John Dewey’s Theory of Aesthetic Experience: Bridging the Gap Between Arts and Sciences

Abstract

John Dewey’s philosophical pragmatism offers a reformatory approach to the arduous relationship between natural sciences and humanities. The crucial issue, which Dewey sets himself to resolve, is the pre-Darwinian influence of classical philosophy upon various scholarly practices. Ancient background assumptions still today permeate a considerable proportion of academic research and argumentation on both sides of the debate. Even evolutionary accounts appear to be affected. In order to avoid the often implicit, but nonetheless problematic, consequences that ensue from such archaic premises, I examine Dewey’s reappraisal of the concepts of art, science and knowledge. An analysis of these key concepts renders it possible to understand the proper function of aesthetic experience. In this paper, natural constitution of an aesthetic experience, which carries one of the intrinsic relations between art and science, comprises the core of the proposed solution. Furthermore, establishment of an integral aesthetic connection forms a fruitful basis for further bridging of the gap between hard sciences and humanities.

Full text

Open Philosophy 2019; 2: 59–74
Raine Ruoppa*
John Dewey’s Theory of Aesthetic Experience:
Bridging the Gap Between Arts and Sciences
https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2019-0007
Received September 11, 2018; accepted January 28, 2019
Abstract: John Dewey’s philosophical pragmatism offers a reformatory approach to the arduous relationship
between natural sciences and humanities. The crucial issue, which Dewey sets himself to resolve, is the
pre-Darwinian influence of classical philosophy upon various scholarly practices. Ancient background
assumptions still today permeate a considerable proportion of academic research and argumentation on
both sides of the debate. Even evolutionary accounts appear to be affected. In order to avoid the often
implicit, but nonetheless problematic, consequences that ensue from such archaic premises, I examine
Dewey’s reappraisal of the concepts of art, science and knowledge. An analysis of these key concepts renders
it possible to understand the proper function of aesthetic experience. In this paper, natural constitution of
an aesthetic experience, which carries one of the intrinsic relations between art and science, comprises
the core of the proposed solution. Furthermore, establishment of an integral aesthetic connection forms a
fruitful basis for further bridging of the gap between hard sciences and humanities.
Keywords: philosophical naturalism, pragmatism, John Dewey, aesthetics, natural evolution, cultural
evolution, philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of art
1 Introduction
The dialogue between natural sciences and humanities has traditionally been a tumultuous one. Also, it is
plagued with both unintentional and intentional misapprehensions. In this paper, I discuss John Dewey’s
philosophical pragmatism for the purpose of dissolving some of the most persistent issues that bedevil
the exchange of ideas between the two research traditions. Recent works on the topic provide detailed
examples of the challenges as they appear in the present academic debates. For example, Matthew Rampley
analyses with meticulous care the difficulties that accompany particular attempts to apply the methodology
of natural sciences in the field of humanities.¹ However, it is possible and, I believe, more productive to
examine the relationship between humanities and natural sciences from a broader point of view. Instead
of an analysis of the consequences of applying certain models, it is possible to focus on the foundations of
the disciplines themselves. If properly conducted, this type of alternative approach can be used to reassess
key terms like art and science. The contents of these particular terms are predominantly considered as self-
evident in most discussions, Rampley’s study included. Of course, the scope of ontological reassessment
I propose necessitates a total reconstruction of the entire tradition of philosophy of science. Nonetheless,
such an overhaul is, I suggest, precisely what is needed for a profound improvement in the dialogue between
hard sciences and humanities. Otherwise, the influence of archaic philosophical thought remains an ever
present obstruction for developing equitable modes of communication between practitioners of natural
science and arts scholars.
1Rampley, The Seductions of Darwin: Art, Evolution, Neuroscience, vii, ix.
*Corresponding author: Raine Ruoppa, University of Helsinki, Finland; E-mail: raine.ruoppa@helsinki.fi
Open Access. © 2019 Raine Ruoppa, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution
4.0 Public License.
Experience in a New Key

60 R. Ruoppa
On the topic of bridging the gap between natural sciences and humanities the possibilities offered by
Dewey’s philosophical framework have previously been examined by Tibor Solymoski.² He focuses on the
role Dewey’s conception of truth plays in the process of establishing connections between the two research
traditions. Hence, in his work Solymoski utilises a different aspect of Dewey’s work than the theory of the
aesthetic which I employ in this essay. Nevertheless, Solymoski raises an important point about Dewey’s
position that is essential for the present debate as well; a genuine reconciliation of natural sciences and
humanities necessitates a thorough reconstruction in philosophy.³
Dewey’s philosophical reform has influenced many contemporary neopragmatist scholars. For example,
Richard Shusterman includes various aspects of Dewey’s philosophy in his somaesthetic theory. However,
in Shusterman’s work the Deweyan elements are overshadowed by linguistic ones. He aligns with Richard
Rorty and positions language in the center of solving philosophical issues. The version of philosophical
pragmatism I discuss in this paper diverges from the ‘post-Rortyan’ pragmatism advocated by Shusterman.
The importance of language to human thought is acknowledged, but human cognition is not deemed to be as
linguistic as the above mentioned neopragmatists claim it to be. Moreover, in this paper Dewey’s operational
concept of knowledge is conjoined with that of his theory of aesthetic experience. Especially the latter
comprises the core of the proposed solution. Dewey holds that natural evolution profoundly affects, but does
not dictate or exhaustively define, the formation of every mode of human activity. This includes arts and
sciences. Furthermore, an aesthetic experience, in itself, does not necessarily demarcate artistic operations
from scientific ones. Combined, all of these conclusions strongly suggest a natural connection between art
and science, which, in turn, can support a constructive convergence of humanities and natural sciences.
2 Naturalistic reconstruction in philosophy
The monumental task of challenging classical philosophy in its entirety has been taken up by John Dewey,
although his results are not generally accepted and often remain overlooked. Dewey’s endeavour to
revolutionise philosophy originates from a very basic question. In short, he asks what should be changed in
philosophy if Darwin is correct in his hypothesis about the evolution of life. Dewey’s answer to this question
is equally straightforward: everything. Darwin’s revelations about the substratum of human existence
necessitates a complete reappraisal of human ontology. Consequently, Dewey spends the majority of his
career reconstructing several areas of philosophical thought. He addresses issues that range from ethics
to logic and from social organisation to education. However, for this paper, I will focus predominantly on
Dewey’s conception of fine art and aesthetics as well as on his description of the structure of knowledge.
Naturally, Dewey is not the only philosopher to engage in such thoroughly regenerative efforts, as
others have had similar aspirations. For example, Hans-Georg Gadamer has studied the issue of revision
in philosophy and the role of humanities in such a process. Also, Georg Henrik von Wright discusses the
relation of humanist philosophy and science. However, for the purposes of this paper Dewey’s framework
is especially pertinent. This argument for the appropriateness of Dewey’s theory finds support in the title
and the content of Jerome Popp’s book Evolution’s First Philosopher: John Dewey and the Continuity of
Nature. In his study Popp provides an overview of the Darwinian basis of Dewey’s thinking. And even
though aesthetic considerations receive only minute attention in Popp’s analysis, his work describes
the foundations upon which Dewey builds his theory of fine art. This is important because in Dewey’s
inquiry into the philosophy of art the theory of natural evolution is rarely mentioned. Some of Dewey’s
contemporaries, such as Yrjö Hirn for example, were more willing to discuss the connection between
2See Solymoski, “Can the Two Cultures Reconcile? Reconstruction and Neuropragmatism”, 83-97.
3Ibid., 84.
4Määttänen, “Shusterman on Somatic Experience”, 56.
5Popp, Evolution’s First Philosopher, 115.
6See Gadamer, Truth and Method.
7See von Wright, Explanation and Understanding.
8See Popp, Evolution’s First Philosopher.

John Dewey’s Theory of Aesthetic Experience: Bridging the Gap Between Arts and Sciences 61
natural evolution and fine art in an explicit fashion. Popp hypothesises that Dewey’s reluctance to use
evolutionary references is traceable to the miseducation of his audience.¹ In Dewey’s time Darwinian ideas
were not as widely accepted as they are today.¹¹ Yet, for the ideas that I will put forward in this study, it is
essential to understand Darwin’s impact on the origins of Dewey’s philosophical stand.
Dewey’s pragmatist definition of knowledge is founded upon the acceptance of Darwinian premises.
Also, the aesthetic quality of experience plays a role in his theory about the constitution of knowledge. This
is due to the fact that the aesthetic relates to the satisfaction of various natural conditions. When results
are found to be satisfactory, they are experienced as such by human beings. No extraneous insurance
for making the correct inferential judgements exists. However, the experienced emotion of satisfaction,
which functions as a sign of value in an organism-environment interaction, is not purely internal in its
origin. Satiety has developed amidst an evolutionary survival pressure; a selective process where random
emotional variation gradually makes way for a more consistent relation between desirable concrete effects
and positive emotional responses. Emotion as a sign evolved for the need of effortless ascertainment of the
concrete benefit or harm of the ongoing activity. The fact that human beings have survived and prospered
in a hostile environment using experience as a guide guarantees – to a degree – that human experience
more or less accurately corresponds with other natural events. And for Dewey, ‘natural events’ include the
experiential states of other living beings as well.
Solymoski discusses this issue in relation to overcoming problems in an organism-environment
interaction. He states that, according to Dewey, if a proposed outcome is experienced as, or ‘feels’,
unsatisfactory, truth remains unattained for the time being.¹² In other words, if the activity does not
produce a sufficient outcome the original plan of the operation is inadequate. On the other hand, expected
consequences experienced as satisfactory indicate establishment of truth and direct further modes of
activity.¹³ In short, a successful operation indicates that the original plan is ‘true enough’, as Dewey’s
operational concept of knowledge excludes absolute truths in the classical sense. Originating from Darwinian
ideas this reappraisal of the role of satisfactory emotions in expectation and action plays an important role
in the constitution of an aesthetic experience as well. In Dewey’s aesthetic theory this nucleus of natural
evolution is embedded in cultural evolution and social surroundings; these merely provide new challenges,
as well as possibilities, for the application of primal mechanisms of anticipation and verification. Human
beings cannot completely ignore the influence of these collective natural guidelines, nor should they.
Following the aesthetic intuition wherever it may lead has often preceded major discoveries in arts and
sciences alike.
3 John Dewey’s naturalisation of experience
Dewey bases his philosophical reconstruction on concrete events of nature, such as the birth of an
individual organism; human beings find themselves ‘thrown into the world’, as Heidegger would say,
with varying physiological and psychological properties.¹ This is an inescapable fact. The development
thereafter depends on numerous things, constitution of knowledge being one of the most important ones.
In the following Dewey explains the origin of knowledge and its ontological position:
But suppose a busy infant puts his finger in the fire; the doing is random, aimless, without intention or reflection. But
something happens in consequence. The child undergoes heat, he suffers pain.The doing and undergoing, the reaching
and the burn, are connected. One comes to suggest and mean the other. Then there is experience in a vital and significant
sense. Certain important implications for philosophy follow. In the first place, the interaction of organism and environ-
9See Hirn, The Origins of Art: A Psychological & Sociological Inquiry.
10Popp, Evolution’s First Philosopher, 92.
11Ibid.
12Solymoski, “Two Cultures”, 91.
13Ibid.
14Dewey, The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. Volume 1: 1925, Experience and Nature (LW1), 277, also Määttänen, Mind in
Action: Experience and Embodied Cognition in Pragmatism, 71.

62 R. Ruoppa
ment, resulting in some adaptation which secures utilization of the latter, is the primary fact, the basic category. Know-
ledge is relegated to a derived position, secondary in origin, even if its importance, when once it is established, is oversha-
dowing.¹
The above summary contains several key concepts that are essential for understanding Dewey’s philosophy.
Perhaps the most important one is that of experience. An occurrence of an experience always depends
on objective physical events of nature. This applies to social experiences as well. Human communication
is a form of natural continuity. Moreover, in its primary form an experience is a whole that does not
separate object from subject.¹ These are derivative products of reflective thought, which itself arises
from the natural process of continuously experiencing the world with structural properties that enable
contemplative tendencies.¹ In this instance ‘natural process’ denotes the fact that the human body is the
primary instrument of experience. The consciously reflective phase is an evolved extension of the total
experience of a living organism. It is emphatic in humans and blends with elementary animal properties.
This combination enhances the capacity of experiential material to function as a guide in various operations.
In addition, the evolutionary constitution and the structural features of the human body, which affect the
way the world is experienced, can be extended and enriched with scientific instruments.¹ However, this
demarcation of instrumentalities is only relative. The human body and all physical tools are no more than
different arrangements of the same basic materials of nature. Therefore, no fundamental difference exists
between the two. Both serve a similar operative function in the actualisation of various forms of interaction
between organisms and their respective environments.¹
The common foundation of organic bodies and material tools is not limited to them alone. Also the
environment, in which bodies and tools are used, shares the same physical basis. Dewey is adamant
about the fact that only one world exists.² Thus, it is no longer reasonable to use the term ‘external world’
in any classical or Cartesian sense. Instead, the world in its entirety is to be understood as a network of
interactions. In this web of relations human beings possess no separate position. The overall development
of the one and only natural system has resulted in an uneven distribution of complexity across the parts of
the system. As a consequence, human beings have gained the ability to experience and operate in a certain
way, which the other structural formations of the network lack. However, this factual state of affairs does
not elevate humans above nature. Neither the structural complexity nor the operational capability should
be taken as signs of transcendence of any kind. All components of the network are equally real in their
concrete existence, even if their connections vary from loose to intricate.²¹
In order to better understand the human position within nature, it is imperative to examine how the
experiencing human mind comes to achieve the trait of self-reflection. Dewey states that no one has ever
encountered a mind that was not connected to a material body.²² Indisputably, the material structure
upholding life and mind in an organism-environment interaction has limits that cannot be exceeded
without losing them both. Thus, mind can be viewed as an emergent feature of organisms that fulfil certain
organisational conditions in the arrangement of their physical structure and surroundings.
Despite the prerequisite of a material basis, the human mind is never fully realised on mere physiological
constitution. Dewey notes that a mind needs other minds to obtain its full operative potential. He explains
that only through interaction with others it is possible to become self-aware.²³ A cognitively demanding
environment fosters the human tendency to observe the effects of the surroundings upon the individual
self. And no environment is more complex and challenging than the one consisting of a multiplicity of
15Dewey, The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924. Volume 12: 1920, Essays, Reconstruction in Philosophy (MW12), 129.
16Dewey, LW1, 18-19.
17Ibid.
18Määttänen, Mind in Action, 26, 83.
19Määttänen, Action and Experience; A Naturalistic Approach to Cognition, 122.
20Dewey, LW1, 205.
21Määttänen, Mind in Action, 10-11, also Dewey, LW1, 207-208.
22Dewey, LW1, 212.
23Ibid., 135.

John Dewey’s Theory of Aesthetic Experience: Bridging the Gap Between Arts and Sciences 63
other human beings with individual minds of their own. Thus, a participation in communication with other
human beings is a necessary condition for an individual person to gain the cognitive ability to communicate
with herself.² In short, the origin of the human mind and the use of reflective thought in the degree
exhibited by contemporary human beings is inherently social. This viewpoint is reaffirmed and developed
further by twenty-first century scholars. For example, Merlin Donald states that “Enculturation dominates
human cognitive development.”² In addition, David Franks expounds a continuity between the work of
George Herbert Mead and current studies in neurosociology. Both focus on the cognitive perspectives of the
self and others.² These examples indicate that in thoroughly evolutionary theories the question of the very
first mind is a moot point. Through social interaction human beings can build upon the thinking of their
predecessors in a way that exceeds any previous modes of thought. A contemporary mind is a continuation
of more primitive minds, and this continuation extends all the way to the animal ancestry.²
Multilevel evolutionary developments have, nonetheless, led to a notable cognitive divergence between
human beings and other animal species. Of course, the sensory interaction of organism and environment
is the basis of all experience, as the example of burning one’s hand demonstrates.² In addition, a
considerable number of animal species show at least redirection of ongoing activity by sensory stimulation,
if not outright learning from various sensations.² For example, identification of the types of objects that
have in prior interactions caused unpleasant experiences guide some animals towards more favourable
courses of activity. Generally, an experience can be defined as “orientating to possible future experiences
on the ground of past practical experience.”³ In human beings, however, this orientation can go beyond
the preparedness for the immediate future situation. Perception of relations in one’s own actions and
consequences, as well as in those of others, leads to a heightened awareness of what is possible in future.
Thus, in humans, encountered objects are not only experienced in their relation to the current situation and
ongoing activity, but to the ones expected to take place in the distant future. The reason primitive human
beings started to carry physical objects with them relates to the fact that these objects were associated
with perceived future possibilities beyond immediate use. The primary mode of experiencing the world is
through affordances for action either here and now or some other time in some other situation, the latter
being the ones in which human beings excel above other animals.
4 Dewey’s definition of object of knowledge
Dewey demarcates the ‘had’ and the ‘known’ in experience.³¹ When objects and events are experienced
randomly in the course of life they are ‘had’. In order for these encountered things to become ‘known’ they
need to be intentionally produced. If the ‘had’ is deemed as enjoyable and beneficial for life, it evokes an
inquiry into possible ways of re-establishing the concrete conditions under which the experience initially
emerged. Thus, the means for attaining factual ends that are experienced as valuable, as in satisfactory,
become the object of knowledge. In other words, knowledge relates to the capability to rearrange the
relations in the network of interactions in a way that desirable outcomes are secured.³² The challenge of
discovering practices that continuously redirect the experiencing organism toward life’s goals is an ever-
ongoing process.³³ Of course, certain aims human beings entertain in thought and pursue in the natural
24Ibid.
25Donald, A Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness, 254.
26Franks, “Why We Need Neurosociology as Well as Social Neuroscience: Or—Why Role-Taking and Theory of Mind Are
Different Concepts”, 27-32.
27Popp, Evolution’s First Philosopher, 39.
28Dewey, MW12, 129.
29Ibid., 128.
30Määttänen, Mind in Action, 23.
31Dewey, LW1, 28, 232, also Dewey, The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. Volume 4: 1929, The Quest for Certainty (LW4),
194, 206.
32Dewey, LW4, 236.
33Ibid.

64 R. Ruoppa
environment differ considerably from the goals that animals from other species strive for. Furthermore, the
scope of human perception, generally, enhances the capability to respond to unforeseen problems and,
also, supports effective utilisation of attained results. Yet, no amount of cognitive capacity liberates human
beings from the basic fact that throughout the lifetime of an organism one problematic situation is followed
by another.³ In short, no absolute or all-encompassing solutions exist for the problem of knowledge; only
improvement in the methods of obtaining further enriched experiences.³
The previous notion points to the fact that all forms of knowledge, including the scientific, are operational
in the most profound sense. The historical processes of natural evolution do render possible and affect, but
do not define or dictate, the formation of these operations. Moreover, natural sciences employed relational
operations even during the times when concepts such as mass and motion were viewed as intrinsic and
immutable properties of objects.³ However, Einstein’s challenge to the Newtonian absolutes of space and
time prompted a comprehensive re-evaluation. These new ideas transformed the understanding of the role
of relations as well as that of operations in the formation of scientific concepts.³
With the surrender of unchangeable substances having properties fixed in isolation and unaffected by interactions, must
go the notion that certainty is attained by attachment to fixed objects with fixed characters. For not only are no such objects
found to exist, but the very nature of experimental method, namely, definition by operations that are interactions, implies
that such things are not capable of being known. Henceforth the quest for certainty becomes the search for methods of
control; that is, regulation of conditions of change with respect to their consequences.³
Acceptance of the concrete restrictions imposed upon human beings by the structure of nature compels
the renouncement of all epistemological premises that transgress these limits. Eternal transcendent truths
or immutable realms of other ‘more real’ realities are clearly in direct violation to anything encountered or
created by humanity. Therefore, such fantasies should occupy no fundamental position in the structure
of knowledge – neither in premises nor in goals. For Dewey, the fact that classical philosophy and certain
accounts of natural science often rely on various antecedent existences positions them in the same category
as religion.³ Thus, instead of being regarded as solutions, they become an obstruction to knowledge. This
applies equally to the actual attainment of knowledge as well as to the comprehension of its proper office. I
conclude this chapter with Dewey’s uncompromising description of the effects and benefits that accompany
the acceptance of the Darwinian hypothesis.
The naturalistic method, when it is consistently followed, destroys many things once cherished; but it destroys them by
revealing their inconsistency with the nature of things – a flaw that always attended them and deprived them of efficacy
for aught save emotional consolation. But its main purport is not destructive; empirical naturalism is rather a winnowing
fan. Only chaff goes, though perhaps the chaff had once been treasured. An empirical method which remains true to nature
does not “save”; it is not an insurance device nor a mechanical antiseptic. But it inspires the mind with courage and vitality
to create new ideals and values in the face of the perplexities of a new world.
5 Dewey’s conception of art and science
Dewey’s reform of philosophical foundations brings about considerable revisions in the concepts of art and
science. However, it is first necessary to analyse how the conception of ‘concept’ itself is understood after the
naturalisation of philosophy. For example, it is no longer tenable to assign any metaphysical significance to
concepts. Instead, all concepts are to be defined through operations which form a coherent set.¹ A concept
34Ibid.
35Ibid., 235-236.
36Ibid., 102.
37Ibid., 102-103.
38Ibid., 103.
39Dewey, LW1, 34.
40Ibid., 4.
41Dewey, LW4, 89.

John Dewey’s Theory of Aesthetic Experience: Bridging the Gap Between Arts and Sciences 65
is always recognised, cultivated, and utilised in human activity. This applies equally to overt actions and
thought processes. Generally, Dewey defines conceptions as platforms for responding to situations.² These
facilities are based on prior experiences and originate, as well as develop, in accordance with cognitive
faculties such as the capacity for language use. In other words, the continuous progression of concepts is
conjoined with, but not solely determined by, forms of human communication. Concepts, as inherently
hypothetical, comprise possible eventualities if a certain action is taken. They are verified through concrete
outcomes of activity and can, accordingly, be modified or discarded if they fail to meet expectations.³ Once
established a concept may factually effect future eventualities and experiences which ensue from its own
emergence. Nevertheless, even the most elaborate conceptual thought constructions remain subordinate to
the physical foundations of nature itself. Thus, no compelling reasons exist for favouring the former over
the latter as the outset or the endpoint of any epistemology.
Furthermore, Dewey deems any fundamental separation between art and science as misguided. For
him art, in the broadest sense, is a successful integration of means and ends in human activity. However,
in anything genuinely artistic the success is not of the type measured in mere monetary compensation.
Art necessitates that the intentional integration has to be thoroughly connected to the experience of
attaining meaningful goals of life. Science, in turn, is an exceptionally well refined intentional mode of
operational activity, which aids in the expansion, as well as the actualisation, of the potential of various
arts. The scientific is defined by the comprehensive efforts that are undertaken in order to verify and
communicate relevant aspects of prevailing issues. In short, science is problem solving without any
prearranged commitments to a specific methodological framework, such as the natural scientific. Arts
can be approached scientifically, as is often the case when a thorough study about the relations between
available means and desired ends is conducted. A struggle to establish secured relations between materials
and procedures describes an essential part of the working practices of both artists in their studios as
well as scientists in their laboratories. Even with the latter the valuable discoveries are not necessarily
predetermined by prior natural scientific conceptions or ideals. Promoting a methodological pluralism in
science distinguishes Dewey’s naturalism as ‘soft’ from the ‘hard’ naturalism of natural sciences. For him,
empirical observations of natural relations neither have to be limited nor reduced to those that are studied
in physical sciences. For example, relations between operations and consequences in social affairs can be
subjected to scientific empirical inquiries, which can be formal and useful without being mathematical.
I conclude this discussion about means and ends with a brief overview of the concept of intelligence.
When the relationship between action and consequence becomes the object of reflective thought,
associations of further connections begin to emerge in the human mind. These prospective relations suggest
forms of concrete activity which, in the end, confirm or falsify the validity of contemplated hypothetical
relations. The capability to produce hypothetical scenarios that practical testing affirms in experience
is the essence of intelligence. Dewey states that “The action and its consequence must be joined in
perception. This relationship is what gives meaning; to grasp it is the objective of all intelligence.” In
addition, Dewey recommends using the adverb ‘intelligently’, as it better captures the active nature of the
term. All intelligently performed operations share the cognitive phase of integration regardless of their
contextual setting. Fine art, natural science and other sophisticated modes of activity are all alike in this
most profound respect.
42Dewey, MW12, 162-163.
43Ibid., also Dewey, The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. Volume 12: 1938, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (LW12), 343.
44Dewey, LW1, 277.
45Ibid., 269.
46Dewey, LW4, 99-100.
47Määttänen, Mind in Action, 2.
48Dewey, LW1, 126.
49Dewey, The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. Volume 10: 1934, Art as Experience (LW10), 51.
50Dewey, LW1, 126.

66 R. Ruoppa
6 The role of evolutionary theory in scholarly practices
Today a considerable part of the academic discussion remains fixated upon saving the treasured ethos of
classical philosophy in one way or another. It is not difficult to find examples of the type of thinking in which
the theory of evolution is accepted in principle but, nevertheless, denied of its full reformatory potential.
Consider, for example, the following argument that “…evolutionary theory may provide an additional
explanatory layer, but it does not easily replace more established discourses in the humanities.”¹ This
statement explicitly contravenes Dewey’s philosophical enterprise. Dewey does, in fact, completely replace
the outdated discourses in all forms of traditional inquiry. Moreover, he does so with an epistemology that
starts out from, but does not limit itself to, natural evolution. However, the main problem with the above
quote is found in the context in which it is put forth. In this framework the theory of evolution is often
viewed as a purely natural scientific product: a derivate of antecedent scientific ideals, which themselves
remain unaffected by the emergence of the theory of natural evolution. In other words, evolutionary theory
is not accepted as a fundamental premise replacing those formed prior to Darwin’s efforts.
Today many evolutionary scholars favour a reduction of all humanities to a natural scientific
paradigm.² Yet, Darwin’s ideas, when consistently followed, do not lead to a single universal solution
for all conceivable problems. Neither do they imply that, in the end, all problems have a mathematical
formulation. The important takeaway from these notions is that certain natural scientific accounts
incorporate, even if implicitly, epistemological aspects from classical philosophy that contradict Darwinian
ideas. An inclination towards a pre-Darwinian way of thinking has considerable consequences for research
modes. For example, it is common to observe that the Darwinian theory of evolution is assigned to an
intermediate role between premises and ends that predate the evolutionary theory itself. Such attempts
underline the desire to preserve the high esteem of the reductionistic ideals of classical philosophy.
In contrast to the tradition of natural sciences, which often suffers from implicit pre-Darwinian
influences, several accounts of traditional humanities remain openly pre-Darwinian.³ For example, mind-
body dualism still remains as an acceptable viewpoint in many philosophical discussions. Furthermore,
cultural studies often rely on archaic concepts. Dewey would agree on the problematic nature of both
issues. As previously noted, Dewey unambiguously rejects mind-body dualism. On the other hand, the use
of ancient, or generally imprecise, conceptual tools is a more complex matter, and it comprises the topic of
the following section.
7 Argument for humanities
Dewey rejects natural scientific reductionism as an all encompassing principle. Therefore, it is important
to examine the ways in which his philosophical position supports the scientific standing of the humanities
– terminology included. Dewey’s view regarding concepts and vocabulary is generally permissive; those
should be applied that solve the encountered problematic situation in a desirable manner. Nevertheless,
the referents of any terminology should be confined to a causally closed nature. In Dewey’s philosophy
teleological concepts, such as ‘purposes’ for example, do not refer to fundamental existences but to
emergent modes of directing and controlling practical activity. ‘Aspirations’ take place within the natural
sphere of concrete experience, which comprises the sole point of reference for the diverse language used to
describe them. The use of ‘human aspiration’ in the sense of a transcendent category is pre-Darwinian and
should, therefore, be avoided.
Even though terms and concepts refer only to natural objects, events and features, methodological
pluralism is, nonetheless, needed. This is due to the fact that, for example, mathematical exactness does not
51Rampley, The Seductions, 14.
52Ibid., 4-6, 132.
53Ibid., 6, 132.
54Ibid., 132.
55Dewey, LW10, 65.

John Dewey’s Theory of Aesthetic Experience: Bridging the Gap Between Arts and Sciences 67
necessarily produce the best results in every imaginable situation. Of course, the world does contain aspects
and relations that are most comprehensively revealed and developed with mathematical concepts. Yet,
nature’s complexity also holds emergent forms of interaction which, clearly, do not submit to mathematical
formalism. In most challenges of life the experienced problematic situation is so indeterminate that it
escapes all exact definitions. Thus, even the most educated mathematicians do not apply their professional
competence in all life’s situations. Such attempts comprise the material of fictional comedy – rarely of
actual life. In the end, it is difficult to deny that human beings, as well as other animals, have successfully
developed means for overcoming problems that defy mathematical or natural scientific formulations.
If concepts such as ‘holy’, for example, are used to describe organic experiential states of an individual
person, they can be of practical use in various problematic situations. Furthermore, the alignment of
associative materials does not need to be total in order to improve co-operation between conscious agents.
For example, organisers of a festival can ask the musicians to play something ‘uplifting’ to enhance the
mood of the ongoing event. In such a situation a somewhat common experiential understanding of the term
‘uplifting’ is adequate in directing the choice of a song and the mode of its performance with regard to the
end-in-view. A successful execution of the request does not necessitate a complete and exact theoretical
category of uplifting music that every party involved in the situation can agree upon. When discussions
about possible consequences result in an agreement, which in itself does not have to be absolute or exact, it
is a strong indication of a sufficient overlap in the experienced premises as well. Overall, a perfect cohesion
of concepts is not mandatory in any phase of productive and successful social activity – or in the formation
of knowledge about it. Inarticulate indefiniteness is a considerable part of human life. Yet, it is possible to
obtain desirable, even if not ideal, results from vague starting points. And science, as a refined continuation
of other practices of life, is no different. Problems vary in their exactness and the concepts used to solve
them have to adjust accordingly. In most circumstances prototypical examples with fuzzy boundaries
suffice.
What makes an attitude scientific, in distinction from common sense, is the intentional engagement in
discovery and confirmation of relevant relations in a given problem. This principle does not necessitate
exact definitions or all-encompassing final solutions. Accuracy does not amount to total correspondence
or ideal exactness. Dewey implies that a mindset which deems anything less than perfect or absolute as
unscientific can be seen as originating from pre-Darwinian ideals.
The fact seems to be that uncritical adherence to Aristotelian conceptions has combined with the prestige of physics, espe-
cially of mathematical physics, to generate the conception that physics is not only the most advanced form of scientific
inquiry (which it undeniably is), but that it alone is scientific in nature.
Dewey’s own conception of science, on the other hand, is based on a view according to which all concepts
are more or less vague. They range from elaborate mathematical accuracy to less precise models of human
behaviour. Moreover, if human activity is most securely predicted and directed with the use of indeterminate
concepts such as ‘uplifting’ or ‘passion’, they should be employed instead of, say, mathematical ones. This
concerns the practice of science, as it is, after all, a problem-solving enterprise. The previous example of
directing human behaviour indicates that the methods of natural science are not synonymous with scientific
rigour. This esteemed thoroughness arises from continuously taking the appropriate measures to identify
and overcome the integral aspects of a prevailing problem. Dogmatic demands to uphold only a small
section of the entire methodological spectrum do not improve the human ability to control occurrences in
science or otherwise.
56Dewey, LW12, 245.
57Ibid., 434.

68 R. Ruoppa
8 Dewey’s definition of fine art
Dewey’s reform of scientific conceptions has an equally comprehensive counterpart in his revision of the concept
of fine art. Moreover, Dewey’s criticism of classical art theory echoes in tone and principle that of his work on
traditional philosophy and science. Both target the pre-Darwinian premises and goals of traditional accounts.
But, to my mind, the trouble with existing theories is that they start from a ready-made compartmentalization, or from a
conception of art that “spiritualizes” it out of connection with the objects of concrete experience. The alternative, however,
to such spiritualization is not a degrading and Philistinish materialization of works of fine art, but a conception that
discloses the way in which these works idealize qualities found in common experience.
This leads to a number of important points about the concept of fine art. Perhaps the most crucial one
is the separation of a work of art from an art object. The former is an experience, whereas the latter is a
material construction. The dynamics between the two form the core of Dewey’s conception of fine art.
In his theory physical objects are constructed for the purpose of producing certain types of experiences
in the individuals who interact with them. The producer assumes that if her personal interaction with an
art-object produces the desired type of experience in herself, it might possibly do so in others as well.
This procedure underlies the social aspects as well as the communicatory dimension of art.¹ In practice,
an artist uses her own experience as a guide for transforming existing materials of nature.² It makes no
difference whether the material consists of human bodies on a stage, pigments on a canvas, or movements
of air as in music.³ The principle holds nonetheless. A work is complete when the materials evoke the
correct type of experience, which denotes the emergence of a work of art. In short, the artist creates an art-
object based on qualities of personal experience. However, a work of art is not complete until an audience
interacts with the art-object and in doing so experiences the object aesthetically. If an object fails to bring
about an aesthetic experience in any individual it cannot be conceived as art-object. However, no physical
object or event can be aesthetically experienced as art by everyone. The plurality of cultural backgrounds
and individual histories among audiences is too diverse. Yet, in the absence of totally universal art-objects,
a considerable overlap in the experienced qualities among human beings does exist. The human ability to
produce works of art as experience is nearly universal.
9 Fine art, science and the constitution of aesthetic experience
The above description of fine art holds mutatis mutandis also of scientific practices. The intentional
production of distinct types of experienced outcomes through methodological or explorative activity is
essential to scientific operations as well. In addition, fine arts and formal sciences both require specific
cultural education from the engaging audience. The common factor for all parties involved in science and
fine art is that everyone experiences the consequences of taking action when faced with a problematic
situation. In both fields the modes of actively taking up a challenge, whether it be construction or
interpretation of objects, affect the experienced outcome.
58Dewey, LW10, 1 7.
59Ibid., 167, 218, 313, also Määttänen, “Emotionally Charged Aesthetic Experience”, 93, also Määttänen, “Emotions, Values,
and Aesthetic Perception”, 94.
60Dewey, LW10, 55, 111, also Määttänen, “Emotionally”, 94, 98.
61Määttänen, “Emotionally”, 94.
62Ibid., also Dewey, LW10, 55.
63Dewey, LW10, 53.
64Määttänen, “Emotionally”, 94.
65Ibid.
66Ibid., 93-94, also Määttänen, “Emotions”, 94, also Dewey, LW10, 110.

John Dewey’s Theory of Aesthetic Experience: Bridging the Gap Between Arts and Sciences 69
‘Consummatory overcoming of meaningful challenges’ summarises in a crude form the gist of Dewey’s
aesthetic theory. One starting point for understanding this key process can be found in the animal
grace. For example, every aspect of the structure, as well as the activity, of a hunting cheetah fits the
purpose. In the act of foray the feline does not reflectively contemplate the relations between actions and
consequences. Instead, it lives them in a state of an instinctually heightened awareness. Similar functions
take place in a performing musician, who consciously thinks over individual aspects of the performative
task predominantly in the training of personal skills – less so in an actual performance. The development of
a musician requires that the conscious and clumsy contemplation of individual sounds and their relations
transforms into an automatic and instinctual use. Only then it is possible to intuitively play an instrument
in a way that can be experienced as aesthetic and expressive by most audiences. In other words, reflective
thought is beneficial in the process of understanding the relevant aspects of a given problem. However,
conscious awareness can become an obstruction for intuitive execution of the solution.
The challenges a performing musician faces are different from those of a mathematician. Yet, the latter,
also, benefits from intuitive and instinctive modes of thought. Of course, reflective thinking is required in
the process of learning the historical structures and accepted operations of mathematics. Nevertheless, the
competence for challenging or extending these existing structures requires more than mere comprehension
and rote memory. By the time a mathematician reaches a level of reformative skill, she should have
internalised a considerable number of mathematical operations to the point of their becoming instinctive.
Otherwise, the task of producing new and elaborate mathematical constructions becomes overwhelming.
The level on which a mathematician operates does not, in itself, determine the aesthetic quality of
engaging in such activity. Solving mathematical problems of any kind contains a consummatory aspect,
which is a necessary component in the constitution of an aesthetic experience. However, with professional
mathematicians an immersion into a state of primary experience affects not only personal enjoyment but
also the overall development of the academic discipline.
Neither the mathematical environment of abstract relations nor the cultural sphere of artistic practices are
that of the savannah. Yet, all forms of intuitive execution overlap to an extent. This applies to an organism’s
engagement with the types of challenges it is most comprehensively trained to overcome. With intuitive expertise
the meanings of objects in the environment, including the capabilities of the organism itself, are no longer
consciously verified but subconsciously relied on. In the case of human beings, derivative conceptions often
precede and follow this type of intuitive activity. Therefore, an expert’s immersion into an aesthetic struggle can
include internalised products of reflective thought. On the level of primary experience these conscious objects
of thought lose their defining, and in some cases restrictive, distinctions. However, their intuitive meanings
and possibilities are not lost but subconsciously enriched and expanded. A free and imaginative interplay of
affordances ensues in a way that only human beings are capable of. And when this intuitive juggling of qualities
and relations produces an aesthetic experience, it is time to revive conscious modes of reflection.
In human activity it is conscious reflection that determines the proper context for the fruits of intuitive
thinking. Sometimes it is the litterbin. Other times their most suitable context is found in a totally different
discipline than the one they originate from. For example, intuitively promising medical experiments can
fail to cure patients, yet they can flourish in a gallery of contemporary art. Similarly, the activity of an
artist can produce outcomes that predominantly excites the minds of the scientific community. An aesthetic
experience is only an indication of the fact that parts are assembled, even if only in imagination, to a new
consummatory whole that relates to prior forms of the successful overcoming of challenges. Moreover,
during evolutionary development a considerable amount of successful activity has been subconscious and
primal. In other words, the basis for the emergence of primary aesthetic experience is one that human
beings share with animal ancestors. Although, in addition to animal operations the blended experience of a
modern human being always includes reflected aspects from the cultural plane as well. In a deep aesthetic
immersion these socially constructed conceptions take a subconscious form and affect accordingly.
67Dewey, LW10, 22, 25.
68Ibid., 24.
69Ibid.
70Ibid., 198.

70 R. Ruoppa
10 Deweyan alternative specified
The Deweyan alternative to the bridging of the gap between natural sciences and humanities diverges from
the more prevalent types of efforts. In order to make the contrast more explicit, it is essential to clarify how
Dewey’s philosophical argumentation relates to the specifics of the more common forms of the debate;
parallelisms exist, but the differences are, nevertheless, substantial. In the following discourse I highlight
Matthew Rampley’s recent study about the relation between the two research traditions.¹ In his approach
Rampley is highly critical of the all-inclusive reductionism of natural sciences. In addition, he acknowledges
the most blatant excesses of the humanities. Yet, Rampley’s work, also, incorporates undertones from
classical philosophy, which, predominantly, lead him towards intractable differences between natural
sciences and humanities instead of correspondences.
In his discussion about knowledge Rampley contends that “Exponents of evolutionary aesthetics
assume that since in general the theory of evolution is not contested, and that since, as materialists, few
hold to a dualistic theory of mind, it must follow that the theory of evolution must provide the bedrock for
the understanding of human cultural practices. Yet even for ontological monists it does not follow that
there must be a single unified field of knowledge, unless one ignores the diverse interests that motivate
inquiry.”² For the main part this particular argument can be viewed as consistent with Dewey’s thinking.
However, the Deweyan approach I present in this paper takes the issue further; even if various fields of
knowledge exist with numerous methodological practices, all of them come together in the one general
mode of human experience. Experiential understanding of the relation between initial states of affairs and
consequent outcomes through action underlies all modes of inquiry. This relation is often stated, even if
implicitly, in the propositional form of ‘if–then’ and it alone comprises the object of knowledge. In other
words, even if no ‘single unified field of knowledge’ exists, as Rampley points out, Dewey’s operational
concept of knowledge is a generalisation that applies to all forms of inquiry. Hence, the operational principle
of knowing can be found in all various fields of knowledge regardless of their other differentiating factors.³
Rampley’s views can be seen as aligning with Dewey’s in the matter of defining fine art as being
conditioned by the social sphere that exists between individuals in a society. Moreover, Rampley argues
that purely biological definitions of art must make way for more comprehensive explanations. Dewey,
likewise, renounces purely biological explanations. However, for Dewey, the necessary broadening of
explanatory methods does not mean fundamental distancing from Darwinism. This is due to the fact that
Dewey does not identify the theory of evolution exclusively with biology or natural sciences. In his soft
naturalism the acceptance of the concrete implications of evolutionary theory precedes the understanding
of the proper office of all intellectual efforts. For Dewey, natural evolution describes one of the many
conditions for the constitution of knowledge in its entirety. Dewey’s philosophy accepts Darwinian
ontology, and at the same time it is free from the premises of hard scientific reductionism. In other words,
Darwinian ideas yield a naturalistic general epistemology as an outset for all sciences, including biology.
Therefore, biological concepts should be based on Darwinian ones and not the other way around. However,
reciprocal development is, of course, allowed in the network of nature. Within said framework biology
aids in understanding the interrelation of nature and culture. In the end, the way in which the expansion
beyond biological explanations of art takes place makes all the difference. The expansion should not be
channelled towards, or by, a classical separation of nature and culture. Otherwise unyielding problems for
the project of bridging the gap between natural sciences and humanities will inevitably arise.
71See Rampley, The Seductions.
72Ibid., 43.
73Dewey, LW4, 157-159, also Dewey, LW10, 50.
74Rampley, The Seductions, 101.
75Ibid., 134.
76Dewey, LW10, 319, also Dewey, LW12, 49.
77Dewey, LW4, 183-184.
78Ibid., 164, also Dewey, LW12, 62-63, 205-206.
79Dewey, LW4, 156-157.

John Dewey’s Theory of Aesthetic Experience: Bridging the Gap Between Arts and Sciences 71
In principle, Dewey would agree with Rampley’s statement that “It may be that the sense of beauty is
descendent from earlier responses to visual display in mating rituals and is thus rooted in sexual selection,
but such distant origins have long since been overwritten by layers of cultural meanings, which are precisely
what concern art and cultural historians.” However, even if the constitution of cultural meanings is not
dictated by natural evolution alone, in this paper I posit the view that the philosophical tradition has,
generally, misunderstood the process of overwriting. Cultural development is based on multiple forms of
interactions in the network of nature described by Dewey. It is important to keep in mind that natural
evolution is only one of the processes taking place within this dynamic network of relations. An exhaustive
analysis of all natural components that may possibly effect cultural development is not mandatory for
understanding the fallacy of traditional pre-Darwinian philosophy. It suffices to say that culture does not
originate out of the a priori blue. Furthermore, cultural development is not directed by any transcendent
entities, whether they be envisioned as immutable categories, laws of reason or, simply, gods. More probable
explanations for cultural evolution and the origins of social practices have been conceived. For example,
Merlin Donald’s elucidation of mimetic culture as a precursor for a linguistic culture is a description which
does not suffer from the unnecessary burden of archaic thought.¹ Overall, Dewey maintains that culture
is a product of nature, and the former bears the characteristics of the latter in one form of continuity or
another.² In other words, culture may overwrite distant natural origins but it does not render all of them
completely irrelevant.
In an explicit appeal to classical pre-Darwinian authorities, Rampley states that “Clearly, the aesthetic
response to art does draw on certain general capacities, but the tradition of thinking since Kant has
been concerned to articulate the very particular ways in which it does so, so as to distinguish between
aesthetic and other kinds of experience.”³ It appears that Rampley deems Kantian theory and its equally
pre-Darwinian derivatives as suitable conceptual tools for assessing the role of evolutionary theory. In
aesthetics, both Dewey and Kant analyse the same phenomenon. Nevertheless, their theories about the
aesthetic are completely different. The latter builds his theory primarily upon modes of existence which
Darwinism renders questionable – if not totally erroneous. The anti-Kantian aesthetics of Dewey, on the
other hand, is based on observable natural phenomena, including cultural and social ones, that align
with twenty-first century sciences. In this framework the aesthetic, as a quality of the overall experience of
living, is always integrally entangled with various other modes of experiencing. Hence, the aesthetic is not
isolated as an autonomous category in any Kantian sense.
For Dewey, the arrangement of natural and everyday materials in the ongoing experience of life can,
and often does, contain tints of aesthetic quality. However, in order for an experience to become aesthetic in
the emphatic sense, the aesthetic quality must grow into its defining feature. Dewey uses the example of a
storm, which stands out from other more tranquil phases of a journey across sea, as in ‘that storm’. In such
an event the sensory qualities of the ongoing situation align with future expectations and the background
of past experiences in an especially unified experiential whole; life suddenly becomes real in the concrete –
not just in contemplation. An exceptional meal served at a dinner can alter the life path of an individual who
abruptly decides to become a chef, after which she can reminisce about ‘that dish’ that stood out from the
rest as changing everything. Of course not all genuinely aesthetic experiences need to be life changing in
the most profound sense, but they, nevertheless, have to strike the very being of the experiencing individual
to the point of affecting a positive personal commotion.
The aesthetic takes over as the dominant quality of experience only in situations that are, consciously
or subconsciously, deemed as especially relevant for personal being, communal life or both. Such are the
situations that artists intend to produce for audiences with their own bodies or some other natural materials.
80Rampley, The Seductions, 14.
81Donald, A Mind, 261, 263.
82Dewey, LW10, 34.
83Rampley, The Seductions, 103.
84Dewey, LW10, 84-85, 257.
85Ibid., 43.

72 R. Ruoppa
Scientists, also, deal with relevant aspects of the world to the point of actual matters of life and death: an
opportune environment for the emergence of aesthetic experience in the full. Accordingly, uncertainty in
a relevant situation is always needed. If a situation does not contain a challenge which can be overcome
in a consummatory fashion, or a challenge exists but it relates to an irrelevant situation, the aesthetic
quality of experience is fleeting at most. Natural evolution provides the basic mechanisms for carrying out
experiential assessments of the relevance of a situation, at least as far as the immediate continuity of life is
concerned. However, Dewey’s theory explains how these natural mechanisms of evaluation remain active
in cultural environments such as the art world and the scientific tradition of accumulating knowledge. For
him the aesthetic is not a self-sustaining category that exists independently of other experiential factors
and modes. It is a quality of the experience of life that varies in intensity with the particularities of the
situation.
In his treatise Rampley briefly notes the full extent of the Darwinian revolution in general epistemology.
Yet, Rampley mainly discusses the theory of evolution as if it were, first and foremost, a natural scientific
concept and in stark opposition to the tradition of the humanities. Dewey, in contrast, views the Darwinian
subversion as primarily a philosophical matter, which brings a comprehensive revision to all modes of
classical thought, including that of natural science. Appropriately, the object of knowledge is deprived of
any self-sustaining position. It is relocated within the natural processes of practical activity and concrete
experience done and undergone respectively by living organisms. This move establishes an inherent
connection between all modes of inquiry and, therefore, various fields of research. Thus, Dewey avoids the
problems that ensue from superimposing the theory of natural evolution to a multiplicity of predetermined
ideals. From a Deweyan viewpoint it seems that Rampley’s work exemplifies the common tendency to
underestimate the obstruction that certain background assumptions of classical philosophy pose to the
goal of bridging the gap between arts and sciences. Or, at the very least, it is difficult to believe that major
breakthroughs will follow from the further development of accounts that contain emphatic echoes of a
pre-Darwinian epoch. Rejection of isolated and autonomous categories is necessary for comprehending
the inherent relationship between different forms of human activity; especially when subordination and
superficial pleasantries are to be replaced with a profound connection between research disciplines.
11 Concluding remarks
Dewey’s philosophical naturalism is an approach that describes science, and to certain extent also
human life, as problem solving. A common ground for all forms of knowledge is thus established through
a perception of verifiable relations between initial states of affairs (problems) and consequent outcomes
(solutions) by active agents in nature. In this process an aesthetic quality of experience arises when the
challenge of a problematic initial situation is perceived to be overcome in a consummatory fashion. In
other words, well-founded, even if subconsciously so, anticipation of future success can evoke an aesthetic
experience, which, then, can direct further operations in a diversity of areas such as fine art and science. An
emotional aesthetic experience is a sign that activity proceeds on a new path that, nevertheless, possesses
some resemblance to those that have led to satisfaction in the past. Furthermore, this past extends all the
way to the evolutionary origins of human beings.
In fine art the novel path has to be exceptionally intense as well as enduring to the degree that the mere
being on such a path brings about a consummatory satisfaction to persons following it; suggestions are
enjoyed as suggestions from which ensues an enriched experience as the conclusive consummation. The
very same aesthetic quality that is found to be enjoyed by artists and audiences alike benefit the scientific
effort; not always but frequently enough to warrant the assertion of the importance of such emotional
experiences in scientific discoveries. However, scientific operations necessitate experiential verification
beyond even the most well founded emotional anticipation of success. The promise of desired consequences
86Rampley, The Seductions, 131.
87Dewey, LW10, 202-203.

John Dewey’s Theory of Aesthetic Experience: Bridging the Gap Between Arts and Sciences 73
observed in material objects has to be actualised in a new material object of importance other than, and in
addition to, the object of factual experience. That is to say, in scientific operations a consummation follows
from the experienced confirmation of concrete results that occur after the encouraging initial material has
run its course not only in imaginative perception but in physical surroundings as well.
For Dewey, the theory of natural evolution describes one of the initial premises that necessarily affects all
further modes of human endeavour, including the formation of knowledge. Therefore, all attempts to retrofit
Darwin’s ideas to traditional philosophic and scientific frameworks remain futile. The most prominent pre-
Darwinian premises and ideals found in classical philosophy do not lead to natural Darwinian continuities.
And, conversely, Darwinian ideas used as premises do not indicate the concrete existence of anything
eternally immutable or exactly definable on any level of reality. Furthermore, a considerable amount
of empirical evidence supports the theory of natural evolution. The traditional ideals and premises of
classical philosophy, on the other hand, rely predominantly on customary institutional hegemony and the
human desire for clear solutions. Therefore, the former can be viewed as a more productive and grounded
foundation for any type of epistemology. Natural evolution as a premise, also, aids in understanding the
integrative aspects of aesthetic experience and their role in contemporary human progression.
From Dewey’s viewpoint, the gap between arts and sciences never existed in the form defined by
classical philosophy and science. Instead, the demarcation of modes of human activity follows from
observed results and the consequential use of these results in further challenges that exhibit distinct
experiential characteristics. Natural sciences and humanities diverge only after such differentiation is
useful and needed in the overall development of human culture and living standards. Names of disciplines
are derivative descriptions that reflect the natural emergence of diversity of human goals as well as the
intentional means of attaining them. Moreover, natural sciences and humanities function alike through
the experience of a human being engaged in activity – whether it be concrete, ideational or a combination
of both. Dewey’s aesthetic theory indicates that no physiological differences exist between the aesthetic of
fine art and the aesthetic of science. His description of the shared experiential foundation constitutes an
alternative basis for the development of the dialogue between natural sciences and humanities. It begins
with a natural connection instead of trying to search for one after different areas of intellectual effort are
a priori separated as autonomous categories. Thus, Dewey’s theory avoids the pitfalls of subordination
and superficiality. Furthermore, it designates the proper office as well as the ‘resolution’ of aesthetics. I
conclude with Dewey’s own words:
The nature of experience is determined by the essential conditions of life. While man is other than bird and beast, he
shares basic vital functions with them and has to make the same basal adjustments if he is to continue the process of
living. Having the same vital needs, man derives the means by which he breathes, moves, looks and listens, the very brain
with which he coordinates his sense and his movements, from his animal forbears. The organs with which he maintains
himself in being are not of himself alone, but by the grace of struggles and achievements of a long line of animal ancestry.
Fortunately a theory of the place of the esthetic in experience does not have to lose itself in minute details when it
starts with experience in its elemental form. Broad outlines suffice. The first great consideration is that life goes on in an
environment; not merely in it but because of it, through interaction with it. No creature lives merely under its skin; its sub-
cutaneous organs are means of connection with what lies beyond its bodily frame, and to which, in order to live, it must
adjust itself, by accommodation and defense but also by conquest.
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