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Editors
José Miranda Justo
Paulo Alexandre Lima
Fernando M. F. Silva
QUESTIONING
THE ONENESS
OF PHILOSOPHY
I. PHILOSOPHY AND THE ARTS
II. PHILOSOPHY, GENDER AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE
CENTRE FOR PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LISBON
2018
4th Workshop of the Project
Experimentation and Dissidence
Editors
José Miranda Justo
Paulo Alexandre Lima
Fernando M. F. Silva
CENTRE FOR PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LISBON
2018
QUESTIONING
THE ONENESS OF PHILOSOPHY
I. PHILOSOPHY AND THE ARTS
II. PHILOSOPHY, GENDER AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE
4TH WORKSHOP OF THE PROJECT
EXPERIMENTATION AND DISSIDENCE
TITLE
Questioning the Oneness of Philosophy
I. Philosophy and the Arts II. Philosophy, Gender and Sexual Difference
4th Workshop of the Project Experimentation and Dissidence
AUTHORS
José Miranda Justo, Paulo Alexandre Lima, Fernando M. F. Silva
PUBLISHER
© Centre for Philosophy at the University of Lisbon and Authors, 2018.
This book or parts thereof cannot be reproduced under any form, even
electronically, without the explicit consent of the editors and its authors.
TRANSLATION AND TEXT REVISION
Fernando M. F. Silva, Paulo Alexandre Lima, Helena Leuschner,
Miguel Novais Rodrigues, Sara Eckerson
INDEX
Fernando M. F. Silva
COVER
Based on an image by João Pedro Lam
reproducing works by Egon Schiele and Leonardo da Vinci
GRAPHIC DESIGN
Catarina Aguiar
ISBN
978-989-8553-48-5
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
9 Introduction
I. PHILOSOPHY AND THE ARTS
17 “For Its Knowledge, as for Its Action, Man Needs an Infinite Progression.”
Hölderlin and the Concept of the Ideal of Knowledge
Fernando M. F. Silva
29 From Aesthetics to Philosophy of Art: Georg Simmel as a Reader of Kant
Adriana Veríssimo Serrão
41 The Relation Between Architecture and Philosophy
in the “Tragedy of Culture”
Maribel Mendes Sobreira
61 Did DADA Fail its Objectives? A Reaction Against Arguments
without Historical Perspective, and an Appraisal of the Dadaist
Contributions for a Philosophical Approach to Heterogeneity
José Miranda Justo
71 Calliope’s Sisters. Richard L. Anderson and the Nature of the Artwork
Carlos João Correia
81 Machines and “Empty and Oceanic Thought”:
Fernando Pessoa’s Doing and Being of the Self
Bartholomew Ryan
99 How to Know More about Mankind with Music, Theatre and Other Arts.
On Brecht’s Learning Plays
Vera San Payo de Lemos
113 Machine Thinking, Thinking Machine:
Considerations on Film as Artificial Intelligence
Christine Reeh Peters
127 The Audience, One Hundred Years after
Ana Pais
II. PHILOSOPHY, GENDER AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE
137 Feminism, Multiculturality and Women’s Rights: Some Questions
Maria Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira
151 The Politics of Trauma. Literary Visions – José Eduardo Agualusa’s Novel
Teoria Geral do Esquecimento (A General Theory of Oblivion)
Dagmar von Hoff
157 Wollstonecraft, an Enlightened Reader
Elisabete M. de Sousa
171 About a New Realism of the Sexual Difference
María Binetti
187 Can Gendered Creativity in the Visual Arts Be Politically Subversive?
Diana V. Almeida
203 Biocriminality and the Borders of Public Order
Pablo Pérez Navarro
215 On Emancipation as a Practice of Dissension
Sofia Roque
227 Contributors
233 INDEX
Questioning the Oneness of Philosophy 203
BIOCRIMINALITY
AND THE BORDERS OF PUBLIC ORDER1
Pablo Pérez Navarro
CES/UC
Abstract
In this presentation, I aim at exploring the notion of public order from a biopolitical
point of view. It draws on the analysis of the state of exception by Giorgio Agamben,
through which he studied the tendency of Western democracies to re-produce
forms of sovereign power that bypass parliamentary democratic control. Departing
from his analysis, I will argue that public order is one of the main forms through
which these forms of sovereign power disseminate in a microphysical form, in al-
most every instance of the judicial system. Moreover, in a similar vein that the state
of exception represents, for Agamben, a crucial dimension of the relation between
the order of life and the order of the law, public order represents, in my view, a
fundamental dispositive through which biopower regulates the social life of gender,
sexuality, reproduction and kinship.
Keywords
Public Order, Homonationalism, Biopolitics, Monogamy, Friendship.
Introduction
Since its irruption in European civil codes during the XIX century, the no-
tion of public became an essential part of state biopolitics of reproduction,
gender and kinship. Its common uses in the hands of governments, but
also jurors and other public officers entail the exercise of specific forms of
1 This study was funded by the European Research Council under the European Union’s
Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013)/ERC Grant Agreement ‘‘INTIMATE –
Citizenship, Care and Choice: The Micropolitics of Intimacy in Southern Europe’’ [338452].
Experimentation and Dissidence204
sovereign power, often surpassing the limits of any meaningful separation of
powers in Western liberal democracies. In this sense, while partly overlap-
ping with the logics of exceptionality explored by Giorgio Agamben (2005),
public order became the legal dispositif (Foucault, 1975, 133) through which
sovereign power and the logics of exceptionality disseminate in a micro-
physical form, in almost every instance of the administrative and judicial
structure of the nation state.
However, where refugee and other camps stand as paradigmatic het-
erotopias for the state of exception, the genealogy of public order bounds
this dispositif to the liberal institution of civil marriage. The order of public
order is thus, in the first place, that of the monogamous, heterosexual, re-
productive couple. This does not isolate, nonetheless, public order from the
biopolitical definition of borders, margins, and constitutive outsides of the
community or of the nation. On the contrary, the irruption of public order
in modern law as a tool for the normalization of marriage served, from its
inception, to put the performative power of the state at the service of de-
fending the community from alien, decaying, immoral relational practices.
The biopolitics of public order are, therefore, closely bound to the history
of Western racism and to the anti-migratory policies of the fortress Europe,
to which they belong as one of its most vague and inapprehensible, but still
ubiquitous and naturalized, constitutive elements.
Through the biopolitics of public order, queer reproductive projects,
non-monogamous migrants, transgender bodies, and other “biocriminals”
are subjected to moral and legal scrutiny. However, in the same way migra-
tory fluxes may be subjected to state and also transnational forms of ne-
glect and violence, but not stopped, so are dissident genders and relational
practices exposed to a differential distribution of vulnerability (Butler &
Athanasiou, 2013, 2) through institutional hostility and plain criminaliza-
tion, but not erased form in the cultural and political landscape. Usually,
we are more or less familiarized with the geopolitical causes leading to the
succession of the misleadingly called migratory “crisis.” In a similar way, we
may ask, what is this impulse rendering it impossible, at the end, for state in-
stitutions to contain the flux of emerging forms of relationality? What is the
topographical structure of that encounter or, rather, what kind of cartogra-
phies emerge from it? Moreover, how are we to conceive this failure of the
Questioning the Oneness of Philosophy 205
state in containing queer, racialized, biocriminal bodies in the strict margins
of recognition the state offers? Should we “open the borders” of liberal state
institutions regarding state control over kinship, gender and reproduction,
or should we, on the contrary, refuse altogether the terms of recognition
offered by the state? How can we best resist the order of public order?
In order to approach some of the questions raised by the encounter be-
tween biopower and resistance, or even the clash between assimilationist
and radical sexual politics, it may turn useful to explore the genealogical
relations between the biopolitics of public order and the racist, exclusion-
ary construction of Western nation states. In a similar manner to the way
Jasbir Puar did in Terrorist Assemblages (Puar, 2007), I will also depart
from Agamben’s criticism of the logics of exceptionalism, with the aim of
exposing some of its parallelisms, and differences, with the biopolitics of
public order as such. Then, I will also address the relation of contiguity or,
rather, of historical overlapping, between the biopolitics of public order and
the homonationalist frame. Finally, and in order to avoid the depiction of
the resulting biopolitical scenario as equivalent to that of the penal colony
(Foucault, 1975) or the totalitarian camp (Agamben, 2005) I will also ex-
plore the counter-biopolitical role played by the force of disestablishment
(Duggan, 1994) and the works of that form of biocriminality that Michel
Foucault referred to as friendship.
Abyssal cartographies
At the end of one of the most influent discussions of biopower Foucault
offered in his lectures at the College de France, he introduced a compelling
analysis of the relation between biopolitics and racism. If biopower is a gov-
ernmental rationality substituting the sovereign right to kill by state man-
agement of life, of populations considered primarily as an assemble of living
beings, then how do modern nation states justify, Foucault asks, their “need
to kill people, to kill populations, and to kill civilizations?” (Foucault, 2003,
257) For Foucault, this necropolitical side of biopower, as Mbembe would
call it, would not reside in a different or a complementary governmental
rationality. In his view, the category that makes it possible for the economy
of biopower to exercise the right to kill in its own terms is no other than race.
Racism, Foucault argues, is the strategy through which the other is depicted
Experimentation and Dissidence206
as a threat to the wellbeing of the group, the health of the population, or
even the survival of the species. Thanks to racism, therefore, the state per-
forms the killing function in the name of life itself. Moreover, according to
Foucault, the logics of racism extend its rule, not only over racialized others,
but also over those who are depicted as biocriminals of different kinds, on
the basis of posing a similar threat to the moral strength of the community.
There is a topological problem at play in this biopolitical account of the
right to kill. The biocriminal outcast, whatever form it adopts, does not
represent an absolute, exterior form of otherness. Because of the eugenic
logics at play, the target of racism has an ambivalent relation of belonging
to the population whose wellbeing justifies its killing or its political vanish-
ing. Certainly, the racialized other or the biocriminal Foucault was thinking
about is not a full member or a legitimate citizen of any given population. Its
biocriminality serves to define, rather, the margins of the population. When
biopower, in this sense, takes hold of that mark of sovereign power that is
the right to kill, literal or otherwise, it reveals itself as the power to decide
who is to become, as it were, the mark of the margin, the living or, rather, the
dying border of the population itself. Foucault’s biocriminal, because of this
topological operation of power, threatens a population by virtue of belong-
ing and not belonging to it at the same time. In this sense, the biocriminal
signals a similarly ambivalent topology to the one Agamben addressed in his
influent treatment of the figure of the refugee as a “limit concept” (Agamben,
1998, 134), confusing the boundaries between exclusion and inclusion in
that state of exception which is the refugee camp.
In genealogical terms, the biopolitics of public order emerges in close
relation with this topological dimension, in relation to the definition of
the inside, the outside and the margins of the nation. This is the case, at
the very least, since public order was introduced in modern law as a way to
discipline the institution of civil marriage, as it had been conceived during
the French Revolution. The intimate relationship between monogamy and
public order dates, also, from this time, but it has long roots in the rejec-
tion of polygamy by French political philosophers and jurists during the 18th
century. Montesquieu, for example, depicted both Christian monogamy, for
not allowing divorce, and Islamic polygamy, as a major biopolitical problem:
Questioning the Oneness of Philosophy 207
Things are much altered since the Christians and Mohammedan religions
divided the Roman world; these two religions have not been nearly so fa-
vorable to the propagation of the species as that of those masters of the world.
(Montesquieu, 2014, 168, my emphasis).
It was under the influence of this tradition that the jurist Jean-Étienne-Marie
Portalis wrote his Preliminary Address on the first draft of the Civil Code
where the idea of “public order” was introduced for the first time, when he
stated that “the legislator can, in the interests of public order establish such
impediments [to marriage] as they deem appropriate” (Portalis, 2016, 17). Of
course, illicit unions included polygamous ones, and Portalis himself con-
sidered polygamy to be “revolting.”2 The enforcement of the same biopolitical
tradition Montesquieu belonged to is made evident when he remarks that
“the publicity, the solemnity, of marriages may alone prevent those vague
and illicit unions that are so unfavorable to the propagation of the species”
(Portalis, 2016, 16).
As if to emulate the propagation of the species, the uses of public or-
der propagated, in a chain of performative repetitions, from one civil code
to another, way beyond the limits of Europe, from Latin America to Japan
(Noriega, 2007; Novoa Monreal, 1976). Meanwhile, however, state regula-
tion of monogamy continued delimiting a diffuse, imaginary boundary be-
tween Western countries and Arab world, even though polygamy is in fact a
minority practice restricted to certain Islamic countries.
The impact over non-monogamous relational structures is obvious. The
fact that, as some would say, “public order is monogamous in the Western
world” (Noriega, 2007, 2) exposes polygamous and polyamorous people, but
also multiparental families that may be neither,3 to specific forms of vul-
nerability and state violence, from the denial of widow’s pensions to plain
deportation. As a result, the biopolitics of public order define a whole car-
tography by imposing a monogamous relational performativity (A. C. Santos,
2019) within the community while limiting its permeability to alien, abject
and, ultimately, unintelligible relational practices coming from its outside.
2 Indeed, his account of the benefits of raising children between “the two spouses” have little
to envy to San Agustin’s elegies to monogamous marriage.
3 Brazil, for example, has recently recognized non-monogamous forms of kinship with no
direct relation with polygamy nor polyamory.
Experimentation and Dissidence208
In this sense, the biopolitics of public order delimit, as Catarina Martins has
shown (2015), what Boaventura de Sousa Santos would call an abyssal line,
that is, a division such that:
“The other side of the line” vanishes as reality, becomes inexistent, and is
indeed produced as nonexistent. Nonexistent means not existing in any rel-
evant or comprehensible way of being. Whatever is produced as nonexistent
is radically excluded because it lies beyond the realms of what the accepted
conception of inclusion considers to be its other. (Sousa Santos, 2007, 45)
Sousa Santos signals precisely modern law as one of the most accomplished
Western forms of abyssal thinking. According to him, distinctions between
what is legal and what is not would be abyssal not only because of their
dichotomic structure, but also due to the process of geographical territo-
rialization of the law, which would have evolved in close relation to the
history of colonialism. Therefore, even when these abyssal lines lack any
fixed location, their relation with modern law would nonetheless delineate a
whole postcolonial cartography.
Homonationalism and the biopolitics of friendship
Gradually, the protection of a restricted spectrum of gay and lesbian
rights has become a part of the biopolitics of public order in many coun-
tries. Nowadays, some European countries, as Slovenia has recently done
(Čeferin & Meznar, 2014), present the protection against certain forms of
homophobia as an issue of public order in explicit terms, in what can be
read as an intrinsic part of the emerging biopolitics that Jasbir Puar refers
to as homonationalism. For her, the historical shift in the relations between
the state and at least certain relational rights, including gay and lesbian
(monogamous) marriages, would be still entrenched in the exclusionary,
Western-centric, and ultimately, racist constitution of the nation state. That
is why the homonationalist frame, for Puar, would demand for,
A deep critique of lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses and how
those rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity
that continue to accord some populations access to citizenship – cultural
Questioning the Oneness of Philosophy 209
and legal – at the expense of the delimitation and expulsion of other
populations. (Puar, 2013, 335)
According to Puar, Israel’s strategies of pinkwashing, aimed at promoting
an image of gay-friendliness in order to be perceived as progressive, mod-
ern and tolerant despite or even through the violation of the rights of the
homophobic Palestinian people, would be a paradigmatic example. The
works of nationalism would be equally present in Europe and the US, how-
ever, especially in the widespread discourses depicting Islamic refugees as a
threat to the security of women or LGBT people. It could be assumed that
homonationalism serves as a way of opening the borders to, at least, those
who run away from homophobic or transphobic violence, institutional or
otherwise. The treatment given in European countries to gay LGBT asylum
seekers, however, prove that hypothesis wrong (European Union Agency for
Fundamental Rights, 2017; Vine, 2014). Transgender migrants and asylum
seekers, in particular, often find themselves trapped between biopolitical
regimes clashing between them, leading to often unbearable situations in
relation with legal gender and name recognition or access to hormonal
treatments (Namer & Razum, 2018; Rojas & Aguirre, 2013; van der Pijl,
Oude Breuil, Swetzer, Drymioti, & Goderie, 2018). The deportations of
transgender migrants who happen to be, also, sex-workers (Vartabedian,
2014), make it evident that this emerging, homonationalist layer of the bi-
opolitics of public order benefits only the mobility of very specific groups
of queer people.
Despite its inner fragmentations4 and its emerging forms, such as the
homonationalist frame, the biopolitics of public order is a force of the sta-
tus quo. While it is true that jurors and public officers invoke the powers
of public order in often arbitrary ways, re-signifying and producing new
meanings for this empty signifier, they do so only to allow for an effective
microphysical distribution of sovereign power. The biopolitics of public
order are, therefore, a micro-political, disseminating form of the established
order, acting upon a disseminating impulse of an opposite direction by which
individuals and, through them, populations, produce and inhabit new rela-
tional possibilities.
4 Especially evident in relation with the regulation of the reproductive field.
Experimentation and Dissidence210
Foucault provided, also, a very compelling account of this impulse for
public disorder. For gay culture to become part of a radical or, at least, an
interesting political project, he argued, it would need to turn into an impulse
for creating new forms of relationships. In an interview for the gay maga-
zine Christopher Street, he provided a quite specific example:
Why shouldn’t I adopt a friend who’s ten years younger than I am? And
even if he’s ten years older? Rather than arguing that rights are fundamental
and natural to the individual, we should try to imagine and create a new
relational right that permits all possible types of relations to exist and not
be prevented, blocked, or annulled by impoverished relational institutions.
(Foucault, 1994, 158)
By suggesting to use adoption in a totally unprecedented way, one to which
the institution was certainly not intended for, Foucault was not just defend-
ing the need for inventing new forms of relationality apart from the forms
of institutional recognition provided by the state. In a way, he certainly was,
but he was also thinking on how to turn these creative, relational alternatives
into a force of institutional transformation. The cultural force that he had
in mind was not a new layer, but, on the contrary, a counter-force for the
biopolitics of public order, that is, for the way state biopolitics oppose all
those “vague and illicit unions” referred by Portalis in his passionate defense
of the marriage between marriage and public order. The name of the force
Foucault was thinking about for opposing the rigidity of the institutions
normalizing sexuality and, concomitantly, the racist, Eurocentric frame was
no other than friendship.
Foucault’s discussion of friendship in the above-mentioned interview,
but also in others like Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity (1994b) and,
of course, Friendship as a Way of Life (1994), points to something similar
and, at the same time, completely different from an anarchist project of pro-
ducing new forms relationality beyond the normalizing powers of the state.
Friendship would be, rather, a way of subverting its normalizing powers,
exciting our political imagination toward a radical transformation of liberal
state institutions. Demands for the recognition of non-monogamous kin-
ship relationships, queer and third-party assisted reproductive projects or
the demands for gender self-determination, would belong, in my view, to
Questioning the Oneness of Philosophy 211
this sphere of relational creativity. In this sense, Foucault’s “friendship” is
just another name for queerness, very close to the way Lisa Duggan uses this
word in “Queering the state”:
This is not the historical moment when we want to set up a negative relation
to state power or slip into limiting forms of libertarianism. The arguments
would need to be carefully framed to emphasize that state institutions must
be even-handed in the arena of sexuality, not that sexuality should be re-
moved from state action completely. Activists might also make the crucial
distinction between state institutions (which must, in some sense, be neutral)
and “the public” arena, where explicit advocacy is not only allowable but
desirable. (Duggan, 1994, 11)
We would possibly still need to slip, perhaps, into at least some non-limiting
forms of libertarianism. The demand of the intersex and transgender move-
ments for the end of the legal life of gender or, at the very least, for the
disappearance of legal gender marks from identity documents, would fit
quite nicely in that category. In any case, both these claims and what Duggan
calls “disestablishment” uses of liberal rhetoric would be ways of resisting
the homonationalist layer of the biopolitics of public order. At least if we
read the works of friendship as a counter-biopolitical force or, that is, if we
understand friendship as an impulse for public disorder.
To include friendship, in the latter sense, in radical sexual politics would
entail both resisting and taking distance from the logics of exceptionalism
and the set of liberal institutions of the state, along with the impoverishing
frames of cultural intelligibility they help to consolidate. However, such a
counter-biopolitics would also need to consider, in order to be able to shake
the moral, legal, political, economic and even religious principles of the na-
tion that courts and jurists often refer to as “public order,” to consider all of
the above as targets of political transformation.
Experimentation and Dissidence212
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