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Jan Slaby
Affective Arrangements and Disclosive Postures
Towards aPost-PhenomenologyofSituated Affectivity1
Abstract
In this paper, Iexplore links between the phenomenology-inspiredphilosophy of emotion,
especiallydiscussions of affective intentionality and situated affectivity, and thosestrands of
work in the field of cultural affect studies that take theirinspiration fromSpinoza and Deleuze.
As bridges between thesefields, Iproposethe concepts ‘disclosive posture’ and ‘affective ar-
rangement’. ‘Disclosive posture’condensesinsights fromphenomenological work on affec-
tivity, especially thosepertaining to whatHeideggercalls Befindlichkeit. ‘Affective arrange-
ment’isadescendantofDeleuze and Guattari’s term agencement. It refers to heterogeneous
ensemblesofelements coalescinginto asphere of heightened affective intensity in alocal set-
ting.Idevelop this notion into atool for analyzing situated affectivity. As it doesnot yet figure
prominently within debates in the philosophy of emotion,Iwill outline what is meant by ‘af-
fective arrangement’ in somedetail. Throughout, Idiscuss aproductive tension between these
two conceptualstrands.
1. Towards apost-phenomenology of situatedaffectivity
Roughly, one mightdiscern threekey issues that phenomenology-inspiredphi-
losophy of emotion grappleswith. First, it undertakes to explicate the way that
emotionsand otheraffective comportmentsrelate to the world.How is what
someone feelsasource of information about–or disclosiveof–whatgoes on in
the world?Affectiveintentionality is the labelfor this.2Secondly, it aims to un-
derstandhow affectivity is bothadimension of individual experienceand some-
thingthatpertainstosocial collectives and environmental constellations. Affect
is individual or subjective in apronounced way;yet, at the same time, it is some-
thingthatistangibly‘outthere’ in the world–in theformofatmospheres or
1Work on this article has beenconductedwithin the subprojectB05 of the Collaborative
Research Center 1171 Affective Societies at Freie Universit(tBerlin (funded by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft,2015 –2019). Ithankananonymousreviewer for valuable sugges-
tionsthat helped me clarifyseveral issues. Iamgrateful to RainerM'hlhoff and Philipp
W'schner for long-standingcollaboration on several themesrelevant to this paper.
2See, e.g., Jan Slabyand AchimStephan.AffectiveIntentionality and Self-Consciousness.
In:Consciousnessand Cognition17(2009), 506–513.
Ph(nomenologischeForschungen 2018 · #Felix Meiner Verlag 2018 ·ISSN0342-8117
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collective moods, for instance. Situated affectivity has come to be the labelfor
this.3Thirdly, much workinthe phenomenologyofemotion is concerned with
comingtoterms withthe embodiedcharacterofaffectivity. Here,the question
is how emotional experience is, whileindeed world-disclosingand socially situ-
ated,yet essentially amatter of the livedbody,orrather of multiple suchbodies
in mutual attunement.4Intentionality, situatedness,embodiment –itisaround
these themes that muchworkincontemporaryphenomenology of emotion has
so far revolved.
In this paper,Iapproach theseissuesthrough anew lens.Myproposaldoes
not beginwithindividual affective experience, neither does it takethe experi-
ential perspective,bodilycomportment or existential orientation of individual
subjects as its starting point. Instead,the concept of an ‘affective arrangement’
presentsaway to approach affectivity fromavantage point of localcon-
stellations of affectiveintensity. Here, affect comes into view as relational dy-
namicsunfolding within asocio-material setting –inconstellations in which
subjects of experience are merely contributing elementsamong otherelements,
forming dynamic meshworks. With this orientation, the approach taken here
has affinities with the post-humanist,material-culture-orientedand neo-vitalist
perspective of cultural affect studies in the Spinoza-Deleuze trajectory.5In this
theoretical lineage,‘affect’ does not refer to feltstates of individuals, but to rela-
tionsofaffecting and beingaffected among humanand non-humanentities in a
dynamic constellation. Inspired by Spinoza’ssubstancemonism and ontological
3There has beenasurgeofphilosophical work recentlyonsituated affectivity. Affects and
emotions are less and lessconsideredasorganism-bound processesorindividual mental states.
Recent studies explore various dimensions of affect’s situatedness –attimes, even ‘extended-
ness’–and theirconceptual viability. Icannot survey this literature here, but my considera-
tionspertain directly to this current of work.See,e.g., PaulE.Griffiths and Andrea Scaranti-
no:Emotions in the Wild.In: Philip Robbins and MuratAydede (eds.). The Cambridge
HandbookofSituatedCognition. Cambridge 2009,437–453;Giovanna Colombetti and Joel
Krueger:Scaffoldings of the Affective Mind. In:Philosophical Psychology28/8(2015), 1157 –
1176;Joel Krueger:Varieties of Extended Emotions.In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive
Sciences13(2014), 533 –555;Joel Krueger and Thomas Szanto:Extended Emotions.In: Philo-
sophy Compass 11/12(2016): 863–878;Jan Slaby:Emotions and the Extended Mind. In:
Christianvon Scheve and Mikko Salmela (eds.): Collective Emotions.Oxford 2014.], 32–46;
Jan Slaby: Mind Invasion:SituatedAffectivityand the CorporateLifeHack. In:Frontiers in
Psychology 7(2016), 266;Achim Stephan,Wendy Wilutzky,and Sven Walter: Emotions Be-
yondBrainand Body.In: Philosophical Psychology27/1 (2014), 65 –81.
4See, e.g. Giovanna Colombetti:The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive
Mind. Cambridge, MA 2014;Thomas Fuchs and Sabine Koch: EmbodiedAffectivity: On
Moving and Being Moved. In:Frontiers in Psychology 5(2014). 508;Matthew J. Ratcliffe:
Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality.Oxford 2008.
5Melissa Greggand Greg J. Seigworth (eds): The Affect TheoryReader. Durham 2010;
BrianMassumi:Parablesfor the Virtual:Movement, Affect,Sensation. Durham 2012.
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understanding of affectus/affections,6scholars working in this tradition takeaf-
fect to belong to apre-individual sphereofbecoming,arealmpriortothe con-
solidation of circumscribedentities, including humansubjects.Affective rela-
tionsare seen as contributing to the formation and concretization of entities as
well as to their subsequent transformation and potentialdissolution.7
To get ahandle on this perspective’srelationship to the autonomous subject
of theenlightenmenttradition, consider this passage by Donovan Schaefer:
Affects,[…],are forces that exceed the classicalliberalthematics of self-sovereignty. Lib-
eralism hererefers to an intellectual lineage emergingout of Western modernitythat places
the liber –the free man, the singular, rational, autonomous, speaking agent–at the center of
its understanding of culture,politics,reason, knowledge and religion. The liber is auto-
nomous –both self-lawed and self-sovereign –and thereforeisthe node(either the origin
or the target) of systemsofpower. Affect complicates this picture. Berlant callsaffect ‘sen-
sual matter that is elsewhere to sovereignconsciousness but that has historical significance
in domains of subjectivity’.8
Yet, as Lauren Berlant hints in this quotation,animportantaim of workin
affect studies is to re-approach ‘the subject’and subjective experience withina
dynamic-materialist framework, and withthe assumption thatmaterially situ-
ated affectivedynamics play an importantrole in boththe formationand the
subsequentdevelopment and transformation of subjects and their individual
perspectivesand orientations. The experiential subject is no longer the main ori-
enting principle, but it still figures as an importantobject of inquiry. The subject
becomes atargetofgenealogical study and criticalanalysis. How do subjectsof
experiencecome about–and how do theyget molded and transformed,framed
and policed –within the meshworksofthe socio-material arrangementsthat
make up our contemporary lifeworlds?What concept of the subject, what‘poli-
6Cf. RussLeo:Affective Physics:Affectus in Spinoza’sEthics. In:BrianCummings and
Freya Sierhuis(eds.): Passionsand SubjectivityinEarlyModern Culture. New York2016, 33 –
49.
7The sociologist Robert Seyfert providesalucid explication of the theoretical core of af-
fectstudies in this Spinoza-Deleuze trajectory. Robert Seyfert:BeyondPersonalFeelings and
Collective Emotions:Toward aTheory of Social Affect.In: Theory, Culture &Society 29/6
(2012), 27–46. Lisa Blackmanoffersadetailed genealogical study of this lineofwork, in-
cluding adiscussionofaffect studies’ sometimes conflict-ridden relationtomainstream emo-
tion theory. Lisa Blackman: Immaterial Bodies:Affect, Embodiment, Mediation. London
2012.Donovan Schaefer presents another condensed reconstruction of the fieldthat alsoex-
plores links to phenomenology. Donovan Schaefer: Religious Affects: Animality, Evolution,
and Power. Durham 2015.EarlierworksofSara Ahmedare aproductive combination of phe-
nomenology of emotion and culturalaffect studies.SaraAhmed: The Cultural Politics of
Emotion. New York 2004;Sara Ahmed: Queer Phenomenology:Orientation, Objects,
Others. Durham 2006.
8Schaefer:Religious Affects, 23–24. The reference is to Lauren Berlant:CruelOptimism.
Durham 2012,53.
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tics’ of subject-formation and whatethos of beingasubject is to be adopted once
the materiality, relationality, and transformative dynamicsofaffect are ac-
knowledged?Itisinthis conciliatory spirit thatIwillattempt to combine two
strands of ideas, one from affect-theory in the Spinoza-Deleuze lineage, cen-
teredonthe notion of an ‘affective arrangement’, and one fromaparticular stage
of the phenomenological tradition, namely, arecent elaboration of Heideg-
gerian Befindlichkeit underthe labelof‘disclosive postures’. As Katherine
Withy has shown,9one can understand Heidegger’s quasi-Aristotelian account
of the passions in suchaway thatitaligns wellwith the idea of the situatedness
of individuals within dynamic formations thatare mostly opaque to reflective
consciousness. Thus, theconcept of adisclosive posture can help one theorize
the individual’s involvementwithaffective arrangements, potentially bringing
the personaland the transpersonal (situated) dimensions of affectivity into align-
ment.Yet atension between these differentperspectivesremains:inbrief, it is a
tension between an individualist and anon-individualistoutlook.Among other
things, thispaper is an attempt to negotiatethis tension,giving due weight to the
contrasting intuitions thatspeak in favorofthese primafacie distinct ori-
entations.
If one wants alabelfor thebroader approachtaken in the following, one
mightspeak of ‘post-phenomenology’. The prefix‘post-’ does not denote the
surpassing of phenomenologybut its transformation.10 Subjects of experience
are approached as constitutivelyenmeshedinsocio-material and socio-technical
constellations;these constellations are the generative milieuofsubject-for-
mation. Accordingly,experience–as it may present itself to phenomenological
analysis –ishereunderstood to be pervadedbydiscursive, material,medial ele-
mentsofvarious kindsand origins. These elementsand processes often operate
outside the consciousgrasp–let alonereflective understanding–of individual
subjects.The goalofpost-phenomenological inquiry is not the laying bare of
essential structures –beitofconsciousness, of subjectivity or of sociality. Rath-
er, the goalistoeffect timely, purposeful interventions into dynamically chang-
ing,contested and politicallyconsequentialterrains –the formative milieus of
contemporary life. Post-phenomenology has abandoned the assumption of one
9Katherine Withy: Owned Emotions:Affective Excellence in Heidegger and Aristotle.
In:DenisMcManus (ed.): Heidegger, Authenticityand the Self:Themes from Division Two
of Being and Time.New York 2015,21–36.
10 “Whereas phenomenologywas originally concerned withthe philosophy of conscious-
ness and the subject,postphenomenological approachesemphasize the anthropic confronta-
tion withthe world –and its cultural articulation –asatrans-subjectivecontext of meaning in
needofpermanent elucidation and interrogation.” Suzy Adams:Introduction to Post-Phe-
nomenology. In:Thesis Eleven 90/3(2007), 3–5,3.
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ultimate phenomenological ‘structure’ of reality. Instead,itadopts ahistorical
and culturalsensibilityfor processes of becoming.Yet, post-phenomenology
does adhere to the phenomenological directive: to the things themselves, in that
it strivesfor concretion, specificityand detail in its case studies.Itaims to give a
voice to participants, humanaswellasnon-human, in social practices and socio-
material constellations.11
This is not the placetooutline this methodological perspective in detail;
therefore, Imerelymention three strands of workthatcontribute to the theoret-
ical current Icall post-phenomenology. First,notable are those lines of workin
feminist and anti-racist phenomenologythat have included genealogical,ethno-
graphic and discourse analytical perspectivesand have displayedaselective
opennesstowards ideasfrompoststructuralism.12 Second, workinthe philoso-
phy of technology that focuses on the formative effects of systemictechnologies
and networked mediawithin the lifeworld and withregard to its role in the con-
stitution and transformation of humansubjects. Here, ‘post-phenomenology’
has been adopted as abrand name by leading practitioners, and this is themost
widely known employment of the term.13 Third, the labelmightbeapplied to
workincultural theorythatcombinesafeminist orientation withtrans-
11 An alternative to my label ‘post-phenomenology’ might be that of ‘materialistpheno-
menology’asproposed by the scholar of religionManuel V-squez and further elaborated by
Schaefer. Manuel V-squez:More Than Belief:AMaterialistTheory of Religion. New York
2011;Schaefer:Religious Affects.
12 Linda Mart4nAlcoff:Toward aPhenomenology of Racial Embodiment In:Radical Phi-
losophy 95 (1999), 15–26; Emily S. Lee (ed.): Living Alterities:Phenomenology, Embodi-
ment,and Race. New York2014;Joanna Oksala:Feminist Experience:Foucauldianand Phe-
nomenologicalInvestigations. Evanston, Ill.2016. IconcurwithJoanna Oksala’s positioning
of post-phenomenology. On the one hand,Oksala points to those strands in the writings of
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty where the adherencetothe first-person-perspectivehas already
given way to openings towards historical, sociological, psychological and ethnographic per-
spectives. Yet, at the same time, she statesinnounclear termsthat astronger alignmentwith
genealogical, discourse analytical and politicalorientations is neededinorder to avoidbeing
stuckwithin aEurocentric perspective. Acentral role thusaccorded to the comparative “study
of different systems of normality” which “function as aform of [phenomenological] reduction
as it makesusaware of the hidden aspects of our own thought”.Oksala:Feminist Experience,
106.
13 E.g., Don Ihde:Postphenomenology and Technoscience. Albany, NY 2009.Robert Ro-
senbergerand Peter-Paul Ve rbeek: Introduction. In:Robert Rosenberger and Peter-Paul Ver-
beek(eds.): Postphenomenological Investigations:Essays on Human-Technology Relations.
Lanham, MD 2015.Besides drawing on acombination of phenomenology and Americanprag-
matism, and aspiring to surpass the anti-technology stance of much earlier phenomenology,
this campaligns closely withempirical work from scienceand technology studies (STS). Its
overall mission goes somewhatlikethis:“Postphenomenology is the practicalstudyofthe
relations between humans and technologies, fromwhich humansubjectivities emerge,aswell
as meaningful worlds.”Rosenberger and Ve rbeek: Postphenomenological Investigations,In-
troduction, 12.
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formative appropriations of phenomenologyinto aperspective thatispolitically
engaged, activist and situatedamidstongoing social and political struggles.14
2. Disclosive postures
Ibeginmyconsiderationsofsituatedaffectivity fromthe side of individual af-
fective comportment,bydiscussingKatherine Withy’s helpful term ‘disclosive
posture’.Itisanexcellent gloss of what affectivity, with respect to the subject of
experience, amounts to if viewed fromanadvancedphenomenological key freed
fromsubjectivist and mentalist baggage. The concept is geared to the zone of
overlap between the situatednessofaffect and thepronounced sense of potential
ownedness that characterizesaffectivity. To get her approach off the ground,
Withy re-alignsHeidegger’s analysis of Befindlichkeit withsome of its source
materialsinAristotle, concepts such as path%,hexis,diathesis,prohairesis,among
others. Here is how she explains her choice of term in relation to Heideggerand
by way of distancing his approach fromboth cognitive and feeling theories of
emotion:
Understandingthe path%in terms of judgmentsmisses the same thingthat understanding
them as bodily feelings or conditions of the souldoes –namely, that the path%are waysin
which we are out and aboutinthe world, immersed and involved in our situation. To cap-
ture this, Heidegger needs amodelother than that of asubject knowinganobject. He uses
the modelofstanding in asituation. On this model, the path%are whatIwill call‘disclosive
postures’. They are ways of findingourselvessituated, where this means both that they are
waysoffinding ourselves and our situation(i. e. that they are findingly disclosive) and that
they are waysofbeing situatedinthe world(i. e. postures). This understanding of the path%
accommodatesall intentional affective phenomena, including moods and emotions.15
What matters for present purposesisthe comportment-type denoted by ‘pos-
ture’: standinginasituation, findingoneself situated,being‘out and about’ in
the world, immersed in it –instead of experiencing or representing,let alone
issuing adetached judgment on one’spresent surroundings. Our affectivity does
not relate us to the world by way of mental representations or innerstates of
otherkinds, but in the formofawholesale positioning or orientation (Ausrich-
tung)ofour embodied beinginrelation to –alignment or misalignment –our
14 Ahmed:QueerPhenomenology;SaraAhmed:APhenomenology of Whiteness. In:Fem-
inist Theory 8/2 (2007), 149–168. Ihave discussedAhmed’s stanceand positioning in detail
elsewhere;inthis case,the label ‘post-phenomenology’ is my attribution.See Jan Slaby: Die
Kraft des Zorns–Sara Ahmeds aktivistische Post-Ph(nomenologie. In:Isabella Marcinskiand
Hilge Landweer(eds.): Dem Erleben auf der Spur.Feminismus und Ph(nomenologie. Biele-
feld2016,279 –303.
15 Withy: OwnedEmotions,23.
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current surroundings. The term posture refers to aperson’s ‘stand’ or ‘stance’,
and it is clearfrommuch of whatHeidegger writes aboutfindingnessthat this is
to be understood as the various modes or waysofaligningwith –beingapart of
and constellated into –alocalarrangement of people and things.16
In view of this,itisnoaccident thatHeidegger’s favored termfor episodes of
affectivecomportment is Stimmung,which,taken literally, means alignment,ar-
rangement or attunement. The history of the concept relates backtothe practice
of tuning amusical instrument. Only later did Stimmung becomethe canonical
Germanterm for ‘mood’, with its connotationssettling on notions of harmony
in the sense of ‘being in tune with’or‘properly sounding’, ‘well-ordered’.17 In
Heidegger’s adoption,however, Stimmung and Befindlichkeit are no longer
wedded to an idea of conventionalharmony or harmonious coordination. In-
stead, thesetermsdescribe thedimensionofaperson’s beingvariously in- or out
of tune withtheir surroundings–thusexplicitly includingstates of disarray
(Verstimmung). This is the first idea to adoptfromHeidegger and Withy:affect-
edness as beingsituated and thereby oriented or disoriented in an ambience.
What aboutthe second term of the composite‘disclosive posture’–dis-
closure? This is Heidegger’s term of art for Dasein’s opennesstothe world:the
dimension in whichunderstanding or misunderstanding, awarenessorunaware-
nessare so much as possible.Part of the point of this choice of termisthat‘dis-
closure’ encompasses more than merelycognitive access, knowledge, or belief.
Disclosure namesthe entire dimensionofaperson’s potential opennesstothe
world, including theopennesstowhat is in fact occluded,and also the openness
to what is ‘there’ but nevertheless beyond one’sgrasp. It is importanttonote
thatthe concept of disclosure has to be understood normatively. ‘Beingdis-
closed’, or existing, does not mean one is in fact awareoforinthe knowabout
everything, but that one is capable and –Heideggerthinks –underthe norma-
tive obligationtobecome knowledgeable aboutoneself and one’ssituation.Da-
sein,although in fact beset by swathes of confusion, error, and notoriously
pronetodiversions of all sorts, is nevertheless required to disclose properly –as
for instance revealedinthe stateofangst, or relatedly in thecallofconscience.18
16 Following asuggestion by Haugeland, Withy translates Heidegger’sBefindlichkeitaptly
as findingness. Cf. John Haugeland:Dasein Disclosed. In:Joseph. Rouse (ed.): John Hauge-
land’s Heidegger. Cambridge, MA 2013.
17 Cf. David Wellbery:Stimmung. In:Karlheinz Barcketal. (eds.): "sthetische Grund-
begriffe. HistorischesWçrterbuch in sieben B(nden Vol. 5. Stuttgart &Weimar 2003,703 –
733.
18 The source of this normativity is not discussedbyWithy as she presupposes the context
of Aristotle’s inquiry into humanexcellence in the Nicomachean Ethics. For Aristotle, it is
obvious and beyond debate that human individuals are subject to normativeassessment in light
of communal standards. Heidegger has amore complicated relationtonormativity, but one is
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Applied to affectivity, this means that affective comportmentisone’s being
constellatedinand attuned to the world in suchaway thatispotentially aware
and knowledgeable, yet for the most part falling shortofalucidawareness of
whatisupwithone. This potential closed-off-ness enabled by disclosure does
not onlypertain to the ways in which averagenessoridle talk cloudone’ssenses.
It applies to the general condition of beingatall times ‘thrown’ intocon-
stellations thatwecannot oversee, grasp and understand. Thereisalways more
going on withand around us thanwecan get ahandle on. The normative de-
mand to become self-aware, to achieve an understanding stance on one’s sit-
uation, is an infinite task,somethingthatone canatbest aspire to and strive for,
yet neverrealize in full.Our disclosive reach inevitably exceeds our manifest
grasp;nonetheless,aspersons we operate under anormative demand to get
clear, and ever more clear on our situation.19 Yet, the impossibilityoffullyliving
up to this obligationdoes not let us off the hook;onthe contrary:wehave to
deal withthe fact that we are situated in aworld thatdoes not end at the margins
of our immediate awareness, our surroundingsare not fenced like an enclosure.
Heidegger’s termdisclosure is meant to capturethis ‘always more’ of situated-
nessand this ‘always less’ofunderstanding. With regard to mundane instances
of affectivity, this means that we are always affectively attuned to and con-
stellated into whatwedonot fullygrasp. We are ‘thrown’ and affected by more
thanwecan process, in wayswedonot fully oversee, no matter how much of a
de facto command of our situationwemight have managed to achieve in agiven
case.
Of course, putting it this way already foregrounds those episodes of affec-
tivity where we have reached ahalfway composed orientation –inAristotle’s
terms:hexeis as opposed to full-blown path%(which will throw us into disarray,
have us lose composure so that aposture needstoberegained).20 But this is less
relevant for present purposes. What matters is that Withy’s takeonHeidegger’s
findingness movesusrightinto the thicketofthe situatedness of affectivity;in
fact,onthis reading,affectivity itself is the situatednessoffinite, sense-making
beings within encompassing worldly constellations. Experiencinganemotion
well-advised to interpretcentral concepts from Beingand Time,such as disclosure, au-
thenticity and resoluteness, in normative terms:Dasein is not intelligible other than as com-
mitted to certain‘constitutivestandards’. See Haugeland:Dasein Disclosed.
19 Ihave adopted this formulation fromRouse, who applies it to the normativity of human
situatedness more generally:“Ournormative reach alwaysexceeds our grasp, and hence what
is at stakeinpracticesoutruns any present articulation of thosestakes.” JosephRouse:How
ScientificPractices Matter :Reclaiming Philosophical Naturalism. Chicago2002,25.
20 Withydistinguishes three‘formats’ of the passions in Heideggerand Aristotle, namely
specific capacity,instance of affectednessand posture or ‘hexis’:“Affectivitycan be as acapaci-
ty to be affected, as an actual pathos, or as ahexis(having).” Withy:Owned Emotions,22.
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means to be constellated in an ongoing situation thatmatters –anaffective ar-
rangement, or rather many of them–thatare open to us yet outrun our under-
standingand practicalgrasp. With this we have reached apoint where the phe-
nomenological perspective on affect opensout to encompassthe wider
ambiance,the situatedness of affect, whileholding on to arobust sense in which
the individual agent is the responsible addressee of normative demands: get clear
on what goeson, take your standresponsibly, but understand that this is an in-
finite, never-to-be-completed task.
3. Affective arrangements
In this section, Ioutline the working concept of an ‘affective arrangement’.
While disclosive posturesare in the dimension of individualaffectivecomport-
ment,‘affective arrangement’applies to the ‘other side’ in the world-relatedness
of affect:formations in the environment thattrigger,channel and modulateaf-
fect,thereby bringingvarious individualsinto adynamic conjunction.Insofar as
individual affective comportment can be glossed as waysofbeing“out and
aboutinthe world”,21 affective arrangements are among the domains and set-
tings within which individuals find themselves immersed wheninapassionate
condition.22 Ibegin by revisiting the main source of inspiration behind my
choice of the term ‘arrangement’–the concept of an agencement in the works of
Deleuze and Guattari.Ithenprovide ageneralcharacterization of the gist of the
concept of affectivearrangement, before Idiscuss an example so as to be able to
illustrate the focal dimensionsofthe concept in aconcrete case.
The section concludeswithadiscussion of threeangles of analysisthatmight
guide the empirical investigation of affect-rich social domains.23
3.a. Lines of origin:agencement, complex, assemblage, machine
In Deleuze’sand Guattari’s works, theconcept agencement has no uniform ap-
pearance. Rather, ‘agencement’and its variouscognatescarveout aconceptual
21 Withy: OwnedEmotions,23.
22 Withycomesclose to making the same pointinher paper:“The path%are particular (af-
fective)arrangements of the worldand us, in relation to one another.”Withy:OwnedEmo-
tions, 23.
23 The themes discussed in this partofthe paper have alsobeencovered in:Jan Slaby, Rai-
ner M'hlhoff, and Philipp W'nschner: Affective Arrangements. In: Emotion Review (2017),
DOI:10.1177/1754073917722214 (OnlineFirst).
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fieldand evolvingconceptual lineage, withmultiple origins and branching out in
differentdirections. Accordingly,there is no single, encompassing character-
ization of theconcept. Still, there is acertainlogic to the conceptualtangle that
sets it apart fromrelated notions,for example fromthe concept of assemblagein
actor/networktheory.24 Likewise,one can trace various genealogicaland con-
ceptual strands thatpresent an informative pre-history of the notion.25 One im-
portant line of origin thatcannot be explored here is the intersection between
French vitalismand the philosophy of technology, astrand of workrepresented
by authors suchasCanguilhem, Leroi-Gourhanand Simondon.26 Aparallelline
developingfromthis vitaliststrandthataligns in some respects with agencement
is Foucault’s concept of dispositif.27 Anotable direct forerunner of the agence-
ment is Freud’s concept of complex (as in ‘oedipal complex’). Renderedas
agencement,the Freudian complex is de-individualized, partly de-psycholo-
gizedand also freedofthe psychoanalytic orientation towards familialcon-
stellations.28 Yet Deleuze’sand Guattari’s agencement retains some aspects of
the Freudian complex –for example its potentialidiosyncrasy or ‘crankiness’, its
capacitytointegrate or attach to all sortsofnovelelements, and thereare also
still some elements of mentalism in at least someemployments of agencement.
An individual’s comportment, characteristic demeanor,bodily-affectivestyle
and habitualappearancecan be considered to be an agencement of sorts. Here,
similarities to the concept of disclosiveposture are evident,sincethe agence-
ment,ifindividualizedinto ahabitual complex, is itself an embodied ori-
entation,acharacteristic pattern of routinized comportment unique to an in-
dividualintheir homely domain(or, mutatis mutandis,toaclose-knitcouple or
in-group). Types of bodily comportment,skills and routines centrally figure in
this.Yet,atthe same time, agencement applies to socialformations thatalso dis-
play the crankiness of Freudiancomplexes.Soagencement findsapplication on
both sides of the shifting zone of overlap or ‘phase transition’ between in-
dividuals and their socio-material surroundings. This is akey reasonwhy this
conceptual tableau is of such interest to the situated affectivitydebate, and why a
24 Ian Buchanan: Assemblage Theory and its Discontents. In:Deleuze Studies 9/3 (2015),
382–392:Thomas Nail: What is an Assemblage ?In: SubStance142 46/1 (2017), 21–37.
25 Cf. Henning Schmidgen: Das Unbewußte der Maschinen. Konzeptionendes Psy-
chischen bei Guattari,Deleuze und Lacan. M'nchen 1997.
26 Cf. Andrea Bardin:Epistemologyand Political Philosophy in Gilbert Simondon.Dor-
drecht 2015.
27 Michel Foucault: Discipline and Punish:The Birth of the Prison. New York1975. See
Gilles Deleuze:Foucault.Minneapolis 1988.
28 Gilles Deleuzeand F0lixGuattari:Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Min-
neapolis 1983.
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rapprochement withthe phenomenologicalunderstanding of Befindlichkeit is a
promisingundertaking.
The term ‘assemblage’ is by now common in social theory;it marksthe theo-
retical afterlife of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept.29 Assemblagewas originally
proposedasatranslation into English of agencement,which was an odd choice
as it is just a different French term instead of afitting English counterpart such
as ‘arrangement’. Since then, ‘assemblage’has come to takeonameaningrather
removed fromwhatDeleuze and Guattari were grappling with. In actor-net-
worktheory (ANT) and other associationist approachestosocialtheory, the
term ‘assemblage’ refers to aformation or alliance of elements coalescing into a
localunity.30 An agencement,onthe otherhand,does not glue its components
into aconventional unity, it does not homogenize its elements.31 Instead,inan
arrangement, the elements keeptheir self-standing character evenwhilebeing
dynamically linked. While the assemblage, as understood by proponents of
ANT, homogenizes its elementsinto amoreorless organic whole, the ‘unity’ of
the agencement is fragmentary –itisaclustering of itemsthat, in asense, do not
‘fit the mold’. Deleuze and Guattari at one point speak of it as a“dry-stone
wall”.32 No one unifyingprincipleorhomogeneous functionality governs it.33
Accordingly,arrangements mightbesomewhat deranged,dispersed,oddly
composed;theyare multiplicities, fragmentary wholes instead of cohesive
wholes suchasbiological organisms.
In light of this, it is no accident –but marksanimportantconceptual decision
–that Deleuze and Guattarioften speak of ‘machines’ or ‘agencementsmachini-
ques’. What this term suggests is thatthe componentsofanarrangement are self-
standingentities thatare not organicallybut, at best, mechanicallyintegrated –
so as to function according to somepotentially unique and idiosyncratic mode
of operation. In addition,the concept of machineenrolls the agencement within
29 Cf. BrunoLatour: Reassembling the Social:AnIntroductiontoActor-Network-Theo-
ry. Oxford/New York2005;Manuel DeLanda:ANew Philosophy of Society:Assemblage
Theory and Social Complexity. London 2006.
30 Latour:Reassemblingthe Social. Yet, various authors in the domain of affect studies have
adopted the canonicalEnglish translation and keepwriting ‘assemblage’ where whatthey in-
tend to denote is what can be better translated as ‘arrangement’ (or kept in the originalFrench
as agencement). Some authors alsocontrast ‘assemblage’withthe ‘actor-network’ofANT. A
valuable overviewfrom the perspective of humangeography–where assemblage-thinking is
most widespread today –isprovidedinMartin M'ller:Assemblages and Actor-Networks:
RethinkingSocio-Material Power, Politics and Space. In:GeographyCompass 9/1 (2015), 27 –
41.
31 For aconcise glossary-style explicationof‘agencement’,see MarkBonta and JohnPro-
tevi:Deleuze and Geophilosophy:AGuideand Glossary.Edingurgh2004,54.
32 Gilles Deleuze and F0lixGuattari:What Is Philosophy?New York 1994,23.
33 Some theoristsspeak of a“non-totalizablesum”(e. g. Bennett :Vibrant Matter, 24).
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the domainoftechnologyand socio-technicalarrangements,especially withciv-
ilization-defining technological complexes suchasindustrial or war machines.34
Yet, the invocation of ‘mechanism’ can mislead,asthe point is not thatan
agencement is in aconventional sense well-functioning (like the proverbial
‘well-oiled’ machine), rather:“what is crucial is thatthesemachines do not
work”.35
Idonot intend to modelthe concept of an affective arrangement to accord
strictlywiththe Deleuze-Guattarian notion of agencement. Not all the detailsof
their approach matter, neither does all of themetaphysicalbackstory thatthese
authors put forward.What does matter is thatDeleuze and Guattari’s ground-
workcan be used to cobble togetheraconceptual tool –a‘cranky arrangement’
in its own right–apt for theorizing situatedaffectivity in socio-technicalset-
tingsinaway neither individualistic nor reductively mentalist, and so as to allow
for case-specific elaboration.Inphenomenological parlance, thisemployment of
‘affective arrangement’ works in the manner of ‘formal indication’.36 That is, it is
ageneric concept that helpsrender portions of reality intelligible,therebysituat-
ing the theoristamidstthese realities, but it does not commit one to aworked
out theoretical positionnor to aspecific theoreticallineage or paradigmtothe
strict exclusion of otherapproaches. Relatedly, the concept does not work in an
explicative way, but more like agenerative principlethatiscapable of guiding
analyses of instancesofsituated affectivity. Command of the concept willresult
in acharacteristic ‘optic’,anattuned sensibilityand capacity for judgment, so
thatcertain aspects of an object domain willbebrought in view and rendered
salient for subsequent elaboration.
3.b. Affective arrangement –explication and example
With this backgroundand methodological orientation in place, we are in aposi-
tion to attempt acharacterization of affective arrangements.
34 Gilles Deleuze and F0lixGuattari:AThousand Plateaus. Minneapolis,Chapter 12.
Thus,there is aclearsenseinwhich agencements machinique are meanttoevokethe
themeofCyborgianman-machine hybrids in bothrealand imaginary registers.Anthropo-
technicalhybridization is not dismissedbyDeleuze and Guattari –asinmanyphenomen-
ological critiques of technology –but welcomedasaresource of creativedevelopment and
transformation of subjectivity(athemeparticularly prominent in Guattari’s later writings;see,
e. g., F0lixGuattari:Chaosmosis:AnEthico-Aesthetic Paradigm. Bloomington, IN 1995.
35 Buchanan:Assemblage Theory and its Discontents,384.
36 Martin Heidegger:BasicConcepts of Metaphysics :World—Finitude— Solitude.Bloom-
ington 1995,§70.
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Affective arrangementsare localensemblesofheterogeneous elements that
form acharacteristic layout marked off from its surroundingsbythresholds of
intensity. Candidateelements include humans and non-humans, i.e.,spaces, ar-
tifacts,technology, but also symbols,utterances, or otherexpressive materials.
Humanactors are partofconstellations fromthe outset –itisonly in con-
junction with humansthatnon-humanelementscoalesce into an affective ar-
rangement. The same goesfor affectivity. Thereisnot first aconstellation of
elementsthatisthen enlivenedbyaffective dynamics unfoldinginit. Rather,
affect –inthe formofatangle of affectiverelations–isthe vital coreofanaffec-
tive arrangement, it is what dynamicallylinksits elementsand demarcatesit
fromthe surroundingambient. Thus,anaffectivearrangement is always in oper-
ation, it is always ‘on’–one mightapplytoitthe Greekterm energeia,asitisan
actualization of apotential(dynamis). It is the ongoing,‘live’ affectiverelations
amongthe elementsthat constitutezones of higher relative intensity compared
to whatisoutside. Thus,affect neither comesbefore nor after the otherelements
but inheres in the entiretyofthe overall formation. Accordingly,one mightsay
thatthis concept primarilypertainstothe event of asimultaneous affecting and
beingaffected in asetting.Yet, the point of the concept is to makesalient aspe-
cifically organized layout of contributoryelements that enable such events to
unfold in the way theydo.37
As asomewhatpedestrian yet informative example, consider aparty. Ad-
equately disposedpeople gather in asuitable location,there is music,foodand
drink, decoration and so on –itall comes togetherinto atangle of characteristic
affectiveinteractions–myriads of micro-engagementsbetween people, overt
and covert, and alsobetween interacting people and the material layout of the
space. These all condenseinto the party’s specific affective atmosphere, achar-
acteristic overall ‘feel’ or impression, yet not in the formofone homogeneous
affectivetone but as moreofadiscontinuousinterweaving of differentzonesof
affectiveintensity.38 Consideredglobally, there willbeanotable divisionbe-
37 Cf. Nail: What is an Assemblage?Seyfert and Andersonhave proposedconceptssimilar
to what Icall affectivearrangement,and bothalignitwith Foucault’s notion of a dispositif:
Seyfert speaks of ‘the affectif’ while Anderson choses the term ‘apparatus’, the standard Eng-
lishtranslation of dispositif. Seyfert:BeyondPersonal Feelings and Collective Emotions;Ben
Anderson:Encountering Affect:Capacities, Apparatuses, Conditions. Farnham 2014,Chap-
ter 2.
38 Icannot provide an explication of ‘intensity’ here,aconcept that has beenprominent in
affect studies thanks to the work of BrianMassumi. Cf.BrianMassumi:The Autonomy of
Affect. In:Cultural Critique 31/2 (1995), 83–109;Massumi: Parables for the Virtual;Robert
Seyfert. Automation and Affect:AStudyofAlgorithmic Trading. In:Birgitt Rçttger-Rçssler
and Jan Slaby (eds.). Affect in Relation –Families,Places, Technologies. EssaysonAffectivity
and Subject Formationinthe 21st Century.New York2018.Inmicrosociology, Randall Col-
linshas proposed the Durkheim-inspiredconcept of ‘emotional energy’ in acomparable theo-
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tweeninside and outside, superficially marked by spatial boundaries of the loca-
tion,but in fact circumscribed by thresholds of intensity. So, when new guests
arrive, if onlyhalfway adequately disposed, theywilllikely be swayed into the
affectivefray rather quickly. But alsosomeone not willing –orable –tosuc-
cumb to the frenzy willatleastsensethe notably higher levelofaffective in-
tensity at the partyascomparedwithits outside. On the otherhand,the party
mightofcourse float across its spatial boundariesintoawider ambient, as when
acloudofsmokers flocksonto thestreet, or whenthe entirecrowd decides to
move to another location.39
The example of apartyisillustrative alsofor furtherreasons. Taken as a
whole, the party is not one homogeneousentity, but an aggregate of different
sub-spheres.40 So it is not unusual that guests willcome away from one and the
same party withrather differentexperiences.Aparty offers differenttrajectories
of potential engagement –and thatisgenerally trueofaffective arrangements.
Thus,‘affective arrangement’ is not just another way of speaking of collective
emotionsormoods, in the sense of asingle homogeneous emotional experience
shared amonganumber of individuals. The concept of an affective arrangement
is specifically geared to capturinga‘distinctness in unity’ amongthose co-pres-
ent in asituation.Inaffective arrangements, differentslotsfor individualin-
volvement existinanoverall constellation thatnevertheless displays aunity of
sorts, as the formation is marked off fromits surroundingsbythresholds of in-
tensity.
retical role. Randall Collins. Interaction Ritual Chains. Princeton 2004. Genealogically, these
strands are linked as they both pointbacktopsychological and sociological work of the phase
between 1880 and 1910, where authors suchas Tarde, Bergson, James and Freud figure prom-
inently.For historicalelucidation, see Blackman:Immaterial Bodies.
39 The invocation of the concept ‘atmosphere’isunderstandable in describing affective ar-
rangements, and it does getatsomething substantive, yet the dangeristhat this concept lets
one assume ahomogeneous overall affective formation instead of alocal tangleofpotentially
distinct, evenconflicting, misaligning or dispersed affectiverelations. Thus,one might say that
whereverthe concept of ‘affective atmosphere’correctly applies, thereisanaffective arrange-
ment,but the reverse does not hold, as theremight be affective arrangements that are too het-
erogeneous and fragmentedfor the concept of ‘atmosphere’ to apply. At best,one might here
speakofdifferent atmospheric zones or currents,but is it doubtful that such metaphoric
speech is of much use.
40 Jane Bennett speaks of assemblages (her term for whatIcall ‘arrangements’)ashaving
“uneven topographies, because someofthe points at which the various affects and bodies cross
pathsare more heavily traffickedthan others, and so powerisnot distributed equally acrossits
surface”JaneBennett:Vibrant Matter:APolitical Ecology of Things. Durham, NC 2010,24.
Bennett’s construalishelpful alsobecause she focuses particularly on the distributed agency
that comestopass in an arrangement, yet in all her approachremains somewhattoo much
within the ambitofLatourian ANT to be fullyadaptable to my understanding of affective
arrangements.
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The same point mightbestated fromthe pointofview of the participant in-
dividuals. Unless theyadhere to avery formal code, parties usually allowtheir
participantsquiteabit of leeway in how to behave, how to look, how to engage
(or not) with other guests, etc. Mostparties do not impose astrict regime on the
partygoers, but allow for all sorts of stylisticextravagances, and foraconsid-
erable range of expression, behaviorand emotion.This is another importantfea-
tureofaffective arrangements:theydonot homogenize or ‘normalize’ their ele-
mentsbut rather integrate theminwaysthatleave their individualitymostly
intact.41 In fact,this is abig partofwhy affective arrangementsare so effective a
means for governing individuals without their notice:Affective arrangements
worklessthrough imposing disciplinarypressures (although they mightdothat
too),but more so in thattheyconnect, integrate and activate –often eventhe
outliers, thosethatwon’t conventionally ‘fit in’. In this respect, certain affective
arrangements haveacounter-cultural openness about themthatmightbewel-
comedbecause of its creative potentials, yet is quiteambivalentfromapolitical
vantage point. Potentially liberating, and permissive as to who and what fits in,
affectivearrangements are neverthelesssuch thatforms of coercion or the ex-
traction of labor, energy or creativity unfold all the moreeffectively through
them, moreseamless,encountering lessresistance, often beingnot evennoticed
by thoseintheir sway.42
In contrast with most parties,many other affectivearrangementsare on the
wholelessintense, and thus probably less easily discernible as specifically affec-
tive arrangements.Yet, adifferentlevelofaffective intensitywillnevertheless
prevail within these constellations as compared with their immediate outside.
Consider whathappens in aclassroom, in acorporate office,incaf0sand restau-
rants, but alsointhe family dining room,not to mention in venuesofentertain-
ment,sports sitesorshoppingmalls–all zones of relativelyhigher intensity,
higher density of affective relatedness, higher emotionalenergy. The point of
the concept is in eachcase to understand localtangles of affective relationsas
specifically enabled and orchestratedbyaconstellation of distinct elements. Ac-
cordingly, these contributory elements, their modesofcompositionand also the
slotsfor individual involvement in the constellation mightbeanalyzedbothsep-
41 This is not to say that affectivearrangement might not alsoeffect exclusions. To the con-
trary: while integrating abroad range of participants,othertypesand stylesmight be all the
more vigorouslyexcluded. Exclusions likewisework in different, sometimes subtle ways, via
various affective markers and affectiveinteraction patterns.Ahmeddiscussesseveral examples
of affectiveexclusions, especially in institutional contexts. Ahmed: QueerPhenomenology;
Sara Ahmed: On Being Included:Racism and DiversityinInstitutional Life. Durham, NC
2012.
42 Cf. Slaby:MindInvasion.
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arately and in their concrete conjunction. It is to these threedistinct yet interre-
lated angles of analysisthatInow turn.
3.c. Three analyticangles
Thomas Nail has abstracted three basic dimensions thatorganizethe agence-
ment. In his terms,any givenarrangement possesses conditions,elements,and
agencies. Deleuze and Guattarispeakofthese dimensions as abstractmachine,
concrete machine and personae.Under the firstrubric, Nail subsumes “thenet-
workofspecific external relationsthat holdsthe elementstogether”.43 One
mightbetempted to speakhere of the arrangement’s operational schema –but
thatwouldsuggest moreinthe way of deliberate,planned organization than
many real-life casesofaffective arrangements in fact display.44 In view of this,
the term‘abstract machine’iswellchosen. What is meant is not ablueprint,
principleor‘idea’ that is only subsequently implemented in aspecific arrange-
ment,b
ut the relational constellation itself thati
sa
lways already ‘live’ in an ar-
rangement. One mightfor instancethinkofthe ‘panopticon’asaparadigmfor
surveillanceasconceivedbyBentham and later turned into atextbook case of a
‘dispositif of power’ by Foucault.45 Another example withcontemporary rele-
vanceisthe idea of the teamor‘teamwork’.46 The ‘team’ figures as the abstract
relational schema that is differentially manifest – hic et nunc –invarious organ-
izations and workplace arrangements.Itdoes not materially ‘exist’ separately
fromits realization in theseconcrete settings.However, theoristsmightof
course analyze sociallifeintermsofabstract machines, i.e., withregard to oper-
ative schemas of social organization and how these evolve or mutate over time.
43 Nail:What is an Assemblage?, 24.
44 Of course, part of the rationalebehindthe concept of affectivearrangement is to enable a
minute analysis of instancesofdeliberate affect design in certain domains of sociallife, but the
concept itself also applies to formations where no deliberate organization has takenplace.
Also, when deliberate organization happens it is often aprocess of adjustingorfine-tuningan
existing arrangement instead of setting up anew one from scratch.
45 Foucault:Discipline and Punish. Anderson points out that Foucault in Disciplineand
Punish discussedpublic arrangements that resemble whatthis paper calls affective arrange-
mentsand whatAnderson calls ‘apparatuses’, for instancepublic spectacles of punishment or
torture. Anderson: Encountering Affect, 31–37. The Foucauldianresonancesofthe concept
affective arrangement are exploredinRainerM'hlhoff and Jan Slaby: Immersion at Work:
Affect and Power in Post-Fordist Work Cultures. In:Birgitt Rçttger-Rçssler &Jan Slaby
(eds.). Affect in Relation –Families, Places, Technologies.Essays on Affectivityand Subject
Formationinthe 21st Century.New York2018.
46 See, e.g., Melissa Gregg:Work’s Intimacy.Cambridge 2011. M'hlhoff and Slaby: Im-
mersion at Work.Slaby, M'hlhoff,and W'schner:Affective Arrangements.
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In turn, it is the various and variable elements out of which the differential
manifestationsofthe abstract machine are composedthatmake up the ‘concrete
machine’. While the abstract machine referstothe relations, the concrete ma-
chinenames the elements. As relationsand elementsare co-dependent in an ar-
rangement, it is clearthat there is no ‘ontic’ difference between abstractand con-
crete; every change on the levelofthe elements manifests in corresponding
changes in the relational configuration:
Sincethe abstractmachine is not an eternal essence or aprogram giveninadvance of the
concrete elements, whenthe concrete elements change so doesthe set of relations they are
in. Thereisthusareciprocal determinationbetween the abstract and the concrete:when
one changes,sodoes the other.47
The thirdelement –personaeoragencies–can likewise be adopted for the
construalofspecifically affective arrangements. With personae,anelement of
‘vital insistence’ is introduced into an agencement –not yet real persons,but
active instances, sometimesperson-like, that enliven the arrangement by enact-
ing its operations. Tentatively,one mightspeakhereof‘roles’ or ‘subjectposi-
tions’ thatanarrangement both enables and depends on. Without such actors,
the arrangement wouldcollapse into aheapofmere stuff;onthe otherhand,
without such arrangements (or agencements in general),there wouldbenovia-
ble ways for individualactors ‘to be’. In terms of theory architecture, this re-
sembles Heidegger’s accountofthe everydaynessofDaseininBeing and Time.
The formal similarity liesinthe fact thatsocialdomains present ‘roles’ thatare
occupied by individuals in routine and unreflective ways. Accordingtothis per-
spective,people are for the most partnot authentic, self-possessed individuals
but almost‘ghost-like’ functionariesofsocialmechanisms (das Man). Thanks to
the arrangements that makeupsocial life, everydayhumanbeingunfolds for the
most part routinely, within the subject positions thatsocialdomains holdatthe
ready. These rolespre-exist their individual occupants in eachcase, yet exist
onlyinsofar as there are specifically constellated individuals at all that interact in
suchrecurring ways.48
Affective arrangements intensifythis dimensionofdefault socialityona
micro-relationallevel. This concept suggests that ‘what is felt’islikewiseout-
sourced intorecurring constellations of affectiverelatedness thatpre-existeach
single individual. Suchpre-formattedaffective relationsmightberesponse pat-
ternswithin socio-technical arrangements,for instanceinhuman-machineinter-
action.49 On another level, we find affective roles besides moreformal ‘social
47 Nail:What is an Assemblage?, 26.
48 Cf. Martin Heidegger:Beingand Time.Oxford 1962, §27.
49 Cf. Seyfert:Automation and Affect.
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roles’, for example roles such as ‘class comedian’, ‘grumpy critic’,‘giggling teen-
ager’, ‘aficionado’. Or consider again the ‘teams’ of teamworkarrangements:
these teams will likely include a‘clown’,an‘energetic leader’,an‘empathetic
listener’, an ‘everybody’s darling’ type, and so on. Affectivity unfolds within the
linesand paths laiddown in chains of previous interactions within affectivear-
rangements.50
In the study of instances of situated affectivity, these three dimensions –con-
ditions, elements,roles–can inform threedifferentyet related angles of analysis.
One mightinquire into the particular material arrangements and how these give
rise to acharacteristic pattern of affectiverelatednessinasetting. For instance,
one mightanalyze the spatial,equipmental,technological,ormediallayout of a
givenlocale –such as acorporate workplace –toreveal the waysinwhich rela-
tional affectivity unfolds concretely therein. One mightthentransposethe per-
spective to theabstractand assessthe overall relational configuration that is dis-
cernible in the setting at hand,and thematize it from ahistoricalperspective or
in aculturally comparative perspective (e.g., ‘attachmenttype’inchild rearing,
styles of art, schemasofworkorganization,educational programs, etc.).Like-
wise,one mightshiftattentiontothe personae or subject positionswithinan
affectivearrangement –all those ‘vital functions’ the arrangement requires to be
fulfilled in order to be able to operate;functionsthatthe arrangement willin
turnsustain,perpetuate and elaborate. In view of these arrangement-specific
‘slots’for individual engagement, differentmodesofaffectiveinvolvement and
habituation enabled by an arrangement can be analyticallyassessed.
All three vantage points–abstractschema,concrete arrangement,subject po-
sitions –offervaluable perspectivesfor studying situated affectivity in away
thatisneither restricted to individualfeelingsnor to categorically codified emo-
tion types. Instead,affective arrangementspresent the possibility to study dis-
tributedaffectivity and agency as partofsocio-material formations, and to
adoptanoutside-in perspective on individualaffective and emotional reper-
toires. This also opensupananglefor critiqueofframing effects,power rela-
tions, processesofnudging and seamless coercion effected through the oper-
ation of affective arrangements.51 As should have been visible throughout, the
approach outlined heredoes not take the affect theoretic roadinto completely
impersonalterritory, as some theoristsfollowingSpinoza and Deleuze have sug-
50 Limited spaceprecludesexploringthe parallelsbetween the present account and the ap-
proach of sociologist Erving Goffman. Several of the concepts he employs in his interactionist
approachresonate withthe perspective sketched here,see,e.g., Erving Goffman:The Arrange-
ment Between the Sexes. In:Theory and Society 4/3, (1977), 301–331.
51 Cf. Slaby:MindInvasion;M'hlhoff and Slaby:Immersion at Wo rk.
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gested.52 Instead,Ihave charted amiddle groundbetween the posthumanism of
the moreradical affect-studies approachesand the humanism of phenomenol-
ogy.
4. Outlook:Aproductive tension?
Yet still, there is atension between the two parts of this paper. ‘Disclosive pos-
tures’ pertain to the comportment of individuals –individual actors that are
under anormative obligation to disclose properly. This runs counter to the per-
spective on ‘affective arrangements’,wherehumanagents comeinview onlyas
elementsamongotherelements, formed and molded by larger, heterogeneous
constellations. AccordingtoWithy, beingcapableofdisclosivepostures–‘exist-
ing findingly’–entails thatone is obliged to strive for astance of clarity and
composed circumspection within constellations that matter yet outrun one’s
command. Her focusthus lies with the comportmentofagents thatfind them-
selves enmeshedinlarger, partially opaque constellations, and –followingAris-
totleand Heidegger –she considersanormative perspective as inevitable.53
While overcomingrepresentationalism and internalist-mentalism, this is still
within the ambit of aclassical philosophyofthe subject, as the world comes in
view as ‘centered’ around aresponsible individual. The farther Withy takesus
into her Aristotelian perspective,the moreher approach resembles anormative
canon, a meta-ethics for asituated humanexistence.
One mightfind suchanethics useful as an addition to the Spinoza-Deleuze
line of affect-theory and its radicalized constellationism. The more dispersed,
heterogeneousand evenchaotic the constellationsare thatmake up the for-
mative ambiance of aperson’s affectivity, the more mightwesee aneed to ac-
countfor an individual’s efforts–and responsibility –toachieve acoherent,rea-
sonable stance amidst thesurroundingfrenzy. It canseem thatwell-calibrated
‘disclosive postures’ is exactly what asituated, relationallyconstituted, post-
sovereignindividual needs in ordertoachieve at leastasemblanceofautonomy.
Alimited, provisional and fragile composure amidstopaque and changing socio-
material constellations is betterthannoaccountable order whatsoever.In-
52 E. g., Bennett:VibrantMatter, xii.
53 Withydoesn’t quiteput it this way herself as she adopts Heidegger’s strategyofontologiz-
ing normativequestions–as is evident in the following passage:“We can be blamed for not
being owned for the same reason that for Aristotle we can be blamed for not being excellent:it
is away of failing to be whatweare.This is not amoral failing but an ontological one” Withy:
OwnedEmotions,31. Withy’s proneness to employingageneric “we” throughout her text
alsoindicates her adherence to normative subject thinking.
Affective Arrangements and Disclosive Postures 215
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dividualaccountability is kept in the picture,instead of letting it all blowoff into
the whirlwinds of posthumanism.
Such an intermediatepositioning between the extremes of ontological in-
dividualismand posthumandissolution mightseem welcome fromthe prag-
maticvantage point of inquiry,and Withy providesconceptualtoolstolet us
steerthiscourse well. But it is not astable resting place. If there is one central
meta-philosophical message of the conceptualframeworkofthe agencement,
thenitisthe conviction thatwell-orderedunitsofsense, homogeneous domains
of intelligibility, and coherent subjective perspectivescan be had onlyoncon-
dition of forcefulstraightening, as aresult of operations that enforce order on
whatwas essentially unordered, plural and multiple, and thus on pain of violent
exclusions. Outside the ambit of exclusionaryorrepressive power relations,
there are no ordered ‘wholes’,nosmoothly functioning arrangements,nouni-
tary,stratified or conventionally organized subjects. Where things or subjects
do appearwellordered, somethingunruly willhavebeen repressed,excluded or
forcefully molded into form.54 Underthis assumption, the dangerofWithy’s
approach is thatitstays complicit with aperspective thatpresupposesahetero-
constitutionofthe subject and apotentially repressive normativecanon –aper-
spective that takesthe question of whatitmeanstobearesponsible subject to be
always already settled in the last instance.55
Work on affect in the Spinoza-Deleuze tradition is better equipped to account
for the unruliness, contingency and contestednessofall thatis. Affect, as under-
stood in this tradition of scholarship,is what registers rupture,conflict, the stir-
ringsofall things blocked out. If freedfrom phantasies of harmony and well-
ordered wholeness, workonaffect sensitizes thought to dispersedcomplexes,
heterogeneity and perpetual change. Affect keeps one’s theoreticalsensibility on
the edge, alert to rupture, disorder and transformative impulses,sothat theorists
willnot rest content witharticulationsalready achieved. The question of the
subject and of apossible normativeaccountabilityofsubjects of experience
should be posedagainst this background. In achaotic and conflict-ridden world
lacking the certainties once provided by tradition, therecan hardly be afirmer
ground for philosophical inquiry.
54 One might call this the Nietzschean legacy of contemporary critical theories, represented
to equal degrees but withdifferent emphases by Foucault,Deleuze,and Butler.
55 Itakeitthat this is how Heidegger himself saw the matter whenhedistanced himself
from his account of Dasein in Beingand Time and adopted apost-humanist outlook in his
later works. Of course, already in the sectionsonangst or conscience in Being and Time,Hei-
degger displaysafirm sensefor the unruliness or disarray in Dasein, yet the orientation in that
bookisultimately always in the direction of composed self-possession as aproper responseto
such disarray.
Jan Slaby2 16
