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Resolving the Ine ability Paradox
Chien-hsing Ho
I
If I believe that a certain item X is ine able for the reason that X cannot be expressed
as it truly is by human concepts and words, questions arise as to how I can make this
known to others in words , how words can be used to gesture toward X. I cannot even
say X is unsayable,
1 because in saying so, I would have made X sayable . is is a time-
honored conundrum known to many philosophers and religious thinkers in the East
and the West. Confronting this conundrum, Augustine thinks it is better to evade the
concerned verbal con ict silently than to quell it disputatiously, and early Wittgenstein
famously asks us to pass over the ine able in silence.
Indeed, a number of contemporary philosophers would agree that the unquali ed
statement “ X is unspeakable ” faces the danger of self-referential absurdity: if this
statement is true, it must at the same time be false, given that X is speakable by the
predicate word “ unspeakable. ” 2 is predicament can be formulated as the following
argument, which I shall term the “ ine ability paradox ” :
P1: X is unspeakable.
P2: e statement “ X is unspeakable ” is true. (From P1)
P3: X is speakable by the predicate word “ unspeakable. ” (From P2)
P4: e statement “ X is unspeakable ” is not true. (From P3)
∴ e statement “ X is unspeakable ” is both true and not true. (From P2 and P4)
Palpably, the conclusion of this argument is a contradiction. Recently, Graham
Priest has reiterated that speaking of the ine able does involve a real contradiction.
However, his strategy for tackling something like the ine ability paradox, besides
using the techniques of contemporary paraconsistent logic, is to aver that some
contradictions are true in that they have their cause in the nature of reality, a nature
that is contradictory. ere are then, for Priest, contradictory statements that are
true, and the statement “ X is unspeakable ” can well be both true and contradictory.
3
Nevertheless, most of us would nd it hard to swallow the idea of the contradictoriness
of reality. Consequently, we need to come up with a di erent strategy for resolving the
paradox.
AQ: Please
provide heading
for each section
instead of
numbered
head levels for
consistency
purpose.
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A er the linguistic turn in the early twentieth century, with so much emphasis
placed on the ubiquity and signi cance of language, the notion of ine ability may,
for many philosophers, become somewhat obsolescent, perhaps something to be le
to mystics and old school metaphysicians. en, why do we need to bother with the
notion? With all due respect to language, however, we must not think that language
knows no limits, as we must not think we can capture the fresh gust of present actuality
in the box of past convention. It is not true that each and every aspect of reality is
speakable in the sense of being directly and properly expressible in words. If so, the
notion of ine ability can still be of relevance to contemporary philosophizing.
To explain — in its use of general terms, such as “ tree ” and “ squirrel, ” language
operates in the realms of resemblance or commonness. It relies for its operation on the
application of a general term to many particular objects that are held to be subsumed
under the concept that corresponds to that term. For example, the word “ tree ” can
be used, on the grounds of di erent trees ’ resemblance to one another, to refer to any
one tree or all trees. Yet, features that are really speci c to a particular tree qua tree do
not fall within the semantic range of the word. It helps little to appeal to more speci c
words such as “ maple ” or “ sugar maple, ” because they, as general terms, also function
on the grounds of resemblance. us, such features can be so concrete, speci c, and
ne-grained that the tree evades complete linguistic determination, which must be
abstract, generic, and coarse-grained. Given that words do not match the features, the
tree is ine able in at least some of its aspects.
4
Furthermore, if one ’ s repertoire of realities does not include universals and
resemblances (more or less generic features that may be believed by others to inhere
in things of the world), then concrete particulars such as maples and apples are
wholly ine able insofar as they are taken to be devoid of objective universals and real
resemblances. Dign ā ga (c. 480 – 540 CE), a prominent Indian Buddhist epistemologist,
basically takes such a stance.
5 For him, universals and resemblances are conceptually
constructed and imposed onto real particulars, which are, in themselves, beyond the
grip of words and concepts. e point for us is that the notion of ine ability may even
concern objects of sense perception.
Now, if concrete particulars are ine able, how are we to use words to refer to them?
In the h chapter of his magnum opus, the Pram ā ṇ asamuccaya , Dign ā ga puts forth
a semantic theory of meaning known as the apoha (exclusion) theory, according to
which a nominal word functions by excluding objects other than its own referent. e
meaning of the word “ maple ” would then be the exclusion of non-maples. Dign ā ga
does not explicitly address the aforesaid conundrum. However, the Chinese Yog ā c ā ra
thinker Kuiji ( 窺 基 , 632 – 682) applies the theory to tackle the conundrum. As a rst
step toward resolving the ine ability paradox, I shall in the next (second) section
discuss Dign ā ga ’ s and Kuiji ’ s relevant views on the issue.
In section 3, I rst cope with the predicament of setting a limit to language. en,
I attend to a few passages in the works of the two Chinese M ā dhyamika philosophers,
Sengzhao ( 僧 肇 , 374? – 414) and Jizang ( 吉 藏 , 549 – 623), and of the h-century
Hindu grammarian-philosopher Bhart ṛ hari to reconstruct a strategy for showing
how we can gesture toward the ine able without making contradictions. A key
notion here is that of indication as an indirect mode of expression, the mechanism
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and functioning of which will be clari ed. In section 4, I contrast indication with
description while introducing the notion of correctness in order to resolve the
ine ability paradox. erea er, I discuss and dismiss three other approaches for
tackling the conundrum as well as two likely objections against my strategy. Section5
presents the conclusion.
I I
Indian philosophers generally think that to apply a nominal word properly to a thing,
a basis for the application is needed, that when one cognizes in a thing the basis for
the application of a word, one is justi ed in using the word to refer to that thing.
Auniversal inherent in a thing would for many serve as the basis: when I cognize in a
tree the universal mapleness, I am justi ed in applying the word “ maple ” to that tree.
Alternatively, some may hold that things of the same kind bear a family resemblance
between them, which can well serve as the basis.
Dign ā ga repudiates the reality of universals and resemblances.
6 Instead, he brings
in apoha or exclusion of others as a substitute for universals. e exclusion is only
a conceptual-semantic item, to be reckoned with whenever we use words, but in no
way truly inherent in a particular. Presumably, for him, the basis for the application
of the word “ maple ” to particular maples is not the universal mapleness, but the
exclusion of things other than maples, in short, non-maples, such as pines, breadfruits,
rabbits, squirrels, hills, rivers, and so forth. e exclusion of non-maples is what all
the particular maples have in common, on the basis of which one can use the word to
refer to them. Incidentally, we can also use the term apoha operationally by saying that
the word “ maple ” functions by excluding non-maples or by di erentiating the maples
from other things.
For Dign ā ga, a nominal word directly and properly expresses exclusion of others
qua its basis of application. However, he also takes the word to directly and properly
express something else. To cite two relevant statements
7 :
S1: A word says ( ā ha ) those things that are quali ed by exclusion of others.
S2: e word “ tree ” . . . presents its own object ( sv ā rtha ) as possessing the feature
of being a tree. us, the object of a word is a thing quali ed by exclusion, but not
merely exclusion.
e word “ tree ” conventionally expresses and refers to all particular trees; it may,
given contextual factors, be used to refer to a given tree. One may take S1 to mean
that the word says (viz., directly and properly expresses) particular trees by excluding
non-trees. However, on account of the ine ability of particulars, the word cannot
really say any particular tree or any of the latter ’ s intrinsic features. In addition, the
quali er-quali cand distinction is for Dign ā ga conceptually constructed. us, a
conceptually unquali ed particular tree must be distinguished from the tree quali ed
by the exclusion of non-trees. Meanwhile, the own object of the word, as noted in
S2, is a thing quali ed by the exclusion of non-trees. e exclusion is conventionally
none other than the generic feature of being a tree, which the thing is linguistically
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presented as possessing. In any case, the word “ tree ” directly and properly expresses a
conceptually quali ed, generic tree as well as the exclusion of non-trees.
As such a quali ed generic something is what a word semantically refers to, it may
be termed the “ semantic referent. ” In contrast, the real particular concerned may be
termed the “ intended referent, ” because it is what the language user intends to refer to
but has di culty putting into words. Of course, under normal circumstances, no one
would use the word “ maple ” to refer to a conceptual-semantic item as the semantic
referent. Given the ine ability of a particular maple qua the intended referent,
however, we need to reckon with a generic maple as an individual thing taken precisely
as conceptually quali ed by the exclusion of non-maples.
Intriguingly, before the time of Dign ā ga, ideas similar to the notion of apoha
were present in Chinese Madhyamaka. Sengzhao asserts that, in Mahayana Buddhist
scriptures, the use of the word “ existent ” ( you 有 ) with respect to a thing is to show
that the thing is not nonexistent, whereas that of the word “ nonexistent ” ( wu 無 ) is to
make explicit that the thing is not existent. 8 e words function by di erentiating their
referents from what the referents are not, rather than denoting something de nitively
existent or nonexistent. However, the rationale behind the assertion di ers from
Dign ā ga ’ s. It concerns Sengzhao ’ s own M ā dhyamika view, which he thinks is implied
in the scriptures, that the myriad things are empty in the sense of being void of any
determinate form or nature.
Although the apoha theory was set forth to explain how nominal words function
given the ine ability of particulars, Dign ā ga did not explicitly address the conundrum
of saying the unsayable. Yet, the Chinese Yog ā c ā ra thinker Kuiji does apply the theory
to o er a noteworthy solution
9 :
A particular cannot be reached by word and speech. . . . [Question:] If so, all real
things being unspeakable, wouldn ’ t it be inappropriate as well to speak the word
“ unspeakable ” ? [Answer:] e word is spoken in order to exclude the speakables.
It is not meant that the word “ unspeakable ” matches the substances of things
( fati 法 體 ), for the latter are not [what one would take to be by the concept of]
unspeakable .
e question posed is that if one uses the word “ unspeakable ” to speak of particulars
as unspeakable, one would self-contradictorily make them speakable. To resolve the
problem, Kuiji applies the apoha operation to the word “ unspeakable. ” e word here
does not really reach or speak of the unspeakable; it does not predicate of the latter
the intrinsic property of being unspeakable. Instead, the word functions by excluding
speakable items such as unreal universals. Meanwhile, Kuiji implies that we must
distinguish between an unspeakable thing in itself and what we understand it to be by
the concept of “ unspeakable, ” a distinction that corresponds to that between intended
referent and semantic referent.
Kuiji ’ s ingenious solution is helpful, but it does not explain how words used can
refer, or direct one ’ s attention, to the ine able.
10 Elsewhere, he claims that nominal
words both exclude and signify.
11 We may clarify this terse claim by considering
the view of his pupil Huizhao ( 惠 沼 , 650 – 714), who appears to think something
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like this: as the word, say, “ maple ” was formed and learned by people ’ s perceiving
particular maples in the past, although it mainly excludes non-maples, one can use
it provisionally to refer to what one intends to signify, namely, particular maples.
12
Presumably, both convention and causation play a role here. Still, this view does not
explain the mechanism of linguistic reference, so it is far from being satisfactory.
III
In the preface to his Tractatus , Wittgenstein writes thus: “ In order to be able to draw
a limit to thought, we should have to nd both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e., we
should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). ”
13 Similarly, it may be said,
to set a limit to language, we should have to nd both sides of the limit sayable and so
the unsayable would turn out to be sayable. We can understand this by considering an
analogical example in actual life. In order to draw a line as a limit on any surface, our
eyes would have to look at both sides of the line. en, the two sides of the line are on
a par, equally visible or cognizable to us; in this sense, the limit ceases to be a limit.
However, there is a line or limit that is an exception to this: the horizon.
Suppose, on a countryside, someone asks me about the location of village X, which
is somewhere beyond our visible horizon. Although I can point out the roads to X,
which we both can see, I can only point toward X, of which neither of us can have a
glimpse, while saying something like “ It is over there above the horizon. ” Clearly, X
and the roads to X, on the two sides of the horizon, are not equally cognized. Still, with
the information conveyed, the person can roughly locate X and know how to reach it.
Likewise, things on the near side of our semantic horizon (the limits to sayability) can
be spoken of or described, whereas those on the far side can only be gestured toward
or indicated. e sayable and the unsayable, on the two sides of the horizon, are surely
di erent. Even though words cannot describe the unsayable, they can gesture toward
it, locating it on the far side of a segment of the semantic horizon.
Gesturing toward is an indirect mode of expression, and so I am assuming that
the ine able is indirectly expressible. As far as I can tell, when an Eastern ine abilist
asserts that a certain item X is ine able, he or she is mostly denying any conformity
between words and X, but not X ’ s indirect expressibility too. In this regard, we may
attend to Sengzhao again
14 :
As this [sagely mind] is nameless, it cannot be spoken of in words. Yet, though it
cannot be spoken of in words, it cannot be transmitted without the use of words.
us, the sages speak all day without having spoken.
Sengzhao clearly implies that though sagely mind is unspeakable, it is linguistically
transmittable. Words can be used to transmit information about the mind and thereby
indirectly express it. Meanwhile, the paradoxical expression “ the sages speak all day
without having spoken ” presumably means that the sages do not use words to speak the
unspeakable. e words used are provisional,
15 indirectly expressive, and to be negated
if one takes them to represent the unspeakable as it is.
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Elsewhere, Sengzhao explains why anything is said to be ine able
16 :
A speech arises from names, names arise because of forms ( xiang 相 ), and a form
arises owing to the mind ’ s cognizing a form [in its object]. What is formless is
nameless, what is nameless is speechless.
e term “ form ” is related to the Indian notion of the basis for the application of a
word. If one conceptually cognizes a generic or coarse-grained form in an object, one
can adequately apply the corresponding word to the object, and the object is deemed
sayable. However, if the object is not endowed with any such cognizable form, as sagely
mind is for Sengzhao, then, being formless, it is nameless and unsayable.
Now, if X is formless and unsayable, how can we use words to refer to it? Sengzhao
suggests that words used to identify the unsayable are provisional external appellations.
According to Jizang, all the Buddha ’ s teachings “ are similar in trying provisionally to
apply names and forms to that which is nameless and formless, in order that sentient
beings realize the speechless by means of speech. ”
17 en, to let others understand the
formless and unsayable X, we should provisionally apply the word “ unsayable ” to it.
For this provisional application, a provisional form as the basis is needed. e form
can be the state of being unsayable, or simply unsayability, which is what the word
directly and properly expresses. Although X is formless, we can conceive this form of
unsayability and apply or superimpose it onto X such that one understands that X is
unsayable.
Something like this can be rationally reconstructed from the following passage
by the Hindu grammarian-philosopher Bhart ṛ hari in his attempt to resolve the
conundrum of saying the unsayable
18 :
If a thing is said to be unsayable, someway or another or in all ways, by some
words, then its state of being unsayable [i.e., its unsayability] is not denied by those
words. Indeed, a doubt with regard to an object does not function toward the
dubiousness attached [to that object] without giving up its own nature.
Suppose for some reason I am doubting someone, I do not simultaneously doubt her
dubiousness. If, instead, I come to doubt her dubiousness, then she is made free from
doubt and my doubt gives up its original nature of rendering her dubious. Likewise,
we can thus construe the functioning of the word “ unsayable ” in the statement “ X
is unsayable. ” e word denies only X itself, but not X ’ s unsayability; that is, the
word conveys that X is not sayable, but not that X ’ s unsayability is not sayable. To
put it the other way, the word says only X ’ s unsayability, but not X itself. Signi cantly,
this unsayability is not an intrinsic feature or property of X. It is only provisionally
conceived and does not really inhere in X. Yet, by being superimposed on X, it makes
known that X is unsayable. As X is not said, it is not made sayable. As the unsayability
is said, by being superimposed on X, one comprehends the unsayability of X. us, the
purpose of making known that X is unsayable is achieved, without thereby making X
sayable.
e notion of superimposition plays a key role here as it helps to relate that which
is said to what is unsayable and show how words can be used to direct one ’ s attention
to the unsayable. On the one hand, the superimposition has the function of revealing,
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because the superimposed unsayability shows X to be unsayable. It performs the
function of concealing on the other, for it covers up the real nature of X, which is not
unsayable in the way we understand X through the concept of unsayability (recall the
above quotation from Kuiji). en, we need to negate the superimposition, taking it
as simply a provisional application, not a real attribution. In the provisional use of
the word “ unsayable, ” we cognize the unsayable through the superimposition on it of
unsayability and the negation of this superimposition. Without the superimposition
nothing about the unsayable would be intimated; without the negation the unsayable
may erroneously become sayable.
19
Let us use the term “ indicate ” in this technical sense: the word “ unsayable ” says the
form of unsayability and so, with the unsayability being superimposed on X, indicates
X such that one comprehends that X is unsayable. Hence, indication is an indirect
mode of expression that consists of two phases: the saying phase and the imposition
phase. An indicative expression can indirectly express the unsayable without actually
saying it.
In respect of the word “ unsayable, ” we have so far focused on the form of unsayability.
Yet, our discussions on Dign ā ga ’ s apoha theory suggest that the word also directly and
properly expresses a generic something quali ed by the unsayability. It is a quali ed
generic X qua the word ’ s semantic referent. e semantic referent is then superimposed
on the unsayable X qua the intended referent such that one knows X to be something
unsayable. However, we can generally neglect this aspect of the functioning of a word.
In addition, while we have been mainly concerned with a word in the context of a
sentence, the mechanism of indication can, mutatis mutandis , be applied to a sentence
as well, allowing us to speak of an indicative sentence or statement.
Finally, indication can broadly be regarded as a gestural language. It helps to
reconstrue, and is reinforced by, the horizon simile. Here, my pointing gesture, as it
were, tells the direction for reaching village X. is direction is superimposed onto
what lies beyond a segment of the horizon, the result of which is the rough location of
the village. e location may need implicitly to be negated as it is not truly an intrinsic
feature of the village. In any case, the point for us is that we can gesture toward the
ine able without making contradictions.
I V
It is widely thought in contemporary philosophy that human language has both
cognitive (referential) and noncognitive (nonreferential) functions. In its cognitive
function, language is meant primarily to convey information about, or express factual
descriptions of, the world. In its noncognitive function, language is used not primarily
to convey information but to make a request, give an order, elicit feelings, evoke
experiences, and so forth. Yet, I think it is unconvincing to hold that language has
only one cognitive function, that is, to describe objects or states of a airs. Suppose
X is unspeakable and the statement “ X is unspeakable ” truly describes what the case
is,namely, the state of a airs of X ’ s being unspeakable. en, as X can be spoken of by
the statement, the statement is both true and not true. e ine ability paradox ensues!
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Indication as an indirect mode of expression is broadly cognitive in that it conveys
information about its intended referent. Unlike a description, however, an indication
is not meant to, and does not actually, match the referent. Since the notion of truth is
o en understood to imply a correspondence between language (words, propositions)
and reality (objects, states of a airs), we should not take an indicative sentence to
be a truth-bearer: it is not either true or false. However, not only can an indication
meaningfully, informatively gesture toward something beyond our semantic horizon,
but the information transmitted can be correct or otherwise (In showing where
village X is, my pointing would be correct if I point in the right direction, incorrect if
otherwise.). erefore, I suggest that we, instead, speak of an indication as correct or
incorrect, where the notion of correctness do es not imply the aforesaid correspondence.
Now, recall the argument I termed the ine ability paradox. e argument embodies
a legitimate logical paradox if we treat its premises as descriptive statements, which
are all plausibly true. However, if we treat P1, “ X is unspeakable, ” as an indicative
statement, then, even if the statement “ X is unspeakable ” is correct, it is not true that
the statement is true. erefore, P2 is false. Consequently, the argument turns out to
be fallacious and fails to be a legitimate paradox. We have thus resolved the ine ability
paradox. e point, then, depends on whether we use the words of the statement
indicatively or descriptively.
ere are, of course, other possible ways of responding to the conundrum of saying
the unsayable or the ine ability paradox. To keep this chapter focused, I shall brie y
discuss only three approaches that are pertinent here. e rst approach distinguishes
rst-order from second-order use of words and treats the word “ unspeakable ” in the
above statement as a second-order word that refers to rst-order words. For instance,
two verses a er the above-quoted passage Bhart ṛ hari writes: “ What functions as
a signi er cannot be signi ed. at which expresses something else cannot in the
same context be expressed. ”
20 us, the word “ unspeakable ” functions to convey that
X cannot be spoken of by any rst-order words, the word not being one of them. It
is a mistake, and goes against the language user ’ s intention, to assert that the use of
the word in respect of X would result in self-referential absurdity. Meanwhile, in the
paradox argument, the statement “ X is unspeakable ” ought to be quali ed one way in
P2, another way in P4; when this is done, the argument is fallacious and the paradox
ceases to arise. One problem with this approach is that it implies that X can be spoken
of by the word “ unspeakable. ”
21 is is a bit odd, and anyone who adopts the approach
owes us an explanation as to why and how X is speakable by second-order words but
unspeakable by rst-order words (when both are human words).
For similar purposes, the anonymous Chinese Buddhist text Awakening of the
Mahayana Faith ( Dacheng qishen lun , 大 乘 起 信 論 ) introduces the phrase “ using words
to exclude words ” ( yin yan qian yan , 因 言 遣 言 ) to contend that the term “ suchness ”
( zhenru , 真 如 ) is the ultimate term that one can appeal to for intimating the ine able
mind of suchness, and that the term serves the function of excluding all other terms.
Unlike the former approach, however, even the term “ suchness, ” the text suggests, is
provisional and does not match the ine able. e commentator and Huayan master
Fazang ( 法 藏 , 643 – 712) gives an intriguing analogy. One shouts “ Quiet! ” in order to
stop human noises. Without the shouting, the noises would not be stopped. Yet, if one,
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to make sure that the order is obeyed, shouts several times, then one makes noises
oneself and fails to stop noises. Just as here one must not keep shouting, likewise,
the term “ suchness ” needs to be excluded too.
22 is points to the second approach
concerned, in which one negates or unsays whatever one has said about the ine able.
Of the paradox argument, one who upholds the approach can challenge even P1 by
saying something like “ I don ’ t mean to say X is unspeakable ” or “ X ’ s being unspeakable
is also unspeakable. ”
We already touched on this approach while explaining Sengzhao ’ s expression “ the
sages speak all day without having spoken. ” It is partially implicit in the discussion on
the notion of superimposition. Like Kuiji ’ s ingenious apoha solution, the approach has
the advantage of refraining from making the unsayable sayable. Nonetheless, they are
both de cient because they do not clearly explain how words can, one way or another,
be related to the unsayable: without the relation, the words used are hardly better than
meaningless sounds. By contrast, our strategy overcomes this problem by resorting to
the notions of superimposition and of gesturing beyond the horizon.
e third approach, the dialetheist approach, radically di ers from the rst two.
In their paper on contradictions in Buddhism, Graham Priest, Jay Gar eld, and
Yasuo Deguchi contend that certain Mahayana Buddhists are committed to the view
that some contradictions are true and acceptable, and that modern developments in
paraconsistent logics have shown that such a stance can be rational. According to them,
for instance, some Buddhists describe certain things about an indescribable reality
such that the indescribable is described.
23 en, the paradox argument would have the
conclusion that the statement “ X is unspeakable ” is both true and contradictory, which
they would say is rationally acceptable.
If the Buddhist simply means to transmit indirectly certain information about an
indescribable reality, then, as we have seen, to state that the reality is indescribable is
not to describe it. ere is no irresoluble contradiction here. It is, instead, gesturing
beyond our semantic horizon by telling something about the direction across the
horizon. To the best of my knowledge, Mahayana Buddhist thinkers never explicitly
assert that some contradictions are true. Whereas some Buddhists are keen on
using paradoxical or gurative expressions, this usually has to do with the perceived
limitations of descriptive language. As an additional note, Priest ’ s claim that reality is
contradictory in the sense that it is such as to render certain contradictory statements
true squares poorly with the Chinese M ā dhyamika position that reality is empty of any
describable determinate structure.
24 A contradiction is as determinate as a tautology.
Correspondingly, to claim that reality is contradictory is to predicate of reality a
determinate, though contradictory, structure describable in words or logical symbols.
Yet, what if reality is indescribable and, somewhat like an amorphous lump, empty of
any determinate structure? Perhaps, the idea of a contradictory reality ts better with a
logically possible world, but not the concrete world of lived experience.
To complete this section, let me examine two likely objections against my strategy.
First, some may object that I, like many others, have unnecessarily complicated the
issue of referring to the ine able. A er all, one can use nominal words simply as proper
names that designate and refer to the ine able. Since few would take a proper name
to have any conceptual meaning or content, the use of such names would not result
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in the aforesaid conundrum. Second, it may be charged that my strategy is based on
the problematic assumption that the ine able is indirectly expressible. In actual fact,
the objector may say, some ine abilists claim or imply that the ine able is indirectly
inexpressible as well. us, even if we rephrase P2 of the paradox argument as “ e
statement ‘ X is unspeakable ’ is correct ” (where the word “ unspeakable ” implies indirect
inexpressibility), the argument would still have the contradictory conclusion to the
e ect that the statement is both correct and not correct. en, the strategy fails to
resolve the ine ability paradox.
In responding to the rst objection, we may appeal to William Alston ’ s views against
a tactic for resolving the predicament of referring to the ine able. For Alston, although
the word “ God ” in the statement “ God is ine able ” may be regarded as a proper
name not standing for any concept, we would not count anyone as understanding the
statement if he or she is unable to use some identifying phrase, for example “ the rst
cause ” or “ the father of Jesus Christ, ” to explain the word. Yet, any such phrase would
constitute a characterization of God and so make God factually speakable.
25 e use or
understanding of a proper name thus presupposes a certain expressible knowledge of
the object named, but this inevitably implies the expression of the so-called ine able. In
addition, we also wonder how anyone can use the word “ unspeakable ” in the statement
“ X is unspeakable ” as a proper name at all. Hence, the issue cannot be resolved so easily
as is believed by the objector.
I agree with the second objection that if the ine able X is directly and indirectly
inexpressible, then one cannot express it without making contradictions. When asked
any question about X, the ine abilist cannot but remain in silence. To make matters
worse, if remaining in silence counts as a body language, which in turn counts as a
form of language, then one cannot even stay silent.
26 ere would be no escape from
self-contradiction. Nonetheless, it is never my intention to defend such an ine abilist.
In addition, to my knowledge, no Eastern ine abilist referred to above asserts that
his ine able X is indirectly inexpressible. Consequently, our assumption is not
problematic, and the objection may simply miss its target.
V
We began this chapter with the time-honored linguistic-philosophical conundrum
of saying the unsayable and the related ine ability paradox. For many, this issue is
unresolvable, which casts doubts on the viability of the notion of ine ability. A er
examining the Buddhist semantic theory of apoha and an apoha solution to the issue,
we resorted to certain Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical materials to rationally
reconstruct a strategy for coping with the conundrum and, especially, resolving the
paradox. By introducing the mode of expression termed “ indication, ” together with
the relevant notions of superimposition and of gesturing beyond the horizon, I wish
to have shown that expressing the ine able does not necessarily involve irresoluble
contradiction. It is also hoped that our philosophical exercise, unusual in conjoining
Chinese Buddhism and Hindu philosophy, points to a constructive way forward for
comparative philosophy.
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Resolving the Ine ability Paradox 79
If our strategy is on the whole persuasive, if we cannot adequately capture the fresh
gust of actuality in the box of convention, then philosophers may need to recognize
the limitations of language and acknowledge the relevance of the notion of ine ability
for contemporary philosophizing. Instead of belittling language, this recognition may
induce one to value even more various possibly non-descriptive modes of expression
such as metaphor, negation, paradox, indication, parable, poetic language, and so
on. It might also prompt philosophers to attend more than is normal to the concrete,
ne-grained, and tacit aspects of human life and experience, which have tended to be
ltered out by abstract philosophical thinking.
N o t e s
1 In this chapter, the words “ ine able, ” “ unsayable, ” and “ unspeakable ” are used
interchangeably.
2 Cf. William Alston, “ Ine ability, ” Philosophical Review 65, no. 4 (1956), pp. 506 – 22;
Keith E. Yandell, “ Some Varieties of Ine ability, ” International Journal for Philosophy
of Religion 6, no. 3 (1975), pp. 167 – 79; and Walter Terrence Stace, Mysticism and
Philosophy (Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher, 1987). Correlatively, Plantinga contends
that the “ view that our concepts don ’ t apply to God is fatally ensnared in self-
referential absurdity. ” See: Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press, 1980), p. 26.
3 Graham Priest, Beyond the Limits of ought (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), pp. 294 – 5; Graham Priest, “ Speaking of the Ine able . . ., ” in Nothingness in
Asian Philosophy , ed. JeeLoo Liu and Douglas L. Berger (New York: Routledge, 2014),
pp.91 – 103.
4 I understand the notion of ine ability somewhat broadly. An item is ine able
(viz., directly and properly inexpressible) if it or its texture does not conform to
the semantic structure of any words one may use to denote or describe it. Roughly
something like this nonconformity or mismatch between language and reality is
behind many Eastern thinkers ’ assertion of ine ability.
5 It is disputable whether Dign ā ga ’ s notion of particular ( svalak ṣ a ṇ a ) covers such
medium-sized objects as maples and apples. However, we can here neglect this
technical issue.
6 Richard P. Hayes, Dign ā ga on the Interpretation of Signs (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1988), p. 246. For a recent exposition of Dign ā ga ’ s apoha theory,
see: O. Pind, “ Dign ā ga ’ s Apoha eory: Its Presuppositions and Main eoretical
Implications, ” in Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition , ed. Mark
Siderits, Tom Tillemans, and Arindam Chakrabarti (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2011), pp. 64 – 83.
7 Hayes, Dign ā ga on the Interpretation of Signs , p. 308: “ ś abdo ‘ rth ā ntaraniv ṛ ttivi ś i ṣ ṭ ā n
eva bh ā v ā n ā ha ” ; Pind, “ Dign ā ga ’ s Apoha eory, ” p. 83: “ v ṛ k ṣ a ś abdo . . . sv ā rtha ṁ
v ṛ k ṣ alak ṣ a ṇ a ṁ praty ā yayati . . ., eva ṁ ca niv ṛ ttivi ś i ṣ ṭ a ṁ vastu ś abd ā rtha ḥ , na
niv ṛ ttim ā tram . ” In this chapter, all translations from Sanskrit and Chinese are mine.
8 Zhaolun , T 45: 152c12–14, 159b11; cf. 151b13–15. All references taken from
Taish ō shinsh ū daiz ō ky ō 大 正 新 脩 大 藏 經 (abbreviated as T). In CBETA Chinese
Electronic Tripi ṭ aka Version April 2014. Taipei: Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text
Association.
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9 Cheng weishi lun shuji , T 43: 288a21–b1: “ 言 說 不 及 是 自 相 。 . . . 若 爾 ， 即 一 切
法 不 可 言 ， 不 可 言 言 亦 不 稱 理 ？ 遮 可 言 故 ， 言 不 可 言 ； 非 不 可 言 即 稱 法 體 ，
法 體 亦 非 不 可 言 故 . ”
10 As Priest puts it, “ If one wishes to explain why something is ine able, one must refer
to it and say something about it. To refer to something else , about which one can talk,
is just to change the subject. ” See: Priest, “ Speaking of the Ine able . . . ” , p. 98. It is
surely not enough just to take the word “ unspeakable ” to exclude speakables.
11 Yinming ru zhengli lunshu , T 44: 138a26–28. is claim is to explain why, by uttering
the word “ re, ” one would obtain re, but not water, when the particulars of both re
and water are unspeakable.
12 Cheng weishi lun liaoyi deng , T 43: 716b9–14. See also Cheng weishi lun shuji,
T 43: 296c15–17.
13 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , translated by D. F. Pears and
B.F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 3.
14 Zhaolun , T 45: 153c24–26: “ 斯 則 無 名 之 法 ， 故 非 言 所 能 言 也 。 言 雖 不 能 言 ， 然 非
言 無 以 傳 ， 是 以 聖 人 終 日 言 而 未 嘗 言 也 . ”
15 e words are provisional in that they are used provisionally in the sense that they are
not meant to say or match the intended referent and need to be negated, especially if
one takes them to represent the way the referent truly is.
16 Zhaolun , T 45: 159b20–21: “ 夫 言 由 名 起 ， 名 以 相 生 ， 相 因 可 相 。 無 相 無 名 ，
無 名 無 說 . ” In Chinese Buddhism, the word “ name ” ( ming 名 ) normally means a
nominal word, but not a proper name.
17 Shengman baoku , T 37: 5b18–19: “ 同 是 無 名 相 中 強 名 相 說
， 欲 令 眾 生 因 言
以 悟 無 言 也 . ” Also, Jingming xuanlun, T 38: 856b7–8.
18 Wilhelm Rau, ed., Bhart ṛ haris V ā kyapad ī ya: Die M ū lak ā rik ā s nach den
Handschri en herausgegeben und mit einem P ā da-Index versehen (Wiesbaden:
Franz Steiner, 1977), p. 120: “ tath ā nyath ā sarvath ā ca yasy ā v ā cyatvam ucyate ,
tatr ā pi naiva s ā vasth ā tai ḥ ś abdai ḥ prati ṣ idhyate . na hi sa ṁ ś a y a r ū p e ’ r t h e ś e ṣ atvena
vyavasthite , avyud ā se svar ū pasya sa ṁ ś a y o ’ n y a ḥ pravartate . ” Bhart ṛ hari ’ s notion
of superimposition (adhy ā ropa, sam ā ropa) can be found in Rau, Bhart ṛ haris
V ā kyapad ī ya, pp. 123, 132.
19 For a related paper of mine that focuses on Bhart ṛ hari ’ s approach, see: Chien-hsing
Ho, “ Saying the Unsayable, ” Philosophy East and West 56, no. 3 (2006), pp. 409 – 27.
To my knowledge, the M ā dhyamika philosopher Candrak ī rti (c. 600–650) and the
Hindu Vedantic philosopher Ś a ṅ kara (c. 788–820) have both employed the notion
of superimposition to show how we can use words to refer to the ine able. However,
they did not elaborate further the way I have done.
20 Rau, Bhart ṛ haris V ā kyapad ī ya , p. 120: “ na ca v ā cakar ū pe ṇ a prav ṛ ttasy ā sti v ā cyat ā ,
pratip ā dya ṁ na tat tatra yen ā nyat pratipadyate . ” Before this verse, Bhart ṛ hari states
that if someone claims that “ all what I say is false, ” the person does not intend to take
this claim to be false. at Bhart ṛ hari mentions such examples may indicate that our
aforesaid strategy is a reconstruction rather than an interpretation of his proposed
solution.
21 If, however, the word “ unspeakable ” refers solely to rst-order words, not to X, then
the problem would be similar to the one faced by Kuiji ’ s apoha solution.
22 See Dacheng qishen lun yiji ( 大 乘 起
信 論 義 記 ), T 44: 252c11–253a2.
23 Yasuo Deguchi, Jay L. Gar eld, and Graham Priest, “ e Way of the Dialetheist:
Contradictions in Buddhism, ” Philosophy East and West 58, no. 3 (2008), pp. 399 – 401.
We have above mentioned Priest ’ s strategy.
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Resolving the Ine ability Paradox 81
24 For Sengzhao ’ s position on the issue, see: C. Ho, “ Emptiness as Subject-Object Unity:
Sengzhao on the Way ings Truly Are, ” in Nothingness in Asian Philosophy , ed.
JeeLoo Liu and Douglas L. Berger (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 104 – 18.
25 Alston, “ Ine ability, ” pp. 511 – 17.
26 In the Vimalak ī rtinirde ś a S ū tra , when asked about his own way of transcending
duality, unlike other Bodhisattvas around who spoke their views, Vimalak ī rti, the
main character of the sutra, wisely remained silent. He was then praised for his sacred
silence . Commenting on this narrative, Jizang remarks that while other Bodhisattvas
provisionally applied names to show the nameless and formless, Vimalak ī rti
provisionally applied the forms of silence to make explicit the nameless and formless.
en, Vimalak ī rti ’ s silence is none other than a provisional bodily expression. See
Jingming Xuanlun, T 38: 856b6–11.
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