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ACADEMIC PAPER
Public service delivery in South Africa: The political influence at
local government level
Mfundo Mandla Masuku
1
|Nokukhanya Noqiniselo Jili
2
1
Department of Development Studies, North
West University, Mahikeng, South Africa
2
Department of Public Administration,
University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, South
Africa
Correspondence
Mfundo Mandla Masuku, Department of
Development Studies, North West University,
Mahikeng, South Africa.
Email: masuku.masuku@nwu.ac.za
Present Address
Mfundo Mandla Masuku, Department of
Development Studies, University of
Mpumalanga, South Africa
This paper analyses poor service delivery at local government level, which is
attributed to the politicisation of administrative components in municipalities,
resulting in poor local governance. The public service delivery system has been
perceived as one of the most important ways of reducing poverty through poverty
alleviation programmes. As part of the South African government's cooperative
system, key stakeholders in municipalities ought to adopt an integrated approach to
public service delivery. An integrated approach to public service delivery demands
that local municipalities, together with relevant stakeholders, integrate processes
and services to ensure effective and efficient service delivery. This ultimately will
result in an improved standard of living and sustainable livelihood for communities.
With regard to public service delivery, local municipalities have the obligation of
creating income opportunities people, especially the poor, with the sole aim of
contributing towards poverty reduction and the realisation of the expectations of
people, as stated in the South African government's White Paper of transforming
public service delivery. The political interface in local municipalities greatly affects
effective and efficient administration, as well as growth opportunities. Administra-
tors, therefore, have the important function of ensuring that explicit assignments of
objectives and administrative functions are wholly separated from the policymaking
activities of government. This paper, therefore, suggests that municipalities adopt
the merit system and abandon the spoils system that is highly characterised by
political favours and political interferences. Political favours and interferences are
dominant in local South African government, and they hinder the process of pro-
viding services equally.
1|INTRODUCTION
Internationally, local government is regarded as the sphere of govern-
ment that should provide the immediate necessary intervention in
terms of provision of services because it is a sphere that is closer to
the community. This paper argues that poor service delivery at a local
government level is attributed to the politicisation of administrative
components in municipalities, resultant of poor local governance. A
number of persisting service delivery challenges, which include gover-
nance problems and backlogs, have been identified in South African
municipalities over a number of years (Department of Cooperative
Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2009; Koma, 2010; Chitiga‐
Mabugu & Monkam, 2013).
This paper attests that the concept of service delivery is
more popular at an elemental level where local government is
mandated to render basic communal needs and services that will
improve the quality of life and enhance the livelihoods of
people. Service delivery in South Africa is often marred by
financial irregularities, corruption, and maladministration. Violent
service delivery protests are caused by the high levels of
Received: 31 January 2019 Accepted: 23 February 2019
DOI: 10.1002/pa.1935
J Public Affairs. 2019;e1935.
https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1935
© 2019 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa 1of7
inefficiency and incompetencies from local government (Kroukamp &
Cloete, 2018).
The state of corruption in South Africa has been reported as a reg-
ular occurrence in all three spheres of government. There are tools
available to detect corruption practices, the abuse of authority, and
ensuring accountability, but those tools are not well implemented
(Napier, 2018). Although there is significance improvement in some
areas, the challenge of corruption remains consistent at the forefront
of development and requires more effort to end it in order to improve
the quality of people's lives. Backlog challenges, such as housing,
water, and sanitation; relationships with communities ruined by poor
communication and accountability; and problems with the political
administrative interface, and intra and interpolitical party issues, nega-
tively affect governance and the provision of basic services. Lack of
basic services, include housing, water and sanitation, and insufficient
municipal capacity, due to the lack of essential skills, has been
identified by numerous scholars as persisting challenges (State of local
government in South Africa: Overview report National State of local
government assessments, 2009; Jili & Banjo, 2013; Koma, 2010;
Maserumule, 2008; Olum, 2011; Thornhill, 2008).
A report published by the South African Local Government Associ-
ation, in 2007, identified critical issues with regard to council capacity,
notably that there is inadequate legal support and advice to their
decision making. Kanyane and Koma (2014) revealed that weak lead-
ership in strategic management, including corporate governance,
shortage of skills to implement the financial management legislation,
misplacement of skills within the municipalities, and political consider-
ation in appointment of senior managers without the required qualifi-
cation, had tremendously affected the performance of municipalities.
It is, therefore, crucial to look at the influence of political favours
towards the provision of services in South African municipalities.
Maserumule (2007) viewed the politics–administration interfer-
ence as being caused by the lack of relationship between the elected
and appointed officials and their endeavours to provide services to
the citizens. He stressed that those officials must find a point of
convergence whereby they work together as a team to administrate
and manage municipal affairs and make certain that there is provision
of services to all citizens.
Mafunisa (2003) emphasised that political interference in adminis-
tration would erode the opportunity of efficiency administration
hence policymaking activities ought to be wholly separated from
administration functions and that administrators had to have explicit
objectives before they could begin to develop an efficient administra-
tive function.
The South African government's tardiness to deliver basic services
and their unfulfilled promises has caused service delivery protests and
frustrations in various communities. The slow process of providing
services to the people is usually caused by the interference of politi-
cians in the duties of public administrators. Political interference in
the functioning of municipalities is revealed as a problem that hinders
the effectiveness and efficiency of the provision of services (Zarenda,
2013). This includes instances where municipal officials have used
political processes to subvert council procedures. Partly political
factionalism also impacts on the stability and effectiveness of local
government.
2|POLITICS–ADMINISTRATION
DICHOTOMY
The debate on how the relationship between politics and administra-
tion should be managed dates back to the late 19th century when
Woodrow Wilson advocated for the complete separation of the two.
In the 20th century, philosophers, such as Waldo, Jane Addams, John
Dewey, and William James, criticised that impractical dichotomy and
advocated for an interface, which is still the globally ideal model for
the 21st century.
Political connections are considered as a very important factor
influencing the ways public institutions perform (Fan, Wong, & Zhang,
2007), which also affect public sector employment decisions. In con-
trast, Napier (2018) argued that the separation of powers in the public
sector, particularly in local government, has been largely overlooked in
literature. The political bureaucratic model presents arguments that
the elected office‐bearers have a mandate to manage and control
the public service. This means that there is no difference between
politics and administration and between party and state. Moreover,
Koma and Modumo (2016) argued that administrative components
in local government should be free from politicisation because services
in municipalities should be equitably rendered and not furnished only
to individuals who have a partisan interest.
The appointment of politicians in senior bureaucratic positions,
such as senior management and general management, is viewed as a
means of controlling bureaucrats and civil service (Heywood, 1997:
335). Mafunisa (2003) stated that the politicised bureaucratic model
gives politicians the power to determine how bureaucracy in public
sector operates. Politicians are dominant and lead the administration
under the politicised bureaucratic model. Tshishonga (2014) assert
that in South Africa, the politicised model is anchored in the cadre Pol-
icy and Development Strategy of the African National Congress (ANC)
which in 1997 emphasises on the recruitment from within the party
and that potential recruits are made to understand and accept the
basic policies and programmes of the ANC.
Political influence weakens municipal officials' performance within
municipalities because the municipal council is the one who decides
who to hire. Municipal managers are appointed by the decision of
the entire municipal council; they even recommend the name and that
is influenced by the political party dominant within the municipality.
In the academic discipline of public administration, the dichotomy
model is regarded as the founding theory. Although appropriately
criticised for being irrelevant, the dichotomy model is still given a his-
torical legitimacy that it does not deserve (Overeem, 2012). Political
interference in administration would erode the opportunity for admin-
istration efficiency and policymaking activities ought to be wholly sep-
arated from administration functions. Administrators have to have an
explicit assignment of objectives before they begin to develop an effi-
cient administrative function (Mafunisa, 2003). The dichotomy model
2of7 MASUKU AND JILI
holds the view that the interference by politicians in public administra-
tion is inappropriate and will erode administrative efficiency and
temper with the administrative neutrality of public officials. This
model maintains that there is a complete separation of the responsibil-
ity between politicians and public officials.
The model is opposed to the pollicised bureaucracy model, which
suggests that public administration and politics are one unit in which
party structures dominate decisions in administrative matters
(Mafunisa, 2003). Furthermore, Mafunisa (2003) found the politicised
bureaucratic model to be a neutral model of administrative responsi-
bility. Shafritz, in the study of Mafunisa (2003: 87), maintained that
the politics and administration dichotomy holds that political interfer-
ence in administration would corrode the opportunity for administra-
tive efficiency, and the policymaking activities of the government are
a burden to be completely separated from the administrative func-
tions. Mafunisa's view is further supported by Heywood (1997:355)
when he pointed out that the recruitment of the senior bureaucracy
into the ideological enthusiasm of the government of the day effec-
tively confuses the distinctions between politics and public officials.
The politicised bureaucratic model does not only corrode adminis-
trative efficiency, nor does it confuse the distinction between politi-
cians and the public officials, whereas the depoliticised bureaucratic
model is neutral. This model requires the separation of administrative
functions from those of policymakers. The government's administrative
function is to implement its policies to the satisfaction of the people
and the ruling political party, which has set both the developmental
and political agenda of the country. The implementation of such poli-
cies shall mean the implementation of policies by public officials
belonging to different political ideologies and members of the public.
This suggests that any political approach must also be an approach that
embraces public administration, through the entire policy processes,
including planning, implementation, and evaluation or review policy.
3|COMPLEMENTARY MODEL
The complementary model is based on the notion that political and
administration office‐bearers can join together in pursuit of good gov-
ernance (Svara, 2001). This model is described as a model that offers a
positive approach to examine the distinct contribution of political
office‐bearers and public servants to the democratic process. Svara
(2001) revealed that this model is better grounded historically and
gives a positive approach to test the distinct contributions of political
office‐bearers and public servants to the democratic process. This
model stresses that each office‐bearer is interdependent, along with
their distinct roles, and compliant in a manner that is in the best
interest of the citizens.
In support of complementary model, Maphunye (2001), in his
study about the roles and the structure in post 1994 departments,
highlighted that both elected political office‐bearers and appointed
public servants agreed that there is no overlap between the world of
the public servants and the world of political office‐bearers. His study
further suggested that the two groups should work together to realise
the goal of the public and satisfy their needs. This theory acknowl-
edges the different roles and responsibilities of each but sees the
needs for interaction and interdependence as an alternative to the
dichotomy model. This paper supports Maphunye (2011) in a sense
that public officials and politicians should work together based on
their separate roles and responsibilities, and no one should interfere
in what the other is supposed to do.
4|POLITICISED BUREAUCRATIC MODEL
The political bureaucratic model presents arguments that the elected
office‐bearers have a mandate to manage and control the public ser-
vice. The appointment of politicians in senior bureaucratic positions,
such as senior management and general management, is viewed as a
means of controlling bureaucrats and civil service (Heywood, 1997:
335). It centres itself in the inseparability nature of politics and
administration. Politicians take a leading role by leading the adminis-
tration under the politicised bureaucratic model. In South Africa, the
politicised model is anchored in the cadre policy and development
strategy of the ANC (1997) which emphasises on the recruitment from
within the party and that potential recruits are made to understand
and accept the basic policies and programmes of the ANC.
Under apartheid, before 1994, after the National Party won the
1948 general election, the ANC deployed its members into strategic
posts and positions in order to catalyse the pursuance of its agenda
in the entire republic. The ANC is the ruling party of the present
government. The majority of ministers and members of the executive
council, including the presidency and premiers, are ANC members. The
senior managers of administration are mostly members of the ruling
party. Mafunisa (2003: 89) believed that the ruling party has to ensure
that people who are committed to the party's transformation agenda
occupy all the senior positions in all the spheres of government (the
national, provincial, and local government).
This model entails an active participation of senior public servants
in policy decision making, by virtue of their proximity to elected
officials. These officials have a political and ideological orientation to
serve the best interest of the ruling party to achieve its objectives of
service delivery within public sector institutions.
This paper used the politicised bureaucracy model to measure the
extent to which the public sector is politicised and how much power
politicians wield, as compared with their counterparts, the administra-
tors. Baekgaard, Mortensen, and Bech Seeberg (2018) emphasised the
importance of the administrative component because administrators
are in a possession of administrative backgrounds that enable them
to manage and develop the public sector and advise politicians in all
institutional matters.
5|CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE
IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
At the Commonwealth Local Government Conference, De Visser
(2009) stated that the inappropriate political interference in
MASUKU AND JILI 3of7
administration has caused South African municipalities to experience
serious challenges that are difficult with which to deal. The strained
relationship between politicians and administration officials appears
to be the norm. Rolland (2018) attested that South African municipal-
ities are continuously vulnerable to potential regime changes, resultant
to introducing new political leadership with its new ideologies and
strategies. The new political leadership could therefore institute
unanticipated changes as far as administrative structures of municipal-
ities are concerned. In most cases, the lack of separation of powers
between legislature and executive authority at local government level
is often blamed for this. Paradza, Mokwena, and Richards (2010) and
Rolland (2018) shared similar sentiments when they indicated that at
local government level, service delivery is experiencing difficulties
because of the different philosophies between the political and
administrative interface that have attributed to confusion in terms of
their roles.
Political affiliation to the ruling party is the basis of being nomi-
nated and becoming a candidate. The community also elects council-
lors based on their political affiliation because the community know
and understand the ideology that guides that particular party. Munic-
ipal managers should be appointed based on their competences, skills
and experience. A municipal manager should be independent from the
municipal council. The council should not recommend who will be the
head of the administration. Local government should appoint experts
who are independent of political affiliation, especially for the appoint-
ment of the municipal manager. The experts that will include all dom-
inating parties within that municipality, interview the candidates,
verify their qualifications, and work together with the legal and moni-
toring team. The personnel management should also be independent
from the politics that will enable them to employ relevant candidates
based on competency and not political affiliation.
In other instances, public projects are left uncompleted, or a poor
quality of services is delivered to the people, such as failure to com-
plete tarred roads or even if it is completed, it is not of good quality.
Failure to deliver those projects undermines the citizen's welfare,
and leads to the loss of billons of rands. It has been revealed that
the extent of these failures varies within and across the country,
driving national, and global inequalities (Bobby Banerjee, 2014). The
Good Governance Learning Network (2008) revealed that public
perceptions on local government are negative; the results show that
the level of trust in local government is in the minority at 48.1%. This
shows that citizens have lost their trust in local government and the
results are substantially lower than those in provincial government,
which is 59.5% and the national government at 64.3%. Citizens trust
national government more than their local government.
The political administration interface has become a weak and a
vulnerable trait of many municipalities. There is no doubt that mem-
bers of municipal executives, officials and councillors are struggling
to define their clear roles. There is growing concern around the
inappropriate relationship between regional party structures and
municipalities (De Visser, 2010). The municipality should, therefore,
implement a merit system in the future because the spoils system
and political favours are dominant in local government. A merit system
involves the principle of recruitment only of qualified individuals from
appropriate sources in an endeavour to compose a workforce from all
segments of society, and selection and advancement should be
determined solely on the basis of relative ability, knowledge, and skills
after fair and open competition, which assures that all receive equal
opportunities.
Another principle entails that all the applicants and employees
should receive fair and equitable treatment in all aspects of person-
nel management, without considering political affiliation. Further-
more, equal pay should be provided for work of equal value. This
principle embodies the vision that maintaining equitable salaries,
and rewarding excellence performance, will attract and retain the
most effective and efficient workforce through positive employee
engagement.
All employees should maintain high standards of ethics, integrity
conduct, and concern about the public interest. The intent behind this
principle is to consider the balance that must be struck between the
employees' right to be hired and fired, solely on the basis of his or
her abilities, and with regards to the public expectation of the govern-
ment that is impartially administered and flexibly managed.
It is further stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa (1996) that public administration must be governed by the
democratic values and principles enshrined in Sections 151–164 of
the Constitution. Section 153 (a) states the development duties of
municipalities, which is to “structure and manage its administration
budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs
of the community and to promote the social and economic
development of the community.”This mandate requires a very strong
relationship between political and administrative office‐bearers, to
work together in order to realise the goal of the municipality. The
National Development Plan (NDP; 2013) serves as the strategic policy
document to ensure that government does play a significant role, as
contemplated in the 1996 Constitution.
The other fundamental principle is the principle of providing
employees with education and training. Education and training will
result in better organisational and individual performance which will
lead to development. It is important for the local government sphere
to provide education and training for employees to create civil
servants that are worthy of the public and its confidence. This could
be achieved through de‐politicising and separating administrative
duties from politics by training officials to be loyal to public institu-
tions, and not partisan interests.
It is, therefore, important that the above principles should be appli-
cable to national, provincial and local spheres of government to ensure
accountability and the effective provision of services. A lot has been
written about local government and service delivery, but as yet there
is no investigation that stresses on how to deal with political
interference. Some of the studies are contrary to this view; various
studies have been conducted on the evolution and history of local
government. The previous studies have also focused on the service
delivery backlogs, resulting in public protests and some studies have
indicated that the causes of those protests are usually because
political influence.
4of7 MASUKU AND JILI
6|WARD COMMITTEES AND WARD
COUNCILLORS
Ward committees face three critical limitations: political representa-
tion, structural limits to power, and the notions of councillors and
party politics (Oldfield, 2008).
In a study that was conducted in Govan Mbeki Municipality
(Secunda, Mpumalanga), ward committee members asserted that the
problem in the municipality was that the ward committees were not
independent, as they relied too much on their ward councillor as their
chairperson. They were coddled by their ward councillor, or when they
came up with creative ideas they were viewed as a threat to the coun-
cillors. When there were elections of the ward committee members in
the community, the councillor already had the names of the people to
be elected. This situation debilitated some ward committee members,
because they could not contribute because they were just told what
to do (Roux, 2005:8).
Furthermore, a study that was conducted at Msunduzi Local
Municipality (Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu‐Natal) by Smith and De
Visse, (2009) found that ward committees are very often politicised
in one of the following three ways: first there is inter‐party competi-
tion, in which political parties control the ward committees and where
the composition of committees is skewed towards supporters of the
other party. There is also intra‐party competition, in which ward com-
mittees have become embroiled in the factionalism within political
parties, where one other faction within the ANC party uses the ward
committees to secure greater political power. Lastly, Piper and Deacon
(2008), and Smith and De Visse (2009) pointed out that there is a
term‐policy competition, whereby the role of ward committees, rather
than the composition, is defined by the political party and not the
legislative framework.
Section 79 (a) of the Municipal Structures Act (1998) stipulates
that ward committees may make recommendation on any matter
affecting their wards. This implies that they have a role to play and
their recommendations are based on the matters that affect the com-
munity members, not ward councillors as individuals. In some cases,
there is a close relationship between the ward committees and the
branch of political leadership. In some instance, the members of both
structures are the same. There is also a citation whereby the ward
committees are combined with the branch leadership, to avoid the
elements of animosity between the two groups, which are essential
(Piper & Deacon, 2008). This articulates the fact that municipal
councillors have influence in the selection of ward committees, and
this shows that even the councillors are influenced by the municipal
council. Reddy (2016) offered explanations that municipalities whose
councils have a scarcity of skills in political and administrative compo-
nents consequently have negative impacts on governance and service
delivery.
Municipal managers are also elected according to political factions.
The problem is that this affects service delivery because they perhaps
do have the skills or knowledge suited to the post, especially because
they are the ones to implement the resolution of the councillors,
together with the officials within the municipality. It is also noted that
the effectiveness of the ward committees are constrained by the lim-
itations of the levels of the education, skills, and expertise of members.
A skills audit of 373 ward committee members in the Nelson Mandela
Bay Municipality, carried out by the Project for Conflict Resolution
and Development in 2008, founded that only 34 of the members
(9%) had post‐matric training (qualification). It is likely that the educa-
tion profiles of ward committee members in rural municipalities will
reflect even lower levels of skills and education (Bendle, 2008).
Because of the ANC won power in the first democratic elections,
post‐apartheid, in 1994, it has maintained a strongly loyal stance to
its members, placing ‘cadres’in all spheres of government. The term
“cadres”has been used to describe ANC loyalists, because of the
armed struggle during apartheid against the white National
government.
South Africa is at a high risk in terms of the ruling party (ANC)
selecting and deploying cadres within municipalities, and this is the
signal of the politicians abusing their powers. The level of risk in local
government is high because they do not involve a merit system in the
selection of employment.
7|PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND
DEPLOYING CADRES
The fundamental principle of local democracy is participation. With
democracy, every citizen can participate in public affairs by freely
communicating information about political issues, by openly express-
ing their own opinion on public affairs; by expressing their expecta-
tions without fear of repression, by voting in elections, by engaging
in civil society organisations or political parties and by standing up as
the candidate in democratic elections. In this way, democracy is the
government of the people, by the people, for the people (Hofmeister
& Grabow, 2011). Politics require the ideas and values that set the
goals and standards of political organisations. Freedom, justice and
solidarity are such principles that guide the political organisation of
any society. Political parties, business organisations, as well as other
non‐governmental organisations of civil society, are organisations that
collect shared social interests. Therefore, politics cannot be divorced
from government; it must work together. However, politics should
not overlap in such a way that it takes the place of governance and
governing policies.
The existence of local government has always been defended on
the basis that it is a crucial aspect of the process of the
democratisation and intensification of mass participation in the
decision‐making process. No political system is considered complete
and democratic if it does not have a system of local government. Local
government must serve the two purposes of providing services to the
people and representing citizens in determining specific public needs
and how these local needs should be met.
The current ANC government designed a NDP, 2013 that is aimed
at collaborating all sections of society and the effective leadership by
the government. The state provides the institution and infrastructure
that enables the economy and society to operate. Critical
MASUKU AND JILI 5of7
interventions are required to build a state capable of realising this
vision by 2030.
However, it is worrying that even the NDP is devised to address
issues that emanate from municipalities. The main challenge has been
unpredictable in capacity that leads to unpredictable performance in
local, provincial, and national government (National Development
Plan, 2013). This is caused by a complex set of factors, including
tensions in the political administrative interface, an instability of the
administrative leadership, a skills deficit, the erosion of accountability
and authority, poor organisational design, and low staff morale. The
public service needs to immerse in the development agenda,
insulated from undue political interference. Staff at all levels must
have the authority, experience and support they need to do their
jobs. This will require a long‐term approach to skills' development.
In analysing this vision, the government, at all levels, must start to
act immediately.
The politicisation of the public service is a government activity
where the appointment and career of those in the service are
subjected to political will (Madumo, 2016). This means that political
interference dictates the appointment of administrative personnel
at particular government departments. Deploying ANC loyalists/
cadres is acceptable only if that cadre matches the job or has the
required skills, to execute the tasks that are given in the job
description.
Meritocracy is a political philosophy that believes that power
should be vested in individuals according to merit. Advancement in
such a system is based on intellectual talent, measured through exam-
ination, and demonstrated through achievement in the field where it is
implemented, then really the principle of meritocracy should be highly
observed.
The question one will ask is how can cadre deployment and
employment be managed? Is the current political landscape conducive
for cadre deployment? Does cadre deployment and employment assist
in the rendering of services? Reitan, Gustafsoon, and Blekesaune
(2015) viewed that the depoliticisation of local government activities
often leads to a positive reform where effectiveness and efficiency
are pursued by local government and the designed results are realised
by communities.
Deploying cadres is acceptable as common practice only if the per-
son the person to be deployed has a level of skill suitable to the
municipal position in question. Loyalty alone is not enough, but the
issue of educational level experience and preparedness should mostly
be taken in to consideration. One should not be employed in a post by
virtue of having had followed party orders (Netshitenzhe, 2013).
Local government institutions are the ones that are closest to the
community, and they are informed by a community's needs, aspira-
tions, dreams, and frustrations. In South Africa, councillors are not
seen as champions and guardians of service delivery. Councillors and
the municipal councils are perceived as being preoccupied with
politics and the technicalities of administration. It is evident that there
is misgivings and mistrust from the community towards municipal
officials and councillors as can be seen in the violent community
protests directed at the councillors and municipal officials.
8|CONCLUSION
Political interference in administration hampers efficient administra-
tive opportunities. In order for administrators to begin with developing
an efficient administrative system, they must have explicit objectives
and administrative functions that are wholly separated from the pol-
icy‐making activities of political parties, especially of the government's
ruling party. For service delivery to be effective in all the local spheres
of the government, officials should understand their powers, distinc-
tive responsibilities and acknowledge that they have different roles.
They have to work together in order to be effective and do their jobs
as they are supposed to. Politicians should not abuse their powers,
more especially when it comes to recruitment. However, if all local
municipal officials were employed by the merit principles, service
delivery in South Africa would improve. Local governments who are
able to separate the roles and duties of public officials and politicians
are doing better to deliver what the public need. The debate about
whether the public sector should be or should not be politicised is
ongoing, but to curb political infighting in local government and to gain
the confidence of the public, politicians should not influence adminis-
trators on what, when, and how, to do what is supposed to be done by
administration.
ORCID
Mfundo Mandla Masuku https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3743-0779
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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES
Mfundo Mandla Masuku is a senior lecturer in the School of
Development Studies at University of Mpumalanga, and he holds
a PhD in development studies.
Nokukhanya Noqiniselo Jili is a lecturer and Head of the Depart-
ment of Public Administration at University of Zululand. She holds
a masters in Public Administration, and she is currently completing
her PhD in public administration.
How to cite this article: Masuku MM, Jili NN. Public service
delivery in South Africa: The political influence at local govern-
ment level. J Public Affairs. 2019;e1935. https://doi.org/
10.1002/pa.1935
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