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Rasak, B., Oye, A.J., Ake, M. & Raji, A.A. (2017). God Fatherism and Political Patronage in Nigeria: A Theoretical
Overview. Political Science Review. Vol. 8(1):77-101. psrunilorin@gmail.com.
GOD FATHERISM AND POLITICAL PATRONAGE IN NIGERIA: A THEORETICAL
OVERVIEW
RASAK Bamidele Ph.D1, OYE Adeniyi Joseph2, AKE Modupe Ph.D3
1,2Department of Sociology
3Department of Political Science
College of Business and Social Sciences
Landmark University, Omu-Aran, Kwara State
Telephone: +2348034955615, +2347052087979
E-mail: delerasak@yahoo.co.uk, delerasak@gmail.com
RAJI Adesina Abdulfattah Ph.D4
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
College of Management and Social Sciences
Fountain University Osogbo, Osun State
Telephone: +2348037201811, 08086710547,
E-mail: sina.raji@yahoo.com, abdulfattahraji@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
The form of political system in Nigeria in the early post-colonial period was characterized by a
clientelistic structure whose top echelon was occupied by the new elites who captured the
economic and political powers of the Nigerian state immediately after independence. They were
patron occupying state offices as “pre-bends”. They became the “gate-keeper”; determines the
development initiative to be followed and employed and benefactors of privileges. Studies of
Godfathering and political patronage in Nigeria have not adequately addressed how these
patronage has remained an important aspect of the political and economic powers of the state.
This study, therefore, examined God fatherism and political patronage in Nigeria: a theoretical
overview. A synthesis of elite, coalition, party system and meritocratic theories provided the
conceptual framework. The design was exploratory and the study was descriptive in nature,
combining both secondary data from books and the internet. Modern political institutions
controlled by elites acquired power through the people. This development places political elites
in a position to bestow privilege and concessions as they deemed fit. Hence, this engender the
creation of a clientelistic structure with political elites as patrons and the vast majority of
population as clients willing to yield their loyalty to patrons for the satisfaction of valued
resources. Patrons who, due to their influence on the state apparatus, control both political and
economic powers therefore, more often than not control the direction development takes in these
areas. The resultant inequality therefore, produces a class of elites who control the economic
and political powers of the state and another class of masses who yield their loyalty to the elites
in order to secure access to state surpluses to be delivered as “good” or compensation for
loyalty. Since access to valued resources is assured through the clientelistic structure, the
emergent social relationships may have implication for Nigeria‟s development both in the rural
and urban areas.
Key word: Political patronage, Clientelism, Democracy, Godfathering, Democratic
Governance
Introduction
Political patronage via state jobs is global phenomenon dispensed by governing political
party or parties but this phenomenon in Africa lead to poor institutional quality or performance
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of the state. In the 1980s and 1990s many African states adopted a multiparty democracy based
on two distinct systems of governance (Nijzinket al, 2006; Kopecky, 2011). Countries such as
Mozambique, Gabon, Ghana, and Nigeria among others, adopted a presidential system of
governance based on the United States philosophy while countries such as South Africa,
Zimbabwe, Malawi, etc., adopted a parliamentary system based on the Westminster governance
tradition, other states such as Senegal, Cape Verde and Namibia adopted a combination of the
two systems of governance (Nijzinket al, 2006; Kopecky, 2011). These political changes were
brought up by the political parties, which were seen then as liberation movements.
However, soon after this democratization process, many African states were bedeviled by
many problems such as poor institutional quality or poor economic performance,
unconstitutional change of government, political violence and so forth. Poor quality or
performance of the state is blamed on political patronage, among others (Nijzinket al, 2006;
Kopecky, 2011). It is worth noting that political party structures undoubtedly can either limit or
enhance the powers and operations of the state institutions including the legislature. The ensuing
debate in the public administration or political science scholarship is whether political patronage
promotes or hinders institutional performance or quality (Mamogale, 2013). Rival theoretical
explanations are advanced by different scholars on the relationship between political patronage
and state economic performance.
The focus of this study was to examine the phenomenon of “God fatherism and political
patronage in Nigeria: a theoretical overview”. Though, the concept is as old as politics itself, its
recent rise in Nigerian politics gives reasons for the evaluation of the concepts and the impact it
makes in the political space of country.
Conceptual review
It is not surprising that much of the writings about political patronage in the political
science or public administration literatures focused more on developing nations, Africa in
particular. This is because many post-colonial African states were castigated as predatory,
patrimonial, choice-less democracies, kleptocracy, rent-seeking, etc. As a result, political
patronage, which is associated with names like political appointment system or cadre
deployment in Nigerian context is seen as immoral and a democratic pathology, which is
associated with malfunctioning of the governance systems (Mamogale, 2013). Therefore,
political patronage is conceptualized as an exchange relationship in which a variety of goods and
services are traded between the political Godfather and the godson.
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Usually these varieties of goods and services are not traded within the confines of the law
and regulations. This simply means that the way in which these goods and services are traded
between the principal and the agent does not follow any legal prescripts (Mamogale, 2013). In
order words, political patronage or simply cadre deployment is not a legislated policy of
government thus often leading non-compliance with recruitment or rather human resource
management laws and regulations (Kopecky, 2011).
From a principal-agent perspective or what Weber (1948) calls “super” and “subordinate”
relationship in a political setting, the principal simply refers to a politician as an elected public
representative who is not purely a administrative figure, whereas the agent refers to the state
official who is appointed presumably on the basis of qualifications to occupy specialized office
either on contractual basis or permanent basis. The principle of “super-subordinate” relations in
the institutions means there is a regulated supervision of the lower office by the higher ones and
this principle is found in all institutional structures of the economy (Kopecky, 2011). Politics is
about power relations between the principal and the agent. The agent is hired and rewarded to
implement policy preferences of the principal. The political principal, on the other hand, has the
leverage to offer legislation, access to state structures and or job opportunities in exchange for
various benefits such as electoral support, campaign contributions, party loyalty, exclusive
information and expertise available from the agent.
The constitutional provision of ruler-ship in Nigeria is the Party system and the
constitution has made the formation of political parties wholly a private investment. All
candidates must depend upon political parties for canvassing for, votes from the electorate. This
is in contrast to political systems with provision for independent candidature. The formation of
political parties in democracies is capital intensive in nature, hence it involves the rich and
wealthy individuals who can fund and maintain them. In the third world, these individuals make
up the clique known as the "Godfathers" whose patronage and interests are required for the
smooth running of the party system (Philip, Chirs, Osimeral & Kingley, 2014).
As William (1979) observed, political elites 'participate in, or influence the making of,
decisions that allocate resources within and among social units'. A variety of conflicts are
produced in the process. Discourses on political elitism raise two important questions: hierarchy
and inequality. 'Hierarchy' has to do with the vertical ranking of people in the society into two
categories, namely, those at the top and those occupying the lowest positions. Those at the
bottom are assumed to be less important than those on top (William, 1979).
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These social hierarchies are assumed to be pyramidal in nature. There are more people at
the bottom of the hierarchy than those on top. The latter are the crème dusac of the society and
are responsible for exercise of social, economic and political powers. Their powers consists
largely in their ability to 'articulate ideas, to persuade, to cajole and coerce, to mobilize, to
embody and advance symbols top which large numbers of people respond‟ (William, 1979).It is
in respect of this point that the notion of political elite is associated with inequality. The political
elites simply organize themselves in a manner that makes them superior to the rest of their
society. This inequality makes it easy for us to differentiate between 'rulers' (the political elites)
and the ruled (the masses).
An important issue raised by Pareto and Marx in their works is that political elites
insulate and isolate themselves from their society and try as much as possible to reproduce
themselves from within. They do all possible within their reach to ensure that non-elites do not
join their membership. To ensure this, the political elites maintain a safe, functional distance
from the rest of the society. They reproduce themselves on an individual and selective basis in a
process which Pareto specifically referred to as the 'circulation of elites'. The criteria for such
elite recruitment are often parochial and the process is usually done in a manner that does not in
any way compromise the traditional integrity of the dominant elite class. As Pareto argued, the
dominant class often tries to frustrate any efforts at the 'collective circulation of elites' and would
rather support individual recruitment.
Conceptualizing the term Political Patronage
A form al definition of patronage is "the power of appointing people to governmental or
political positions" and "the positions so distributed" (Webster‟s II New College Dictionary
1995). Generally, the word patronage has a negative connotation that this straight-forward
definition fails to convey. Patronage suggests the transgression of real or perceived boundaries of
legitimate political influence, the violation of principles of merit and competition in civil service
recruitment and promotion. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that governments the world-
over accept that some political appointments are fully legitimate. A small number of these
appointments are justified as a means for political leaders to fashion a circle of government
policymakers and managers who share a common agenda. Patronage is clearly a problem,
however, when these appointments pervade public administration, severely undermining merit
principles. Somewhere between these two extremes the line between appropriate and
inappropriate uses of patronage is crossed.
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Political patronage is the dispensation of favours or rewards such as public office, jobs,
contracts, subsidies, prestige or other valued benefits by a patron (who controls their
dispensation) to a client. The patron is usually an elected official or is otherwise empowered to
make such grants. In return, the client supplies the patron with some valued service, such as
voting for the patron‟s party or providing money or labour for electoral campaigning. The
relationship between patron and client is typically unequal, selective and discretionary; the
patron does not generally grant favours to all potential clients but picks and chooses among
them.
Conceptualizing the term God fathering
The concept of godfatherism is synonymous to intermediary, mentoring, benevolence,
and support and sponsoring. In a political setting, the concept is an ideology that is championed
on the belief that certain individuals possess considerable means to unilaterally determine who
get a party‟s ticket to run for an election and who wins in the electoral contest (Chukwuemaka,
Oji, & Chukwurah, 2013). Godfathers are men who have the „power‟ and influence to decide
both who get nominated to context elections and who wins in the election. In this sense,
Godfatherism means office seekers getting connected to an individual who is believed to have
the ability to deliver a desired outcome in an electoral contest. It is the tradition for looking for a
political father to help promote one‟s political aspiration.
Bassey and Enetak (2008) conceptualized godfatherism to connote the power and
influence of people who are politically relevant in deciding who gets nominated to contest
elections and who eventually wins the election. Godfathers are highly politically mobile and can
sway political support to the political party and/or candidate behind which they throw their
political weight. Those that play godfatherism are known as godfathers while those who benefit
from their benevolence are known as godsons.
The advent of godfatherism in the Nigerian partisan politics dates back to the First
Republic when leaders of the three major political parties (Northern People Congress (NPC),
Action Group (AG) and National Congress of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) carefully and
meticulously cultivated godsons that they were convinced would advance the well being of the
citizens. According to Bassey and Enetak (2008), Ahmadu Bello of NPC, Nnamdi Azikiwe of
the NCNC and Obafemi Awolowo of the AG were motivated to do so not to use godsons as
surrogates to promote parochial interests, but to promote the developmental aspirations of the
people. Unlike the present crop of political godfathers, the first generation godfathers were
essentially benevolent and progressive because they did not abuse their status as godfathers by
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imposing frivolous demands on their godsons as it is the case today. Literally godfathers are seen
in Nigeria to be men who have the power personally to determine both who get nominated to
contest elections and who wins in a state.
The nexus between the concept of Political Patronage and Godfatherism
The term patronage appears with increased frequency in anthropological analysis. Indeed,
it has become a major concept in the study of peasant societies, somewhat analogous to the
concept of the “big man” in certain kinds of chiefdoms, or “fission and fusion” in lineage-type
societies (Jeremy, 1966). There is, however, considerable ambiguity in the meaning given to the
term. Patronage is found on the reciprocal relations between patrons and clients. By patron it
means a person who uses his “client”, and in return provides certain services for his patron.
Patronage is thus the complex of relations between those who use their influence, social position
or some other attribute to assist and protest others, and those whom they to help and protest
(Jeremy, 1966).
The structure of the system of patronage, which is based on social relationships between
clients seeking for a man with the ability and friendship connections to protect them and a patron
who accepts these duties in return for political allegiance, grows upwards and through lawyers,
other persons of influence, and members of parliament, is linked to the legislative assembly.
Thus the organization of government and the structure of patronage are parallel hierarchies
(Campbell, 1964). In patronage, the transactor (patron) has the power to give some benefit which
the respondent (client) desires. Examples of this would be the improvement of a road near the
respondent‟s house, or the employment of the respondent (or his relative) in an office over which
the (patron) has control. The number and extent of such benefits naturally vary with the power of
the (patron); but even the most influential is unlikely to please everyone who comes to him. He
must therefore husband these direct patronage transactions so that they produce linkages with
key people who can bring followers with them (Adrian, 1966).
In some countries such as Canada the term is used to describe political patronage or
political Godfatherism. political patronage is refers to the dispensation of favours or rewards
such as public office, jobs, contracts, subsidies, prestige or other valued benefits by a patron
(who controls their dispensation) to a client (The Canadian Encyclopedia, 2013). While political
godfatherism connotes the invasion of the political candidates by discarnate powerful sponsor,
tending to complete possession for the purpose selfish gratification (Mbamara, 2004, Bassey &
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Enetak, 2008). For some, the godfather is the political slave merchant while the godson is the
political slave or slave boy or political article for sale.
The godson is purchased with big sum of money under a democratic oath. Their aims and
objectives include appointments, stealing, robbery and looting of government treasury. The
decision making appointments and contract awards is usually manipulated by the godfather. In
the words of Ajayi (2014), Chukwuemeka, Oji & Chukwurah (2013), Godfatherism is a kind of;
Politics whereby an influential person in a popular or ruling party will assist someone usually a
lackey, i.e. godson to emerge as the governorship candidate of a party at all cost and either by
hook or crook, he will help him to emerge victorious in the state governorship election
irrespective of whether he is a popular candidate or not.
Intuitively, political godfatherism represents a self-seeking individual out there to use the
government for his own purposes (Isaac, 2005). The cost of this incidence is enormous to the
state as what usually obtains is that when the incumbent godson is at pains to satisfy the whims
and caprices of the godfather among other competing demands on the scarce resources of the
government, the interest of the larger number is savagely undermined. This according to Joseph
(1999) has left democracy in Nigeria to assume the form of prebendalism. The French
'godfathers' can be broken down into two types: the first are those who manipulate the economy
for their own benefit, and the second those that can be referred to as crisis fixers, social
reformers, and populist advocates of the poor (Newsweek, 2003).
Political patronage and politics in Nigeria
The patron/client relationships that popularized the term in Nigerian politics have cultural
roots among many Nigerians. It is not a totally new experience in the sociology of the Hausa,
Yoruba and Igbo for people to have one or other type of 'godfather' (Isaac, 2005). For example,
the word 'godfather' has a local equivalence in Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo languages and these
words have been in usage since the pre-colonial era. A godfather is known among the Hausa as a
'maigida' (landlord or the head of a household). The word 'maigida' goes beyond its literal
meaning.
Abner, Paul & Polly (1965) used the term in their works to refer to those who provided
brokerage services to Hausa traders in transit in different parts of West Africa. These Hausa
traders brought cattle from their homeland to different parts of South-Western part of Africa and
took back kola nuts to the North. At the various transit centers where they have to stop to do
businesses, they rely on a maigida to facilitate their economic activities. The maigida provides
them with accommodation, storage and brokerage services. The maigida receive compensations
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for their services and many of them became rich from the number of clients they had. Even in
Hausa land, from where these itinerant traders came, this kind of patron/client relationship is
popularly known (Albert, 2005).
A 'godfather' is referred to in Yoruba land as 'baba-kekere' (the small father), 'baba-isale'
(the father of the underground world), or 'baba-nigbejo' (a great help in times of trouble). The
most historical of these terms is 'baba-kekere'. It was used to depict community leaders with
whom people of less social status identified as a way of providing physical, social, political and
economic security for themselves. For example, most of the Yoruba refugees who came to settle
in Ibadan in the early nineteenth century settled with the 'baba-kekere' in the city (Falola, 1985).
These were military chiefs and patrons appointed tobe in charge of certain Ibadan
colonies by the town's traditional council. The migrants who settled under these Ibadan chiefs
paid the 'baba-kekere' tribute, part of which the 'baba-kekere' transmitted to the Ibadan
authorities. In return, the chiefs were obligated to protect those under them against any act of
violence that characterized Ibadan at this time.
Dibia (2003) too has observed that the idea of godfatherism is grounded in the sociology
of traditional Igbo society. He made reference to the popular relationship between 'Nnam-Ukwu'
(my master) and 'Odibo' (the servant) in the Igbo world view. A younger person is entrusted to a
more mature and experienced person for training in social, economic and moral adulthood. The
role played by the man in this kind of relationship is akin to that of a godfather. In the cases
mentioned above, a person of lesser social status attaches himself to another person, usually of
higher status, for support, which could be social or economic. The godfather gets something in
return from the adopted son for the transactional relationship. It is probably on this
understanding that the modern notion of godfatherism in Nigeria is based.
In other words, the phenomenon of godfatherism is not strange to the cultural world of
the Nigerian people. The giving of kola by a client to his patron is also not strange. What is
probably strange is that the transposition of this social or economic system into the political
arena and also the ridiculous nature of what patrons now ask for from their clients as
compensation for providing them with 'brokerage services' (Isaac, 2005).
Five types of political godfathers are discernible under the present democratic
dispensation in Nigeria. The first type is 'geo-political' or 'ethnic' organizations that arrogate to
themselves the right to decide who represent their jurisdiction in government. Such movements
under the present democratic dispensation include 'Afenifere', the Yoruba socio-cultural
organization; Arewa Consultative Council (ACF) which presents itself as the authentic voice of
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the North; Ohaneze, the pan-Igbo cultural group that considers itself to be the only body with the
power to determine Igbo interests. The powers of all these organizations have been receding
recently. This is to the extent that their candidates for political offices are often defeated by those
sponsored by 'individual godfathers'.
The second category consists of 'geo-political' or 'ethnic father figures'. These are some
prominent individuals within some geo-political or ethnic organization who are popularly
respected by members of the movement they belong to, as a result of some past 'nationalist
activities'. Such people, very few in the Nigerian society, have occupied public positions in the
past and were found to have served their people to the best of their ability. Their political
opinions are thus much respected.
The best known example of this class of godfathers was the slain Nigerian Minister for
Justice, Chief Bola Ige. He was the Deputy leader of Afenifere, but his influence in Yoruba
politics towered above that of the pan-ethnic group. He was a godfather to many south-western
Nigerian governors between 1999 and 2003.He was considered to be a true scion of Chief
Obafemi Awolowo. During his tenure as the Executive Governor of the defunct Oyo state (1979-
1983), he performed so well that he became idolized by the Yoruba people of South Western
Nigeria as an embodiment of 'free education, free health' policies of the late Chief Obafemi
Awolowo.
In his lifetime, politicians in south western Nigeria made sure that he was on their
campaign train. Even after his death, politicians (most especially members of Alliance for
Democracy (AD) campaigned under his name. He is believed to have played a prominent role in
the choice of the governors of Oyo and Osun states during the 1999 elections. His name
consistently came up during the Bisi Akande vs. Omisore conflicts in Osun state 1999-2002 as
the godfather to Governor Bisi Akande. One thing with this first set of godfathers is that they are
well-known and have the support of grassroots people. The respect people have for them is also
tied to concrete developmental issues.
The third category of political godfathers consists of some rich Nigerians who see
sponsorship of political candidates as a source of upward social and economic mobility. Such
politicians go around, like a typical businessman, looking for 'materials' (not necessarily
marketable) to invest their money in. The clients are usually people who are interested in
winning elections 'by all means' but who do not have the grassroots support, the money, or the
violent dispositions for winning elections.
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The godfather assures the candidate of easy availability of this possible assistance in
exchange for some personal benefits for the godfather after election. Many of these godfathers
keep their promise of making the candidates win their elections. This could be any form of
electoral malpractice, but is hardly through any honest political activities. Uba, the best-known
political godfather under the present dispensations in Nigeria, is a good example of this kind of
godfather. He nominated and ensured the victory of governor Ngige of Anambra State during the
2003 elections (Isaac, 2005).
The fourth type of godfathers consists of those who only deal with rich clients. Such
people, for want of appropriate terminology, can be said to be 'political entrepreneurs' (Isaac,
2005). They live on politics. The only asset they have is that they are well schooled in the tricks
of winning elections among the grassroots people. They are familiar with all constituencies to be
won over in a political contest and what it formally and informally takes to win them over. They
often are not rich people but their clients are. The contractual relationship between the two is
simple: the client provides the money and the godfather delivers the votes. In other words, this
category of godfathers does not invest their own money but that of their clients in politics. In
exchange, they are accorded important status in the government formed by their clients after
election. They are given juicy contracts as well as slots in ministerial and board appointments.
The fifth type of godfather consists of rich patrons who are willing to provide what it
takes for either rich or poor clients to win elections. He is willing to provide poor candidates with
money and logistical support to win elections and he is ready to contribute to the campaign funds
of rich candidates as well as provide him with logistical support. Dr Sola Saraki of Kwara State
has played this kind of role in the past. He supported several poor people to win elections in
Kwara State. Governor Mohammed Lawal, the governor of Kwara State with whom he has his
major running battle cannot be said to be a poor man. He is a retired naval officer and a former
military governor. He was a man of immense means before he was nominated by Saraki to
become the governor of Kwara State in 1999.
The implications of Political Patronage on Democratic Governance
Political patronage is one of the factors that embedded democratic setting in Nigeria since
first republic (Oshodi, 2011). Regrettably in the face of dilapidation or non-sufficient existence
of social infrastructures especially in states and local governments, public resources are used for
political patronage. In Nigeria‟s fourth republic, the emergence of „godfatherism‟ posed great
threat not only to good governance but also the socio-economic stability of democratic
governance (Chukwuemeka, 2012). Perhaps one of the most disturbing and damaging influence
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of political patronage in Nigeria‟s fourth republic was in domain of making nonsense of a truly
free, fair and credible electoral process in which the electorates by right are expected to freely
elect people of their choice into public office to represent their interests.
Indeed, the privilege of electing people of their choice into public office was denied
given the situation in which „godfathers‟ foisted candidates of their preference on the generality
of the people. This is to say the least very inimical to the tenets of democratic rule, when public
office holders would not be accountable to the people, who at any rate did not count in their
elections into public office. Invariably, the loyalty of such public office holders would be tilted
towards their godfathers and this in itself negates one of the critical attributes of democracy
which is responsive and transparent government.
This scenario is also inimical to good governance and political stability which are
predicated on the rule of law, due process, accountability and transparency in the management of
public business. The emergence of political patronage has also robbed the citizens of the
privilege of enjoying the dividends of democratic governance in the sense that the-would be
government became reluctant to initiate and implement policies that would advance the
wellbeing of the generality of the citizens. This was as a result of the fact that political patronage
in Nigeria was basically predatory in nature.
The primary motive of venturing into politics was borne out of the need to acquire money
from the coffers of government to which their godsons held sway. Therefore the lean financial
resource accruable to the state from the federation account which was meant for the
improvement of living standard of the citizens was paramount interest to them. In instances
where the „godsons‟ upon reflection refused to settle their „godfathers‟ as agreed upon before
securing public office, hell was let loose. The experiences recorded in Enugu State in 1999
between Jim Nwobodo and Governor Chimaroke Nnamani. Also in 2007 between Governor
Sullivan Chime and Chimaroke Nnamani were awful.
Another far reaching effects of political patronage on the entrenchment of good
governance, which in turn would engender democratic growth and stability, according to Uduji
(2009) is the complete erosion of the normative elements of democracy of which trusts is a sine-
qua-non attribute between the government and the governed. In a polity where prescribed rules
guiding the electoral process are frequently disobeyed with impunity, the basis of citizen‟s trust
in government was compromised. If the situation is not decisively addressed with the urgency it
deserves, the resultant effect is that trust as a vital social capital is lost, and when there is no trust
between the government and the governed, interaction would only take place on the basis of
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mutual suspicion and this does not augur well for the healthy development of democratic
governance.
However, political patronage has become a scary phenomenon in Nigerian politics. As
observed by Omotola (2007), political patronage in Nigeria, particularly in its current form and
character, is distributive. Though it is a longstanding and deeply rooted feature of the cultural
values of Nigerian society, where it is purely socio-economic in nature and mutually productive
for both parties, its politicization would appear to have contributed to the criminalization of
politics. Political patrons reign across all spheres of the society: academics, legal, and religion
environment.
Therefore, the clamour for democracy in Nigeria is to improve both political and socio-
economic situation of the country through massive involvement in the policy making, but reverse
is the case as those that attained political power in both legislative and executive arms of
government got to the seat of powers through the support of some political „godfathers‟ in
various states cum the center, however, the desire of political godfathers is to hold political and
socio-economic powers both at the center cum the component units as mechanisms to politically
influence the activities of political office holders, that is, the Governors and some Legislators in
terms of appointing people into various positions, such as Ministers/Commissioners, Chairmen
of the boards, Secretaries to the various Institutions, and Treasurers of Local Governments as
well as allocation of some developmental projects into various localities within the state or center
as well (Alabi and Sakariyau, 2013).
Consequently, the impact of the political patrons on Nigeria‟s general elections was
unprecedented. Political patrons are those who have the security connections, extended local
links, enormous financial weight to plot and determine the success of a power seeker at any level
of a supposedly competitive politics. Although political patronage has an institutionalized feature
in Nigerian politics over the years, its contemporary manifestations suggest that it has assumed
epidemic proportions, becoming one of the greatest threats to democratic consolidation in
Nigeria (Omotola, 2007). The recent activities of some Nigerian political patrons could be
likened to attributes of mafianism; however, some still see the existence of political patrons as
the „balancer‟ of power in a democracy.
Akinola (2009) believes in the need to have a good-hearted individual (people‟s hero) at
the sole realm of absolute power, a political patrons distributes power as he deems, and anoints
who rules. But, political patronage has taken a strange dimension in Nigeria‟s political
environment. It has become a menace pulling down the foundations of masses-driven
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governance, thereby denying Nigerians the much-deserved dividends of democracy. Ademola
(2004) added that since 1999, when Nigeria joined the comity of democratically governed
countries, it has continued to experience an unprecedented rise in political violence ranging from
increased crime wave, armed robbery, political assassination, and religious riots as a result of
crises loomed between „godfathers‟ and some „godsons‟.
Indeed, Nigeria has joined the comity of democratic nations with the hope that the ideals
of democracy will be upheld and sustained. However, the signals political events in Nigeria are
showing are that what we actually have is a democratic system „sustained‟ by political patrons. It
is not one primarily aimed at improving the welfare of the people. Rather it is system the
political class craves for in order to gain access to state resources to finance patronage,
patrimonialism and for personal gains (Omobowale, 2007). This is why violence has to be used
to silence the opposition and actualize primitive and exploitative acquisition. Thus, what the
present democratic dispensation have brought forth for Nigeria in general is a system sustained
by hoodlums for the sake of the political class and not the electorate.
Theoretical framework
In explaining God fathering and political patronage in Nigeria, the following theoretical
paradigm was to be considered:
Coalition theory
This theory focuses on government formation, which simply means on how governing
political party or parties enter and construct and consolidate their own government identity
(Wood, 1998; Furlong, 1989; Scott, 1997). According to this theory, one way to do exactly that
is through dispensing patronage politics via state jobs whereby political principals distribute and
manage state institutions‟ jobs in order to bargain over policy output. For this school of thought,
political patronage or rather political appointment system is an „inherent‟ feature of all governing
political parties in government worldwide and there is no problem in dispensing the system at all.
However, there are variations between countries on the quality and integrity of
bureaucrats appointed based on political patronage rather than merit. It is argued that all
governing political parties widely apply this political tool to tame, control and regulate the
behaviour of the state agents as they may not be entirely trusted, especially as they deal daily
with public monies and other state resources. Even countries castigated as developmental states
such as Malaysia, Brazil, China, Japan, South Korea, etc., apply the system at varying degree
(Wood, 1998; Furlong, 1989; Scott, 1997).
14
In similar tone, Du Gay (2000) argues that political principals dispense political
patronage via state jobs to tame the power of agency officials and to enhance their (politicians)
own positions within government. According to this theory, political patronage via state jobs is
not only about controlling but also about ensuring that the state agents achieve the principals‟
policy objectives particularly given the danger of the opposition political parties‟ agents to derail
and sabotage the governing political party‟s policy vision and objectives.
Party System Theory
The party system theory also agrees that the conduct of political parties influences the
performance of the state institutions including the legislatures since government is constructed
by political parties. They can either limit or enhance the powers and operations of the state
institutions. According to this theory, certain party systems are able to limit the extent or level of
political principals or political parties dispensing political patronage.
This theory distinguishes between „fragile party system‟ and „competitive party system‟.
One basic difference is on the level of competitiveness, meaning the likelihood that the
incumbent governing political party or parties can be defeated. GrzymanA-Busse (2003) argues
that lack of robust competition between programmatic political parties in the state results into
ineffective and inefficient state institutions evident in poor institutional quality or performance
thus allowing a governing party or parties to dispense political patronage via state jobs.
This in turn leads to corruption and poor governance, which are used widely by the
World Bank, Transparency International, etc., as indices for measuring the quality or
performance of the state institutions worldwide. In such situation where the state is inefficient
due to poor governance systems and or corruption, the governing political party or parties
legitimizes itself or themselves based on their ability to reward supporters through selective
incentives rather than their ability to generate the kinds of public goods necessary for human and
economic development as well as growth.
Meritocratic Theory
This theory literally rejects political patronage via state jobs as enhancing the
performance or quality of state institutions. Proponents of this theory (Weber, 1948; 1968; Evans
& Rauch, 1999; Henderson et al, 2007, Miller, 2000; Ritzer, 1975; Dahlstrom, Lapuente &
Teorell, 2011; Andreski, 1983, Johnson & Libecap, 1994) argue that political patronage leads to
politicization rather than professionalization of state institutions. Politicization of the state
institutions eventually culminates into poor institutional capacity and lack of accountability on
public goods provision as the system is immoral and a democratic pathology.
15
Dahlstromet al (2012) gives an example of the mayor of Spain between 2001 and 2003
who replaced „merit-recruited‟ state agents with political appointees. According to these
scholars, the Spanish mayor was able to coordinate his corruption intensions with appointees he
had himself selected based on political patronage. Conspicuously, the theory of meritocracy
argues that poor performance by state agents appointed on political patronage is often blamed on
others or covered up by their political principals.
Empirical evidence indicates that officials appointed based on political patronage may be
recalled at any time once they have lost favour with their political principals. As noted by
Kanyane (2006), with a culture of patronage politics an atmosphere of playing safe is often
created, which is not conducive for responsible and accountable bureaucratic institutions.
Proponents of this theory strongly maintain that people in the state should be appointed on merit
because such officials see office holding as a vocation.
For this theory, office holding is not considered a source to be exploited for rents or
emoluments nor is considered a usual exchange of services for equivalents (Weber, 1948). In the
study of bureaucracy, Max Weber, for example, advocated for „career personnel‟ with
specialized training and expertise, among others, as the prerequisite for employment in any
bureaucratic institutions. Of course, Weber‟s work on bureaucracy has a profound impact on our
theoretical understanding of how principal-agent relationship within institutions plays out and
how the bureaucratic institution developed. Therefore, the theory of meritocracy has intellectual
roots from the Max Weber‟s study of a bureaucracy.
Moreover, Woodrow Wilsons (1887 in Rosenbloom, 2008) in his study of administration
also argued for an administration apparatus that is devoid of politics and meddling after he was
concerned about the bureaucratic system in America that operated as a bastion for political
patronage. Proponents of this theory suggest that democratic states all over the world should
shun away from political patronage via state jobs and embrace a culture of meritocratic
recruitment and promotion. They argue that access to institutions of government as an employee
should be conditioned on the bases of possession of relevant knowledge, skills and qualification
credentials, what Max Weber (1968) refers to as „expert-officialdom‟.
This is due to the fact that partly qualified officials in terms of specialized training and
examination always enter the state as employees with an understanding that office holding is a
vocation. The executive office is separated from the households much as business assets are
separated from private fortunes. Proponents of this school of thought give examples of some
countries such as Australia, Brazil, Malaysia, China, Japan, UK, etc., that have also introduced a
16
system of tough public civil service examination to select the best potential candidates for the
state institutions as agents. The civil service examination system in China, for example, has a
created a unique class of „scholar-bureaucrats‟ irrespective of family or party pedigree (Fukai &
Fukui, 1992) even if cadre deployment is applied.
Throughout the period of military rule and in the Nigeria‟s fourth republic (1999-2013),
emergence of political patronage posed a great threat not only to good governance but also to the
socio-economic development and stability of democratic governance. Perhaps, one of the most
disturbing and damaging influence of political patronage in Nigeria‟s fourth republic was in
domain of making nonsense of a truly free, fair and credible electoral process in which the
electorates by right are expected to freely elect people of their choice into public office to
represent their interests.
Indeed, the privilege of electing people of their choice into public office was denied
given the situations in which patrons foisted candidates of their preference on the generality of
the people. This is to say the least very inimical to the tenets of democratic rule (Chukwuma,
2008). When public office holders would not be accountable to the people, who at any rate did
not count in their elections into public office, invariably, the loyalty of such public office holder
would be tilted towards their godfathers and this in itself negates one of the critical attributes of
governance and democracy which is responsive and transparent government. This scenario is
also inimical to good governance and political stability which are predicated on the rule of law,
due process, accountability and transparency in the management of public business.
The emergence of political patronage has also robbed the citizens of the privilege of
enjoying the dividends of democratic governance in the sense that government has become
reluctant to initiate and implement policies that would advance the well-being of the generality
of the citizens. This was a result of the fact that political patronage in Nigeria was basically
predatory in nature. The primary motive of venturing into politics was born out of the need to
acquire wealth (money) from the coffers of government to which their „godsons‟ held sways
(Chukwumeka, 2012). Therefore, the lean financial resource accruable to the state from the
federation account which was meant for the improvement of living standards of the citizens was
paramount interest to them.
Instances where the „godsons‟ (governors, chairmen)etc. refused to settle their
„godfathers‟ as agreed before securing public office, hell was let loose. The experiences recorded
in Senator Rashidi Ladoja of Oyo state and Lamidi Adedibu between 2003 and 2007, Olusola
Saraki and Mohammed Lawal (2003-2007), and Chris Uba and Chris Ngige (2003-2006) were
17
awful and devastating. The end point and consequences of these „godfatherism‟ in our politic is
that economic activities are brought to a halt, especially education sectors, health, security
(political wrangling), agriculture, housing and infrastructural developments etc.
The political patrons or godfathers in Nigeria see governance and political power as the
cheapest and surest method of amassing wealth to the detriment of the governed. Sponsoring a
weak and poor candidate to win election by appointment is seen as a lucrative business whereby
the sponsor will invest heavily in imposing his candidate on the people as their leader, with all
intent and protégé, called chairmen, and governors.
Political patronage is a dangerous development in Nigeria politics. The electorates are
impoverished the more, and the corrupt rich godfathers are corruptly enriching themselves the
more. The circle is endless, as the solution to this menaces is the serious problem facing Nigeria
until a morally sound, committed and patriotic leader emerge to lead the people honestly with the
attribute of transparency, openness, people oriented policies and programmes, Nigeria economic
development will be a mirage. The susceptibility of the political structures and institutions to the
influence and control of forces operating outside the government but within the political system
is a great and potential threat to growth and economic development of the country.
Elite theory:
The major assumptions of elite theory is that in every society there is, and must be a
minority which rules over the rest of society, and this minority forms the political class or
governing elite composed of those who occupy the posts of political command and more
regularly those who can directly influence political decision. They undergo changes in its
membership over a period of time, ordinarily by the recruitment of new individual members
from the lower strata of the society, sometimes by the incorporation of new social groups, and
occasionally by the complete replacement of the established elite by counter-elite. Vilfred (1935)
opined that in every branch of human activity each individual is given an index which stands as a
sign of his capacity, very much the way grades are given in the various subjects in examinations
in school (Suenu, 2004, Nkwede, 2014).
According to Suenu (2004), an elitist correlation to the understanding of political
patronage is very apt. He sees political patrons as being synonymous with the elites. For him,
elites in the political spheres are known in Nigerian context as godfathers. They are the ones who
govern, and are known as the kingmakers, the notables and often seen as strongmen who control
politics in their different domains. Apparently, in a political environment where political
patronage is in vogue, individuals are „colonized‟ by the political patrons. In order words,
18
patrons rule by proxies. The relevance of this theory to the current study cannot be
overemphasized. This is because of its interconnectivity to the explanation of political patronage
in a democratic dispensation and its implication on economic development in Nigeria.
Conclusion
The recruitment and appointment of state agents based on political patronage than
meritocracy creates problems of poor strategic planning outputs and capacity deficit at the
bureaucratic level pertaining to fiscal management and public goods provision. It also creates
institutional instability and loss of institutional memory as evident in increased number of
prolonged acting roles as a result of suspensions of more senior state agents by their political
principals and high staff turnover. Various successive reports in Nigeria indicate the
performance of many state institutions in the country is increasingly regressing after democracy
due to lack of capacity, lack of consequences for poor performance, etc.
Nigeria has a huge pool of „expertly‟ trained and qualified labour force to draw from but
political meddling during recruitment and promotion processes pose a threat to building a
capable, career-oriented and professional civil service. Empirically, studies has found that state
officials who deal with human resource issues like recruitment in Nigeria want less political
meddling in administration. This paper then suggests that where the governing political parties
or the political principals see a need to dispense patronage via state jobs, considerations should
be given to the cadre‟s qualification credentials and integrity.
Political patronage in Nigerian present democratic dispensation will continue to threaten
the practice of popular political participation in the country if no concrete efforts are made to
deal with the problem. Godsons who have problems with their god fathers should openly
provide information on the type of problems they are consequently subjected to. This exposure
could aid the democratic governance of the country by humiliating the political patrons and
revealing to the public how the Political patrons manipulate elections in the country, that would
ultimately culminate into the sustenance of the democratization process, which in-turn shall
engender the sustainability of the economic development efforts of successive political parties
and emergent governments in Nigeria in future. Finally, unless political patronage is stamped
out of Nigerian politics, it would be difficult for Nigeria to be stable in politics, democratic
governance and economic development.
19
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