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ADRi PUBLICATIONS
ENHANCING
DIVERSIFYING
STRATEGIC OPTIONS
AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE
CHARMAINE MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY, PH.D
& FRANCIS C. DOMINGO, PH.D
COOPERATION:
e Stratbase ADR Institute for Strategic and International
Studies (ADRi) is an independent strategic research
organization with the principal goal of addressing the issues
aecting the Philippines and East Asia through:
1. Eecting national, regional, and international policy
change or support
2. Fostering strategic ideas based on cooperation and
innovative thinking
3. Providing a regional venue for collaboration and
cooperation in dealing with critical issues in East Asia; and
4. Actively participating in regional debates and global
conversations
With its international focus, ADRi believes that Philippine
and regional security and development can be achieved
through the cooperation of the public and private sectors.
ADRi traces its roots to the Stratbase Research Institute
(SRI) established in 2004. SRI focused on providing strategic
solutions to domestic governance, socio-economic, and
other policy concerns. It aimed to contribute to Philippine
development through research and responsive policy
alternatives.
As SRI sought solutions, East Asia’s aairs frequently
inserted themselves into the equation. ere was and is a clear
relation between domestic and regional aairs; movement in
one reverberates in the other.
WRITTEN BY
ADRi PUBLICATIONS
CHARMAINE MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY, PH.D
FRANCIS C. DOMINGO, PH.D
Manila, Philippines
DIVERSIFYING
STRATEGIC OPTIONS
AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE
ENHANCING
COOPERATION:
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES DEPARTMENT
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSIT Y
Stratbase ADRi
Albert Del Rosario Institute for Strategic and International Studies
Copyright © 2019
A Publication of the Stratbase Albert Del Rosario Institute for
Strategic and International Studies
Stratbase ADRi Website: www.adrinstitute.org
Facebook: https://facebook.com/stratbaseadri/
Twitter: https://twitter.com/stratbaseadri/
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part
of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any formor by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of the Institute,
except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.
The views, opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper are
those of the author and do not necessarily reect those of
the Institute or any of its ocers and trustees.
The author is solely responsible for its content.
For information, address ADRi Publications:
9F 6780 Ayala Avenue, Makati City 1200
Design by Carol Manhit
Text set in 11 type Minion Pro
Printed in the Philippines by Rex Publishing
Manila, Philippines
ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION
Victor Andres “Dindo” C. Manhit is the President of Stratbase Albert Del Rosario
Institute for Strategic and International Studies. Concurrently, he is Philippine
Country Head of the renowned BowerGroupAsia (BGA). He was a former
Chair and recently retired Associate Professor of the Political Science
Department of De La Salle University. Among the government positions he
held include Undersecretary for External Aairs and Special Concerns of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and Deputy Secretary for
Administration and Financial Services of the Philippine Senate. Meanwhile,
his legislative experience encompasses the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 12th Congress as
the Chief of Sta of the late Former Senate President Edgardo Angara and
senior policy research adviser in key senate committees.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Ambassador Albert del Rosario was the Secretary of Foreign Aairs of the
Philippines from 2011 to 2016. He also served as Philippine Ambassador
to the United States of America from 2001 to 2006. Prior to entering public
service, Amb. Del Rosario was on the Board of Directors of over 50 rms. He
received numerous awards and recognition for his valuable contributions to the
Philippines and abroad.
Manuel V. Pangilinan is CEO and managing director of First Pacic Company
Limited. He is also the chairman of Metro Pacic Investments Corp., Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company, Manila Electric Co. (Meralco), and Smart
Communications, among others. He is a recipient of several prestigious awards
including the Ten Outstanding Young Men of the Philippines (TOYM) Award
for International Finance in 1983 and the Presidential Pamana ng Pilipino
Award by the Oce of the President of the Philippines in 1996.
Edgardo G. Lacson is an honorary chairman of the Philippine Chamber of
Commerce and Industry (PCCI). He is the Chairman of the Employers
Confederation of the Philippines. He holds numerous leadership positions in
various companies. He served as a Director of e Philippine Stock Exchange,
Inc. and is an Honorary Member of the Rotary Club-Diliman.
iii
Benjamin Philip G. Romualdez is the former president of the Chamber of Mines
of the Philippines. He also holds, among others, the following positions:
Chairman of MST Management, Inc., President of Oxford University and
Cambridge University Club of the Philippines, Director at Philippine-
Australia Business Council (PABC), Trustee/Vice President of Doña Remedios
Trinidad Romualdez Medical Foundation, Inc, and Trustee/Vice President of
Dr. Vicente Orestes Romualdez (DVOR) Educational Foundation, Inc.
Ernest Z. Bower is a senior adviser for Southeast Asia at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), having founded the rst chair for the region.
He is CEO of BowerGroupAsia (BGA) and a leading expert on Southeast Asia.
Renato C. de Castro, Ph. D is a full professor of international studies at De La
Salle University – Manila (DLSU). In 2009, Dr. de Castro became the U.S.
State Department ASEAN Research Fellow from the Philippines and was
based in the Political Science Department of Arizona State University. A
consultant in the National Security Council of the Philippines during the
Aquino administration, he has written over 80 articles on international
relations and security.
Judge Raul C. Pangalangan, Ph. D is a judge of the International Criminal
Court. He was previously the dean of the University of the Philippines
College of Law and publisher of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. He has taught
in many universities around the world, such as Melbourne University, Hong
Kong University, and Harvard Law School.
Epictetus E. Patalinghug, Ph. D is a professor emeritus at the Cesar E.A. Virata
School of Business, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman. He received
his doctorate degree in Agricultural Economics from the University of Hawaii.
His works have been featured in various publications around the world.
Francisco A. Magno, Ph. D is the executive director of the Jesse M. Robredo
Institute of Governance and former President of the Philippine Political
Science Association. He is a professor of political science at DLSU and
previously served as Chair of the Political Science Department and Director
of the Social Development Research Center.
Carlos Primo C. David, Ph. D. is a licensed geologist and professor in UP
Diliman having obtained his PhD in Environmental Science and Geology
from Stanford University. He is a former the Executive Director of DOST-
PCIEERD. A project leader of the DOST’s Project NOAH, Dr. David
pioneers short term rainfall forecasting in the country and climate change-
related research on water resources.
iv
Introduction
Since establishing diplomatic relations in 1946, the two countries have strong
people-to-people links, sustained development assistance, deep economic
ties, and robust security cooperation which are sustained through trade,
investment, cultural exchange, education, tourism, and migration.
Cooperation via Transnational Communities
Our argument is that transnational communities—thanks to its network of
professionals and experts—can strengthen existing regimes.
Maritime Security
e South China Sea remains to be the region’s maritime security priority.
is section discusses the entry points for transnational communities to
complement or strengthen existing policies, and/or initiate new policies.
Counter-terrorism
Terrorism continues to plague the Indo-Pacic region. is calls for a
re-evaluation of strategy in addressing counter-terrorism eorts. is section
explores the role of transnational communities in these eorts.
Cybersecurity
Cyberspace has become the new platform to advance foreign policy
interests.is section draws on the potential cooperation of the Philippines
and Australia in cybersecurity and the contribution of transnational communities to it.
Conclusions
e Australia-Philippines bilateral relationship has strong foundations and
so far, has demonstrated an upward and forward trajectory. e bilateral
cooperation can be sustained and further enhanced by relying
on and tapping the dynamism of transnational communities.
References
Acknowledgments
About the Authors
CONTENTS
1
4
7
14
28
36
22
v
ABSTRACT
e Australia-Philippine relationship prides itself in having a long history
of bilateral cooperation. Since establishing diplomatic relations in 1946, the
two countries have strong people-to-people links, sustained development
assistance, deep economic ties, and robust security cooperation. Growing
people-to-people links are sustained through trade, investment, cultural
exchange, education, tourism, and migration. ousands of Filipinos go to
Australia for further studies while hundreds of thousands Australian come
to the Philippines as tourists. e relationship, which embodies their shared
interests and values, was upgraded to a comprehensive partnership in 2015.
With this new arrangement, the two sides rearmed their commitment
in the areas of politics, economics, defense, law and justice cooperation,
education, and development cooperation. Despite the sound foundations,
Australia-Philippine relations are hampered by domestic factors, which
then begs the question of how to sustain the upward trajectory of the
partnership, especially amidst President Duterte’s controversial war on
drugs and Australia’s frequent leadership change.
We argue that Australia-Philippines cooperation can be enhanced
by leveraging transnational communities: professional networks with
authoritative and policy-relevant expertise. We focus on the critical role
that these transnational communities can play in inuencing the existing
mechanisms of Australia-Philippine security relations, specically in
the areas of maritime security, counter-terrorism, and the emerging eld
of cybersecurity. We posit that tapping the crucial role of transnational
communities can be the key to the diversication of strategic options for
Australia and the Philippines, given the unique dynamics in the Indo-
Pacic’s security architecture.
vii
1
ENHANCING
AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE
COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING
STRATEGIC OPTIONS
CHARMAINE MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY, PH.D
FRANCIS C. DOMINGO, PH.D
The Australia-Philippine relationship prides itself in having a long
history of bilateral cooperation. Since establishing diplomatic
relations in 1946, the two countries have strong people-to-people
links, sustained development assistance, deep economic ties, and
robust security cooperation.
Growing people-to-people links are sustained through trade,
investment, cultural exchange, education, tourism, and migration.
Based on 2016 data, there were 8,206 Filipino students in Australia, 61
of whom were recipients of Australia Awards.1 At the same time, there
were 216,400 Australian visitors to the Philippines.
In terms of development assistance, Australia extends targeted
advice and technical assistance to the Philippines to eect reform
eorts and capacity development. For 2018-2019, the total Australian
ocial development assistance to the Philippines is at an estimated
AU$85.4 million.
Meanwhile, the total two-way trade between the two countries was
valued at AU$4.8 billion in 2017, with merchandise trade comprising
the bulk at AU$3.2 billion. Australian investment in the Philippines
2ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
was at AU$9.3 billion in 2016, while Philippine investment in Australia
was at AU$1.3 billion.
Security cooperation between the two focuses primarily on
the elds of maritime security and counter-terrorism. e 1995
Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperative Defense Activities
laid the foundation for the Joint Defense Cooperation Committee
to provide policy direction and monitor activities. By 2012, a Status
of Visiting Forces Agreement was entered into force which then
served as the comprehensive legal and operational framework for
defense cooperation. Australia has also participated in the annual US-
Philippine Balikatan exercises since 2016.
e relationship, which embodies their shared interests and values,
was upgraded to a comprehensive partnership in 2015. With this new
arrangement, the two sides rearmed their commitment in the areas
of politics, economics, defense, law and justice cooperation, education,
and development cooperation. An interesting aspect of the bilateral
relationship is that both Australia and the Philippines are quasi-allies,
i.e., both are treaty allies of the United States but are themselves not.
Hence, the comprehensive partnership, while not necessarily elevating
the relationship to an ocial alliance, nevertheless reiterates and
reinforces the two sides’ commitment to work together.
Despite the sound foundations, Australia-Philippine relations are
hampered by domestic factors. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s
election in 2016 ushered in a controversial anti-drug campaign, which
prompted Australian concerns—alongside the European Union and
the United Nations—over human rights violations. is then prompted
a counter-criticism from Duterte about Australia meddling in Filipino
aairs. In eect, Duterte has put Australia in the same “watch list”
3
MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY & DOMINGO
as the European Union and the United Nations.10 Domestic factors
are also not unproblematic in Australia, particularly considering the
country’s so-called revolving door of prime ministers (six changes of
prime ministers since 2007) and a series of “leadership skirmishes”
that have become “increasingly short-term in its focus, opportunistic,
populous and sometimes very personal.”11
As domestic-level politics continue to color Australia-Philippine
relations, this situation raises the question of how to sustain the
upward trajectory of the partnership. Given that state-level eorts can
be easily bogged down by bureaucratic politics at the domestic level,
we argue that cooperation between the two sides can be enhanced
by leveraging neither supra- nor sub-national actors, but those that
cut across: transnational communities. ese communities come in
various forms. In academic literature, they are known as epistemic
communities: professional networks with authoritative and policy-
relevant expertise.12 In practice, they take the form of think tanks or
Track 1.5 and Track 2 groupings.
We focus here on the key role that these transnational communities
can play in inuencing the existing mechanisms of Australia-Philippine
security relations, specically in the areas of maritime security, counter-
terrorism, and the emerging eld of cybersecurity. We posit that tapping
the crucial role of transnational communities can be the key to the
diversication of strategic options for Australia and the Philippines,
given the unique dynamics in the Indo-Pacic’s security architecture.
Against this backdrop, the next section makes an inevitable port of
call to theory. We revisit the phenomenon of cooperation to situate our
main argument that transnational communities do indeed enhance
cooperation. e succeeding sections deploy the framework in three
4ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
areas of Australia-Philippine cooperation: maritime security, counter-
terrorism, and cybersecurity. Our goal here is to demonstrate that these
regimes can be sustained by the active participation of transnational
communities. We focus on these three areas because, at least insofar as
the maritime and counter-terrorism domains are concerned, these are
the established pillars of security cooperation between Australia and the
Philippines. As such, we aim to identify the nuances that transnational
communities add to the mix. We also include the area of cybersecurity
as one of the emerging areas of security cooperation. is is especially
apropos, given the reported breach of passport information recently
from the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Aairs.13 We conclude
by highlighting policy implications for Australia and the Philippines.
Cooperation via Transnational Communities
e phenomenon of cooperation takes place “when actors adjust their
behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through
a process of policy coordination.”14 Policy coordination, in turn,
requires actors—oentimes states—to adjust their respective policies
so that their negative consequences for other actors are reduced.15
is classic denition presupposes that states cooperate to achieve
a certain goal and that states hope that cooperating with others can
provide them with gains or rewards. Much of the literature concentrate
on the development of hypotheses about the conditions under which
cooperation is likely to occur. For our purposes, we focus on two of
these: the epistemic community hypothesis and the international
regimes hypothesis.
5
MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY & DOMINGO
e epistemic community hypothesis advances the idea that
cooperation is most likely to occur when epistemic communities play
an active role. Dened as “a professional group that believes in the
same cause-and-eect relationships, truth tests to accept them, and
shares common values; its members share a common understanding
of a problem and its solution,” epistemic communities are oen,
although not always, viewed as a prerequisite for cooperation.16 In the
context of globalization today, research on the continuing signicance
of epistemic communities is subsumed under the broader umbrella
of transnational communities. ese transnational communities,
of which epistemic communities is only one type, impact the global
governance of a wide range of issue areas, not least of which are
migration, social and political activism, and expertise.17 Hence, the
goal of transnational communities is to shape global governance by
tapping into networks of experts who can persuade others of their
shared beliefs and policy goals through their professional knowledge.18
Examples of transnational communities include advocacy networks
whose shared interests derive from idealism, multinational private
corporations, lobby groups, academic or intellectual groups, think
tanks, and Track 1.5 and Track 2 networks.19
Cooperation is likewise more likely to occur when transnational
communities impact international regimes. ese are sets of
norms, principles, rules, or decision-making procedures where the
expectations of actors converge.20 Usually, actor expectations converge
on issue-areas, which are articulated in certain platforms or areas of
cooperation. In the context of Australia-Philippine relations, examples
of existing regimes include maritime security, counter-terrorism, and
cybersecurity. Regimes can therefore facilitate cooperation by reducing
6ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
uncertainty in the face of problems.
Our argument is that transnational communities—thanks to its
network of professionals and experts—can strengthen existing regimes.
Together, these can enhance Australia-Philippine cooperation in the
areas of maritime security, counter-terrorism, and cybersecurity. Our
analysis rests not so much on who or which transnational community
operates best in certain areas, but rather on the entry points where
transnational communities writ large can best impact a given regime.
Here we nd useful Mai’a K. Davis Cross’ summary of the instances
when transnational communities are most likely to be persuasive.21
First, the scope conditions must be pinned down. When there
is a high degree of uncertainty surrounding an issue-area because
it is complex, new, politically salient, or because decision-makers
are unhappy with past policies, then the chances of transnational
communities impacting the regime are high. We nd this at play
most prominently in the maritime domain. Second, transnational
communities are most likely to succeed in impacting a regime when
coalition building is critical, i.e., when the various networks within
that issue-area are not as cohesive. Our analysis nds that this is
manifest most in counter-terrorism. ird, transnational communities
can have the most impact in a regime that is in the early phase of its
policy process, such as in cybersecurity. is is when transnational
communities seek to inuence the initial debate and the technocratic
phase of decision-making.
e subsequent analyses on maritime security, counter-terrorism,
and cybersecurity consider transnational communities’ scope
conditions, their eorts at coalition building, and their role in the policy
process. e aim is to underscore how transnational communities can
7
MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY & DOMINGO
impact established regimes and therefore enhance cooperation in the
context of the Australia-Philippine bilateral relationship. Tapping into
the signicant contributions of transnational communities can result
in diversifying the strategic options open to both Australia and the
Philippines in managing contemporary issues.
Maritime Security
Maritime security in the region is concentrated on issues surrounding
the South China Sea. While there are many claimants to the disputed
waters, the Philippines’ actions are especially prominent, primarily
because of its oscillation from securitizing the issue to the point of
lodging—and winning—an arbitration case at the Permanent Court
of Arbitration, to desecuritizing it via Duterte’s “independent foreign
policy,” which seems to pivot towards China. e analysis oered here
rst describes the uncertainty surrounding the issue. is ambiguity
stems from the fact that despite overt state actions, a denitive
resolution to the issue remains elusive. From here, we move the
discussion to identifying entry points for transnational communities
to complement, strengthen, or initiate policies.
e disputes in the South China Sea focused initially only on
the natural resource and maritime entitlements of some features,
including Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal.22 Mischief Reef is
a circular, coral, low-tide elevation within the Spratly Islands.23 It is
approximately 126 miles from the Philippines, and about 600 miles
from China. Filipino shermen would sometimes take shelter on
the reef, but it remained largely unoccupied. Needless to say, the
8ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
Image credit: dw.com/image/18570509_401.gif
9
MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY & DOMINGO
Philippines considers it as part of its exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). Meanwhile, Scarborough Shoal is 118 miles from
the coast of the Philippines and 325 miles from Woody Island, which
China claims. Under international law, shoals cannot be claimed as
territory, but even so, the Philippines asserts rights to it since it has
exercised jurisdiction over it by enforcing Philippine law against
smuggling and illegal shing, constructing a lighthouse, and using
the shoal as target practice for air force pilots.24 China also claims
Scarborough Shoal since parts of it are above water and can be claimed
as part of Maccleseld Bank, which China also claims.
In January 1995, China built simple structures on stilts on
Mischief Reef, marked them with a Chinese ag, and prevented
Filipino shermen from approaching the reef without its consent.25
e Philippines signied its objection by sending a Memorandum to
the Chinese Embassy in Manila where it noted a “signicant change
in the disposition of Chinese forces in the South China Sea,” i.e.,
certain structures were built on the reef and three large warships
and ve smaller vessels were in the vicinity.26 e Philippines also
requested the release of detained Filipino shermen. By March 1995,
the Philippines detained four Chinese shing boats and 62 shermen
around the Spratly Islands for poaching on Philippine waters and
using explosives.27 In response, China pointed out that “the real
issue is that Chinese shermen had not violated Philippine territory
because they were conducting ‘normal routinary shing’ in traditional
Chinese shing grounds.”28 China insistently called on the Philippines
to release the shermen and stated that the shing areas could only be
delineated once they have been released.
10 ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
e bottom line for China was (and continues to be) to seek a
peaceful settlement of the dispute through bilateral means. China
holds that the “basis for multilateral cooperation is bilateral
cooperation.”29 It also aims to shelve the sovereignty issue at the heart
of the dispute and instead pursue joint development.30 On the other
hand, the Philippines was then partial towards the internationalization
of the issue. For example, in 1998 a Memorandum was sent from
the Department of Foreign Aairs in Manila to all the Philippine
Embassies with instructions to inform the host governments about
the South China Sea issue and to obtain their reactions on the
Mischief Reef incident. e Embassies were also directed to assure
the host governments that the Philippines adheres to its position via
diplomatic means.31
e disputes entered a new phase upon China’s assertion of its
historical rights to the waters, seabed, and subsoil within the nine-
dash line in the South China Sea. e Philippines, as well as other
countries in Southeast Asia, claims some of the areas within this line
under the provisions of UNCLOS. e Philippines protested that
the nine-dash line “impinges on territorial and maritime zones” of
the country.32 Aside from the assertion based on historical rights,
China’s rhetoric also shied to an insistence that the South China
Sea issue is not an agenda of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). China underscored this by pointing out that the
dispute was between China and some ASEAN countries, not between
China and ASEAN as an entity. Indeed, the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), while an ASEAN
document, emphasizes parties, not ASEAN.33 Eorts to guarantee
that the issue remained outside of the ASEAN framework included
11
MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY & DOMINGO
China summoning the representatives of all ASEAN member states
in Beijing to deal with them individually. As a result, the South China
Sea did not appear on the agenda of the 15th ASEAN-China Senior
Ocials Meeting in 2009.34
Apart from utilizing bilateral and regional eorts to internationalize
the South China Sea issue, the Philippines also lodged a legal case
with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in January 2013, given that
co-opting ASEAN proved limited.35 Instead of oering a denitive
answer to the question of sovereignty and boundary delimitations
between the parties involved, the Philippines asked the Court to rule
on the role of historic rights and the source of marine entitlements
in the South China Sea. is move entailed the clarication of the
status of maritime features, which would then pave the way for the
denition of the entitlements said features could generate. To this
end, the lawfulness of China’s actions could then be determined.
e unanimous award was issued in favor of the Philippines in
July 2016.36 e Court concluded that China’s claims on historic
rights were incompatible with the exclusive economic zones that are
enshrined in UNCLOS.
Moreover, there was no historical evidence that China had exercised
exclusive control of the South China Sea or the resources therein.
Given this, there was no legal basis for China’s nine-dash line. Similarly,
the maritime areas that China claims in the Spratlys are incapable of
generating an exclusive economic zone. In fact, the Court declared that
some areas fall within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines
because they do not overlap with any possible entitlement of China.
In this context then, China’s actions were found to have violated the
Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone. Largely
12 ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
due to the land reclamations and the construction of articial islands at
seven features in the Spratly Islands, the Court considered the damage
to the marine environment and ruled that China failed to protect the
ecosystems in the waters.
Given the current situation in the South China Sea, i.e., on one
hand, China’s continuing actions in the form of its militarization of
reefs, installations of docks and runways, and the conduct of naval
drills, and on the other, the Philippines’ “independent foreign policy”
that considerably leans towards China, it becomes apparent that
the scope conditions surrounding the issue point to a high level of
uncertainty. As such, transnational communities can navigate this
via several entry points. First, think tanks in both Australia and the
Philippines can develop a set of recommendations on the mechanisms
that can improve both countries’ deterrence capabilities, either through
information sharing or transfer of equipment.37 is can then address
incidents of illegal, unreported, and unregulated shing activities in
the disputed waters of the South China Sea. Professional networks
can likewise contribute their expertise in promoting the Philippines’
territorial defense capabilities, particularly in air defense and anti-
submarine warfare, strategic assessments, and information exchange
regarding naval and coast guard assets and shing vessels.
Ultimately, transnational communities in both Australia and the
Philippines can work to persuade decision-makers to upgrade the
comprehensive partnership into a strategic partnership. Doing so
will make the Australia-Philippine relationship more agile and more
responsive to broader security challenges.38 is can be achieved
through regular dialogues at the Track 1.5 and Track 2 levels as these
become platforms for identifying shared interests and formulating
converging strategies.
13
MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY & DOMINGO
Image credit: manilalivewire.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ery_cross_sep03_2015_cover_alt.jpg?ssl=1
14 ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
Counter-terrorism
Despite the extensive counter-terrorism eorts invested by states in
the region, terrorism continues to be a key national security threat
among states in the Indo-Pacic region. During the earlier part of
the century, terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and Jemaah
Islamiyah were able to develop complex networks and systematically
execute attacks across multiple states across the Indo-Pacic.39
While the operational capabilities of these organizations are now
degraded, a resurgence of violent extremism in the region inspired
by the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) calls for a re-evaluated
strategy that recognizes the distinctive nature and tactics of ISIL.40
Given these considerations, cooperation between states is central
to understanding the threat and developing a strategy to mitigate
militant extremism in the region.41 is subsection explores the
role of transnational communities in enhancing counter-terrorism
cooperation. It rst surveys the existing counter-terrorism initiatives
of Australia and the Philippines and then discusses the potential
contributions of transnational communities in reinforcing counter-
terrorism cooperation between these two states.
Terrorism is an enduring national security issue that aects
Australia’s strategic environment. While there have been no major
terrorist incidents in Australia during the last three decades, the state
has enhanced its counter-terrorism eorts following the 9/11 terrorist
attacks against its major ally, the United States. Australia’s counter-
terrorism strategy was rst documented in the 2004 Terrorism
White Paper (threats from transnational groups) and the 2010
Counter-Terrorism White Paper (threats from local terrorist cells).42
15
MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY & DOMINGO
A more detailed approach outlined in Australia’s Counter-Terrorism
Strategy was reiterated in 2015 in response to strong indications
of an imminent terrorist attack against the Australian homeland
in September 2014.43 e strategy presents four interconnected
measures to address terrorism, with a focus on “prevention as a rst
line of defense against terrorism.”44
e strategy’s rst measure is disputing violent extremist
ideologies by encouraging communities (family and friends) and local
organizations (non-government organizations) to disseminate their
own messages that challenge these.45 is requires investing resources
to systematically empower communities and local organizations to
utilize dierent forms of communications to share their thoughts
on extremist ideas and undermine oine and online propaganda.
e second measure is preventing people from becoming terrorists
by addressing the drivers of radicalization and helping individuals
at-risk. Tackling the drivers of radicalization involves improving
social cohesion through initiatives such as education, job generation,
and workplace diversity.46 Assisting vulnerable individuals requires
supporting community organizations that cater to where these
individuals live through nancial grants, resources, and training.47
e third measure is shaping the global environment by sharing
information with partner states, and helping regional partners build
capacity. Information sharing is predominantly undertaken with
the state’s traditional partners (Canada, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and the United States) with the objective of disrupting
terrorist nancing, movements, and networks.48 In terms of capacity
building, the state works with regional partners such as Indonesia
to reinforce counter-terrorism laws, upgrade law enforcement skills,
16 ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
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enable the use of networked technologies to counter-terrorism
activities, and develop response and recovery capabilities.49
e fourth measure is disrupting terrorist activity within
Australia by using the options prescribed by the state’s counter-
terrorism legislation.50 For instance, a rst option is to warn
suspected individuals that their activities are being monitored to
discourage them from engaging in suspicious activities. More drastic
options include the use of control orders issued by a court to impose
restrictions on the behavior of individuals suspected of terrorist
involvement, as well as preventive detention orders that allow the
police to detain individuals when there is a threat of imminent
terrorist attack.51 e h and last measure is enhancing the capacity
for eective response and recovery. is requires that government
agencies be in a strong position to respond to a wide range of
terrorist incidents and to coordinate recovery eorts to help citizens
within and outside Australia. Domestic initiatives include working
closely with key service providers to enforce standards for counter-
terrorism measures, monitoring, and ensuring resilient systems and
infrastructures during terrorist attacks. Overseas initiatives involve
strengthening consular assistance to victims and their families as well
as closely coordinating with authorities of the state where terrorist
attacks were executed.52
Terrorism is a prevalent phenomenon that continues to shape the
national security priorities of the Philippines.53 Even before the 9/11
terrorist attacks in the United States, the Philippines was already a
target of several signicant terrorist attacks.54 Despite this, the
Philippines does not have a dedicated strategy to counter terrorist
activities and prior to 2011, the counter-terrorism initiatives of the
18 ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
state were only discussed in classied documents. e Philippines’
broad approach to counter-terrorism can be extracted from several
government documents including the National Security Policy 2011-
2016, the National Security Policy 2016-2022 and more recently the
National Security Strategy 2018.55 e National Security Strategy
2018 is instructive for this paper because it presents ve “strategic
actions” that the government intends to implement to counter violent
extremism.56
e rst strategic action is to modernize the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and develop synergy with the Philippine National
Police. Upgrading the capabilities of both the military and the police
is a fundamental task that has been long overdue for the Philippines.
Previous studies have discussed the various challenges that relate to
the modernization of the military and the police, but the principal
reason for the delay is the gap between the national security priorities
of the government and the existing internal and external conditions
that aect the state’s national security.57 In this sense, the key concern
is whether succeeding governments will continue the modernization
eorts implemented by the previous and current governments.
e second strategic action is to disrupt the process of radicalization
through information operations and education. is requires a
coordinated government approach to strategic communications
across all government agencies as well as a deeper understanding
of terrorist propaganda and messaging through specialized training
such as counter-terrorism strategic communications.58
e third strategic action is to reinforce security in future and
existing infrastructure projects to prevent militant groups from
sabotaging these projects. A key task associated with this action is
19
MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY & DOMINGO
to assign government forces as well as private security, to defend
infrastructure from militant organizations such as the Communist
Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army that destroy cell sites
if “revolutionary taxes” are not paid to sustain their operations.59
Another task is to work closely with private companies that manage
critical infrastructures—electricity, water, telecommunications, and
health services—to facilitate a more comprehensive response to the
disruptive actions of militant groups.
e fourth and most prominent strategic action prescribed in
the National Security Strategy 2018 is to strengthen mechanisms for
pursuing and maintaining peace with militant groups. is entails
the enactment of several initiatives, including implementing the
peace agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, boosting
the capacity of peace and development institutions such as the
Oce of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, addressing
the grievances of indigenous peoples and farmers, and ensuring the
delivery and monitoring of socioeconomic programs around the
Philippines.60
A survey of the counter-terrorism strategies of both states reveals
a shared interest in preventing terrorist activities by disrupting
the process of radicalization. Since law enforcement operations
are insucient in addressing the spread of radical ideas, states
acknowledge the need to develop calibrated strategies to counter
terrorist propaganda and recruitment. is situation likewise reveals
that despite the high level of threat that terrorism poses, coalitions
that are critical in addressing the issue are largely disconnected and
incohesive. Hence, while both Australia and the Philippines are
taking steps in sharing their respective approaches to challenging
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radicalization, there is an opportunity for transnational communities
to contribute to deepening counter-terrorism cooperation through
Track 1.5 diplomacy and higher education.61
Track 1.5 diplomacy between think tanks and government is a
vital strategy for enriching the discussion about counter terrorist
propaganda and recruitment because think tanks can propose new
ideas about addressing the sources of radicalization since they have
access to expertise and are not constrained by government policies.
Through these exchanges, decision-makers are given more options
to consider when developing strategies and policies related to
counter-terrorism. A prominent example that illustrates this point
is the series of discussions under the aegis of the Albert del Rosario
Institute, which brings together not only members of academia,
but also policymakers, decision-makers, and private and corporate
partners.
Another potential opportunity for transnational communities is
deepening the understanding of decision-makers through a more
rigorous and comprehensive training in terrorism studies offered
by colleges and universities. While the study of terrorism and
political violence is a typical standalone subject in Australian law
enforcement and military educational institutions, it is not clear if
Philippine counterparts have integrated this crucial subject in their
respective curricula. In this sense, there is an opportunity for leading
colleges and universities in the Philippines to develop graduate
programs that offer courses on terrorism and establish institutional
partnerships with public higher education institutions such as
the Philippine Military Academy, the Philippine National Police
Academy, and the National Defense College of the Philippines.
22 ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
Cybersecurity
Cyberspace has emerged as a new strategic environment for states to
advance their foreign policy interests. At the same time, it is also a
prominent source of insecurity in the twenty-rst century. Existing
research on cyber interactions suggest that states carry out cyber
intrusions to convey calibrated responses to prevailing political and
territorial disputes between states.62 While not necessarily lethal like
military action, computer network operations have proven to be both
disruptive and instrumental for states in the Indo-Pacic region,
where the highest number of interstate cyber incidents has been
observed during the past een years.63 Mitigating cyber insecurity is
therefore a core interest of states in the region given the lack of cyber
norms and increasing aggression of powerful states in cyberspace.64
is subsection evaluates the potential of cybersecurity cooperation
between Australia and the Philippines. It rst surveys the existing
cybersecurity initiatives of Australia and the Philippines and then
discusses the prospective contributions of transnational communities
in strengthening cybersecurity cooperation between these two states.
Cybersecurity was rst recognized as a national security issue
by the Australian government in its Defense White Paper released
in 2000.65 Since then, Australia has gradually developed its capacity
for protecting its interests in cyberspace as documented in several
strategies released in 2009 and in 2010.66 In 2013, however, a series of
sophisticated cyber intrusions against multiple government agencies
compelled the state to boost its cyber capabilities by establishing the
Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), a government agency
mandated to manage cyber issues. Specically, the ACSC was created
23
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24 ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
to reinforce the state’s “strategic capacity and reach in cyberspace” by
giving it the “ability to detect, deter and deny oshore malicious cyber
actors targeting Australia.”67
e state’s most recent initiative, Australia’s Cyber Security Strategy,
builds on previous strategies and takes a more comprehensive approach
to protecting Australia’s interests in cyberspace.68 e strategy advances
ve themes of action for cyber security until 2020, with an emphasis
on protecting Australia’s economic interests in cyberspace.
e rst theme of the strategy is developing a “national cyber
partnership” between dierent sectors of society: government, private
sector, and academia.69 is necessitates close collaboration between
these three sectors with the government as lead, in developing a decisive
response to the spectrum of cyber threats (espionage, sabotage and
subversion) that make it dicult for the state to harness the advantages
of network technologies.
e second theme is building strong cyber defenses to increase
resilience and to better anticipate risks. is involves measures such as
“mitigation strategies to detect cyber incidents” that make it onerous
for perpetrators to weaken the Australian Government’s ability to
deliver basic services and ensure a rapid recovery in the event that
these networks and systems are compromised by cyber intrusions.70
e third theme is promoting global responsibility in maintaining
an open, free, and secure Internet. is entails implementing measures
to enhance international cooperation and advance the idea of a
cyberspace where state behavior is consistent with international law,
based on agreed norms or standards for appropriate conduct, and are
supported by “practical condence building measures that reduce the
risk of conict.”71
25
MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY & DOMINGO
e fourth theme is enabling the growth of Australian businesses
through cybersecurity innovation. is entails the creation of a growth
center where government works with the private sector and academia
to engage in cutting edge cybersecurity research, export Australian
cybersecurity products and services, and make the state a global leader
in cybersecurity education.
e h and last theme is to build a “cyber smart nation” by
equipping Australians with the appropriate skills and knowledge in
the area of cybersecurity. is necessitates that “targeted actions at all
levels of Australia’s education system, starting with academic center of
cyber security excellence in universities and by increasing diversity in
this workforce.”
Meanwhile, cybersecurity was rst acknowledged as a national
security issue by the Philippine government in the Philippine
National Cyber Security Plan released by the Oce of the President
in 2004.72 An implementation strategy was developed to execute
the plan in 2008. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the
intended outcomes were achieved. Aer several years of inaction, the
Philippine government released its most recent initiative, the National
Cybersecurity Plan 2022 in 2016.73 e strategy promotes four key
program areas with the objective of strengthening the physical and non-
physical infrastructure necessary for computer network operations.
e rst program area is protecting critical information infrastructure.
is involves establishing a baseline for cyber capabilities through
compliance with the global standards on Information Security (ISO/
IEC 27000) and implementing “cyber drills and exercises” to assess the
level of maturity of existing systems.
e second program area is the protection of government networks.
26 ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
is program necessitates multiple measures, including establishing a
system for computer emergency response, strengthening cybersecurity
expertise across the state, and building the capacity to collect
information on potential threats and formulate assessments to that
help manage cyber intrusions.74 e third program area is protecting
the supply chain of business in the Philippines. is necessitates the
development of national common criteria for evaluating risks in the
supply chain as well as establishing a certication program to ensure
standards are consistent with global practices.75 e fourth and last
program area is the protection of individuals. is relates to the
implementation of a systematic and comprehensive cybersecurity
awareness program that targets the integration of cybersecurity skills
in the curriculum in colleges and universities, capacity building in
public and private organizations with limited resources, and public
information campaign that utilizes all forms of media to increase the
reach of the government.76
While both states are implementing strategies to advance their
interests in cyberspace, cooperation in this area is just emerging. It
is, in other words, in the technocratic phase. Indeed, there are no
existing initiatives for cybersecurity cooperation between Australia
and the Philippines even though both states recognize cyberspace as a
“new” domain of conict and cooperation that needs to be explored.77
In this sense, there are at least two opportunities for transnational
communities to contribute to the development of cybersecurity
cooperation between the two states. e rst opportunity relates to
the role of multinational companies in cybersecurity. Cyberspace
is a signicant source of both opportunities and vulnerabilities for
multinational companies due to their great dependence on networked
27
MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY & DOMINGO
technologies. A secured network environment is a fundamental
concern for multinational companies to evaluate before they invest in
new markets.78 Since Australian multinational companies such as the
ANZ and Telstra contribute to the growth of the Philippine economy,
they have a strong interest in maintaining a clear national approach to
cybersecurity as well as implementing proactive measures to address
cyber intrusions against nancial and telecommunications companies.
In this sense, while public-private partnerships have limitations, these
arrangements can still be mutually benecial because the government
can benet from the expertise and resources of the multinational
companies while multinational companies can gain inuence and
access from working with the government.79
e second opportunity relates to the contribution of civil society
organizations in enhancing cybersecurity cooperation. Civil society
organizations in this discussion refer to non-government organizations
and think tanks. Non-government organizations such as the Internet
Society promote cybersecurity cooperation between states through
Track 2 diplomacy and at the individual level of interaction across
dierent states including Australia and the Philippines. e Internet
Society contributes to cybersecurity cooperation because it promotes
the idea that Internet should be accessible to everyone.80 is is a
basic norm that both states conform to, regardless of disagreements
about the use of the Internet for misinformation.81 ink tanks such
as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) also contribute
to cybersecurity cooperation through Track 1.5 diplomacy where
government ocials, academics and policy analysts discuss the
strategic importance of cybersecurity in the twenty rst century. A
specic example of this initiative is the annual Australia-Philippines
28 ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
Dialogue composed of key stakeholders such as the Asia Pacic
Pathways to Progress, the Australian Embassy in Manila, the Grith
Asia Institute, and the Department of National Defense.
Conclusions
e Australia-Philippines bilateral relationship has strong foundations
and so far, has demonstrated an upward and forward trajectory.
Despite bureaucratic politics at their respective domestic levels, the
momentum of the bilateral cooperation can be sustained and further
enhanced by relying on and tapping the dynamism of transnational
communities. Epistemic communities, as one type of transnational
community, are professional networks that are geared towards
knowledge sharing that can lead to converging interests, mechanisms,
standards, and eventually, policies. ink tanks are the prime examples
of transnational epistemic communities because they act as platforms
and venues for various actors—policymakers, decision-makers,
private entrepreneurs, academics, and practitioners—to come together
and engage with each other. We argued in this paper that the key to
boosting Australia-Philippine cooperation is precisely by leveraging
these professional networks in three areas of cooperation.
In maritime security, we highlighted that the scope conditions
surrounding the South China Sea are rife with uncertainty. In cases
like this, transnational epistemic communities can have a high
impact by identifying a set of mechanisms to improve deterrence
capabilities. is can include standards for information sharing and
equipment transfer, both of which can help reduce shing issues of
29
MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY & DOMINGO
the illegal, unreported, and unregulated variety. Another entry point
for transnational epistemic communities is by promoting territorial
defense capabilities, such as by setting up a platform where information
exchange about naval and coast guard assets can take place. Critical
for maritime security is for these professional networks to mobilize a
bottom-up or grassroots approach for Australia and the Philippines
to upgrade their current comprehensive partnership to a strategic
partnership. Pushing for a full-edged alliance may be premature
at this point, but a strategic partnership signies a deeper and more
tangible commitment to move forward given the current dynamics
between the United States and China.
In the domain of counter-terrorism, we emphasized that despite the
maximum threat that terrorism poses, networks remain disconnected
and incohesive. As such, we recommend that transnational epistemic
communities hold focused and regular Track 1.5 engagements. ink
tanks can take the lead on this one. At the same time, network cohesion
can be improved by engaging higher educational institutions like
colleges and universities that can oer rigorous and comprehensive
training on terrorism studies. Likewise, linkages can be established
with public educational institutions like the Philippine Military
Academy, the Philippine National Police Academy, and the National
Defense College of the Philippines.
Finally, cybersecurity is an emerging regime and area of cooperation
between Australia and the Philippines. We underscored that because
this domain is in the technocratic phase, that is, policies are in the
early stages of being craed, transnational epistemic communities can
have maximum impact here. We propose a two-pronged engagement
strategy: on one hand, working with private multinational corporations
30 ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
can aid in identifying opportunities and vulnerabilities for investments,
and on the other, reaching out to civil society organizations via Track 2
diplomacy can guarantee a participatory, sustainable, and long-lasting
solution to the problems surrounding cybersecurity.
Transnational epistemic communities infuse information and
insight to existing regimes, such as in maritime security, counter-
terrorism, and cybersecurity. Although our focus in this paper was on
these three, we acknowledge that there are other areas of cooperation
that can similarly benet from the dynamism of these professional
networks, not least of which are in the domains of trade and investment
on one hand, and tourism, culture, and education on the other. We
cannot stress enough that the contribution of these networks in these
regimes can pave the way for a diversication of both countries’
strategic options, that can lead to further and deeper cooperation.
31
MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY & DOMINGO
1 Department of Foreign Aairs and Trade, Australia, Bilateral Relationship at a Glance:
Australia and the Philippines, April 2016. https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/
bilateral-relationship-at-a-glance-philippines.pdf
2 Ibid.
3 Department of Foreign Aairs and Trade, Australia, Overview of Australia’s Aid Program
to the Philippines, 2018. https://dfat.gov.au/geo/philippines/development-assistance/Pages/
development-assistance-in-philippines.aspx
4 Department of Foreign Aairs and Trade, Australia, Philippines Country Brief, 2018.
https://dfat.gov.au/geo/philippines/Pages/philippines-country-brief.aspx
5 Ibid.
6 Prashanth Parameswaran, “US, Philippines Launch Wargames as China Issues Warning,”
e Diplomat, 5 April 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-sounds-warning-as-us-
philippines-launch-wargames/
7 Joint Declaration on Australia-Philippines Comprehensive Partnership, 18 November
2015. https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/joint-declaration-on-australia-the-
philippines-comprehensive-partnership.pdf
8 Julio S. Amador III, “Why the Philippines-Australia Comprehensive Partnership Matters,”
CIRSS Commentaries, June 2016. http://www.fsi.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2016-
0628-Vol-3-No-8-Implications-of-the-Philippines-Australia-Comprehensive-Partnership-
Amador.pdf
9 “Australia Urges Philippines: Stop Extrajudicial Killings,” Philippine Star, 4 October 2016.
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/10/04/1630253/australia-urges-philippines-stop-
extrajudicial-killings
10 Charmaine Deogracias and Orrie Johan, “Australia-Philippines Relationship: It’s
Complicated,” e Diplomat, 24 December 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/australia-
philippines-relationship-its-complicated/
11 James Curran, “Australia’s Revolving-Door Politics is a Serious Drag on Its Asia Strategy,”
East Asia Forum, 9 September 2018. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/09/09/australias-
revolving-door-politics-is-a-serious-drag-on-its-asia-strategy/#more-145076; John Hewson,
“e Impact of Australia’s Political Instability,” East Asia Forum, 8 September 2018. http://www.
eastasiaforum.org/2018/09/08/the-impact-of-australias-political-instability/
12 Peter M. Haas, “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,”
International Organization 46, 1 (Winter 1992): 1-35.
13 Camille Elemia, “Senate Probe Sought into DFA Passport Data Loss,” Rappler, 14 January
2019. https://www.rappler.com/nation/220938-senate-investigation-sought-dfa-passport-data-
loss
14 Robert Keohane, Aer Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
15 Helen Milner, “International eories of Cooperation Among Nations,” World Politics
44 (April 1992): 466-496.
16 Peter Haas, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 55.
17 Marie-Laure Djelic and Sigrid Quack, Transnational Communities and Governance:
Shaping Global Economic Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
18 Mai’a K. Davis Cross, “Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later,” Review
of International Studies 39 (2013): 137-160.
19 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in
International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jean-Christophe Graz and
Andreas Nölke (eds), Transnational Private Governance and Its Limits (New York: Routledge,
32 ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
2008); Randall Collins, e Sociology of Philosophies: A Global eory of Intellectual
Change (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Emmanuel Adler, Communitarian
International Relations: e Epistemic Foundation of International Relations (London and New
York: Routledge, 2005); Emmanel Adler, “e Spread of Security Communities: Communities
of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO’s Post-Cold War Transformation,” European Journal
of International Relations 14, 2 (2008): 195-230; Emmanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot,
“International Practices,” International eory 3, 1 (2011): 929-949.
20 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables,” International Organization 36, 2 (Spring 1982): 185-205.
21 Davis Cross (2013).
22 Mischief Reef is also known as Panganiban Reef in Filipino and Meiji Reef in Chinese.
Scarborough Shoal is also known as Panatag Shoal in Filipino, Huángyán Dao in Chinese.
23 e Spratly Islands is also known as the Kalayaan Island Group in Filipino and Nansha
Islands in Chinese.
24 e South China Sea Arbitration, Philippines v China (30 March 2014). Memorial of the
Philippines (hereaer MP), Vol. I.
25 Government of the Republic of the Philippines and Government of the People’s Republic
of China, Agreed Minutes on the First Philippines-China Bilateral Consultations on the South
China Sea Issue (10 August 1995). MP, Vol. VI, Annex 180; Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, Transcript of Proceedings Republic of the Philippines-People’s Republic of China
Bilateral Talks (10 August 1995). MP, Vol. VI, Annex 181.
26 Memorandum from the Undersecretary of Foreign Aairs of the Republic of the
Philippines to the Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China in Manila (6 February 1995).
MP, Vol. III, Annex 17.
27 Memorandum from Erlinda F. Basilio, Acting Assistant Secretary, Oce of Asian and
Pacic Aairs, Department of Foreign Aairs, Republic of the Philippines, to the Secretary
of Foreign Aairs of the Republic of the Philippines (29 March 1995). MP, Vol. III, Annex 19;
Memorandum from Lauro L. Baja, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Oce of Asian and Pacic Aairs,
Department of Foreign Aairs, Republic of the Philippines, to the Secretary of Foreign Aairs of
the Republic of the Philippines (7 April 1995). MP, Vol. III, Annex 20.
28 Memorandum from Erlinda F. Basilio (29 March 1995).
29 Government of the Republic of the Philippines, Transcript of Proceedings (10 August
1995).
30 Memorandum from the Secretary of Foreign Aairs of the Republic of the Philippines to
the President of the Republic of the Philippines (31 July 1995). MP, Vol. III, Annex 23.
31 Memorandum from Lauro L. Baja, Jr., Undersecretary for Policy, Department of Foreign
Aairs, Republic of the Philippines to all Philippine Embassies (11 November 1998). MP, Vol.
III, Annex 35.
32 Memorandum from Secretary-General, Commission on Maritime and Ocean Aairs
Secretariat, Department of Foreign Aairs of the Republic of the Philippines to the Secretary
of Foreign Aairs of the Republic of the Philippines (7 December 2010). MP, Vol. IV, Annex 66.
33 Memorandum from the Embassy of the Philippines in Beijing to Secretary of Foreign
Aairs of the Republic of the Philippines, No. ZPE-0691-2009 (8 September 2009). MP, Vol. IV,
Annex 61.
34 Memorandum from the Embassy of the Philippines in Beijing (8 September 2009).
35 Sarah Raine and Christian Le Mière, “Regional Order: e South China Sea Disputes,”
Adelphi Series, 2013.
33
MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY & DOMINGO
36 Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Press Release: e South China Sea Arbitration (e
Republic of the Philippines v. e People’s Republic of China),” 12 July 2016.
37 Mark Bryan Manantan, “Philippine-Australia Dialogue: Security Dimensions of the
Comprehensive Partnership,” APPFI Policy Paper 2018-02, November 2018.
38 Ibid.
39 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2003); Sidney Jones, “e Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Australian Journal
of International Aairs 59, 2 (2005): 169-178.
40 Joseph Franco, “Confronting the reat of an ISIS,” in Learning from Violent Extremist
Attacks, ed. Majeed Khader, et al. (Singapore: World Scientic, 2018); Peter Chalk, “e Islamic
State in the Philippines: A Looming Shadow in Southeast Asia?” CTC Sentinel 9, 3 (2016): 10-12.
41 Bilveer Singh, “Terrorist Networks in Southeast Asia and Implications for Regional
Security,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 10, 5 (2018): 8-10; Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda,
the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
42 Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Transnational Terrorism: e
reat to Australia (Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2004); Australian
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian Counter-terrorism White Paper
(Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010).
43 Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australia’s Counter-Terrorism
Strategy (Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2015).
44 Ibid., vi.
45 Ibid., 7-8.
46 Ibid., 10-11.
47 Ibid.
48 is arrangement can be traced to the UKUSA Agreement of 1956 that provided the
mechanisms for the exchange of signals intelligence between the ve states.
49 Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 12-13.
50 Australia’s laws against terrorism are in Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995.
51 Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 14-16.
52 Ibid., 17-19.
53 Peter Chalk, et al., e Evolving Terrorist reat to Southeast Asia (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2009).
54 e Abu Sayyaf Group raided the Town of Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur killing 53 people in
April 1995 while rogue elements of the Moro Islamic Liberal Front attacked multiple targets in
Metro Manila killing 22 people in December 2000.
55 Oce of the President, National Security Policy 2011-2016 (Malacañang: Oce of the
President, 2011); Oce of the President, National Security Policy 2016-2022 (Malacañang: Oce
of the President, 2016).
56 Oce of the President, National Security Strategy 2018 (Malacañang: Oce of the
President, (2018), 40-42.
57 Renato C. de Castro, “Developing a Credible Defense Posture for the Philippines: From
the Aquino to the Duterte Administrations,” Asian Politics & Policy 9, 4 (2017): 541–563; Glenn
Varona, “Politics and Policing in the Philippines: Challenges to Police Reform,” e Flinders
Journal of History and Politics 26 (2010): 101-125.
58 William Maley, “Terrorism, Diplomacy, and State Communications,” ICCT Research
Paper No. 8, March 2018. https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ICCT-Maley-Terrorism-
Diplomacy-and-State-Communications-March2018-3-1.pdf
34 ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
59 Francis C. Domingo, “Explaining the Sustainability of the Communist Party of the
Philippines-New People’s Army,” Small Wars Journal, October 2013. https://smallwarsjournal.
com/jrnl/art/explaining-the-sustainability-of-the-communist-party-of-the-philippines-new-
people%E2%80%99s-army
60 National Security Strategy 2018, 42.
61 Department of Foreign Aairs, “Philippine Department of Foreign Aairs Philippines
co-hosts workshop on mainstreaming the prevention of violent extremism in the AFR Region in
Brussels,” 27 February 2017. https://www.dfa.gov.ph/phl-embassies-and-consulates-news/11805-
philippines-co-hosts-workshop-on-mainstreaming-the-prevention-of-violent-extremism-in-
the-arf-region-in-brussels
62 Michael Poznansky and Evan Perkoski, “Rethinking Secrecy in Cyberspace: e Politics
of Voluntary Attribution,” Journal of Global Security Studies 3, 4 (2018): 402–416.
63 Brian Valeriano and Ryan Maness, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conict in
the International System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
64 Adam Segal, “e Development of Cyber Norms at the United Nations Ends in Deadlock.
Now What?” Council of Foreign Relations, 29 June 2017. https://www.cfr.org/blog/development-
cyber-norms-united-nations-ends-deadlock-now-what
65 Nicole Brangwin, “Cyber security,” Australian Parliamentary Library Brieng Book, December
2013. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/
pubs/BriengBook45p/Cybersecurity
66 Attorney-General’s Department of Australia, Cyber Security Strategy (Canberra:
Attorney-General’s Department, 2009); Attorney-General’s Department of Australia, Critical
Infrastructure Resilience Strategy (Canberra: Attorney-General’s Department, 2010).
67 Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Strong and Secure: A Strategy
for Australia’s National Security (Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet,
2013), 40.
68 Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australia’s Cyber Security
Strategy (Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2016).
69 Ibid., 6.
70 Ibid., 21-37.
71 Ibid., 39-43.
72 Oce of the President, Philippine National Cyber Security Plan 2004 (Malacañang:
Oce of the President, 2004).
73 Philippine Department of Information and Communications Technology, Philippine
National Cyber Security Plan 2016-2022 (Quezon City: DICT, 2016).
74 Ibid., 35-28.
75 Ibid., 39.
76 Ibid., 39-40.
77 “Australia, Philippines Explore New Areas of Security Cooperation,” Philippine Star, 7
July 2018. https://www.philstar.com/world/2018/07/07/1831410/australia-philippines-explore-
new-areas-security-cooperation
78 Matthias Bossardt, “Clarity on Cyber Security,” KPMG Switzerland, 2018, https://assets.
kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/ch/pdf/clarity-on-cyber-security-2018.pdf
79 Madeline Carr, “Public–Private partnerships in National Cyber-Security Strategies,”
International Aairs 92, (2016): 43–62; Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Manuel Suter, “Public-Private
Partnerships are No Silver Bullet: An Expanded Governance Model for Critical Infrastructure
Protection,” International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection 4, 2 (2009): 179-187.
35
MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY & DOMINGO
80 Internet Society, Open Internet Standards, n.d. https://www.internetsociety.org/issues/
open-internet-standards/
81 Harley Comrie, “Misinformation for Prot,” e Strategist, 18 January 2019. https://www.
aspistrategist.org.au/author/harley-comrie/
36 ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
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41
MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY & DOMINGO I ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ADR Institute gratefully acknowledges all those who have extended
their support, cooperation, and commitment in the development of
this project. This publication would not have materialized without
their help.
We are fortunate enough to engage with insightful persons from
different sectors, namely: the academe, public and private sectors, as
well as civil society organizations, who have shared their expertise
and have actively contributed to discussions in various fora.
We would also like to thank Prof. Victor Andres ‘Dindo’ Manhit,
President of the ADR Institute, for his leadership, vision, and
guidance in making this endeavor possible.
Last but not the least, we would like to thank the following for
their hard work and dedication and for working tirelessly towards
the completion of this project:
Our design consultant, Ms. Carol Manhit, for the publication
layout and cover design;
And the rest of the ADRi team headed by Executive Director,
Edwin Santiago, Deputy Executive Director for Programs, Ms. Ma.
Claudette Guevara, Deputy Executive Director for Research, Dr.
Jimmy Jimenez, External Affairs and Social Media Manager, Ms.
Krystyna Dy, and Research Associate, Ms. Bianca Suarez.
42 ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIP PINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
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43
MISALUCHA-WILLOUGHBY & DOMINGO I ABOUT THE AUTHORS
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Dr. Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby
is an Associate Professor in the International Studies Department
of De La Salle University and Program Convenor at the Asia
Pacic Pathways to Progress in Manila, Philippines. Her areas of
specialization are ASEAN’s external relations, security cooperation,
and critical international relations theory. She was a Joint Fellow
in the Institute of East Asian Studies and the Käte Hamburger
Kolleg Centre for Global Cooperation Research at the University
of Duisburg-Essen in Germany, an Advanced Security Cooperation
Fellow (ASC15-2) at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacic Center for
Security Studies in Honolulu, a Visiting Research Fellow under a
Japan Foundation grant in the Osaka School of International Public
Policy at Osaka University in Japan, and a recipient of the inaugural
US-ASEAN Fulbright Program in the School of International
Service at American University in Washington, DC. She received her
PhD from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the
Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.
Dr. Francis C. Domingo
is an Assistant Professor and currently the Vice Chair of the
International Studies Department at De La Salle University. He
completed his PhD in International Relations at the University
44 ENHANCING AUSTRALIA-PHILIPPINE COOPERATION: DIVERSIFYING STRATEGIC OPTIONS
of Nottingham in 2018. His thesis explored the cyber strategies of
small states in the Asia-Pacic Region. His work has been published
in several peer-reviewed journals including Comparative Strategy,
Defense & Security Analysis, and Strategic Analysis. Before joining
academia, he briey worked as a research analyst with the Oce
of Strategic and Special Studies (OSS) of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. In the private sector, he coordinated nationwide eld
operations involving brand protection for several multinational
clients as the Associate Managing Director of RVDBic, a pioneering
business risk and intelligence consultancy based in the Makati
Central Business District.
e views, opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reect those of the Institute or any
of its ocers and trustees.
e authors are solely responsible for its content.
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