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Brazil:(an(emerging(academic(market(in(transition(
Elizabeth Balbachevsky
(
Abstract: This paper analyses how recent changes in the Brazilian Higher
Education landscape impact the design of the academic market and career and also
review the tensions created by the transition from this scenario to another where
academic credentials become more widely spread and loose its central discriminant role.
As argued in this paper, the only way to diffuse the tensions generated by this changing
scenario is to hollow out the relevance and prerogatives attached to different positions
in the academic ladder. In these circumstances, the main signals of academic prestige
are organized by external institutions and programs, and sometimes cut across the
signals produced by the academic career.
The paper also argues that emerging systems, facing crossing pressures for expanding
access and improving academic performance will always experience some degree of
diversification. In the case of Brazil, the picture that emerges is a process of strong
segmentation, where the barriers against mobility become more and more stronger as
the academic become older and more experienced. Different segments in the Brazilian
academic market create diverse professional portfolios. What is valued in one segment
is not even relevant in other segments and, with time, the professional profile produced
by working in one segment closes the alternative for success in other segments. Thus,
while mobility in the Brazilian academic market has increased in the last decade, and
there are signals that the academic market in the private and public sectors are more
connected today than they were in the past, mobility is still an experience confined to
the first years of the academic life. In such a segmented market, many young well-
qualified academics that are being formed by the expensive Brazilian system of
graduate education will fail to secure a place in a nurturing academic environment that
could support her further development.
Key words: Brazil; academic market; academic ladder; academic credentials
Paper presented at 11th Biennial Comparative Education Society of Asia (CESA),
Siem Reap, Cambodia, Mai 11-12, 2018.
!
The Brazilian experience could be taken as exemplary for understanding the
tensions and contradictions produced inside an emerging academic system that faces,
simultaneously the challenges of expanding access and strengthening its academic
performance. first there are the challenges for building up a modern academic system in
a situation of chronic shortage of qualified candidates to fill the academic positions. The
paper analyses how this situation impacts the design of the academic market and career
and also review the tensions created by the transition from this scenario to another
where academic credentials become more widely spread and loose its central
discriminant role. As argued in this paper, the only way to diffuse the tensions
generated by this changing scenario is to hollow out the relevance and prerogatives
attached to different positions in the academic ladder. In these circumstances, the main
signals of academic prestige are organized by external institutions and programs, and
sometimes cut across the signals produced by the academic career.
Facing the crossing pressures for expanding access and improving academic
performance. An emerging academic system will always experience some degree of
diversification. In the case of Brazil, the picture that emerges is a process of strong
segmentation, where the barriers against mobility become more and more stronger as
the academic become older and more experienced.
1.(Changing(policies(and(its(effects(on(the(academic(market:(
Brazil is a well-known case of extreme institutional diversity: while in the public sector
the institutional dominant profile is still the traditional comprehensive university, the
huge private sector, which answers for almost 75% of all undergraduate enrollments in
the country, presents a myriad of different institutional arrangements and patterns of
ownerships. In the private sector, one can find several kinds of institutions, varying
from small, family owned isolated professional schools, offering less than a dozen
bachelor programs, and counting with less than a hundred students, up to huge for-profit
universities, some of them with shares in the stock market, and enrolling several
hundreds of thousands of students both at undergraduate and graduate levels. In the last
20 years, diversity was reinforced and expanded by new initiatives and policies
implemented by both the federal government and the state governments.
First, there was the decision taken by the State of São Paulo Government, the country's
richest state, to accrue complete financial and academic autonomy for its own three
universities
1
. Since 1987, the three universities owned by the state of São Paulo are
supported by a fixed percentage of the largest tax collected by the state, a tax imposed
over all commerce of goods and services inside the state. The strong autonomy then
granted to these universities created a unique opportunity for institutional development
that allowed these universities to differentiate and strength their performance, creating
unique conditions for academic development.
In 1996 the federal government enacted a new Education Law - the Lei de Diretrizes e
Bases da educação (LDB). This law reformed the framework of the country's higher
education. It reinforced the academic autonomy of universities - both the public and
private sectors, and recognized the diversity of institutional formats, allowing for a
flexible definition of institutional missions: while universities are supposed to
1
The autonomy then granted to the São Paulo state universities resulted from a long and aggressive strike
that united the academic staff, students and employees’ unions from the three universities. From the
union’s and university authorities, achieving the autonomy represented the fulfillment of more than a
decade of struggles for autonomy and stable support. From the point of view of the government, the
agreement that gave financial autonomy to the universities was a price to pay in order to stop the
increasing political costs created by the constant attritions between universities and government, usually
escalated by the intense coverage they received by the media.
acknowledge teaching, research and outreach as their core missions, non-universities
institutions, colleges, isolated professional schools, federation of schools or the
university centers, which are all the official formats recognized by the law, were
allowed to focus their missions in undergraduate teaching and, sometimes, outreach
activities. The new Education Law also differentiated the first level certification.
Besides the traditional four years programs leading to bachellor degrees, it also
recognized a three years vocational training leading to a technological degree and the
sequential programs, where the student could get a vocational certificate when finishing
the first two years of a four years training program.
In 1997, the Federal government also allowed the private sector to differentiate by
adopting either a philanthropic or a for-profit profile. The formers, usually Catholic or
other denominational universities and schools, and community owned institutions,
exchange stronger controls, especially regarding their philanthropic roles, for exemption
from some taxes. Being non-for profit also facilitate access to some programs and
support from Federal Government. The for-profit sector are less regulated but have no
tax-exemption. This change in the regulatory framework opened a window of
opportunity for the private sector to expand and diversify. Some institutions
experienced a strong process of merging and consolidation that gave rise to large
conglomerates -the for-profit universities - operating inside a demand driven market.
They mostly cater for older, less qualified students, usually coming from low income
families, who are not prepared for succeed in the entrance examination that bar the
access to a place inside the tuition free public sector. Other institutions have evolved
toward a more elite oriented profile, catering for students coming from the upper middle
class. They offer innovative programs tailor made to fit the demands from the corporate
life, both at the bachelor level and at the graduate level.
In the 2000s, the for-profit sub-sector experienced an intense process of consolidation,
with the merging of major organizations, which, in time, bought a large number of
smaller enterprises. These dynamics started as a response to a new, stringent rules
imposed by the Federal government, which created relevant new costs for the private
sector. The costs were easily faced with the scale created by merging small
organizations. These organizations also profited from the decision of the government to
use the private sector as an exhaust valve for the increasing pressure for access to higher
education, which was strengthened the a and profiting from the new programs These
mega-organizations grew up to become very large teaching oriented for-profit
universities. Since the end of 2000s, some of them organizations entered into the stock
market and implemented standardized processes and materials for teaching.
Also, between 2007 and 2012 the Federal government adopted an ambitious plan of
expansion and modernization for the federal universities, nicknamed REUNI. In this
program, the government tried to stir the Federal universities toward a more responsive
role regarding the demands of access. The program exchanged resources for expansion
and modernization of the universities. Among other objectives, the universities were
demanded to increase the number of freshmen taken each year, to adopt evening courses
targeting non-traditional students and to reserve quotas directed to minorities and
children from poor families. Sustained by the program, the federal sector experienced a
quick expansion, with the creation of new universities and the building of new
campuses for old universities. The efforts for expanding the federal sector also
supported the foundation of several new universities, some of them adopting highly
innovative designs.
Finally, in early 2000s, the Federal government, focusing in answer the increasing
pressure for enlarging the access to the public sector, expanded and upgraded the old
network of federal vocational secondary schools into tertiary institutions. This change
created a large network of Federal Technological Centers, with a profile very similar to
the one of the European polytechnics, This decision were coupled by other states'
initiatives to create their own networks of technological schools. Again, the more
successful experience comes from the State of São Paulo, which developed a large
network of technological schools, covering all regions inside the state during the 2000s.
Brazil is also a Federative country, which means that the policies shaping higher
education come from different and more or less autonomous instances of authority. Not
only the Federal Government, but also the 26 states, the Federal District, and all the
5,570 municipalities are officially entitled to organize their own higher education
systems. Thus, in 2015, the Federal system includes 107 institutions, of which 63 hold
the status of comprehensive universities and other 40 are Federal Centers for
Technological Education (vocational training centers). States own other 118 HE
institutions, of which 38 are universities. A number of municipalities, in different states,
own 73 institutions, of which, ten also hold the status of universities. The Private sector
includes 2,070 institutions, with 84 universities.
While the federal government is in charge of regulating and supervising the federal and
private institutions, different states are in charge of regulating as supervising the state's
and municipalities' institutions inside their territories. Thus, it is not unusual to find
three or more different institutions, all located in the same neighborhood, but subject to
different rules, diverse evaluation systems and counting with different sources of
support.
From the perspective of the academic career, the diverse overlapping systems reinforce
the barriers for inter-institutional mobility. All academics from the public sector hold
the status of civil servants. However, they serve different governments and are subject
to different rules. In this context, change may be easier if the academic is younger and
green in the profession, but becomes more challenging and rare as the time passes. Even
inside the same sector, after some years, changing from one institution to another is a
highly unlikely event. If the change involves crossing the boundary between two
systems, the odds are definitely against it, since the academic may lose a relevant part of
the income that depends on seniority. Thus, Public sector in Brazil is marked by the
prominence of internal markets. Once nominated as part of the academic staff of a
public university, the scholar has access to a de facto life-long career where progression
is controlled by both general rules and local uses which may rise or lower the threshold
of the minimal performance demanded for promotion.
Until 2012 the more relevant part of the public sector, the federal universities, were
allowed to choose between opening new academic positions at the beginning of the
career ladder or at the mid-level. In concourses to fill the lowest position, the candidate
was not demanded to hold a graduate degree. On the other hand, openings for mid-level
positions required the doctoral degree. The possibility of opening new positions at the
mid-career level created a relevant external market in the public sector, in particular for
the young scholars, less affected by the gains produced by seniority. Many young
academics started their career at a less demanding, teaching-oriented public university
and moved to a more research-oriented institution after accumulating enough experience
and research products to be competitive.
The new law regulating the academic career in the Federal system (law 12722/2012)
imposed strong restrictions to this informal external market. Since December of 2012,
the only entry position in all Federal universities is the lowest level, teacher-assistant.
The law also reinforced seniority as a necessary requisite for career progression. Even
an academic holding a Ph.D. degree can only be admitted as teacher-assistant. Though
she is entitled to a large bonus in recognition of her degree, she still will need to wait
several years before reaching the position of associate professor, no matter what is her
academic performance.
Traditionally, in all public sectors, the only position with a restricted number of places
is the full-professorship. Access to this position is done through a concourse. By law it
should be competitive, open to all qualified academics inside, and even from outside the
academic unit. However, in many departments informal rules impose seniority as the
main criteria for deciding who, among the associate professors is entitle to apply for a
new opening for a full-professorship. In the Federal system, the 2012 law imposed a
relevant change in the status quo: access to full-professorship became open to all
academics qualified to apply to it. Every academic, once passed through all the lower
ranks and with the level of performance deemed enough by the local accepted
parameters, is entitled to apply for being promoted to this last step in the career.
State owned institutions have autonomy for organize their career in different manners,
but, in general, they tend to follow the pattern established by the federal system. The
only major deviant case is represented by the three universities belonging to the richest
state in the Federation, the state of São Paulo
2
. In these universities holding a Ph.D. is a
formal entry requisite. These universities also impose a post-doctoral degree, the livre-
docência- an adaptation of the old German Privatdozent
3
- as a mandatory requirement
for an academic to be promoted as associate professor, and also to apply for full-
professorship.
2.(Academic(career(in(the(public(sector:(patterns(created(by(the(
interplay(between(formal(rules(and(local(norms(
An attentive reader should have noticed that the former paragraphs repeatedly
have mention differences between formal rule and local uses. Even though formal
written rules are general and accessible to anyone interested, their real operation inside
each university depends on a number of unwritten arrangements known by all
stakeholders, but seldom spelled out. The differences between general rules and local
uses vary from one institutions to another. Among other things, they are a byproduct of
the distance between the real conditions for the academic life inside different
universities and the formal assumptions that organize the academic career in the public
sector.
In mature higher education systems, the institutional career ladder is, in several
ways, out of control of any particular organization. In these systems, the academic’s
reputation, built inside the national and the international community of peers, plays a
decisive role in defining the academic’s odds when running for a new institutional
position or for a promotion. In this sense, disciplines “cut across enterprise” (Clark,
1983, 29). The academic’s reputation in relation of her peers in a disciplinary
community -and in present days, in the growing cross-disciplinary communities - is the
most relevant reference when it comes to access the odds of a particular academic have
to win when running for a new position. These “invisible colleges” (Crane, 1972) are
organized mostly through signals in the form of publications and other outputs. In this
sense, publications operate as interconnecting points of co-ordination linking otherwise
2
The three universities are the Universidade de São Paulo (USP), the Universidade Estadual de Campinas
(UNICAMP) and the Universidade Estadual Júlio de Mesquita (UNESP).
3
Privatdozent(or PD, for short) is both a title and a position in the German tradition. In Germany, PD-ship is
conferred to academics with Ph.D. degree. In order to achieve the PD title, candidates must write another dissertation,
as well as giving a number of lectures, a procedure that takes, in all, about 6 more years after finishing the doctoral
training. In the German system, PD is a necessary step for access to the rank of full-professor.
isolated academics (Polanyi, 1968 and Braun, 2003). It is the complex interplay
between the rules produced inside particular organizations, and the norms that organize
this wide web of interconnected professionals, that makes the academic career so
elusive in eyes of most organizational theories.
As said above, in mature systems, the expected situation is a relative congruence
between the academic’s position in the organizational ladder and his/her reputation,
acquired among the peers. The congruence reflects the meritocratic nature of the
academic life and makes the university the best institutional environment for the growth
of a flourishing research community. This congruence cannot be taken for granted in
emerging systems. Shortage of advanced trained human resources is a well know trait of
developing societies. It is, therefore, no surprise that universities also face the same
problem when it comes to finding qualified candidates for all academic positions. What
is seldom acknowledge by the literature is the impact that such situation have over the
institutionalization of the university, mostly in the way academic markets are organized,
and how the academic career works inside each institution.
First, the shortage of qualified candidates forces universities to lower the
barriers for recruiting freshmen for academic positions. In most developing countries,
not only the availability of qualified personal is small, also the alternatives for training
are scarce. This reality means that while some young academics will have access to
graduate education once employed, others will stay their entire professional life without
sound academic qualifications. In this scenario, usually, the academic degree (and not
performance) is the first and most relevant credential for ascending in the academic
ladder. However, the opposite movement is also present. Since many academics will
spend all professional life without experiencing a regular academic training, there is a
pressure to mitigate the exigency of a graduate degree for promotion. Usually, the
answer to these cross-pressures is to recognize the academic degree as a sufficient
condition for promotion while, at the same time, to acknowledge local organizational
bypaths allowing the academics to circumvent the legal requirement of a degree for
promotion. In some countries, this situation may also create pressures for lower the
knowledge and performance contends of the graduate education, which ends up into
creating a system of hollow academic credentials.
As institutional career become disconnected of the hierarchies of intellectual
prestige, it also loses its discriminant capacity and its meritocratic role for “accrue to an
individual or to a group of academics for meritorious or exemplary performance”
(Moore, 1992). In many emerging systems, the role of recognizing exemplary
performance tend to be attributed to external entities and institutions, such as research
scholarships controlled by science foundations, the prestige derived from the
academic’s individual links to a prestigious research groups, laboratory or research
center.
The Brazilian experience is an interesting case for exploring how the shortage of
qualified profiles for academic positions affects the institutionalization of the university
life. In the 1950s and 1960s, the challenge of staffing higher education institutions with
competent professionals was first met by sending a significant number of academics
abroad to have access to Ph.D. training. By late 1960s, the number of graduated
personnel was enough to support the development of a domestic graduate system.
Graduate education in Brazil was, since the beginning, organized in formal programs,
which includes a number of courses the student is demanded to attend, writing a piece
of research work, and a public defense of the thesis or dissertation. Since 1976, a
formal, nation-wide evaluation based on peer-review defines the level of public support
each graduate program is entitled to receive. This evaluation successfully imposes a
threshold of minimum quality for graduate education, which, in turn, defines which
programs are qualified to grant master's and doctoral degrees. This evaluation also
limited the dispersion of graduate programs across all universities. Even in the present
days, despite its rapid expansion, graduate education, in particular doctoral programs
tend to be concentrated in a small number of more academically qualified institutions
(Balbachevsky & Schwartzman, 2010; CGEE, 2011)
In the Brazilian experience, the success in building up a dynamic system of
graduate education also produced an informal stratification among public universities,
which cut across the legal classification that separates Federal owned universities and
State-owned ones. In late 1960s, when graduate education was first recognized and
received support from the federal government
4
, only a few public institutions (both
federal, and state owned), and some catholic universities were well positioned to take
advantage of the existing incentives. At the time, these institutions had attracted a
number of PhD holders coming from abroad, and because of that, they were able to
create the first graduate programs. Since graduate programs also offered the best
conditions for supporting research, these universities attracted more academics with
doctorate while, at the same time, qualified their academic personnel. The operation of
this virtuous circle is one of the most important factors explaining the growth of a small
number of real research Universities in Brazil (Balbachevsky, 2013). As early as the end
of 1980s, these universities already had most of their academics qualified as Doctors,
and, what is more important, many of them started to impose informal norms
demanding a Ph.D. degree as the minimal condition for access to an academic
placement
5
.
In other public institutions, in spite of also holding the university status, graduate
education is a small enterprise mobilizing the efforts of the more active academics.
Nonetheless, these institutions play a relevant role not only in undergraduate education,
but also as a regional source of skills and knowledge. As thus, I call them public regional
universities, regardless if they belong to the Federal government or to state governments.
2.1(Career,(academic(degree,(and(meritocratic(rule(inside(Brazilian(
public(universities(
It is possible to evaluate how the relationship between career and academic
degree has evolved in the last 30 years in Brazil. In 1992 and 2007, the Research Center
on Public Policy from the University of São Paulo (NUPPs)carried out national surveys
with representative samples of the Brazilian academic profession. The first survey
received support from The Carnegie Foundation and was part of the research project
“The International academic profession”, organized by this Foundation. The second
4
For an overview of the Brazilian graduate education, see Schwartzman and Balbachevsky 2010, and
CGEE 2011.
5
In 1988, the University of São Paulo (USP) was the first Brazilian university to officially demand the
doctorate as the minimal requirement for access to the ranks of faculty across all university. At that year,
USP reformed its academic career and eliminated all academic positions that did not require a doctorate.
In 1989, this decision was also adopted by the State University of Campinas (UNICAMP), and, a few
months later, also by the State University Júlio de Mesquita (UNESP). Up to 2014, the Federal
Universities’ career didn’t officially impose the doctorate for those entering their academic ranks.
Nevertheless, this requirement became a norm in some research oriented Federal universities since the
end of 1990s. In 2014 the Ministry of Education enacted a decree imposing a doctorate as the minimal
threshold for a candidate being accepted as an academic at Federal Universities. Nevertheless, a provision
was made for accepting lower degrees in “exceptional cases”. This provision is frequently used by
regional universities, because of the lack of qualified candidates, and also because local candidates, even
if holding a lower qualification, are preferred since they have more incentives for not moving away after
some years.
survey was part of the international research network “The Changing Academic
Profession’ (CAP)
6
, and was supported by the São Paulo Science Foundation
(FAPESP). Table 1, bellow, presents the data from both research oriented and regional
public universities in Brazil, collected in 1992 and 2007:
Table 1. Academic degree and institutional career in Brazilian public universities, 1992
and 2007
1992
Master’sdegree
and lower
Doctorate
Total
Research
universities
Entering positions
90.7%
52.7%
66.7%
Mid career positions
6.7%
35.7%
25.0%
Full-professor
2.7%
11.6%
8.3%
Total (100%)
(75)
(129)
(204)
Regional
universiti
es
Entering positions
53.9%
6.0%
41.9%
Mid career positions
41.6%
77.5%
50.6%
Full-professor
4.5%
16.5%
7.5%
Total (100%)
(401)
(133)
(534)
2007
Research
universities
Entering positions
93.3%
21.0%
26.5%
Mid career
positions
6.7%
66.3%
61.7%
Full-professor
0
12.7%
11.7%
Total (100%)
(15)
(181)
(196)
Regional
universities
Entering positions
65.7%
11.6%
31.5%
Mid career
positions
7.4%
78.1%
52.2%
Full-professor
26.9%
10.2%
16.3%
Total (100%)
(91)
(181)
(272)
Source: Brazil sample, the Carnegie Foudation, 1992; Brazil sample, CAP, 2007.
The data presented at table 1 exemplify some of the dynamics discussed above. It is
possible to access how the relationship between career and academic degree changed in Brazil in
the last 20 years using a very sensible statistic: the Proportional- reduction-in-error (PRE), which
compare the estimate the probability of error under two rules (Vale e Silva, 1990). Thus, if P(1)
is the probability of error associated with the first rule, and P(2) is the probability of error with
the second rule, the RPE is estimated by the general formula PRE= P(1)-P(2)/P(1).
Using this very simple statistic it is possible to estimate the proportional
reduction in error of predicting that an academic is placed in a given position from the
knowledge of her degree. By comparing the probability of error for predicting a position
for an academic in the entire sample and the probability of error for predicting a
position among the subset of academics with the relevant degree, it is possible to
6
For more details of this research network, see:
http://www.uni-kassel.de/einrichtungen/en/incher/research/research-area-change-of-knowledge/the-
changing-academic-profession-cap.html
The author thanks FAPESP for the financial support (contract 2006/03329-0) for the Brazilian survey.
calculate the PRE for predicting the individual position in the academic ladder given her
academic degree.
Consider first the PRE on estimating an entering position, given that the
academic had a master or lower degree: In 1992, this reduction was of 0.72 inside the
research universities, and only 0.21 inside the regional universities. This data show that
already at the beginning of the 1990s, research universities was successful in confine
lower qualified academics to lower ranks. On the other hand, in regional universities, a
large number of academics were able to reach high positions in the hierarchy without
holding a doctorate.
Consider now the PRE on estimating a middle-upper rank, given the academic
had a doctorate. In 1992, it was 0.29in research universities, and 0.81 in regional
universities. Thus, already at that time, holding a doctorate was not enough to assure a
promotion inside a research university, while in a regional university, this was a
sufficient condition for securing a promotion.
From 1992 on Brazilian higher education landscape experienced major changes.
First, graduate training opportunities expanded. In 1996, all Brazilian universities
together granted only 29 hundreds of doctorates. In 2007, this number was 99 hundred
an increase of 350% in nine years. The regulatory framework has also changed. A new
Education Law, enacted at the end of 1996 reinforced the relevance of the academic
degrees in the public universities’ academic ladder. Most important, from 1996 until
2003 access to the public sector was almost closed. In this period, Brazilian government
imposed restrictions for new contracts inside all public sectors as part of its policy for
controlling the expansion of the public budget and fighting the high inflation rates that
plagued the Brazilian economy. By 2004, when the public sector started to hire again,
there were a large number of young scholars holding a doctoral degree and waiting for a
position inside the public sector. The new afflux of qualified academics affected in
different ways the shape and odds of the academic career inside research and regional
universities and produced new dynamics in the academic market in general.
Among the research universities, the new reality almost erased the presence of
poorly qualified academics. At the end of the 2000s, almost all academics of these
universities had a doctoral degree: only 7% of these academics reported not hold a
doctoral degree. Inside the regional universities, the picture is more complicated: not
only there were a large number of academics without full qualifications (33.5% of the
academic staff), but also the odds for the less qualified academics for reaching a top
position in the institutional ladder was still high. The PRE on estimating a middle-upper
position, given a low academic qualification was 0.52, which means that in these
universities tensions is building up, as a new generation of young, better qualified
academics entered in institutions were the upper positions in the institutional ladder was
already filled by old, less qualified academics.
One way to access the tensions created by the new reality inside the regional
universities is to compare the degree of commitment to research among of academics in
different ranks inside research and regional universities. As it is well acknowledged by
the literature, in order to be a full-fledged researcher, besides doing research with some
regularity, an academic should be able to bring the research findings to the attention of a
wider audience, which means to publish these findings. In Brazilian context, researchers
should also have the skills to compete for external support, since it is not usual for
universities, even public ones, to set aside their own resources for supporting research.
In the 2007 survey, a number of questions covered all these dimensions. When
combined, they produce a scale measuring the level of the academic’s commitment to
research. The scale ranks the research engagement of Brazilian academics from a non-
active role through a fully professionalized researcher with active international
connections. In the middle, the scale distinguishes those that publish, but do not have
access to external funds for research (classified as Partially professionalized researcher)
and those that publish and have access to external funds, but do not hold active
international connections (classified as Full-fledged researcher with only domestic
connections)
7
. Table 2 shows the relationship between different profiles of commitment
to research and academic rank, both in regional and research universities:
Table 2: Patterns of commitment to research, academic rank and institutional
environment in the Public sector, in 2007
Type of
institution
Academic rank
total
Full-
professor
Associate
professor
and other
mid –
career
positions
Assistant
and
other
entering
positions
Public
research
universities
Full-fledged researcher with
international connections
56,5%
28,9%
19,2%
29,6%
Full-fledged researcher with
only domestic connections
26,1%
25,6%
21,2%
24,5%
Partially professionalized
researcher
8,7%
40,5%
51,9%
39,8%
Not active
8,7%
5,0%
7,7%
6,1%
Total (100%)
(23)
(121)
(52)
(196)
Public
regional
universities
Full-fledged researcher with
international connections
6,3%
18,2%
4,3%
11,9%
Full-fledged researcher with
only domestic connections
6,3%
22,1%
9,7%
15,6%
Partially professionalized
researcher
45,8%
55,2%
61,3%
55,6%
Not active
41,7%
4,5%
24,7%
16,9%
Total (100%)
(48)
(154)
(93)
(295)
Source: CAP Survey, 2007, Brazil
As one would expect, the proportion of academics with high research profile is
much higher in research universities than in regional universities. Research universities
also counts with academic personnel more internationalized and better positioned to
compete for research funds. However, what is more impressive is the way these profiles
relate to the academic career inside each institutional environment. In research
universities, the relationship between commitment to research and rank tends to follow
a linear pattern, where academics in higher ranks are also research leaders with an
active and international research profile. Inside regional universities, the pattern runs
contrary the expected association. There are more academics fully committed to the
7
This is a Guttman Scale, and its coefficient of reproducibility is 0.92, well above the usual threshold of
0.85. The very possibility of building up such robust scale is a powerful indication of how well organized
is the system for support science and technology in Brazil.
research role in mid-career positions than in, either, the entering positions or at the end
of the career ladder.
The data presented in both tables describe a system in transition. In fact, until
the end of the 1990, the positions opened in regional universities attracted mostly local
candidates without small if any kind of academic training. Once employed, the
exigencies for academic qualifications could be easily by-passed using some special
provisions present in almost all universities’ regulations, such as the recognition of
“equivalent performance”, done by internal committees. For those with a more
entrepreneurial profile, the usual rote was to comply with the teaching demands of the
institution for a while and ask for a leave after some years, to search for academic
qualifications at doctoral programs in more research-oriented universities.
After 2003, when the public sector, when the public sector experienced a new
cycle of expansion, the new positions opened in all public universities attracted a large
number of candidates, most of them holding a doctoral degree. Even if the initial
salaries were not high, employment at the public sector was (and still is) highly
attractive: once accepted, academics have immediate access to full-time stable contracts,
and the teaching load is, comparatively with the private sector, very low. What is more
important, as an academic from the public sector, the scholar qualify to apply for the
many programs launched by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation to
support research.
But the internal environment these young scholars found inside regional
universities were not the heavens they envisage: the doctoral degree assured them
access to mid-level positions in the career ladder, but the access to higher positions was
blocked by academics from an older generation, less qualified and less productive, but
still in control of the institution’s inside politics. In addition, the new academic positions
opened by the Federal government imposed larger teaching loads, since they were
created under a policy framework aiming to support a quick expansion of access to the
public sector. Furthermore, even if motivated for doing research, the young generation
faced a harsh competition to access the funds for supporting research projects. At the
end of the 1990s the Brazilian Council for Research (CNPq) changed the way research
funds were distributed. Instead of attending individual projects, as they were presented
to the Council consideration, it started launching bids, increasing greatly the
competition for funds. For the younger academics, without counting with the
collaboration of older, more experienced colleagues, the access to these funds is a
serious challenge. And since Brazilian universities have no special provisions for
supporting the academic’s research activities, developing an active research profile is
quite difficult, in particular to academics hired into regional universities, far from the
more dynamic academic centers, and working in environment that traditionally showed
low commitment to research and graduate education.
This situation gave rise to an intense mobility among young scholars from the
less research-intensive public institutions toward the more research-intensive ones. At
the end of the 2000s, it was quite common for a young scholar to start his/her career
employed in a more remote regional universities, and, by applying to different positions,
to succeed in moving from there to a more research-oriented department in another
university. After improving her publishing portfolio, she would be apt to apply again to
another position, and so on, until, with luck, she could reach a highly disputed position
inside a research university.
From the point of view of the more research-intensive universities, the new
reality was positive because it created opportunities for selecting the best academics.
However, for regional universities the new academic mobility was perceived as a sort of
brain drain. The situation was particularly adverse because regional universities had no
autonomy to fight for the talents they were losing. Given the uniform law regulating the
career ladder in all Federal universities and the strong constraints on their financial
autonomy, it was not possible for them to offer fringe benefits that would tip the scale in
favor of the regional university. It comes not as a surprise that, by the end of the 2012,
the Federal government reformed the career inside the federal system, as described
before, and strengthened the barriers against this mobility. The new regulations
succeeded in restrict mobility because by moving from one institution to another, the
academic now runs into the risk of losing the positions he/she has already climbed
inside the career ladder in her/his former university.
2.2(Institutional(ranks(and(signals(of(academic(prestige(
The more usual alternative to diffuse the internal tensions described above is to hollow
out the meaning of hierarchies in the academic career. In most Brazilian public
institutions, different positions in the institutional rank, alone, add few prerogatives
outside the increase in salary: all academics have similar teaching loads and are subject
to the same staple contract, which establish the duties and privileges associated to an
academic position in general terms. On the other hand, academic credentials mean a lot:
only academics holding a doctorate are entitled to give classes and advise in graduate
programs; and doctorate is a required degree for an academic to be appointed as Rector,
deans and, in some cases, also heads of departments. Being attached to a well evaluated
doctoral program is considered a relevant signal of prestige and is much more important
for appraising the academic role inside the university than her position in the
institution’s academic rank
8
.
Since 1976, all graduate programs in Brazil are subject to a stringent system of
evaluation strongly based on peer-review, and coordinated by the Ministry of
Education’s Agency in charge of Graduate Education – CAPES. The process of
evaluation is long, mobilize hundreds of academics in all fields, and considers different
aspects of each program, from the quality of the students' products, and their
commitment to the academic activities, to the academics’ research profile, and the
quality of the academic’s publications. The main evaluation is carried out every 4 years,
but exchange between CAPES and the Programs is intense all the time. One by-product
of this evaluation is an unequivocal sign of prestige for all academics linked to the
programs that score high in the seven-point scale of this evaluation
9
. Being an advisor in
these programs counts for the researcher success when applying for external support.
Most important, such programs represent a good platform for organizing competitive
networks for applying to the more competitive programs. On the other hand, success in
the application to these large programs, the level of support and resources for research
that comes with them, and the visibility and the increased potential for developing high-
impact research, are all relevant indicators that will improve (or confirm) the evaluation
of a Doctoral program in the next round of evaluation.
Another signal of prestige highly prized by the academics with an active research
profile is the system of scholarships known as "scientific productivity scholarships".
These scholarships are awarded by the Federal Council for Research (CNPq), and are
ranked from Level 2 up to level 1A, passing through 1B, 1C, and 1D. Access to this
8
The Brazilian Federal Council for Support of Research (CNPq), for example, classify the researchers in
its files using only the information whether she is or is not advisor at doctoral programs.
9
CAPES’ rank runs from 1 to 7. A program with ranked in 1 or 2 position is not allowed to continue its
activities. Programs that offer only master’s programs can only reach the fifth position. Programs with
doctorate may be evaluated from
scholarship is organized through a call issued by the CNPq every year. Committees of
specialists in each area make the selection of the candidates to whom the scholarship
will be granted. Once awarded, the researcher must submit a report of her academic
production every four years. This report serves the base for the assessment that will
decide if the scholarship will be renewed or denied and, if it is the case, the academic's
promotion through the scholarship's ranks.
These reinforcing dynamics supported the development of a strong, self-refereed
scientific community in Brazil (Schwartzman, 2010). Members of the scientific
community tend to concentrate in research-oriented universities, where graduate
education are a major endeavour. Nevertheless, academics with this profile are found in
all public universities, and, what is more relevant for our discussion, in most, less
research-oriented universities, they are placed in different positions in the institution's
rank: some are full professor, but many younger academics, highly committed to research
related activities, are placed in lower ranks, which may even include the position of
teacher assistant. In this situation, it is crucial for these academics to hollow up the
institutional career while asserting the prerogatives attached to the Doctorate degree. For
them, it is important to assure that the institution's hierarchy have no saying regarding the
researcher' agenda, and that the university's bureaucracy cannot stand between the
researcher and the resources for supporting research and graduate education. It is also
crucial that differences in positions at the institutional career does not imply dissimilar
teaching load or produce any kind of privilege that could pose a barrier for the academic's
autonomy for organizing her research and other professional commitments. Thus, in all
universities, advising master's and doctoral candidates is a prerogative of doctorate
holders, but is not linked to a certain position in the institutional ladder. It is perfectly
possible, for example, for a teacher-assistant (when also a Ph.D. holder) to become a full
member of a doctoral program, while an older, less research-oriented colleague, even if
in a full-professor position, have all her academic commitments circumscribed to
undergraduate teaching.
Most of the academics in public universities are placed in a more peripherical position
regarding the web of researchers that organize the core of the Brazilian scientific
community. They also hold stable, full-time contracts, but do not meet the standards of
professional achievements usually expected from a member of the scientific community.
Some of them do not hold a doctoral degree; others have a low publishing profile and
thus are not accepted as a full member of a graduate program because of the exigencies
posed by CAPES
10
. In these circumstances, no matter which is their position in the
institutional rank, their academic responsibilities tend to be circumscribed to teaching at
the undergraduate level. Because of the lack of academic credentials and/or limited
performance as researchers, they are also almost entirely disconnected from their national
and international community of peers. For these academics, the only acceptable grounds
for differentiation are those produced by externalities, in principle accessible to everyone,
such as seniority. Thus, for different motives, they also contribute to hollow the
institutional career from all prestige and prerogatives.
Thus, inside most of the public sector the formal ranks that organized the institutional
career have small relevance. They do not define roles and responsibilities and do not
entitle special privileges. The relevant hierarchies are placed outside the university and
10
One of the most important indicators in CAPES evaluation is the publishing profile of the academics
linked to a graduate program. Thus, accepting an academic with low publishing profile as a full member
of a graduate program can jeopardize its evaluation. Since CAPES support to programs is linked with the
evaluation, performing badly in the evaluation process have severe consequences for the other academics
and students.
are by-products of the operation of the complex machinery that supports research and
graduate education in Brazil. These hierarchies spell the prestige of an individual
researcher inside her community of peers. They are more fluid and less conspicuous than
the ranks recognized by the university, but much more effective. They regulate the level
of support the academic is able to mobilize from external sources, which, in turn, is the
major constraint on the level of complexity, scope and design of the academic's research
network, which, at its turn, has consequences for the level of impact of the research
products.
3.(Career(and(market(dynamics(in(the(private(sector:(
Full-time contracts were introduced in the public sector in 1968, with the first major
reform of the Brazilian higher education
11
. In the 1970s, full time contract was almost
universalized in the public sector. Since then, it become the staple mode of contract in
public universities. The adoption of full-time contracts in the public sector was followed
by the development of a number of internal controls for enforcing the academic's full
commitment to the university. The introduction of this kind of contract in public
university was contemporary to the major policy initiatives that organized for the first
time a large scale public support for research and graduate education in Brazil
(Schwartznman, 2010). The conjunction of all these initiatives created an unparalleled
window of opportunity for both the consolidation of the scientific community and an
increasing complexity of the public universities' the institutional design. Estimations
made by several specialists point out that from 1970 up to 1980 the total budget
allocated to the Federal Universities in Brazil more that quintupled, and that most of this
increase were directed to support the expansion of full-time academic contracts (Mattos,
1990; Velloso, 1987; Schwartzman, 1993)
However, what was not foreseen by the 1968 reform was the increasing pressure for
access to higher education experienced by the Brazilian society at that time. From mid
1960 to 1970 the number of enrolments at undergraduate level grew from a bit more
than 93 thousand to more than 425 thousand of students. In 1980, the number of
students enrolled in bachelor programs in Brazil was more than 1.2 million
(Schwartzman, 1992). The pressures posed by this rash growth was faced mostly by the
private sector. The growth of the private sector happened with the expansion of many
private isolated "faculdades", usually small, family owned non-university institutions
entitled to grant bachellor degrees. These institutions were teaching only schools,
offering evening courses and staffed with per-hour paid instructors with almost no other
academic qualifications outside a bachellor degree.
The growth of this new demand-driven private sector
12
, and the expansion of the full-
time contracts in the public sector created two segregated markets: from the 1970s until
early 1990s the private sector and the public sector's markets grew with almost no point
of contact. Operating under different rules and with diverse goals, one sector almost
11
The 1968's reform also replaced the chair system by the departmental organization and opened
alternatives for internal diversification by allowing the old Faculties of science, humanities and
philosophy to split into different specialized institutes. For an overview of the 1968 reform, see Klein,
12
Private higher education has a long history in Brazil (See Sampaio, 2000). Since the beginning of the
XX century, denominational learning centers were organized in the country by the Catholic Church and
other religions. The first catholic university was founded in Rio de Janeiro, in 1940. Besides these elite
institutions, another traditional form of private higher education in Brazil were the schools of commerce,
a kind of tertiary vocational school catering to children from lower middle class interested in training for
the clerk positions created by the ever-expanding tertiary sector in the Brazilian economy. Up to the
1960s, it was more or less usual for an academic, specially at the beginning of her career, to hold two or
more appointments, both in the public and private institutions.
ignored the other. Public institutions relied on their alumni for recruiting new academics
and had the public graduate system for attending their demands for faculty qualification.
Private, demand driven institutions, also enlisted their academics among their alumni. In
their market, academic credentials didn’t matter at all. Instructors working in the private
sector were poorly qualified and were totally ignorant of the rules of academic life. In
between these two major sectors, there were a small elite oriented philanthropic sector
composed by, mostly, denominational institutions.
This picture started to change in the beginning of 1990s, when a new Education
Act, the Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação (LDB), was enacted. The public debate
that preceded the changes in the regulatory framework of Brazilian Higher Education
created a new social awareness of the importance of the academic credentials for the
quality of higher education. When enacted, the new LDB imposed several changes in
the private market. First, it imposed to the private institutions a minimal threshold of 1/3
of their faculty qualified as, at least, Master's. Second, in order to be accredited as
university, the private institutions should also have a minimal proportion of doctorate
holders among their faculty and sustain some activity at the graduate level, which
means organizing at least two programs accredited as master's programs and one
program at doctoral level. Third, the new law also imposed a pattern of academic career
in the private universities that should acknowledge and reward the academic degrees.
Together, these changes opened a new market for the young scholars graduated by the
ever-expanding graduate system. These changes happened in a time when the public
sector was closed
13
. With the lack of new places at the public universities, the
alternative of being employed at the private sector seemed attractive enough for the new
generation.
The ways different institutions answered to the new regulatory framework
created a novel differentiation inside the private sector. The majority of private
organizations stayed confined in a kind of "commodity-like" market of mass
undergraduate education, where they compete for students offering the less expensive
education possible. For these institutions, qualified academics is something they hardly
are able to afford (or interested in). Most of these institutions are small family owned
institutions. They usually opt to avert changes and go on operating in the old patterns. In
the new regulatory environment, they avoid the pressure for upgrade the profile of their
academics with an intense circulation of employees. These institutions hire better
qualified academics when they sense stronger regulatory pressure, just to dismiss them
later.
The larger for profit private organizations benefited from the change in the
regulatory environment and the scale of their operations. This scale buffers the costs
created by the government's regulatory pressure related to the academics' qualifications.
For them it is easier to insulate the pressures posed by the better qualified academics
into small “isles of academic life”, linked to a few graduate programs, while preserving
the traditional ways in most of its undergraduate operations. By supporting these small-
scale research environments, they answer to the regulatory pressures, and are able to
provide the figures demanded by the government in order to be accredited as
universities. With the status of universities, they also profit from the autonomy granted
by the new LDB.
Finally, on the top of the new hierarchy in the private sector there are a small number of
highly entrepreneurial institutions catering for students from the wealthier families.
13
In the middle of 1990s, Federal Government forbade hiring new civil servants in order to have control
over public spends, regarded as a major source of inflationary pressures that plagued the Brazilian
economy.
Besides undergraduate programs, these institutions also offer well-regarded professional
training programs, professional graduate education, consultancy, and, some of them,
also doctoral programs. Some are new, non-university institutions; some are old
traditional Catholic and other denominational universities. For all these institutions, the
academic credentials of the academic staff are a source of prestige both at the
undergraduate market, and at the professional market. These institutions are what I call
private elite institutions.
Private elite institutions are marked by a heterogeneous institutional environment
Diversity is, first, by-product of the differences among the institutions themselves. This
sector congregates old, well-regarded Catholic universities; other respected
denominational universities and new, ascending, non-university secular institutions,
some of them linked to prestigious non-for-profit research foundations and think-tanks,
and others that gained prestige offering tailor-made undergraduate and professional
graduate programs targeting well paid niches in the job-market.
Diversity is also a pervasive trait of their institutional environment. Being placed outside
the benevolent umbrella of the public sector, they cannot afford to extend the same
generous terms of contract to all academics. On the other hand, in order to increase their
attractiveness in the eyes of the families from the upper-middle class, they have to sustain
a rich and dynamic academic environment. To accommodate these diverging drives, these
institutions usually opt for diversify roles and contracts among their academic staff. They
usually have an academic core, composed of well-regarded teachers, distinguished
scholars, and acclaimed professionals, that works side by side with a larger number of a
more peripherical staff composed of academics hired to give a fixed number of classes.
In a small number of these institutions the academic career is formally divided into three
different profiles. Some academics are hired in the role of scholars and researchers – with
their teaching load concentrated in graduate education and their performance measured
by the number and quality of articles published. Others are hired as teachers – with their
performance measured by their popularity among students. Finally, others are hired as
consultants – with their performance measured by the number of projects contracted in
the external market (Balbachevsky and Botelho, 2015).
While the public sector is marked by a mix between collegiality and democratic modes
of governance, the private sector is much more hierarchical (Balbachevsky and
Schwartzman, 2011). The department is the usual academics' reference as the smallest
unity in the public sector. In the private sector, academics tend to identify themselves as
attached to an undergraduate program or to a teaching discipline. In both cases, the
relevant authority that organize the academic's daily life in the private sector is the
coordinator (of the program, or of the discipline). The coordinator is, usually, a position
filled by direct appointment of the organization's high administration. She is charge of
organizing the grid of courses that will be offered to an undergraduate program;
distributing the teaching responsibilities among the academics - which is a central issue,
since the staple contract in the private sector is based on the number of hours-class the
academic is in charge
14
. The coordinator also intermediates demands from students and
the academic body and from the academics and the organization's high administration. It
is also her responsibility to enforce the decisions taken by the central administration and
to ensure that the targets fixed by the high administration are met. Finally, another
relevant role of a coordinator is to respond the demands and controls produced by the
government in its quality assurance policies.
14
The most usual contract at the private sector is a per-hour paid salary, which can vary according to
tasks under the academic's responsibilities. It may includes teaching hours, coordination of programs,
advising students and even doing some research
Access to an academic contract on in the private sector is mostly done through informal
procurement. Selecting the new academic is a direct responsibility of the coordinator,
after consulting the high administration. The private sector does not offer tenure
contracts, but each institution offers full time contracts to a restrict number of
academics, usually the ones with major responsibilities inside the institution. Promotion
is usually done through the external market: it is by moving from one institution to
another that one academic improves her conditions of contract.
Academics hired by institutions operating in the mass oriented private sector face the
worst conditions of contract and work. These institutions offer the same terms of
contract to almost all academics and have no other differentiation than the positions of
coordinator. For-profit universities have, by law, to have a career, and also some
academics with full-time contracts. However only few academics in each organization
have access to these positions, and, again, the decision about who will fill these
positions is not based on the academic's actual performance, but on the degree of
commitment she have shown toward the organization's high administration.
Some academics employed by mass oriented private organizations, conceive this
contract as a transitional placement while waiting for an opening at the public sector or
an opportunity for moving to an elite private institution. In the large metropolitan areas,
it is not unusual for doctoral candidates or fresh doctorate holders to combine evening
lectures in mass oriented private institution with a fixed term, part-time, informal
arrangement as assistant researcher in a research team directed by a senior academic in a
public university. While this is regarded as an acceptable alternative for a young
ambitious academic, this choice may create a dead end for the young scholar. The large
teaching load that comes with these contracts sometimes prevent her to amass enough
research experience and outputs in order to build up a competitive profile necessary for
succeed in the competition for access to more dynamic academic environment.
Elite private institutions have different strategies for selecting new academics. Some are
selected through a procurement process described above. In other circumstances -
especially when the selection aims to fill a more permanent position - some institutions
resort to organizing a contest, where the new opening is announced and a public
concourse selects the chosen one. This kind of contest is more usual in Catholic and
other denominational universities, and less frequent in other private elite institutions.
In all circumstances, private elite institutions offer a more dynamic and diverse
academic environment for the academic. However, the conditions of contract may vary
a lot from one person to another. Usually the enter position is a per-hour paid teaching
place, not essentially different to the ones offered by mass-oriented organizations.
Access to the institution’s career ladder is negotiated case by case by the academic with
the coordinator and the high administration. This decision depends on the assessment of
the candidate's performance as a teacher and as a researcher and/or as a consultant.
Thus, if the new academic accepts a large teaching load at the beginning of her contract,
this decision may again compromise her ability to improving the performance in other
areas deemed necessary for access to the career.
4.(Conclusions:(
This paper reviews the dynamics that shapes and changes the academic market
in Brazil. As argued above, the Brazilian experience could be taken as exemplary of the
tensions and contradictions produced inside an emerging academic system that faces,
simultaneously the challenges of expanding access and strengthening its academic
performance.
First, the paper discusses the challenges for building up a modern academic
system in a situation of chronic shortage of qualified candidates to fill the academic
positions. In this situation, as argued, not only the availability of qualified personal is
small, but also the alternatives for training are scarce. This reality means that while
some young academics will have access to graduate education once employed, others
will stay their entire professional life without sound academic qualifications In this
scenario, usually, the academic degree (and not performance) is the first and most
relevant credential for ascending in the academic ladder. However, the opposite
movement is also present. Since many academics will spend all professional life without
experiencing a regular academic training, there is a pressure to mitigate the exigency of
a graduate degree for promotion.
In mature systems, the expected situation is a relative congruence between the
academic’s position in the organizational ladder and her reputation, acquired among the
peers. This congruence cannot be taken for granted in emerging systems. As
institutional career become disconnected of the hierarchies of intellectual prestige, it
also loses its discriminant capacity and its meritocratic role for “accrue to an individual
or to a group of academics for meritorious or exemplary performance” (Moore, 1992).
In many emerging systems, the role of recognizing exemplary performance tend to be
attributed to external entities and institutions, while the academic career itself plays only
a minor role. The paper show how these processes take place in Brazil and also analyses
the tensions created by the transition from this scenario to another where academic
credentials become more widely spread and loose its central discriminant role.
In fact, the last two decade, the number of new academic positions opened in the
Brazilian higher education grew fast, in both the public and private sectors.
Nevertheless, the requirements for filling these positions have also increased drastically.
While, in the past, graduate education was, typically, an experience that came after
employment, the would-be academic now a day a would be academic must finish
graduate studies before applying for an academic job, especially if her focus is the more
reputed positions in the public sector. However, once accepted to an academic position,
many scholars discover that even if the doctoral degree is enough to assure monetary
gains, the upward movement in the career is blocked by an older generation, less
qualified and less productive, but still in control of the institution’s inside politics. As
argued in this paper, the only way to diffuse the tensions generated by this situation is to
hollow out the relevance and prerogatives attached to different positions in the academic
ladder. In these circumstances, the main signals of academic prestige are organized by
external institutions and programs, and sometimes cut across the signals produced by
the academic career.
The paper also argues that emerging systems, facing crossing pressures for
expanding access and improving academic performance will always experience some
degree of diversification. In the case of Brazil, the picture that emerges is a process of
strong segmentation, where the barriers against mobility become more and more
stronger as the academic become older and more experienced. Different segments in the
Brazilian academic market create diverse professional portfolios. What is valued in one
segment is not even relevant in other segments and, with time, the professional profile
produced by working in one segment closes the alternative for success in other
segments. Thus, while mobility in the Brazilian academic market has increased in the
last decade, and there are signals that the academic market in the private and public
sectors are more connected today than they were in the past, mobility is still an
experience confined to the first years of the academic life. In such a segmented market,
many young well-qualified academics that are being formed by the expensive Brazilian
system of graduate education will fail to secure a place in a nurturing academic
environment that could support her further development.
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