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Differentiation of Industry 4.0 Models
The 4th Industrial Revolution from different Regional Perspectives in
the Global North and Global South
Authors: Markus SPERINGER, Judith SCHNELZER (University of Vienna)
Contributor: Heather SAENZ
Agency: United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
Mentors: Ritin KORIA, Svenja WIEMER (UNIDO)
Counsel: Roman HOFFMANN (VID/ÖAW)
Vienna, at 28th February 2019
Imprint
Copyright © 2019 and Editorial by Markus SPERINGER & Judith SCHNELZER
Published in Vienna, Austria
By RAUN (Regional Academy on the United Nations)
Vienna International Centre (VIC), PO Box 09, Wagramer Straße 5, A-1400 Vienna (Austria)
Responsible for the concept, content, design, visuals (incl. figures, maps, tables and infographics) and
implementation:
Markus SPERINGER
Department of Geography and Regional Re-
search, University of Vienna
Universitätsstraße 7, 5th Floor, D0519
1010 Vienna (Austria)
T: +43-1-4277-48722
Email: markus.speringer@univie.ac.at
Judith SCHNELZER
Department of Geography and Regional Re-
search, University of Vienna
Universitätsstraße 7, 5th Floor, C0522
1010 Vienna (Austria)
T: +43-1-4277-48698
Email: judith.schnelzer@univie.ac.at
This research was conducted by the authors in collaboration with the United Nations Industrial Devel-
opment Organization (UNIDO) and the Regional Academy on the United Nations (RAUN) with
Heather Saenz contributing to the Mexico case study (Section 4.2.3).
All rights reserved. Printed in Vienna, Austria. No part of this work may be reproduced in any manner
whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical arti-
cles and reviews. For further information, address Markus Speringer or Judith Schnelzer via Email.
Please use the following when citing this report:
Speringer, M., Schnelzer, J., 2019. Differentiation of Industry 4.0 Models. The 4th Industrial Revolution
from different Regional Perspectives in the Global North and Global South, In: Regional Academy on
the United Nations (RAUN) (Eds.) 2019. “Innovations for Development: Towards Sustainable, Inclu-
sive, and Peaceful Societies.” Vienna. Accessible at: http://www.ra-un.org/publications.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. - 1 -
2 Theoretical & Historical Framework..................................................................................... - 3 -
2.1 Historical Developments ................................................................................................. - 3 -
2.2 Theoretical Framework - Linking Technological Advances with Economic
Performance .................................................................................................................................. - 4 -
2.2.1 Theory of Long Waves (Kondratieff Waves) ........................................................ - 4 -
2.2.2 Stage Model of Development .................................................................................. - 5 -
2.3 Defining “Industry 4.0” in contrast to the “4th Industrial Revolution” ......................... - 6 -
3 Research Design ....................................................................................................................... - 7 -
3.1 Hypothesis & Research Questions ................................................................................. - 7 -
3.2 Methodological Approach and Measurement ............................................................. - 8 -
4 Case Studies .............................................................................................................................. - 8 -
4.1 “Global North”................................................................................................................ - 12 -
4.1.1 Germany’s “Industrie 4.0” (I4.0) – Strategy ........................................................ - 12 -
4.1.2 Japan’s “Society 5.0” (S5.0) – Approach .............................................................. - 15 -
4.1.3 USA’s “Industrial Internet of Things” (IIoT) – Initiative .................................. - 17 -
4.2 “Global South” ................................................................................................................ - 20 -
4.2.1 China’s “Made-in-China 2025” (MIC2025) – Strategy ....................................... - 20 -
4.2.2 Indonesia’s “Making Indonesia 4.0” (MI4.0) – Initiative .................................. - 23 -
4.2.3 Mexico’s “Crafting the Future” (CF) – Approach .............................................. - 26 -
4.3 Comparison ..................................................................................................................... - 29 -
5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. - 32 -
Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................................... - 36 -
6 References ............................................................................................................................... - 37 -
6.1 Literature ......................................................................................................................... - 37 -
6.2 Internet Resources .......................................................................................................... - 47 -
7 Annex ...................................................................................................................................... - 49 -
7.1 Authors and Contributors ............................................................................................. - 49 -
7.2 List of Tables and Figures.............................................................................................. - 49 -
7.2.1 List of Tables ........................................................................................................... - 49 -
7.2.2 List of Figures .......................................................................................................... - 50 -
7.3 Additional Tables & Figures ......................................................................................... - 51 -
Abstract Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
i
Differentiation of Industry 4.0 Models
The 4th Industrial Revolution from different Regional Perspectives in the
Global North and Global South
by Markus Speringer & Judith Schnelzer
Abstract
This paper addresses the regionally different approaches or strategies in selected countries
from the Global North as well as the Global South in discussing the Fourth (4th) Industrial Rev-
olution (4IR) and its representation in manufacturing, Industry 4.0 (I4.0). The 4IR marks a digi-
tally-enabled and technologically driven paradigmatic change that will not only disrupt in-
dustries and the economic system, but will have its effects on the society and environment as
a whole. As technological, economic and societal innovations and transformations are closely
linked with one another, the 4IR will bring opportunities and challenges that require country-
specific adaptation and mitigation strategies that address both, a country’s strengths and
weaknesses. The core premise of this comparative analysis is the existence of a basic difference
in the motivation between on the one hand the frontrunner countries in the Global North that
so far coin the global 4IR/ I4.0 discourse and on the other hand the countries in the Global
South that aim to utilize this transformation processes to catch up in the global competition.
The selected countries and their strategic approaches towards the 4IR represent fully industri-
alized (Germany’s Industrie 4.0, Japan’s Society 5.0, and USA’s Industrial Internet of Things) and
emerging industrial economies (China’s Made-in-China 2025, Indonesia’s Making Indonesia 4.0,
and Mexico’s Crafting the Future).
Keywords
1
: B10, B22, H11, H50, I25, J24, O14, O15, R11, R58
1
JEL Classification Codes: B10 (General: History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox
Approaches), B22 (Macroeconomics), H11 (Public Economics: Structure, Scope, and Performance of
Government), H50 (General: National Government Expenditures and Related Policies), I25 (Education
and Economic Development), J24 (Human Capital • Skills • Occupational Choice • Labor Productivity),
O14 (Industrialization • Manufacturing and Service Industries • Choice of Technology), O15 (Human
Resources • Human Development • Income Distribution • Migration), R11 (Regional Economic Activ-
ity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes), R58 (Regional Development Planning
and Policy) (see https://www.aeaweb.org/econlit/jelCodes.php?view=jel#R)
Nomenclature Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
ii
Nomenclature
1IR First (1st) Industrial Revolution
2IR Second (2nd) Industrial Revolution
3IR Third (3rd) Industrial Revolution
4IR Fourth (4th) Industrial Revolution
AEM Space Agency, Mexico
AI Artificial Intelligence
AM Advanced Manufacturing, USA
AMITI Association of Information Technologies, Mexico
AMP Advanced Manufacturing Partnership, USA
AR Augmented Reality
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BKPM Investment Coordination Board, Indonesia
BMBF Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Germany
BMWi Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Germany
BPO Business Process Outsourcing
BUAP Benemarita University of Puebla, Mexico
CAO Cabinet Office, Japan
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CF Crafting the Future, Mexico
CHN China
CIMAT Center for Research in Mathematics, Mexico
CISTP China Institute for Science and Technology Policy, Tsinghua University
CONACYT National Council for Science and Technology, Mexico
CPC Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, China
CPS Cyber Physical Systems
CRF Construction of Research Facilities, USA
DEU Germany
DTTL Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited
EDB Economic Development Board
EIE Emerging Industrial Economies
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FOMEX Mixed-Hybrid Fund, Mexico
FORDECYT Institutional Fund for the Regional Promotion of Scientific and Technological Development
and Innovation, Mexico
FTA Free Trade Agreements
G20 Group of Twenty
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GOB Government of Mexico, Mexico
GVA Gross Value Added
HVMC High-Value Manufacturing Catapult, United Kingdom
I4.0 Industry 4.0
IC Industrialized Countries
ICT Information and Communication Technologies
IdF L’Industrie du Futur, France
IDN Indonesia
IDR Indonesian Rupiah
IIC Industrial Internet Consortium, USA
IIoT Industrial Internet of Things, USA
IoT Internet of Things
IoTAC Internet of Things Acceleration Consortium, Japan
IoTS Internet of Things Services
Nomenclature Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
iii
IR Industrial Revolution
ISIC International Standard Industrial Classification of all economic activities
IT Information Technology
ITS Industrial Technology Services, USA
IVI Industrial Value Chain Initiative, Japan
IVRA Industrial Value Chain Reference Architecture – Next, Japan
JPN Japan
KANTEI The Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Japan
KINAS National Industrial Committee, Indonesia
KPMG Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler
MCE Manufacturing Centers of Excellence, USA
METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan
MEX Mexico
MEXT Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan
MHLW Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Japan
MI4.0 Making Indonesia 4.0, Indonesia
MIC2025 Made-in-China 2025, China
MIIT Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, China
MNCs Multi-National Corporations
MOD Ministry of Defense, Indonesia
MOEC Ministry of Education and Culture, Indonesia
MOF Ministry of Finance, Indonesia
MOH Ministry of Health, Indonesia
MOI Ministry of Industry, Indonesia
MOM Ministry of Manpower, Indonesia
MORA Ministry of Religious Affairs, Indonesia
MORTHE Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education, Indonesia
MOSOE Ministry of State Owned Enterprises, Indonesia
MOST Ministry of Science and Technology, China
MOST Ministry of Science and Technology, Thailand
MTT Manufacturing Technology Testbeds, USA
MVA Manufacturing Value Added
MYS Mean Years of Schooling
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission, China
NDS National Digital Strategy, Mexico
NIC Newly Industrializing Countries
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology, USA
NMIP Network for Manufacturing Innovation Program, USA
NNMI National Network for Manufacturing Innovation, USA
NSTC National Science and Technology Council, USA
ÖAW Austrian Academy of Sciences
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCAST President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, USA
pp. Percentage Points
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
PWC PricewaterhouseCoopers
RAUN Regional Academy on the United Nations
R&D Research and Development
RRI Robot Revolution Initiative, Japan
RTA Regional Trade Agreements
S5.0 Society 5.0, Japan
SDG Sustainable Development Goals
SGI Services of General Interest
Nomenclature Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
iv
SE Secretariat of Economy, Mexico
SI Smart Industry, Netherlands
SME Small and Medium Enterprises
SMNDP Ministry of National Development Planning, Indonesia
STEM Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
STRS Scientific and Technical Research Services, USA
TBY The Business Year
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USA United States of America
USCC United States Chamber of Commerce
US$ United States Dollar
VIC Vienna International Centre
VID Vienna Institute of Demography
VR Virtual Reality
WEF World Economic Forum
WTO World Trade Organization
WWII Second (2nd) World War
Introduction Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 1 -
Differentiation of Industry 4.0 Models
The 4th Industrial Revolution from different Regional Perspectives in the
Global North and Global South
by Markus Speringer & Judith Schnelzer
“You cannot wait until a house burns down to buy fire insurance on it. We cannot wait until
there are massive dislocations in our society to prepare for the Fourth Industrial Revolution.”
— Prof. Robert J. SHILLER (Economist, Yale University and 2013 Nobel laureate in economics)
2
1 Introduction
The Fourth (4th) Industrial Revolution (4IR) and its representation in manufacturing, Industry 4.0
(I4.0), is not a futuristic concept, but is happening now. The 4IR as paradigmatic change will
have far-reaching implications for nations, industries, academia and people all around the
world. In this era of transformation, it requires a vision to conceptualize, facilitate and imple-
ment comprehensive adaptation and mitigation strategies.
The world is facing major challenges, like eradicating poverty (incl. extreme poverty), hunger,
rising inequalities (incl. gender inequality), (youth) unemployment, more frequent and intense
natural disasters, spiraling conflict, violent extremism, terrorism and related humanitarian cri-
sis and forced displacement of people, natural resource depletion, environmental degradation
(incl. desertification, droughts, loss of biodiversity, etc.), climate change, etc. (UN, 2015).
Therefore the United Nations adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by ad-
dressing those challenges with outlining 17 majors Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
with 169 targets to end poverty and hunger, protect the planet, and ensure prosperity for all
(UN General Assembly, 2015). The 4IR is expected to positively contribute to accelerate the
global progress towards the SDGs (World Bank, 2018a), whereby I4.0 is often envisaged as
savior with solely beneficiary aspects, where technology innovation triggers economic growth,
the creation of jobs and generates prosperity as well as energy and resource efficiency in mit-
igating climate change impacts (European Commission, 2017a; Fukuyama, 2018; Heider, 2016;
Herold, 2016; Keidanren, 2017; Sorko et al., 2016; The Economist, 2017; United Nations, 2016).
Indeed, I4.0 will bring innovative technologies to create broader access to clean energy, includ-
ing more environmental and sustainable production value chains as well as it might enhance
smallholder production or potentially has equalizing effects on wages on a global level (Nor-
ton, 2017; Schwab, 2017; UNIDO, 2017a, 2017b).
2
At the WEF 2016 Annual Meeting in Davos (Switzerland) nine quotes that sum up the Fourth Industrial
Revolution were collected (see https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/9-quotes-that-sum-up-the-
fourth-industrial-revolution/) (Herold, 2016; WEF, 2016)
Introduction Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 2 -
But on the other hand, this emerging technological progress will create a structural transfor-
mation that will affect the future location of global centers of manufacturing and might involve
the risk that especially low-income countries fail to succeed in the global competition for at-
tracting industry. One threat might be that wealth inequality will further increase and leave
poor countries behind, if they cannot adapt fast enough for creating an I4.0 equipped economy
and high-skilled labor force. Additionally, struggles might occur to integrate smallholders and
SMEs in rural economies in the new production schemes as well as to stay competitive in a
global economy, when the comparative advantage of low labor costs diminishes and produc-
tion sites might be relocated closer to the consumer. There is a chance that people, especially
in low income countries, could be excluded from this transformation, enforcing the global eco-
nomic inequality (Norton, 2017; Schwab, 2017; Singh, 2016; UNDP, 2018a). To ensure an inclu-
sive and sustainable transformation, Norton (2017) argues to incorporate politics and revise
the tax system to the emerging needs of a changing global economic system. Key challenges
for a timely and successful achievement of the SDGs worldwide are (A) a substantial lack of
global leadership to inspire policy change, investment, inclusion, awareness, and mobilization
towards the SDGs, (B) a knowledge of the SDG facets, including the implications of I4.0 on how
people might work, produce, consume and spend their time after the now emerging transfor-
mation, and (C) a need to unify targets for all countries, e.g. setting universal standards for
clean energy production, clean water, etc. (Singh, 2016; Tsvetkova, 2017).
As a step towards understanding the processes and potential global implications of the 4IR
and I4.0 further research has to be conducted, taking regional perspectives, strategies and chal-
lenges into account. Thereby, a distinction in the analysis between countries/ regions in differ-
ent development stages is required to sketch different approaches and create a broader under-
standing for the potential prospective development. This conceptual paper focuses on the re-
appraisal of the perceptions as well as adaptation and mitigation strategies of case study coun-
tries in the Global North and Global South (Grugel and Hout, 1999) to open up the analytical
frame not only on Industrialized Countries (IC), but also Emerging Industrial Economies (EIE)
in the so called Global South (UNIDO, 2017a). This is especially relevant as most research and
political strategies are originating in countries in the Global North, what has notable implica-
tions on the global discourse on the 4IR and I4.0 (Buer et al., 2018; Buica, 2016; Liao et al., 2017).
In the context of the Regional Academy on the United Nations (RAUN), under the superordinate
theme “Innovations for Development: ‘Towards Peaceful, Sustainable and Inclusive Societies’” this
work aims to contribute to this research desideratum by pursuing the question what general
concepts of 4IR/ I4.0 can be identified, how they might differ, and how countries in different
development contexts approach this topic and from what perspective and thematic foci the
topic is tackled.
The paper starts with contextualizing and differentiate the 4IR and I4.0 from a theoretical and
historical perspective (see Section 2) before illustrating the research design (see Section 3). This
will provide the basis for examining regional public and private approaches to cope with the
opportunities and challenges of the 4IR in the Global North (see Section 4.1) and Global South
(see Section 4.2) before comparing the regionally different strategies (see Section 4.3) and
providing concluding remarks (see Section 5) with a comparison of the different approaches
found towards I4.0.
Theoretical & Historical Framework Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 3 -
2 Theoretical & Historical Framework
The term “Industrie 4.0” (I4.0) was first used by Henning Kagermann, the head of the German
National Academy of Science and Engineering (Acatech), in 2011, and has since then become
very popular (Kagermann et al., 2018, 2011). I4.0 describes “[…] the use in industrial production
of recent, and often interconnected, digital technologies that enable new and more efficient processes,
and which in some cases yield new goods and services.” (OECD, 2017a). The term “Industry 4.0” is
often used interchangeably for the “4th Industrial Revolution” (4IR), and even within the scien-
tific community there are neither clear distinctions nor is there a uniform usage of the two
denominations. Therefore the terminology has become very fuzzy. However, both terms de-
scribe different phenomena and therefore need to be differentiated from one another. But first,
the historical development of the steadily changing and advancing industrial sector has to set
a framework for defining as what is nowadays known as I4.0.
2.1 Historical Developments
In general, industrial revolutions mark a “significant technological development”, (Sung, 2018)
that has occurred in the past or is about to occur. Thus far there have been identified four
industrial revolutions (see Figure 1). The 1st Industrial Revolution (1IR) began in the late 18th
century and was mainly characterized by the invention of mechanical systems, e.g. steam lo-
comotives and weaving looms, which were operated with the biggest technological innovation
of this era, namely steam power.
Figure 1: The Four Industrial Revolutions (IR) (authors illustration)
3
Electrification and the novel installation of assembly lines to implement mass production
chains and division of labor are the primal innovations that characterize the 2nd Industrial Rev-
olution (2IR) in the late 19th century. With the introduction of automation, micro-electronics
3
The vectors files used in this figure are retrieved from the Free Vector Icon Platform Flaticon.com and
adapted by the authors (see https://www.flaticon.com/)
Theoretical & Historical Framework Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 4 -
and computer technology to the world of manufacturing the 3rd Industrial Revolution (3IR)
started in the Mid-late 20th century (Xu et al., 2018). The 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR)
(Schwab, 2017) marks a „[…] systemic transformation that includes an impact on civil society, gov-
ernance structures, and human identity […]”, (Sung, 2018). This new production paradigm of
smart and connected production systems is based on Information and Communication Technolo-
gies (ICT). Humans, machines and virtual worlds start interacting with each other within the
framework of this paradigm (Van der Elst and Williams, 2017).
2.2 Theoretical Framework - Linking Technological Advances with Economic Performance
In structuralist paradigms technological and/ or basic innovations are interlinked with the eco-
nomic performance of market economies and therefore with societal transformations, e.g.
changing skill requirements of the labor market. From an evolutionary economic point of view
these technological innovations are linked with the emergence of successive economic cycles.
One basic innovation heralds the start of an economic upswing in the market economy. Hence,
many complementary products, services, manufacturing processes or organizational forms
derive from this initial major technological innovation. These alter the economy as a whole as
well as its economic sectors. As described with the four IR cyclical economic development and
growth is induced by those basic innovations. Although Nikolai Kondratieff (1926) empirically
observed these waves and is eponymous for them, eventually Joseph Schumpeter (1939) for-
mulated the so called Theory of Long Waves, which is still of high relevance in economic re-
search, e.g. in Neo-Schumpeterian paradigms.
2.2.1 Theory of Long Waves (Kondratieff Waves)
The Theory of Long Waves refers to technological innovations as drivers of economic booms or
upswings. These so-called Kondratieff Waves describe long-term economic cycles of recurring
economic upswings and subsequent recessions as result of successive industrial revolutions.
Innovations potentially create macroeconomic profits that last until the market is saturated
and the economic performance of formerly (fast) growing economic sectors and industries is
slowing down, stagnating and shrinking again, resulting in an economic recession or even
depression. As each cycle is highly coined by a dominant “techno-economic paradigm” (Freeman,
2008) that creates new dynamic industries and influences all economic sectors to a certain ex-
tent. An economic recession and erosion of profits can only be reversed by the induction of
new technologies to initiate another economic wave. Each wave not only creates a new techno-
economic paradigm, but has also societal and economic implications like the increase of struc-
tural unemployment due the mismatch of the new labor market requirements in skills and
qualifications from technological innovations. So, each wave creates high social costs due the
declining demand for obsolete skills, occupations, industries and services (Kondratieff 1926,
Williamson und Lindert 1980, Freeman 2008). Each new wave of technological and economic
development is surrounded by different contexts, e.g. economic, societal, political etc., than
the previous one (Freeman, 2008). Not every IR has more than one basic innovation to induce
a long wave, thus they do not necessarily overlap entirely.
Theoretical & Historical Framework Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 5 -
The emergence of every IR can be linked with distinct geographical locations and countries as
innovations are not spatially distributed at random. Therefore every long wave has been in-
duced by a few regional centers, where basic innovations have spawn (Schumpeter, 1939). The
emerged economic growth in these regions made innovations quantifiable and in further con-
sequence observable. With each new economic wave respectively IR those centers of innova-
tions have changed. Usually the initial innovations are spread from the centers, which are only
a few countries, to other nations.
While the first long wave was spatially located in England, the second as well as the third
wave had shifted the technological innovation centers to Germany, Japan and the United
States (Dosi, 2007; Freeman, 2008). Since the fourth wave many Newly Industrializing Countries
(NIC) came into focus next to the before mentioned forerunners in technological innovations.
The leading countries had comparative advantages in newly emerging manufacturing pro-
cesses, while others were not able to adapt quickly enough to the new challenges and require-
ments. The results are spatial processes of differentiation due to the concentration of techno-
logical innovations and hence economic growth. In the past increasing industrialization was
perceived as guarantee of a country’s economic growth and development as described in Ros-
tow's stage model (1960).
2.2.2 Stage Model of Development
Rostow's (1960) linkage of development and economic growth in his stage model provides a
quasi-deterministic assumption that all countries follow the same development pathway
4
. Ac-
cording to this model countries are more or less advanced in these stages, opening a gap be-
tween countries worldwide. A distinction between countries of the Global North and Global
South evolved in order to differentiate between the few fully industrialized or fully developed
countries and the rest. In this process of differentiation the importance of nation states in-
creased steadily although in the recent decades the importance of globalization is not to be
denied. (ibid.) Freeman (2008) calls the dissimilar national environments, where innovative
processes take place, “national systems of innovation”. Various development paths that lead to
uneven development between but also within countries can be identified and remain a feature
of the global(ized) economic system.
In this highly competitive system, countries and industries occasionally “[…] have forged ahead,
whilst others have fallen far behind.”, (Freeman, 2008) in the described economic cycles. During
the previous IR, countries with the most pro-active policies for innovation and growth were
catching-up to the forerunners, which lead to the rearrangement of the global economic power
structures. England, for example, initiated the first wave as well as the 1IR but has fallen be-
hind as the top frontrunner since then. Countries like Germany and the US were able to catch
up with England and stay upfront also because of policies accelerating long-term economic
growth through industrialization.
4
Rowstow’s (1960) “Stages of Growth”-Model is one of the most prominent historical models of economic
growth within the modernization theories. It has been widely criticized for its deterministic, Western-
centric perspective on development and neglecting power asymmetries that potentially hinder devel-
opment, especially in the Global South.
Theoretical & Historical Framework Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 6 -
2.3 Defining “Industry 4.0” in contrast to the “4th Industrial Revolution”
With the emergence of the 4IR the question how to position or how to be positioned as a coun-
try in the new techno-economic paradigm has arisen. In order to stay ahead, catch up or pre-
vent from falling behind, countries and companies are pushing strategy papers, which take
their national environments into account. These policies aim to restructure the industrial pro-
duction processes by promoting digitalization and automation manufacturing to increase
productivity, competitiveness and sustainability, whilst lowering the (labor) costs. Industry
4.0 (I4.0) is considered as “[…] manufacturing in the current context […] separate from the fourth
industrial revolution in term of scope.”, (Sung, 2018). Although I4.0 is not considered as being
consistently defined by the scientific community and mainly known as an “[…] umbrella term
used to describe a group of connected technological advances that provide a foundation for increased
digitalization of the business environment […]”, (Skobelev and Borovik, 2017).
Industry 4.0 (I4.0) basically represents the economic point of view, which primarily takes man-
ufacturing/ production into consideration. In its core, the I4.0 concept contains the following
aspects:
› Digitalization of manufacturing (European Commission, 2017a; UNIDO, 2017a,
2017b)
› Decentralization of manufacturing (UNDP, 2018a)
› Vertical and horizontal integration of the value chain (BMBF, 2017a; European Com-
mission, 2017b; Forschungsunion, 2012; Heilmann et al., 2016; Plattform Industrie 4.0,
2015; Schroeder, 2016)
› Increased productivity (BMBF, 2017a; European Commission, 2017b; Heilmann et al.,
2016; Plattform Industrie 4.0, 2015; Schroeder, 2016)
› Flexibility (real-time production, customization, etc.) (BMBF, 2017a; European Com-
mission, 2017b; Heilmann et al., 2016; Plattform Industrie 4.0, 2015; Schroeder, 2016)
Components: Cyber-Physical-Systems (CPS), Internet of Things (IoT), and Technological in-
novations: Big Data, additive production (e.g. 3D printing), Cloud computing, Artificial Intel-
ligence (AI), collaborative robotics, Virtual Reality (VR), Augmented Reality (AR) (BKPM,
2017; BMBF, 2017a; Business Sweden, 2018; CPC, 2016; European Commission, 2017b; For-
schungsunion, 2012; GOB, 2014; Heilmann et al., 2016, 2016; IIC, 2018, 2015; IVI, 2016; KANTEI,
2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2013a; MOI, 2018a; NSTC, 2018a, 2018b; Plattform Industrie 4.0,
2015; RRI, 2018a, 2018b, 2015; Santiago, 2018; Schroeder, 2016; SE, 2016; TBY, 2018; Walden-
berger, 2018)
4IR emerging technologies: Advanced materials, Cloud technology (incl. Big Data), Autono-
mous vehicles (incl. drones), Synthetic biology, Virtual (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR),
Artificial Intelligence (AI), Robots, Blockchain, 3D printing, and IoT. (Herweijer et al., 2017;
UNDP, 2018a)
Although most of these technological components are existing today (in other applications),
I4.0 is still a futuristic concept (Drath and Horch, 2014). However, I4.0 will influence the ways
of manufacturing significantly and raise questions on who, how, where and when will (be)
produced (Van der Elst and Williams, 2017). It also has emerged as technological framework
Research Design Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 7 -
for integrating and extending manufacturing processes at both intra- and inter-organizational
levels (Xu et al., 2018). In contrast, the 4IR refers to a systemic change with a holistic view that
also takes effects on society, governance, environment, etc. into consideration.
When considering the potential implications of I4.0 and 4IR on the SDGs, the I4.0 as such is
primarily limited to SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure) (Fujitsu, 2018; UNDP,
2018a; United Nations, 2016). On the other hand, the 4IR might have impact on the majority of
all 17 SDGs and many aspects of society because of the broader context, what can create op-
portunities, but also threats, especially to emerging and developing countries in the Global
South (see Table 5 in Annex Section 7.3). To sum up, I4.0 is one small part of the 4IR, which
mainly focuses on the production/ manufacturing process (UNDP, 2018a).
3 Research Design
3.1 Hypothesis & Research Questions
The aim of this study is to review and evaluate the Industry 4.0 (I4.0) concept as such from a
theoretical perspective within the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR) framework and discuss it from
a regional perspective by referencing to country cases from the Global North and Global South.
From the theoretical standpoint we argue, that due to different development paths and socio-
economic contexts each country is tackling the 4IR in different ways, whereby the core moti-
vations and strategies of the countries within the Global North and Global South are expected
to be more closely related than between the North-South divide. Some countries want to stay
in the position as a forerunner (especially countries from the Global North) while others want
to or try to catch up in this process (especially countries from the Global South). Selecting the
countries according to the Global North/ South divide should reflect on the countries’ techno-
economic position as whether they want to stay upfront (fully developed economies) or need
to catch up (emerging industrial economies, developing economies as well as least developed
countries). To achieve these various aims countries need to adapt their 4IR policies as well as
strategies accordingly, not only to their current position in the technological field but also to
many other areas, e.g. labor force, environment, energy efficiency, etc. (Hallward-Driemeier
and Nayyar, 2018; Herold, 2016; Schwab, 2017; UNDP, 2018a; UNIDO, 2017b; WEF, 2018a,
2018b).
The basic hypothesis pivots on the following statement: “There are different interpretations of the
4th Industrial Revolution and the Industry 4.0 concept within the political and scientific discourse de-
pending on regional and also national contexts.”
This premise disembogued to the articulation of the following two research questions that
shall be answered in the research process:
› “Which concepts of the I4.0 can be identified within the 4IR discourse and how do they differ
from each other?”
› “How do different countries in different contexts approach the 4IR?”
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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3.2 Methodological Approach and Measurement
To operationalize these research questions a systematic literature review of scientific literature
and national policy papers on 4IR and I4.0 has been conducted. Based on the review a matrix
was created to compare and contrast the different concepts of I4.0 from the regional perspec-
tives, contextualizing the regional socio-economic pathways by using descriptive quantitative
analysis. (Buer et al., 2018; Heilmann et al., 2016; Liao et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2018)
The systematic literature review refers to the systematic comparison of available literature
about the 4IR/ I4.0 by categorizing the paper contents according the discussed topics (“T”) as
illustrated in Table 1. In a first step, papers and reports on 4IR/ I4.0 were collected, before
extending the search parameters to global, regional and country-specific policies and strate-
gies. On this way, we aim to not only cover an academic perspective on 4IR/ I4.0, but also
include country perspectives from national governments, industry and academia.
Table 1. Schematic illustration of the systematic literature review matrix (authors illustration)
Author
Year
Title
Geo
Type
Concept
Abstract
Aim
T1
T2
(…)
T+n
Institute
Keywords
A1
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
(…)
⚫
⚫
⚫
A2
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚪
(…)
⚪
⚫
⚫
(…)
(…)
(…)
(…)
(…)
(…)
(…)
(…)
(…)
(…)
(…)
(…)
(…)
(…)
A+n
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚪
⚫
(…)
⚫
⚫
⚫
Apart of the systematic juxtaposition of the theoretical and regional perspectives on (the) 4IR/
I4.0 within the literature, the country-specific perspectives are contextualized with the national
strategic plans aiming at a successful adaptation to (the) 4IR/ I4.0 and the socioeconomic pat-
terns and pathways of the selected countries. The focus is set on indicators that are potentially
reflecting SDG related goals, e.g. share of Manufacturing Value Added (MVA), patent appli-
cations, trade in goods and services, or high-tech exports. This allows the thematic arrange-
ment of national adaptation approaches in the context of the SDGs by highlighting socioeco-
nomic developments in the present and recent past. The required data is retrieved from mul-
tiple data sources such as the UN (2017), World Bank (2018b), Wittgenstein Centre (2018),
OECD (2018) and Roser (2018).
4 Case Studies
The geographical scope of this paper focuses on the regional macroeconomic disparities of
selected countries in the Global North (Germany, Japan, and United States) and Global South
(China, Mexico, and Indonesia) to illustrate and contextualize the country-specific (political
and strategic) approaches in the 4IR discourse. The differentiation is necessary to capture the
regional and country-specific perspectives and approaches to the tackle the potential chal-
lenges and opportunities arising from the 4IR. The selection of the six country case studies
comprises three selection criteria:
› Geography: The countries have to represent the Global North-South divide AND dif-
ferent geographic regions in the world;
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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› Economy: The countries have to represent, in terms of GDP, economically high per-
forming countries;
› Policy: The countries have to have or are going to implement an I4.0 related policy to
tackle the challenges and opportunities of the 4IR;
Firstly, the Global North-South divide is primarily a political and socio-economic one (Gallas
et al., 2016; Grugel and Hout, 1999; Reuveny and Thompson, 2007; Trefzer et al., 2014) and will
determine the future regional policies handling the opportunities and challenges of the 4IR.
The Global North comprises the so called advanced Industrialized Countries (IND) (see in blue,
Figure 2), including the most parts of the European Union and Europe, the United States, Can-
ada, the Four Asian Tiger or Little Dragons (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan)
as well as Japan, Macau, Brunei, Israel, Australia and New Zealand. The Global South (see in
green, Figure 2) basically covers all the other nations that are not yet considered as advanced
as the Global North, whereby those countries comprise a mixture of Emerging Industrial Econ-
omies (EIE), Other Developing Countries (ODC) as well as Least Developed Countries (LDC) illus-
trated in Figure 2 (UNIDO, 2017a)
5
.
Figure 2. Case Studies by level of industrial development (UNIDO, 2017a) and I4.0 related policies (authors’
illustration)
Secondly, the selection of case countries for this study aims to include countries from both,
Global North and South, from different geographical regions with a significant economic per-
formance in the global economy. The level of a country’s economic performance is predomi-
nantly measured by its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). When ranking the Top-5 countries of the
Global North and South by GDP in US$ (see Table 2) there are 10 members of the G20 or Group
5
For a detailed list on the UN categorization of countries to “industrialized nations”, “emerging industrial
economies”, “other developing countries” and “least developed countries” see (UNIDO, 2017a).
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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of Twenty
6
displayed, which is a powerful global conglomerate to promote international fi-
nancial stability.
Table 2. GDP in 2016 at constant 2010 prices in US Dollars (World Bank, 2018b)
GLOBAL NORTH
GLOBAL SOUTH
#
Country
GDP in US$
#
Country
GDP in US$
1
United States
16920.3bn
2
China
9505.3bn
3
Japan
6040.7bn
7
India
2456.0bn
4
Germany
3781.7bn
8
Brazil
2248.1bn
5
France
2810.5bn
15
Mexico
1259.0bn
6
United Kingdom
2753.8bn
17
Indonesia
1037.7bn
Thirdly, to narrow the list of countries down, countries with a national I4.0 strategic plan had
to be selected to allow a review and evaluation of the regionally diverging approaches facing
the 4IR. The aim was to select countries with initiatives/ strategies in different stages of imple-
mentation, from planning via early stage of implementation to advanced stage of implemen-
tation. With Germany (Industrie 4.0), Japan (Society 5.0) and USA (Industrial Internet of Things)
three countries that can be described as global frontrunners in the promotion of the 4IR were
selected, whereby Germany and USA are already in an advanced stage of implementation.
The Global South finds itself represented in this study with China (Made in China 2025), Indo-
nesia (Indonesia 4.0) and Mexico (Crafting the Future), which are either in early stages of imple-
mentation or still conceptualize their initiatives. (see Figure 3)
Within the EU there are more national policy initiatives, e.g. “L’Industrie du Futur” (IdF) (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2017c) in France, “High-Value Manufacturing Catapult” (HVMC) (Euro-
pean Commission, 2017d) in the UK or “Smart Industry” (SI) in the Netherlands (European
Commission, 2017a; European Commission, 2017e) (see Figure 3) to name a few. But also coun-
tries in the Global South are showing a raised awareness for the challenges and opportunities
the 4IR might bring by creating their own strategies, e.g. Singapore’s Industry 4.0 (e.g. Smart
Industry Readiness Index, see The Singapore Smart Industry Readiness Index. Catalysing the trans-
formation of manufacturing, 2017) or Thailand 4.0 (MOI, 2018b; Thailand MOST, 2017), which
shall not be further discussed in this paper. (see Figure 3)
The description of the country-specific case studies will start with Germany [DEU] that is con-
sidered to be the initiator and instigator of the global 4IR discourse by pushing and coining
the terminology “Industrie 4.0” that became a synonym for the 4IR all over the world. Germany
carried this discourse also into the committees and panels of the European Union that made
Industry 4.0 a European policy target (European Commission, 2017a, 2017e, 2017b). Beside the
EU, the World Economic Forum (WEF) founded its own Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolu-
tion that shall promote this topic globally (WEF, 2018b, 2018a, 2017) beside other institutions
like the United Nations (UNDP, 2018a; UNIDO, 2017b, 2017a) or World Bank (Hallward-Drie-
meier and Nayyar, 2018; World Bank, 2018c, 2017).
6
The G20 or Group of Twenty comprise a mix of the world’s largest advanced and emerging economies,
representing about two-thirds of the world’s population, 85 percent of the global GDP and over 75 per-
cent of global trade. (see http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/g20-members/)
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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Figure 3. Selected countries in the Global North/ South that have or are going to launch I4.0 related initiatives
by year of policy launch and stage of implementation (European Commission, 2017a; MOI, 2018b; PCAST,
2011; SE, 2016) (authors illustration)
Nevertheless, the 4IR is predominantly discussed in the globally leading economies (Buer et
al., 2018; Buica, 2016; Liao et al., 2017), the so called Global North like Japan [JPN] and the
United States [USA], while within the countries of the Global South the awareness of the im-
portance of this topic as well as creating national policies has only recently started to evolve.
This circumstance also hindered the selection of case study countries to the extent, that due
the lack of documented policies, no Other (ODC) or Least Developing Countries (LDC) have
been selected for this study.
The three case study countries from the Global South solely represent Emerging Industrial
Economies (EIE). The leading economic role in the so called Global South has been taken over
by China [CHN] that invests huge efforts and money into catching up with the other leading
economies. Despite China’s global macroeconomic performance, the country is still considered
as an emerging industrial economy (UNIDO, 2017a) on the verge to become a fully industrial-
ized country. The other two case studies for the Global South representing Latin America and
South East Asia are Mexico [MEX] and Indonesia [IDN].
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Figure 4. Manufacturing (ISIC D) Value Added in 2011, 1970-2016 (in trillion US$) (World Bank, 2018b) (au-
thors illustration)
The countries reside among the Top-5 nations in the Global South when it comes to GDP and
are members of the G20. Additionally both countries have a high share of GVA by industry
(IDN: 22.2 percent | MEX: 16.0 percent in 2016) (World Bank, 2018b), which will be affected
by the development shaped by the 4IR. In total, the six case countries generated 7.4 trillion
US$ MVA, which made up 59 percent of the global MVA in 2016 (see Figure 4). (World Bank,
2018b)
4.1 “Global North”
4.1.1 Germany’s “Industrie 4.0” (I4.0) – Strategy
Today, Germany has a leading position in machinery and plant engineering as well as supplier
of factory equipment, including the field of digitalization and automation of manufacturing
(BMBF, 2013; Forschungsunion, 2012; Heilmann et al., 2016). In a global competitive economy,
the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF)
7
sees the German production and inno-
vation location endangered (BMBF, 2013; Forschungsunion, 2012; Plattform Industrie 4.0,
2015). Since the end of WWII the manufacturing and production sector, including mining, con-
struction, manufacturing and utilities, have been the driving forces in the revitalization of the
German economy and labor market (Heilmann et al., 2016). The industrial specialization in
high-tech manufacturing, e.g. automobile industries, aviation, ICT, automation, etc. (For-
schungsunion, 2012), has not only created economic growth, but also generated employment
and in 2016 approximately 27.3 percent of the German labor force were working in the manu-
facturing and production sector contributing 27.9 percent value added (MVA) to the GDP (see
Figure 8 in Section 4.2.1). (World Bank, 2018b) The German private and public sector have
strong international trade relationships, which make up about 86.9 percent of the GDP in 2017
7
Federal Ministry of Education and Research (German: Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung,
BMBF) (see https://www.bmbf.de/en/index.html)
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(World Bank, 2018b). Thereof 47.2 pp are contributed by exports (OECD, 2018). In total, 16.9
percent of all manufactured exports are high-technology exports (see Figure 5), totaling in
189.6 billion US$ in 2016 (World Bank, 2018b). The national economy is depending on export-
ing their manufactured goods, especially in the high-technology segment to create revenue
(BMBF, 2017b, 2014; European Commission, 2017b; Heilmann et al., 2016; Plattform Industrie
4.0, 2015).
Figure 5. High-technology exports, 1991-2016 (% of manufactured exports) (World Bank, 2018b) (authors
illustration)
To maintain its position as a thriving economy in the future, the German government started
early on to create strategic initiatives and policies to shape its prospective industrial orienta-
tion and capacities (European Commission, 2017b). In the beginnings of the I4.0 discourse in
Germany the national strategies and white papers of the government and industry associa-
tions were still using the terminology “embedded systems” (BMBF, 2007, 2006; Heilmann et al.,
2016; ZVEI, 2009). The Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and the Ministry for Eco-
nomic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) are promoting the I4.0 national strategic initiative and led
the basis for it with long-term strategies like the High-Tech 2020 Strategy (BMBF, 2017b, 2014,
2006; European Commission, 2017b), the Digital Strategy 2025 (BMWi, 2016; Hohmann, 2018)
and ICT 2020 Strategy (BMBF, 2007). In those strategy papers the discourse was not solely
concentrated on the manufacturing capacities as it is now, but also included the energy sector,
the health system and other economic sectors (BMBF, 2007, 2006). This changed with the in-
troduction of the term “Industrie 4.0” at the Hannover Fair (Hannover Messe) in April 2011
(Kagermann et al., 2011) when the thematic focus shifted to the manufacturing industries and
branches where Germany was obtaining positions as global market leaders. I4.0 is described
as the “[…] national strategic initiative from the German government […] [which] aims to drive digital
manufacturing forward by increasing digitalization and the interconnection of products, value chains
and business models. It also aims to support research, the networking of industry partners and stand-
ardization.”, (European Commission, 2017b).
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The German efforts regarding I4.0 have become institutionalized by founding the “Plattform
Industrie 4.0”, funded with € 200 million by BMBF and BMWi, with the aim to coordinate I4.0
related initiatives and to serve as a central contact point for policy-makers (European Com-
mission, 2017b; Forschungsunion, 2012; Plattform Industrie 4.0, 2015). The I4.0 initiative has
the objective to consolidate the German technological leadership in mechanical engineering,
machinery and plant engineering as well as supplier of factory equipment (European Com-
mission, 2017b; Heilmann et al., 2016; Plattform Industrie 4.0, 2015; Schroeder, 2016, 2016).
The primarily policy driven efforts in Germany to facilitate a feasible I4.0 strategy is designed
to support the specialization in and market demand for high-tech manufacturing, which
means it is shaped by the supply side. The target audience is mainly considered to be manu-
facturers/ producers and SMEs. The aim is to create a more efficient cross-linkage and vertical
integration of production chains among enterprises due to CPS to maintain the manufacturing
capacities, strengthen the international competitiveness and increase the share of (high-tech-
nology) manufactured exports (BMBF, 2017a; Heilmann et al., 2016; Schroeder, 2016).
The German government is advancing digital manufacturing, innovations in R&D, networks
and cooperation of industry partners, and standardization with the I4.0 initiative (BMBF,
2017a; European Commission, 2017b; Plattform Industrie 4.0, 2018a). The promotion of the
German I4.0 is funded by public-private partnerships. The main technological innovations are
horizontal and vertical integration of the value chain within the so-called smart factory ena-
bled by embedded systems, Cyber Security, Big Data, Cloud Computing, IoTS, IoT and CPS
(BMBF, 2017a; European Commission, 2017b; Forschungsunion, 2012; Heilmann et al., 2016;
Plattform Industrie 4.0, 2015; Schroeder, 2016). Those systems are tested, according to Platt-
form Industrie 4.0 (2018a), in over 280 R&D centers as well as technological clusters and
testbeds (BMBF, 2017a; Plattform Industrie 4.0, 2018b, 2018c, 2018a, 2015) and over 500 loca-
tions that conduct I4.0 related funded projects (BMBF, 2018).
The biggest strength of the German I4.0 strategy is the comprehensive strategic framework,
which involves policy-makers, industry, science and social partners to push the I4.0 agenda.
On the other side, the key challenges or weaknesses are concerning the potential involvement
of SME’s to adapt their management and shop-floor organization as well as to maneuver along
the demarcation lines of different stakeholder goals, e.g. between industry and trade union or
among competing German companies to establish a joint approach (European Commission,
2017a, 2017b). Further challenges include the economic capacity to adapt to accelerating prod-
uct and innovation life cycles, emergence of new business models as well as the need for cus-
tomization in manufacturing in the global competition. This will increase the pressure on the
national manufacturing sector to internationalize value chains, what may weaken the German
production and innovation location as well as the labor market. (BMBF, 2017a; European Com-
mission, 2017b; Heilmann et al., 2016; Plattform Industrie 4.0, 2015; Schroeder, 2016)
Technological changes affect not only the economic productivity but also the society and es-
pecially the workforce as well as the environment. Therefore it is necessary to rethink the re-
lation of society, education and work. Within the German discourse little consideration has
been put on the implications of technological innovations on society as such. Although the
strategy papers articulate the framework for succeeding in the 4IR, no profound details on
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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societal coping strategies that should handle I4.0 induced unemployment of unskilled workers
or other potentially negative effects. The environmental dimension of the German I4.0 strategy
is also underrepresented.
4.1.2 Japan’s “Society 5.0” (S5.0) – Approach
After WWII and the necessary reconstruction of the Japanese economy, the manufacturing
sector inherited an elevated position to persist in the global economic competition. The indus-
trial sector is held in high esteem as it was decisive in the economic recovery due to its eco-
nomic value added and the multiplier effects on other sectors. The economic reinvigoration of
Japan from 1950 to 1970 was interplayed with large-scale developments like education expan-
sion (Goujon et al., 2016; Speringer et al., 2018), the expansion of Services of General Interest
(SGIs), but also infrastructures like roads, railway, bridges, water pipes, sewage system, etc.
(Fukuyama, 2018). Today, Japan ranks among the countries with the highest mean-years of
schooling in the world (Goujon et al., 2016; KC et al., 2018; Lutz et al., 2018; UNDP, 2018b;
Wittgenstein Centre, 2018) and has the third largest economy after USA and China, when it
comes to the total GDP volume (World Bank, 2018b). In the last decades Japan has brought
forth multiple multinational corporations (MNCs) in manufacturing industries, electronic and
mechanical engineering, automation engineering, IT, and automobile production. Japan holds
a leading positing in robotics and AI (Fujino and Konno, 2016; KANTEI, 2013a, 2013b). This
reflects in the potential innovative capacity of Japan, e.g. when looking at standardized annual
patent applications per million inhabitants (see Figure 6), which has stood out compared to
other countries over the last decades, but with a notable decline since the early 2000s (World
Bank, 2018b).
Despite this socio-economic success story, Japan is facing severe demographic, political and
societal challenges, e.g. rapid ageing
8
affecting the productivity and innovative capacities,
which they aim to tackle with creating a new human-centered society, namely Society 5.0
(S5.0)
9
(Fukuyama, 2018; Harayama and Fukuyama, 2017; Waldenberger, 2018). This S5.0 ini-
tiative has to be evaluated as direct response to Germany’s “Industrie 4.0” – strategy to ensure
the maintenance, revitalization and competitiveness of Japan’s economy (KANTEI, 2013b,
2013a). The most prominent public stakeholders are the Cabinet Office (CAO), the Prime Min-
ister of Japan and his Cabinet (KANTEI), the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
and Japan’s leading business organization, namely Keidanren (Fukuyama, 2018; Walden-
berger, 2018).
8
From 1950 onwards the share of population aged 65+ years increased from 7.7 percent to 33.1 percent
in 2018 and is expected to surpass the 40 percent in 2038 (UN, 2017).
9
The four previous human society development stages are: hunter and gatherer in harmonious coexist-
ence with nature (Society 1.0), agrarian with increasing organization and nation-building (Society 2.0),
industrial with invention of mass production (Society 3.0), and information society that utilizes infor-
mation networks to connect assets (Society 4.0) (Fukuyama, 2018; Waldenberger, 2018)
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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Figure 6. Patent applications, 1970-2016 (per million inhabitants) (World Bank, 2018b) (authors illustration)
In general, automatization respectively digitalization in manufacturing processes is nothing
new to the Japanese industry and public discourse. Beside organizing since 1998 the annual
Global ICT Summit, Japan has launched several general economic growth policies (KANTEI,
2018, 2017a, 2017b, 2016a, 2016c, 2016d, 2016b, 2016e), industrial policies (METI, 2017, 2016,
2015), science and technology policies (CAO, 2018, 2017, 2016) and an ICT strategy (MIC, 2017,
2016) in line with the S5.0 initiative (Fukuyama, 2018; Keidanren, 2018; Waldenberger, 2018).
Apart from the public sector, the industry responded by establishing in 2015 three major in-
dustry consortia, namely the Robot Revolution Initiative (RRI), the Industrial Value Chain Initiative
(IVI), and the Internet of Things Acceleration Consortium (IoTAC) beside some smaller ones like
the Japan Association of New Economy or the Internet Association Japan (IVI, 2016; RRI,
2018a, 2018b, 2015; Waldenberger, 2018).
IVI, for instance, tries to promote a knowledge and technology based society in Japan until
2020. On this pathway, standards and regulations for interconnected production technologies
shall be developed and internationally adopted. So far production optimization was only con-
cerned in big enterprises, but with IVI this shall spread over to SMEs by integrating them into
the production and value chains (IVI, 2016; IVRA Next, 2018; Nishioka, 2017). Another focus
area is human capital, which appears in the reorientation of education policies, where natural
sciences and economy shall be promoted (Heilmann et al., 2016; KANTEI, 2016a; METI, 2016).
The public and private sector have shown a very strong response to international initiatives
on I4.0, because the economic future competitiveness is relying on it. Globally known enter-
prises like Toyota, Honda, Fujitsu, Hitachi, Yamaha and many more are highly aware of this
topic and the potentials of optimizing production processes to regain innovative capacities
and remain competitive (Harayama and Fukuyama, 2017; Heilmann et al., 2016; Walden-
berger, 2018). Apart from that, Japanese research institutes are frontrunners in material sci-
ence, engineering technology and electronic semiconductor research due to high investments
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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in ICT and R&D, what makes the country highly competitive in the international market (Heil-
mann et al., 2016; Waldenberger, 2018). Most of the initiatives pushing the 4IR forward are
originating in the private sector, but the government takes up a vivid role in funding less prof-
itable sectors, like the Smart Japan ICT Strategy (2014) that aims at the development of eGov-
ernment systems, Smart Cities and Smart Agriculture (KANTEI, 2016a; METI, 2016).
While Germany and USA focus on the optimization of production processes, Japan is more
specialized on robotics. As described in the Monodzukiri
10
White Paper, Japan perceives itself as
global leader in robotics, which also has a historical dimension (METI, 2016). In comparison to
other countries of the Global North, Japan has a competitive advantage as this was the coun-
try’s strategy to revive its economy in the past and shall lead on to the future. Currently, there
are 250.000 operational robots registered and in use in Japan, even before the US (~140.000)
(OECD, 2017b). The overarching goal is to become a global center for innovation in robotics
and to include robotic technologies, AI and IoT based on Big Data analysis in all parts of eve-
ryday life (KANTEI, 2016a, 2016d, 2016c, 2016b). This holistic ambition coins the term “Super
Smart Society” as well as “Society 5.0” (Heilmann et al., 2016; KANTEI, 2016c; Skobelev and
Borovik, 2017). Robotic technologies will be included in automobile production, manifold elec-
tric branches right up to the health sector and elderly care, which tackle the challenges of the
demographic aging in Japan (METI, 2015). The new technologies and business models created
within the 4IR shall not only deploy Japans status, but also bring production back to the coun-
try (KANTEI, 2016a; METI, 2016).
Major challenges associated with the 4IR are the lack of a vibrant startup eco-system (Joh, 2017;
Waldenberger, 2018) and the deprived innovation culture within Japanese enterprises, which
is shaped by the approach to find in-house-solutions (“not-invented-here-syndrome”) (Heilmann
et al., 2016). This often creates problems with data security and leaks. Since 2010 approximately
one third of all enterprises and about 55 percent of the enterprises with more than 250 employ-
ees indicated digital security incidents, what are the highest shares among OECD countries
(OECD, 2017b). The open innovation culture was considered to be a taboo for a long time. In
an era of accelerating technological life cycles in the production industries, this kind of open
innovation culture is essential. The capacities to adapt their company culture, customization
of products and establishing international networks will affect the competitiveness and global
market leadership. Other challenges in this process might be the lacking of a start-up culture
because young skilled workforce often prefers an employment in big enterprises and job secu-
rity (KANTEI, 2016a; METI, 2016).
4.1.3 USA’s “Industrial Internet of Things” (IIoT) – Initiative
In the 20th century, the United States of America has become the biggest global economy ac-
cording to the GDP. Holding a share of 11.7 percent of the GVA to the GDP in 2016, totaling
in 1.9 trillion US$ (World Bank, 2018b), the industrial sector is an important job creator (see
Figure 8 in Section 4.2.1). The overall US GDP has increased since 1970 from 4.8 to 16.9 trillion
10
Monodzukiri describes the principle of producing goods. The White Paper was produced in a coop-
eration of Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare
(MHLW) and Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT);
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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US$ in 2016. Nonetheless, the USA lost many jobs in the manufacturing sector due to offshor-
ing industrial labor to low-wage countries. This affects all manufacturing branches that pro-
duce durable goods, for sectors such as construction, infrastructure, mechanical engineering
(e.g. automobile, military, etc.), building machineries, appliances, utilities, etc. With offshoring
the industrial labor, the share of employment in industry has been declining from 24.7 percent
in 1991 to 18.9 percent in 2017 (World Bank, 2018b). This decline also affected the country’s
global (economic) competitiveness and innovation capacity. Nevertheless, the US ranks
among the Top-10 countries in the world when it comes to Mean Years of Schooling (MYS) in
2015 (Goujon et al., 2016; UNDP, 2018b; Wittgenstein Centre, 2018) or GDP per capita PPP in
2017 (World Bank, 2018b). When it comes to access to internet the US hardly makes the Top-
40 with 76.2 percent of the population that had access to internet in 2016 (World Bank, 2018b).
This is a rather small figure for a highly industrialized country in the Global North (see Figure
7).
Figure 7. Comparison of Mean Years of Schooling (x-axis) in 2015 (Goujon et al., 2016; UNDP, 2018b; Witt-
genstein Centre, 2018), Share of Internet Users (y-axis) in 2016 (World Bank, 2018b), and GDP per capita,
PPP (constant 2011 International Dollar) in 2017 (Feenstra et al., 2015; World Bank, 2018b) (authors illustra-
tion)
Historically, the industrial sector had been attributed a particular role in the economy because
of its multiplier effect for other sectors. The shift from industry to service sector oriented econ-
omy is nowadays perceived as problematic, because this has weakened the USA’s position in
the global manufacturing value chains. Aiming on reindustrializing, the national economy and
reshoring skilled industrial jobs, the USA pushes innovations in production and value chains,
coordination of information, digitalization, automation, computation, software, sensing and
networking (NSTC, 2018a, 2018b). This shall also reinforce the (high-technology) export
achievements, increase the share of high-technology exports as part of the overall manufac-
tured exports and to maintain as well as strengthen the international competitiveness (see Fig-
ure 5 in Section 4.1.1).
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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To revitalize the American manufacturing sector, the US President’s Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology (PCAST) recommended in 2011 the implementation of the “Advanced
Manufacturing” (AM) – Initiative to facilitate public-private partnerships between government,
academia and industry to expedite research on new technologies in manufacturing processes
(PCAST, 2011). In 2012, the National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI), today
also known as Manufacturing USA, was founded to establish a network of research institutes
to promote manufacturing technologies (NNMI, 2018).
In 2014, US Congressional Senate passed the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innova-
tion Act of 2014 (United States. Cong. House, 2014) to establish and convene a nationwide
network to coordinate the efforts of the individual manufacturing innovation institutes
(United States. Cong. House, 2014; United States. Senate, 2014). This led to the establishment
of the Network for Manufacturing Innovation Program (NMIP) within the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), which is a subdivision of the US Department of Commerce,
that has a budget of 1.2 billion US$ (2018) to support Scientific and Technical Research Services
(STRS), Industrial Technology Services (ITS), and Construction of Research Facilities (CRF).
(NIST, 2018; United States. Cong. House, 2018; United States. Senate, 2017) Initially the fund-
ing was recommended to be 500 million US$ per year appropriated to the Departments of
Defense, Commerce and Energy to promote AM principles (PCAST, 2011), just to be increased
in the following years to almost 1 billion US$ per year (McCormack, 2012; PCAST, 2012).
In the US context, the term I4.0 is not used, but instead Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)
11
and
Advanced Manufacturing (AM) are the key terms (NSTC, 2018a, 2016a, 2012). The AM - initiative
not only covers elements of I4.0, but is used in a broader context. This includes the innovative
usage of cutting-edge materials and capabilities, such as nano- and biotechnology, physics or
chemistry. Explicitly, knowledge from natural and life sciences are included in the implemen-
tation of the US strategies. The aims of this initiative are to develop new manufacturing tech-
nologies, educate and train the manufacturing workforce as well as expanding the capabilities
of the domestic manufacturing supply chain (NSTC, 2018a, 2018b, 2012).
Apart from the public AM – initiatives, the private sector has a very strong interest in the
promotion of I4.0 technologies in the digitalization of manufacturing. Especially, General Elec-
tric was essential in framing the term Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) and co-founding the
Industrial Internet Consortium (IIC) in 2014 together with AT&T, Cisco, IBM and Intel (Diab,
2018; Diab et al., 2017; Evans and Annunziata, 2012; Heilmann et al., 2016; IIC, 2015). The aim
of the IIC is the coordination and widespread enablement of the IIoT among their 258 mem-
bers, including MNCs, SMEs, nonprofit, academic, and government organizations (e.g. NIST),
to increase their innovative and adaptive capacities to the 4IR (Diab, 2018; Diab et al., 2017;
IIC, 2015). The IIC and IIoT are conceptually not confined to the industrial or manufacturing
11
The term IIoT is a combination of the Internet and Industrial Revolution. From the US perspective the
current IR is just the third (Rifkin, 2011). The first revolution is characterized by mechanical- and mass-
production. The second revolution is marked by the invention and global diffusion of the internet. The
third revolution combines the achievements of the first both in the so-called Industrial Internet of Things
(Evans and Annunziata, 2012).
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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sector, but include major parts of the service sector, e.g. energy, healthcare, agriculture, avia-
tion and shipping, but also mining, transportation, retail and smart cities, including the crea-
tion of testbeds for IIoT applications (Heilmann et al., 2016; IIC, 2018, 2015).
Similar to Germany, the overall strategy in the US is to support the industrial specialization
and create a market demand for high-technology manufacturing. This supply side perspective
is supported by manufacturers, producers, agriculture and to a minor extend by the govern-
ment and research (NSTC, 2018a, 2018b). Funding is mainly provided via public-private-part-
nerships to support technological development, the establishment of R&D centers and techno-
logical testbeds (McCormack, 2012; NSTC, 2018b, 2016a; PCAST, 2011).
In the US, the technological focus differs from Germany and Japan as all technologies that can
be more efficient by connecting them to the internet are considered. This includes, beside em-
bedded systems, integration of production and value chains, smart and digital manufacturing
(e.g. 3D printing), ICT, automation, AI, advanced industrial robotics also data generation and
predictive analysis based on Big Data. In this context, Cyber Security is probably the most
important focal point in the general discourse (NSTC, 2018b, 2016a, 2012).
Under the umbrella of the Advanced Manufacturing Partnership (AMP), research initiatives are
funded via public-private partnerships, e.g. Manufacturing Centers of Excellence (MCE), National
Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI) and Manufacturing Technology Testbeds (MTT).
The main purpose of these centers is to do research on new technologies, production processes,
products and requirements of reeducation of the workforce (NSTC, 2016b; PCAST, 2012).
4.2 “Global South”
4.2.1 China’s “Made-in-China 2025” (MIC2025) – Strategy
China is considered to be the most thriving economy and potential sales market in the world
with one of the highest average annual GDP per capita growth rates (2016: +6.1 percent).
China’s economic reform began in 1978 with the aim to lift people out of poverty (Li, 2017).
Since the opening up of the country for foreign investments and the economic reform to allow
privatization in the early 1980s, an unprecedented economic growth took off and is still con-
tinuing today (Brandt and Rawski, 2008; Butollo and Lüthje, 2017; Rawski, 2008). Before these
reforms the Chinese industry was largely stagnant with limited policies to improve the quality
and productivity of the manufacturing sector. In the 1980s, foreign enterprises and foreign
capital had started to gain influence in the Chinese industry accompanied with large-scale
privatizations. There are three critical indicators, namely manufacturing capability, human
capital, and R&D, that have been the major source of China’s socio-economic change in the
last decades and in the years to come (Li, 2017). In this context, China established itself as the
world`s extended manufacturing workshop, which generated low-wage jobs for unskilled
workers. As a result, the economy started to thrive and absolute poverty, especially in urban
areas, declined, while the quality of living standards increased (Benjamin et al., 2008; Brandt
and Rawski, 2008; Wübbeke et al., 2016).
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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In 2016, China’s Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) is roughly accounting for 31.4 percent of
the total GDP, totaling in about 2.98 trillion US$ (World Bank, 2018b). The MVA has increased
since 1970 (12.1 percent) peaking in 2012 (32.0 percent) (see Figure 8). With the strengthening
of the manufacturing sector, China has blossomed out of being solely a source of natural re-
sources and durable goods for export, e.g. coal, concrete, steel, textiles, etc., and a mere exten-
sion of the world’s manufacturing base to an increasingly attractive sales market as well as
trading partner. The thriving economy is driven by foreign investments and massive public
spending’s to develop the national economy. (Butollo and Lüthje, 2017; Heilmann et al., 2016;
Rawski, 2008; Wübbeke et al., 2016)
Figure 8. Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) to GDP, 1970-2016 (in %) (World Bank, 2018b) (authors illus-
tration)
The major challenge is the controlled downsizing of labor-intensive economic sectors with
low-skilled workers and the simultaneous creation and expansion of a high-skilled labor mar-
ket segment (Butollo and Lüthje, 2017; Wübbeke et al., 2016). By deliberately losing the com-
parative advantage in the low-skilled and low-wage economic branches compared to other
high-wage economies, the economic competitiveness might suffer (Brandt and Rawski, 2008;
Heilmann et al., 2016; Rawski, 2008).
In 2016, the 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China
promoted China’s economy and society to become innovation-based and high-technology re-
lated (CPC, 2016; KPMG, 2016; Wübbeke et al., 2016; Zenglein, 2018). The industrial sector
shall incorporate more own, innovative and sustainable ideas to further develop the Chinese
economy. Hence, the Chinese government adopted two central political strategies, namely the
Made-in-China 2025 (MIC2025) and Internet Plus Strategy brought forth in 2015 (Li, 2017). The
MIC2025 is a strategic plan to move China up the value chain by emancipating itself from a
global manufacturing production workshop into a globally competing industrialized power
(Butollo and Lüthje, 2017; Malkin, 2018; State Council, 2018a, 2018b, 2017; Wübbeke et al.,
2016). The MIC2025 was developed by China’s National Development and Reform Commission
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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(NDRC) and by the Ministry of Science & Technology (MOST), with contributions from the Min-
istry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) (Butollo and Lüthje, 2017; State Council,
2017). China thereby orientates alongside the German I4.0 concept, which also aims to increase
their collaboration in the future. (CPC, 2016; Li, 2017) Generally speaking, the MIC2025 strat-
egy is interpreted as an attempt to foster progress within the diversified China. (CPC, 2016; Li,
2017)
The plan is to launch an industrial transformation from labor intense production to knowledge
intensive manufacturing, whereby MIC2025 demarks the first stage of a three phase master-
plan (Liu, 2016; State Council, 2015). In the first phase (until 2025), namely the MIC2025, China
thrives to get on the list of the top global manufacturing powers in the world and gain influ-
ence in the global economy (Baker-McKenzie, 2017; Wübbeke et al., 2016; Yuan, 2018; Zenglein,
2018). In the second phase (2026 to 2035), China aims to become a medium-level world’s man-
ufacturing power camp. In the third phase (2036 to 2049), China envisions to be one of the
leading global manufacturing powers (Li, 2017; State Council, 2015; Wübbeke et al., 2016;
Zenglein, 2018). In this process, China wants to move from “Made-in-China” to “Designed-in-
China” in order to push innovative industries and achieving more control over the entire value
chain of the product life cycles (Li, 2017; Liu, 2016; State Council, 2017).
The MIC2025 strategy largely focusses on the electronic and mechanical engineering, construc-
tion, and automobile utilities sectors (State Council, 2017; Yuan, 2018), with implementing
manufacturing innovation centers for technology and R&D (MIIT, 2016, 2015; State Council,
2018a, 2015). Ten technologies are being prioritized: information technology, high-end numer-
ical control machinery and automation, aerospace and aviation equipment, maritime engineer-
ing equipment and high-tech vessel manufacturing, rail equipment, energy-saving vehicles,
electrical equipment, new materials, biomedicine and high performance medical apparatus
and agricultural equipment (State Council, 2018a, 2017, 2015; Wübbeke et al., 2016; Zenglein,
2018).
In addition, automation is to be spilled over to other sectors, e.g. agriculture, energy, financial
services, logistics or transportation. Technologies to be used are anchored in the so called In-
ternet Plus strategy. Especially mobile internet, cloud computing, Big Data, IoT are promoted
there. Other technologies promoted within the MIC2025 are AI and robotics as “[…] initiatives
to secure China a favorable position in the new round of technological revolution […]”, (CISTP, 2018),
with a focus on the challenges and possibilities these technologies might bring for the Chinese
economy (Barton et al., 2017; CISTP, 2018). The driving force behind these aspirations is the
government, more precisely the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The
government provides the framework and the funding for MIC2025 related purposes (CPC,
2016; Li, 2017), where the total amount remains unclear, but is expected to be in the three-digit
billion US$ range (Malkin, 2018; USCC, 2017; Wübbeke et al., 2016)
12
.
12
(Malkin, 2018) lists, referring to Wübbeke et al. (2016) and other sources, a number of public funding
sources for MIC2025, including MIIT and China Development Bank (45 billion US$), Special Construc-
tive Fund (270 billion US$), Shaanxi MIC2025 fund (117 billion US$), Gansu MIC 2025 fund (37 billion
US$), etc. in the coming years, where the total amount and specifically for MIC2025 initiatives reserved
funds remain unclear.
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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In China, the 4IR is conceptualized as digitalization in the sense of virtualization, cloud com-
puting, IoT and customization. The Chinese population is very affine to the internet itself, what
makes the shift to internet based consumption easy. A demand side approach to the 4IR is
pursued as can be seen with e.g. Alibaba. This is also an example for the promotion of Chinese
brands. As a consequence, a new innovation driven economy model shall develop from ecom-
merce retail, which also is expected to secure economic growth, jobs and quality of life. (Butollo
and Lüthje, 2017; CPC, 2016; Li, 2017)
In order to implement all the objectives mentioned in the strategy papers, China has to over-
come major challenges. First, the uneven development within the country respectively be-
tween urban and rural areas needs to be overcome and standardized. As a consequence of the
countries’ inner-regional disparities, unskilled workers from the countryside are flocking to
the cities for jobs. As digitalization increases a lot of unskilled labor will be set free, therefore
(re-)education measures have to be implemented (State Council, 2015). Another major issue is
that most of the factories in China are rather poorly equipped and relate heavily on manpower
and manual labor. It often lacks capital to bring these onto another level of industrialization
(CPC, 2016; Li, 2017; State Council, 2017, 2015), but China established - as mentioned earlier –
diverse multi-billion public funding schemes to support the national MIC2025 strategy (Mal-
kin, 2018; USCC, 2017; Wübbeke et al., 2016). The plans for enhancing automation are primar-
ily driven by the political system and reads like a wish list (CPC, 2016; State Council, 2017,
2015). However, the MIC2025 roadmap is in place and the first concrete landmark projects
have been initiated (State Council, 2018a, 2018b).
4.2.2 Indonesia’s “Making Indonesia 4.0” (MI4.0) – Initiative
Indonesia has - in absolute numbers - with 125.4 million people (2016) the fourth largest labor
force
13
in the world after China, India and the United States. Approximately 21.7 percent of the
working labor force (about 26 million people) are employed in the manufacturing/ industry
sector (see Figure 9). Manufacturing accounts for about 22.2 percent of Indonesia’s value
added to GDP (MVA) in 2016. This share has slowly, but steadily, increased since 1970 (5.5
percent) peaking in 2004 (24.6 percent) (World Bank, 2018b) (see Figure 8 in Section 4.2.1). The
contribution of manufacturing to the GDP is totaling roughly in 212.8 billion US$ (Business
Sweden, 2018; Jacob, 2005; World Bank, 2018b).
The importance of the manufacturing sector for the Indonesian economy and labor market in
the present as well as in the years to come is evident. But, in the future this share of MVA is
expected to drop to 16.3 percent with significant damages for the national economy (MOI,
2018a). Therefore, it is not surprising that Indonesia’s Ministry of Industry (MOI) is articulating
for years its strategic orientation to modernize and standardize the manufacturing processes
to increase the productivity and competitiveness (MOI, 2015, 2010a, 2010b), especially in the
13
“Labor force comprises people ages 15 and older who supply labor for the production of goods and services during
a specified period. It includes people who are currently employed and people who are unemployed but seeking work
as well as first-time job-seekers. Not everyone who works is included, however. Unpaid workers, family workers,
and students are often omitted, and some countries do not count members of the armed forces. Labor force size
tends to vary during the year as seasonal workers enter and leave.”, (World Bank, 2018b).
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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ASEAN regional context (Arbulu et al., 2018; Santiago, 2018; WEF, 2017). Those ambitions,
when facing the challenges and opportunities of the 4IR for Indonesia, have led to the concep-
tualization and implementation of the “Making Indonesia 4.0” (MI4.0)-Initiative to enter the era
of the 4IR (BKPM, 2017; MOI, 2018c, 2018a, 2018b) by thinking outside the box and evaluating
the key lessons learnt from other countries’ 4IR policies
14
(MOI, 2018b). This initiative shall
help to stay competitive in the 4IR era and keep/ lift the MVA by at least 21.4 (accelerated
scenario) up to 26.1 percent (aspiration scenario) (MOI, 2018a).
Figure 9. Employment in Industry, 1991-2017 (in % of total employment) (World Bank, 2018b) (authors il-
lustration)
The greater aspiration of the MI4.0 initiative is to lift Indonesia in the ranks of the 10 biggest
economies by the end of the 2018-2030 programming period. The MI4.0 initiative shall directly
influence the economy by reviving the production sector and regaining a net exporter position,
while the indirect effects are expected to be the improvement of Indonesia’s financial strength,
enhanced government spending and investment to create a robust economy and better labor
market. The quantifiable aims are the increase of the net export contribution to the GDP up to
10 percent, doubling the labor productivity rate over the labor costs, allocating 2 percent of
GDP to R&D and technology innovation fields (BKPM, 2017; MOI, 2018b).
In the process of adapting to the technological requirements of the MI4.0, the Ministry of In-
dustry identified its MI4.0 roadmap five main technologies to subsidize to prompt the Indo-
nesian capacities in the 4IR, namely IoT, AI and Big Data (Cloud Computing), Human-Ma-
chine Interface, robotics and sensor technology, as well as advanced production methods (e.g.
3D printing) (BKPM, 2017; Business Sweden, 2018; MOI, 2018c). The MI4.0 Initiative consists
of 10 national priorities: (1) improve flow of goods/ materials, (2) develop/ redesign industrial
14
The (MOI 2018c) made a cross-country comparison of 4IR initiatives in different stages of implemen-
tation from (A) advanced stage with visible benefits (Germany, United Kingdom, USA), (B) early stage
of implementation (China, Japan, South Korea), and (C) planning phase (Malaysia, Philippines , Singa-
pore, Thailand, Vietnam), to derive the key lessons to be learnt.
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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zones, (3) embrace sustainability standards, (4) empowerment of SME’s, (5) build a nationwide
digital infrastructure, (6) attract FDI’s, (7) improve Human Capital quality, (8) develop inno-
vative ecosystems, (9) design incentives for technology investments, and (10) harmonize reg-
ulations and policies (BKPM, 2017; MOI, 2018c, 2018a; Saputra, 2018).
To implement the MI4.0 strategy the government focuses on five core economic sectors to
strengthen the fundamental structure of the Indonesian economy, namely the food and bever-
age industry, automotive industry, electronic industry, chemical industry, and textile industry
(BKPM, 2017; MOI, 2018c, 2018a). The implementation of the MI4.0 roadmap requires collab-
orative approaches among multiple ministries
15
, associations, the industry (e.g. Indofood,
United Tractors, Astra Int., Chandra Asri Petrochemical, or SriTex) and academia (e.g. Univer-
sity of Indonesia, Institute of Technology Bandung, or Universidas Gadjah Mada) to create
synergies (MOI, 2018a). Therefore, the MOI recommended to establish a National Industrial
Committee (KINAS) to facilitate nation-wide, interagency, cross stakeholders alignment to
push the national 4IR implementation (MOI, 2018a). Another already existing service is for
instance the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM)
16
, which is an investment service
agency of the Indonesian government to promote and coordinate investments in the Indone-
sian economy (BKPM, 2017).
The Ministry of Industry, which primarily pushes conceptually and financially the MI4.0
agenda, had with a planned budget of 2.8 trillion Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) [~189 million US$]
one of the lowest ministerial budgets
17
and only makes up roughly 1.2 per mill
18
of the overall
Indonesian budget expenditures in 2018 (MOF, 2018a, 2018b). But this budget got slightly in-
creased by 53.9 billion IDR [~361.6 thousand US$] in July 2018 to finance measures in line with
the MI4.0 initiative (MOI, 2018d). In the fiscal year 2019 the overall MOI budget will be in-
creased by 2.73 trillion IDR to overall 5.3 trillion IDR [~355 million US$] to promote actions
within the MI4.0 initiative (MOI, 2018e)
19
.
The increasing budgetary investments in the MI4.0 adaptation strategies in Indonesia are
founded on the expectation that those policies will increase the economic performance,
productivity and exports. Additionally, it is perceived that the 4IR will create new types of
works, job requirements and opportunities that will demand a high skilled labor force (BKPM,
2017; Lindsay et al., 2016; MORTHE, 2015; Nasir, 2018) that yet has to be created (di Gropello
et al., 2011). At the moment, the workforce’s skill sets, e.g. from ICT graduates, often fall short
of what the industrial sector requires (Mourshed et al., 2013; Nasir, 2018; World Bank, 2018c).
15
The involved ministries are Ministry of Industry (MOI), Ministry of National Development Planning
(SMNDP), Ministry of State Owned Enterprises (MOSOE), Ministry of Manpower (MOM), Ministry of
Education and Culture (MOEC), and Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education
(MORTHE) (BKPM, 2017);
16
(see https://www3.bkpm.go.id/)
17
The highest budget among ministries had the Ministry of Defense (MOD) with 105.7 trillion IDR be-
fore the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) [62.2 trillion IDR] and the Ministry of Health (MOH)
[59.1 trillion IDR] (MOF, 2018a);
18
In 2018, the Indonesian State Revenue was 1,894.7 trillion Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) [~127 billion US$]
while at the same time spending 2,200.7 trillion IDR [~148 billion US$] (MOF, 2018b).
19
Here has to be mentioned that related investments like increase in expenditures in education/ aca-
demia or R&D, are not explicitly imputed to the MI4.0 initiative.
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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This fact contributes to high youth unemployment rates between 14 to 20 percent over the last
decade (Tobias et al., 2014; World Bank, 2018b). The Ministry of Research, Technology and
Higher Education (MORTHE) pushes the agenda to improve the access, relevance and quality
of higher education to increase the innovation, science and technology capability to support
the country’s economic competitiveness in the 4IR era (MORTHE, 2018, 2015; Nasir, 2018).
Therefore, Indonesia has to overcome not only the still persistent lack in the quality of educa-
tion, skills and talent development, but also tackle other challenges, e.g. the underdeveloped
(digital) infrastructure, inefficient productivity and supply/ production chains, lacks in R&D
capabilities, highly fragmented industry and left-behind SME’s, overcomplicated regulations/
policies, and limited domestic funding and technologies (MOI, 2018a; Supriyadi and Tania,
2018).
4.2.3 Mexico’s “Crafting the Future” (CF) – Approach
According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Mexico was in 2016 and 2017 the 13th larg-
est exporter in world merchandise trade by exporting manufactured goods as cars, vehicle
parts, trucks and vans, television and radio equipment, computers, telephones, etc. (Haus-
mann et al., 2014; WTO, 2018, 2017). Mexico maintains 12 multi- and bilateral Free Trade
Agreements (FTA) with altogether 46 countries (ProMéxico, 2017a) to facilitate and promote
the country’s export-based-economy.
20
(Kuwayama, 2009; ProMéxico, 2017b). About 77.6 per-
cent of Mexico’s GDP (World Bank, 2018b) was from international trade in 2017, whereby 37.9
percent are contributed by exports and 39.7 percent by imports (OECD, 2018). Since 1970, the
contribution of trade to the GDP has steadily increased from 17.4 percent with a recognizable
drop in 1993-1994, when Mexico slithered into an economic recession and hyperinflation. With
the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, the inter-
national trade and the national economy started to recover (Kuwayama, 2009; World Bank,
2018b) (see Figure 10). In 2016, Mexico produced more than 80 percent of all high-tech exports
in Latin America (SE 2016).
As an export-oriented economy, Mexico has a vital interest in the developments, opportunities
and challenges connoted with 4IR in order to support its position in the global competition in
trading manufactured goods (ProMéxico, 2014a, 2011). Mexico’s 4IR aspirations focus on im-
plementing digital manufacturing via IoT (ProMéxico, 2014b) to ensure its competitiveness in
exporting manufactured goods and services. Furthermore the country is trying to build a sus-
tainable economy capable of persisting in the global competition (ProMéxico, 2014a) by estab-
lishing R&D clusters and invest in the human capital for long-term, sustainable economic
growth (GOB, 2014; Santiago, 2018; SE, 2016).
20
Apart of the 12 FTAs, Mexico had in 2017 33 Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agree-
ments and nine Economic Complementation and Partial Scope Agreements with 46 countries across the
Americas, the Asia-Pacific region, and the European Union in force (ProMéxico, 2017a). According to
the WTO, Mexico participates in 18 of worldwide 311 Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) in 2019 (WTO,
2019).
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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Figure 10. Trade in Goods and Services, 1970-2017 (Imports/ Exports, % of GDP) (OECD, 2018; World
Bank, 2018b) (authors illustration)
Following the example of Germany, the Mexican government enacted in 2016 its first national
I4.0 strategy “Crafting the Future: A Roadmap for Industry 4.0 in Mexico” (Santiago, 2018; SE,
2016), further abbreviated as CF, it consists of multiple sector specific strategies. The CF - strat-
egy is an extension of the National Digital Strategy (GOB, 2013a), which is in-line with the Na-
tional Development Plan 2013-2018 (GOB, 2013b), and the Program for Science, Technology, and
Innovation (GOB, 2014; OECD, 2016; Rullán-Rosanis and Casanova, 2015). These national strat-
egy papers towards the 4IR have been designed in cooperation with government entities
(CONACYT
21
, AEM
22
, ProSoft 3.0
23
, ProMéxico
24
), science and academia (e.g. specialized edu-
cation programs in Mexican states, for example in Guadalajara, Monterrey, Querétaro, Mexico
City and Puebla), international ICT companies as well as MNCs (e.g. Intel, Continental Auto-
motive, Honeywell, the Volkswagen Group) and trade associations (AMITI
25
) (KPMG, 2017;
Santiago, 2018; SE, 2016).
The CF strategy highlights three strategic manufacturing sectors with high rates of MVA that
would benefit from the adoption of new technologies to create a higher level of automation
and digital production, namely chemical industry (ProMéxico, 2018a), aerospace economy
(ProMéxico, 2015), and automotive (ProMéxico, 2018b) industry (SE, 2016; Santiago 2018). Be-
side these focus sectors, the Mexico’s digitalization strategy also proposes roadmaps for other
national industries like space industry (ProMéxico, 2017c, 2012), energy sector (ProMéxico,
2017d), logistics (ProMéxico, 2018c), etc. Mexico pushed these roadmaps “[…] to present a first
21
Mexican National Council for Science and Technology (Spanish: Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y
Tecnología, CONACYT) (see http://www.conacyt.gob.mx/)
22
Mexican Space Agency (Spanish: Agencia Espacial Mexicana, AEM) (see https://www.gob.mx/aem)
23
Prosoft 3.0 is the Mexican government’s program to develop industrial software and innovation. (see
https://prosoft.economia.gob.mx/Prosoft3.0/)
24
ProMéxico (Spanish: ProMéxico) (see http://www.promexico.gob.mx/en/mx/home)
25
AMITI (Spanish: Asociación Mexicana de la Industria de Tecnologías de Información) (see
https://amiti.org.mx)
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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approach towards national value added strategy for the manufacturing industry through the implemen-
tation of Industry 4.0 strategies and technologies.”, (SE, 2016). The strategies focus on establishing
smart factories in the production process via technological advancements (e.g. 3D printing,
robotics, cloud computing, Big Data analysis). A reinvigorated R&D network shall strengthen
the Mexican economy and companies, where research centers
26
and universities provide tech-
nologies and services regionally (GOB, 2014; Santiago, 2018; SE, 2016). As of 2018, Mexico has
over 98 research and development centers in 26 states related to advanced manufacturing and
innovation plus 34 industrial clusters focused on I4.0 technologies and IoT solutions (Pro-
México, 2017e, 2018d; TBY, 2018)was
27
.
Similar to Germany and Japan, Mexico’s CF strategy has been initiated and funded in partner-
ship with the government and MNCs. The Mexican Secretaría de Economía (SE) implements and
governs the CF development. In 2018, Mexico established and funded its first state testbed
initiative, Nuevo Léon 4.0, within the CONCACYT framework and the state government of
Nuevo León. This initiative aims to promote this region as an innovation, business, education,
and research development hub to support the CF initiative in Mexico (Nuevo León 4.0, 2018;
Santiago, 2018; Waterfield, 2018). State funding for the CF initiatives under CONCACYT also
includes regional research development
28
with the Institutional Fund for the Regional Promotion
of Scientific and Technological Development and Innovation (FORDECYT
29
) and a Mixed/ Hybrid
Fund (FOMEX
30
). FOMEX is funded from city, state, and federal government entities to sup-
port scientific and technological development (Gobierno Nuevo León, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c;
ProMéxico, 2017a).
While the total amount of public and private investments for CF initiatives is unknown, it is
expected that MNCs will be major financial contributors and the driving forces in the imple-
mentation of strategic CF projects (GOB, 2014; Rullán-Rosanis and Casanova, 2015; Santiago,
2018; SE, 2016). For instance, AMITI is one of Mexico’s national sponsors for advancing the
4IR, along with corporations such as Intel, Continental, Volkswagen, Honeywell, and General
Electric (Santiago, 2018; SE, 2016).
26
As of 2018, Mexican educational and research institutions have formed state-initiated and public-
private partnerships connected to Mexico’s key strategy markets, e.g. CIMAT for robotic manufacturing
and research, Infotec/ Fiware: National Laboratory of the Internet of the Future, and Inter-Institutional
Complex of Education under the partnership of the Volkswagen Group and Benemarita University of
Puebla (BUAP). (Santiago, 2018; SE, 2016)
27
This includes an Industrial Design and Big Data Cluster in Jalisco, Intelligent Factories in Chihuahua,
or Automation Technologies in Nueva Leon (TBY, 2018; Waterfield, 2018).
28
FORDECYT has dedicated 130 million pesos (~ 6.5 million US$) for a new 1,000-square-meter research
facility for the Molds, Dies, and Tools Consortium of three government research centres to support
training Mexican research, developing new technologies, and implementing new business models in
the domestic market (ProMéxico, 2017a).
29
Institutional Fund for the Regional Promotion of Scientific and Technological Development and In-
novation (Spanish: Fondo Institucional de Fomento Regional para el Desarrollo Científico, Tecnológico,
FORDECYT) (see https://www.conacyt.gob.mx/index.php/fondo-institucional-de-fomento-regional-
para-el-desarrollo-cientifico-tecnologico-y-de-innovacion-fordecyt)
30
(see https://www.conacyt.gob.mx/index.php/fondos-y-apoyos/fondos-mixtos)
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 29 -
Contrary to other case country initiatives, the CF initiative reveals a gap between MNCs and
Mexican SMEs moving towards the 4IR (GOB, 2014; Santiago, 2018; SE, 2016). Other challenges
that might hinder Mexican companies to implement 4IR systems are weak (digital and tech-
nological) infrastructure, inefficient regulatory frameworks, deficiencies in the innovative en-
vironment, misalignments between academia and industry, undeveloped domestic market,
etc. (Dutz et al., 2018; GOB, 2014; SE, 2016). Threats for Mexico to develop its CF strategy is the
lack of access to financial resources for SMEs, low diffusion of I4.0 best practices in clusters
and technological parks as well as the prioritization of technological acquisition over develop-
ment of own technology (SE, 2016). A key element for the digital transformation will be the
functional intertwine of Mexican human talent and technological transfers derived from in-
vestments (ProMéxico, 2018e) to create new employability and labor opportunities (Pro-
México, 2018f, 2018g). Without a feasible strategy to tackle the potential weaknesses and
threats of the 4IR, Mexico will not be able to develop an economy for a sustainable and inclu-
sive future for everyone
31
(GOB, 2014, 2013a; Kaplinsky, 2000; SE, 2016).
4.3 Comparison
When comparing the different country-specific approaches outlined in this section, a quite
heterogeneous picture of regional adaptation and mitigation strategies as well as efforts were
unveiled that range from monothematic orientations on innovation capacities in the digitali-
zation processes of manufacturing (e.g. Germany’s smart factory within I4.0, see BMBF, 2017b,
2014; European Commission, 2017a; Forschungsunion, 2012; Plattform Industrie 4.0, 2018a,
2015) to a very holistic approach that literally covers the majority of the UNs SDG targets (e.g.
Japan’s Smart City and Super Smart Society within Society 5.0, see Fukuyama, 2018; Harayama
and Fukuyama, 2017; Heider, 2016; Keidanren, 2017). Although none of the presented national
strategies toward 4IR are explicitly addressing the SDGs as such, some are implicitly targeting
a broader spectrum of topics covered in the SDGs than others.
Beside the contextual scope of the different countries, the initiators and driving stakeholders
as well as their thematic leadership and sphere of influence in coining the I4.0 related initia-
tives and strategies are quite variably interpreted. While the adaptation and mitigation strate-
gies related to the 4IR/ I4.0 are predominantly government and policy driven, the influence of
the different industry or private sectors varies among the selected case studies. For example,
the governments of China, Germany and Indonesia are pro-actively working on related strat-
egies, e.g. High-Tech Strategy (Germany) or the Internet-Plus-Actionplan (China). On the
other hand, in Japan, USA and Mexico different industries and MNCs have been leveraging
the national governments to implement strategies and coordination networks in order to ena-
ble a faster industrial adaptation to the 4IR/ I4.0 transformation. In the case of the USA and
Japan, the national industrial sector has been having a stagnating and declining economic per-
31
Long-term social and economic development is one of the core aims of Mexico’s 2013 National Digital
Strategy (NDS) for ICT development in the country: NDS’ mission is to “[…] facilitate access to and pro-
mote the use of ICTs in everyday life of society and government so that they contribute to economic and social
development, and improve people’s quality of life.” (GOB, 2013a).
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 30 -
formance and productivity to the national GDP, where the opportunities of the 4IR shall repo-
sition and revitalize the national economies. In Mexico, MNCs try to push their agenda to open
a new market and utilize the favorable geographical and economic position of the country as
production location in the Americas at the interface between the export markets in North
America, Latin America and the Caribbean
32
.
This supply side driven approach is based on the production of a wider variety of goods and
services for the domestic and international market to create revenue via exports. On the other
hand, the demand side aims to increase consumer demand for goods and services. While the
Global North countries can be considered as a mix of supply and demand side because of their
unique selling points, e.g. Germany’s knowledge in smart factories and Japan’s expertise in
robotics and AI. Both examples created an international sales market for their own knowledge,
services and high-tech products. The case countries from the Global South are currently cov-
ering only the supply-side by producing mainly resources, materials, and (manufactured)
goods for export. So far, the innovative capacities to create a demand side for the national
products and services are limited for the countries in the Global South. Only China decidedly
aims to create a demand side for Chinese brands. An innovation driven economy shall be de-
veloped to ensure economic growth, jobs and quality of life in China.
The strategic foci of the countries in the Global North and Global South are denoted by a di-
chotomy between countries that aim to deploy (stay in front) or to advance (catching-up) their
position in the global economic competition. For the case countries in the Global North, strat-
egies to deploy and maintain their leading positions within the global economy can be found.
China, for instance, aims to move up the value chain by emancipating itself from a global
manufacturing production workshop into a globally competing industrialized power, while
Mexico and Indonesia aim to increase their economic ties in their geographical region by fos-
tering their domestic market and by enlarging their export capacities to lift themselves in the
ranks of the 10 biggest global economies. Preconditions on many levels, e.g. skill-level, work-
force composition, etc. play an important part in achieving the goals, especially in the countries
of the Global South. All selected case studies have in common that the export capacities occupy
a central strategic importance in the political perception of each country that shall ensure eco-
nomic prosperity in the future.
Core technologies and innovations (Table 3) associated and explicitly mentioned within all
strategies addressing the 4IR in the case studies are CPS/ embedded systems, IoT, and Big
Data. Other innovations are more dependent on the context of the countries, e.g. mainly coun-
tries from the Global North are concerned with cyber security as potential copyright infringe-
ments due to their leading position in these fields are likely to occur. Japan has a strong focus
on AI, robotics as well as trying to implement the 4IR as a holistic concept with the smart city
and super-smart society.
32
Most prominently in the media was the announcement of General Motors to idle five factories in the
USA, while in parallel announcing the opening of a new production site in Mexico. (see https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/11/26/business/general-motors-cutbacks.html)
Case Studies Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 31 -
The effects of the 4IR on society and environment are reflected in each country’s strategy, but
weighted differently. While some countries simply mention potential implications on the so-
ciety or labor market, without going into detail (e.g. Germany), especially the countries in the
Global South are discussing this subjects broader. The major concerns are negative implica-
tions of the 4IR on labor market and social equality due to potentially increasing unemploy-
ment rates for low-skilled workers. Therefore, the redefinition of required skillsets and the re-
education of the workforce are central elements in the country-specific strategies from the
Global South. In the Global North this is less of a concern and often discussed in combination
with universal income schemes (Norton, 2017) to mitigate the potential negative effects on the
society. However, the focus in the Global North is predominantly on the industrial productiv-
ity, in contrast to the case countries of the Global South, where competitiveness and economic
advancement are mainly considered with its socioeconomic consequences for the population,
especially vulnerable groups like low-skilled workers (in the informal sector), women, rural
population, etc.
Table 3. Technologies highlighted in the countries strategies (authors illustration)
Technologies / Innovations
I4.0
(DEU)
S5.0
(JPN)
IIoT
(USA)
MIC2025
(CHN)
CF
(MEX)
MI4.0
(IDN)
CPS / embedded systems
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
IoT
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
Cyber Security
⚫
⚫
⚫
Data An-
alytics
Cloud Services
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
Big Data
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
AI / Human-Machine Interac-
tion
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
Smart Services / Smart City /
Super Smart Society
⚫
Advanced
Production
Smart factory
⚫
⚫
Robotics
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
3D printing
⚫
⚫
⚫
sensor tech.
⚫
A detailed overview of the country-specific policies, stakeholders, aims, challenges, etc. can be
found in Annex Table 5 in Section 7.3.
Conclusion Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 32 -
5 Conclusion
The 4IR is inevitable. It will sooner or later initiate a global transformation of economic, societal
and political systems with implications on the environment and the way of living of soon to
be 8 billion inhabitants worldwide. The SDGs are a noble attempt to mitigate the adaptation
stress to this upcoming future by defining goals and targets to create a sustainable future to
promote prosperity and end poverty while saving the planet (United Nations, 2016). The pre-
paredness to cope with the challenges is essential to succeed and to leverage from the oppor-
tunities the 4IR will bring (Heider, 2016; Melamed, 2015; The Economist, 2017). The question
if and how the 4IR might benefit or cripple the efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change,
social and spatial inequality, poverty, malnutrition, etc. cannot be comprehensively answered
now, but only in the years to come.
The SDGs aim to ensure a globally sustainable future for environment and society by ulti-
mately aspiring a socioeconomic convergence of all countries to end poverty and hunger.
However, it is not been said if such a socioeconomic convergence is a realistic outcome of the
4IR or if the development gap between the so-called frontrunners and latecomers might open
even more and solidifies the apparent global economic hierarchy, which often manifests in the
formation of international economic forums, networks and summits like the G20 or the WEF.
An indication of the disruption potential for the global economic hierarchy within the 4IR can
be drawn from history with the relay of the United Kingdom as globally leading economy
after the 1IR, among others due to the stagnation of innovation capacities, promoting its re-
placement with Germany, and later Japan and USA. Today, China is challenging the old global
power structures by claiming its economic supremacy from the USA. China arose from a strug-
gling, less developed country to an Emerging Industrial Economy (EIE) in the near future be-
coming an Industrialized Country (IC) that might supersede the USA as largest global econ-
omy. The potential country-specific future pathways cannot be deduced solely from strategic
policy papers, but those make it possible to evaluate the country-specific readiness and will-
ingness to face the challenges and opportunities that supposedly are ahead of us with the 4IR.
Who knows what country might jiggle this hierarchy in the future, when a however shaped
5IR might re-transform yet another time the human life as we know it.
As we have shown, every case country has different perspectives and aims toward the 4IR,
which are influenced by a unique historical, political, societal, economic, environmental, etc.
framework. Due to this circumstance, there might not be one singular solution or approach to
face the 4IR, as there are evolving distinct “national systems of innovation” (Freeman, 2008).
Therefore, each country has to be analyzed individually in order to give country-specific rec-
ommendations how challenges and threats can be embraced or withstood. From the research
done in this paper, a variety of different strategies facing the 4IR in a different way can be
presented and shall be used as a basis for further research.
The keys for success in this global competition might be socioeconomic versatility and adap-
tation capacities to prepare the national production and manufacturing sector, workforce, so-
cial system etc. for a potential paradigmatic shifts as the 4IR. The earlier strategies, policies
and mechanisms are in place to prepare for this foreseeable transformation of the global econ-
omy and way of living, the easier it will be to discard potential weaknesses and threats. Those
Conclusion Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 33 -
measures will require the recognition that I4.0 and 4IR are not interchangeable terms for the
same process, but have quite different scopes to distinguish. To misinterpret the 4IR as I4.0 in
coping with an all spheres of life pervading transformation might short-changes the im-
portance of a holistic strategic approach to reduce the societal vulnerability and tackle chal-
lenges and threats the 4IR might causes.
A uniform usage and distinct definitions of the terms 4IR and I4.0 is important in the context
of tackling the SDGs to be able to talk about the same phenomena. The 4IR is to be understood
as a process of transformation on many levels, e.g. economy, society, environment, etc. It is an
umbrella term of the emergence of new technologies and also innovations derived from these
new technologies. Everyone’s life will – sooner or later – be affected by the 4IR. In contrast to
the broader notion of the 4IR, the term “Industrie 4.0” is mainly referring to the technological
advances made/ used in the manufacturing sector. Although the term is used widely and in-
terchangeably all over the world with the 4IR, I4.0 summarizes only a few of these new tech-
nologies that are used especially in the (German) manufacturing sector, e.g. in the smart fac-
tory.
Figure 11. 4th Industrial Revolution vs. Industry 4.0
The 4IR can mean a threat, if not addressed in time with mid- and long-term adaptation and
mitigation strategies, e.g. to cope with 4IR induced increasing unemployment, endangerment
of social and gender equality between high and low-skilled population, reduction of the tax
base, obsoleting of education curricula, resurgence of the informal sector, loss of export-led
manufacturing, regionalization of supply chains, etc. (UNDP, 2018a). By only addressing I4.0
in the SDGs (SDG 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure) and not the 4IR as a whole, it
might hinder efforts to provide sustainable development. The potential consequences of the
newly emerging digitalization in manufacturing processes are only implicitly conquered in
the SDGs. To ensure an inclusive socioeconomic transformation of the society in the 4IR it is
advisable to evaluate the consequences, challenges and opportunities of this process in the
context of the SDG targets.
When talking about the 4IR, it is required not only to rethink production and manufacturing
(e.g. decentralization of production, mass-customization, etc.) but because of this disruption it
will become necessary to also discuss work and labor (e.g. unemployment, working time, etc.),
skillsets and quality of education (e.g. adaptation of education system, low to high skilled la-
bor force, etc.) etc. On a meta level, questions about the purpose of work and life (e.g. basic
income, creative industries, etc.) have to be raised and will sooner or later become inescapable.
Also Drath and Horch (2014) argue, that an IR is merely motivated by “[…] the new way[s] of
working rather than the technical novelty […]” on its own. As the discourse around 4IR/ I4.0 seems
to be rather narrow, we argue for a broadening of the perspective as the issues intertwined are
far-reaching as well.
Conclusion Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 34 -
When it comes to the perception of preparedness for the global manufacturing competition
that inevitably will kindle in the competition for production locations, investments, etc. The
conception of a 4IR strategy shows to be favorable for the evaluation of a production location
by global CEO’s (see Figure 12) as all of the case studies, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Indonesia
and USA, got ranked higher in the Global CEO Survey after having announced their 4IR strat-
egies.
Figure 12. Global CEO Survey - Global Manufacturing Competitiveness Index: Country Rankings, 2010-
2020
33
(DTTL, 2016, 2013, 2010) (authors illustration)
Which countries will utilize the 4IR best in the years to come is not reasonably to argue, but it
can be said that those will have a head start who foster initiatives, approaches, strategies and
policies early on to tackle the 4IR. So far predominantly countries in the GN, but also multiple
countries in Asia assigned to the GS, are in a planning, early or advanced implementation
phase of their 4IR policies (Figure 3). Especially, ODC and LCD countries lack of sufficient
efforts to develop such strategies so far, which reflect the case study selection of this paper.
We recommend to analyze and monitor existing country-specific adaptation and mitigation
policies tackling the 4IR/ I4.0. Some kind of monitoring system would allow to generate longi-
tudinal data on policies and the transformation process itself. This would provide lessons
learned for other countries (especially ODC and LCD) that might have no related policies in
place yet. Indonesia, for example, has analysed multiple other approaches before conceptual-
izing their own MI4.0 policy paper.
33
The ranks for 2020 are projected values based on the Global CEO Survey 2016 (DTTL, 2016, 2013,
2010).
Conclusion Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 35 -
The 4IR is still at its beginning, hence opportunities as well as challenges that this process will
bring can only be estimated. Not only the questions addressed in this paper will need more
(comparative) research, but a variety of research desiderata will emerge.
To conclude, we want to refer once again to a statement made by Prof. Schwab (2017) in his
book “The Fourth Industrial Revolution” to highlight the momentum of this transformation:
“Shaping the fourth industrial revolution to ensure that it is empowering and human-centered, rather
than divisive and dehumanizing, is not a task for any single stakeholder or sector or for any one region,
industry or culture. The fundamental and global nature of this revolution means it will affect and be
influenced by all countries, economies, sectors and people. It is, therefore, critical that we invest atten-
tion and energy in multistakeholder cooperation across academic, social, political, national and industry
boundaries. These interactions and collaborations are needed to create positive, common and hope-filled
narratives, enabling individuals and groups from all parts of the world to participate in, and benefit
from, the ongoing transformations.”
— Prof. Klaus M. SCHWAB (Engineer and Economist, Founder and Executive Chairman of the World
Economic Forum)
34
34
(see Schwab, 2017)
Acknowledgments Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 36 -
Acknowledgments
Many individuals and institutions have been involved in the front as well as in the background
to organize and implement the Regional Academy on the United Nations (RAUN). We are
thankful to Billy Batware and his team at RAUN for organizing this non-university workshop
series, especially the efforts of Roman Hoffmann (Counsel), Daniela Paredes (Advisor) and
Anneleen Van Uffelen (Peer+) have to be highlighted. Furthermore we are grateful for the time
and efforts invested by Ritin Koria and Svenja Wiemer from the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO), who mentored our progress in the 8 months of the pro-
ject duration. We also would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers of this report for their
efforts, helpful remarks, and detailed criticism, but still very positive an encouraging com-
ments to this work, which helped to emphasize and smooth the rough edges and minor flaws
of this work to create this final report.
References Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
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World Bank, 2018b. World Development Indicators [WWW Document]. URL https://datacat-
alog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators (accessed 1.15.18).
World Bank, 2018c. Preparing ICT Skills for Digital Economy: Indonesia within the ASEAN
context.
World Bank, 2017. Progress in a Changing World: Sustainable Development Goals, 4th Indus-
trial Revolution, “Leave No One Behind.”
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WTO, 2019. Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS) [WWW Document].
Reg. Trade Agreem. Inf. Syst. RTA-IS. URL http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMain-
tainRTAHome.aspx (acceabssed 1.20.19).
WTO, 2018. World Trade Statistical Review 2018. World Trade Organization.
WTO, 2017. World Trade Statistical Review 2017. World Trade Organization.
Wübbeke, J., Meissner, M., Zenglein, M.J., Ives, J., Conrad, B., 2016. Made in China 2025. The
making of a high-tech superpower and consequences for industrial countries. (No. 2),
MERICS Papers on China. Mercator Institute for China Studies, Berlin, Germany.
Xu, L.D., Xu, E.L., Li, L., 2018. Industry 4.0: state of the art and future trends. Int. J. Prod. Res.
1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2018.1444806
Yuan, L., 2018. Retooling China, From the Bottom Up. N. Y. Times B1.
Zenglein, M.J., 2018. Made in China 2025 - Chinas Hightech Strategie. Industriepolitische Of-
fensive auf dem Weg zur Technologieführerschaft.
ZVEI, 2009. Nationale Roadmap Embedded Systems. Zentralverband Elektrotechnik- und
Elektronikindustrie e.V., Frankfurt am Main, Germany.
6.2 Internet Resources
AEA - American Economic Association - https://www.aeaweb.org/econlit/jel-
Codes.php?view=jel#R
AEM - Mexican Space Agency – https://www.gob.mx/aem/
AMITI - Mexican Association of Information Technologies, Mexico -
https://www.amiti.org.mx
BKPM - Indonesian Investment Coordination Board, Indonesia - https://www3.bkpm.go.id/
BMBF - Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Germany - https://www.bmbf.de/en/in-
dex.html
CONACYT - National Council for Science and Technology, Mexico - http://www.cona-
cyt.gob.mx/
CONACYT - National Council for Science and Technology, Mexico - https://www.cona-
cyt.gob.mx/index.php/fondo-institucional-de-fomento-regional-para-el-desarrollo-cientifico-
tecnologico-y-de-innovacion-fordecyt
CONACYT - National Council for Science and Technology, Mexico - https://www.cona-
cyt.gob.mx/index.php/fondos-y-apoyos/fondos-mixtos
FLATICON – Free Vector Icon Platform - https://www.flaticon.com/
FORDECYT - Institutional Fund for the Regional Promotion of Scientific and Technological
Development and Innovation - https://www.conacyt.gob.mx/index.php/fondo-institucional-
de-fomento-regional-para-el-desarrollo-cientifico-tecnologico-y-de-innovacion-fordecyt
G20 - Group of Twenty - http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/g20-members/
GOB - Government of Mexico, Mexico - https://www.gob.mx/aem
References Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 48 -
New York Times - https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/26/business/general-motors-cut-
backs.html
ProMéxico - http://www.promexico.gob.mx/en/mx/home
Prosoft 3.0 - https://prosoft.economia.gob.mx/Prosoft3.0/
RAUN – Regional Academy on the United Nations - http://www.ra-un.org/
WEF - World Economic Forum - https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/9-quotes-that-
sum-up-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/
Annex Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 49 -
7 Annex
7.1 Authors and Contributors
Markus SPERINGER is a population geographer, living and working in Vienna. He is a Re-
searcher and PhD Candidate at the Department of Geography and Regional Research, Univer-
sity of Vienna (UNIVIE) and at the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human
Capital (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU), Vienna Institute of Demography, Austrian Academy of Sci-
ences (VID/ÖAW). His research interests include spatial demography and statistics, demo-
graphic modelling, urban diversity and social/spatial inequality.
Markus Speringer is the corresponding author of this paper. He conceptualized and refined a
research idea, conducted literature research, created a research design, selected a method/ sta-
tistical tests, performed (statistical) analysis / computations, interpreted the (statistical) analy-
sis, wrote chapters of the paper (Introduction, Methods, Results incl. General, Japan, China,
Indonesia and the final version of Mexico, Discussion, Conclusion, Limitations of the study,
Future Directions), reviewed the paper critically, responded to the reviewers’ feedback, made
changes based on the reviewers’ feedback.
Judith SCHNELZER is a social geographer, living and working in Vienna. She is a Research
Scientist at the Department for Geography and Regional Research, University of Vienna (UNI-
VIE) as well as Project Assistant at the Competence Center for Empirical Research Methods,
Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU). Her research interests include inequality
research, urban studies, social theory, visual methods and geovisualization.
Judith Schnelzer is co-author of this paper. She conceptualized and refined a research idea,
conducted literature research, created a research design, selected a method/ statistical tests,
performed (statistical) analysis / computations, interpreted the (statistical) analysis, wrote
chapters of the paper (Introduction, Methods, Results incl. General, Germany, Japan, Discus-
sion, Conclusion, Limitations of the study, Future Directions), reviewed the paper critically.
All authors contributed by reading and approving the final version of this manuscript.
Contributor: Heather Saenz is a contributor to this paper by helping with the literature re-
search for Mexico and writing a draft of the Mexico section.
7.2 List of Tables and Figures
7.2.1 List of Tables
Table 1. Schematic illustration of the systematic literature review matrix (authors illustration)
............................................................................................................................................................. - 8 -
Table 2. GDP in 2016 at constant 2010 prices in US Dollars (World Bank, 2018b) ................ - 10 -
Table 3. Technologies highlighted in the countries strategies (authors illustration) ............ - 31 -
Table 4. 4IR related threats and opportunities to selected SDGs (UNDP, 2018a) (authors
illustration) ...................................................................................................................................... - 51 -
Annex Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 50 -
Table 5. 4IR related initiatives, approaches, strategies and policies for selected countries in the
Global North and Global South (authors illustration) .............................................................. - 52 -
7.2.2 List of Figures
Figure 1: The Four Industrial Revolutions (IR) (authors illustration) ....................................... - 3 -
Figure 2. Case Studies by level of industrial development (UNIDO, 2017a) and I4.0 related
policies (authors’ illustration) ......................................................................................................... - 9 -
Figure 3. Selected countries in the Global North/ South that have or are going to launch I4.0
related initiatives by year of policy launch and stage of implementation (European
Commission, 2017a; MOI, 2018b; PCAST, 2011; SE, 2016) (authors illustration) .................. - 11 -
Figure 4. Manufacturing (ISIC D) Value Added in 2011, 1970-2016 (in trillion US$) (World
Bank, 2018b) (authors illustration) ............................................................................................... - 12 -
Figure 5. High-technology exports, 1991-2016 (% of manufactured exports) (World Bank,
2018b) (authors illustration) .......................................................................................................... - 13 -
Figure 6. Patent applications, 1970-2016 (per million inhabitants) (World Bank, 2018b) (authors
illustration) ...................................................................................................................................... - 16 -
Figure 7. Comparison of Mean Years of Schooling (x-axis) in 2015 (Goujon et al., 2016; UNDP,
2018b; Wittgenstein Centre, 2018), Share of Internet Users (y-axis) in 2016 (World Bank, 2018b),
and GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 International Dollar) in 2017 (Feenstra et al., 2015;
World Bank, 2018b) (authors illustration) ................................................................................... - 18 -
Figure 8. Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) to GDP, 1970-2016 (in %) (World Bank, 2018b)
(authors illustration) ...................................................................................................................... - 21 -
Figure 9. Employment in Industry, 1991-2017 (in % of total employment) (World Bank, 2018b)
(authors illustration) ...................................................................................................................... - 24 -
Figure 10. Trade in Goods and Services, 1970-2017 (Imports/ Exports, % of GDP) (OECD, 2018;
World Bank, 2018b) (authors illustration) ................................................................................... - 27 -
Figure 11. 4th Industrial Revolution vs. Industry 4.0 ................................................................. - 33 -
Figure 12. Global CEO Survey - Global Manufacturing Competitiveness Index: Country
Rankings, 2010-2020 (DTTL, 2016, 2013, 2010) (authors illustration) ...................................... - 34 -
Annex Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 51 -
7.3 Additional Tables & Figures
Table 4. 4IR related threats and opportunities to selected SDGs (UNDP, 2018a) (authors illustration)
SDGs
Threats
Opportunities
- Increased unemployment
- End of export-led manufacturing
- Reduced tax base
+ More efficient welfare
+ AI and Big Data-enabled fin-tech
+ New livelihoods in gig economy
- Lower disposable income for food
- Reverse migration to food-inse-
cure rural areas
- Micronutrient-deficient diets
+ Food supply chain optimization
+ Improved manufactured food
quality
+ Yield improvement
- Health spending constraints
- Lack of safeguards in gig economy
- Job insecurity
+ Advanced health diagnostics
+ Telemedicine
+ Blockchain and AI-optimized Pa-
tient data
- Obsolete education curricula
- Reduced public spending
- Widening gap between high and
low-skilled
+ Low cost e-learning tools
+ Speech recognition for learning
+ AI-based marking optimizes
teacher time allocation
- Gender pay imbalance in STEM
- Reduced women employment in
BPO and retail
- Algorithm-driven decision bias
+ Women opportunity in automa-
tion-proof sectors (e.g. care)
+ Reduced decision maker bias
- Resurgence of informal sector
- Loss of export-led manufacturing
model
- Regionalization of supply chains
+ New, improved livelihoods
+ Reinvigoration of rural areas
through internet-enabled entre-
preneurship
- Decline of BPO sector
- Decline of developing economy
technological innovation
- Polarized industrialization
+ ICT infrastructure investments
(e.g. 4G/5G)
+ Emergence of new innovation
champions
- Racial / ethnic bias
- Wealth polarization
- Higher wages of STEM-trained
middle classes
+ ♀ excel in creative industries / e-
commerce
+ Internet inclusion give more inde-
pendent means of income
- Social media bots generate misin-
formation
- Cyberterrorism vulnerability
- AI-based surveillance
+ Blockchain-powered citizen data
management
+ Human rights enforcement
through social media listening
Annex Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 52 -
Table 5. 4IR related initiatives, approaches, strategies and policies for selected countries in the Global North and Global South (authors illustration)
Concept
Industrie 4.0
(I4.0)
Society 5.0
(S5.0)
Industrial Internet of
Things
(IIoT)
Made in China 2025
(MIC2025)
Crafting the Future
(CF)
Making Indonesia
4.0 (MI4.0)
Countries
Germany
Japan
USA
China
Mexico
Indonesia
Launch Year
2011
2015
2011
2015
2016
2018
Initiators
government, policy
driven
industry driven,
politically coordi-
nated
government, policy and
industry driven
government, policy
driven
government, policy
and industry driven
government, policy
driven
Target Group
manufacturers/pro-
ducers, SMEs and
policy makers
manufacturers/pro-
ducers and society
manufacturers/produc-
ers, agriculture, policy
makers and research
manufacturers/produc-
ers, agriculture and
policy makers
manufacturers/pro-
ducers, SMEs and re-
search
manufacturers/pro-
ducers, SMEs, policy
makers and research
Implementation Strategies &
Networks
•Hightech-Strategy
•Digital Strategie
2025/ Plattform In-
dustrie 4.0
•ICT 2020 Strategy
•Super Smart Soci-
ety (Society 5.0)
Service Platform
•5th S&T Basic
Plan, Industrial
Value Chain Initia-
tive (IVI)
•Advanced Manufac-
turing (Partnership)
(AMP)
•Industrial Internet
Consortium (IIC)
•Manufacturing Centers
of Excellence (MCE)
•National Network for
Manufacturing Innova-
tion (NNMI)
•Manufacturing Tech-
nology Testbeds (MTT)
•MIC2025
•Internet-Plus-Action-
plan
•AI Development Re-
port
•Roadmap for Craft-
ing the Future
•National Digital
Strategy
•25-year “Program
for Science, Technol-
ogy, and Innovation”
•ProMéxico
•Making Indonesia
4.0 Initiative
•National Industrial
Committee (KINAS)
[concept]
•Indonesian Invest-
ment Coordinating
Board (BKPM)
Stage of Implementation
Advanced
Early
Advanced
Early
Early
Planning
Supply / Demand Side
supply & demand
side
supply & demand
side
supply side (and de-
mand)
supply side (and de-
mand)
supply side
supply side
Funding Model
mixed (public & pri-
vate)
mixed (public &
private)
mainly private
public
mixed (public & pri-
vate)
public
Status Quo
leading position in
plant construction
and engineering
leading position in
robotics and AI,
lack in cybersecu-
rity
offshoring of industrial
labor, increased interna-
tional competition
investment driven
global production
workshop, internet af-
fine population
export driven econ-
omy, with high MVA
export driven econ-
omy, with high MVA
Annex Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 53 -
Concept
Industrie 4.0
(I4.0)
Society 5.0
(S5.0)
Industrial Internet of
Things
(IIoT)
Made in China 2025
(MIC2025)
Crafting the Future
(CF)
Making Indonesia
4.0 (MI4.0)
and share of employ-
ment in manufactur-
ing
and share of employ-
ment in manufactur-
ing
Aims
digital manufactur-
ing, research & inno-
vation, cooperation of
different stakehold-
ers, and standardiza-
tion
Super Smart Soci-
ety (people and ro-
bots/AI), made-to-
order services, in-
ternationalization
of industry, com-
petitiveness, reset-
tle outsourced in-
dustry, vertical in-
tegration of indus-
trial value chains
Reindustrialization,
funding of innovative
production, use and co-
ordination of infor-
mation, automation,
computation, software,
sensing and networking,
innovation capacities,
ensuring skilled labor
market
From global workbench
to innovation-driven
economic growth via in-
crease innovation ca-
pacity, integration of IT
and production,
strengthen industrial
basis (I30), promoting
Chinese brands, eco-
friendly green and sus-
tainable development,
service oriented and in-
ternationalized produc-
tion, vertical integration
of production and value
chains
Implementing digital
manufacturing to
maintain Mexico's
competitive ad-
vantage and export
capacities, with focus
on developing R&D
sector, strengthen
Mexican firms (SME),
and establish Mexico
as a regional center for
Industry 4.0 produc-
tion/supplier
Enter the list of 10 big-
gest economies by
2030, increase of the
net export contribu-
tion to GDP to 10 per-
cent, doubling labor
productivity rate over
the labor costs, allo-
cating 2 percent of
GDP to R&D and
technology innova-
tion fields
Strategic Focus
deployment, competi-
tiveness, export
deployment, com-
petitiveness, S&T,
innovation
deployment, competi-
tiveness, export
advancement, competi-
tiveness, export
advancement, com-
petitiveness, develop-
ing domestic market
and regional center
advancement, com-
petitiveness, export,
R&D
Approach
industrial manufac-
turing, mechanical en-
gineering
holistic (healthcare,
mobility, infra-
structure, finance),
industrial manufac-
turing, mechanical
engineering, pro-
duction innovation
centres
production innovation
centres and manufactur-
ing testbeds, aviation,
shipping, energy and ag-
ricultural industries,
health services
production innovation
centres, funding IT,
CNC, robotic, aeronau-
tic gear and avionic, na-
val gears, low-energy
and emission free vehi-
cles, energy technolo-
gies, advanced materi-
als, biomedicine, agri-
cultural machines
production innova-
tion centres and man-
ufacturing testbeds in
key production sec-
tors like chemical
economy, aerospace
economy, and auto-
motive industry
industry and labor
force: industrial zones
and set of measures in
5 focus areas in foods
and beverage indus-
try, automotive indus-
try, electronic indus-
try, chemical indus-
try, and textile indus-
Annex Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 54 -
Concept
Industrie 4.0
(I4.0)
Society 5.0
(S5.0)
Industrial Internet of
Things
(IIoT)
Made in China 2025
(MIC2025)
Crafting the Future
(CF)
Making Indonesia
4.0 (MI4.0)
try plus change of ed-
ucation/academic sys-
tem
Challenges/barriers
internationalization of
value chains, acceler-
ating product life cy-
cles, competition, cus-
tomization of produc-
tion
stimulus under-
funded sectors (i.e.
smart agriculture),
shift from mass
production to
mass-customiza-
tion, in-house re-
search vs. open in-
novation culture,
integration of SMEs
decreasing industry cre-
ates lack in innovation
capacities
governmental coordi-
nation, rural-urban-mi-
gration/disparities, ur-
banization, restructur-
ing of labor market
government coordi-
nation, gap between
MNCs and SMEs due
to lack of access to fi-
nancial resources for
SMEs, low diffusion
of I4.0 best practices in
clusters and techno-
logical parks as well
as the prioritization of
technological acquisi-
tion over develop-
ment of own technol-
ogy , weak (digital
and technological) in-
frastructure, ineffi-
cient regulatory
frameworks, defi-
ciencies in the innova-
tive environment,
misalignments be-
tween academia and
industry, undevel-
oped domestic mar-
ket, etc.
limited investment,
low productivity, lim-
ited FDIs/net exports,
weak currency ratio,
and high capital costs
(debt and equities
costs), undeveloped
digital platforms, 62
percent of IDN's labor
force are in SMEs, raw
materials & critical
parts are import de-
pendent, no strong
government or PPP
R&D centers
Technology
CPS, IoT, Big Data,
tech. Innovation
based on horizontal
and vertical integra-
tion, cyber security,
CPS, IoT, Big Data,
AI, robotics, Big
Data, smart city,
smart services,
cyber security
CPS, IoT, Big Data, AI,
robotics, cutting edge
materials, nano- and bio-
technology, physics,
chemistry, cyber secu-
CPS, IoT, Big Data, AI,
robotics digitalization
(mobile internet, cloud
computing, IoT in pro-
duction, eCommerce)
CPS, IoT, Big Data, ro-
botics, smart facto-
ries, data analytics
CPS, IoT, Big Data
(Cloud Computing),
AI, Human-Machine
Interface, robotics,
sensor technology, ad-
vanced production
Annex Speringer & Schnelzer (2019)
- 55 -
Concept
Industrie 4.0
(I4.0)
Society 5.0
(S5.0)
Industrial Internet of
Things
(IIoT)
Made in China 2025
(MIC2025)
Crafting the Future
(CF)
Making Indonesia
4.0 (MI4.0)
smart factory, embed-
ded systems, Cloud
Computing, ad-
vanced production
methods (e.g. 3D
printing)
rity, ICT, advanced pro-
duction methods (e.g.
3D printing)
methods (e.g. 3D
printing)
Potential action fields
rethinking work and
education
rethinking educa-
tion with focus on
economic and natu-
ral sciences
strengthen skilled indus-
trial labor market
rethinking production,
labor and skills
rethinking work and
education
rethinking work and
education
Discourse
technological change
on society and econ-
omy, increasing inter-
national competition
with accelerating in-
novation cycles and
new business models,
potential chances of
I40
societal and techno-
logical integration
business perspective on
potentials, policy per-
spective on international
competitiveness
sustainable and innova-
tive economic growth
sustainable and inno-
vative economic
growth, strengthen
domestic companies
and market, maintain
net exports
revitalization of in-
dustry, increase of
productivity, to
strengthen net ex-
ports, competitive-
ness, human capital &
skills for future labor
market
