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Copyright © Humanitarian Organization for Migration Economics & Liberty Shared
Photo Credit: Tom White (https://visura.co/white)
First published January 2019
Humanitarian Organization for Migration Economics
Website: http://www.home.org.sg/
Email: contact@home.org.sg
Tel: (+65) 6741 1725
#02-01, 495 Geylang Road, Singapore 389453
Liberty Shared
Website: https://libertyshared.org/
Email: contact@libertyshared.org
Share (Asia Pacific) Limited, P O Box 23526, Wan Chai Post Office, Hong Kong
Disclaimer:
The report sets out our findings based on casework data as well as a desktop review of publicly
available sources in English. Users should at all times consult the full text of the relevant laws in
the original language as well as seek advice from local counsel qualified in the relevant domestic
jurisdictions. This report does not constitute legal advice under any circumstances.
3
Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................................ 5
FOREWORD ................................................................................................................................................ 6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................... 8
CHAPTER 1 ............................................................................................................................................... 10
FORCED LABOUR: TAKING IT SERIOUSLY .................................................................................. 11
Objectives ............................................................................................................................................. 11
Methodology ........................................................................................................................................ 13
Outline .................................................................................................................................................. 14
CHAPTER 2 ............................................................................................................................................... 16
FORCED LABOUR: AN OVERVIEW ................................................................................................... 17
Forced Labour: What Is It? ................................................................................................................. 17
Singapore and its Forced Labour Obligations ............................................................................... 19
Forced Labour and Human Trafficking .......................................................................................... 20
Indicators of Forced Labour .............................................................................................................. 22
CHAPTER 3 ............................................................................................................................................... 25
FORCED LABOUR AND SINGAPORE’S WORK PERMIT REGIME .......................................... 26
Tied Work Permit System ................................................................................................................. 26
Restrictions on Labour Mobility ................................................................................................... 27
Restrictions on Freedom of Movement and Communication .................................................. 27
Fear of Employer Retaliation ........................................................................................................ 28
Legislative Framework: Exclusions & Regulatory Gaps.............................................................. 29
Exclusion from the Employment Act .......................................................................................... 29
Lack of Minimum Wage Protections ........................................................................................... 30
Debt-Dependent Migration: Excessive Recruitment Fees......................................................... 30
Difficulty in Leaving Employment .............................................................................................. 33
Inadequate Enforcement Regarding the Withholding of Passports ........................................ 33
CHAPTER 4 ............................................................................................................................................... 34
FORCED LABOUR & MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN SINGAPORE: CASE STUDIES
...................................................................................................................................................................... 35
Casework Statistics: Domestic Workers ......................................................................................... 35
4
Case Studies: Domestic Workers in Forced Labour Situations .................................................. 41
Multiple Forms of Coercion: The ‘Subtle and Not Immediately Observable’ ....................... 41
Not Criminal Enough: Exploited but ‘Not Abused’ .................................................................. 42
Employment Agents: Perpetrators & Enablers .......................................................................... 47
Underage & Child Labour............................................................................................................. 50
A Note About ‘The Employer’ ............................................................................................................ 51
CHAPTER 5 ............................................................................................................................................... 53
CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................................ 54
Recommendations ............................................................................................................................... 55
APPENDIX A: ILO’S HARD TO SEE, HARDER TO COUNT ........................................................... 59
APPENDIX B: ILO’S DELPHI INDICATORS FOR HUMAN TRAFFICKING ........................... 63
ENDNOTES ............................................................................................................................................... 65
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................ 72
5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
HOME gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Archana Sinha Kotecha, Asia Region Director
and Head of Legal at Liberty Shared, who provided expert guidance and drafting support on this
report.
Some information for this report was gleaned from other HOME submissions and we would like
to thank MJ Davis for her assistance in this regard.
We are very grateful to Linklaters LLP (Singapore) for reviewing the report and offering their
expertise on labour laws and other legal content.
The lead author of this report is Stephanie Chok, Research & Advocacy Manager at HOME.
Research assistance was provided by Rebecca Liu Jia Yu and Chelsea Koh Zyang Kym. Credit also
needs to be given to HOME staff whose insights and recommendations were instrumental in
shaping this report: Sheena Kanwar (Executive Director), Jolovan Wham (Consultant) and Jaya
Anil Kumar (Case Manager). For design and layout, a big thank you to Rinawati from Linklaters.
We also thank Heidi Chiu and Leah Blewett for proofreading and careful editing of the near-final
drafts. For the cover image, we extend our appreciation to photojournalist Tom White
(https://visura.co/white).
6
FOREWORD
Globally, there has been increasing cognizance and scrutiny of the large-scale prevalence of forced
labour in the context of migration. A sector that deserves attention in these discussions is that of
domestic work. There are at least 67.1 million domestic workers worldwide, with over 40% in the
Asia-Pacific region, of which 80% are women;
1
the ILO estimates there are 11.5 million migrant
domestic workers in the world.
2
In Asia, Singapore employs the second highest number of documented migrant domestic workers.
3
As of December 2017, there were 246,800 migrant domestic workers in Singapore. Yet there are
very few protections in place for this community in Singapore’s formal, regulated and advanced
economy. Where such reliance is placed on domestic workers to support working families, one
would expect the receiving state to have relevant safeguards in place to ensure that the occurrence
of labour exploitation is minimized, and to the extent that exploitation does occur, that it is
addressed swiftly, fairly and in a transparent manner.
The lack of a guaranteed minimum wage, exclusion from the Employment Act, along with the non-
mandatory employment contract and the insufficient guidelines on working conditions, among
others, leave Singapore’s migrant domestic worker population vulnerable to different forms and
degrees of labour exploitation and abuse. Whilst anti-trafficking legislation exists, this is in no way
a substitute for fundamental labour protections. Conversely, complex forced labour issues cannot
be dealt with simply by reference to labour laws that are not designed to deal with such issues. In
a framework in which labour inspections in homes are unlikely to take place, education of workers
about their rights and avenues to access remedial justice, as well as employer education and
accountability, are important safeguards in ensuring that exploitation is prevented and addressed
correctly.
Whilst HOME has been primarily invested in providing support services to migrant workers in
crises, we also aim to present relevant data and highlight systemic issues. This report is an
important part of HOME’s commitment towards our sustained efforts to address human
trafficking and forced labour issues in Singapore. We also hope that this report will contribute to
a deeper understanding of what forced labour looks like in practice and how it manifests itself in
the domestic work sector in Singapore. It is hoped this will encourage key stakeholders, including
policymakers, parliamentarians, government officials, researchers and civil society organizations
to collaborate towards ensuring timely and much needed support to victims as well as the
prevention of forced labour.
A greater degree of protection is necessary for this vulnerable community of workers, who should
be able to flourish in their employment whilst they are away from their homes and families. This
is also an opportunity for employers to step up and learn more about their duties and
responsibilities vis-à-vis these individuals who have become an indispensable member of many
households. We are hopeful that beyond much needed legislation and accountability, our
humanity and reliance on each other will eventually prevail.
7
It has been a privilege for Liberty Shared and HOME to work together on this report and we will
continue in our endeavours to document the stories of the most vulnerable domestic workers and
seek justice and accountability for them.
Archana Kotecha, Sheena Kanwar
Asia Region Director Executive Director
Liberty Shared HOME
8
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report examines the issue of forced labour (FL) among Singapore’s migrant domestic worker
(MDW) population. Engaged in essential care and household work, live-in domestic workers are
recognized as particularly vulnerable to labour and human rights violations. As a community,
domestic workers are highly susceptible to forced labour due to the isolated nature of their work
and workplaces (private homes), the lack of legal protections in Singapore, as well as the
difficulties of—and reluctance associated with—regulating domestic work, even when policies
aimed at so doing already exist.
In the last year, HOME provided shelter to over 800 MDWs. The five most common complaints
leading these women to seek shelter were: overwork, emotional abuse (including verbal insults,
intimidation and threats), salary-related claims, illegal deployment and inadequate provision of
food. Other issues reported included a lack or denial of rest days, unreasonable restrictions on
communication (including the confiscation of mobile phones), the denial of sick leave and/or
medical treatment, and poor living conditions. There were also reports of physical and sexual
abuse or harassment. While not the primary trigger for leaving employment, almost all the
domestic workers who seek help from HOME have their identity documents (most notably
passports) withheld by their employers. Meanwhile, recruitment regimes continue to subject
MDWs in Singapore to several months of salary deductions in order to repay recruitment fees,
leaving them with low to no salary for an average of four to eight months. Pursuant to the
International Labour Organization’s (ILO) frameworks for forced labour, many of these practices
are recognized as strong indicators of forced labour.
The key tenets of forced labour are deception, coercion and exploitation. These mark and shape
the daily lives of MDWs in Singapore in several ways. They manifest themselves in the practices
cited above and they configure relations between domestic workers, employers and recruiters.
Such relations and practices, in turn, influence decision-making by further narrowing the already
constrained options available to domestic workers. First and foremost forced labour must be
recognized as a process: a person may consent to migrate for work but nonetheless become trapped
in a situation of forced labour through deception, the use or menace of force and penalty, or other
forms of coercion. Persons could remain in such situations for longer than they are willing due to
coercive mechanisms, some of which are not easily detectable by external observers. In any
analysis of forced labour, it is vital to explicitly acknowledge the acute power asymmetries that
exist between employers/agents and employees which not only allow for such practices to occur
and persist, but which make it extremely difficult for MDWs to escape such conditions.
In detailing particular case studies, this report offers insights into the conditions and contexts that
enable and lead to forced labour situations. While individual actors facilitate systems of forced
labour, it is often the collective impact of multiple actors—including a lack of action and
intervention—that maintain and sustain such systems. The case studies also highlight the risk
factors that need to be strictly managed in order to deal with forced labour.
Ultimately we strive to achieve the prevention of forced labour through the existence of a robust
legal framework supported by a well-trained body of professionals capable of recognizing and
taking action to reduce the vulnerabilities of MDWs to practices that could result, over time, in a
9
forced labour situation. Practices that are recognized as strong indicators of forced labour must be
strongly dealt with as a critical component of risk management. Allowing exploitative recruitment
and labour practices to become entrenched risks eroding and undermining the general conditions
for decent work, hence creating an enabling environment for more extreme forms of abuse to occur
and flourish.
The recommendations set out in Chapter 5 are premised around strengthening legislative
protection, which includes guaranteeing basic employment rights for MDWs as well as greater
specificity in law on particular practices and forms of abuse. Domestic workers are currently
excluded from the Employment Act, which means basic labour standards, such as their working
hours, are not adequately regulated. Though MDWs are covered by the Employment of Foreign
Manpower Act, the ambiguous language of its provisions leaves MDWs vulnerable to abuse.
Greater clarity is also required in defining key terms. In the Prevention of Human Trafficking Act,
core concepts, including forced labour and exploitation, are not defined and aligned with
international standards, thus inhibiting victim identification and the provision of holistic support
for survivors of forced labour and trafficking. In order to ensure that any progress made towards
the prevention and eradication of forced labour is aligned with international benchmarks, we urge
the Singapore government to ratify the 2014 Protocol on Forced Labour and adopt the
supplementary recommendations.
Our recommendations also focus on practical steps that can be taken to address the practices and
policies that exacerbate the already uneven balance of power between MDWs and their
employers/agents which have such a fundamental effect on the lives of MDWs. Some of these are
related to the regulatory framework that govern Work Permit holders in Singapore, for example
the security bond imposed on employers that incentivize draconian measures such as control of
MDWs’ movements and the withholding of identity documents. Another key issue exacerbating
the high level of dependency on employers is the lack of labour mobility for MDWs. The right to
unilaterally dismiss and repatriate the MDW is reserved for the employer as is the right to withhold
consent to the MDW changing employers.
The current status quo of MDWs paying large sums for their overseas placements needs to be
tackled if the coercive power of debt and its inextricable link to forced labour is to be mitigated.
Measures to strengthen cross-border cooperation between countries of origin and countries of
destination are required to improve regulation of recruitment agencies and other intermediaries,
and to ensure the portability of rights and protection mechanisms for MDWs. Regional and
bilateral agreements are frequently forged when it comes to the protection of trade interests.
Likewise, political will needs to be aimed towards ensuring that such agreements are also focused
on aligning labour standards between countries of origin and countries of destination with a view
to protecting migrant workers.
Forced labour among the MDW population in Singapore is a problem that needs to be taken
seriously. Forced labour can and does occur in ‘ordinary households’; it can be perpetuated by
accepted behavioural norms executed by ordinary people. Far from a covert activity, it takes place
in formal economies and among documented workers with legal status who participate in highly
regularized migration regimes. A more robust recognition of exploitation and coercion, and how
these core concepts interact with each other and the particular vulnerabilities of MDWs is a
necessary starting point for discussing and dealing decisively with forced labour.
10
CHAPTER 1
FORCED LABOUR: TAKING IT SERIOUSLY
11
CHAPTER 1
FORCED LABOUR: TAKING IT SERIOUSLY
The suggestion that slavery exists in Singapore is a contentious claim. Yet contemporary forms of
slavery are globally pervasive—the International Labour Organization estimates that over 40
million people are victims of modern slavery at any one time
4
—and Singapore is not immune to
this pernicious phenomenon. The term ‘modern-day slavery’ is used to encapsulate a range of
slavery-like practices and manifests in multiple forms: forced labour, human trafficking, debt
bondage, forced marriage, as well as child slavery.
5
This report specifically examines the issue of forced labour among Singapore’s migrant domestic
worker (MDW) population. The ILO considers persons to be in a situation of forced labour ‘if they
enter work or service against their freedom of choice, and cannot leave it without penalty or the
threat of penalty’.
6
Of the over 40 million people in modern slavery, the ILO estimates that over
half (24.9 million people) are trapped in forced labour; of this group, about 16 million are exploited
in the private sector (domestic work, construction or agriculture).
7
Forced labour has been
identified as a problem especially prevalent in Asia and the Pacific, in which four out of every 1,000
persons are victims of forced labour. Overall, women are disproportionately affected by ‘privately
imposed forced labour’; and half of the victims of forced labour are in debt bondage.
8
Additionally,
the ILO estimates that 44% of the world’s forced labourers are migrants:
9
migrant workers have,
in fact, been identified as ‘particularly vulnerable’ to forced labour.
10
Frequently linked to poverty, forced labour is sustained by inequality. This manifests itself through
asymmetries in power, influence and access not only to money, but in the case of MDWs, to visas
and overseas job opportunities. It is exacerbated by reduced literacy in complex bureaucratic
processes, inability on the part of MDWs to unilaterally switch jobs, to seek protection and
representation, as well as difficulties in accessing justice. Despite the ILO’s Forced Labour
Conventions being some of the most widely ratified ILO instruments,
11
there are significant
governance gaps between and within member states, which include both countries of origin and
destination.
While temporary low-wage migrant workers, as a social group, are recognized as vulnerable to
forced labour, this report specifically focuses on women MDWs,
12
who are recognized as especially
vulnerable.
13
Domestic workers in Singapore, who are required to live-in with their employers,
frequently have to contend with severe restrictions on communication (including confiscation of
their mobile phones), constant surveillance, substandard living conditions, inadequate food and
constant psychological abuse (including name-calling and threats of harm). Cases of physical and
sexual abuse are also regularly reported. These issues have been determined by the ILO to be
strong indicators of forced labour (see Chapter 2).
Objectives
Based on HOME’s casework data and accumulated experience assisting hundreds of MDWs
annually, this report is a call to take forced labour issues in Singapore seriously. Its objectives are
manifold:
12
• To identify patterns of forced labour and how it manifests in particular national contexts
for certain social groups—in this case MDWs in Singapore. Despite the prominence of
forced labour as a global issue of concern, conceptually there is confusion over what the
term encapsulates.
14
The ILO has pointed out how forced labour, while universally
recognized as a crime, is rarely prosecuted, due to the difficulties in articulating the various
component elements that constitute forced labour in national laws and regulations.
15
There
are also distinctions between what the ILO terms ‘older’ versus ‘newer’ patterns of forced
labour, in which ‘mechanisms of coercion’ may be shifting.
16
This report, through its
specific focus on forced labour imposed by private agents for economic exploitation in
Singapore,
17
aims to identify the key characteristics and forms of coercion that a) constitute
forced labour situations in Singapore; b) pose particular risks for MDWs, such that forced
labour conditions may develop.
• To address enduring myths (or partial truths) surrounding forced labour and its victims
as well as perpetrators. Mainstream characterizations of victims and perpetrators tend to
veer towards extremes: an ‘illegal’ migrant chained up/locked in, assaulted by a tyrannical
taskmaster and too terrified or in too remote a location to seek assistance. While not always
entirely inaccurate, it is problematic when these representations of forced labour are used
to set an extremely high ‘threshold of victimhood’,
18
obscuring abuses and violations that
are treated as relatively ‘less severe’ and thereby go undetected or unpunished.
Additionally, forced labour is not just a covert activity taking place in informal economies:
in Singapore, labour migration is highly regularized and documented workers with legal
status—and legitimate papers—are also susceptible to forced labour, which may not
involve physical restraints and overt displays of violence or other forms of physical abuse.
• To make explicit causal relationships between multiple actors and practices that create
an enabling environment for forced labour. The notion of a ‘single perpetrator’ needs to
be re-examined, particularly in the case of domestic workers, who live and work in
households with multiple members. It is also important to consider how various persons
are complicit in enabling the sustained exploitation of a domestic worker through the ways
they engage in deceptive and fraudulent practices, differentially exert control over her (e.g.
employer threatens, agent invokes large debt), are indifferent to her plight, hinder her from
seeking assistance, or obstruct access to remedial justice: this includes not just employers
and employment agents, but other brokers and intermediaries, as well as law enforcement
officers, labour attachés, and policymakers, in both countries of origin and countries of
destination. MDWs are entwined in a complex web of relations—some intimate and
familiar, others far removed—and are highly dependent on a wide range of intermediaries
for a vast array of needs: from recruitment to travel and all the attendant bureaucratic
requirements (passports, visas, certificates, training), job placements, basic needs (food,
lodging, medical treatment) as well as their legal status, to name but a few. As forced labour
involving migrant workers relies on complex collaborations that stretch from countries of
origin to countries of destination, dealing with the multiple problems that arise requires
attention to interlocking, interdependent features of labour migration and its varied cross-
border actors.
13
• To advocate for a rights-based approach when dealing with forced labour and human
trafficking, with an emphasis on addressing exploitation and coercive practices in
prevention work. The framing of human trafficking as a security issue has led to States
directing anti-trafficking efforts towards ‘better policing and border controls’.
19
This can
obscure States’ responsibilities in enacting and enforcing strong labour protections, and
ensuring that increasingly restrictive immigration and labour controls are not creating
conditions that encourage forced labour and human trafficking.
20
Dealing with forced
labour requires a multifaceted approach that integrates labour and criminal justice
responses, in which human and labour rights protection inform policy and practice.
21
A
human rights approach to anti-trafficking efforts ‘would…place an ethical concern with
exploitation at the heart of the response’, in which efforts are directed towards supporting
all on ‘the continuum of exploitation’,
22
not just the ‘exceptionally exploited’
23
who are
marked as deserving and legitimate by exceptionally narrow, legalistic categories. As
people can gradually get trapped in a situation of forced labour through an assemblage of
human rights abuses, it is important to protect persons from the varied forms of
exploitation along this continuum, as a means of interrupting the process leading to forced
labour.
24
Such an approach requires explicit acknowledgment of the acute power
asymmetries that exist between parties that not only enable such abuses to occur and
persist, but which make it extremely difficult for those attempting to escape such
conditions.
Our report is motivated by the persistence and severity of the problems faced by MDWs, in
particular those who have come through our doors seeking assistance. This report aims to
contribute to a more nuanced, empirically-rich understanding of forced labour and its key tenets—
namely deception, coercion and exploitation—and how these dimensions manifest in the working
lives of MDWs in Singapore. There is a distinct lack of empirical data in this area and improved
knowledge of how forced labour operates can contribute to improved policy-making and relevant
action.
Methodology
This report relies on HOME’s casework data from April 2017–October 2018 to illustrate the nature
of forced labour among MDWs who have sought assistance from our organization. An estimated
15 to 20 MDWs seek assistance at HOME’s shelter each week, with many women experiencing
conditions akin to forced labour. As determining forced labour relies on an accumulation of
abuses—rather than individual violations
25
—case studies offer insights into the multiple practices
that lead to forced labour situations and the various actors involved. A few case studies involve
domestic workers who have reached out to us for assistance but did not stay at our shelter. All
domestic workers mentioned in our case studies have been given pseudonyms to protect their
identities. In determining what constitutes forced labour, key ILO frameworks, definitions and
indicators are adopted and applied to the selected case studies. Further details about the indicators
applied are provided in the next chapter.
14
Outline
This first chapter sets out the key objectives of the report.
The following chapter, Chapter 2, begins with a discussion of forced
labour, including definitions of the term. This discussion includes an
overview of international conventions related to forced labour and,
specifically, Singapore’s obligations under these conventions. Forced
labour is a term that tends to be conflated with other related concepts,
such as slavery, modern-day slavery, and human trafficking: the debate
is fierce regarding this conflation (and the consequent confusion).
26
In this
report, we focus on the relationship between forced labour and
trafficking (which are closely-tied but distinct concepts); we refrain from
adopting the terms ‘slavery’ and ‘modern-day slavery’, except when
citing others using the term. In identifying forced labour, the ILO is relied
upon to provide guidance and the final section details the key indicators
used.
Chapter 3 sets the context by analyzing the temporary status of visa
programmes that allow migrant workers to reside and work in
Singapore, specifically, Singapore’s work permit system for low-wage
migrant workers. The forced labour discourse places a heavy emphasis
on ‘irregular’ workers who are especially vulnerable due to their
undocumented status. In Singapore, it is notable that forced labour occurs
under the context of a highly regularized and managed migration
programme. This chapter details the work permit system as well as the
legislative framework (or, as appropriate, the lack thereof) that sets
labour standards for MDWs. It is a labour migration regime that creates
and sustains systemic vulnerabilities capable of being exploited by
employers and agents, to the detriment of the domestic workers they hire
and place. Critical to these discussions is the issue of debt and
recruitment: migrant workers incur excessive debts in order to obtain jobs
in Singapore and the predatory practices of recruiters and their
intermediaries exert immense pressure on them to remain in jobs despite
highly exploitative conditions.
1
3
2
15
Chapter 4 delves into HOME’s casework data to illustrate the nature of
forced labour among domestic workers who have sought assistance from
our organization. The chapter begins with a breakdown of our overall
casework statistics for the past year, which give an indication of the top
complaints received at our helpdesks. As can be seen, many of these
complaints are considered strong indicators of forced labour. Specific
case studies are then detailed to illustrate the complexities and
characteristics of forced labour among the MDW population in Singapore
assisted by HOME.
Chapter 5 concludes the report with a vision of the way forward and a
range of recommendations to deal with the problems associated with
forced labour. Forced labour is recognized as a problem that requires
criminal as well as labour justice approaches, with those susceptible to
forced labour treated not merely as ‘victims’ but also recognized as
claimants of core, inalienable rights at work.
4
5
16
CHAPTER 2
FORCED LABOUR: AN OVERVIEW
17
CHAPTER 2
FORCED LABOUR: AN OVERVIEW
Forced Labour: What Is It?
The ILO’s Forced Labour Convention, 1930
(No. 29) defines forced labour as ‘all work or
service which is exacted from any person under
the menace of any penalty and for which the
said person has not offered himself
voluntarily’.
27
This definition encapsulates two
key dimensions of the lack of freedom:
‘involuntariness’ and ‘menace of penalty’.
Menace of penalty can take various forms: from
criminal sanctions to multiple forms of
coercion such as ‘threats, violence, the retention
of identity documents, confinement, or non-
payment of wages’.
28
The ILO also recognizes
the loss of rights or privileges as a penalty.
29
The concept of ‘voluntariness’, meanwhile,
refers to a worker’s consent to both enter an
employment relationship and his/her freedom
to exit it at any time (within reasonable notice
in accordance with national laws).
30
A person is
therefore considered to be in a situation of
forced labour ‘if they enter work or service
against their freedom of choice, and cannot leave it without penalty or threat of penalty’.
31
It also
includes workers being forced to undertake tasks not initially agreed to at the time of recruitment.
32
It is important to note that initial consent is irrelevant when deception or fraud has been used to
obtain it.
33
These definitions demand recognition of coercion—how it operates, its
consequences/potential consequences—and an explicit acknowledgement of the grave imbalances
in bargaining power that keep persons in highly exploitative conditions against their will.
Importantly, forced labour is not assessed by either the nature of work being performed or the
migration status of the worker (i.e. it does not matter if the work is considered ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’,
or if the worker is documented or undocumented under national law). What matters is ‘the nature
of the relationship between the person performing the work and the person exacting the work’.
34
The means of coercion employed could be ‘overt and observable’ (e.g. beatings and physical
confinement), but more frequently ‘the coercion applied is more subtle and not immediately
observable’ (emphasis added).
35
Such actions could include the confiscation of passports or mobile
phones, the withholding of wages, threats to report the worker to the authorities, or the withdrawal
of privileges (e.g. the right to leave a workplace).
36
The covert nature of such practices is a key
hurdle to the detection of forced labour, and impedes the collection of evidence as well as effective
law enforcement action.
37
FIGURE 1. FORCED LABOUR: AT A
GLANCE
ILO definition: all work or service exacted
from a person under the menace of any
penalty, for which the person has not offered
him/herself voluntarily.
Menace of penalty: criminal sanctions as well
as forms of coercion—threats, violence,
retention of identity documents, confinement
or non-payment of wages etc.; also includes
loss of rights or privileges.
Voluntariness: refers to workers’ consent to
freely enter into employment, and freedom to
exit it (with reasonable notice).
A person is in a situation of forced labour if
they enter work against their freedom of
choice, and cannot leave it without penalty or
the threat of penalty.
18
The ILO stresses that forced labour involves more than being paid low wages or enduring poor
working conditions; failing to respect labour laws which set out the criteria for adequate working
conditions does not, on its own, constitute forced labour
38
—they can, however, be important
signifiers to the potential of a forced labour situation. The problem is that a wide spectrum of
working conditions and practices exist—from ‘decent work’ (where the full range of rights are
respected; see Figure 2) at one end, to severe violations and extreme abuse on the other. Trying to
determine precisely where ‘the line dividing forced labour in the strict legal sense of the term from
extremely poor working conditions’ can be extremely challenging.
39
It is also debatable whether
clear lines can be established, if the fluidity involved in employment relations can be as tidily
delineated. Researchers and practitioners are therefore advocating approaches that recognize the
‘continuum of exploitation’ to better understand and deal with situations of forced labour.
40
Viewing labour exploitation as a continuum acknowledges the dynamism and volatility of a
migrant worker’s migration and employment experiences. Labour conditions can deteriorate, and
along with coercive employer practices and indebtedness, may result in the situation lapsing into
the realm of forced labour.
41
As has been pointed out by anti-trafficking NGOs, there is often a
passage of slippage into a forced labour situation.
42
Forced labour needs to be recognized as a
‘process more than a static relationship’, a process described as ‘an ever narrowing labyrinth where
the decision-making power of the worker is surrendered in the end’.
43
DECENT WORK: AT A GLANCE
ILO Definition: Opportunities for work that are productive and deliver a fair income,
security in the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal
development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize,
and participate in the decisions that affect their lives, and equality of opportunity and
treatment for all women and men.
Figure 2. Decent Work: At a Glance.
44
Social
security
Equal opportunity
and treatment in
employment
Stability
and
security of
work
Adequate
earnings
and
productive
work
Employment
opportunities
Combining
work,
family and
personal
life
Decent
working
time
Safe work
environment
Work that
should be
abolished
Social dialogue,
employers’ and workers’
representation
Decent Work Indicators
19
In relation to MDWs, the ILO recognizes their specific vulnerability due to the nature of their work
and living arrangements: there is a high level of dependency on employers, who are able to exert
undue influence over a domestic worker’s movements and ability to communicate freely with
others. A domestic worker may enter an employment relationship voluntarily, but the emergence
of particular conditions may transform that situation into one of forced labour: these include but
are not limited to physical confinement, psychological compulsion (e.g. credible threats, including
the loss of employment), physical or sexual abuse, the withholding of wages and retention of
identity documents.
45
Forced labour requires the twin elements of penalty (or menace of penalty) and involuntariness. It
is exploitative work exacted under coercion. A point of contention is the degree of coercion and
how that is determined. The ILO has indicated that States and employers cannot be accountable
for ‘all external constraints or indirect coercion existing in practice’.
46
However, while a perpetrator
cannot be blamed for the existing vulnerability of victims, taking advantage of their vulnerable
status and situation to induce them to work or prevent them from leaving would be considered
forced labour. It is therefore critical that States commit to the full implementation of ILO standards
in relation to labour protections and rights for all workers, including migrant workers, in order to
suppress the conditions that allow employers/agents/other intermediaries to exploit workers’
vulnerabilities.
47
This is a necessary and vital preventive measure. When labour standards are
continually violated, the general conditions for decent work are undermined and this creates an
enabling environment for ‘more extreme forms of violations to flourish’.
48
Viewing forced labour
from the perspective of a continuum of exploitation points out the various interventions required
at every stage to deal with the risks and vulnerabilities that expose workers to abuse and labour
exploitation.
Forced labour includes situations where persons are induced to work—through deception, debt,
fraud, or forms of coercion—and also involves situations in which one lacks the freedom to exit an
employment relationship without penalty/threat of penalty.
49
These threats need to be assessed
from the perspective of the person being threatened. This is especially relevant in Singapore,
particularly in relation to MDWs, who frequently encounter problems trying to ‘resign’ or exercise
their freedom of choice to terminate their employment contracts. In HOME’s experience,
employers may simply refuse to accept their terminations, ask them to ‘wait until I find a
replacement’ without specifying a timeline (or set unreasonable ones, and keep extending them),
renew their work permits without their consent, or threaten them with harm or denunciation to
the authorities if they continue to ask to return home. In some cases, requests to transfer or go
home are met with wrongful confinement and the confiscation of identity papers. As the ILO notes,
even in cases where an employment relationship was the result of a ‘freely concluded agreement’,
a worker’s ‘right to free choice of employment remains inalienable’.
50
Restrictions on leaving an
employer, even if the worker freely consented to the job, can be considered forced labour (of
course, there are qualifiers regarding reasonable notice periods in accordance to national law). In
instances where there was deception or fraud, a victim’s initial consent is irrelevant.
51
Singapore and its Forced Labour Obligations
The ILO has two key FL conventions: the C029 Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No.29), and the
C105 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105). These are considered fundamental
conventions and are the most widely ratified. Additionally, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
20
Principles and Rights at Work, adopted in 1998, ‘commits all member States to respect and promote
the abolition of forced labour’, regardless of whether they have ratified the FL conventions.
52
Singapore has been a member of the ILO since 1965 and it signed the Forced Labour Convention
No.29 the same year. While the Singapore government also ratified the C105 Abolition of Forced
Labour Convention in 1965, it was denounced in 1979.
53
Other than C029 and C105, other ILO conventions relating to forced labour include the Protocol
of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, and the Forced Labour (Supplementary Measures)
Recommendation, 2014 (No. 203).
54
The 2014 Protocol is a legally-binding instrument that ‘requires
States to take measures of prevention, protection and remedy’ to fulfil its obligations to suppress
forced labour;
55
only ILO member States that have ratified C029 can ratify the 2014 Protocol.
56
Recommendation No.203 provides ‘non-binding practical guidance’ on how States can strengthen
legislation on forced labour and supplements both the 2014 Protocol and Convention No.29.
57
It
was at the June 2014 ILO International Labour Conference that governments, employers and
workers ‘voted overwhelmingly’ to adopt the Protocol and the Recommendation.
58
The Singapore
government voted for the 2014 protocol
59
, but has not ratified it yet. However, even if Singapore
has not ratified the 2014 protocol, there is still a need to adhere to certain obligations as an ILO
member state that has ratified C029.
60
By signing C029, Singapore has undertaken ‘to suppress the
use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest possible period’.
61
As this
convention was signed more than 50 years ago, the presumption is that the State has reasonably
exceeded this ‘timeline’. This obligation on the State to suppress the use of forced labour includes
both an obligation to abstain and an obligation to act: States must ‘neither exact forced or
compulsory labour nor tolerate its exaction’.
62
It is also necessary to ‘repeal any laws or regulations
which provide for or allow the exaction of forced or compulsory labour’, and amend national laws
such that any exaction, whether by public or private entities, will be illegal.
63
Singapore’s Penal Code, described as ‘an Act to consolidate the law relating to criminal offences’,
64
includes a section on ‘Unlawful Compulsory Labour’. Section 374 states: ‘Whoever unlawfully
compels any person to labour against the will of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.’ There is, to date, no public
record of anyone being convicted under Section 374. It is also unclear how ‘unlawfully compels’ is
to be interpreted. The 2014 Protocol establishes that member states that have ratified C029 should
not only make forced labour a penal offence, penalties must be adequate and strictly enforced.
65
Singapore enacted its Prevention of Human Trafficking Act on 1 March 2015,
66
in which the
definition of exploitation includes forced labour (see Table 1). The Singapore government has also
signalled its commitment to eradicate human trafficking and forced labour by acceding to the
United Nations’ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially
Women and Children.
67
Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
The term forced labour is frequently linked with related concepts such as ‘human trafficking’,
‘slavery’, ‘modern-day slavery’ and ‘slavery-like practices’ (which further encapsulate practices
such as ‘debt bondage’, ‘debt slavery’, ‘forced marriage’, ‘servitude’, and ‘serfdom’). While these
are closely-linked concepts, differences remain, particularly in how they are legally defined in
international and national laws.
68
The utility and relevance—as well as the harm—of such terms
21
being conflated and used interchangeably continues to be debated by scholars and practitioners.
69
For the purposes of this report, the focus is on establishing the relationship between human
trafficking and forced labour, concepts with ‘overwhelmingly deep ties’.
70
Table 1: Definitions of Trafficking in Persons
71
HUMAN TRAFFICKING: KEY DEFINITIONS
UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
Definition of Trafficking in Persons (TIP): Trafficking in persons shall mean the
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means
of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving
or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices
similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
Singapore’s Prevention of Human Trafficking Act
Definition of Trafficking in Persons: Any person who recruits, transports,
transfers, harbours or receives an individual (other than a child) by means of —
(a) the threat or use of force, or any other form of coercion;
(b) abduction;
(c) fraud or deception;
(d) the abuse of power;
(e) the abuse of the position of vulnerability of the individual; or
(f) the giving to, or the receipt by, another person having control over that
individual of any money or other benefit to secure that other person’s
consent,
for the purpose of the exploitation (whether in Singapore or elsewhere) of the
individual shall be guilty of an offence. Exploitation, meanwhile, is defined as
‘sexual exploitation, forced labour, slavery or any practice similar to slavery,
servitude or the removal of an organ’ (emphasis added).
The UN’s Trafficking Protocol (sometimes referred to as the Palermo Protocol, see Table 1)
continues to be the definition of human trafficking most often cited, with the definition explained
as comprising three constituent elements: the act, the means, and the purpose (see Figure 3).
72
It
bears emphasizing, though, that the ‘essence of human trafficking is exploitation and not
movement’.
73
One of the forms of exploitation identified is forced labour, a crucial element and, in
HOME’s experience, the most prevalent form of exploitation among potentially trafficked MDWs.
While the focus of this report remains on examining forced labour practices, trafficking discourse
and anti-trafficking measures are invoked primarily to emphasize that the global movement to
eradicate human trafficking must necessarily involve efforts to deal decisively with forced labour,
22
regardless of how people arrive in these conditions.
74
Related to trafficking yet legally distinct,
forced labour needs to be taken seriously as a problem ‘rather than (or in addition to) the
mechanisms of trafficking itself’.
75
As has been repeatedly pointed out, ‘not all forced labour is the
result of human trafficking and … not all trafficking-related activities necessarily result in forced
labour’.
76
The existence of anti-trafficking laws should not discount the necessity of laws to combat
forced labour: if forced labour is punishable only when there is an established link to trafficking,
‘those in non-trafficked forced labour will find it even more difficult, if not impossible, to seek
justice’.
77
States should undertake to criminalize the exploitation of persons in forced labour
situations.
78
A clear definition of forced labour in national legislation is needed, one that adheres
to the ILO’s C029 FL convention. This should be complemented with the formulation of victim
identification protocols aligned with internationally recognized and accepted ILO forced labour
indicators.
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: The Three Key Elements
The Act
(what is done)
The Means
(how it is done)
The Purpose
(why it is done)
Recruitment,
transportation, transfer,
harbouring or receipt of
persons
+
Threat or use of force,
coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power
or vulnerability, or giving
payments or benefits to a
person in control of the
victim
+
For the purpose of
exploitation, which
includes exploiting the
prostitution of others,
sexual exploitation, forced
labour, slavery or similar
practices and the removal
of organs
= TRAFFICKING
Figure 3: Three Key Elements of Trafficking in Persons
79
Indicators of Forced Labour
The ILO is the leading UN agency engaged in labour standard-setting with the endorsement of 187
member States (including Singapore).
80
It is relied upon to provide authoritative guidance on
interpretations of forced labour. In 2012, the ILO’s Special Action Programme to Combat Forced
Labour (SAP-FL) produced a booklet in which it identified 11 indicators of forced labour.
81
These
indicators include the ‘main possible elements of a forced labour situation’, and are intended to
help front-line officials (such as criminal law enforcement, labour inspectors) as well as trade union
and NGO workers in the identification of possible FL victims.
82
The 11 indicators are:
• Abuse of vulnerability: taking advantage of a worker’s vulnerability in order to deceive,
impose highly exploitative conditions, and/or prevent a worker from leaving the job.
• Deception: a ‘failure to deliver what was promised’—in writing or verbally—such that if
the reality was known, the worker would not have accepted the job.
83
23
• Restriction of movement: being locked up or having movements restricted and tightly
controlled.
• Isolation: restricting or denying contact with the outside world. Isolation could be
geographical (such as being in a remote or difficult-to-access location) or social, that is,
having communications and movements restricted (e.g. confiscation of mobile phones). It
includes situations where businesses are informal, remote and unregulated, such that law
enforcement is unable to monitor and detect what is happening.
• Physical and sexual violence: acts of physical and sexual violence could also be a means
of disciplining workers and extracting more work, as well as inducing them to take on
additional tasks not originally agreed to. Violence is a very strong indicator of FL.
• Intimidation and threats: particularly when the worker complains about conditions or
wants to quit. Besides threats of physical harm, common threats include threats of
denunciation to authorities, loss of wages or withdrawal of privileges. Psychological
coercion, in which workers are constantly verbally abused and undermined, increases their
vulnerability—this is especially prevalent in the case of domestic workers and is one of the
most common complaints received at HOME.
• Retention of identity documents: this also includes the retention of valuable personal
possessions. Sometimes termed ‘safekeeping’ by employers and government officials,
retention in this case refers to situations where workers are unable to access their
documents upon demand, or feel they are unable to leave without risking losing these
items. The lack of identity documents also impacts workers’ access to other jobs as well as
services and the way they are subsequently treated by authorities.
• Withholding of wages: involves a systematic and deliberate withholding of wages in order
to compel workers to stay, or prevent them from changing employers.
• Debt bondage: when persons are working to pay off an incurred or inherited debt. Debts
can be manipulated and thereby compounded, making it difficult for workers to escape
the debt. Sometimes referred to as bonded labour, the situation ‘reflects an imbalance in
power between the worker-debtor and the employer-creditor’, and ‘has the effect of
binding the worker to the employer for an unspecified period of time’.
84
The situation is
different from loans taken from a bank, in which there are ‘mutually agreed and acceptable
terms’ for repayment.
85
• Abusive working and living conditions: working conditions that are degrading,
hazardous and in severe breach of labour law; they are conditions workers would never
freely accept. Substandard living conditions include overcrowded and unsanitary facilities.
While abusive conditions alone are not sufficient to prove FL, they serve as an ‘alert’ that
there may be coercion preventing the worker from leaving.
• Excessive overtime: long working hours beyond those stipulated by national law; includes
being on call 24/7 and being denied breaks as well as days off. A FL situation arises if a
person works overtime in excess of legal limits, under some form of threat, or in order to
earn a minimum wage.
24
‘Measuring’ forced labour is a daunting task. The ILO’s global reports have attempted to capture
the scale of the problem,
86
but it is an imperfect—and controversial—science. In this report, we
focus on identifying forced labour in an attempt to understand what enables it and how it
manifests itself; it is also an attempt to improve understanding of the core FL concepts, particularly
coercion. In addition to these 11 indicators, the interpretation of FL and key concepts has also been
informed by key literature on forced labour and trafficking. There are considerable overlaps with
indicators used in other key frameworks such as the ILO’s Hard to See, Harder to Count,
87
and the
ILO’s Delphi indicators (see Appendices A and B),
88
notwithstanding that both frameworks weight
the indicators (strong, medium or weak). In this report, however, the aim is to illustrate the
cumulative impact of various employer/agent practices and the exercise of coercion: these
elements are mutually-reinforcing and, in particular combinations and contexts, can transform an
employment relationship entered into voluntarily into one of forced labour.
25
CHAPTER 3
FORCED LABOUR AND SINGAPORE’S
WORK PERMIT REGIME
26
CHAPTER 3
FORCED LABOUR AND SINGAPORE’S WORK PERMIT
REGIME
In discussions about forced labour and trafficking, reference is often made to
undocumented/’irregular’ workers and their increased vulnerability. This is undisputed. What
this chapter highlights is the growing acknowledgment that documented workers, who migrate
for work under highly regularized ‘employer-tied’ visa programmes, are subject to severe rights
restrictions that heighten their vulnerability to forced labour.
89
Singapore is not alone in being
affected by these issues. In countries that have established guest worker programmes, such as the
United States and Canada, there is mounting criticism about such programmes: they have been
termed ‘exploitation express’,
90
described as ‘close to slavery’,
91
and targeted for the ‘creeping
economic apartheid’ between migrant workers and citizens.
92
These ‘use-and-discard’
93
regimes share core characteristics: a migrant worker can enter the
country but is only allowed to work for a particular employer, or in a specific industry; they are
clustered in sectors in which the work is generally low-paid and working conditions are poor (e.g.
agriculture, domestic work), and where they can be easily dismissed and repatriated.
94
MDWs in
Singapore are subject to this regime of ‘permanent transience’,
95
in which they are not entitled to
access permanent residency or citizenship as well as family reunification. Their ‘deportability’,
shaped by deportation laws that render them ‘disposable economic subjects with few or no
political rights’,
96
functions as a form of ‘structural coercion’ that impedes their ability to resist and
contest highly exploitative working conditions and workplace abuse.
97
What matters, then, is not
merely ‘legality’ but stability and labour mobility: MDWs’ legal and employment status is
extremely tenuous, and highly dependent on employers and recruiters. This confluence of factors
makes MDWs extremely vulnerable to forced labour. Consequently, it is critical to acknowledge
that FL is not a covert activity that flourishes in the absence of state intervention; it can manifest in
formal, regulated, and advanced economies, with States playing an active and ‘constitutive role in
producing unfree labour’.
98
Tied Work Permit System
The Work Permit (WP) system is a restrictive visa system that is often compared to the kafala system
in the Gulf States, a system Human Rights Watch calls a ‘sponsored’ gateway to human
trafficking.
99
There were 965,200 low-wage migrant workers on WPs in Singapore in December
2017; of these, 246,800 were MDWs.
100
It is estimated that one in five households in Singapore hires
an MDW.
101
WP holders are subject to sector-specific restrictions determined by the Ministry of
Manpower (MOM). MDWs in Singapore mostly come from Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Myanmar, with smaller numbers from India, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia.
102
This employer-sponsored WP system is a fundamental stumbling block to the realization of
migrant workers’ rights. This is because attempts to assert rights of any kind can lead to immediate
dismissal and repatriation, as well as retaliatory measures that may impinge on the migrant
worker’s ability to return to Singapore to work. This exerts a coercive effect on workers to comply
27
with exploitative working conditions—including those akin to forced labour—for fear of losing
their jobs.
Work Permit conditions for MDWs simply state that employers are to give the domestic worker
‘reasonable notice’ of her repatriation.
103
It is not clarified what is ‘reasonable notice’, and
employers have been known to dismiss and repatriate a domestic worker within a day, with less
than 24 hours’ notice. HOME regularly receives calls from domestic workers who are on the way
to or are already at the airport, having been summarily dismissed and sent packing. Whether or
not a worker is then able to successfully resist her repatriation depends on a range of factors,
including whether or not she has a ‘valid claim’ as determined by the MOM (see Chapter 4), the
attitude of the immigration officers, and if the domestic worker has the capacity to stand her
ground against frontline officers who may, in certain instances, encourage the domestic worker to
return home or even actively tell her that she has no right to remain. Conversely, we are also aware
of situations where a domestic worker pleads with her employer to let her leave and return home,
but the employer refuses this request; in certain cases, employers may even go online to extend the
domestic worker’s WP without her consent.
Restrictions on Labour Mobility
In Singapore, an MDW who wishes to ‘transfer’ to a different employer requires the consent of her
current employer, who needs to sign what is locally referred to as ‘transfer papers’ or ‘release
papers’. If her current employer refuses, the domestic worker has little choice but to stay with the
current employer or return home.
If the employer grants a transfer, he or she has the right to determine which employment agency
actions the placement: there have been many occasions where domestic workers have had to return
to employment agencies that treated them poorly because they were desperate to stay in Singapore
to work and therefore had to comply with the ‘terms and conditions’ of the transfer as imposed by
the employer and/or the agency. This includes situations where the agents had overcharged them,
did not respond when assistance was required, verbally abused the MDW, confiscated their
identity papers and personal belongings, did not give them adequate decision-making power
when placing them with an employer or even engaged in deceptive recruitment. Employers may
stipulate such terms because of contracts signed with employment agencies and their ability to get
a ‘free replacement’ during a stipulated period.
104
These arrangements are closely linked to the
financial arrangements made between employers, employment agencies and MDWs (see later
section on recruitment fees).
105
Restrictions on Freedom of Movement and Communication
WP conditions stipulate that employers ‘shall control and supervise’ their foreign employee.
106
The
Singapore government further imposes financial burdens on employers to ensure they undertake
this obligation. Every employer of an MDW (unless the employee is a Malaysian citizen) has to
furnish a security bond of up to S$5,000 to the Singapore government for each worker hired (this
is usually done via an insurer’s guarantee).
107
This bond is liable to be forfeited (whether in whole
or in part) if the domestic worker ‘goes missing’ or contravenes any WP conditions.
108
There are WP conditions that place restrictions on WP holders’ ‘conduct’. WP conditions impose
restrictions on marriage (e.g. WP holders are not to marry a Singaporean or permanent resident
without the permission of the Controller of Work Passes).
109
Further, female WP holders ‘shall not
28
become pregnant or deliver any child in Singapore’, unless she is already married to a Singaporean
or PR—domestic workers who are found to be pregnant are to be repatriated; they may also be
blacklisted.
110
Meanwhile, MDWs have to undergo mandatory six-monthly medical examinations,
which include a pregnancy test.
111
WP conditions also state that the ‘foreign employee shall not be
involved in any illegal, immoral or undesirable activities, including breaking up families in
Singapore’.
112
This broadly worded provision potentially criminalizes MDWs who become
involved in relationships with Singaporeans or PRs, and induces the moral policing of MDWs.
It is regarded an employer’s responsibility to ensure domestic workers do not violate the terms of
their WPs: liability for particular contraventions by the MDW is discharged only if an employer
has informed an MDW of the conditions they are to comply with, and reports any violation to the
authorities once they are aware of it.
113
These regulations effectively incentivize employers to adopt
draconian control measures to restrict and monitor their MDWs movements, activities and
communication, such as through the denial of rest days or the enforcement of strict curfews on rest
days, and through the confiscation and withholding of MDWs’ mobile phones, passports and other
key documents.
While weekly rest day legislation for domestic workers came into effect on 1 January 2013, this
mandated that MDWs are entitled to a weekly rest day or financial compensation-in-lieu.
114
Such
arrangements are meant to be ‘mutually agreed’ upon between employers and domestic workers
but significant imbalances in bargaining power mean that, in practice, the number of rest days a
domestic worker does/does not have is often imposed by employers and agents (see Figure 6). A
2015 study by TWC2, a local migrant worker advocacy organization, found that more than half the
domestic workers surveyed did not have a weekly rest day.
115
Fear of Employer Retaliation
The Ministry of Manpower maintains an online ‘feedback’ system (otherwise known as a ‘reference
channel’) in which employers are able to share unsubstantiated negative feedback about an MDW
after she has left the country. A domestic worker will not know this has occurred until a
prospective employer or recruitment agent makes a new application. At that point, the prospective
employer will be alerted to the fact that the MDW’s ex-employer has left a ‘personal reference’—
usually a complaint (see Figure 4). The employment agent or prospective employer making the
application will be provided with the contact details of the former employer, who can then make
unverified allegations about the MDW, thereby jeopardizing her chances of being hired. While a
prospective employer can still insist on hiring the MDW despite the complaint, it is unlikely that
employment agents and employers will continue with the application.
116
29
Apply for a domestic helper (standard application)
Figure 4. ‘Personal reference’ left in respect of a MDW that prospective employers will be
notified of when making an application to hire her. Source: Screenshot from MOM website.
This ability of employers to potentially ruin an MDW’s chances of returning to Singapore to work
makes the threat of ‘blacklisting’ a powerful tool, one that employers and agents regularly and
effectively wield to threaten and coerce workers into not making claims against them or into
agreeing to unfavourable terms of employment. HOME receives at least one enquiry a week
related to feedback left by employers on this system. It is worth noting that there is no equivalent
system for MDWs to leave feedback on their employers or employment agencies.
Legislative Framework: Exclusions & Regulatory Gaps
Exclusion from the Employment Act
The main labour law in Singapore is the Employment Act (EA), which governs basic working
conditions in core areas. It sets limits on working hours (no more than 12 hours a day), including
overtime hours (no more than 72 overtime hours a month).
117
It also prescribes formulas for
overtime, rest day and public holiday pay and provides minimum standards on notice periods,
annual leave and paid sick and hospitalization leave.
118
Currently, the EA excludes civil
servants, managers/executives with a monthly basic salary of more than S$4,500, seafarers and
domestic workers.
119
The State rationalises domestic workers’ exclusion from the EA on the basis that the nature of
domestic work is ‘quite different from normal work’,
120
making conditions of work difficult to
regulate. This exclusion leaves MDWs bereft of core labour rights protection. In responses to
criticism of this exclusion, the Singapore government tends to reiterate that MDWs are covered
by the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (EFMA).
121
However, the EFMA offers a limited set of protections and entitlements which are not equal to
those provided for under the EA. For example, MDWs are not protected by legal limits on
working hours as EFMA merely stipulates that MDWs should have ‘adequate’ rest. This lack of
specificity has enabled employers to pressure domestic workers to work gruelling hours—a
situation exacerbated by their live-in situation—and MDWs are unable to seek effective redress
for forced overtime and excessive working hours, which are key indicators of forced labour.
The ambiguous language of EFMA provisions impacts on MDW’s welfare. Presently the EFMA
requires employers to provide ‘acceptable’ accommodation, ‘adequate’ food, ‘adequate’ rest,
and ‘reasonable’ notice of repatriation.
122
Failure to clearly specify these terms means MDWs’
30
wellbeing and working conditions are largely dependent on the whims of employers and their
interpretation of these regulations. This is exacerbated by inconsistent enforcement even when
guidelines are issued.
123
The tendency for state authorities to leave employment conditions to
negotiations between employer/employment agent and domestic worker ignores the grave
inequalities in bargaining powers between parties, and the limited ability of MDWs to contest
the imposition of exploitative conditions, which may continue to deteriorate.
Lack of Minimum Wage Protections
Working excessive overtime in order to earn a minimum wage is recognized as contributing to
a forced labour situation.
124
The ability to assess this is complicated by the fact that the Singapore
government does not prescribe a mandatory minimum wage for any workers, whether local or
foreign. The MOM’s stance is that ‘[w]hether wages should increase or decrease is best
determined by market demand and supply for labour’.
125
While the Philippines embassy,
Indonesian embassy, and Sri Lankan embassy have set recommended minimum wages for their
citizens working as domestic workers in Singapore—at the monthly rate of S$570 (USD 400),
S$550 (USD 411), and S$500 (USD 374) respectively
126
—these wage rates are not legally
enforceable.
The lack of enforceable minimum wage guidelines leave MDWs vulnerable to long-term
economic exploitation, where their wages remain depressed and do not reflect increased costs
of living as well as the inflated placement costs incurred in overseas labour migration.
Depressed wages and higher migration costs also lead to increased debt burdens and longer
loan repayment periods. It can also result in domestic workers forgoing rest days in lieu of
financial compensation in order to earn a higher monthly wage.
Debt-Dependent Migration: Excessive Recruitment Fees
The indebtedness of migrant workers in Singapore is a significant factor in their compliance
with deteriorating working conditions and increases their risk of being in forced labour.
127
Currently, many MDWs are required to pay fees of around S$1,200–$4,000 (USD 874–2,913) to
employment agencies for being placed in a job in Singapore. This practice is common and
widespread. Whenever the issue of excessive recruitment fees is raised, the Singapore
government cites the Employment Agencies Act (EAA), which limits agency fees to one month
of salary per contract year, at a maximum of two months fixed salary for a two-year employment
contract.
128
However, the Singapore government does not regulate training or agency fees paid
in the home country, which it deems to be outside its jurisdiction;
129
debts listed as ‘personal
loans’ for fees incurred overseas appear to be ‘allowable’ deductions. This regulatory loophole
is easily exploited by employment agencies, who continue to charge MDWs four to eight months
of salary deductions. To abide by the EAA regulations, some local employment agents couch
the overall ‘agency/placement fee’ as comprising:
1. A service fee charged to the domestic worker by the local agency
2. A personal loan incurred by the domestic worker in the country of origin
31
Figure 5: Sample of MDW Employment Contract Signed by MDW’s Employer
with Employment Agency.
130
As can be seen in Figure 5, the total amount is paid upfront by the employer of the domestic
worker to the employment agency, and thereafter regarded as an ‘advance’ by the employer for
the MDW’s ‘loan’; the employer then makes a deduction from an MDW’s salary until the
amount is recovered. Depending on the MDW’s salary and the size of the ‘loan’, this could
amount to six or eight months’ worth of salary deductions. MDWs therefore often work for
months either without any pay or with only a minimal monthly sum (sometimes referred to as
an MDW’s ‘allowance’ or ‘pocket money’, see Figure 6). Fearful that the MDW may ‘run away’
during this salary deduction or ‘loan repayment’ period, employers often impose additional
restrictions such as denying MDWs their full complement of rest days and/or restrict their use
of mobile phones.
131
Some employers may also withhold an MDW’s ‘allowance’ until the loan
repayment period is over.
32
Figure 6: Sample of Salary Schedule and Loan Repayment Scheme. As can be seen in the
salary schedule, the MDW has ‘no off days during loan periods’ and the total amount
deducted is S$470 x 8 months = S$3,760. During those months, she is meant to receive
‘pocket money’ of S$72 a month. The ‘0 Off Day’ in the right column over a period of two
years indicates the MDW is on a contract that does not allow her to take any rest days,
with the rest day compensation factored into her monthly salary, thus making it S$542
instead of S$470 a month (after the 8-month salary deduction period).
33
The Ministry of Manpower does not consider these salary deductions a breach of the EEA
regulations. Domestic workers who wish to leave their placement are particularly vulnerable
during the loan deduction period—they often experience great difficulty in trying to resign or
getting their employers to agree to a transfer. Recruitment agents are also often reluctant to
provide them with assistance, with agents known to pressure MDWs to endure unfavourable
working conditions until they have paid off their ‘loan’.
In addition to the initial recruitment and placement fees, domestic workers who are transferred
from one employer to another incur additional fees, typically an additional two months’ worth
of salary deductions. There have been cases, though, where agency fees escalate quickly due to
agents preying on a succession of transfers (see Chapter 4).
Difficulty in Leaving Employment
A domestic worker who wishes to leave an exploitative or forced labour situation faces
considerable obstacles because current regulations only allow employers to cancel WPs.
Employers have the upper hand, especially as the MDW is reliant on them for a transfer. MDWs
sometimes risk the wrath of employers by leaving the household without notice because
previous suggestions of leaving have been met with disapproval or ambiguity (‘let’s see’), or
because MDWs are fearful that raising the notion of quitting/transferring would lead to a
deterioration in the working relationship and, consequently, working conditions. From HOME’s
casework experience, common complaints such as excessive working hours, inadequate food
and rest, emotional abuse, and restrictions on communication are generally not treated as ‘valid
claims’ for a change of employer by the Ministry of Manpower. MDWs who approach the MOM
with such complaints and seek a change of employer will most likely not be granted permission
and, consequently, will either be repatriated or told to return to their agencies/employers.
Inadequate Enforcement Regarding the Withholding of Passports
The withholding of passports and identity documents is a key indicator of forced labour as it
restricts freedom of movement. An overwhelming majority of domestic workers who seek
assistance from HOME have their passports withheld either by employers or employment
agents. This practice is widespread but employers are rarely (if ever) penalized for it,
132
even
though it is against the law to do so without ‘reasonable excuse’,
133
and the MOM website
expressly provides that employers should not do so.
134
Employers, meanwhile, often rationalize
this practice as ‘necessary’ due to the Singapore government’s S$5,000 security bond
regulations.
135
34
CHAPTER 4
FORCED LABOUR & MIGRANT DOMESTIC
WORKERS IN SINGAPORE: CASE STUDIES
35
CHAPTER 4
FORCED LABOUR & MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS
IN SINGAPORE: CASE STUDIES
This chapter delves into HOME’s casework data to illustrate the nature of forced labour among
domestic workers who have sought assistance from our organization. The chapter begins with a
breakdown of our overall casework statistics for the past year: April 2017 to March 2018 (52 weeks
in total). These give an indication of the most common complaints received at our helpdesks for
domestic workers. It is of particular concern that many of the key complaints are considered strong
indicators of forced labour. Specific case studies are detailed in order to illustrate some of the
complexities and characteristics of forced labour among the MDW population in Singapore
assisted by HOME.
Casework Statistics: Domestic Workers
HOME runs a shelter for domestic workers. At the helpdesk that receives the domestic workers
who need shelter, HOME saw an average of 17 new runaway domestic workers per week between
April 2017 to March 2018. The following figure and table provide a breakdown of their nationalities
and the nature of complaints received, categorized into specific issues—it should be noted that
most domestic workers have multiple complaints.
Figure 7: Number & Nationality of MDWs Who Sought Shelter at HOME (2017–2018)
India: 38
Indonesia: 200
Philippines: 401
Myanmar: 196
Cambodia: 1
Sri Lanka: 2
Total no. of cases:
872 (average 17 per week)
Nationality unknown: 34
36
Table 2: HOME’s Domestic Worker Casework Data
DOMESTIC WORKER CASEWORK DATA: APRIL 2017 TO MARCH 2018
Overwork
483
Verbal abuse (shouting/threats/insults)
472
Salary-related issues: salary unpaid; salary withheld; salary
delayed; salary deducted; medical expenses paid by
worker/deducted from salary; salary not as promised
342
Inadequate or poor quality food
292
Illegal deployment by employer (more than one house, or
employer’s business)
194
Unreasonable restriction of phone usage
197
No days off
166
Poor living conditions
154
Physical abuse (including threats of physical abuse)
138
Unsafe work
91
Denied medical treatment
90
Denied sick leave
65
Terminated by employer
61
Inappropriate tasks (e.g. massage)
55
Sexual abuse/sexual harassment
32
The top complaint received was being overworked, with working hours generally exceeding 12
hours a day. It is not uncommon for domestic workers to report working hours that range from
16–18 hours a day (in some extreme cases, even 20 hours a day), with the domestic worker also not
having any rest days. As there is a live-in requirement for MDWs, those who look after the elderly
or young children may be on call 24/7. The presence of surveillance cameras in the home—which
is very common in Singapore—makes it difficult for domestic workers to take breaks or rest during
the day without express permission from their employers. Workloads are often excessive and
unreasonable, and domestic workers may also be asked to perform duties that are not traditionally
viewed as domestic work, such as washing their employers’ cars and giving them massages,
sometimes on a daily basis. There are also regular complaints about illegal deployment, in which
domestic workers are asked to undertake work for another household (usually a family member
of the employer) or to work in the employer’s business (e.g. a shop or a restaurant). This
exacerbates their workload and is a violation of EFMA.
136
Many domestic workers who seek help from HOME do not have weekly rest days: those who are
allowed to have rest days may only be allowed to go out once or twice a month. Additionally, even
among those who have rest days, a common complaint is that they are asked to perform chores
37
before they leave the house and have early curfews (sometimes as early as 5pm) as they are
required to return home in time to prepare dinner. Currently, the law does not state that a domestic
worker’s rest day has to include 24 hours of continuous rest.
137
While physical and sexual abuse cases are generally taken seriously by the authorities, the
problem lies in obtaining sufficient evidence for a prosecution. The investigation process is also
protracted and unpredictable. If required for a police investigation, a migrant worker’s passport is
impounded by the police, and they may not be allowed to leave the country when they wish even
though such investigations can continue for longer than a year. HOME is currently housing one of
two domestic workers from the same household who suffered egregious abuse by their employers
(a couple). The domestic workers were punched, slapped, kicked, and suffered food deprivation
and humiliating punishments (one of them was forced to eat her own vomit; the two domestic
workers were also forced to slap each other in front of the employer), and were closely monitored
via surveillance cameras.
139
As of late October 2018, the case for one of the domestic worker
involved has yet to conclude notwithstanding that it has been ongoing for five years. The offences
took place between February 2011 and December 2012,
140
and were reported in 2012. In May 2018,
compensation was ordered by the court for one of the domestic workers and the amount payable
was S$7,800 comprising S$500 for each incident of abuse and loss of income for four months (S$450
multiplied by four, amounting to S$1,800).
141
While the inclusion of compensation is an
Verbal abuse is the second highest complaint, and MDWs frequently
endure shouting and name-calling (‘stupid’, ‘idiot’, ‘dog’), vulgarities
(‘fuck you’, ‘cunt’),138 as well as sexually-loaded insults and harassment
(‘whore’, ‘you are no better than a prostitute’). Domestic workers are
also often threatened—employers may threaten to dismiss and
repatriate them, ‘blacklist’ them and ensure they are not able to work
in Singapore or file a police report against them (for example, a theft
charge). These threats are taken seriously as they are tools frequently
utilized by employers and can greatly undermine a domestic worker’s
self-esteem and livelihood.
Violence and/or threats of violence are also regular complaints.
Domestic workers are subject to abusive behaviour not just by their
main employer, but anyone else living in the household; which can
include the elderly and even children. Domestic workers supported by
HOME have complained of being slapped, bitten, scalded, kicked,
punched and sometimes having items thrown at them. They may also
be threatened with harm. HOME also receives complaints of sexual
harassment and abuse, in respect of which the live-in requirement and
isolated nature of domestic work make them especially vulnerable.
Domestic workers complain of being molested, of having to deal with
lewd remarks, suggestive talk, and of being ‘flashed’. There are also
cases of sexual assault, which is likely under-reported.
38
improvement, concerns have been raised about the adequacy of the compensation, and if payment
will actually materialize. The couple appear intent to claim insolvency and the amount might not
be paid; instead a longer jail term would be served by the perpetrators.
142
In HOME’s experience, domestic worker cases that involve physical and sexual abuse typically
include other strong indicators of forced labour such as threats of denunciation to authorities,
limited freedom of movement and communication, constant surveillance, confiscation of
passports, and recruitment linked to debt. It is our view that many physical and sexual abuse cases
encountered would qualify as forced labour cases as outlined by the ILO. However, the tendency
for the authorities to segregate issues means allegations of physical abuse are investigated by the
police, and all other issues mentioned are generally not treated as punishable offences by the MOM
unless they are severe enough to become criminal offences.
Food deprivation is another common complaint by MDWs.143 While
the Ministry of Manpower issues advisories for employers on what
the typical daily food intake for an MDW should comprise,144 such
advisories are not given the force of the law, and enforcement is
inconsistent. In 2014, it was reported that as many as eight in 10
domestic workers who sought help from HOME did not get enough
food.145 During a series of focus groups conducted by HOME in
early 2017, MDWs complained of inadequate food in terms of
quantity as well as quality. Some were only allowed to eat instant
noodles and/or bread, others only leftovers, and almost all said they
were not allowed to have fruit. Many said they were not allowed to
snack in between meals and would drink water to stave off their
hunger pangs.146 Some Muslim MDWs have related how their
employers did not consider their religious beliefs and would mix
pork (considered non-halal) with most of the food, leaving them to
eat only rice and some leftover vegetables.
39
About 40% of the complaints received by HOME from domestic
workers are salary-related. The complaints involve unpaid salaries,
withheld salaries, delayed salary payments and salary deductions
(including for employer obligations such as medical expenses).
There are also cases where salaries are not paid in accordance to
what was initially promised to the domestic worker. This is
immensely difficult to prove if the promises were made verbally,
and extremely challenging even if written documentation was
initially provided. Domestic workers have reported being asked to
sign new contracts/documents upon arrival in Singapore at
employment agencies, or after being sent to their employer’s homes,
with such contracts stipulating lower salaries and more restrictions
(e.g. fewer rest days), or with salary deductions higher than they
were expecting. There are also employers who withhold the wages
of their workers under the guise of helping them to ‘safe-keep’ their
money.147
Furthermore, MDWs are sometimes pressured to sign contracts
allowing the employer to do this, or sign documents indicating they
have already received their salaries. HOME has also encountered
situations where employers heavily control the MDW’s
money/spending by giving them stipulated amounts on rest days
(if they are allowed rest days)—the MDW is to return all unspent
cash to the employer when she returns at the end of her rest day.
MDWs who do not have rest days are reliant on their employer to
remit money to their families. At the time of writing this report, it
was announced by the Ministry of Manpower that a new WP
condition will be introduced from 1 January 2019, in which
employers will not be allowed ‘to safe-keep any money belonging
to their MDWs, including paid salaries or any other money’.148 This
is an important development, and further clarification is required
on whether or not domestic workers who come forward to file such
complaints will be granted transfers if their claims are verified. 149 If
the risk of job loss followed by repatriation remains, under-
reporting is likely.
40
Isolation, confinement or surveillance is a strong indicator of
coercion at destination under the ILO’s framework for identifying
victims of trafficking for forced labour.150 HOME has documented
dozens of cases where MDWs have been locked up in their
employer’s houses or their agent’s living quarters. Many employers
also prohibit them from owning mobile phones or may confiscate
their phones and severely restrict their use (for example, only
allowing them to use it on certain days and for a specified period of
time). When complaints are made against employers and agents for
wrongful confinement and confiscation of mobile phones, they are
not accepted as serious complaints and MDWs’ contracts are usually
terminated by their employers and the MDW repatriated. As
previously stated, employers commonly install surveillance
cameras in their home to enable them to keep a watch on domestic
workers.151 Sometimes, cameras are also installed in the bedroom or
living space where the domestic worker sleeps: this practice is
allowed, especially if the domestic worker shares the bedroom with
a child or elderly person.
41
Case Studies: Domestic Workers in Forced Labour Situations
HOME has identified multiple cases that illustrate situations of forced labour encountered in the
past year. These case studies are detailed in order to illustrate some of the complexities and
characteristics of forced labour among the MDW population in Singapore.
Multiple Forms of Coercion: The ‘Subtle and Not Immediately Observable’
The following case study involves a domestic worker who lived in our shelter in 2017 and
exemplifies what the ILO has pointed out—that there are different forms of coercion that need to
be acknowledged, especially those that are ‘subtle and not immediately observable’.
152
Case Study 1: Indah
FORCED LABOUR INDICATORS
• Withholding of wages
• Isolation
• Restriction of movement
• Excessive overtime
• Retention of identity documents
• Abuse of vulnerability
Indah worked with her employer for nearly ten years without direct pay. In those ten years, her
employer said she was not allowed to hold on to any money and withheld more than S$40,000 of
her salary. Four years after she started working for them, her employer remitted about S$1,000 to
her family. After a further four years, her employer claimed to have remitted S$2,000 but no proof
was given. Indah worked from 7am to 11pm daily, and was not given a rest day for ten years: she
could only go out of the house for chores such as to wash the car, water the plants, or sweep
outside the house. She was not allowed to own a mobile phone and was also instructed not to
speak to any strangers (including other domestic workers in the neighbourhood) and would be
censured if ‘caught’. Her appeals for home leave were rejected by her employer and she was not
able to speak with her family for almost seven years. Indah was never shown or given a copy of
her employment contract—her salary was only S$280 when she first arrived in Singapore. Her
passport and WP were kept by her employer throughout her employment.
HOME considered Indah’s case one of forced labour and suggested to the authorities that Indah
could also be a victim of trafficking but this suggestion was rejected. Additionally, her employer,
who did pay the outstanding wages after an MOM mediation, was not publicly penalized (HOME
is not privy to other outcomes, for example, if the employer was privately punished or given a
warning). It was deemed by MOM that the matter was successfully resolved once Indah’s wages
were received. An additional complication in relation to redress for Indah and prosecution of the
employer was that Indah, having not seen her family for so many years, was desperate to return
home as soon as possible. Indah was reluctant to pursue any further claims once her owed wages
were received. As noted by the ILO, relations between forced labour victims and employers can
be complex and contradictory:
153
Indah, despite the extreme isolation, prolonged financial abuse,
and suffering from being cut off from her family (her family thought she had died), did not wish
to cause harm to her employer, and seemed to resist the framing of herself as a victim of forced
42
labour. This was an especially alarming case and illuminating in terms of how coercion and abuse
of vulnerability operates as Indah worked without pay for a decade despite the absence of physical
or sexual violence directed towards her. It is a key example of how coercion can be ‘subtle and not
immediately observable’, and how abuse of vulnerability operates.
154
When asked repeatedly why
she didn’t seek help earlier, Indah indicated that she was confused and had no idea where to seek
help. She couldn’t speak any English, it was her first time working overseas, and she was ‘clueless’
about where to go or what to do about her situation. It is immensely difficult, under current civil
law systems, to prove that subtle forms of coercion and deception should be considered critical
components of criminal offences of forced labour or labour trafficking. Consequently, there are
few successful prosecutions.
155
As a result, national legislation tends to ‘focus on the objective
conditions of exploitation, rather than on the coercive or deceptive means by which people are
brought into these conditions’.
156
Not Criminal Enough: Exploited but ‘Not Abused’
A key observation—and point of contention—is that cases in which there is no physical abuse but
strong elements of coercion and psychological abuse rarely result in employer penalties.
Additionally, domestic workers may be penalized for filing complaints about such employers as
they lose their jobs and may not be allowed to transfer. They may also suffer additional penalties
such as being ‘blacklisted’ for not returning to their employment agencies.
157
The potential for
penalty can contribute to domestic workers complying with unacceptable employment situations
due to fear of losing their job and being repatriated.
Case Study 2: Ella
FORCED LABOUR INDICATORS:
• Excessive overtime (one rest day a month)
• Isolation
• Retention of identity documents
• Abusive working and living conditions
In addition, there was illegal deployment, a breach of the EFMA.
Ella had to do household chores in two houses: her employer’s, and her employer’s daughter’s.
Whenever she raised an objection to this, her employer would scream at her, and say that Ella
had to repay them for the costs incurred in bringing her to Singapore. Ella worked around 17
hours a day, and had one rest day a month. Her mobile phone was confiscated by her employer,
who said it would only be returned after her recruitment fees had been repaid; her passport was
also retained by her employer.
Ella had to hand wash the clothes of all the family members each day and complained to her
employers that her hands were hurting: they insisted she continue doing so. Ella also told her
employers it was dangerous to clean the ceilings while perched on a ladder unsupervised, but
her employers insisted she do it. Ella was only given rice and vegetables for lunch and dinner;
she was not allowed to eat any fish or meat. After Ella ran away, her employer rang HOME to
ask Ella to return to work until a replacement MDW was hired; the employer said ‘there was no
abuse’. Ella requested a transfer, but the Ministry of Manpower said this depended on her
employer, who refused.
43
Case Study 3: Anna
FORCED LABOUR INDICATORS:
• Excessive overtime
• Intimidation and threats
• Retention of identity documents
• Isolation
• Restriction of movement
When Anna asked for a transfer to a new employer, there was a loss or withdrawal of privileges
(her rest day) and additional restrictions on communication.
Anna worked long hours, from 5am to midnight. During the day, she only had short breaks for
meals. Anna complained of constant shouting and scolding from her employer, including name-
calling. She was only allowed to use her mobile phone after work, which was past midnight.
After some weeks, Anna asked for a transfer. As a result, her employer revoked her rest day for
the coming Sunday and confiscated her belongings: her phone, laptop, WP and wallet. Alarmed
at not being allowed out of the house and having her cash and communication devices
confiscated, Anna, in desperation, escaped to the HOME shelter via the rubbish chute of a high-
rise building. While Anna was hoping to transfer to a new employer, this request was denied by
the authorities. Additionally, she was investigated by the police for ‘endangering her life’ by
escaping from the house via the rubbish chute.
Denying domestic workers the right to seek alternative employment when complaints are filed
against employers who exploit them is punitive. It is problematic to suggest that MDWs have
access to due process and should come forward to report complaints when many do so, on a
regular basis, but are then sent home. In the above case studies, the employers, instead of being
censured, were effectively given license to punish their employee by denying her the right to work
for someone else in Singapore. While the MDW can go back home and return to Singapore on a
new WP application, this often relies on the MDW having the money to pay for upfront costs, as
well as incurring another round of recruitment fee debt upon her return (i.e. working for more
months without pay or for nominal pay).
The MDW in the following case study was subjected to extremely harsh treatment. However,
under Singapore’s current legislative framework governing domestic workers, there is very little
avenue for redress for women like her. The harshness of her treatment was not deemed adequate
enough for the police to pursue any criminal charges. Meanwhile, the issues presented—excessive
working hours, lack of rest days, verbal abuse, inadequate food, poor living conditions, constant
surveillance, wrongful confinement, threats, retention of identity documents—are not offences
that generally attract punishment by the MOM or the police. While the employer may be privately
warned, there is no public censuring of specific employers regarding such behaviour.
44
Case Study 4: Myaing
FORCED LABOUR INDICATORS:
• Excessive overtime (including no rest days)
• Abusive working and living conditions
• Intimidation and threats
• Isolation
• Restriction of movement
• Retention of identity documents
In addition, recruitment fees charged were in excess of the legal limit under the EAA.
Myaing was subjected to forced overtime in which she worked almost 20 hours each day; she
was not allowed any rest days. She also suffered severe food deprivation—plain bread and water
was all she was allowed to consume and she was also deprived of food as punishment if her
employer got angry. Myaing was also subjected to constant verbal abuse—including vulgarities
like ‘cunt’. She slept on the balcony where there was a surveillance camera. Her employer kept
her mobile phone and locked the house when she left each day (Myaing did not have the keys).
Her employer also threatened to blacklist her if she ever told anyone about her situation.
Myaing’s passport and WP were held by her employer. She was charged eight months of
recruitment fees for this job and when she ran away from the employer, it was still during her
salary deduction period.
An additional point to note is the evidentiary burdens. Domestic workers are often asked to
undergo polygraph or lie detector tests by the MOM as well as the police when they make
allegations against employers. It is unclear if employers are also asked to undertake such tests, and
with the same frequency that MDWs are subject to. It is also unclear how the results of such tests
are used and the influence they have over outcomes.
158
Domestic workers are also always warned
by officers that they are liable to being charged for making a false statement if their testimony is
inaccurate, which can be extremely intimidating and causes much anxiety to victims, especially if
they are unable to provide adequate evidence. Under such pressure, domestic workers sometimes
choose not to pursue complaints and prefer to return home instead.
The following case study is one in which MOM deemed there was no ‘valid claim’ and insisted on
sending the domestic worker back to her agency. She ran away from the agency after they told her
she had to pay them money in order to return to her home country.
45
Case Study 5: Citra
FORCED LABOUR INDICATORS:
• Excessive overtime (including no rest days)
• Isolation
• Retention of identity documents
In addition, there was illegal deployment, a breach of the EFMA; she was also asked to perform
inappropriate tasks (such as massaging her employer). Recruitment fees charged were in excess
of the legal limit under the EAA.
Citra worked about 17 hours a day—she started work at 5.30am and finished at approximately
11pm—and could only rest when she was having her meals. She was also sent to her employer’s
mother’s house twice a week where she had to do the cleaning. She was required to massage her
employer up to three times a week, for about an hour each time. Citra was not given any rest
days. She was not allowed to own or use a mobile phone; her request to call her family was
denied. Her passport was withheld by her employer and she was charged recruitment fees
equivalent to eight months of salary deductions.
Citra ran away from her employer’s home after three months. Her employer was livid; she
demanded Citra return to the employment agency and pay back the ‘loan’ as there were still five
months of outstanding salary deductions (which the employer had paid for upfront). According
to Citra’s employer, she had been cleared by the MOM of any wrongdoing and therefore asserted
Citra had no right to seek shelter elsewhere. Cases like Citra’s are commonly encountered at
HOME, as are such responses from employers, who equate ‘real abuse’ with physical beatings. In
contrast, highly exploitative practices that result in overwork, the confiscation of passports and
mobile devices, compelling domestic workers to engage in non-domestic work (e.g. giving
massages) do not result in employer penalties and are widely construed as ‘not comprising abuse’.
This binary categorization of ‘deserving’ versus ‘undeserving’ victims—tied to what is or is not
deemed a valid claim, emboldens employers’ sense of impunity and entrenches, over time, a
widespread acceptance of practices that, under international law, would be unacceptable in most
workplaces. It is indicative of a high level of societal tolerance for such practices when even law
enforcement shares such views. HOME continues to regularly encounter situations in which staff
and volunteers attend to helpline calls by going to employers’ homes to assist distressed domestic
workers who have reached out for help, only to face terse and lengthy standoffs when the
employer insists the domestic worker is not allowed to leave their premises. When calls are made
to the police in such instances, in the absence of evidence of physical abuse, police officers have
been known to leave the MDW in the employer’s home despite her wanting to leave; or refuse to
allow the MDW to go to the HOME shelter. The following incident demonstrates the difficulty of
attending to helpline calls when domestic workers reach out for help but are not deemed ‘abused
enough’.
46
Case Study 6: Hayma
FORCED LABOUR INDICATORS:
• Excessive overtime (including no rest days)
• Retention of identity documents
• Isolation
• Intimidation and threats
In addition, there was illegal deployment, a breach of the EFMA; also, recruitment fees charged
were in excess of the legal limit under the EAA.
Hayma rang our helpline in 2018 asking for assistance. She complained of overwork and poor
living conditions (she was initially given a mattress, but this was taken away after a few months).
In the last year and a half she had been with her employers, she was not allowed any rest days.
Her employers withheld Hayma’s passport and WP from the day she arrived at their home.
Hayma was not allowed to own a mobile phone and had not been able to contact her family for
nine months: she asked for permission but her employers denied it. She was also paid varying
amounts that did not tally with the salary she was promised; her salary deduction was for eight
months.
According to Hayma, she asked her employers for a transfer after two months of working there
but was refused. After a few months, the family started to illegally deploy Hayma to work in
their family business (a food establishment): Hayma had to wake up at 3am to assist with the
food preparation. When Hayma asked to return to her home country, they said she had to pay
them S$1,500. Hayma then went to the police, but the police said they could not do anything
because Hayma was not physically abused. The police then rang her employers, who came to
fetch her. Hayma’s employers were furious and on the way home from the police station, scolded
her and threatened to harm her family. When they returned home, her employers confiscated her
wallet and money and locked her in the house. A few days later, Hayma’s employers said they
had reported Hayma to the police: the employment agent then arrived at the house and
instructed Hayma to sign a document stating that she had to pay for broken items in the house,
as well as her air ticket home (which is against regulations). Her salary was unlawfully deducted
for these items and Hayma was repatriated back to her home country though she was still owed
about S$100 in unpaid wages.
These encounters are not exceptions, employers regularly prohibit domestic workers from leaving
their homes, even when they have clearly expressed a desire to do so, and even after they have
called for help from non-governmental organizations like HOME. Additionally, police officers are
frequently reluctant to intervene unless obvious physical abuse is involved. The S$5,000 security
bond conditions (see Chapter 3) placed on employers are a key factor and an oft-cited reason.
Employers frequently say, ‘But I am responsible for her’; ‘What if something happens to her, who
will be responsible?’ As a result, employers are given excessive powers to control domestic
workers’ movements. Even when employers are perpetrators of abuse and exploitation, this power
imbalance can be utilized to thwart MDWs’ efforts to access help and seek justice.
47
Situations of wrongful confinement are rarely recognized. In addition, domestic workers who have
tried to escape from such situations have been criminalized, either for ‘attempting suicide’ (a crime
in Singapore)
159
or for ‘causing harm or distress’ (see Case Study 7).
Case Study 7: Rosa
FORCED LABOUR INDICATORS
• Isolation
• Excessive overtime (including no rest days)
• Intimidation and threats
• Restriction of movement
• Retention of identity documents
Rosa worked around 19 hours each day at her employer’s house (her working hours were 4 a.m.
to 11 p.m.). She was not allowed to rest (or even sit down) during the day, except when having
her meals, and even then she would be constantly rushed as she was eating. She had no rest days
and was subject to seven months of salary deductions to repay her recruitment fees. Her mobile
phone was confiscated by her employer. Rosa said she was constantly scolded by her employer
and other family members, who would find fault with everything she did. Her passport was
withheld by her employer.
When Rosa asked her employer for a transfer, her employer refused and said she had paid a lot
of money to hire Rosa and if she dared to leave she would be reported to the police. After Rosa
asked for a transfer, her employer kept the house key on her person and did not let Rosa out of
the house: not even to take out the trash. Meanwhile, the grilles to the front door were always
locked. Feeling increasingly stressed about being confined in the house and not allowed to
transfer, Rosa tried to escape from the bedroom window and fell from a height of several storeys.
She ended up badly injured, with both legs fractured. The police then investigated Rosa for
‘attempted suicide’—a crime in Singapore—even though Rosa insisted she was trying to escape,
not kill herself. Rosa was eventually issued a ‘stern warning’ from the police for ‘causing alarm
or distress’ to her employer by her action of jumping out the window. Rosa has been told by the
doctor it will take her at least a year to recover from her injuries.
Employment Agents: Perpetrators & Enablers
While our casework statistics relate primarily to complaints against employers, HOME also
receives numerous complaints related to employment agents, in which they are either the
perpetrators of abuse (see Case Study 8), or are complicit in enabling forced labour by acting in
collusion with employers. A common complaint shared by MDWs about agents is that they don’t
help when problems arise (‘don’t complain so much’, ‘you are here to work, just be patient’). Some
would even reprimand MDWs who report abuse and ask for a transfer. Agents may invoke the
recruitment fee debt, threaten to make them pay even more money if they don’t complete their
contract, threaten to repatriate them (if they wish to stay), or threaten to keep them in Singapore
(if they wish to return home). Complaints have also been received about agents who engage in
deceptive recruitment practices, including contract substitution (whereby terms and conditions
48
promised in countries of origin differ from terms established when the MDW arrives in Singapore
and/or starts working for the family). Copies of employment contracts are also often given only
to employers by agents, rather than to both the employer and the MDW. Most MDWs say that
despite the high recruitment fees, agents do not provide a detailed, itemized breakdown of the fees
charged. MDWs also regularly complain about agencies confiscating their mobile phones and
personal belongings (including identity papers, personal documents, as well as cash), verbally
abusing them, and illegally deploying them when they are housed with agents.
Case Study 8: Cho
FORCED LABOUR INDICATORS
• Debt bondage
• Physical violence
• Isolation
• Intimidation and threats
In one extreme case, Cho, an MDW saw her six-month loan inflated to 17 months as she had three
different employers within five months. When she was eventually sent back to the employment
agency, the agent physically assaulted her and deprived her of food as punishment. The agent
would also restrict her mobile phone usage (only one hour a day) and one day smashed her
mobile phone in retaliation. The agent taunted her with degrading insults (‘you are so useless,
you should go work as a prostitute’) and would impose humiliating punishments for minor
infringements (once, Cho drank a packet of instant coffee and was punished by having to clean
‘menstruation stains’ off the agent’s pants). The agent told Cho she would achieve nothing by
filing a complaint as the agent ‘knew all the people at MOM and the police’. When Cho came to
HOME for help, the agent started to harass Cho’s family in Myanmar and demanded they repay
her loan.
While the Singapore government repeatedly claims that regulating agencies in countries of origin
(COO) is outside their jurisdiction, there remains a high level of coordination between recruiters
and agents in COO and countries of destination (COD). In 2017, HOME dealt with several cases of
Indonesian domestic workers whose key personal documents (e.g. birth and marriage certificates,
as well as skills certificates) were withheld by agents in Indonesia as collateral for the repayment
of recruitment fees. When the domestic workers left their employers due to deteriorating working
conditions, these agents told the women their documents would not be returned if their
recruitment fee debts were not repaid. Additionally, there were at least two cases of Indonesian
domestic workers being ‘accosted’ by agents in Indonesia when they returned. The local Singapore
agent booked their flight and alerted the Indonesian agent of their arrival times. One domestic
worker was confined in the agency’s office in Indonesia and was pressured to work in Hong Kong
in order to pay off her recruitment fee debt. The following case studies illustrate the coercive power
of recruitment fee debt, along with agency malpractice and complicity in engendering forced
labour and possibly trafficking.
49
Case Study 9: Nurul
FORCED LABOUR INDICATORS
• Excessive overtime (including no rest days)
• Abusive working conditions
• Isolation
• Intimidation and threats
• Retention of identity documents
In addition, recruitment fees charged were in excess of the legal limit under the EAA.
According to Nurul, she worked anywhere from 16.5 to 19 hours a day. She woke up at 4am each
morning and had a long list of chores to complete. She did not have any rest days for the three
months that she worked. Nurul lost 9kg in three months from food deprivation—she was only
fed leftovers or food that was about to expire. Her employer confiscated her personal mobile
phone and would constantly shout at her, call her names, and threaten to beat her. The
recruitment agency charged Nurul fees equivalent to almost six months of her salary (around
S$3,760); the money was to be deducted from her salary for eight months.
After Nurul ran away to HOME, the local agent told Nurul that, as she only worked for three
months, she still owed them several months’ worth of recruitment fees. The Indonesian agent had
confiscated Nurul’s personal documents (including documents required in Indonesia for
registering her child for school) and threatened not to return them unless Nurul completed her
loan repayments. In the end, Nurul decided to return to her employer. This was facilitated by the
local agent. The agreement was that she would work for them until her loan was paid off then
either seek a transfer or return home.
Case Study 10: Jane
FORCED LABOUR INDICATORS
• Excessive overtime
• Intimidation and threats
• Isolation
• Retention of identity documents
• Abusive working conditions
Jane first came to HOME with complaints of overwork and verbal abuse. She worked until
around 2am each day, and would be constantly scolded and called names like ‘stupid’ and
‘useless’. Meal times were late (lunch at 5pm, dinner at midnight) and Jane developed gastric
problems as a result. While she was promised rest days, she was only allowed to leave the house
for short periods of time and would be given the full load of chores to complete. Her mobile
phone and passport were confiscated by her employers; she could only call her family using a
public phone once a week. After Jane went to MOM, she was sent back to her employment
agency. The agency did not want to repatriate Jane as there were outstanding recruitment fees
unpaid: they said she had to pay them S$1200 if she wanted to return home. As Jane was unable
50
to pay this amount, the agency sent her back to the same employers she had previously escaped
from. She was subject to similar working conditions and eventually found a way to return to
HOME for assistance.
The policy of sending domestic workers back to employment agencies against their will or risk
being blacklisted by the authorities is especially problematic in the current context, in which
employment agencies often act in the interests of their more empowered clients: the employers of
MDWs. The web of debt and liability adds to employers’ sense of ‘ownership’ over domestic
workers, as employers pay a sizeable sum upfront to employment agencies, expecting that this
debt will be repaid through the labour of the domestic worker for a stipulated period. Disruptions
to this arrangement are often met with indignation and demands for the domestic worker to ‘pay
back’, either through monetary compensation or by working for longer periods until the loan
period is over.
The international law definition of debt bondage implies a debt in which the loan repayment
period is unspecified and manipulated, and in which one’s labour is unable to liquidate the debt.
160
While the general debt situation for MDWs may not strictly adhere to such interpretations of debt
bondage, the debt is often excessive and can have a coercive effect on workers, especially if the
unfulfilled debts lead to threats, harassment and the confiscation of important collateral. The
additional restrictions and controls imposed on domestic workers during their loan repayment
periods, and some employment agents’ reluctance to assist until loans are repaid, can contribute
to forced labour situations arising and the creation of further obstacles to access justice for those
trapped in forced labour.
Underage & Child Labour
In Singapore, the minimum legal age to be an MDW is 23
161
—at HOME’s domestic worker
helpdesk, we see at least one suspected underage domestic worker a month. Every year, HOME
shelters at least a few suspected child domestic workers: that is, those below 18 years of age. These
child domestic workers tend to be from Myanmar and they are especially susceptible to forced
labour (see case study below).
Case Study 11: Nia
FORCED LABOUR INDICATORS
• Excessive overtime (including no rest days)
• Intimidation and threats (including threats of violence)
• Isolation
• Restriction of movement
• Withholding of wages
Nia was 17 years old when she came to HOME. She woke at 6 am each weekday and worked
until 2 or 3 am. Nia had to hand wash clothes for eight family members and clean a three-storey
home. She and a fellow domestic worker washed the employer’s three cars each week. Their
breaks were restricted and when they ate their meals, their employer would constantly hurry
them. Nia did not have a single rest day during the year she worked for the family. She was not
51
allowed to have mobile phone and was only allowed to call her family back in her home country
once a year, and then only for 5 to 10 minutes.
There were two closed circuit TVs in the house which her employer used to check on Nia and her
fellow domestic worker to ensure they were working; they would be scolded if the employer was
dissatisfied. Nia’s employer’s mother would also threaten to slap Nia when she got angry. When
Nia asked to change employer, both her employer and agent refused. The agent threatened to
repatriate her.
In addition, Nia was not paid her full salary or allowance for many months. When she came to
HOME, she was owed close to S$1,500.
An MOM officer investigated Nia’s case. Through mediation, she was paid the wages she was
owed and returned home. It is unclear if her employers were penalized or barred from hiring new
domestic workers. Meanwhile, the State has not given sufficient assurances that underage victims
will not be prosecuted for lying about their age (even if they are potentially victims of trafficking).
Under the UN’s Palermo Protocol, the presence of deception and coercion is not necessary to
characterize a case as trafficking when it involves a child (anyone under 18 years old).
162
Underage
domestic workers are particularly vulnerable to threats of denunciation to authorities; these threats
put them at risk not only of being blacklisted or repatriated, but also of being charged with
violations of the law. Indeed, this is a jarring gap in the law as non-criminalization of victims for
offences committed as a direct result of being exploited forms the cornerstone of victim protection.
In May 2018, the Singapore government charged two employment agencies for allegedly recruiting
domestic workers as young as 13 years old to work in Singapore;
163
the owner of one of the
employment agencies was eventually fined S$5,000 in July 2018.
164
The two underage domestic
workers’ work applications were cancelled and they were sent back.
165
The MOM has stated that
MDWs who do not admit to being underage when they first arrive in Singapore but have yet to be
placed in the employer’s house, and are later discovered, face a permanent ban on working in
Singapore.
166
In another underage domestic worker case, in which the MDW was sexually assaulted, criminal
proceedings have halted as the domestic worker, who is currently back in her home country, is
unable to travel back to Singapore to testify as a witness. Permission has not been granted for her
to testify via video link. As the domestic worker was underage at the time of her working in
Singapore, this had involved some falsifying of identity papers and there are concerns that if she
returns to testify she may be detained for investigations into that offence. This has serious
implications for the protection of underage victims of abuse, including underage victims of forced
labour and trafficking, and their access to justice.
A Note About ‘The Employer’
While perpetrators are often referred to as ‘the employer’, in reality, the person/s responsible for
exploiting or causing hurt or alarm could be numerous—agent, employer, even co-worker (when
there is more than one domestic worker hired for the household) or someone other than the
employer specified on the work pass. In the case of domestic workers, HOME has received
complaints of abuse, bullying, and harassment by children, elderly persons, or even relatives that
52
visit the home, or are heavily involved in managing the household despite not living there (e.g.
the son/daughter of an elderly employer). The notion of a ‘single perpetrator’ therefore needs to
be re-examined, particularly in the case of domestic workers, who live and work in households
with multiple members. It is also important to consider how various persons are complicit in
enabling the sustained exploitation of a domestic worker through the ways they engage in
deceptive and fraudulent practices, differentially exert control over her (e.g. employer threatens,
agent invokes large debt), are indifferent to her plight (agents who refuse to assist when there are
calls for help, or tell a domestic worker to ‘just tolerate it’), hinder her from seeking assistance or
impede access to justice. This includes not just employers and employment agents, but other
intermediaries, as well as law enforcement officers, labour attachés and policymakers, in both
countries of origin and countries of destination. MDWs are entwined in a complex web of
relations—some intimate and familiar, others far removed—and are highly dependent on a wide
range of persons for a vast array of needs: from recruitment to travel and all the attendant
bureaucratic requirements (passports, visas, certificates, training), job placements, lodging, basic
needs (food, medical treatment) as well as their legal status, to name but a few. Dealing with the
multiple problems that arise as a result requires attention to interlocking, interdependent features
of labour migration and its varied actors.
Forced labour must be recognized as a process in which an accumulation of abuses, under a
particular structural context, can lead to a worker, who voluntarily entered an employment
relationship, ending up in a forced labour situation. Violations and malpractices should not be
segregated but assessed cumulatively, with an explicit emphasis on the coercive mechanisms that
keep persons in FL situations and create additional hardships for them if/when they exit.
53
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
54
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
Rosa arrived in Singapore earlier this year with the goal of improving the financial situation of her
family. It was her first time out of the country, her first sojourn as an MDW. In the end, Rosa’s
desperate attempt to escape from an unbearable work situation (see Case Study 7) resulted in two
fractured limbs and a warning letter from the Singapore Police Force regarding her alleged offence
of causing ‘alarm or distress’
167
by jumping out of the window of her employer’s home.
Rosa repeatedly speaks of her ‘bad luck’ in having such a wretched employment experience:
fatalism and resignation frame her assessment of her plight and the stark variabilities in
employment outcomes experienced by her vis-à-vis her much ‘luckier’ compatriots. Anxious to
return home as quickly as possible and be reunited with her family, Rosa is disinterested in
pursuing any course of remedy that could result in further complications and potentially delay her
return.
It is common for migrant workers to speak of their ‘good/bad’ fortune in recounting employment
experiences. It is also a measure of how deeply flawed our migration model and regulatory
frameworks are that the ability to enjoy fundamental rights at work is subject to the vagaries of
employers and recruiters. Decent work and its entitlements need to be less of a gamble: core labour
rights should be clearly specified, benchmarked to international standards, and enshrined in
national laws.
As our case studies have shown, when labour standards are continually violated and the general
conditions for decent work regularly undermined, this creates an enabling environment for more
severe forms of exploitation to flourish. Policies that aggravate inequalities in bargaining power
between employers/recruiters and MDWs exacerbate the situation, making it much easier for the
former to threaten and coerce the latter into accepting and staying in unfavourable working
conditions. Survivors of forced labour, meanwhile, need to be viewed as workers whose
fundamental rights have been violated, and should be ‘treated as claimants of rights and be able
to access criminal justice as well as labour justice’.
168
Establishing victimhood, necessary in criminal justice systems for the making of claims and
accessing of remedial justice, can lead to the perception, especially in the arena of forced labour, of
‘passive and helpless victims’.
169
This perception can perpetuate expectations that MDWs behave
accordingly, and continue to be supported as pitiable subjects. However, it is vital that persons in
forced labour situations be viewed as ‘workers [who] are an active party in the labour market’.
170
Importantly, systemic conditions that hinder workers from claiming their rights—or punish them
for asserting these rights—need to be dealt with.
171
Attempts to eradicate forced labour are at once ‘a political, practical and moral struggle’ in shaping
our society, a means of challenging and articulating ‘the kinds of coercive pressures we consider
legitimate [or not] in labour relations’, and of demanding the social and labour protections
governments have a duty to provide.
172
It is time to demonstrate the commitment to eradicate
forced labour as signified by Singapore’s signing of the Forced Labour Convention in 1965. The
55
exploitative yet normalized practices that characterize employer-domestic worker relationships in
Singapore must be critically scrutinized and benchmarked against employment standards all
workers deserve. Domestic work is work.
Recommendations
HOME has made many recommendations in other reports and submissions in relation to MDWs
including our joint shadow report to the UN’s Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) and our reports, Trafficking into Domestic Servitude, and Work, Life &
Well-being of Foreign Domestic Workers in Singapore.
173
We reiterate the importance of improving
legislative protection and ensuring stricter and consistent enforcement to combat unethical
recruitment practices and multiple forms and degrees of labour exploitation. Measures should also
be taken to empower MDWs and ameliorate the grave power imbalances that currently
characterize the employer/recruiter-MDW relationship.
1. Extend the Employment Act to MDWs so that basic labour rights for MDWs, such as
working hours, sick leave, limits on overtime and notice periods, among others, are
regulated. The exclusion of MDWs from the Employment Act leaves them highly vulnerable
to abuse. Current provisions under the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act are not equal
to those under the EA and are too vaguely worded to offer reliable protection.
2. Amend the Prevention of Human Trafficking Act 2014 and ensure its full compliance
with the UN’s Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons. While
Singapore has enacted the Prevention of Human Trafficking Act, ‘forced labour’ and
‘exploitation’ are not clearly defined. This lack of clarity in the legislation hinders the
identification of forced labour and its risk factors, and also effectively impedes coordinated
attempts to deal with them. Forced labour and exploitation need to be clearly defined in the
Act so that survivors of forced labour are identified and their cases investigated in
accordance with international standards.
3. Establish the right for MDWs to switch employers freely, with clearly defined notice
periods that employers and employees are to abide by. Currently, domestic workers are
reliant on their employers’ consent in order to switch employers. Meanwhile, employers are
able to unilaterally dismiss and repatriate a domestic worker without giving any prior
notice. MDWs’ deportability and the constraints on labour mobility are fundamental factors
influencing MDWs’ decisions to stay in highly exploitative situations and to not report
abuses and violations. They fear the very probable, retaliatory consequence of being
dismissed and repatriated. The freedom of migrant workers to terminate their employment
and change employers without their current employer or recruiter’s permission is a key
general principle under the ILO’s Fair Recruitment Initiative.
174
4. Reform and abolish security bond conditions. The S$5,000 security bond conditions
imposed by the Singapore government place an undue financial burden on employers of
MDWs to ensure they ‘control and supervise’ their foreign employee. This responsibility
heightens employers’ anxieties about the movements and activities of their domestic worker
and incentivizes draconian control measures including the denial of rest days as well as the
confiscation and withholding of MDWs’ mobile phones, passports and other key
documents. The security bond should be reformed to act as a protective measure for MDWs.
56
Forfeiture should be linked directly to specific employment violations committed by
employers, not utilized as a means to allow employers to control MDW’s movements and
engage in moral policing. In the longer-term, the security bond should be abolished, with
alternative regulatory mechanisms adopted to ensure fair and effective repatriation of
migrant workers.
5. Shift towards a zero recruitment fees model. Debt-dependent migration is entrenched in
low-paid labour migration regimes. The indebtedness of migrant workers in Singapore is a
significant factor in their acceptance of deteriorating working conditions. The current status
quo of MDWs paying large sums for their overseas placements in the form of many months
of salary deductions by employers, who act as de facto ‘guarantors’, is a widespread market
practice, and will be challenging to dislodge. Yet it is necessary if the coercive power of debt
and its inextricable link to forced labour are to be mitigated.
6. While the longer-term goal is to shift towards the ILO Fair Recruitment Initiative’s model of
zero recruitment fees borne by migrant workers
175
—that is, an employer-pays model
176
—
some interim measures are required to shift the debate and onus of responsibility. First and
foremost is improving transparency. For example, agencies in both countries of origin and
countries of destination should have to provide detailed, itemized breakdowns of fees
charged and evidence to back up these claims; the burden of proof should be on agencies,
not MDWs. Debates about what migration costs should be, who should pay, and how much,
cannot progress in an environment in which the migration industry thrives on murky
transactions that are ill-regulated, and involve multiple brokers and intermediaries who are
able to profit excessively from others’ vulnerabilities and lack of access to opportunities.
7. Strengthen cross-border cooperation with MDWs’ home countries to regulate recruitment
and establish mandatory working conditions in compliance with international labour
standards. Labour migration is a transnational process, and jurisdictional challenges leave
enforcement gaps that recruiters and other intermediaries are able to easily exploit.
Recruiters in COOs often blame agents in CODs for unethical practices and vice versa. There
have also been instances where governments in COOs establish standards to protect
MDWs—such as minimum wages and bans on the charging of recruitment fees—but such
standards are not enforced in Singapore by the relevant authorities. Regional and bilateral
agreements are frequently forged when it comes to the protection of trade interests.
Similarly, political will needs to be directed towards ensuring that bilateral agreements are
also focused on aligning labour standards between COOs and CODs with the aim of
protecting migrant workers. Agreed standards should be benchmarked against
international standards. Beyond signing agreements, regulatory systems need to be
established to ensure effective cross-border monitoring and management of breaches.
8. Abolish the online reference channel which allows employers to leave unsubstantiated
and unverified feedback about a worker. The ability for employers to leave
unsubstantiated negative feedback about domestic workers on the Work Permit Online
System allows employers and employment agents to effectively threaten and coerce workers
into not making claims against them or into agreeing to unfavourable terms of employment.
It can also be utilized as a means to punish domestic workers if they assert their rights. It is
time to establish a fairer system in which MDWs themselves provide referees and details of
57
former employers to prospective ones—the same way employees in other industries provide
referees.
9. Commit fully to mitigating the risk of forced labour situations arising. Practices that are
recognized as strong indicators of forced labour must be strongly dealt with as a critical
component of risk management. Some recommended measures include:
• Ensure freedom of movement and communication for MDWs:
Strictly enforce laws which prohibit employers or agencies from retaining
MDWs’ passports and other identity documents; penalties should be more
severe for repeat offenders;
Set guidelines and, eventually, enact laws against the restriction and
confiscation of MDWs’ personal communication devices;
• Make it compulsory for employers to pay the salaries of workers through bank
transfers and provide workers with a copy of their pay slips;
• Enhance and enforce strict penalties for employers who provide abusive working
and living conditions, including inadequate food, poor housing and hazardous
working conditions. Set clear standards on these aspects as current EFMA
regulations lack specificity.
10. Provide capacity-building programmes to law enforcement officers and other relevant
front-line responders. There is a distinct lack of recognition of and discussion around forced
labour and its indicators. Capacity-building programmes are necessary to ensure that
stakeholders who encounter migrant workers on a regular basis—and who are often the first
responders in a crisis situation—are able to recognize the indicators of forced labour and
how a FL situation may develop. Victim identification processes need to be strengthened
with the deep involvement of CSOs working in this area, both locally and internationally.
11. Ratify the 2014 Protocol on Forced Labour and work towards applying the
recommendations set out in the Forced Labour (Supplementary Measures)
Recommendation, 2014 (No. 203). The 2014 Protocol is a legally-binding instrument that
requires governments to adopt concrete measures of prevention, protection and remedy to
suppress forced labour;
177
Recommendation No.203 provides practical guidance on how
States can strengthen legislation on forced labour and supplements both the 2014 Protocol
and Forced Labour Convention No.29. The Singapore government signed C029 in 1965 but
has yet to ratify the 2014 protocol. We urge the government to ratify the 2014 Protocol and
take concrete steps to apply the recommendations, including but not limited to:
• Ensuring effective victim protection and access to appropriate and effective
remedies for survivors of forced labour;
• Preventing and responding to risks of forced labour;
• Protecting migrant workers from abusive and fraudulent recruitment and
placement practices;
• Addressing the root causes that heighten the risks of forced labour;
58
• Regularly releasing detailed and disaggregated data on aspects related to forced
labour; and
• Respecting and promoting fundamental principles and rights at work and
combating discriminatory practices that heighten vulnerability to forced labour.
59
APPENDIX A: ILO’S HARD TO SEE, HARDER TO
COUNT
The ILO’s Hard to See, Harder to Count (2012) is a comprehensive report that provides guidance and
specific tools—including indicators—to assist in the collection of data on forced labour. Lack of
empirical data is seen as an impediment to improving understanding of FL and the report provides
guidelines, operational definitions, sampling techniques, suggestions on data analysis, as well as
ethical considerations for research on FL as a means to enable better data collection regarding FL.
178
The legal and conceptual framework echoes the ILO’s other work on FL, with an emphasis on
coercion that highlights the following subcategories: threats and violence, restriction on freedom
of movement, debt bondage/debt manipulation, withholding of wages, retention of identity
papers, and abuse of vulnerability.
179
In determining indicators of forced labour of adults, the
guidelines include strong, medium and weak indicators for three key dimensions: unfree
recruitment, work and life under duress, and impossibility of leaving employer. A person is considered a
victim of forced labour if they fulfil any one of these dimensions. Each dimension is further broken
up into two components: involuntariness and menace of penalty, with specific, identifying indicators
under each component (see Table 3). A dimension is positive when a person triggers at least one
indicator of involuntariness and one strong indicator of menace of penalty, and at least one of those
indicators is strong.
Table 3: Dimensions and Indicators of Forced Labour
DIMENSIONS & INDICATORS OF FORCED LABOUR
Dimension of forced labour
Indicator
UNFREE
RECRUITMENT
Involuntariness
Strong
indicators
Recruitment linked to debt
(advance or loan)
Deception about nature of work
Medium
indicators
Deceptive recruitment (working
conditions, content or legality of
contract, legal status, location,
wage/earnings, employer)
Penalty
Strong
indicators
Denunciation to authorities
Confiscation of identity papers or
travel documents
Sexual violence
Physical violence
Other forms of punishment
Removal of rights or privileges
60
Withholding of assets (cash or
other)
Threats against family members
WORK AND
LIFE UNDER
DURESS
Involuntariness
Strong
indicators
Forced overtime (beyond legal
limits)
Forced to work on call (day and
night)
Limited freedom of movement and
communication
Degrading living conditions
Medium
indicators
Forced engagement in illicit activities
Inducted or inflated indebtedness
Multiple dependency on employer
(housing)
Penalty
Strong
indicators
Denunciation to authorities
Confiscation of identity papers or
travel documents
Confiscation of mobile phones
Further deterioration in working
conditions
Isolation
Locked in workplace or living
quarters
Sexual violence
Physical violence
Other forms of punishment
(deprivation of food, water, sleep,
etc.)
Violence against worker in front of
other workers
Constant surveillance
Withholding of wages
Withholding of assets (cash or
other)
61
Threats against family members
Medium
indicators
Dismissal
Exclusion from future employment
Extra work for breaching labour
discipline
Financial penalties
Informing family/community about
worker’s current situation
(blackmail)
IMPOSSIBILITY
OF LEAVING
EMPLOYER
Involuntariness
Strong
indicators
Reduced freedom to terminate
labour contract after training or
other benefit paid by employer
No freedom to resign in accordance
with legal requirements
Forced to stay longer than agreed
while waiting for wages due
Forced to work for indeterminate
period in order to repay outstanding
debt or wage advance
Penalty
Strong
indicators
Denunciation to authorities
Confiscation of identity papers or
travel documents
Imposition of worse working
conditions
Sexual violence
Physical violence
Other forms of punishment
(deprivation of food, water, sleep,
etc.)
Under constant surveillance
Violence imposed on other workers
in front of other workers
Withholding of wages
Withholding of assets (cash or
other)
62
Threats against family members
(violence or loss of land or jobs)
Medium
indicators
Dismissal
Exclusion from future employment
Extra work for breaching labour
discipline
Financial penalties
Informing family, community or
public about worker’s current
situation (blackmail)
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APPENDIX B: ILO’S DELPHI INDICATORS FOR
HUMAN TRAFFICKING
The ILO’s ‘Operational Indicators of Trafficking in Human Beings: Results from a Delphi Survey
Implemented by the ILO and the European Commission’ (hereafter ‘Delphi indicators’), was
developed with the objective of having standardized definitions and indicators to harmonize data
collection on trafficking across EU member states.
180
The Delphi indicators are discussed here with
an emphasis on how it identifies victims of trafficking for forced labour. To qualify as a victim of
trafficking for forced labour, a person has to fulfil the three dimensions of deception, exploitation
and coercion. To be assessed as positive in either dimension, there must be at least:
• Two strong indicators, or
• One strong indicator and one medium or weak indicator, or
• Three medium indicators, or
• Two medium indicators and one weak indicator.
Table 4: ILO’s Trafficking for Forced Labour Indicators
DECEPTIVE
RECRUITMENT
EXPLOITATION
COERCION AT
DESTINATION
Strong indicators
Strong indicators
Strong indicators
• Deceived about
nature of the job,
location or employer
• Excessive working
days or hours
• Confiscation of
documents
• Debt bondage
• Isolation, confinement
or surveillance
• Violence on victims
Medium indicators
Medium indicators
Medium indicators
• Deceived about
conditions of work
• Deceived about
wages/earnings
• Deceived about
content or legality of
work contract
• Deceived about
housing and living
conditions
• Deceived about legal
documentation/
• Bad living conditions
• Hazardous work
• Low or no salary
• Wage manipulation
• No respect of labour
laws or contract
signed
• Very bad working
conditions
• No social protection
• Withholding of wages
• Threat of
denunciation to
authorities
• Threat of violence
against victim
• Forced into illicit/
criminal activities
• Forced tasks or clients
• Forced to act against
peers
64
DECEPTIVE
RECRUITMENT
EXPLOITATION
COERCION AT
DESTINATION
obtaining legal
migration status
• Deceived about travel
and recruitment
conditions
• Forced to lie to
authorities, family,
etc.
• Threat to impose even
worse working
conditions
• Under strong
influence
• Violence on family
(threats or otherwise)
Weak indicators
Weak indicators
Weak indicators
• Deceived about access
to education
opportunities
• No access to
education
• Threat to inform
family, community or
public
A person who is assessed positive in the dimensions of exploitation and coercion at destination is
deemed to be in a situation of forced labour; additional information about whether or not there
was deceptive recruitment establishes if this person is a victim of trafficking for forced labour.
Descriptions of each indicator are also provided by the ILO,
181
for example:
• Low or no salary: refers to situations where persons are denied their salary; when they
receive ‘in-kind’ payments; when they receive less than what was originally agreed upon,
or less than the minimum wage.
182
• No respect of labour laws or contract signed: refers to situations where persons work
without a contract; where contractual terms are not respected; where the contract provided
was unlawful; where the person was illegally recruited. Also includes situations where
there was deception (about the job, the working conditions), and where an individual is
paid less than others or in a different manner to others (cash only, when others are paid by
bank transfer).
183
• Isolation, confinement or surveillance: refers to coercive means to control workers.
Isolation includes partial or restricted freedom of communication (e.g. restricted access to
telephones); confinement includes holding someone against their will, and limited freedom
of movement. Also included are situations where a person is under constant or partial
surveillance.
184
65
ENDNOTES
1
International Labour Organization, ‘Social Protection for Domestic Workers: Key Polocy Trends and Statistics’, Social
Protection Policy Papers, Paper 16, 2016, http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2016/116B09_14_engl.pdf (accessed
20 October 2018).
2
International Labour Organization, ILO Global Estimates on Migrant Workers: Results and Methodology—Special Focus on
Migrant Domestic Workers (Geneva: ILO, 2015), http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2015/489539.pdf (accessed 20
October 2018), p.xi.
3
Ben Westcott and Katie Hunt, ‘Most Singapore Foreign Domestic Workers Exploited, Survey Says’, CNN, 4 December
2017.
4
ILO, ‘Facts and Figures’, https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/lang--en/index.htm (accessed April 12,
2018).
5
Anti-Slavery International, ‘What is Modern Slavery’, https://www.antislavery.org/slavery-today/modern-
slavery/(accessed July 23, 2018).
6
ILO, Combating Forced Labour: A Handbook for Employers and Business, 1: Introduction & Overview (Geneva: ILO, 2015),
http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/publications/WCMS_101171/lang--en/index.htm (accessed April
12, 2018), 4.
7
ILO, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery..
8
Ibid., p.10.
9
ILO, Profits and Poverty: the Economics of Forced Labour (Geneva: ILO, 2014),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_243391.pdf
(accessed April 12, 2018), 8.
10
ILO, Combating Forced Labour: A Handbook for Employers and Business, 2: Employers’ Frequently Asked Questions, (Geneva:
ILO, 2015), http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/publications/WCMS_101171/lang--en/index.htm
(accessed April 12, 2018), 5.
11
ILO, 96th session, 2007, Report III (Part 1B), General Survey Concerning the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and the
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc96/pdf/rep-iii-1b.pdf (accessed April 12, 2018), xi.
12
While this report focuses on women MDWs, men are allowed to work as domestic workers in Singapore, subject to
approval from MOM. This is allowed if employers ‘have good reasons for doing so’, and employers must submit a letter
to MOM ‘explaining their needs’. There were 33 male MDWs in 2013. See Amelia Tan, ‘First Male Helper from Myanmar
Starts Work’, Straits Times, 12 May 2013.
13
ILO, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, 31.
14
ILO, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour: Global Report under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, 93rd sess., Report I(B) (Geneva: ILO, 2005), 5.
15
Ibid., p.8
16
Ibid., p.9
17
The ILO, in its global reports on forced labour, distinguish between different categories of forced labour: there is forced
labour imposed by the State, forced labour imposed by private agents for commercial sexual exploitation, and forced
labour imposed by private agents for economic exploitation: this report is focused on forced labour imposed by private
agents for economic exploitation. See ILO, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour, 10.
18
Julia O’Connell Davidson, ‘New Slavery, Old Binaries: Human Trafficking and the Borders Of “Freedom”’. Global
Networks 10, no. 2 (2010): 244-261.
19
ILO, ‘Policy Brief on Anti-Trafficking Laws, Policies and Practices’, February 2017,
http://www.ilo.org/newdelhi/whatwedo/publications/WCMS_545580/lang--en/index.htm (accessed April 12,
2018).
20
Deirdre Coghlan and Gillian Wylie, ‘Defining Trafficking/Denying Justice? Forced Labour in Ireland and the
Consequences of Trafficking Discourse’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37, no. 9 (2011): 1513-1526.
21
Klara Skrivankova, ‘Between Decent Work and Forced Labour: Examining the Continuum of Exploitation’, JRF
Programme Paper: Forced Labour, November 2010, https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/between-decent-work-and-forced-
labour-examining-continuum-exploitation (accessed April, 12, 2018), 29.
22
Coghlan and Wylie, ‘Defining Trafficking/Denying Justice’, 1524.
23
Ibid., p.1520.
24
Jeroen Beirnaert, ‘A Trade Union Perspective on Combating Trafficking and Forced Labour in Europe’, in Combating
Trafficking in Human Beings for Labour Exploitation, ed. Conny Rijken (Nijmengen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011), 472.
66
25
Justice Centre Hong Kong and Liberty Asia, How Many More Years a Slave? Trafficking for Forced Labour in Hong Kong
(Hong Kong: Justice Centre Hong Kong and Liberty Asia, 2014), 10.
26
Roger Plant, ‘Forced Labour, Slavery and Human Trafficking: When do Definitions Matter?’, Anti-Trafficking Review,
Issue 5, 2015: 153–157.
27
ILO, 1930, Forced Labour Convention, Article 1, C29, Geneva: ILO.
28
ILO, Combating Forced Labour: A Handbook for Employers and Business, 1: Introduction & Overview, 8.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
ILO, Hard to See, Harder to Count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and Children (Geneva: ILO, 2012),
13.
33
ILO, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour, 6.
34
ILO, ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labour: Results and Methodology (Geneva: ILO, 2012), 19.
35
Ibid.
36
ILO, ILO Indicators of Forced Labour (Geneva: ILO, 2012), http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-
labour/publications/WCMS_203832/lang--en/index.htm (accessed April 12, 2018).
37
ILO, ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labour: Results and Methodology, 19.
38
ILO, Human Trafficking and Forced Labour Exploitation: Guidelines for Legislation and Law Enforcement (Geneva: ILO, 2005),
19.
39
ILO, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour, 8.
40
Beirnaert, ‘A Trade Union Perspective’; Justice Centre Hong Kong and Liberty Asia, How Many More Years a Slave?;
Skrivankova, ‘Between Decent Work’; Kendra Strauss and Siobhán McGrath, ‘Temporary Migration, Precarious
Employment and Unfree Labour Relations: Exploring the “Continuum of Exploitation” in Canada’s Temporary Foreign
Worker Program’, Geoforum 78 (January 2017): 199–208.
41
Skrivankova, ‘Between Decent Work’; Michael Potter and Jennifer Hamilton, ‘Picking on Vulnerable Migrants: Precarity
and the Mushroom Industry in Northern Island’, Work, Employment and Society 28, no.3 (2014): 390–406; Hannah Lewis,
Peter Dwyer, Stuart Hodkinson and Louise Waite, ‘Hyper-precarious Lives: Migrants, Work and Forced Labour in the
Global North’, Progress in Human Geography (2014): 1–21; Sallie Yea and Stephanie Chok, ‘Unfreedom Unbound:
Developing a Cumulative Approach to Understanding Unfree Labour in Singapore’, Work, Employment and Society
January 2018: 1–17.
42
Justice Centre Hong Kong and Liberty Asia, How Many More Years a Slave?, 10.
43
Beirnaert, ‘A Trade Union Perspective’, 472.
44
ILO, ‘Decent Work’, http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm (accessed April 26, 2018);
ILO, ‘Decent Work Indicators’, http://www.ilo.org/integration/themes/mdw/WCMS_189392/lang--en/index.htm
(accessed April 26, 2018).
45
ILO, Effective Protection for Domestic Workers: A Guide to Designing Labour Laws (Geneva: ILO, 2012), 10.
46
ILO, Human Trafficking and Forced Labour Exploitation, 22.
47
Ibid., p.23
48
Skrivankova, ‘Between Decent Work’, 4.
49
ILO, Combating Forced Labour: A Handbook for Employers and Business, 1: Introduction & Overview, 8.
50
ILO, Human Trafficking and Forced Labour Exploitation, 23.
51
This is similar to principles of the trafficking protocol as well, where a victim’s consent is irrelevant to the commission
of the crime. See ILO, Human Trafficking and Forced Labour Exploitation, 22.
52
Ibid.
53
ILO, ‘Ratifications for Singapore’, ILO,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103163 (accessed April 12,
2018).
54
ILO, ‘List of Instruments by Subject and Status’,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12030:0::NO:::#Forced_labour (accessed April 12, 2018).
55
ILO, ILO Standards on Forced Labour: The New Protocol and Recommendation at a Glance (Geneva: ILO, 2016), 4.
56
Ibid.
57
ILO, R203—Forced Labour (Supplementary Measures) Recommendation, 2014 (No. 203),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:3174688
(accessed April 12, 2018).
58
There were 437 votes for, 27 abstentions, 8 against, see: ILO, ‘ILO adopts New Protocol to Tackle Modern Forms of
Forced Labour’, ILO, 10 June 2014, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_246549/lang-
-en/index.htm (accessed April 12, 2018).
67
59
ILO, 103rd Session, Provisional Record, Twelfth Sitting, Geneva, 2014, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--
-ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_247587.pdf (accessed April 12, 2018).
60
ILO, Human Trafficking and Forced Labour Exploitation, 68.
61
ILO, C029—Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) under Article 1, Para 1,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C029 (accessed April 12, 2018).
62
ILO, 96th session, 2007, Report III (Part 1B), 5.
63
Ibid.
64
Penal Code (Chapter 224), https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/PC1871 (accessed April 12, 2018).
65
ILO, P029–Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, https://tinyurl.com/ILO2014Protocol (accessed April 12,
2018).
66
Ministry of Home Affairs, ‘Prevention of Human Trafficking Act to Take Effect from 1 March 2015’, 1 March 2015,
https://www.mha.gov.sg/newsroom/press-release/news/prevention-of-human-trafficking-act-to-take-effect-from-
1-march-2015 (accessed April 12, 2018).
67
Xing Hui Kok, ‘Singapore Accedes to UN Protocol to Prevent and Combat Human Trafficking’, Straits Times, 29
September 2015.
68
ILO, ‘Background Note: What is Forced Labour, Human Trafficking and Slavery? Do Definitions Matter, and Why?’, April–May
2014.
69
Plant, Forced Labour, Slavery and Human Trafficking; Janie A. Chuang, ‘Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human
Trafficking Law’, American Society of International Law 108, no.4 (October 2014): 609–649.
70
Brittany Foor, ‘Human Trafficking and Forced Labor: A Recommendation’, Grove City College Journal of Law and Public
Policy 1, no. 1 (2010): 93.
71
UN, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/protocoltraffickinginpersons.aspx (accessed April 12, 2018);
Singapore Government, Prevention of Human Trafficking Act 2014, https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Acts-Supp/45-
2014/Published/20141229?DocDate=20141229 (accessed April 12, 2018).
72
UN, What is Human Trafficking’, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/what-is-human-
trafficking.html (accessed April 12, 2018).
73
Justice Centre Hong Kong and Liberty Asia, How Many More Years a Slave?, 7.
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid.
76
ILO, Combating Forced Labour: A Handbook for Employers and Business, 1: Introduction & Overview, 10.
77
Skrivankova, ‘Between Decent Work’, 9.
78
ILO, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour, 7.
79
UN, ‘What is Human Trafficking’, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/what-is-human-
trafficking.html (accessed April 12, 2018).
80
ILO, ‘Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries’, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm
(accessed April 12, 2018).
81
ILO, ILO Indicators of Forced Labour.
82
Ibid.
83
Ibid.
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid.
86
ILO, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery; ILO, ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labour: Results and Methodology.
87
ILO, Hard to See, Harder to Count.
88
ILO, ‘Operational Indicators of Trafficking in Human Beings,’ http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_105023.pdf (accessed January 16, 2018).
89
Genevieve Lebaron, Neil Howard, Cameron Thibos and Penelope Kyritsis, ‘Confronting Root Causes: Forced Labour in
Global Supply Chains’, Opendemocracy, 10 January 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery/genevieve-
lebaron-neil-howard-cameron-thibos-penelope-kyritsis/confronting-root-causes (accessed 26 April 2018).
90
Patti Tamara Lenard and Christine Straehle, Legislated Inequality: Temporary Labour Migration in Canada (Montreal:
McGill-Queen University Press, 2012), 3.
91
Southern Poverty Law Center, Close to Slavery: Guestworker Programs in the United States (Alabama: Southern Poverty
Law Center, Feburary 2013), https://www.splcenter.org/20130218/close-slavery-guestworker-programs-united-states
(accessed 26 April 2018).
92
Aziz Choudry and Adrian A. Smith, ‘Introduction: Struggling Against Unfree Labour’ in Unfree Labour? Struggles of
Migrant and Immigrant Workers in Canada (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2016), 2.
68
93
Charanpal S. Bal, ‘Dealing with Deportability: Deportation Laws and the Political Personhood of Temporary Migrant
Workers in Singapore’, Asian Journal of Law and Society 2 (August 2015): 267-284.
94
Lebaron et al., ‘Confronting Root Causes’, 38.
95
Charmian Goh, Kellynn Wee, and Brenda S. A. Yeoh, ‘Who’s Holding the Bomb? Debt-Financed Migration in
Singapore’s Domestic Work Industry’, Working Paper 38, Migrating Out Of Poverty Research Programme Consortium,
August 2016, 5.
96
Bal, ‘Dealing with Deportability’, 268.
97
Ibid., p.270 .
98
Aziz Choudry, Unfree Labour, p. 9; see also: Kendra Strauss and Siobhán McGrath, ‘Temporary Migration, Precarious
Employment and Unfree Labour Relations: Exploring the “Continuum of Exploitation” in Canada’s Temporary Foreign
Worker Program’, Geoforum 78 (January 2017): 199–208; Elizabeth Frantz, ‘Jordan’s Unfree Workforce: State-Sponsored
Bonded Labour in the Arab Region’, Journal of Development Studies 49, no.8 (2013): 1072–1087.
99
Human Rights Watch, ‘Middle East: End “Sponsored” Gateway to Human Trafficking’, Human Rights Watch, 14 June
2010,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/14/middle-east-end-sponsored-gateway-human-trafficking (accessed 26 April
2018).
100
Ministry of Manpower, ‘Foreign Workforce Numbers’, http://www.mom.gov.sg/documents-and-
publications/foreign-workforce-numbers (accessed July 26, 2018).
101
Slesh Anand Shrestha, ‘Empowering Foreign Domestic Workers’, Straits Times, 19 November 2014.
102
Cambodia became an approved source country in October 2016. See Rachel Au-Yong, ‘More Maids from Cambodia
Next Year’, Straits Times, 23 December 2016.
103
Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (Chapter 91A), Employment of Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations 2012,
Fourth Schedule, Part II, Section 12.
104
Goh, Wee, and Yeoh, ‘Who’s Holding the Bomb?’, 7.
105
Ibid.
106
Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (Chapter 91A), Employment of Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations 2012,
Fourth Schedule, Part II, Section 1.
107
MOM, ‘Security Bond Requirements for Foreign Domestic Worker’, http://www.mom.gov.sg/passes-and-
permits/work-permit-for-foreign-domestic-worker/eligibility-and-requirements/security-bond (accessed 26 April
2018).
108
Ibid.
109
Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (Chapter 91A), Employment of Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations 2012,
Fourth Schedule, Part VI, Section 6.
110
Joanna Seow, ‘Maids Fear Losing Job When They Get Pregnant’, Straits Times, 3 December 2017.
111
There are mandatory six-month medical tests for domestic workers that screen for pregnancy, syphilis, HIV, and
tuberculosis. Domestic workers who fail their medical test must be repatriated. See Ministry of Manpower, ‘Six-Monthly
Medical Examination (6ME) for Foreign Domestic Worker (FDW)’, http://www.mom.gov.sg/passes-and-
permits/work-permit-for-foreign-domestic-worker/eligibility-and-requirements/six-monthly-medical-examination
(accessed May 17, 2018).
112
Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (Chapter 91A), Employment of Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations 2012,
Fourth Schedule, Part VI, Section 7, 8.
113
MOM, ‘Security Bond Requirements for Foreign Domestic Worker’.
114
Ministry of Manpower, FDW Weekly Rest Day: A Guide for Employers,
https://www.mom.gov.sg/~/media/mom/documents/publications/fdw-weekly-rest-day/fdw-weekly-rest-day-
english.pdf (accessed October 10, 2018).
115
Transient Workers Count Too, ‘The Right to Rest: The Effectiveness of the “Day Off” Legislation for Foreign Domestic
Workers’, 11 June 2015, http://twc2.org.sg/2015/06/11/the-right-to-rest-the-effectiveness-of-the-day-off-legislation-
for-foreign-domestic-workers/ (accessed 26 July, 2018).
116
Joanna Seow, ‘Employers Share Feedback on Maids’, Straits Times, 15 April 2017; Joanna Seow, ‘Tough Time for Maid
After False Complaint’, Straits Times, 15 April 2017.
117
Ministry of Manpower, ‘Hours of Work, Overtime and Rest Day’, https://www.mom.gov.sg/employment-
practices/hours-of-work-overtime-and-rest-days (accessed May 17, 2018).
118
Singapore Statutes Online, Employment Act (Chapter 91).
119
Ministry of Manpower, ‘Employment Act: Who It Covers’, https://www.mom.gov.sg/employment-
practices/employment-act/who-is-covered (accessed May 17, 2018).
120
Parliamentary Debates Singapore: Official Report, vol 85 at vol 998 (November 18, 2008).
121
Ministry of Social and Family Development, Singapore’s Fifth Periodic Report to the UN Committee for the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Singapore: Ministry of Social and Family Development, October
2015), 10.
69
122
Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (Chapter 91A), Employment of Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations 2012,
Fourth Schedule, Part 1, Sections 1, 4, 10a; Part II, Section 12.
123
Singapore Government, CEDAW: Fifth Periodic Report of State Parties Due in 2015, October 2015,
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/SGP/CEDAW_C_SGP_5_6007_E.pdf
(accessed September 14, 2017), 28.
124
ILO, ILO Indicators of Forced Labour.
125
Ministry of Manpower, ‘Is There a Prescribed Minimum Wage for Foreign Workers in Singapore’,
http://www.mom.gov.sg/faq/work-permit-for-foreign-worker/is-there-a-prescribed-minimum-wage-for-foreign-
workers-in-singapore (accessed May 17, 2018).
126
Joanna Seow, ‘Minimum Pay Raised for Filipino Maids Here’, Straits Times, 1 April 2017; Joanna Seow, ‘Cap on Fees
Paid by Indonesian Maid’, Straits Times, 3 February 2017; Kenneth Lim, ‘Minimum Pay for Filipino Maids to Go Up May
1: Philippine Embassy’, Channel News Asia, 31 March 2017.
127
ILO, ‘Fair Recruitment’, http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/fair-recruitment/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 26 July,
2018).
128
Employment Agencies Rules 2011, Section 12; MOM, ‘How Will Foreign Workers Know How Much They are Expected
to Pay the Singapore Employment Agency (EA)?’, http://www.mom.gov.sg/faq/employment-agencies/how-will-
foreign-workers-know-the-amount-that-they-are-expected-to-pay-the-singapore-ea (accessed 26 April 2018).
129
MOM, ‘MOM: Employment Agency Fees are Already Capped’, 27 December 2013,
http://www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/press-replies/2013/mom-employment-agency-fees-are-already-capped
(accessed July 26, 2018).
130
‘Standard Service Agreement Between Foreign Domestic Worker Employer and Employment Agency’,
www.employmentcare.com.sg/uploads/4/.../ecc_standard_employment_contract.docx (accessed April 26, 2018).
131
Kellynn Wee and Charmian Goh, ‘The Current System is No Good’: The Challenges of Singapore’s Domestic Work
Industry’, Asia Research Institute, Policy Briefing No.5, September 2016,
http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/files/file.php?name=rp08-mig-ind-mi-policy-brief-v9.pdf&site=354
(accessed May 17, 2018).
132
Transient Workers Count Too, ‘ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and the Promotion of the Rights of Migrant
Workers: Evaluation and Commentary by Transient Workers Count Too, Singapore’, 23 January 2018,
http://twc2.org.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Commentary_by_TWC2_on_ASEAN_consensus_v3.pdf (accessed
July 26, 2018), 3.
133
The Passports Act, Section 47, Subsection 5 says: ‘If (a) a person has or retains possession or control in Singapore of a
foreign travel document; and (b) the person knows that the foreign travel document was not issued to him, the person
shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000 or to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding 10 years or to both.’ However, Subsection (7) adds a qualifier: ‘Subsections (2) to (6) shall not apply
if the person has a reasonable excuse. ’It is unclear what would constitute a reasonable excuse. See Singapore
Government, Passports Act, Section 47, Subsection 5.
134
Ministry of Manpower, ‘Can an Employer Keep a Worker’s Passport’, https://www.mom.gov.sg/faq/work-pass-
general/can-an-employer-keep-a-workers-passport (accessed July 26, 2018).
135
Esther Ng, ‘Employer’s Passport to Trouble’, TODAY, January 25, 2010.
136
Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (Chapter 91A), Employment of Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations 2012,
Fourth Schedule, Part II, Section 3.
137
Article 10 of the ILO’s Domestic Workers Convention states: ‘Weekly rest shall be at least 24 consecutive hours.’ See
ILO, C189—Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No.189), https://tinyurl.com/ILO189 (accessed May 17, 2018).
138
Domestic workers frequently report being called ‘cheebye’, which is a Hokkien equivalent for cunt.
139
Elena Chong, ‘They Slapped Her, Punched Her, Whacked Her with Canes,’ The New Paper, 11 March 2017; Hannah
Teoh, ‘Myanmar Maid Recounts Incidents of Abuse by Singapore Couple,’ Yahoo News, 25 September 2017.
140
Asia One, ‘Husband and Wife Jailed 28 and 2 months Respectively for Abusing Maids’, Asia One, 10 March 2017.
141
K.C. Vijayan, ‘Couple who Abused Maid Ordered to Pay Her $7,800’, The New Paper, 10 May 2018.
142
Eugenia Lim, ‘Spotlight: More Protection for Foreign Domestic Workers’, Channel NewsAsia, 9 September 2008,
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/videos/spotlight-more-protection-for-foreign-domestic-workers-video-
10699902 (accessed October 12, 2018).
143
Humanitarian Organization for Migration Economics, ‘Domestic Workers Lack Adequate Food and Nutrition’,
https://www.home.org.sg/our-stories/2017/11/30/domestic-workers-lack-adequate-food-and-nutrition (accessed
May 17, 2018).
144
Ministry of Manpower, ‘Rest Days and Well-Being for Foreign Domestic Worker,’ http://www.mom.gov.sg/passes-
and-permits/work-permit-for-foreign-domestic-worker/employers-guide/rest-days-and-well-being (accessed
September 27, 2017).
145
Chang May Choon, ‘More Foreign Domestic Workers Say They Do Not Get Enough To Eat,’ Straits Times, 25 October
2014.
70
146
HOME conducted six focus groups with approximately 30 MDW residents living in HOME’s shelter in March and April
2017. The MDWs were from the Philippines, Indonesia and Myanmar. During the focus groups, the MDWs discussed
their living and working conditions, and inadequate food surfaced as a key issue.
147
Aw Cheng Wei, ‘Safe Keeping of Maids’ Pay Can Be Tricky’, Straits Times, 2 May 2015.
148
Ministry of Manpower, ‘New Work Permit Condition to Protect Both Employers and Foreign Domestic Workers from
Money-Related Disputes’, 7 October 2018, https://www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/press-releases/2018/1007-new-
work-permit-condition-to-protect-both-employers-and-foreign-domestic-workers-from-money-related-disputes
(accessed October 8, 2018).
149
Low Youjin, ‘Employers Not Allowed to Hold On To Domestic Helpers’ Money from January’, TODAY, 7 October 2018.
150
ILO, ‘Operational Indicators of Trafficking in Human Beings’.
151
Desmond Ng, ‘Spying on Maids with CCTV—Where Do We Draw the Line?’, Channel NewsAsia, 6 October 2018.
152
ILO, ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labour: Results and Methodology, 19.
153
ILO, Human Trafficking and Forced Labour Exploitation.
154
ILO, ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labour: Results and Methodology, 19.
155
Roger Plant, ‘Forced Labour, Slavery and Human Trafficking’.
156
Ibid.
157
Under the Ministry of Manpower’s new Casework Referral System, established in August 2017, all MDWs who come
to HOME shelter must present their claims at MOM whether or not the MDW wishes to file an official complaint. Upon
filing this claim at the MOM, the MOM will decide if it is a ‘valid claim’. MDWs who do not have a ‘valid claim’ as
determined by MOM may be sent back to their employment agencies; those who refuse to do so may be blacklisted by
the MOM and will not be able to return to Singapore to work for at least three years.
158
According to the American Psychological Association, polygraph tests are controversial and generally unreliable.
Although they are inadmissible as evidence in Singapore’s courts, law enforcement has used them to assess the
credibility of subjects and decide which charges to file since 1977. See American Psychological Association, ‘The Truth
About Lie Detectors (aka Polygraph Tests) ’, http://www.apa.org/research/action/polygraph.aspx (accessed April 26,
2018); Andy Ho, ‘Deceptive Dangers of Lie Detectors’, Straits Times, 21 August 2013.
159
While there are indications this law will be amended later this year, currently, under Singapore’s Penal Code, attempted
suicide is an arrestable offence and a person who attempts suicide faces a jail term of up to a year, or a fine, or both. See
Selina Lum, ‘Penal Code Review Committee: Punishment Not the Answer for People Attempting Suicide’, Straits Times,
9 September 2018.
160
United Nations, Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar
to Slavery, Article 1(a).
161
Ministry of Manpower, ‘Underage Maids: Onus on Agencies to Ensure Entry Norms’, 29 December 2010,
http://www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/press-replies/2010/underage-maids-onus-on-agencies-to-ensure-entry-n
(accessed May 17, 2018)
162
United Nations, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Article 3(c).
163
Yuen Sin, ‘Two Employment Agencies Charged over Bringing in 13-year-old Maids, in First Such Cases Here’ Straits
Times, 24 May 2018.
164
Lydia Lim, ‘Employment Agency Owner Fined S$5,000 for Bringing in 13-year-old Myanmar Maid’, TODAY, 12 July
2018.
165
Ibid.
166
Yuen Sin, ‘More Underage Maids Spotted in Singapore and Sent Home’, Straits Times, 27 May 2018.
167
The warning letter cited Section 4(1)(a) p/us 4(2) of the Protection from Harassment Act, Chapter 256A.
168
Skrivankova, ‘Between Decent Work’, 9.
169
Ibid.
170
Ibid.
171
Ibid., 30.
172
Neil Howard, ‘Forced Labour: It’s About Politics, not Crime’, The Guardian, 7 November 2013,
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/nov/07/forced-labour-slavery-
crime (accessed April 26, 2018).
173
These reports can be accessed on HOME’s website: https://www.home.org.sg/research/.
174
International Labour Organization, ‘General Principles and Operational Guidelines for Fair Recruitment’, 5-7 September
2016, https://tinyurl.com/ILOFairRecruitment (accessed October 10, 2018).
175
This is also reiterated in Article 15 of the ILO’s Domestic Workers Convention, C189, which states that measures should
be taken to ‘ensure that fees charged by private employment agencies are not deducted from the remuneration of
domestic workers’. See International Labour Organization, ‘C189—Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No.189),
https://tinyurl.com/ILO189 (accessed May 17, 2018).
176
Under Section IV, Operational Guidelines, paragraph 6.2, it states: ‘Prospective employers, public or private, or their
intermediaries, and not the workers, should bear the cost of recruitment. The full extent and nature of costs, for instance
71
costs paid by employers to labour recruiters, should be transparent to those who pay them.’ See ILO, ‘General Principles
and Operational Guidelines for Fair Recruitment’.
177
ILO, ILO Standards on Forced Labour: The New Protocol and Recommendation at a Glance (Geneva: ILO, 2016), 4.
178
ILO, Hard to See, Harder to Count, p.10
179
ILO, Hard to See, Harder to Count, p.15-16
180
ILO, ‘Operational Indicators of Trafficking in Human Beings,’ http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_105023.pdf (accessed January 16, 2018).
181
ILO, ‘Explanations for Indicators of Trafficking for Labour Exploitation’, 21 April 2009,
http://www.ilo.org/global/docs/WCMS_105035/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 5 May 2018).
182
Ibid.
183
Ibid.
184
Ibid.
72
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