbal tasks). Furthermore,
those who held a stronger negative bias towards American Indian mascots were more likely to
perceive their American Indian partner in a stereotypical manner. Their findings show how
stereotypes, even when not explicitly known or stated, affect the lives of others. In this study,
the impacts directly relate to educational and occupational limitations as Indigenous Peoples
are less likely to be considered as enjoying academic tasks. In other cases, the impacts of
misrecognition through stereotyping could include an increased risk of imprisonment, child
welfare involvement, physical and mental health concerns, and (re)victimization.
When misrecognition becomes internalized, it can lead individuals to feel shame and
self-loathing. A study by Stephanie Fryberg, Hazel Markus, Daphna Oyserman, and Joseph Stone
found that exposure to stereotypical Indigenous mascots and representations (including
Pocahontas and Chief Wahoo, former mascot of the Cleveland Indians) led to American Indian
high school and college students feeling lower personal and community worth and having lower
achievement-related expectancies (2008). To understand how internalization occurs, it is useful
to turn to Fanon (2008). Although Fanon’s work explores how misrecognition occurs in the
context of race, his work applies to culture and has been used by Glen Sean Coulthard (2014)
and Taylor (1992) in cultural analysis. Fanon argues that misrecognition has been an intentional
weapon of colonizers and oppressors. These groups impose an image of inferiority upon
perceived others by misrecognizing others while promoting the superiority of themselves. As an
exemplification, Fanon describes an experience where a white child he passed on the street
said: “Look, a N*gro” followed by “Maman, look, a N*gro; I’m scared!” (2008, 91). Fanon says
that self-objectification is the result as “incapable of confronting the Other, the white man,
who had no scruples about imprisoning me, I transported myself on that particular day far, very
far, from myself, and gave myself up as an object” (1992, 92). The objectification or
depersonalization of people denies their own creation of meaning. In Fanon’s case, he shares
that “Since I realize that the black man is the symbol of sin, I start hating the black man. But I
realize that I am a black man” (2008, 174). This internalization of the oppressor’s prejudicial and
hateful gaze can result in self-loathing and shame. It is, therefore, extremely limiting and
harmful to well-being and self-esteem.
Nonrecognition and misrecognition through appropriation create a hostile environment
wherein cultural groups are silenced or made invisible, and subject to stereotypes that impact
their self-recognition and the recognition of others. Imbalanced access to resources furthers
the impacts of appropriation as marginalized groups often do not have the social, political, and
economic resources available to constantly battle nonrecognition and misrecognition. Still,
many cultures have fought back against cultural appropriation and asserted their cultural
understandings. One way we can see this is through the numerous repatriation claims made to
have cultural property returned to cultures, including the activism that led to the passage of the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (Greenfield 2007; Gunn 2010).
Another way is through the continued activism aimed at ending the appropriation of Indigenous
imagery and names for mascots and logos (Wilbur and Keene 2019). Cultural appropriation, like
other tools of oppression, can threaten and harm cultural groups but many cultural groups have
shown their resilience in the face of such threats. Still, cultural resilience does not undermine
the necessity of addressing the threat of appropriation and challenging oppression.
Before moving on to exploitation, it is worthwhile to pause and consider the objection
that cultural appropriation is not harmful since it is done in appreciation of the culture and
therefore offers the cultural group recognition. News outlets in particular often frame the issue
of cultural appropriation as one of “Appreciation versus Appropriation” (Estrada 2016; Hosie
2018). By taking Indigenous imagery and names, corporations are said to be recognizing the
beauty of the culture and promoting cultural understanding. Redsk*ns owner Daniel Snyder has
stated that “the name really means honor, respect” (ESPN 2014). Going a step further, it could
be argued that not engaging in cultural appropriation is a form of nonrecognition since the
contributions of cultures are not being recognized by outsiders.
However, the harms of nonrecognition and misrecognition give us strong reasons for
doubting if cultural appropriation does engage in cultural appreciation and meaningful
recognition. An individual painting their face and wearing a headdress to be like a mascot does
not necessarily mean they will be aware of dilemmas faced by Indigenous Peoples. There is no
automatic connection between engaging in cultural appropriation and knowing about or caring
for the cultural group. While putting on a costume, for instance, may be an attempt to engage
with or “try on” the culture, it is done on the terms of the appropriator and their interests.
Furthermore, it is often done without an awareness of how cultural members may have been
historically or are currently being denied the ability to express their culture. My account of
appropriative harms allows us to respond to this objection by noting that recognition requires
avoiding nonrecognition and misrecognition. Simply donning cultural apparel that one deems
beautiful or that one appreciates is not recognition.
Exploitation
Exploitation is strongly related to recognition as material conditions, like distributive injustice,
underlay recognition struggles (Fraser 2000). Exploitation occurs when cultural property is
unfairly taken in a way that harms cultural members, while benefitting the appropriator.
Exploitation, in this case, is structural since what matters is not only an unfair transaction
between two parties, where say one cultural piece is undervalued in a face-to-face transaction,
but rather a structural imbalance of power produced by injustice in the political and social
environment (Zwolinski 2012). Appropriation masks power imbalances as it appears that
society is accepting the culture since cultural imagery and names are being sold and shared
widely but, in reality, these cultural materials may not reflect the culture accurately and most
often do not financially benefit the culture. Exploitation theory is useful in showing how
situations, like appropriation, that may appear to be just can indeed be harmful. I will focus on
two exploitative harms: loss of economic potential and commodification.
Loss of economic potential occurs when cultural property is “wrongfully exploited for
financial gain” (Ziff and Rao 1997, 14). The volume of economic potential taken could be very
significant and even a driving force behind cultural appropriation, as evidenced in Joane
Cardinal-Schubert’s statement: “Money, that is what appropriating is about. Whether the issue
is land or art or iconography or ceremonial reliquiae, the focus of the deprivation is money”
(1997, 122). Currently, profit is gained through the cultural appropriation of knowledge,
medicines, exercises, spiritual practices, names, stories, styles of art, and pieces of tangible
property sold or kept in museums. Even if cultures that were appropriated from did try to get
into the market at this point, they would likely not be able to compete with large companies in
producing and disseminating distinctive goods from their culture (Perreault 2003; Radcliffe
2006).
Appropriation from Indigenous Peoples for team names and mascots is, no doubt,
related to money. These teams do not treat Indigenous Peoples as a contemporary group, but
as a cipher for making money (Black 2002). One blatant example of this treatment is the
appropriation of Chief Illiniwek, the former mascot of the University of Illinois at Urbana–
Champaign, in the production of toilet paper. Clem Iron Wing, an Illini Native, shares that:
The eagle feather (which accompanies Chief Illiniwek) is the primary religious symbol of
the American Indian. We would like to know how many persons of faith would like their
religious symbols used to wipe human excrement?…Remember the brown stain on the
eagle feather and you will know what their honor means. (as quoted in Black 2002, 612)
While corporations claim that they are respecting or honoring Indigenous Peoples through
appropriation, examples like this call into question if appropriation is little more than a money-
making tactic.
A further example can be found in appropriations of Indigenous imagery and names by
Urban Outfitters, a lifestyle retailer based in the USA (Keene 2010; Riley and Carpenter 2016).
Often under the label of “Navajo,” they have dreamcatchers, moccasins, totem poles,
Pendleton blankets, and headdresses (see Figure 2). Many of these pieces by Urban Outfitters
were not commissioned by those in the Indigenous community and the profits did not go back
to Indigenous Peoples. When Urban Outfitters takes and sells these products without
consultation and consent of the culture, they seize a large source of potential direct revenue
from the culture (CBC Unreserved 2016). They also make it more difficult and competitive for
the Navajo Nation to sell distinctive goods with their name due to overcrowding and
competition. Indeed, the Navajo Nation sued Urban Outfitters for trademark dilution in 2012
but their claims were denied as Navajo was deemed not famous enough to be eligible for
protection (Moynihan 2018).
Figure 2. Screenshot of items labelled “Navajo” and sold by Urban Outfitters.
Note: Image is reprinted with permission. Screenshot taken by CULTURS (Patrick 2014).
Commodification, on the other hand, has more to do with how cultural property is
transformed into a commodity through appropriation. Commodification is explored by Michael
Sandel in his book What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (2012). Sandel notes
two objections to commodification: the fairness objection and the corruption objection. The
fairness objection captures how some individuals may be forced to sell their cultural property
as a result of the dire circumstances they are placed under due to colonialism, imperialism, and
other forms of oppression. It may be dealt with through the establishment of fair bargaining
conditions and consent. Going back to the case of Urban Outfitters, they did eventually reach a
settlement with the Navajo Nation regarding their use of the “Navajo” name in the marketing
of their products. While the details of the settlement are largely unknown, one piece agreed on
was that the Navajo Nation would collaborate with Urban Outfitters to produce jewelry (Landry
2006). Here, the Navajo nation seemed most concerned about fairness. The production of
Navajo necklaces was not objectionable. What was problematic was the lack of consultation,
involvement, and reciprocity with the Navajo people.
The corruption objection, on the other hand, rejects the commodification of cultural
property even if the background bargaining conditions are fair. When cultural property is
bought and sold on the market, the property is encoded with market values and seen as a tool
for profit. These market values can conflict with how the culture values the property as
something meaningful or sacred. For instance, the appropriated Indigenous headdresses and
war bonnets that are on mascots and donned by sports fans carry deep spiritual significance to
many Indigenous Peoples, so they are not something to be bought and sold for everyday use
(Keene 2010). When cultural property that is deemed to be uncommodifiable is taken and
commodified, cultures have the ability to protect what is deemed to be most sacred to them
hindered thus resulting in nonrecognition, misrecognition, and exploitation all at once.
The tendency to take and commodify cultural property is not an isolated phenomenon,
but part of a broader system of dispossession. Rosa Luxemburg argues that the accumulation of
capital requires that:
Force, fraud, oppression, looting are openly displayed without any attempt at
concealment, and it requires an effort to discover within this tangle of political violence
and contests of power the stern laws of the economic process. Bourgeois liberal theory
takes into account only the former aspect: “the realm of peaceful competition”, the
marvels of technology and pure commodity exchange; it separates it strictly from the
other aspect: the realm of capital’s blustering violence which is regarded as more or less
incidental to foreign policy and quite independent of the economic sphere of capital.
(1968, 453)
Luxemburg highlights how appropriation is often guised in the rhetoric of cultural sharing or
commodity exchange, when it is, in fact, only obtained through dispossession. Her point again
challenges those who argue that appropriation is an example of cultural sharing or appreciation
(Page 2017). Those promoting this view tend to present appropriation as occurring in cultural
markets where merchants willingly share their distinctive goods and histories. To them,
appropriation is a positive aspect of globalization and enables creativity and innovation (Lessig
2008). Rather than a positive exchange, Luxemburg shows how appropriation is part of ongoing
colonial and imperial practices where groups have their bodies, land, and property violently
taken from them. Instead of promoting creativity and innovation, appropriation simply steals
and reproduces cultural property.
Overall, we should be wary when seeing cultural goods up for sale. Who is it that
produced the good? Who is receiving the profits from the sale? Were fair bargaining conditions
in place? Is it something that should be sold? The answers to these questions result in serious
consequences for cultures that face exploitation due to loss of economic potential and
commodification.
Combining the three potential harms
The three potential harms I identify must fit into a broader account of harm to explain why
cultural appropriation may be harmful. One popular account of harm is consequentialism
wherein actions are judged by the consequences they produce. The three potential harms and
their consequences detailed herein would seem substantial enough on a consequentialist
account for cultural appropriation to be considered harmful, especially given that the cultures
appropriated from are likely to be those most marginalized. I believe that other accounts of
harm would similarly come to this conclusion. For example, consider the counterfactual
account of harm where harm is a wrongful setback to interests (Feinberg 1984, 36). If we have
an interest in being recognized, as Hegel argues we do, then misrecognition and nonrecognition
are a setback. We furthermore all have an interest in economic security, so appropriation from
marginalized cultures who are often in a precarious financial position is obviously a setback to
their interests.
Judging if cultural appropriation is harmful, and potentially how harmful, requires
considering whether the potential harms listed herein are present. Each potential harm may
not be present in every case of cultural appropriation. Furthermore, how the potential harm
operates within individual cases of cultural appropriation may differ as well. It may be, for
instance, that some cases of cultural appropriation are extremely exploitative due to their
explicit and undeniable commodification of cultural property and that these cases also engage
in blatant nonrecognition and misrecognition through prejudicial stereotypes. Other cases, in
comparison, maybe more blurred so that there appears to be recognition but there is still
exploitation as profits do not go to the culture recognized. As such, the application of these
potential harms will look different depending on the case of cultural appropriation under
examination. This is a benefit to my theory as it has the ability to analyze and respond to
diverse cases of appropriation, as opposed to saying that cultural appropriation is always
equally harmful.
Overall, my account of the potential harms in cultural appropriation takes seriously that
cultural appropriation is a distinct phenomenon that needs to be addressed. My claim differs
from other cultural appropriation scholars like James Young who argue that cultural
appropriation may not result in oppression or that it only does so to a limited extent. Young
states that:
Some people will find my conclusions objectionable on the ground (which I
acknowledged at the outset of this essay) that appropriation from indigenous cultures is
common and these cultures are often terribly disadvantaged. This oppression is
deplorable but the appropriation of artistic content has contributed comparatively little
to the oppression of indigenous peoples. (2008, 152)
Young argues that the real issue is not appropriation but the marginalization or oppression of
Indigenous groups. What he misses is how appropriation is a tool of oppression with a distinct
history and means of operating. Cultural appropriation carries very real dangers in the form of
nonrecognition (voicelessness and invisibility), misrecognition (stereotyping and self-loathing),
and exploitation (potential economic loss and commodification). Any worthwhile account of
appropriation must, therefore, deal with and respond to these specific harms even though they
operate within a broader context of oppression.
How to avoid cultural appropriation
A question remains about whether cultural appropriation, and its associated harms, could ever
be completely avoided. One suggested way to avoid cultural appropriation is to seek permission
to use cultural property. In order to assess how gaining permission impacts the potential
harmfulness of cultural appropriation, it is useful to investigate an example. Based on a real-life
scenario, the Intellectual Property Issues in Cultural Heritage Project explores a case study of
Indigenous imagery and names being appropriated by game designers (2015). The game
designers wanted to create a board game about Māori warriors and sought permission from a
Māori elected official for their project. By seeking permission, the game creators better enabled
recognition to occur since the Māori were acknowledged so nonrecognition was addressed.
There was also the possibility to address misrecognition as the culture could grant permission
only when they are being properly recognized without stereotypes. The harm least likely to be
addressed through permission is exploitation. While seeking permission can minimally ensure
that the cultural property is not something that should not be commodified, it does not
necessarily involve the sharing of economic benefits.
Although seeking permission to take cultural property is certainly better than not doing
so, there are still a number of issues that permission alone does not address. First, as already
detailed, a lot depends on how permission is gained including whether there is review for
misrecognition and whether financial benefits are shared. These are not pieces that permission
can guarantee. Second, permission may not always be gained in a free and fair way. Sandel
highlighted the necessity of fair bargaining conditions with his focus on the fairness objection
(2012). If the background conditions are such that the group is forced to give permission due to
financial constraints or undue pressure, then permission was not fairly gained. Third, there may
be questions about whether the person or organization granting permission has the authority
to speak on behalf of the culture. This issue came up in the Māori warrior board game case
study (Intellectual Property Issues in Cultural Heritage Project 2015). When the game was
released, there were a series of problems including misspellings of Māori names, the
problematic inclusion of sacred deities, and some non-Māori motifs. Questions arose about
who would permit the game and it came out that permission was only obtained by an individual
who was not regarded as a cultural steward and so was unauthorized to grant permission. Thus,
what seemed like a promising instance of avoiding cultural appropriation turned out to still
have harmful effects.
The difficulty with obtaining permission points to the complexity, but not impossibility,
of avoiding cultural appropriation. The best way to ensure that cultural appropriation is not
harmful is to put the work into building cultural knowledge, fostering relationships, and
following cultural protocols; these are pieces that the game developers above missed. An
example where cultural appropriation was avoided is the video game Never Alone (also known
as Kisima Ingitchuna in Iñupiaq) initiated by the Cook Inlet Tribal Council (March 2015). The
Council partnered with E-Line Media, a non-Indigenous owned company, to produce a game
based on an Iñupiaq story “Kunuuksaayuk” that they gained permission to share and alter. The
Council was motivated to create Never Alone to become “more financially self-sufficient” and to
transfer “cultural knowledge from one generation to the next” (March 2015). These
motivations speak directly to what is lost when something is appropriated: potential financial
gain (exploitation) and recognition.
Never Alone does not seem like an instance of cultural appropriation because there was
partnership from beginning to end. It was the Council that initiated the relationship with the
company, there was extensive consultation throughout, and the release of the product was
done under E-Line Media and Upper One Games, the first Indigenous-owned game company
created with help from the Council. In creating the game, there was a cultural ambassador, Amy
Fredeen, and the lead writer, Ishmael Hope, was a storyteller and poet of Iñupiaq and Tlingit
heritage. The E-Line Media team also made visits to Alaska to hear stories and seek images for
the game, in addition to sharing their progress. Doing so involved some learning and changes as
ideas were discussed and reformulated. The Founder and President of E-Line Media shares
how: “When people hear about the game, they think that we went and made a game about the
Alaska Natives culture. That’s not really true. We made our game with our Alaska Native
partners” (Hudson 2015).
While Never Alone avoided cultural appropriation, the example also highlights how
easily a project can veer into harmful cultural appropriation. When the E-Line Media team first
started exploring Indigenous characters in video games, they found that “[i]t ran the gamut
from being terrible stereotypes to just appropriation” (March 2015). The most common
experience seems to be companies unilaterally deciding to use Indigenous imagery and names
without any consultation, recognition, or compensation. This could have been the case if E-Line
Media simply decided to create the story or use the story without partnership. Another issue is
when permission or discussion occurs at the beginning of the process but does not continue
throughout the project. For example, E-Line Media Producer Matt Swanson shared how the
villain of the game changed from a raven after input from the community:
As Westerners, we have lots of stories where [the raven] is a trickster character, and
things like that. And they pushed back on that and said, ‘Look, that’s not really culturally
appropriate. The raven in our culture is a much more sort of sacred character’. (March
2015)
If that review and partnership were not present then the resulting product could have involved
harmful cultural appropriation even with permission. What seems to make the difference then
is not exclusively permission but full and equitable partnership.
Ultimately the best way to avoid appropriative harms is to avoid cultural appropriation.
Doing so involves partnership from conception to completion of the product or project. It is
through acknowledgement and consultation that misrecognition and nonrecognition can be
avoided. Likewise, partnership can ensure that the property is something that can be
commodified without corruption and that there is sharing of the economic benefits.
Interestingly, what seems to have worked in terms of the partnership for Never Alone also
aligns with existing work on Community-Based Participatory Research (CBPR) that focuses on
“collaborative, equitable partnership in all phases” and “co-learning and capacity building
among all partners” (Israel et al. 2012). Engagement with CBPR work and principles may,
therefore, be a fruitful avenue for future considerations on how to avoid cultural appropriation,
especially as it relates to academic research and writing (Haig-Brown 2010).
Conclusion
This paper has answered the question: Does cultural appropriation cause harm? I identify three
potential harms: nonrecognition, misrecognition, and exploitation. Nonrecognition and
misrecognition pull on Hegelian notions of how individuals are dialogically formed and how a
lack of recognition or misrecognition can be harmful. When cultures are seen as no more than
mascots and when cultures are stereotyped, they are dehumanized. There is no need to know
or understand them because meaning is imposed upon them. Exploitation is a related harm in
that outsiders profit from the efforts and labor of cultures while denying them any benefits.
Cultural property is commodified for financial gain regardless of the culture’s desires, and the
money goes to those outside of the culture. These three potential harms serve as a guideline to
understand and assess instances of cultural appropriation. They lead to the finding that cultural
appropriation is harmful, despite claims that cultural appropriation recognizes and appreciates
cultures.
Generally, addressing the potential harms of cultural appropriation requires broad
social, political, and economic reform. For cultures, they need to, and already do, fight against
nonrecognition, misrecognition, and exploitation by asserting and reaffirming their self-
determination (Eason, Brady, and Fryberg 2018). Doing so can involve several means including
awareness campaigns, intellectual property rights, and activism. For those who are engaging in
cultural appropriation, or attempting to avoid it, there is a need to partner with cultures. As
shown, it is through partnership that the harms identified can be avoided. For policy makers
and lawyers, there is a need to work with cultures to consider if and how we can use law and
policy to protect against these harms. For researchers, there is a need to investigate and
challenge cultural appropriation, including how it occurs in academic institutions. For
consumers, there is a need to investigate and be aware of what they are buying, where it is
coming from, and who is benefitting from its sale. This paper contributes to these efforts by
offering the tools to name and describe the potential harms associated with cultural
appropriation and by suggesting a means through which cultural appropriation can be avoided.
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