Our Corner of the Somme: Australia at Villers-Bretonneux

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OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME
AUSTRALIA AT VILLERS-BRETONNEUX
Before the First World War, Villers-Bretonneux was a lively and flourishing
French town dedicated to textiles and agriculture. By the time of the
Armistice, it had been largely destroyed, and half its population had fled or
died. From March to August 1918, Villers-Bretonneux formed part of an
active front line, where Australian troops were heavily involved. As a result, it
holds a significant place in Australian history.
At the end of the war, Villers-Bretonneux became an open-air memorial to
Australia’s participation in the First World War. Successive Australian
governments have valorised the Australian engagement, contributing to an
evolving Anzac narrative that has become entrenched in Australia’s national
identity.
Our Corner of the Somme provides a robust, eye-opening analysis of the
memorialisation of Australia’s role on the Western Front and the Anzac
mythology that so heavily contributes to Australians’understanding of
themselves. In this rigorous and richly detailed study, Dr Romain Fathi
challenges accepted historiography by examining the assembly, projection
and performance of Australia’s national identity in northern France.
Romain Fathi PhD is Lecturer in Australian History at Flinders University and
achercheur associé at the Centre d’Histoire de Sciences Po, Paris. He has
taught and researched at Sciences Po in France, Yale in the United States, and
the University of Queensland in Australia. His primary research interests
focus on the First World War, war commemorations and Australian identity.

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OUR CORNER OF
THE SOMME
AUSTRALIA AT VILLERS-
BRETONNEUX
ROMAIN FATHI

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‘MACHIN, TRUC, CHOSE, tous morts, tous tués, crevés,
écrabouillés, anéantis, disloqués, oubliés, pulvérisés, réduits à zéro, et
pour rien [...].’
Blaise Cendrars, La main coupée, 1946
‘WHO’S-IT, WHAT’S-HIS-NAME and THINGUMABOB: all dead,
all killed, slain, crushed, annihilated, dismembered, forgotten,
pulverized, reduced to zero, and for nothing [...].’
Blaise Cendrars, Lice, trans. Nina Rootes, 1973

FOREWORD
Some years ago, I came across an anonymous letter in the archives of the
Commonwealth War Graves Commission. It described a visit to the
Australian National Memorial at Villers-Bretonneux within months of
its dedication. A place pledged to remember Australian sacrifice in France
had already become a site of casual visitation. By day, this ‘beautiful
memorial’became ‘a kind of picnic ground’:‘tourists’purchased ice
creams at the entrance and enjoyed a fine view of the countryside from
the heights of Lutyens’commemorative tower. By night, the former
battlefield hosted even less appropriate pastimes. Install ‘iron railing with
a lockable gate’, the correspondent urged, otherwise ‘this hallowed spot’
will in time become a ‘lovers’walk’for all and sundry.
This letter reminds us of the multiple uses any commemorative site
might serve. It also suggests a tension between local, national and imperial
aspirations. What London and Canberra hoped for from Villers-
Bretonneux was very different from callow youths who parked bicycles
and smoked cigarettes beside the porch of the cemetery, or children who
‘jumped in and out of the entrance chapel’. Not all the locals were quite so
irreverent. Our correspondent was touched by workmen removing their
hats, and impressed by gardeners and police struggling to impose order
and decorum. Even so, the message was clear. Australia and the Empire
must assert its control over this external site; commemoration in a foreign
land involved a delicate renegotiation of sovereignty.
All these issues –and many more –are surveyed in this remarkable
book. Romain Fathi explores the reasons Villers-Bretonneux was chosen
as Australia’s principal commemorative site in France and the way this
‘open-air memorial’has functioned. His study extends from the war years
to the present day, charting the way Australian national identity was
asserted first within an imperial framework and then as an aspect of
commemorative diplomacy. This is a project of considerable breadth.
What Dr Fathi calls the ‘assembly, projection and performance of war
commemoration’occurs on French territory, through the mediation of
vii

French locals, but is designed for ‘internal consumption in Australia’.It
involves both ‘top-down’and ‘bottom-up’remembrance. One of the most
rewarding discussions in this book is the relationship between personal
investments in war commemoration and the political purposes war
memory serves. Here he advances new explanations for the ‘Anzac
revival’and brings new sources to our attention. This book is not the first
to survey responses through visitor books, but it does employ quantitative
analysis in a way none previously has. And that scan of some 20 000
entries suggests that Australians often take very different messages from
visiting the Somme than the perspective ‘suggested by official sources’.
What this book also establishes is the narrowing of the official com-
memorative compass in recent decades. Once, ceremonies on the Somme
were restrained affairs, focused on the sombre remembrance of the war
dead. Today, commemoration has taken on a carnivalesque character.
The Department of Veterans Affairs issues tickets to what it calls com-
memorative ‘events’, Villers-Bretonneux is fitted out with makeshift sta-
diums and remembrance is orchestrated for TV audiences ‘back home’.
Politicians speak less of loss and more of imagined Anzac virtues. Dr Fathi
dubs this the ‘impoverishment’of remembrance. Paradoxically, that same
‘remembrance’relies increasingly on costly digital recreations. The simu-
lation of battle in the Sir John Monash Interpretative Centre means the
most expensive museum raised on the Somme is something of a 3D
shooting gallery. One wonders how our letter writer would have viewed
this latest abuse of a ‘hallowed’place originally intended as a ‘sanctuary’.
This book takes issue with abiding mythologies. Australian troops did
not save Amiens in 1918 and therefore (by extension) France. Forgotten
(and more effective) Moroccan troops fought beside them at Villers-
Bretonneux, as did British forces. Nor did Victorians rebuild the town’s
school alone. That ‘gift’actually ran counter to wishes of the mayor, who
believed an abattoir would serve the purpose of civic reconstruction. His
proposal for a memorial slaughter-house was not well received in Austra-
lia! Here and elsewhere, Romain Fathi employs measured argument and
incisive analysis to craft a bold and revealing history. Our Corner of the
Somme is one of the most searching studies of Australian commemorative
practices abroad to emerge from the Great War’s Centenary.
Professor Bruce Scates, FASSA
Australian National University, July 2018
viii FOREWORD

CONTENTS
Foreword by Professor Bruce Scates vii
Maps x
Photographs xi
Figures and tables xiii
Preface xv
Acknowledgements xvii
Glossary xx
Introduction 1
1 Villers-Bretonneux: An Australian victory? 11
2‘The turning point of the war’: Occupying the memory front 30
3 A school or nothing 48
4 The Australian National Memorial at Villers-Bretonneux:
Commemorating the nation within an imperial frame 73
5‘Have we forgotten this place?’99
6‘The meaning of the Anzac tradition must be learned anew’112
7‘A piece of Australia in France’135
8‘It was great to see Australia acknowledged in such a great way’159
Conclusion 196
Appendix 204
Notes 208
Bibliography 240
Index 262
ix

MAPS
1 Operation Michael, German Offensive, March 1918 13
2 German push on Villers-Bretonneux and Allied counter-offensive,
24–27 April 1918 19
3 Advance of the Moroccan Division from 0500 to 1800 hours,
26 April 22
4 Battle of Amiens, August 1918 25
x

PHOTOGRAPHS
0.1 Do Not Forget Australia 7
0.2 N’oublions jamais l’Australie 8
2.1 Australian memorial plaque, cathedral of Amiens 32
2.2 American plaque, cathedral of Amiens 36
2.3 Canadian plaque, cathedral of Amiens 37
2.4 Newfoundland’s plaque, cathedral of Amiens 38
2.5 New Zealand’s plaque, cathedral of Amiens 38
2.6 British plaque, cathedral of Amiens 39
2.7 Tribute to General Debeney, cathedral of Amiens 40
2.8 Tablet offered to Australia by the inhabitants of
Villers-Bretonneux 44
3.1 & 3.2 Villers-Bretonneux’s church 49
3.3 & 3.4 Rue Arsène Obry, Villers-Bretonneux 50
3.5 & 3.6 Rue d’Herville, Villers-Bretonneux 51
3.7 Stele commemorating the donors, Victoria School 66
4.1 Lucas’proposal for the Australian National Memorial 76
4.2 Lutyens’proposal for the Australian National Memorial 79
4.3 Rising Sun motif on the entrance to the Australian National
Memorial’s tower 80
4.4 Orientation table at the top of the Australian National
Memorial’s tower 81
4.5 A section of the orientation table 82
4.6 The Australian National Memorial at Villers-Bretonneux,
July 1938 90
6.1 Plaque unveiled by French Minister for Defence André Giraud
in 1988 115
xi

6.2 The Bullecourt Digger 127
7.1 & 7.2 Setting the scene: Anzac Day preparations
at Villers-Bretonneux, 2010 147
7.3 Anzac Day Dawn Service, Villers-Bretonneux, 2009 148
7.4 The Sir John Monash Centre under construction 154
7.5 Front of the Sir John Monash Centre 156
8.1 Small commemorative items, Villers-Bretonneux 185
8.2 Villers-Bretonneux’s French–Australian Museum 193
xii PHOTOGRAPHS

FIGURES AND TABLES
Figures
7.1 Visitors to the French–Australian Museum of
Villers-Bretonneux from 1992 to 2016 138
8.1 Estimated numbers of signatories in the visitor books of
Adelaide Military Cemetery and Villers-Bretonneux Military
Cemetery between 1989 and 2013 162
8.2 Samples of distribution of signatories’nationality at the
Adelaide Military Cemetery 162
8.3 Samples of distribution of signatories’nationality at the
Villers-Bretonneux Military Cemetery 163
Tables
8.1 Nationalities of soldiers buried at Adelaide and
Villers-Bretonneux military cemeteries 166
A.1 Visitors to the French–Australian Museum of
Villers-Bretonneux from 1992 to 2016 204
A.2 Estimated numbers of signatories in the visitor
books of Adelaide and Villers-Bretonneux military
cemeteries between 1989 and 2013 205
A.3 Samples of distribution of signatories’nationality
at the Adelaide Military Cemetery 206
A.4 Samples of distribution of signatories’nationality
at the Villers-Bretonneux Military Cemetery 207
xiii

PREFACE
The Australian Army has a long and admirable record in fostering serious
research and publication about its history. For more than a century the
Army has seen the value of history to its future. From its outset ‘Military
History’was part of the formal education of officers at RMC Duntroon,
and for a time officers’promotion depended upon candidates being able
to give a coherent analysis of Stonewall Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley
campaigns in promotion exams. An understanding of the Army’s history
and traditions remains central to its esprit de corps in its most literal
meaning.
From the 1970s (as a consequence of educating officers at university
level) the Army has produced several generations of educated soldiers,
several of whom became historians of note, including John Coates, Robert
O’Neill, David Horner, Peter Pedersen, John Mordike, Bob Hall, Jean
Bou, Bob Stevenson and Craig Stockings. The creation of an Army
History Unit in the late 1990s demonstrated the Army’s commitment to
encouraging and facilitating serious history. Under Dr Roger Lee it
exerted a profound influence in managing the Army’s eighteen museums,
supporting research on Army history and in publishing its history.
One of the most impressive demonstrations of the Army’s commitment
to history has been its long association with several major publishers, and
notably with Cambridge University Press. This has been a productive
relationship brokered by Roger Lee and the long-standing former General
Editor of the Army History Series, Professor David Horner.
The Australian Army History Series brings to an academic and popu-
lar readership historical work of importance across the range of the
Army’s interests and across the span of its history. The series, which
I now have the honour to edit, seeks to publish research and writing of
the highest quality relating not only to the Army’s operational experience
but also to its existence as an organisation and as a part of its contribution
to the national narrative.
xv

The Army History Unit has created a community of writers and
readers (including soldiers in both roles), the product of whose questions,
research, debate and writing informs the Army’s understanding of itself
and its part in Australia’s history. It is a history to be proud of in
every sense.
Romain Fathi’sOur Corner of the Somme begins with a challenging
account of the fighting around Villers-Bretonneux in the French spring of
1918. He contests the traditional Australian story by drawing on French
sources utterly unknown to Australians. His exploration of Australia’s
changing relationship with the community of Villers-Bretonneux –the
location of the Australian National Memorial –offers many revelations
and even surprises to Australians who cherish a simple narrative of French
gratitude. That Dr Fathi’s book deals with a commemorative site reinvig-
orated by the opening of the Sir John Monash Centre gives it a strong
relevance to those interested in understanding the complex relationship
between Australia and the nation in which lie more Australian soldiers
killed in battle than any other.
Professor Peter Stanley
General Editor, Australian Army History Series
UNSW Canberra
xvi PREFACE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A wide range of people and institutions have provided me with their
support to complete this book, which is based on research completed
during my doctoral studies. I have been extremely fortunate to have
Associate Professor Martin Crotty and Professor Guillaume Piketty as
my supervisors thanks to an auspicious cotutelle agreement between the
University of Queensland and Sciences Po, Paris. I owe my deepest grati-
tude to both Martin Crotty and Guillaume Piketty for their incredibly
supportive mentorship. Their advice, availability, dedication and encour-
agement provided the best environment a doctoral candidate could wish
for. I feel privileged to have learned from them as academics and as men of
great generosity. Thank you both.
Academic support has been essential to this project. I would like to
sincerely thank all those who have encouraged me and provided me with
guidance, feedback, advice on primary sources, conference or publication
opportunities, advice on public engagement, funding and all areas of early
career academia. I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to Stéphane
Audoin-Rouzeau, Damien Baldin, Joan Beaumont, Annette Becker, Laur-
ence Bertrand-Dorléac, Frank Bongiorno, Andrew Bonnell, Geoff Ginn,
Matthew Graves, Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Anne Hertzog, John Horne,
Patrick Jory, Marc Lazar, Morris Low, Nicolas Offenstadt, Melanie
Oppenheimer, Emmanuel Saint-Fuscien, Bruce Scates, Peter Stanley,
Shanti Sumartojo, Jakob Vogel, Ben Wellings, Caroline Winter and
Bart Ziino.
Thanks to Sciences Po’s Centre for the Americas, I was able to com-
plete a doctoral exchange at Yale University during my candidature. My
deepest gratitude goes to Professor Jay Winter, who supported my appli-
cation and welcomed me to the department, an invaluable opportunity
and a fantastic experience. I was lucky enough to become a Teaching
Fellow for Professor Timothy Snyder, whom I would equally like to thank
for his dedicated mentorship.
xvii

In Paris, the support and camaraderie of Paul Lenormand, Géraud
Létang, Victor Louzon, Camille Mahé, Paul Marquis, Claire Morelon,
Malcolm Théoleyre and Nina Valbousquet turned research and writing
into an exceedingly pleasant activity. In Brisbane, I am immensely
indebted to Kate Ariotti, Mark Cryle, Susan Kellett, Fiona Mcleod, Maria
Quirk and Laura Roberts for their generosity, friendliness and proofread-
ing, which were tremendously helpful as I faced the challenges of writing
in a foreign language. Beyond my supervisors who bore the brunt of this
situation, your dedication will be fondly remembered.
This research would not have been possible without the financial
support of several institutions. First and foremost, I would like to thank
the University of Queensland for having awarded me the UQI scholarship.
UQ’s Graduate School International Travel Award supported research at
Oxford, Maidenhead and Kew, while UQ’s School of Historical and
Philosophical Inquiry and Sciences Po’s École Doctorale both provided
significant travel funding for research in France, Australia and the United
States. I am also grateful to His Excellency Christophe Lecourtier, former
Ambassador of France to Australia and his predecessor, Stéphane Roma-
tet, as well as Catherine Hodeir, for their support, particularly through
the embassy’s Scientific Mobility Program award. I am also most grateful
to the International Research Centre of the Historial of the Great War in
Péronne, the Conseil Général de la Somme and the Foundation Gerda
Henkel for their financial support, and to the Chancellerie des Universités
de Paris at the Sorbonne, which bestowed a Prix de la Chancellerie upon
my work.
I am also deeply indebted to all those in the Somme who facilitated and
supported my research, including François Bergez, Guillaume de Fonclare,
Étienne Denys, Mélanie Driencourt, Lorraine El Yabouri, Hervé François,
Natalie Legrand, Hubert Lelieur, Marie-Pascale Prévost-Bault, Yves Taté
and Jean-Pierre Tranchard. Among the many archive centres this research
took me to (and institutions that served as research centres), a few distin-
guished themselves through the dedication of their staff. I am especially
grateful to the French–Australian Museum of Villers-Bretonneux, the
Archives Départementales de la Somme, the Centre de documentation
de l’Historial, the Préfecture de la Somme and the Australian War
Memorial. I wish to thank the staff of the Commonwealth War Graves
Commission at Maidenhead, Beaurains and Villers-Bretonneux, and
Andrew Fetherston in particular for his terrific and continuous support.
The support and dedication of series editor Peter Stanley and that of
Olivia Tolich, Associate Commissioning Editor at Cambridge University
xviii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Press, have been invaluable in transforming a much larger study into a
book. Professor Stanley’s clever suggestions and insights, and his cheerful
attitude, were particularly appreciated. After completing this research,
I was appointed a lecturer at Flinders University, and I would like to
thank my colleagues for their tremendous support since joining their
enthusiastic and dedicated team of scholars.
I would also like to express my sincerest gratitude towards those who
supported this research in other ways such as Alain Besoin, Emily Galla-
gher, Danielle Le Galloudec, Georgia Haydon, Marcy Kaufman, Judy
King, Agnieszka Rec, the entire Young family, and Claire Rioult in
particular for her caring support. All the friends who, wherever in the
world they may be, encouraged and stimulated this research simply
cannot be adequately acknowledged. Your patience, your laughter, your
proofreading, your conversation –and your spare bedrooms when I was
on field trips –have been invaluable. I am so very grateful to you all for
your support and companionship.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge my loving parents, who have been
incredibly supportive through the entire duration of the project, also
backing my relocation to Australia despite the distance. I am also
immensely grateful to my grandparents for their love and care, which will
always be inestimable. Merci à vous.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xix

GLOSSARY
ADS Archives départementales de la Somme
AIF Australian Imperial Force
ANM Australian National Memorial
AWM Australian War Memorial, Canberra
CWGC Commonwealth War Graves Commission
DVA Department of Veterans’Affairs
ECPAD Établissement de communication et de production
audiovisuelle de la Défense
FAMVB French–Australian Museum of Villers-Bretonneux
IWGC Imperial War Graves Commission
MAE Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
MVB Museum’s visitor book
NAA National Archives of Australia
NARA National Archives and Records Administration
PMD Prime Minister’s Department
PVDAG Procès-verbaux des délibérations des assemblées générales
RSL Returned and Services League
RSSILA Returned Sailors and Soldiers Imperial League of
Australia
SHD Service historique de la Défense
VBMC Villers-Bretonneux Military Cemetery
VVBF Victoria Villers-Bretonneux Fund
xx

INTRODUCTION
The habit of seeing ourselves through the eyes of the imaginary other is
the most lasting mental relic of colonialism.
Davison, ‘The imaginary grandstand’
Villers-Bretonneux is a small country town; it is nestled in the plains of
Picardy, and the vast majority of French people have never heard of it.
Thousands of kilometres away in Australia, however, it is considered
sacred ground. During the First World War, from March to August
1918, Villers-Bretonneux was part of an active front line that saw intense
mobile fighting between Allied and German forces, from Albert in the
north to Montdidier further south. Australian troops were heavily
involved on a small section of this front at Villers-Bretonneux and in
its vicinity such that, to this day, the small town is considered one of
Australia’s most important battlefields.
Before the First World War, Villers-Bretonneux had about 4500 inhab-
itants and was a lively and flourishing town dedicated to the textile
industry and to agriculture.
1
By the time of the Armistice, Villers-
Bretonneux had been mostly destroyed, and half its population had fled
or died. The town never recovered its industrial capacity and, more
recently, has suffered from the industrial restructuring that was rife in
northern France in the 1980s and 1990s, the consequences of which are
still felt. However, one distinctive element sets Villers-Bretonneux apart
from neighbouring towns. Since the end of the First World War, Villers-
Bretonneux has become an open-air memorial to Australia, a shrine to its
1

participation in the Great War. While until recently few Australians could
afford to travel to Villers-Bretonneux, Australian commemorations in the
town were duly reported and commented on in Australia. The few local
villagers involved in those commemorations became the subject of widely
circulated press reports, in which they were dubbed with emphatic titles
such as ‘France’, or the ‘the French’, and were lauded for ‘honouring’,
‘remembering’or ‘revering’Australia and Australians through the
homage they paid to former Australian combatants. It is the staged nature
of such homage mobilised for the construction of a key aspect of Austra-
lia’s national identity that is the subject of investigation of this book.
This book examines the assembly, projection and performance of an
aspect of Australia’s national identity through the prism of Australian war
memorialisation at Villers-Bretonneux by scrutinising the tangible ties
between the town and Australia such as the Victoria School, the Austra-
lian National Memorial, the French–Australian Museum, the French–
Australian Association and the commemoration of Anzac Day, as well
as other forms of commemoration and commemorative devices. Through
war commemoration, Australian official and non-official agencies have
been closely involved in the designing of an evolving aspect of Australian
national identity: that linked to the Anzacs, the Australian soldiers of the
First World War who, in the national narrative, gave birth to the white
Australian nation.
2
These three facets (assembly, projection and perform-
ance) of war commemoration, while occurring on French territory, are
designed for internal consumption in Australia through the mediation of
French locals. By analysing evolving Australian national images through
the prism of Villers-Bretonneux, this book reveals that the village has
acted as a stage on which to project a changing Australian national
identity and narrative. Australian commemorative patterns are the focus
of this study, which illustrates how they often relegate those who are
commemorated –the dead soldiers –to the background of commemora-
tive practices in order to benefit the agenda of those remembering them.
War propaganda, memoirs, the press and both professional and popu-
lar historians have nourished a lasting popular memory of Villers-
Bretonneux in Australia, based on the rendition of official historian
Charles Bean, testifying to the too often self-referential nature of Austra-
lian military history.
3
It has often been claimed that Australian troops
saved Villers-Bretonneux, thereby saving Amiens and, by extension,
France. Stories of French gratitude have been extolled, and a positive
mythology has emerged of Australia’s military involvement in Villers-
Bretonneux. Many of the claims surrounding such involvement need to
2OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

be reassessed, as they often do not stand the test of critical transnational
analysis that this book proposes. Yet they have greatly contributed to the
formation of Australia’s national identity and are deeply entrenched in the
segment of Australian society that feels strongly about Anzac.
The Anzac legend, the role of this dominant narrative in the elabor-
ation of Australia’s national identity and First World War commemor-
ations in Australia have been well covered in the historiography
and remain of significant interest to the public.
4
Nations do not
come into existence ex nihilo; rather, they are constructed and, for theor-
eticians of nations and nationalism, they follow a recipe, comparable to a
‘do-it-yourself’kit.
5
One of the necessary ingredients is a national narra-
tive, which is the tale of how the nation came into being, a tale in which
national characteristics are essentialised and given historical illustrations
in the past, which in fact serve only to embed in an historical depth
present values that the nation prizes. Nations also require an emotional
investment to come into existence and endure, and so do their national
narratives: as both are originally fictitious, they become real only by
‘collective adhesion’.
6
This study investigates how Villers-Bretonneux
has been used to manifest and stimulate such adhesion and emotional
investment in Australia through war memorialisation. A nation is very
much a living and evolving entity. War memorialisation and public com-
memoration of war have been considered important elements of national
construction, particularly in the nineteenth-century conception of the
nation.
7
‘War memorialisation’is understood to mean the creation of
records such as memorials, monuments, plaques, movies, pictures and
the rehearsal of the narrative through commemorations, ceremonies or
simply words written in visitor books and diaries. This book scrutinises
the life of these cultural productions at Villers-Bretonneux and studies
their meanings and how they have evolved.
The extraterritorial dimension of this study –Villers-Bretonneux is an
Australian commemorative site outside Australia –only renders more
apparent the images that Australia has projected of itself for viewing not
only by Australians but also by others, in this case mostly the French.
Traditional studies of national narratives, such as the French historian
Pierre Nora’s three-volume work Les lieux de mémoire (Realms of
Memory), and the many similar projects in other countries that have
reapplied its theoretical framework to their national history, have privil-
eged the study of the construction of the national narrative within the
borders of the state their nation inhabits.
8
This book suggests that trans-
national history yields insights into national narratives, particularly in
INTRODUCTION 3

Australia’s case where extraterritoriality and otherness have been essential
to validating the national identity presented in the national narrative.
Even though it observed typical processes for the construction of its
national narrative, Australia was atypical in the way it was progressively
formed as a nation.
9
There was no bloodshed against the motherland, no
revolution, but the development of strong ideas of difference in which
similarities with Britain were nonetheless evident.
10
The development of
Australia’s national identity has been multifactorial and multifaceted.
Early forms of Australian nationalism grew within a wider sense of
imperial loyalty that could appear at odds with the idea of a nation, which
implies notions such as political independence.
11
Nevertheless, by the start
of the twentieth century, Australians felt no difficulty in having a threefold
allegiance to their state, the nation and the British Empire.
12
Subsequent
evolutions of Australian nationalism, its ‘de-dominionisation’and its
‘nationalisation’, from the end of the Second World War to the present,
are equally identifiable in the Australian involvement in the town of
Villers-Bretonneux.
13
One of the goals of this book is to understand
how Australian war memorialisation has followed and contributed to
the reshaping of an Australian national narrative in the twentieth century.
In war commemoration, whatever shape it assumes, one is able to gain
a sense of the nation, how it differentiates itself, how it showcases
itself and which values it proposes as worthy of veneration.
14
Acts of
commemoration are crafted and require public participation. They have a
performative dimension, explored here through the case study of Villers-
Bretonneux both at a national and at a personal level.
15
This means that
through enunciation, commemoration constitutes simultaneously what it
expresses; it is a ‘performative act’that ‘describes a condition and recre-
ates it’,represents it.
16
In doing so, it also adds another layer of proof to
the existence of what is being commemorated, which strengthens and
reinvigorates the memory of the past event that is being remembered. This
study mostly considers institutional ‘agencies’, to borrow Jay Winter’s
terminology. It examines official collective forms of remembrance prac-
tices (‘Who remembers, when, where and how?’) such as that of the
Australian Government, state governments and smaller forms of local
government in Australia and France.
17
Smaller and non-state Australian
and French institutions such as funds, associations and museums are
also scrutinised. More personal and private forms of remembrance by
individual actors are examined only to assess their reaction to or partici-
pation in the remembrance practices of institutional agencies; individual
‘pilgrimages’are not the subject of this book.
18
4OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

Several factors make Villers-Bretonneux the most appropriate environ-
ment through which to understand the phenomena uncovered by this
study. Many Australian sacred military sites are concentrated in the
Somme area. The geographical scope of the book could potentially stretch
as far as Belgium –but it would then become an exercise in cataloguing
with no coherent central question. By contrast, Villers-Bretonneux encap-
sulates the guiding thread of national identity synthesised under different
forms in a single place through commemorative activities, both official
and private. This book considers Villers-Bretonneux not just as a battle-
field but also as a lens through which to observe national, state, commu-
nity, associative and individual actors that converge at this particular
focal point to promote a version of Australian identity. A top-down and
bottom-up analysis of the interactions between these various bodies facili-
tates comprehension of the different evolutionary facets of an identity
meticulously defined over time, as opposed to a pre-existing identity,
innate or essential to a national character. It is the unicity of the place
that fosters the specificity of the phenomena observable at Villers-
Bretonneux and makes this town a powerful microcosm in which to study
the construction and evolution of Australia’s national identity through
commemorative activities. The use of the term ‘microcosm’does not mean
that this study aspires to be the Montaillou of Australian presence at
Villers-Bretonneux.
19
It means that the town encapsulates, in miniature,
the elements of something much larger, revealing Australian commemora-
tive patterns, their goals, their developments and their meanings in a
paroxysmal way. Thus the book proceeds in comings and goings between
Villers-Bretonneux and Australia through which Villers-Bretonneux
appears as a stage for an evolving Australian national identity, an identity
in search of itself and which uses otherness to define and strengthen itself.
It has been argued that in the early twentieth century Australians were
‘preoccupied’with the way others saw them.
20
In the case of Australian
war memorialisation at Villers-Bretonneux, perceived or even fantasised
foreign attention has been, and still is, of primary importance in the
shaping of images of Australian identity, images that Australian agencies
have been trying to craft.
The advantageous symbolic system linked to Villers-Bretonneux was
crafted, rearranged and used in Australian self-celebration to assemble an
aspect of the national narrative contributing to the definition of a national
identity. At Villers-Bretonneux, there has been a constant rewriting
of national narrative, resculpting the past in order to define oneself –
collectively and individually –in the present. A part of the Australian
INTRODUCTION 5

community has been projecting and continues to project itself beyond its
national borders in order to define itself internally. This process helps the
community bind itself together back home. The metaphor of a theatre
stage could be used to grasp different aspects of the same phenomenon.
The book argues that Villers-Bretonneux acts as a performing stage on
which to construct one aspect of Australia’s national narrative and iden-
tity for Australian audiences, a stage Australians themselves erected in the
town through war memorialisation. On this stage, a valorised image of
Australian identity was, and continues to be, projected and carefully
monitored, an image testifying to the alleged superiority of the Australian
Imperial Force (AIF) and, by association, to that of Australians, as a
filiation is established between the diggers and other Australians. How-
ever, if one looks backstage, one can see that what is on display is crafted,
engineered, and not always based on reality. Yet the crafted narratives
have their own reality for they exist (once materialised by plaques and
memorials), but this reality is performative. The elements being celebrated
exist only through the commemoration that enshrines them, but they are
not necessarily validated by historical facts; they become historical
through commemoration and the recording of traces of such commemor-
ation. As a result of such commemorative processes, the illusion that
France ‘remembers’and ‘honours’Australia is diffused through the media
and government agencies in Australia because, if others embrace the
projected and crafted narrative, it means that it is validated and therefore
worth believing in for every Australian.
Examining commemoration at Villers-Bretonneux is watching Austra-
lian identity being shaped and remodelled by war memorialisation for
Australian consumption and Australian benefit. Australians come to, or
use, Villers-Bretonneux (in Australian press, history, politics and so on) to
establish and contemplate a proud national narrative set amid one of the
biggest slaughters of the twentieth century. While post-war European
memories broke away from this vision of heroic warfare as a result of
the First World War and its mechanisation, official Australian representa-
tions of the conflict since the end of the war have drawn the values of the
national character from those attributed to their First World War com-
batants.
21
A century after the war, this phenomenon continues, and in
2015 the Australian Prime Minister came to Villers-Bretonneux to
‘honour what’s best and noblest in human nature’.
22
The inhabitants of Villers-Bretonneux do not mind, mostly, as it is in
their interest to host this Australian show. Villers-Bretonneux is a quiet
country town of 4200 inhabitants that has little to offer to visitors apart
6OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

from Australian paraphernalia, and if it were not for this and the war
dead, there would be nothing to attract Australians to the town. Austra-
lians come and take a photograph of the ‘DO NOT FORGET
AUSTRALIA’sign (photo 0.1) in the yard of Victoria School. This is the
heir of the small ‘Never forget Australia’signs (photo 0.2) put in every
classroom in the 1920s by another Australian, Frank Tate, Director of the
Education Department of Victoria.
23
Today’s Australians photograph the schoolyard’s sign to keep a record
of how ‘the French’remember Australia. This is of course misplaced, for
the great majority of the French population ignores the fact that Austra-
lians fought in the First World War, with the exception of a few villagers
in north-eastern France who have become accustomed to Australians’
présence mémorielle –their ‘memory presence’, or, in Joan Beaumont’s
terms, Australia’s‘memory footprint’.
24
Indeed one of the central
elements of the Australian show at Villers is showcasing Australia to
imagined ‘others’. Yet, as this book reveals, ‘others’do not come to
Villers-Bretonneux. The perception of Australians that they are being
observed and acknowledged in France contributes to their national pride.
Much of the commemorative behaviour analysed through this book
shows that Australians come to Villers to watch themselves on a positive
Photo 0.1 DO NOT FORGET AUSTRALIA –sign, 8 metres long, erected in
the late 1980s, Victoria School schoolyard, Villers-Bretonneux
(Author’s photograph)
INTRODUCTION 7

stage that they themselves, or other Australians, have built, assuming that
the French and other nationalities approve of, or admire, their national
narrative. Traditional national narratives are generally self-validated. In
the case of Australia, Villers-Bretonneux illustrates how a national narra-
tive has required intermediaries and mediation.
This book is structured chronologically and divided into eight chapters.
Chapter 1 demystifies Australian military engagements at Villers-
Bretonneux in 1918; it is based on military history. It identifies the
common myths perpetuated in the literature since the end of the First
World War and reassesses them on the basis of new data and trans-
national research. It takes into account the role of the Moroccan Division
at Villers-Bretonneux and other empirical evidence regarding the Battle of
Amiens and the use of Allied troops. Chapter 1 demonstrates that not only
have accounts of different operations at Villers-Bretonneux been unsatis-
factory for so long but also they have resulted in unreliable records and
false or severely inaccurate claims in Australian public remembrance.
Chapter 2 deals with the immediate post-war period and the craving
for Australian acknowledgement on the global and local scenes. The
chapter explores Australian commemorative ceremonies in the Somme
Photo 0.2 N’OUBLIONS JAMAIS L’AUSTRALIE –sign, 40 centimetres long,
one of several original signs displayed in Victoria School classrooms in the
late 1920s
(Author’s photograph)
8OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

département and the visit of Australian VIPs to Villers-Bretonneux. The
chapter illustrates how some Australians, representing various interests,
crafted a glorious narrative related to Villers-Bretonneux immediately
after the war through commemorative activities. It also demonstrates
how some inhabitants of the Somme played a part in this process of
memorialisation by reinforcing and reusing Australian self-promotion
for their own agenda.
Chapter 3 studies Victoria School, the primary school of Villers-
Bretonneux, which was built as a result of generous Victorian donations
in the 1920s. For the French mayor of the time, Dr Vendeville, it seems to
have been a poisoned chalice in the sense that he wanted to use the
donation for purposes other than building a school, and its construction
attracted unnecessary interference in the way the town was rebuilt. The
chapter also explains that the Victorian donation, despite carrying an
altruistic dimension, was primarily an action conducted for Australian
interests.
Chapter 4 studies the Australian National Memorial erected at Villers-
Bretonneux by the Commonwealth of Australia. The chapter argues that
compared to the war years and the early 1920s, the making of the
Australian National Memorial from the late 1920s through to its
unveiling in the late 1930s testifies to a return of the affirmation of
Australian national identity within and through an imperial framework.
The main focus of the chapter is the Australian National Memorial’s
unveiling ceremony on 22 July 1938, during which the Australian com-
memorations were relegated to the background of the Franco-British
Entente Cordiale celebrations.
Chapter 5 provides a microcosm through which to examine the sup-
posed ‘death’or ‘fall’of Anzac Day in the 1950s and 1960s. It examines
Villers-Bretonneux as a counterpoint to study the declining interest in
Anzac Day in Australia. The chapter establishes that there was an overall
decline in the resonance of Australian official and non-official commem-
orative practices at Villers-Bretonneux for the Australian community,
concomitant with the development of very active local networks (both
in France and Australia) dedicated to the maintenance of links with
Australia through remembrance activities in Villers-Bretonneux.
Chapter 6 analyses the renewed interest of the Australian Government
in Villers-Bretonneux throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The chapter
considers how Australian government agencies, and most particularly
the Department of Veterans’Affairs, encouraged and exploited the multi-
plication of Australian visitors at Villers-Bretonneux to promote a version
INTRODUCTION 9

of Australia’s national identity through rhetoric, new memorials and
other commemorative devices. It also looks at how the local French
population adapted to the growing presence of Australian visitors, com-
memorations and memorials.
Chapter 7 examines how Villers-Bretonneux, within the context of
the Australian rediscovery of the Western Front, became the most import-
ant Australian overseas commemorative ground besides Gallipoli under
John Howard’s prime ministership between 1996 and 2007. The
chapter documents the increase in Australian commemorative activities
at Villers-Bretonneux since the late 1990s and the explosion in the
number of Australian visitors. Analysing the link between these two
phenomena, the chapter explores and explains the evolution of Australian
commemorative behaviour and practices. It also illustrates how the
French have benefited from the Australian presence in the town by pro-
moting their own agenda, which has affected Australian commemorations
in the Somme.
The final chapter, chapter 8, investigates recent commemorative pat-
terns of Australian visitors and provides an opportunity to assess whether
these visitors accept the Anzac legend as proposed by Australian author-
ities at Villers-Bretonneux since the 1990s. This chapter is based on a
statistical and qualitative analysis of more than 20 000 comments col-
lected in the visitor books of two of Villers’military cemeteries together
with other private sources. These comments are personal and offer a
markedly different perspective from that suggested by official sources.
They provide insights into what Villers-Bretonneux means for a part of
the Australian population today.
Looking at nearly a century of Australian agencies’connections to
Villers-Bretonneux yields insight into the evolution of Australian national
identity and commemorative patterns. While they both insist on their
permanency to affirm legitimacy, they are in fact in constant evolution,
catering for the present needs of those who perform them. They are
constructions, learnt behaviour, not innate or pre-existing permanent
structures. This study captures these evolutions to understand their motiv-
ations beyond the commemoration of the war dead.
10 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

CHAPTER
|
1
VILLERS-BRETONNEUX
AN AUSTRALIAN VICTORY?
Encapsulating the then popular understanding of Australia’s role at
Villers-Bretonneux, Bruce Scates has written: ‘France had survived
because the German army had been turned back at Villers-Bretonneux.
There Australian troops had held the line.’
1
However, those who shared
and still share such a view would perhaps be surprised to learn that
Villers-Bretonneux is a town unknown to the vast majority of French
people –still less the fighting that had occurred there during the First
World War –owing to Villers’marginal significance to the greater course
of the war. The reality is that the previous perception of Australian
military engagement at Villers-Bretonneux is the fruit of a long tradition
of Australian self-aggrandisement, encouraged by wartime propaganda.
Since 1918, Australian accounts have followed this pattern and have
repeatedly explained that in ‘saving’Villers-Bretonneux, Australians
saved Amiens and therefore saved France. Yet preventing the loss of
territory before Amiens is hardly the same as the grand victory rendered
in such accounts or in commemorative speeches recently delivered by
Australian ministers at Villers-Bretonneux. Australian accounts of their
three main military operations in and around Villers-Bretonneux in
1918 have paved the way for false or severely inaccurate claims by various
agents of memory throughout the last century. There is a need to reassess
the three key operations in which Australians were involved in and
around the town to understand the military objectives at stake, the oper-
ational unfolding of combat, and Villers-Bretonneux’s relevance to the
overall military situation on the Western Front in 1918. Before doing so, it
11

is worth locating Villers-Bretonneux within the wider context of the
Western Front.
In the winter of 1917, from the bitterly cold and windy plains of
northern France and Belgium to the woody and hilly massifs stretching
from the Ardennes to the Vosges, entrenched soldiers knew that the new
year would bring intense fighting on the Western Front. The German high
command wanted to strike the Allies as soon as the winter was over. The
spring and summer of 1918 would be decisive. The economic situation
was becoming dire for Germany and her allies, making the end of the war
more necessary than ever.
2
The forthcoming military landscape was also
concerning for the Central Powers. The United States had declared war on
Germany in April 1917, which meant that American troops would soon
start to pour over the Western Front, threatening to tip the balance
irreversibly in favour of the Allies.
3
One element, however, brought hope
to the Central Powers. With the Russian revolutions, an armistice had
been sought by the Bolsheviks and signed in December 1917, eventually
leading to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
4
This meant that much of Ger-
many’s forces on the Eastern Front could soon be redeployed to the west
for major offensives. By March 1918, Germany’s forces on the Western
Front were ready to emerge from their trenches and commence the
Kaiserschlacht –the Emperor’s battle.
The Kaiserschlacht started with Operation Michael (map 1), launched
on 21 March 1918. German storm troops attacked on the Western Front
in the Somme area with the goal of separating the British from the French
armies and driving the British to the sea. At first, the tactics proved
extremely successful and German troops advanced deep into French
territory. This was unprecedented in what had become a trench war of
restricted mobility. Notwithstanding this grand feat, German Quarter-
master General Ludendorff was unable to sustain the advance as the
storm troops’tactical approach had its drawbacks: the rapid advance
had exhausted German supply lines and revealed the inability of massed
artillery to match the troops’advance. Consequently, the Allies were able
to stabilise their retreat, and this offensive came to an end. After attacking
the British on the south of their lines, with Operation Michael, Ludendorff
sought to break the front line in the north. The initial success of the first
week ended, and Operation Michael was officially called off on 5 April
1918.
5
Operation Georgette (9–29 April 1918) was then launched, from
Poelcappelle to La Bassée, aiming for Ypres, in Belgium. The pressure
on the Somme decreased, with the main effort concentrated on the Ypres
12 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

Map 1 Operation Michael, German Offensive, March 1918: German push from
right to left
(Map from the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian
Federation, German documents of the First World War, TsAMO RF, Fond
500, Series 12519, Folder 336)
VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 13

salient. Here again, the German advance was brought to a standstill at the
cost of a high death toll on both sides. No major German goal was
achieved because, once again, the artillery and the supply lines experi-
enced difficulties in reaching and covering the front line. The German
army then turned south, into the Aisne area, to attack the French sectors
with Operation Blücher-Yorck (27 May –5 June 1918), then back to
Noyon and Montdidier for the Battle of the Matz (also called Operation
Gneisenau; 9–15 June 1918) and finally around the Reims sector, with the
Marneschutz–Reims offensive (15 July –3 August 1918). Ludendorff had
noticed that in the north the British had been able to hold the line only
with the help of French reinforcements. By attacking the French, who had
already lost many men in the previous offensives, Ludendorff sought to
weaken them further in order to finally break the British lines, which
would lose their French reinforcements as a result of this attack. The
progress of the Marneschutz–Reims offensive on the Marne worried the
French. Their reaction was consequential, deploying twenty-four divisions
in the first and second lines on 18 July 1918, maintaining ten divisions in
reserve.
6
Outnumbered three to one, the Germans withdrew and, within a
few weeks, the French regained the ground previously lost.
At the end of the German retreat, the Entente forces launched the
Battle of Amiens. An impressive push into German lines began on
8 August, and until 12 August, when the offensive was brought to an
end, the Allies kept advancing. From then on, all over the Western Front,
the advance became steady. The French and the Americans made moder-
ate gains in the Meuse, in Argonne and in the north and, by the end of
September, the Allies were facing the fortified Hindenburg Line. By early
October they had passed the Hindenburg Line and kept advancing until
the Armistice was signed on 11 November 1918.
7
In these critical months from spring to autumn 1918, Australians
contributed to the Allies’advance. They were assigned a limited section
of the front, progressively driving the Germans eastward from Villers-
Bretonneux to Montbrehain, some 80 kilometres away, between April
and October 1918. In Australia, Villers-Bretonneux became synonymous
with victory, good news that was much needed for the divided civilian
population.
8
To appreciate the degree of importance of Villers-
Bretonneux in Australian collective memory, it is worth considering the
original military involvement of the Australian Corps in and around the
town in 1918. If today’s Anzac Day ceremonies on the Somme mainly
encompass one experience of Villers-Bretonneux –the fighting of 24 and
25 April 1918 –it is to the detriment of other Australian military actions
14 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

in and around the town. Indeed, there were three major instances in which
the Australian Corps was heavily involved at Villers-Bretonneux: 4 and 5
April 1918, 24 to 27 April 1918 and from 8 August –the date on which
the Allies launched the Battle of Amiens. In all three instances, Charles
Bean, Australia’sofficial historian of the war, had a crucial role in shaping
the memory of Villers-Bretonneux.
EPISODE 1: 4 AND 5APRIL 1918
The official British history of the First World War refers to the operations
on 4 and 5 April 1918 to the east of Amiens as ‘the last phase’of the
‘German offensive in Picardy’(end of Operation Michael) while its Aus-
tralian counterpart, The Official History of Australia in the War of
1914–1918, hails them as ‘First Villers-Bretonneux’. As often, Australian
official war historian Charles Bean did not adequately contextualise the
Australian involvement and commenced his narration from when the
Australians began to participate in the operation. Bean cannot be blamed
for such a penchant. In contrast to other official historians aiming to
provide lessons for future generations of army officers, Bean’s aims were
to memorialise the AIF’s effort and to refer to as many Australians as he
could as a tribute to their involvement. Yet, in adopting such an approach,
Bean leads the reader to believe that the German push occurred only in
and around Villers-Bretonneux. However, the German push against the
British forces stretched from Bouzencourt to Hangard and that against
the French forces, from north of Moreuil to south-west of Aubvillers. The
assault consequently stretched for 30 kilometres and was notably intense
in the French sector around Moreuil.
9
Villers-Bretonneux therefore repre-
sented a very small section of the Allies’front line.
Bean’s factual account of the operations on 4 and 5 April 1918 in the
Villers-Bretonneux sector can be considered accurate. However, Bean
extols the work of the Australian troops and attempts to define a quintes-
sential Australian fighter who could become an exemplum for the nation.
In so doing, he tends to exaggerate the influence of Australian involve-
ment and diminish that of other nationalities in the defence of Amiens.
First, he diminishes the French contribution, writing:
But here [Bois de Sénécat] the deep penetration was only at one point,
and, with French reinforcements steadily arriving, the danger had
probably been less than at Villers-Bretonneux, the capture of which
might, at the lowest estimate, have influenced the whole remainder of
VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 15

the spring campaign. The averting of this danger on this occasion must
be credited largely to the 3rd Cavalry Division and the 9th Australian
Infantry Brigade.
10
Three affirmations in his statement need to be examined in greater detail.
First, if Amiens was the objective, then the success of the Germans on
4 and 5 April can be measured by the proximity of their troops to the
objective and, consequently, the dangers, for the Allies, can be measured
by assessing the distance to which they were pushed back to the closest
point in the direction of Amiens. Taking the extreme point of retreat from
the front line of 4 April to the frontline of 5 April, the Australians lost
roughly 1.1 miles in front of Villers-Bretonneux. Meanwhile the British
and the French were pushed back 1.4 miles respectively to the north of
Bois de Hangard and Bois de Sénécat.
11
However, looking at the distance
from the objective –Amiens –in relation to the line established on 5 April
after the German advance, one can see that the closest point to Amiens
that the Germans reached was 11.3 miles away from the objective on the
Australian front, 9.6 miles on the British front and 8.5 on the French
front. One can see Amiens from Bois de Sénécat, a position defended by
the French. The greatest danger was a breakthrough so close to Amiens,
where the French were experiencing a very tough fight. Such calculations
do not aim to diminish the hardship experienced by the Australians or the
British. Rather, these calculations aim to assess Bean’s statement because
it has framed the Australian version of First Villers-Bretonneux.
12
In
reality, the danger was far greater at Bois de Sénécat than at Villers-
Bretonneux. By granting such importance to Villers-Bretonneux, Bean
intended to legitimise his claim for the defence of Amiens as an Australian
success when in fact it was a common Allied effort or, in many ways, a
German failure.
Second, Bean omitted to state that if the Australians held the ground at
First Villers-Bretonneux, it was in fact thanks to the Canadians.
13
The
competition between the two dominions was so strong that such acknowl-
edgement would have obscured the value of the diggers. Yet, at some
point, the gap established between the British 55th Brigade and the 35th
and 33rd Australian Battalions was so significant that the British official
history offers a radical contrast to Bean’s conclusion, a contrast also
expressed in the Official History of the Canadian Army.
14
The British
official history reads: ‘But for five Canadian motor machine-gun batteries,
with six armoured cars –sent up by the Fourth Army with orders to hold
Villers-Bretonneux to the last –which came into action about 4 p.m.
16 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

north-east and south of the town, the way into it from the south-east
seemed open to the enemy.’
15
Australian defences might not have been as
successful as Bean suggested. Indeed, the previous quotation implies that
the Australians were struggling to hold the line. The British official history
congratulated the Canadians: the gap established between the British and
Australian troops could not have been filled without the Canadians, who
restored the line and offered covering fire to the Australians.
16
By mini-
mising the role of the Canadians at First Villers-Bretonneux, Bean once
again tried to celebrate Villers-Bretonneux as an Australian victory, an
interpretation that has not been challenged since his accounts were
published.
Third and finally, the idea that First Villers-Bretonneux ‘influenced the
whole remainder of the spring campaign’is hyperbolic. Just south of
Villers, at Moreuil, the sheer number of counter-attacks by the Germans
illustrates how important and strategic the French sector was.
17
It was not
a weak point in which Ludendorff saw an opportunity; he identified it as a
goal and a gate to Amiens.
18
That the strong army of French General
Debeney hurried to hold Moreuil was a firm sign of commitment on the
part of the French army, seconded by the Canadians or British at times,
not to yield ground to the enemy and to maintain the connection between
the French and British armies. The fighting at Villers-Bretonneux that
occurred from late March to late April was sporadic, while at Moreuil it
was more continuous throughout April.
19
Although Villers-Bretonneux
was subject to gas shells and barrage fire, the damage it suffered could not
be compared to Bois de Sénécat, a strong position on the outskirts of
Moreuil, which was obliterated.
20
In reality, Bois de Sénécat was the
closest point the Germans came to the Paris–Amiens railway line, one of
their objectives, barely three kilometres away from their positions.
21
The
fighting at Moreuil and Bois de Sénécat in late March until mid-April was
longer, more intense and strategically more significant than that at Villers-
Bretonneux.
22
This fact does not intend to detract from Australia’s mili-
tary participation in operations in and around Villers-Bretonneux.
Rather, the evidence suggests that Australian military history, both popu-
lar and sometimes academic, ought to broaden its spectrum of investi-
gation and look at a much wider front to fully comprehend the nature of
Australian participation in the war. Alongside the defence of Moreuil,
another significant moment in the defence of Amiens was the fighting that
took place in and around Hangard in the French sector, immediately
south of Villers-Bretonneux.
VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 17

All of these elements prove Bean’s statement to be more of a claim for
fame than historical reality. In truth, the success of the defence of Amiens
lay in the relative coordination of the different Allied nations at work and,
importantly, the difficulties encountered by the Germans after the rapid
progress of Operation Michael. The latter were recounted by an anony-
mous German soldier, whose letter was quoted in the very popular and
widely circulated French weekly L’Illustration. After mentioning his
exhaustion, his extreme hunger and how dirty he was, the soldier wrote:
‘Nothing turns up. Neither food nor munitions. The watchword is always
“Tomorrow”, and “Save up!”Personally, I only have forty-two cartridges
left.’
23
The German army running out of steam is perhaps a more signifi-
cant explanation of the German failure to take Amiens than the martial
valour of Allied troops facing them. Villers-Bretonneux was no more
important than Hangard, Moreuil or Bois de Sénécat. It was the rupture
of the front line that would have represented a danger for Allied troops, at
whichever point this might have happened in the vicinity of Amiens.
However, at this stage of Operation Michael, this was unlikely. Indeed,
Operation Michael died from its own weaknesses and from Allied stabili-
sation of the front line after a severe debacle in the first few days of the
offensive. By early April, the capture of Villers-Bretonneux by German
forces would not have altered ‘the whole remainder of the Spring cam-
paign’, as Bean suggested, because, on that specific front, the Germans
had come to a standstill after having encountered significant logistical
problems. Yet, to boost their populations’morale after such incredible
German advance, the press in the Allied nations promptly published
glowing reports of how the Germans had been stopped in Picardy, each
nation’s press writing on the importance of the sector allocated to their
troops. The Germans’difficulties were downplayed to turn the Allies’
struggle into a military success. Australia conformed to this process,
and this element of wartime propaganda should not be overlooked
when considering how press reports eulogised First Villers-Bretonneux
in Australia at a time when the Australian Corps was desperately short of
new recruits.
EPISODE 2: 24 AND 25 APRIL 1918
The second engagement of Australian troops at Villers-Bretonneux
occurred on 24 and 25 April during an operation lasting from 24 to 27
April (map 2). This time it was not the Canadians who were wiped out of
the Australian narrative but the whole Moroccan Division of the French
18 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

Map 2 German push on Villers-Bretonneux and Allied counter-offensive,
24–27 April 1918
Key:
—Allied frontline before the German attack
••••• Limit of German advance
–––Allied line restored by 27 April
(État-major des Armées –Service historique, Les Armées françaises dans la
Grande Guerre, book VI, vol. I, map volume, map 34)
VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 19

Army. By 24 April, it had been a number of weeks since Ludendorff had
called off Operation Michael. However, a small-scale operation was
launched to seize Villers-Bretonneux. The localised fight that ensued in
the following days was a diversion by the German army, which was
simultaneously launching a much larger operation to seize Ypres and
drive the Allied forces to the channel ports, in another attempt to cut off
the British and French forces. This operation, the Lys Offensive, was part
of Operation Georgette. The British official history quotes German
accounts:
The object of the attack [on Villers-Bretonneux on the 24th of April]
was ‘to hold the enemy forces on this front and thus assist further
German attacks at another place. The secondary object was to advance
the line so as to permit of a still more effective artillery attack on the
great railway establishments at Amiens, and thus prevent the shifting of
enemy forces.’
24
The generalissimo of Allied forces on the Western Front, Marshal Foch,
noted that once the Villers-Bretonneux sector was lost, the Germans did
not renew their operations in order to seize the town, also indicating that
it was an operation of diversion.
25
In late April, holding Villers-Bretonneux was not the German Com-
mand’s primary goal; it simply was a diversion. Yet no Australian account,
from the wartime press to more recent historical studies, has ever presented
it as such. The reality is nothing like the grand trial presented by Bean, who
explained that this operation ‘brought great fame to the Australian infantry
[and] had rescued the Allies’and that this counter-attack was ‘not infre-
quently cited as the most impressive operation of its kind that occurred on
the Western Front’.
26
Such an account paved the way for subsequent
writers. To support his claim, Bean quoted Monash’s book, itself an
exercise in self-aggrandisement.
27
Bean also referred to Brigadier General
George Grogan, who had written that the attack by night at Villers-
Bretonneux had ‘perhaps [been] the greatest individual feat of the war’.
Bean, however, did not disclose that Grogan was mostly referring to the
work of his own British brigade, the 23rd, 8th Division. As historian Linda
Wade observed, ‘Bean’s account of the fighting of the AIF at Second Villers-
Bretonneux has set the tone for many subsequent accounts of Villers-
Bretonneux penned by military historians.’
28
Such a romanticised account
diminished both British and French contributions.
Bean, for example, consigned the Division Marocaine to oblivion. The
Division Marocaine fought at Second Villers-Bretonneux, but to this day
20 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

its role has not been acknowledged by Australian historiography, which
has not consulted French military archives on the matter. About the
Division Marocaine Bean wrote: ‘The details of the costly attack by the
Moroccan Division, which followed, form no part of this history, for
which the barest outline must suffice.’
29
In Bean’s defence, one may argue
that the Australian official history is dedicated to Australian soldiers and
focuses on an Australian readership. However, Bean’s statement, as legiti-
mate as it might be, coincides with the type of history that he was writing.
The Moroccan Division is the great absentee in the Australian literature
when it comes to understanding the operations of late April 1918 at
Villers-Bretonneux. The shaping of a certain public memory by Bean –
and by army officials and government speeches and publications based on
his work –has eliminated the participation of the Moroccan Division
from the fighting of Second Villers-Bretonneux.
30
What matters in Aus-
tralian accounts is the retaking of the town by the Australians on 25 April
owing to the symbolic relevance of the date concurring with Anzac Day,
thus transubstantiating 25 April 1915 Gallipoli defeat into 25 April 1918
France victory –a very powerful symbol for Australians. However, this is
part of a larger operation in which not only Australians took part but also
Englishmen, Frenchmen, Algerians, Tunisians and Russians.
31
Villers-Bretonneux had no strategic importance per se. What mattered
was the plateau on which Villers-Bretonneux and other towns were
positioned. This was an Allied operation in which everyone played a
part.
32
It was just not an Australian victory; it was, at best, an Allied
effort to regain what was lost on 24 April; an attempt in which, on a
purely military assessment, the Moroccan Division was more successful
than the Australians in the south of Villers-Bretonneux.
33
In fact, what
was not reconquered by the 13th Australian Brigade was taken by the
Moroccan Division on 26 April (map 3).
34
Yet Bean describes their attack
as a ‘magnificent but entirely useless daylight advance against the
German machine-guns’, an incorrect and biased statement.
35
If it had
been the case, it is unlikely that the French President would have granted
the Légion d’honneur to the 8
e
régiment de marche de Zouaves with the
following citation: ‘regiment of superb heroism and bravery [...] The year
1918 finds them ready for acts of boldness and sacrifices. On April 26,
they attack Villers-Bretonneux and block the road to Amiens.’
36
It may be argued that a complimentary recognition of their actions
would have been rather difficult for Bean or the AIF. Bean mentioned the
fact that these troops consisted of white and non-white soldiers, and
‘racial pride occupied an unspoken centrality in the AIF’s identity’.
37
VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 21

Map 3 Advance of the Moroccan Division from 0500 to 1800 hours,
26 April
Key:
–––Starting point for the French attack
••••• Location of the British–Australian line before the French took position
prior to their attack
—Allied front line restored by the French
(‘Croquis faisant ressortir l’avance réalisée dans la journée du 26 avril 1918’,
included in Daugan’s report in 24 N 2915, SHD)
22 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

Non-white troops had retaken a section of the front that Australians had
not been able to recover. In particular, the Division Marocaine prevented
the disappearance of the AIF’s 52nd Battalion, which had suffered heavily
in the attack.
38
Just like First Villers-Bretonneux, Second Villers-Bretonneux was not
an Australian victory. It was an Allied effort to regain lost ground and was
not entirely successful. The action beginning on the night of 24 April and
ending on 27 April can be summed up as follows: the Australians encir-
cled the town, and the English helped to clear it (which proved a very
difficult task), also offering support during the operation. South of Villers-
Bretonneux, the French almost pushed back the Germans to their line of
24 April, securing the south of the plateau. Any attempt to understand the
Villers-Bretonneux engagement of late April 1918 without these three
movements is misguided. They each relied upon the other to be successful.
It is the coordinated support of all these different battalions that led to a
mostly successful operation.
Following the recapture of Villers-Bretonneux, numerous Australian
accounts have reported that it had prevented the bombardment of
Amiens.
39
Such claims, however, are also inaccurate. With the German
spring campaign, the first shells fell on Amiens on 22 March 1918 and the
last on 15 August.
40
When the Australians, the British and the French
retook Villers-Bretonneux in late April, the town was held by the Allies
from then on.
41
Did this change the way Amiens was bombarded? Before
25 April, at least 4534 shells and bombs were directed at Amiens over the
course of thirty-five days, starting on 22 March, after the beginning of the
Michael offensive.
42
After the capture of Villers-Bretonneux by the Aus-
tralians and the British, until 30 May (that is, thirty-five days, in order to
provide a similar comparative scale), another 4719 explosive devices
headed towards Amiens.
43
This was followed by another 2100 devices
from 30 May to 15 August, the date on which the bombardment of
Amiens ceased.
44
Although these numbers look impressive, they pale in
comparison to what rained down on French cities such as Soissons, Arras,
Reims or Verdun, all ravaged by the Great War.
45
Amiens was bombarded
regardless of whether Villers-Bretonneux was in German or Allied hands.
EPISODE 3: 8 AUGUST 1918
The Allies’8 August offensive aimed to drive away the Germans from the
vicinity of Amiens, to free one of the Paris–Amiens railway lines while
pushing the Germans behind the River Somme.
46
In 1914, the Germans
VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 23

had entered Amiens without fighting and left it the same way two weeks
later.
47
In 1918, however, the situation had changed: Amiens had become
an important railway hub and had many military hospitals; hence it was a
strategic position for the Allies and worth preserving.
48
During the spring
of 1918, plans were therefore developed to drive away the Germans as far
as possible from Amiens. However, owing to the violent Aisne offensive
and the German push in Flanders, no large-scale Allied operation could be
undertaken. It was only when the Germans were brought to a standstill by
the French, and were subsequently pushed back during the Second Battle
of the Marne with the help of US divisions in mid-July, that Foch and
Haig could safely envisage an Allied push east of Amiens.
49
The Second
Battle of the Marne was a turning point in the war, as the German tide
reversed.
50
The Battle of Amiens, from 8 to 11 August (map 4), was essentially a
British-led operation, with massive French involvement in the south.
Australians and Canadians have been particularly active in overplaying
their role in this engagement since the end of the war as it represented a
considerable effort in proportion to the size of their forces.
51
The 33rd
Division of the American Expeditionary Force also contributed, fighting
alongside the British north-east of Amiens. On the first day of the oper-
ation, British General Rawlinson and his Fourth Army had at their
disposal two British divisions and one in reserve, three Canadian divisions
and one in reserve, two Australian divisions and two in reserve. To
support his ‘active divisions’Rawlinson disposed of another five British
divisions at the rear. The French and their First Army only engaged four
divisions on 8 August.
52
The final objective to be reached was established
along the line that stretched from the south of Morlancourt to the south of
Moreuil, a front of almost 26 kilometres. The Australians were only a part
of this front, almost five kilometres, with a final objective established from
the south of Méricourt to Harbonnières.
53
British and French efforts only
grew stronger in the following few days.
Foch’s initial plan was to push on the flanks of the breach created by
the attack of 8 August. However, the resistance encountered by the British
Fourth Army prevented this move. The French Third Army had more
success in the south and retook much ground from the Germans. Each
corps was assigned a first, second and third (final) objective and, overall,
all succeeded. These objectives were determined by the difficulty the
troops would encounter in their advance. Overall, from 8 to 11 August,
the French First and Third Armies gained two and a half times more
ground from the Germans than the British Fourth Army (to which the
24 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

Map 4 Battle of Amiens, August 1918

Canadian and Australian Corps belonged with four and five divisions
respectively), as opposition and terrain encountered by British troops had
rendered their task more difficult.
54
The French did, however, have the
benefit of a wider rotation of their divisions. They engaged approximately
twenty-five divisions over four days. However, by 1918, the French Army
had 109 divisions, which allowed for such a rotation.
55
The Battle of
Amiens could not become one of the French Army’s‘realms of memory’
such as Verdun or the Marne, not only because of the brevity of the
engagement but also because it was not a common experience shared by
French combatants across the Army. In Amiens, nearly all available
Canadians and Australians fought, hence its national resonance for these
former British dominions.
The memorialisation of the Battle of Amiens commenced soon after
the end of the Great War. Both Australia and Canada tried to claim the
Battle of Amiens. For the Canadians, Australians were good enough
fighters but Canadians were better. For the Australians, the opposite
applied. Although compliments were occasionally paid for good measure,
one can feel the tension between the two dominions, even though they
worked side by side during this successful Allied operation. The Canadian
account of the 8 August offensive opens by stating that ‘The Australians
were acting as a screen behind which the Canadian Corps was to concen-
trate for a major role in the forthcoming offensive’. The narrative goes on
to explain how the 15th Australian Brigade required the assistance of the
Canadians in order to reach its objective and how the Canadians, later in
the day, had no choice but to wait for the Australians to advance, so as
not to expose their own flank by being too far ahead of the Australians. It
is even recorded that the Canadians ‘echeloned back’towards the Austra-
lians’right flank, about five kilometres behind. Adopting a competitive
tone, the account notes that the Canadians pushed the Germans back up
almost 13 kilometres that day, the Australians 11 and the British and the
French even less.
56
Yet this version of events, however flattering for the Canadians, does
not account for the greatly unequal resistance encountered by the different
corps. In the same way, Bean’s account relegated the Canadians to a
secondary role. At the beginning of the operations, for instance, when
Australians and Canadians were still side by side and encountered resist-
ance, the Australians are recorded as going forward, taking ten prisoners
and ‘hand[ing] [them] over to the Canadians’. Later, Bean chronicled
that the Canadians’left asked the Australians for help. Similarly, he
reported the Canadians as being ‘far behind’the Australian right, at
26 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

around 11.00 a.m. on 8 August or, later that day, that the far right of the
5th Australian Division had to wait for the Canadians when the rest of the
division had already reached its objective.
57
In these two accounts, the facts are sufficiently substantiated to be
considered historically accurate. Nevertheless, while both accounts
showed a great ability to record the difficulty encountered by the other
ally, they hardly mentioned the challenges faced by the men whose story
they are narrating and, when they did, it was justified by a stronger
resistance. The assistance provided by the respective corps was portrayed
as illustrating good grace on the part of the helping corps, which put itself
in a position of superiority. Facts from which panache and glory can be
extracted were overplayed, whereas incidents that could question the
value of the troops were downplayed. Worst of all, the very nature of
the combat was not presented for the reader’s understanding. Mutual
assistance was not provided by good grace but by strict necessity. The
Australians or the Canadians did not wait for one another out of courtesy,
but did so in order not to expose their own flank. Nothing could be
achieved without the other, very much as in a Greek phalanx where each
man protected the man standing next to him.
58
The success of Amiens did not lie in the superior martial value of the
Australians or the Canadians, or in the multitude of divisions engaged by
the British or the French. Even though this success is multifaceted it can,
for the most part, be attributed to the coordination of the movements of
the different corps and a very advantageous fog that particular morning,
together with thorough logistical organisation. Planning, coordination,
cooperation and unity of command were decisive in the way the men from
all Allied nations involved were able to perform in the field.
Notwithstanding the availability of up-to-date academic works on the
events on the 8 August offensive, popular accounts in Australia still claim
the whole success of the operation for the Australians and tend to forget
their allies. Monash’s 1920 account was arguably more influential
than Bean’s 1942 account, and has become a reference for Anzac Day
speeches or popular history in Australia over time.
59
This sort of self-
congratulatory tone when it comes to the telling of the Battle of Amiens is
not just an Australian characteristic. Canadians, both post-war and in the
present day, maintain the same memory of the event. According to Cana-
dian accounts, Canadian troops saved Amiens and did so before the
battle itself, during the German push in March and April.
60
These con-
ceptions are not based on facts but on wartime newspapers, which main-
tained a high level of propaganda throughout the conflict. They have been
VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 27

passed on in a slow conscious and unconscious national identity-making
process that this book investigates in the Australian case. In the Australian
wartime press, ‘Australians saved Amiens’.
61
In the Canadian wartime
press, ‘Canadians saved Amiens’.
62
When historians, essayists or journalists reprint conceptions inherited
from such accounts, they fail to present a critical analysis of the events and
to contextualise their sources, when much understanding of wartime and
present society could be gained in adopting a more critical and trans-
national approach. Boasting or asserting supposed martial qualities of the
soldiers of a given nation only serves nationalism when fundamental
questions are left aside. These statements need to be understood in their
context, with regard to factors such as the need for recruitment at the
time, maintaining morale in a society at war, how propaganda can come
from the top as well as from the bottom, or how what French historians
call cultures de guerre are shaped.
63
Evidence shows that during the Battle
of Amiens, one British corps, the Canadian Corps, the Australian Corps,
seven French corps and a few US brigades and regiments took part in the
operations. This should encourage a more historical and less aggressively
nationalist reading of the Battle of Amiens and the defence of Villers-
Bretonneux.
Villers-Bretonneux is, first and foremost, important in the Australian
collective remembrance of the war, unlike in that of other belligerents, for
which Villers remains a standard fighting ground with no intrinsic import-
ance. The brief reassessment of the military engagements provided by this
chapter calls for greater research into, and the re-evaluation of, Australian
‘battles’by integrating them into a broader context: that of a moving front
line on which military operations were closely linked to one another.
Moreuil, Hangard or Bois de Sénécat, for example, held the same strategic
importance as Villers-Bretonneux but remain ignored in Australian
accounts and historiography. The German push towards Amiens came
from the north-east (Arras), east (Villers-Bretonneux) and south-east
(Moreuil, Hangard and, further south, Montdidier and Noyon). Yet,
because Australian troops were not involved in other parts of that front,
these operations have been overlooked in Australian historiography.
By failing to understand Villers’position in relation to a much wider
active front line from March to August 1918, Australian historians have
overemphasised the importance of Villers-Bretonneux, presenting at times
a very localised and biased account that has done little to increase overall
understanding of the Great War. Foch made no mistake in ordering
General Rawlinson to do all he could to seize Villers-Bretonneux.
28 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

However, similar orders regarding neighbouring towns such as Moreuil
and Montdidier never appear in Australian literature. This distorted
memory of the fighting around Amiens from March to August 1918,
passed on through newspapers, various self-advertising memoirs, Bean’s
official history and popular historians, has influenced the memorialisation
of the Australian engagement at Villers-Bretonneux for a century. It is
such memorialisation that is the object of investigation of this book.
VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 29

CHAPTER
|
2
‘THE TURNING POINT
OF THE WAR’
OCCUPYING THE MEMORY FRONT
Immediately after Second Villers-Bretonneux, Australian newspaper
writers frequently reiterated the assertion that ‘Villers-Bretonneux was a
turning point of the war’.
1
Commentators and popular historians alike
have repeated this claim since 1918. This is, of course, not an isolated
phenomenon, and such places as Mont Saint-Quentin, Morlancourt
or Le Hamel, for example, were also extolled by reporters in Australia
as turning points of the war. Chapter 1, by putting First and Second
Villers-Bretonneux into context, has demonstrated that this claim is hard
to substantiate. Nevertheless, Australian authorities, Australian news-
papers and even some Australian military personnel tried to propagate
this version of events from 1918 onward. In fact Australian government
agencies and representatives worked hard to craft a glorious narrative of
Villers-Bretonneux immediately after the war through commemorative
activities. Interestingly, some inhabitants of the Somme district played
a part in this process of memorialisation by reusing and reinforcing
Australian self-promotion to support their own agendas. But Australia’s
strenuous efforts of war memorialisation at Villers-Bretonneux can in fact
be traced to their lack of success in claiming the Battle of Amiens or the
defence of the city as their own victories. Villers-Bretonneux proved a
much more receptive ground for Australian war commemoration than
Amiens, despite initial efforts to celebrate Australian achievements in the
capital of Picardy.
30

AMIENS:A COMPETITIVE COMMEMORATIVE GROUND
The attempt to disseminate an Australian-centred narrative of the war
through commemorative activities in Amiens can be analysed with the
assistance of several examples, including the display of Australian flags
and the erection of an Australian commemorative plaque in the cathedral
of Amiens. These commemorative events were occasions for the glorifica-
tion and mythologisation of the AIF through speeches and articles repro-
duced in the press for Australian readers.
The first post-war commemorative event involving Australian author-
ities at Amiens occurred in 1919. In July that year, the Archbishop of
Amiens proposed the placement of an Australian flag in his cathedral. The
Australian response to this proposal was prompt and favourable.
2
The
placement of the flag in the cathedral of Amiens in August 1919 was widely
publicised in the nation’s newspapers, and the Archbishop’s statement
describing the Australians as saviours and liberators was widely cited.
No Australian newspaper, however, mentioned the unveiling of a Cana-
dian plaque in the cathedral several months earlier, an event accompanied
by similar testimonies of gratitude from His Grace.
3
What appeared to be a
unique testimony of gratitude was in fact a tribute offered to all the fighting
forces that took part in the Battle of Amiens or were involved in the Somme
during the Great War. The Archbishop had made similar requests to other
combatant nations that took part in operations around Amiens in
1918 and paid tribute to their involvement in similarly glowing terms for
purposes that shall be explored later. The flags of Newfoundland, the
United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and France still hang
near that of Australia in a small chapel in the cathedral. All were dedicated
in 1919 or the early 1920s, and all provided occasions for similar laud-
atory speeches and reports.
4
A little over a year later, on 7 November 1920, an Australian commemo-
rative stone tablet was unveiled at the cathedral of Amiens while the streets
of the historic city were alive with the coming of a national figure, Maréchal
Ferdinand Foch, formerly generalissimo of Allied forces during the war
(photo 2.1).
5
The Australian press reported the ceremony in glowing terms,
and the event was yet another occasion, approaching Armistice Day, to
remind readers of the deeds of the AIF in the Somme. As for the stone tablet,
the paternity of the project can be attributed to General Talbot Hobbs, who
was in charge of the construction of Australian divisional memorials. Upon
learning that the Canadians were to erect a memorial plaque in Amiens
cathedral, Hobbs consulted Prime Minister William Morris Hughes to see
‘THE TURNING POINT OF THE WAR’31

whether a tablet in honour of the AIF could be purchased for a similar
purpose. Hughes agreed, and Hobbs contacted the Archbishop of Amiens,
Monseigneur Du Bois de Villerabel, who accepted the proposal.
6
The tablet
was thus erected on 3 September 1920. When the Australian authorities
enquired about a suitable time to arrange their ceremony, they were advised
that a ceremony organised by the Souvenir Français (a French organisation
for veterans) had been scheduled for 7 November 1920 to commemorate the
fallen, and they were offered the opportunity to combine their commemor-
ation with that of the French.
7
This joint ceremony was a success for the Amiénois (inhabitants of
Amiens), who were bestowed with the honour of receiving Foch, and for
the Australians, who could claim his presence and that of a huge crowd,
which had gathered for the service of the Souvenir Français.
8
While some
mention of grief and mourning was made in press reports (the fact that
the French would care for Australian graves was mentioned by the Arch-
bishop during the ceremony), the Australian press’s reporting of the
Photo 2.1 Australian memorial plaque, cathedral of Amiens
(Author’s photograph)
32 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

ceremony continued wartime propaganda habits tinged with patriotism.
Those parts of Marshal Foch’s and the Archbishop’s addresses that
extolled the bravery of the Australians and their heroic character were
systematically reproduced.
9
The British press, meanwhile, reported the
‘Bishop’s glowing eulogy of British valour’, noting that he had spoken ‘of
the coalescing of the various forces and interests which had led to victory –
the English effort, the Australian effort, the Canadian effort’, thus pro-
moting an imperial agenda.
10
In contrast, the Australian press focused on
Australian heroism, which for them was reinforced by having been con-
firmed by extra-nationals. While the British press reflected on the great-
ness of the empire, Australian reports served to define and strengthen the
character of the AIF, and the French praise of their allies cemented
friendship with those old and new nations in a time when they, the
French, needed their support to ensure that the prescriptions of the Treaty
of Versailles were observed by Germany.
Foch, observing the etiquette for other national commemorations, had
also spoken about ‘American heroes’,‘Canadian heroes’or ‘Irish
heroes’.
11
These sentiments, whether heartfelt or not, were reproduced
in the French local press and in the press of the commemorated nation.
They meant a lot more than the one-size-fits-all heroisation they proposed.
They commemorated a common cause, legitimised and justified the war
and commemorated in a traditional –indeed archaic –fashion what
painter Christopher Nevinson ironically referred to as the ‘paths of
glory’.
12
These manifestations served each country’s interests and formed
the basis for commemorative diplomacy.
The ceremonies at Amiens were widely publicised in Australia. Yet the
commemoration of the dead was not at the foreground of Australian
reports but rather constituted a background used to promote, construct
and further establish pride in a national narrative based on the perceived
experience of the AIF. Receiving ‘France’s gratitude’(even in ceremonies
orchestrated by Australian authorities) or being praised by French
notables reinforced the national imaginary, for these statements seemed
to be all the more objective because they were made by non-Australians.
Australian reportage also reflected a need for recognition as an independ-
ent and worthy nation, craving the acknowledgement that would not be
given by similar notables in the United Kingdom owing to their closer
cultural ties and, to some extent, cultural prejudices.
13
Through the
memorialisation of the First World War, Australia could not only prove
the valour of its men but also promote itself as a young and vibrant nation
graced with its own martial national characteristics. Extraterritorial
‘THE TURNING POINT OF THE WAR’33

commemorations of the First World War and its aftermath became a stage
on which to parade the national identity of Australia, which, although it
suggested important differences with Britain, mostly positioned itself as a
better Britain.
Interestingly, the Australian stone tablet in the cathedral of Amiens
again attracted some public interest when, several years after its unveiling,
it was the subject of some controversy in the Sydney Morning Herald.
Several gentlemen who had recently travelled to Amiens expressed their
disappointment for they thought the tablet was ‘unimaginative’and over-
all too simple.
14
They were concerned that it would ‘compare most
unfavourably with the memorials erected by other nations’. They
revealed, in so saying, that some Australians did indeed feel a patriotic
sense of competition.
15
Clarence Seccombe from the War Memorial
Sections answered these criticisms, writing that the French authorities
had opposed a more elaborate design and that the tablet was dignified.
16
Indeed, when the initial design was proposed to the Directeur des Beaux-
Arts and the cathedral authorities, they refused it, enjoining Australian
authorities to submit a less elaborate and smaller design similar to those of
other nations, which were already in place.
17
The point of interest in this debate is not so much the point of dissent
(whether the plaque was sufficiently impressive and of good facture to
commemorate the AIF) but the point of agreement: that the cathedral of
Amiens would stand for centuries to come and, as such, the commemor-
ation of Australian soldiers would be displayed for centuries as well. This
was initially the hope and plan of the Australian Government, which
wanted to erect memorials that would last ‘for all time’or for ‘centuries
to come’, and specifically selected sites and materials that would enable this
to come to fruition.
18
The diggers were to be commemorated and remem-
bered for all time and preferably in a highly visible manner, as ‘memorials
should be erected so as to be in the most commanding view points –so that
they would be seen from many points and so that from them a commanding
view could be obtained –and that this should be the deciding factor in
choosing sites’.
19
Being seen and being granted importance were ambitions
at the heart of official Australian commemorative practices.
NATIONAL,NOT IMPERIAL COMMEMORATIONS
In August 1921, on his way to the Imperial Conference, Hughes toured
the former battlefields of northern France in his official capacity as Prime
Minister. Just as King Georges V would represent his subjects during his
34 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

pilgrimage in 1922, Hughes, a year earlier, represented his people in a
pilgrimage that most would never be able to make. On this occasion,
women associated with the RSSILA had invested the Prime Minister with
the mission of delivering an Australian flag to the city of Amiens together
with the laying of a laurel wreath on the grave of the Unknown Soldier in
Westminster Abbey.
20
The flag, no mere piece of fabric but the metonymic
representation of a nation, was invested with the grief and mourning of
Australian women. As Hughes declared on this occasion, ‘The Town Hall
ceremony, to present the flag of Australian Women [to Amiens], filled up
with pride the heart of their fellow countrymen and countrywomen, not
only for the respects that were paid, but also because you [the people of
Amiens] have opened your hearts to us and called us comrades.’
21
Through this commemorative event, grief was incumbent on women
while subsumed in a wider frame: that of the nation (in the French
ceremony and in that of the British Empire at Westminster). Grief,
although present in Hughes’s open letter to the citizens of Amiens, was
not mentioned directly but embedded in a narrative of national glory and
pride. In Hughes’s text, the respects paid to the diggers were appropriated
by living Australians who were proud of being presented with the
Amiènois’respects and being placed on an equal footing to that of France.
Because the Anzacs represented Australia in these ceremonies, there was
consequently a potential Anzac in every Australian for the Anzacs were
the embodiment of Australianness –bestowed with a set of qualities
granted to them by war propaganda and popular mythology. Thus, by
commemorating the Anzacs in such instances, Australians also commemo-
rated and celebrated themselves, in their present. Hughes –his policies and
his personality –greatly affected the early stages of First World War
memorialisation in Australia. He watched over the elaboration of war
memorials very closely and, when visiting the former battlefield, adopted
patriotic and nationalist tones that were unknown to Bruce, Scullin and
Lyons when on similar duties in later decades.
With such commemorative events, Australia, Canada and New
Zealand were developing their roman national, their national ‘bards’,a
century after most European nations.
22
They were choosing their heroes,
defining national qualities and developing commemorative artefacts to
embody them. Unveiling each national memorial stone tablet in the ca-
thedral of Amiens provoked equally glowing reports in Canada, Australia
and New Zealand. The press in New Zealand, for example, reported the
unveiling of their memorial tablet in a similar way to that of Australia,
mentioning that the Archbishop of Amiens had ‘eulogized New Zealand’s
‘THE TURNING POINT OF THE WAR’35

sacrifices’and declaring that ‘the names of the heroes from New Zealand
are inscribed in the hearts of the people of Amiens, whose gratitude
will ever guard their memory’.
23
In trying to create essential differences
(i.e. a national narrative, national qualities and national heroes) these
nations were following banal patterns of nation-building. These com-
memorative events were widely reported in each national press. The US
plaque (photo 2.2), however, did not arouse any such coverage; the
United States already had a national history with its own array of national
moments.
24
The fact that Canada, Australia and New Zealand were firmly inde-
pendent in their commemoration of the deeds of their men in the wake of
the war and celebrated their nation without resorting to the imperial
framework did not escape Britain’s notice. Each of these dominions
placed both a flag and a plaque in the cathedral (photos 2.1,2.3,2.4
and 2.5). The dominions’emulation obscured Great Britain’s war effort
(which was the most significant) and undermined the ideal of imperial
unity. This point was even discussed in the House of Commons.
25
As a
result, Great Britain presented a Union Jack to the cathedral on 2 Novem-
ber 1920 and a memorial plaque (photo 2.6) in July 1923, in memory of
the 600 000 dead Great Britain and Ireland lost in the war, thereby
Photo 2.2 US plaque, cathedral of Amiens
(Author’s photograph)
36 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

asserting Great Britain’s primacy over the dominions.
26
This impressive
figure relegated the role of each dominion to a secondary contribution.
Both the Union Jack and the plaque Great Britain placed in the cathedral
of Amiens came in reaction to the artefacts given by her dominions.
27
But
Britain went a step further: it ordered the production of thirty plaques to
be displayed in some of France’s cathedrals in order to remind all of ‘the
million dead of the British Empire’, and reclaim the dominions’participa-
tion in the conflict as part of an imperial effort, not a national one.
28
Some
of these plaques were unveiled with great pomp, extolling the empire, an
idea that had found an embodiment in the graves of the soldiers it
commemorated.
29
Being remembered by the French in Amiens was mostly unsuccessful for
the Australians, owing not only to imperial or international competition
but also to the French perception of their own army’s role. Two of the three
ceremonies organised by Australian authorities in the city had occurred
only because the Archbishop had encouraged war memorialisation in his
cathedral. The war had filled churches’pews. Church-going as an expres-
sion of faith grew during the war, and many mourners managed their grief
through their faith.
30
Churches, as a result, became very active in war
Photo 2.3 Canadian plaque, cathedral of Amiens
(Author’s photograph)
‘THE TURNING POINT OF THE WAR’37

Photo 2.4 Newfoundland’s plaque, cathedral of Amiens
(Author’s photograph)
Photo 2.5 New Zealand’s plaque, cathedral of Amiens
(Author’s photograph)
38 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

commemoration. In addition, the cathedral of Amiens itself had been
badly damaged during the war. Encouraging the memorialisation of the
war in the cathedral helped its reconstruction for it encouraged donations
and the erection of many memorial tablets and plaques.
31
Yet the popu-
lation of Amiens would not celebrate the Australian engagement in the
defence of the city in the way the population of Villers would. The
Amiénois had seen hundreds of thousands of men coming from so many
nations over the years, and both the defence of the city and the offensive of
August 1918 were joint efforts for which they had praised all Allied
nations and, above all, their own soldiers. In that regard, the plaque they
erected in the cathedral in the memory of French general Debeney is
explicit (photo 2.7):
Tribute from the grateful Amiénois to General Debeney, Victor of the
Battle of Picardy who, achieving the operation plans conceived by
Marshal Foch for the defence of Amiens built up in the midst of the
battle between 26 March and 5 April 1918, in collaboration with the
Allies, the army which completed his victory on 8 August 1918,
liberating Montdidier and the Somme’s territory.
Photo 2.6 British plaque, cathedral of Amiens
(Author’s photograph)
‘THE TURNING POINT OF THE WAR’39

A commemorative plaque in honour of Foch was also erected in the
cathedral in 1929, following his death. The speech delivered by a bishop
for its unveiling dubbed Foch the ‘Saviour of Amiens’, even more than a
decade after the events, and testified to the enduring local memory of the
events.
32
The memorialisation of the defence of Amiens and the later
August offensive was conceived by the Amiénois as primarily a French
action supported by Allied troops. It proved difficult for Australia to
establish a glorious narrative in Amiens for it received little echo. How-
ever, while the Villers-Bretonneux engagements were also joint efforts, the
Australians had less competition in turning their narrative into the dom-
inant one –no other nations claimed the defence of Villers-Bretonneux –
and it was one endorsed and promoted by the mayor himself for reasons
that will be discussed in chapter 3.
That extolling the Australians’fighting prowess was an acutely local-
ised phenomenon that found no echo in the greater French population did
not matter; a humble mayor of a humble town somewhere in France’s
countryside and his population were essentialised as ‘the French’. And
Photo 2.7 Tribute to General Debeney, cathedral of Amiens
(Author’s photograph)
40 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

French they were, but in Australia they came synecdochially to embody
the general population and give the impression of a general consensus on
the martial valour of the digger among the whole French population,
which simply was not the case. Instead, the French national press seldom
mentioned Australian soldiers after the war.
Even during the war, most of the French population were not aware of
the Australians as they were merged into the multitude, the millions of
soldiers from around the world who came to fight on the Western Front.
As we shall see, commemorative endeavours dedicated to remembering
Australia’s participation in the war at Villers-Bretonneux involved its
townspeople, whereas Australian commemorations in Amiens did not
and were mostly confined to the cathedral. The city of Amiens itself did
not need to engage in Australian commemorative practices in the way that
Villers did, perhaps because, as the capital of Picardy and an important
regional production and distribution hub, Amiens could anticipate a
swifter state-financed recovery. Moreover, for Amiens’population,
while the Allies’involvement in the 1918 offensives to protect the city
was acknowledged, French military figures –such as Marshal Foch and
General Debeney and their French troops –were the victors they preferred
to celebrate.
VILLERS-BRETONNEUX:A WELCOMING
COMMEMORATIVE PLATFORM
The memorialisation of the Australian involvement in and around Villers-
Bretonneux started with the AIF’sfirst engagement in the area in early
April 1918. Yet the propensity of the wartime press to exaggerate what
could be perceived as ‘positive’action for propaganda purposes cannot
explain the way Villers-Bretonneux was later remembered. This was a
cumulative process influenced by several factors. Villers-Bretonneux and
its area saw three identifiable engagements of Australian forces, one of
which required all Australian divisions. As such, Villers-Bretonneux was
experienced by a significant number of soldiers of the AIF, more likely to
return to Australia than their comrades of 1915, 1916 and 1917 and
consequently more likely to be able to contribute to the creation of a
distinctive memory of the war linked to Villers-Bretonneux. Moreover,
the troops stationed in the area for a sufficient time were involved in
important Allied actions and were successful in the task assigned to them,
thus rendering Villers-Bretonneux an important name from then on in
‘THE TURNING POINT OF THE WAR’41

Australian military history. This is also why Villers-Bretonneux was
chosen by Australia as a site for the construction of an Australian
National Memorial in France.
Furthermore, Second Villers-Bretonneux, ending on 25 April 1918 in
the Australian narrative of the battle, was the transubstantiation of a
defeat (Gallipoli 1915) into a victory. A ‘successful’Anzac Day 1918 on
the Western Front legitimised the temporary defeat in the Dardanelles in
1915 while also legitimising the fallen for, ultimately, the war they died
for came a step closer to being won. In addition, while the landing at
Gallipoli was the invasion of a foreign country with which Australia had
little to do before the war and perceived as a less civilised society, Villers-
Bretonneux was the defence of an Allied nation against the Germans and
on French territory, a nation perceived as having a long-established
military tradition.
All these elements were combined to establish the ‘historical import-
ance’of Villers-Bretonneux as a site of Australian experience of the First
World War in terms of fighting, in terms of the production of meaning
and in terms of mourning and remembrance.
33
This in turn led to the
development of post-war links between Australia and France, with the
former eager, like most former combatant nations, to memorialise the part
it played in the war and ensure that her dead would be cared for and
remembered.
As a consequence, an economy of gratitude developed after the war
between France and Australia, in the Somme, at a local level.
34
Many
villages needed money to rebuild themselves; Australia needed a safe place
for her dead and the recognition of her part in the conflict. An exchange of
friendly services was quickly established, as needs and provisions comple-
mented each other in both cases. With the war over, Villers-Bretonneux
was left in a shambles. It had lost many of its men and an even greater
number of homes. The scale of devastation was so dramatic in northern
France that the Mayor of Villers-Bretonneux, Doctor Vendeville, foresaw
that reconstruction would take many years, with the town being a low
priority for those overseeing French reconstruction.
35
As soon as 1919,
Vendeville turned to those who could have an interest into the reconstruc-
tion of Villers-Bretonneux and wrote to the local Australian War Graves
Detachment to propose that Australia adopt Villers.
36
Some of the mayors
on the former front line were well aware that Australia, and other distant
nations, were anxious about the maintenance of the graves of their loved
ones. Linda Wade has noted that ‘the graves of Australian soldiers were
an ever-present backdrop in many of the news stories on the Adoption of
42 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

Villers-Bretonneux’.
37
These mayors were also well aware that the Aus-
tralians had a very high opinion of their contribution to the war. The
Mayor of Steenwerk, in France, near Fromelles, provides a good example
to illustrate this point. On 4 November 1920, he wrote to the Australian
Governor-General asking for financial support to rebuild a hospital for
men in their old age. After extravagant praises of the Australians and a
rare review of their involvement in the war, the mayor abruptly stated:
In return [for Australian financial assistance] we make this offer [...]
The old men of the Hospital will take care of [the remains of your
gallant soldiers] and will consider it an honour to tend the graves and
ornament them with flowers. On the front of the new edifice, we shall
put the inscription: ‘In Memory of the Australian and New Zealand
soldiers gloriously buried under our soil during the war of 1914–1918.’
Thus [your people] will have the satisfaction of thinking and knowing
from the antipodes, [that] the memorial to their dead, associated to a
charitable idea, will be perpetuated from generation to generation.
38
From Villers-Bretonneux, Mayor Vendeville proceeded in a somewhat
more subtle manner. On Bastille Day 1919, grieving France was officially
en fête and conducted the traditional military parade (usually held at
Longchamp) on the Champs-Elysées for the first time. Thousands of men,
among them mutilated veterans, paraded under the Arc de Triomphe. The
Victory Parade (Le défilé de la Victoire) commemorated the war and the
freshly signed Treaty of Versailles. Although the festivities had a bitter taste
(for the nation could not forget the dead nor the devastation), millions of
people gathered in the streets of Paris to attend the parade.
39
On the very
same day, Villers-Bretonneux too was having its own parade, and, on the
occasion of this 14 Juillet, Dr Vendeville, on behalf of the City Council and
the inhabitants of Villers-Bretonneux, presented a commemorative stone
tablet to AIF Lieutenant-Colonel John Eldred Mott of the Australian War
Graves Detachment (photo 2.8).
40
The tablet stated: ‘To the Australian
heroes who died for the defence of Villers-Bretonneux 24–25 April 1918.
The grateful inhabitants.’
On this occasion, the mayor and his deputy gave a public speech full of
praise to the Australian Corps, which ‘saved the capital of Picardy, saved
France, saved our European civilisation’.
41
Both speeches ultimately
promised Australians that their glorious dead would be cared for by the
local population, a promise that resonated deeply in Australia.
42
This
gratitude, widely promoted by the Australian press, was, however, tinged
with less virtuous elements that were not so widely publicised. In fact, the
‘THE TURNING POINT OF THE WAR’43

decision to erect the Australian National Memorial (ANM) had been
taken just a few months earlier, in April, and the mayor certainly identi-
fied this gift as a way to contribute to the project and secure it for his
township by making it even more concrete.
43
In reality, the stone tablet
that was presented to Australian authorities was conceived by the inhabit-
ants of Villers-Bretonneux as a contribution to the memorial to be built by
the Australian Government, a contribution that they wanted to see physi-
cally integrated into the ANM. The land bought by the Australians on
Hill 104 where the ANM stands today is in fact on the land of the
neighbouring village of Fouilloy. Vendeville, however, had Australian
recollections in his favour as the Australians identified this memorial as
the Australian National Memorial of Villers-Bretonneux, as the military
action in which they were involved was linked to Villers-Bretonneux and
not Fouilloy. It was therefore important for him to embody these repre-
sentations in stone, with this tablet. For many years Vendeville cautiously
relegated the mayor of Fouilloy to the background when attempting to
secure the control of Australian financial contributions. Before offering
the stone tablet, Vendeville had already appealed to the Australian Gov-
ernment through the Australian War Graves Detachment, writing that
Photo 2.8 Tablet offered to Australia by the inhabitants of Villers-Bretonneux.
The tablet is still visible in the First World War galleries of the AWM.
(AWM EO5487)
44 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

‘5000 inhabitants evacuated the town and abandoned everything in
March 1918. The people are very poor, and hopefully turn to Australia,
the heroism of whose sons is imperishably associated with the defence of
their town.’
44
It is in this context that this ‘gift’–and the laudatory
speeches accompanying it –is to be understood: securing the Australians’
presence at Villers-Bretonneux while requesting financial support for its
reconstruction.
VILLERS’GRATITUDE:A MUCH-APPRECIATED
STORY IN AUSTRALIA
This gratitude, however pragmatic it might have been, was deeply appre-
ciated in Australia.
45
It also reveals how some French local authorities
contributed to the glorification of Australian actions, or other allies’
actions for that matter. Although the mythical poilu (French infantryman
of the First World War) was widely admired for the multitude of qualities
he allegedly embodied, the Somme’s inhabitants, who saw men from
many nations coming to fight the enemy, were also prompt to grant these
qualities to foreign soldiers who were fighting for the same cause and in
similar conditions. Reports of French compliments in the Australian press
after the war gave grounds to Australian claims about the valour of their
diggers. Just as Ashmead Bartlett’s reports on the heroic diggers on the
shores of Gallipoli led to national pride for being acknowledged by the
Mother Country, quoting French praise of Australian soldiers also
reinforced the mythical figure of the digger.
46
After the ceremony, the stone tablet was packed at once and shipped to
Australia House to be sent to Australia.
47
It ended up in the possession of
the Australian War Memorial (AWM), where it became an esteemed item.
According to Lieutenant-Colonel Mott of the Australian War Graves
Detachment, Senator George Pearce had promised him that the tablet
would tour Australian capital cities before being returned to Villers-
Bretonneux in order to be fitted into the memorial in accordance with
the wish of Villers’inhabitants.
48
In the late 1920s, the tablet was the
subject of scrutiny again when architect William Lucas was commissioned
to design the ANM. The measurements of the tablet were required so as to
integrate it in the monument.
49
However, John Treloar, Director of the
AWM, lobbied the Official Secretary for Defence and Major Phillips
(the Australian representative at the IWGC) to keep the stone tablet at
the Memorial.
50
His arguments revealed the importance of this artefact
‘THE TURNING POINT OF THE WAR’45

for the collection. Treloar declared that the tablet had over the years
become ‘one of the most treasured exhibits in the War Memorial collec-
tions’.
51
He further argued that ‘the members [of the War Memorial
committee] feel that this expression of the gratitude of the people of
Villers-Bretonneux to the Australians is more appropriately placed here
in their own country than it would be overseas’and asked Captain
Murphy from the IWGC ‘to ensure that the tablet is preserved where it
may be seen by the greatest possible number of Australians and visitors’.
52
In Treloar’s mind, that was the AWM. While the Memorial was happy to
sell some of its relics to fund itself, this tablet was invested with a special
meaning for Treloar and others, and ought to be retained.
53
It was a direct
testimony of the gratitude of the inhabitants of Villers-Bretonneux that
could be displayed in Australia, a direct proof that the Australians had
fought to liberate that corner of France. This assertion of the valour of the
diggers was all the more valuable and legitimate because it was acknowl-
edged by citizens of one of the leading nations at the time.
Following Treloar’s request through Captain Murphy, on 24 April
1929, Vendeville informed Australian authorities that the city council
approved the retention of the tablet in Australia. This declaration was
made official a day before the foundation stone of the AWM in Canberra
was laid so as to publicise Vendeville’s statement. This was an idea of
Captain Murphy, who thought that he would have more bargaining
power with Vendeville if he was induced to believe that his message would
be delivered on a special occasion to a greater audience.
54
This prospect
seems to have suited the mayor of Villers-Bretonneux, who agreed to let
the tablet go. How this tablet ended up in the AWM’s collections sheds
some light on the post-war memorialisation process that took place in the
Somme under the auspices of Australian authorities. The mayor saw a
way to capture Australian attention, and the tablet later served to remind
the Australian public of the historic links developed with Villers-
Bretonneux, reifying this French–Australian connection.
55
In 1919 and the early 1920s, Australian commemorative policies were
autonomous and assertive, with the ambition to provide the nation with
places to remember its own achievements outside an imperial framework,
an orientation that changed with Hughes’s departure from the prime
ministerial office in 1923. In the Somme, Australia found fertile ground
at Villers-Bretonneux to cultivate the image of itself that it wanted to see
projected. It had attempted this in Amiens, but this endeavour had not
been entirely successful. While the Australian press claimed that Australia
saved Amiens during the war, when the government tried to memorialise
46 OUR CORNER OF THE SOMME

Australian involvement in Amiens, it did not meet with the Amiénois’
interest. Not only was this commemorative ground claimed by several
other Allied nations but also the Amiénois had their own national heroes
to commemorate. At Villers-Bretonneux, on the other hand, the situation
was different as the town held little to no special significance to other
combatant nations, the French included. The mayor of Villers-Bretonneux
was pleased to emphasise the Australian role in the liberation of the town
for motivations explored in the following chapters.
‘THE TURNING POINT OF THE WAR’47