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Food security and political unrest in Pakistan: Case study report*
July 2018
Edward Newman†
Summary key points
• Four key factors have characterized Pakistan’s food security outlook in recent
decades: i) The country’s broad development challenges mean that a
significant proportion of its population is relatively poor and exposed to food
insecurity, including prices shocks, such as those which occurred between
2007 and 2011; ii) Pakistan is vulnerable to natural disasters, and these have
had a severe impact upon the country’s food security, in particular for the
most deprived communities; iii) Pakistan’s food security challenges are often
compounded by the military security problems that are found in some areas of
the country; and iv) the country has experienced challenges related to political
and economic governance which extend to the management of agriculture and
the nutritional needs of the population. These key factors are compounded by
the inflationary impact of ‘middlemen’ practices, and transportation
challenges. As a result of these factors, food security has been a key challenge
for the country, and in particular at a time of rising food prices. The 2018
National Food Security Policy builds upon progress in a number of social and
economic areas. However, further progress towards food security involves a
number of major ongoing challenges.
• National/city level data from the Food and Agricultural Organisation and the
World Food Programme indicates significant food prices rises in food staples
from 2007 onwards, which may be associated with these (above) inflationary
drivers, as well as the impact of international food price increases.
• A significant number (19) of major incidents (large food protests,
demonstrations or riots) linked to grievances over food prices and availability
were recorded in Pakistan in the 2005-2015 period. There is evidence that
food security is politicized in the country, and may be linked with instability
or potential instability in a number of ways. The link between food insecurity
and recruitment into militant groups suggests that food insecurity plays a role
in the military challenges which exist in some regions of the country. In
addition, some analysts have suggested that food insecurity and rising food
prices play a role in broader instability and potential instability, fueling
grievances related to governance, corruption, and public service delivery.
• However, well-established networks and practices of informal social
protection and coping mechanisms exist – in particular aimed at the provision
of food for poor communities – which are often not reflected in official
welfare surveys. These offer a significant level of protection for the poorest
communities, and to a large degree mitigate the impact of food price inflation.
Moreover, many of these households – especially in rural areas – have the
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*!This paper is based upon research conducted as a part of the project ‘Soaring International
Food Prices and Political Upheaval in Fragile Food Exporting Countries: Implications for
Food Security Resilience in Qatar’, funded by the Qatar National Research Fund’s National
Priorities Research Program (NPRP-8-1040-5-148). This report draws upon interviews
conducted in Islamabad, Pakistan, in June 2018.!
†!School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, e.newman@leeds.ac.uk!
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means to some degree of nutritional self-sufficiency. This reduces exposure to
rising food prices, and the likelihood that rising food prices may play a role in
driving instability.
• Lower-income working households – whose income puts them outside the
voluntary/informal social protection networks – and in particular those in
urban areas, are vulnerable to food price inflation, and potentially more likely
to become politicized in relation to social grievances. However, there is little
evidence that this is a source of serious instability or potential instability in the
country, whether due to opportunity costs or collective action obstacles.
Therefore, the incidents of food riots and other events related to grievances
over food prices are likely to be episodic rather than a reflection of potential
widespread upheaval.
Human development, social protection, and food security
The period between 2007 and 2011 experienced soaring food price increases, food
price volatility, and disruptions in the distribution and availability of basic foodstuffs
in many regions of the world.1 These trends occurred against a longer-term increase in
dependency upon food imports globally, and thus an increasing exposure to
international food price increases.
The rise in international food prices – especially when this is translated into local
markets – has a direct impact upon human security in developing countries, further
deepening the poverty of almost 1 billion people who were already living in
deprivation. According to the FAO, there were 166 million more undernourished
people in poor countries as a result of the first major price spike in 2007-08.2 In turn,
the World Bank estimated that the increase in food prices between mid-June 2010 and
April 2011 led to an estimated 44 million increase in the number of the global poor.3
Research also indicates that low and low-middle-income countries have experienced
higher levels of food price inflation compared to upper-middle and high-income
countries, particularly when international prices spike.4
Large proportions of Pakistan’s population have been vulnerable to food insecurity
since the country was founded.5 In the years leading up to the soaring international
food price increases, Pakistan realized strong economic growth and reduced poverty,
and the country has a wide range of social protection programs.6 The country has also
seen improvements in food production, and it is a major producer of some foodstuffs,
such as wheat. Yet significant numbers of the population remain in impoverishment
and food insecure.7 The Ministry of National Food Security and Research suggests
that this remains a key challenge due to high population growth, rapid urbanization,
low purchasing power, high price fluctuations, erratic food production, and inefficient
food distribution systems.8 Despite a somewhat slowing population growth, its growth
is still considered to be high. The size of Pakistan’s population has been projected to
increases to a size which will make the country the 4th largest nation by 2050.9
Domestic food production is not keeping pace with this population increase, and the
necessary diversification of production has not occurred.
As a general measure of human welfare, the UNDP Human Development Index
demonstrates the challenges faced by the country in terms of meeting income, health,
and education needs, with fairly modest improvements over the 2005-15 period (See
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figure 1.). (Pakistan’s HDI score was 2005: 0.501, 2006: 0.505, 2007: 0.513, 2008:
0.514, 2009: 0.521, 2010: 0.525, 2011: 0.529, 2012: 0.538, 2013: 0.542, 2014: 0.548,
2015: 0.550.10)
Figure 1: Human Development Index for Pakistan. Source: UNDP Human Development Report Office.
Public social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP has generally been
relatively low, for example in 2009 it was 1.7% overall, and excluding healthcare
1.3%. (For comparison, in the same year, India’s overall social protection spending
was 2.6% of GDP, and excluding healthcare it was 1.5%.)11 Despite being a major
exporter of wheat, the country is described as a “Low-income food-deficit country”
by the FAO’s ‘State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World’ report.12 Indeed, the
prevalence (as a percentage of total population) of undernourishment in Pakistan
gives a general indication of significant deprivation, but also marked improvements
(2004-2006: 23.3% undernourishment; 2014-2016: 19.9%). This means that in the
2004-06 period 35.7 million people were regarded as being undernourished, and in
2014-16: 37.6 million.13 Naturally, at the sub-national level, significant regional
variations exist in terms of food insecurity.14 The Global Food Security Index, which
assesses food affordability, availability and quality, confirms only slow improvements
in Pakistan since the index began in 2012. Whilst there are modest improvements to
Pakistan’s Global Food Security Index score, the country’s ranking, relative to
approximately 113 other countries, remained generally static:
2017 Rank: 77. Score out of 100: 47.8.
2016 Rank: 78. Score out of 100: 47.8.
2015 Rank: 77. Score out of 100: 45.7.
2014 Rank: 77. Score out of 100: 43.6.
2013 Rank: 75. Score out of 100: 39.7.
2012 Rank: 75. Score out of 100: 38.5.15
A further general indication of vulnerability to food insecurity is the proportion of
household income that is committed to essential foodstuffs, since the higher this
proportion is, the more exposed households are to – and less able to cope with – price
inflation. The World Bank Global Consumption Database indicates that in 2010 the
average household consumption on food and beverages in Pakistan was 49.99% of
household expenditure. In terms of the lowest segment of households — below $2.97
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per capita a day – the proportion of household expenditure on food and beverages was
as high as 55.67%, and for the low segment — between $2.97 and $8.44 per capita a
day – the proportion was 44.84%.16
Against this backdrop of general food insecurity for significant numbers of the
population, Pakistan has suffered the effects of severe natural hazards – particularly
severe weather – in recent decades, which has had a major impact upon food
production and availability, despite being one of the 7 biggest wheat producing
countries.17 The FAO observed that “The 2010 floods in Pakistan were one of the
most devastating natural disasters of our times – described as a slow motion
tsunami.”18 They affected one-fifth of the territory – including a large section of
Pakistan’s most fertile land – and more than 20 million people, and destroyed 1.6
million homes. 2.4 million hectares of unharvested crops were lost, with damages
estimated as USD 5.1 billion. Smallholder tenant farmers and unskilled labourers bore
the brunt of the impact.19
A further pressure upon Pakistan’s food security situation has come from the ongoing
violent conflict that has affected a number of areas of the country, including major
food-producing areas and areas of deprivation. Inter-linkages between conflict and
food insecurity are compounded in many ways.20 Armed conflict and physical
insecurity disrupt food production – as a result of internal migration and the
disruption of governance – which results in scarcity and price inflation. This is
exacerbated by the impact that violence and insecurity has upon markets and food
distribution. Three million people required emergency food assistance in 2011, and
the food security situation was particularly bad in the conflict-ridden Federally
Administered Tribal Areas along the Pakistan-Afghan border. 21 In turn, food
insecurity can exacerbate insecurity and fuel conflict, driving dispossessed young men
into the ranks of armed groups due to frustration and as a means of finding
sustenance. The relationship between food insecurity and violence/instability has been
identified in a number of regions in Pakistan.22 In addition, the ‘securitized’ mindset
that seems to be institutionalized within successive governments, the bureaucracy,
and the military, has arguably resulted in an over-emphasis upon traditionally-defined
‘national security’ and a neglect of the ‘human security’ needs of individuals and
communities, including access to food and welfare generally.
Soaring food prices, 2007-2011
In this context, Pakistan experienced a considerable impact of rising international
food prices in the 2007-2011 period. Among the Asian countries, the World Bank
judged Pakistan to have experienced “very high” price inflation during the first major
food price spike in 2007-08.23 (By way of comparison, “Between mid‐ 2006 and mid‐
2008, wheat prices in India increased less than 15 percent but those in Pakistan went
up by about 35 percent”24). All the key food price indices confirmed that staple food
prices had increased in Pakistan, including wheat, even though Pakistan is a major
producer and exporter of wheat, and it “had one of the largest increases in wheat
production in 2009-2010.” 25 During these periods of rapid price increase, for
example, “[i]n the one year prior to February 2010 wheat prices rose by 24% in
Lahore,” partly as a result of drought.26 Moreover, food price increases also had a
general inflationary impact on countries – with Pakistan having the biggest inflation
in south Asia.27 During this period, flooding also inflated wheat prices, and due to
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weather related shocks “recent reports suggest that Pakistan’s rice exports may be
35% lower than the previous year”.28
The World Bank indicated that 77% of Pakistan’s households are net buyers of wheat,
which indicates a wide – although uneven – vulnerability to price increases in this
commodity.29 Another staple, rice, also saw steep rises during this period.30 This
compounded an already very challenging food security situation in the country that is
ongoing. According to a World Bank study, “Pakistan, a lower middle-income
country with the sixth largest population in the world, has an exceptionally high level
of child under-nutrition. Its stunting rate, at 45%, ranks worse than 124 out of 132
countries; its wasting rate, at 11%, ranks worse than 106 out of 130 countries; and its
trends in these indicators in relation to the 2025 World Health Assembly targets are
viewed to be off track.”31
Figure 2: Number of people undernourished in Pakistan. Source: FAO.
Against this backdrop, the impact of the 2007-2011 food price crisis can be
demonstrated in a number of ways. A marked negative impact upon households was
recorded in terms of food security. 32 As Figure 2 indicates, the number of
undernourished people in Pakistan started to rise significantly from the time of the
first major international food price spike in 2007. The gap between poor and non-poor
populations was deepened, and so was the inequality between provinces.33 However,
a World Bank report suggests that, to some extent, “rural households were shielded
from the worst effects of the crisis by their capacity to grow their own food” and thus
“Urban households were relatively worse off than rural households during the
crisis.”34 Thus, “price changes were much more dramatic in some districts than
others.” 35 There was also a negative impact on children’s schooling, although this
varied according to gender and economic circumstances.36 Increased social protection
measures – including cash transfers – after 2007 have struggled to alleviate
deprivation due to continued price inflation, regional conflict, and flooding.37
However, informal social protection activities – including the provision of food – by
charities, religious organisations and actors in the agricultural production sector play a
significant role in cushioning the poorest households from food insecurity shocks.
This, according to some analysts, explains why there are not more protests within the
poorer communities in response to food insecurity. 38 These and other coping
mechanisms – such as family support networks – generally prevent people from
extreme malnutrition, as long as they have access to a distribution centre. A further
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factor relevant to the apparent absence of upheaval on the part of the rural poor,
according to a number of analysts, is the high level or religious fatalism amongst
communities. People tend to accept their lot in life.39 In contrast, lower middle class
people are more exposed to soaring food prices, and yet they generally do not
mobilize in significant numbers.
The politics of food insecurity in Pakistan
From a theoretical perspective, Pakistan reflects a number of conditions which point
to a heightened likelihood of instability related to grievances over food prices and
availability. The country has a history of political instability, including a number of
successful coups and coup attempts. Political or sectarian conflict has been an
ongoing characteristic of some regions of the country, the magnitude or intensity of
which would qualify – according to Uppsala Conflict Data Program criteria40 – as
‘armed conflict’ or even ‘civil war’ for many years of the 21st Century.
A number of theoretical links between food insecurity and instability may be relevant
to Pakistan. Existing research suggests that soaring food prices and disruptions in the
availability of food are associated with social unrest in societies which are relatively
poor and have significant inequalities, in situations of political transition or group
domination of power, where state capacity and public service delivery are weak, and
where there are perceptions of clientalism and corruption in government.41 In these
circumstances, protests triggered by rising food prices can become politicized and
represent a vehicle of opposition to governments. In societies which are prone to
unrest and instability, rising food prices may become a ‘lightening rod’ for a broad
range of grievances.
In addition, sharp food price increases might exacerbate inter-communal conflict in
the context of broader social tensions, in particular in situations of horizontal
inequalities (inequalities in societies divided by collective identities). In these
conditions, rising food prices may affect different groups to different degrees,
generating resentment related to broader relative deprivation grievances. Soaring food
prices can also be symptomatic of the declining social welfare and status of certain
sections of society, for whom a major grievance is relative – rather than absolute –
deprivation.
Internal and trans-border migration may result from food scarcity or soaring prices, as
individuals and communities migrate in search of livelihood opportunities, habitable
land, and food. This can generate friction between migrating and settled communities,
and competition over limited resources and public services.
In some, albeit limited, situations, food crises might directly contribute to recruitment
into armed gangs and insurgencies, because membership in such organizations may
provide the means for sustenance – something that the government and the market
may fail to provide. Moreover, the risks of membership become acceptable weighed
against the precariousness of poverty and hunger, and the inability of young men to
provide for their families.
Sharp rises in food prices can act as a ‘lightening rod’ and a mobilizing effect in
societies where there are broader political and social grievances. Often, such rises
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occur alongside price inflation in other essentials, as well as other forms of social
deprivation. In this way, grievances have become mobilized by sharp price increases
in societies which reflect existing drivers of instability, and especially those which are
readily mobilized into political opposition or communal conflict. In these societies,
protests and riots over food shortages and prices can be treated as a proxy for broader
dissatisfaction over a range of social and political issues.
Pakistan’s recent history suggests that some of these theoretical scenarios are
applicable in this case.42 The data above – particular the Human Development and
food insecurity levels – indicate a general level of vulnerability to rising food prices.
The data of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program indicates that Pakistan suffers from
ongoing low and sometimes higher intensity armed conflict. Since 1990 UCDP
recorded 40,022 deaths resulting from political violence in Pakistan (including 32,412
from state-based violence, 3,744 deaths from non-state violence, and 3,866 deaths
from one-sided violence).43 Figure 3 indicates an upsurge of political violence since
2007.
Fig. 3: Deaths from all forms of Political Violence (Pakistan). Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program.
Structural conditions for instability appear to exist in the country. For example, the
World Bank’s measure of social and economic inequality – the gini-coefficient –
suggests relatively high levels of inequality, without a marked improvement.
According to this measure of inequality, where a higher number indicates higher
inequality, Pakistan’s scores were: in 2005: 32.70, in 2007: 31.80, in 2010: 29.80, in
2011: 30.90, and in 2013: 30.70.44 There is also evidence of a sharp historical trend
towards the numbers of people living in urban settings, which has been associated
with instability in various settings. According to World Bank data, between 1955 and
2016, the percentage of Pakistan’s population living in urban centres increased from
22% to 39%.45 It is also notable that there is evidence that urban populations – which
tend to be more inclined towards instability – were relatively more hit by the 2007-11
food price increases.46 Moreover, the Center for Systemic Peace’s ‘Polity IV’ data
characterizes Pakistan as an anocracy, which, again, is often associated with a
heightened risk of instability in conjunction with other factors.47 The country was
scored as ‘5’ in 2009 and ‘6’ in 2010 in Polity’s 21-point scale ranging from -10
(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).
Between 2005 and 2015 Pakistan experienced 19 serious incidents of unrest – riots,
demonstrations, major protests – where grievances over food prices were specifically
identified as a, but not necessarily the only, factor which motivated people involved in
the event.48 This is based upon a survey of 297 incidents of unrest related to
grievances over food prices between 2005 and 2015 in 79 countries. In this survey,
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Pakistan came second to only India (which experienced 80 events) in terms of the
absolute number of events, and as a per capita ratio this puts Pakistan as a country
marked by relatively high levels of food protests. According to one analyst, “rising
food prices could lead to a level of instability which may in turn become critical for
the maintenance of national security. Such a situation has the potential to impact on
the regional and international arenas as well as at the national level, because of
Pakistan’s geo-political strategic importance, and its persistent weak governance.”49
For example, in Bannu (in Waziristan) there was serious rioting – mainly directed
against the authorities – in connection with people displaced by a military operation
against the Taliban who complained of a lack of food.50 During the peak of the food
price crisis, soaring food prices – and the government’s response to this – was also a
broad campaign within Pakistan’s civil society, led by the Human Rights Commission
of Pakistan.51 Hooper warned that, in the case of Pakistan, “rising food prices could
lead to a level of instability which may in turn become critical for the maintenance of
national security. Such a situation has the potential to impact on the regional and
international arenas as well as at the national level, because of Pakistan’s geo-political
strategic importance, and its persistent weak governance.”52
Commentary about the political impact of food insecurity in Pakistan also indicates
grievances related to the price and availability of food reflect broader contestation in
the country. Food riots in 2009 – including a stampede in which 20 women/girls were
killed – present, according to Kugelman, to “a disturbing picture of food insecurity in
Pakistan.”53 This, he claims, has taken place in a context in which food security has
been “under constant threat” in recent years.54
However, the significance of these of riots and other incidence of instability – and in
particular, the question of whether they may reflect an increased likelihood of
upheaval – remains debatable. Observers in Pakistan – civil servants, academics, and
analysts in think tanks – suggest that these events are largely episodic rather than a
reflection of structural instability, or indeed that many such cases would better
defined as a ‘stampede’ rather than a ‘riot’.55 According to this, such events are
certainly a reflection of desperation in times of high food insecurity, but not an
indication of heightened instability in general.
Kugelman notes that the country’s vulnerability to food insecurity is linked to
extreme weather problems, conflict in food-producing regions, hoarding, smuggling,
and internal displacement due to military/security operations. He also claims that food
insecurity in Pakistan is a consequence of “bad management of the wheat economy
and poor stewardship of the agricultural economy as a whole.”56 His study paints a
picture of poor and sometimes corrupt governance which fails to provide services and
goods in a fair and equitable manner, and favouritism towards wealthy, landed, and
politically connected actors.57 Other analysts concur.58 Suleri asks, “Despite a bumper
crop of wheat in 2006-07 (23.3 million metric tonnes), the prices of wheat flour in
Pakistan doubled in the next fiscal year. So, what went wrong?”59
A further challenge has been identified as a concentration of efforts into the wheat
market, partly as a result of preferential treatment of certain regions, neglecting other
food production, which is symptomatic of a broader neglect of rural areas.60 Such a
failure to diversify, according to this critique, has exacerbated vulnerability to food
insecurity.61 The fact that the colonial Land Acquisition Act is still on the books
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seems to lend weight to such claims. Moreover, the fact that Pakistan often produces a
wheat surplus, but suffers food insecurity, demonstrates deep-seated problems,
irrespective of rising international food prices.
In addition to the structural issues which some analyst claim are at the heart of
Pakistan food insecurity, Malik suggests that there was “no serious policy response to
the emerging crisis” of rising food prices in 2008.62 The strategy that was identified,
in 2009, targeted increased agricultural growth, a more efficient and equitable system
of food procurement, storage, and distribution, pro-poor growth and non-farm
employment generation to improve access to food, and safety nets for the poor.63
However, according to Malik, the success has been limited, reflecting “official
neglect of the agriculture sector more generally.”64 Malik also suggests that the
liberalization of the food product market has been poorly and half-heartedly managed
– partly as a result of reluctance to give up control, but also “entrenched institutions
that govern the wheat sector in Pakistan.”65
Roshan Malik focuses in particular on the food security-governance nexus in
Pakistan, making the case that poor governance and food insecurity are closely
related. He argues that in Pakistan “More than half of these food-insecure districts
lack government effectiveness, the rule of law, and political stability.”66 Moreover,
there is also a link between food insecurity and governance incapacity – conflict
affected or Taliban strongholds tend to be food insecure.67 Other research has found a
very strong relationship between landlessness/food insecurity and the probability of
violent attacks across districts in Pakistan.68 Roshan Malik suggests that citizens’
frustrations towards the government in general are focused upon food insecurity, and
there is a real prospects of instability related to this. Pakistan is “facing a triple threat:
very low human development, very high food insecurity, and dangerously high
malgovernance,” and “The patience of the Pakistani people is disappearing very
quickly.”69
The security challenges confronting Pakistan have also played a role in creating food
insecurity.70 Abid Qaiyum Suleri demonstrates how military insecurity and food
insecurity reinforce each other, and how food insecurity fuels militancy and violence.
For example, “Chronic food insecurity in Baluchistan and especially in its gas-
producing districts aggravated the sense of marginalization and deprivation.”71 From
this point of view, a large part of the militant challenges is driven by food insecurity
rather than ideological commitment. But in addition, he suggests that there is an over-
emphasis and prioritization of military national security above individual welfare;
“Unfortunately, hunger is perceived only as a humanitarian concern.”72
In turn, Saadia Toor identifies the structural factors which drive food insecurity. From
this perspective, a key part of the problem is the pressure to export to global markets,
which explains the paradox of experiencing a food shortage and a bumper wheat crop
in the same year.73
Various sources provide a picture of price inflation in Pakistan, and these are more
effective than using international prices in terms of understanding the impact upon
individuals and households. See figures 4-16.
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Figure 4: Karachi average market price for rice (basmati in pink, and irri in purple). Source: FAO.
Figure 5: Karachi average market price for wheat (wheat floor in purple, raw wheat in pink). Source:
FAO.
Figure 6: Lahor average market price for rice (basmati in pink, irri in purple). Source: FAO.
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Figure 7: Lahore average market prices for wheat (wheat floor in purple, raw wheat in pink). Source:
FAO.
Figure 8: Multan average market price for rice (basmati in pink, irri in purple). Source: FAO
Figure 9: Multan average market price wheat (wheat in pink, wheat flour in purple). Source: FAO
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Figure 10: Peshawar average market price for rice (basmatic in pink, irri in purple). Source: FAO.
Figure 11: Peshawar average market price for wheat (in pink) and wheat flour (in purple). Source:
FAO.
Figure 12: Quetta average market price for basmati rice (pink) and irri rice (purple). Source: FA0.
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Figure 13: Quetta average market price (wheat). Source: FAP.
Figure 14: average market price basmati rice – various cities. Source: WFP VAM.
Figure 16: Average market price for wheat – various cities. Source: WFP VAM.
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Government responses
The government of Pakistan initiated a number of responses to the soaring food price
rises. These should be seen in the context of the ‘Pakistan 2025. One Vision – One
Nation’ strategy, which sets down targets for social, political and economic
development, including (pillar IV) of the vision which focuses on energy, water and
food security.74 This includes a commitment to “Reduce food insecure population
from 60% to 30%.”75 In terms of economic policies, the government introduced stock
management, export restrictions for some commodities, and various pricing policies.
In terms of social protection programs, it launched a policy of cash transfers and
school feeding programmes.76 In 2008 the Government launched the Benazir Income
Support Program (BISP), which provided cash transfers to poor families identified on
a means-tested basis.77 However, there have been claims that some official responses
were not entirely effective, were an overreaction, or generated unintended
complications. For example, a World Bank report suggests that export restrictions
“denied producers the benefits derived from improved terms of trade.”78 In general,
whilst the government’s response to emergency situations has had an impact, the
longer-term structural efforts needed to strengthen food security presents a more
formidable challenge. The 2018 National Food Security Policy – with the overriding
goal of a ‘food secure Pakistan’ – provides the policy guidelines to implement the
range of strategies.
Conclusion
In the years following the peak of the food crisis, official statistics indicate poverty
reduction in 2010-11, continuing a positive trend. However, large numbers of people
remain concentrated just above the poverty line, and they are vulnerable to economic
shocks.79 Like many large developing countries, the challenges of poverty alleviation,
equitable development, and food security are formidable. The challenges of structural
economic factors, the global pressures of food price inflation, natural disasters, and
ongoing violent conflict, combine to make Pakistan’s food insecurity particularly
stubborn for large numbers of vulnerable people. In addition, many commentators
claim that the political and bureaucratic mindset of the country – including a fixation
with ‘national security’ – has reinforced food insecurity and made effective change
difficult.
However, despite the incidence of riots apparently related to rising food prices, and
the theoretical heightened risk of instability in Pakistan, there is insufficient evidence
to conclude that food insecurity poses to substantial threat to stability in Pakistan, or a
possible trigger for widespread upheaval. Various official and informal support
mechanisms mitigate the worse impacts of food insecurity upon the poorest
communities, and even where severe deprivation exists, there seems little inclination
to engage in widespread violent opposition. Rising food prices have an impact upon
lower-income workers in urban settings – potentially a greater source of instability
and political opposition – but there has been little support for the claim that this is a
source of serious conflict. There is evidence of a link between food insecurity and
armed conflict in the conflict-affected regions of the country – and thus support for
the argument that deprivation fuels insurgency – but this is largely confined to such
regions, and it is difficult to disentangle food insecurity from the other relevant
factors which driver conflict there.
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Interviews were undertaken with individuals from the following organisations in
Islamabad during fieldwork in the country in June 2018:
• Al-Mawrid Foundation, Islamabad
• Defense & Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-I-Azam University,
Islamabad
• Ministry of Food Security and Research, Islamabad
• National Defense University, Islamabad
• Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad
• Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad
• United Nations Development Programme, Islamabad
Notes
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1 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), “The State of Food Insecurity in the World:
How does international price volatility affect domestic economies and food security?” Rome:
Economic and Social Development Department, FAO, 2011.
2 FAO, “The State of Food Insecurity in the World: Addressing food insecurity in protracted
crises,” Rome: Economic and Social Development Department, FAO, 2010.
3 World Bank, Food Price Watch (Quarterly). Poverty Reduction and Economic Management
Network, 2017. www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/publication/food-price-watch-home.
4 World Bank, Food Price Watch (Quarterly), 2017.
5 Mohammad Aslam Khan and S. Akhtar Ali Shah, ‘Food Insecurity in Pakistan: Causes and
Policy Response’, Journal of Agricultural Environmental Ethics, vol.24, 2011, pp.493-509;
Munir Ahmad and Umar Farooq, ‘The State of Food Security in Pakistan: Future Challenges
and Coping Strategies’, The Pakistan Development Review, vol.49, no.4, part II, 2010,
pp.903-923.
6 Pakistan. Social Protection in Pakistan Managing Household Risks and Vulnerability.
Human Development Unit South Asia Region. Report No. 35472-PK, October 18, 2007.
7 Abid Qaiyum Suleri and Sahib Haq. 2009. Food Insecurity in Pakistan in 2009. Available
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8 Ministry of National Food Security and Research. 2018. National Food and Security Policy,
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9 Ahmand Munir and Umar Farooq. 2010. Food Security in Pakistan: Future Challenges and
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10 UN Development Programme, Human Development Index: http://hdr.undp.org/en/data
11 Social protection data: ILO - www.ilo.org/ilostat/
12 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the
World 2017. Building resilience for peace and food security. Rome, FAO, 2017.
13 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the
World 2017, p.80.
14 Abid Qaiyum Suleri and Sahib Haq, Food Insecurity in Pakistan in 2009. Available from
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp225636.pdf
15 Global Food Security Index. 2018. An assessment of food affordability, availability and
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16 The World Bank Global Consumption Database:
http://datatopics.worldbank.org/consumption/country/Pakistan - accessed April 2018.
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17 Global food security index. An assessment of food affordability, availability and quality A
report from the Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013 p.23 and 27.
18 Food and Agricultural Organisation, ‘Pakistan Floods: One Year On: From relief to
recovery’, Rome: FAO, 2011, p.3.
19 ‘Pakistan Floods: One Year On’, p.4.
20 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the
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21 Food and Agriculture Organisation, Monitoring and Analysis Country Brief – Pakistan,
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22 S.M. Malik, An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship between Food Insecurity,
Landlessness, and Violent Conflict in Pakistan. PIDE Working Papers, 2011. Available from:
http://pide.org.pk/pdf/Working%20Paper/WorkingPaper-71.pdf
23 World Bank, Food Price Increases in South Asia. National Responses and Regional
Dimensions. The World Bank South Asia Region Sustainable Development Department
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24 World Bank, Food Price Increases in South Asia. National Responses and Regional
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25 WB Food Price Watch. Poverty Reduction and Equity Group, May 2010, p.2.
26 WB Food Price Watch. Poverty Reduction and Equity Group, May 2010, pp.1-3.
27 World Bank, Food Price Increases in South Asia. National Responses and Regional
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28 World Bank Food Price Watch. Poverty Reduction and Equity Group, September, 2010,
p.2.
29 World Bank, Food Price Increases in South Asia. National Responses and Regional
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30 WB Food Price Watch. Poverty Reduction and Equity Group, Aug.2011. “However, for
some countries, the levels remained significantly higher in comparison to the same point last
year: rice prices were up in Pakistan (23 percent)”.
31 Dhushyanth Raju and Ritika D’Souza, ‘Child Under nutrition in Pakistan What Do We
Know?’, Policy Research Working Paper 8049, World Bank Group, South Asia
Region Office of the Chief Economist May 2017, p.2.
32 Cheng Fang and Issa Sanogo, ‘Food Price Volatility and Natural Hazards in Pakistan.
Measuring the impacts on hunger and food assistance’. Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations Rome 2014.
33 Jed Friedman, Seo Yeon Hong, Xiaohui Hou, ‘The Impact Of The Food Price Crisis On
Consumption And Caloric Availability In Pakistan: Evidence from Repeated Cross-sectional
and Panel Data’. HNP Discussion Paper, World Bank's Human Development Network
(HDN), November 2011.
34 Jed Friedman, Seo Yeon Hong, Xiaohui Hou, ‘The Impact of the Food Price Crisis on
Consumption and Caloric Availability in Pakistan, p.6.
35 Jed Friedman, Seo Yeon Hong, Xiaohui Hou, ‘The Impact of the Food Price Crisis on
Consumption and Caloric Availability In Pakistan, p.28.
36 World Bank, The Heterogeneous Effects of a Food Price Crisis on Child School Enrollment
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37 World Bank. Pakistan. Towards an Integrated National Safety Net System. Assisting Poor
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PK.
38 Interviews, Islamabad, June 2018.
39 Interviews, Islamabad, June 2018.
40 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala
University: http://ucdp.uu.se
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41 Edward Newman, ‘Hungry, Or Hungry for Change? Edward Newman, ‘Hungry, or
Hungry for Change? Food riots and political conflict, 2005–2015’, Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 2018: DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2018.1454042.
42 Interviews, Islamabad, June 2018.
43 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala
University: http://ucdp.uu.se
44 World Bank Gini: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=AL-PK
45 World Bank United Nations Population Division. World Urbanization Prospects.
46 Jed Friedman, Seo Yeon Hong, Xiaohui Hou, ‘The Impact Of The Food Price Crisis On
Consumption and Caloric Availability in Pakistan, p.6. This is also found in Food Price
Increases in South Asia. National Responses and Regional Dimensions. The World
Bank South Asia Region Sustainable Development Department Agriculture and Rural
Development Unit, June 2010, p.xiii.
47 Center for Systemic Peace: www.systemicpeace.org.
48 Edward Newman, ‘Hungry, or Hungry for Change?’
49 Hooper, E. 2010. Pakistan’s Food Crisis: Water, Energy, Agriculture & Power: The
Conflict Ahead. [Online]. Notes internacionals CIDOB, December 2010. Available from:
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/126043/notes_internacionals_25.pdf
50 Dawn. 2014. IDPs protest food shortage in Bannu. [Online]. June 24, 2014. Available from:
https://www.dawn.com/news/1114839
51 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. 2013. HRCP demands adequate, affordable,
nutritious food for all. [Online]. Available from: http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/hrcp-demands-
adequate-affordable-nutritious-food-for-all/ See also Pakistan Today. 2016. Peace and
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Avialable from: https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/08/13/peace-and-stability-linked-to-
food-security-hunger-a-reason-behind-lawlessness-icst/
52 Hooper, E. 2010. Pakistan’s Food Crisis: Water, Energy, Agriculture & Power: The
Conflict Ahead. [Online]. Notes internacionals CIDOB. Available from:
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/126043/notes_internacionals_25.pdf
53 Michael Kugelman, ‘Pakistan’s Food Insecurity: Roots, Ramifications, and Responses’, in
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Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., 2010, p.5.
54 Michael Kugelman, ‘Pakistan’s Food Insecurity: Roots, Ramifications, and Responses’,
p.6.
55 Interviews, Islamabad, June 2018.
56 Michael Kugelman, ‘Pakistan’s Food Insecurity: Roots, Ramifications, and Responses’,
p.10.
57 Michael Kugelman, ‘Pakistan’s Food Insecurity: Roots, Ramifications, and Responses’,
pp.10-11.
58 Abid Qaiyum Suleri, ‘The Social Dimensions of Food Insecurity in Pakistan’; Sohail
Jehangir Malik, ‘Food Supply Challenges and Implications for Food Security’; Zafar Altaf,
‘Food Security in Pluralistic Pakistan’; and Roshan Malik ‘The Food Security-Governance
Nexus in Pakistan’, in Michael Kugelman and Robert M. Hathaway, eds., Hunger Pains:
Pakistan’s Food Insecurity, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington,
D.C., 2010. See also J. Lemétayer, ‘Pakistan: Half of the population is exposed to food
insecurity because of bad governance and abuses’, 2010. [Online]. Asian Human Rights
Commission. Available from: www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-ART-058-
2010/?searchterm=Half%20of%20the%20population%20is%20exposed%20to%20food%20i
nsecurity; S. Rahim, ‘Pakistan’s food shortage alarms rights organizations’. DW. [Online],
2012. Available from: http://www.dw.com/en/pakistans-food-shortage-alarms-rights-
organizations/a-16309778; Z. Yusuf. Rising food scarcity must be addressed: HRCP. 2012.
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. [Online]. Available from: http://hrcp-
web.org/hrcpweb/rising-food-scarcity-must-be-addressed-hrcp-2/
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59 A. Q. Suleri. 2009. Food Crises in Developing Countries: The Role of National
Governance. Issues in Brief. The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-
Range Future. [Online]. Available from: http://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/2008-
09%20Food%20Crises%20in%20Developing%20Countries%20The%20Role%20of%20Nati
onal%20Governance.pdf
60 Interviews, Islamabad, June 2018.
61 Zafar Altaf, ‘Food Security in Pluralistic Pakistan’, in Michael Kugelman and Robert M.
Hathaway, eds., Hunger Pains: Pakistan’s Food Insecurity; Interviews, Islamabad, June
2018.
62 Sohail Jehangir Malik, ‘Food Supply Challenges and Implications for Food Security’, p.47.
63 Sohail Jehangir Malik, ‘Food Supply Challenges and Implications for Food Security’, p.52
64 Sohail Jehangir Malik, ‘Food Supply Challenges and Implications for Food Security’, p.52.
65 Sohail Jehangir Malik, ‘Food Supply Challenges and Implications for Food Security’,
pp.53-54.
66 Roshan Malik, ‘The Food Security-Governance Nexus in Pakistan’, in Michael Kugelman
and Robert M. Hathaway, eds., Hunger Pains: Pakistan’s Food Insecurity, p.64.
67 Roshan Malik, ‘The Food Security-Governance Nexus in Pakistan’, pp. 67-68
68 S. M. Malik, ‘An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship between Food Insecurity,
Landlessness, and Violent Conflict in Pakistan’. PIDE Working Papers, 2011. Available
from: http://pide.org.pk/pdf/Working%20Paper/WorkingPaper-71.pdf
69 Roshan Malik, ‘The Food Security-Governance Nexus in Pakistan’, p.71.
70 Interviews, Islamabad, June 2018.
71 Abid Qaiyum Suleri, ‘The Social Dimensions of Food Insecurity in Pakistan’, pp.80-81.
72 Abid Qaiyum Suleri, ‘The Social Dimensions of Food Insecurity in Pakistan’, p.84.
73 Saadia Toor, ‘The Structural Dimensions of Food Insecurity in Pakistan’, in Michael
Kugelman and Robert M. Hathaway, eds., Hunger Pains: Pakistan’s Food Insecurity, p.99.
74 Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform. [No date]. Pakistan 2025. One Vision – One
Nation. [Online]. Available from: http://pc.gov.pk/uploads/vision2025/Vision-2025-
Executive-Summary.pdf
75 Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform. [No date]. Pakistan 2025, p.14
76 World Bank, Food Price Increases in South Asia. National Responses and Regional
Dimensions. The World Bank South Asia Region Sustainable Development Department
Agriculture and Rural Development Unit, June 2010, p.xi. See also M. Balagamwala and H.
Gazdar, Life in a Time of Food Price Volatility: Evidence from Two Communities in Pakistan.
[Online]. IDS Working Paper. Vol. 2014, No. 449. Available from:
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/4462/Wp449.pdf?sequence
=1
77 Jed Friedman, Seo Yeon Hong, Xiaohui Hou, ‘The Impact of the Food Price Crisis on
Consumption and Caloric Availability in Pakistan, P.6.
78 World Bank, Food Price Increases in South Asia. National Responses and Regional
Dimensions. The World Bank South Asia Region Sustainable Development Department
Agriculture and Rural Development Unit, June 2010, p.8.
79 Jose Lopez-Calix, Carolina Mejia, David Newhouse and Carlos Sobrado, ‘Pakistan Poverty
Trends, Scenarios and Drivers’. World Bank. Policy Paper Series on Pakistan. PK 23/12. June
2014.
