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Armenia and Belarus: caught between the EU's and Russia's conditionalities?
Abstract
This article looks into Armenia's and Belarus’ engagement with the European Union's (EU) and Russia's conditionalities, the two EU Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries that are also members of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). While paying attention to political, economic (including energy and technical) as well as security dimensions of the EU's and Russia's approaches, as proposed in the present special section, the article demonstrates that the conditionalities extended by the EU and Russia to the two countries in question have differed. In their turn, Armenia and Belarus have reacted differently to Russia's and the EU's conditionalities. Against the backdrop of the changing significance ascribed to both the EU's and Russia's policies towards their common neighbourhood since the 1990s, the present contribution identifies and analyses factors that account for the diverging positions of Armenia and Belarus, including the type of regime, the geopolitical considerations, the stakes in the economic and energy spheres and the predisposition to integration. The article shows that in the resulting complex context, Armenia and Belarus have been able to influence the shape and content of the EU's and Russia's conditionalities, although in a different way and to a different extent.
... Such delicate diplomacy plainly contradicts the reality of the growing importance of the CSTO as an instrument that restricts 'bilateral dialogue between the former Soviet republics and the EU or NATO' (Pop 2009, p. 278). In addition to security concerns, the two rival initiatives presented by Russia and the EU-the European Union's Eastern Partnership and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) (Vasilyan 2017;Vieira & Vasilyan 2018)-present Armenia with a difficult choice. Eventually, Sargsyan chose to participate in the EaEU and to sideline the European option because of Russian economic and political pressure (Ter-Matevosyan et al. 2013). ...
Russia has been conventionally portrayed in the area studies literature as a close ally of Armenia, although the latter is a subordinate rather than an equal partner. More recent scholarship has focused on Armenia’s dilemma as to whether to align itself with the liberal West or to enhance ties with its former patron. The Armenian foreign policy establishment has demonstrated in political action and discourse a marked preference for Europe’s institutions and political vision. Russia’s neutrality in the recent escalation of tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan, despite bilateral security arrangements with Armenia, showed the inherent fragilities of this asymmetric alliance. Drawing on asymmetric alliance literature, this article seeks to explain Russia’s reluctance to involve itself in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute in favour of Armenia and identifies how Russia rewards or punishes its ally, based on its assessment of whether the ‘side payments’ attached to the alliance have been honoured.
... In other words, all EU countries, as well as the EU accession countries, will have to switch from fossil fuels to 94-96% carbon-free power, which is possible with electrification based on renewable energy sources, with an emphasis on increasing energy efficiency, increased use of electric transport systems and heat pumps, and the production of hydrogen and synthetic fuels [2]. In order to achieve climate neutrality of Europe, it is necessary to successfully implement the energy transition in neighbouring countries, which are part of Europe, but in which the energy transition process is slowed down for a number of reasons [3]. ...
Background
Decarbonisation of the European economy is one of the main strategic goals of energy transition in the European Union (EU), which aims to become a leader in this process by 2050 and to include other European countries making thus the European continent the first carbon neutral region in the world. Although decarbonisation is an important goal of the EU, the models for monitoring the progress of this process have not yet been clearly defined, and views on the social, economic, and security implications in terms of prioritising decarbonisation are conflicting. The main objective of this paper is to determine the methodological correctness of the existing method of decarbonisation monitoring, to develop a new monitoring model indicating the differences in the EU and European countries that are non-EU and to point out the underlying social, economic and security implications that must certainly find their place in the decision-making process in this field.
Results
The main results showed that there is no clearly defined model for monitoring the success of decarbonisation, while the indicators that are commonly used for this purpose make a model that, as the analysis shows—is methodologically incorrect. In the case of EU countries, the following indicators proved to be the most reliable: consumption-based CO2 and share in global CO2. For non-EU countries, the best monitoring indicators are CO2 per unit of GDP, consumption-based CO2, and renewable energy consumption. These indicators can explain 99% of the variance in decarbonisation success.
Conclusions
The basic conclusion of the paper is that even before the implementation, the decarbonisation monitoring model should be defined and methodologically tested, and the use of a single model for all EU countries or for all countries is not recommended. It is proposed to simplify the monitoring model, with an emphasis on monitoring of consumption-based CO2, which proved to be the most efficient in all sampled countries. The current method of monitoring is based exclusively on environmentally related indicators while ignoring the fact that decarbonisation is associated with almost all aspects of development. The additional social, economic and security aspects need to be developed and included in the further monitoring process.
... In other words, all EU countries, as well as the EU accession countries, will have to switch from fossil fuels to 94-96% carbon-free power, which is possible with electri cation based on renewable energy sources, with an emphasis on increasing energy e ciency, increased use of electric transport systems and heat pumps, and the production of hydrogen and synthetic fuels [2]. In order to achieve climate neutrality of Europe, it is necessary to successfully implement the energy transition in neighbouring countries, which are part of Europe, but in which the energy transition process is slowed down for a number of reasons [3]. ...
Background.
Decarbonisation of the European economy is one of the main strategic goals of energy transition in the European Union (EU), which aims to become a leader in this process by 2050 and to include other European countries making thus the European continent the first carbon neutral region in the world. Although decarbonisation is an important goal of the EU, the models for monitoring the progress of this process have not yet been clearly defined, and views on the social, economic, and security implications in terms of prioritizing decarbonisation are conflicting. The main objective of this paper is to determine the methodological correctness of the existing method of decarbonisation monitoring, to develop a new monitoring model indicating the differences in the EU and European countries that are non-EU and to point out the underlying social, economic and security implications that must certainly find their place in the decision-making process in this field.
Results.
The main results showed that there is no clearly defined model for monitoring the success of decarbonisation, while the indicators that are commonly used for this purpose make a model that, as the analysis shows – is methodologically incorrect. In the case of EU countries, the following indicators proved to be the most reliable: Consumption based CO2 and Share in global CO2. For non-EU countries, the best monitoring indicators are CO2 per unit of GDP, Consumption based CO2, and Renewable energy consumption. These indicators can explain 99% of the variance in decarbonisation success.
Conclusions.
The basic conclusion of the paper is that even before the implementation, the decarbonisation monitoring model should be defined and methodologically tested, and the use of a single model for all EU countries or for all countries is not recommended. It is proposed to simplify the monitoring model, with an emphasis on monitoring of Consumption based CO2, which proved to be the most efficient in all sampled countries. The current method of monitoring is based exclusively on environmentally-related indicators while ignoring the fact that decarbonisation is associated with almost all aspects of development. The additional social, economic and security aspects need to be developed and included in the further monitoring process.
Open Access https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616742.2023.2298692
Over the past two decades, the literature on norm diffusion in the post-Soviet space has grown dramatically. Increasingly, scholars have stressed the role of geopolitical competition between powerful international actors, notably Russia and the European Union (EU), in achieving and/or resisting liberal-democratic reform in the region. This article contributes to this recent research by adding a corrective to the literature, exploring the agency of local rather than external actors in the contestation of global gender equality norms through the high-value cases of Armenia and Georgia. By uncovering taken-for-granted gendered power dimensions in local norm contestation – a subject barely addressed in the norm diffusion literature – the article offers an explanation for the persistence of non-democratic trends in the post-Soviet space as a whole. Specifically, the article examines populist political masculinities contesting EU gender equality policies and related norms concerning violence against women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans (LGBT) rights, arguing that in Armenia and Georgia, it is local populist actors, using taken-for-granted patriarchal and heterosexual discourses to reclaim local masculinities and their political legitimacy, who represent a major challenge to gender equality norms.
Afghanistan is surrounded by four security systems including the Middle East, South Asia, Eurasia, and Asia-Pacific. It has enacted an ineffective role within these systems over the last four decades. However, the country has been a pivotal area regarding competition between influential players of these systems. As a result of various conflicts, we have witnessed an arms race taking place in this country. The main question of this article concerns the sources of the longstanding conflict in Afghanistan and its different aspects. The main argument of the present contribution is that the situation of Afghanistan as an insulator country has led to the rise of tensions and competition among the various security systems and, consequently, overwhelmed Afghanistan, with the key actors intervening and meddling in the Afghanistan internal political and security affairs. The findings show that the transition from an insulator state to one of a connector can help to manage the crisis in this country and prevent the current status quo from ever changing.
Introduction: Ever Since Putin rose to power in Russia, Belarus has
pursued more independent foreign policy toward Russia's regionalism.
Based on the two countries that had signed the Union Treaty in 1999,
Russia called for Belarus to be more cooperative and integrative in
economic, political, security, and institutional dimensions. But
Belarus not only has not implemented many of the provisions of the
Union State and refused Russia's multifaceted demands on more
convergent policies within Eurasian institutions and has strived to
expand relations with members of the European Union and other
trans-regional powers. This issue has caused tensions between Russia
and Belarus. Belarus has always been considered Russia's closest ally.
Russia has had serious tensions with all of its neighbors since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, but Belarus has been an exception and
recognized as a pro-Russian state. Russia has long been the main and
exclusive guarantor of Belarus' security and economy. In terms of
trade, Russia has by far been Belarus' largest trading partner and on
the cultural aspects, linguistic closeness and common religion,
ethnicity, and history have been the reasons for Belarus' alignment
with Russia. Tensions between the two countries have risen severely,
especially since Putin. In terms of energy, Putin has put Belarus in a
tight spot and has repeatedly cut off gas supplies to Belarus, which is
dependent exclusively on Russian energy. On the other hand,
Lukashenko has repeatedly condemned Russia and Putin with
unprecedented and blunt statements. In addition, the government has
begun significant cooperation with the European Union.
Research Question: what is the cause of the tensions between Russia
and Belarus, especially during the Putin era?
1 E-mail: ekolaee@ut.ac.ir (Corresponding author)
Journal of Central Eurasia Studies, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Vol. 14, No. 2, Autumn & Winter 2021 272
Research Hypothesis: Three factors of (a) rising tensions between
Russia and world powers, (b) Belarus' independent approach to
Russia, and (c) Belarus's tendency to cooperate with "outside powers"
such as the European Union, has led Russia to push pressure on
Belarus for more integration and this pressure has increased tensions
between the two countries.
Methodology (and Theoretical Framework if there are): The
theoretical framework of this research is based on Olaf Knudsen's
analytical model, which is used to evaluate the relationships of small
powers with opposing poles of global power. In this paper the research
methodology for studying the hypothesis is explanatory. Data
collection tools are libraries and internet resources.
Results and discussion: The factors that increase tensions between the
two countries are the EU's Eastern Partnership strategy, the Ukraine
crisis, Russia's forced regionalism, energy disputes, and the expansion
of Belarus' relations US. The first concerns the Eastern Partnership
strategy. The EU Eastern Partnership Strategy was adopted in 2009
for six Eastern European countries, including Belarus. Russia saw the
strategy as a geopolitical conspiracy by the West and the European
Union to weaken RussiaIn this regard, Belarus has taken several
measures, including the release of political prisoners, electoral law
reform, lowering restrictions on NGOs, making laws to increase
media freedom, increasing freedoms in the 2008 parliamentary
elections, dialogue with political opponents, and allowing the sale of
some from their newspapers, propaganda in favor of the European
Union and inviting senior members of the EU. Lukashenko traveled to
Western countries such as Italy in 2009 after 13 years, and then
Berlusconi became the first high-ranking leader to visit Belarus in 14
years. The second is the Ukraine crisis, which has two important
effects. First, Belarus resembles itself and Ukraine, thinking that
Belarus might be Russia's next target. Second, since the Ukraine crisis
and the annexation of Crimea to Russia, tensions between Russia and
the European Union escalated unprecedentedly. As tensions between
Russia and the West increased, Russia's pressure on Belarus to
develop integration has increased. So the third is Russian regionalism.
Russia's efforts to create a cohesive and integrated region have failed.
Because of their collective memory, Russia's neighbors in Eurasia fear
that Russia will violate their national sovereignty. Belarus is also one
country that is very skeptical about Russia's regional goals. Russia has
officially stated that Belarus' integration into Russia is possible and
Journal of Central Eurasia Studies, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring & Summer 2021 273
desirable and that six Belarussian provinces could be added to 89
Russian regions.
The fourth is energy. Russia has repeatedly used energy tools to
pursue political interests in Belarus. The first case was in 2002 and the
last case was in January 2020. Belarus is heavily dependent on
Russian oil and gas to meet its domestic needs and to generate revenue
from the processing and sale of energy. In the most recent case, the
cessation of energy exports to Belarus in 2020, Russia explicitly stated
that sustainable re-export of energy to Belarus was conditional on
Belarus complying with the provisions of the Union State Treaty.
Belarus met with US officials such as Bolton and Pompeo in 2019 and
2020, and the United States delivered its first oil shipment to Belarus
in May 2020, promising to supply energy to Belarus. Russia considers
the presence of NATO and the United States in Eastern Europe to be
the most important security problem, and strongly opposes the
development of relations between Belarus and the United States
Conclusion: All of these factors have led to unprecedented tensions
between Russia and Belarus. Despite the protests of the Belarusian
people against Lukashenko in 2020 and 2021 and the escalation of
tensions between Belarus and the European Union and the
rapprochement of Belarus and Russia, tensions between the two
countries have temporarily eased However, it should be noted that the
reason for the conflict between the two countries is fundamental and
will continue with or without Lukashenko. Belarus seeks partnership
and alliance but Russia seeks integration and unification. The threats
of the European Union are limited to criticizing issues such as human
rights. But Russia's threats go far beyond the disintegration of Belarus
and the annexation of part of its territory to Russia, as in the case of
Georgia and Ukraine, rather, Russia, as its politicians have repeatedly
stated publicly and officially, claims to dominate the whole of the
independent nation-state of Belarus, based on its specific
interpretation of the Union State. So the realization of scenarios such
as the Ukraine crisis over Belarus is not far-fetched.
Due to the fact that the potential of the transition of the Eurasian Economic Union to a green economy has not been sufficiently studied, the analysis of the applicability of the EU experience in the field of green innovations for the EAEU countries is being conducted for the first time. The study aims to analyze the potential of the EAEU in achieving the goals of green growth, the ability of the EAEU to compete with alternative projects of the European Union with the post-Soviet countries, and the possibility of joint activities of the EAEU with the EU in the field of green innovations. In this work, we used empirical methods-operations in the study of documents of the organizations and the scientific literature devoted to them. Based on the narrative method, the author considered how plans for the introduction of green technologies into the production process are being implemented in the EAEU countries. When analyzing trends in the sustainable development of the EAEU based on green growth, an analytical forecasting method was used, as well as a scenario writing method. As a result of the study, the author identified the leading directions of the transition of the EAEU countries to a green economy. The study allowed us to identify both the main obstacles to cooperation between the EAEU and the EU based on green growth, and factors that can bring these organizations closer together economically, primarily joint projects in the field of green innovation.
After two decades of meagre results in post-Soviet regionalism, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is the first gleam of hope. However, research on the EAEU is mostly Russia-centred and focused on trade issues, which leaves the small states’ perspectives and developmental aspects, such as the EAEU’s industrial cooperation agenda, understudied. The small states might disproportionately benefit from a shift towards developmental regionalism, but there are also many challenges associated with this issue. Thus, this paper examines Armenia’s and Belarus’ industrial development prospects in the framework of the EAEU. Based on Regulation Theory, the paper triangulates data from national, supranational and international organisations, official EAEU documents and reports with insights from 10 expert interviews with policy makers, policy advisers and management consultants. The paper identifies diverging (and sometimes conflicting) interests regarding the relevance and concrete arrangement of industrial cooperation, which has particular implications for smaller member states like Armenia and Belarus.
The Armenian view on Eurasian integration is multidimensional, as it includes various ideological, historical, political, and economic aspects that simultaneously contradicts to the classical Eurasianism, but gets along with the political and economic contexts of this phenomenon. Joining CSTO and the EAEU is explained by searching political and economic stability in regional integrative projects, as well as within a country. Highlighting three levels of reflection of Eurasian integration allows observing a large gap of state, public, and diasporic approaches to understanding and mastering the idea of integration in the post-Soviet space. However, there is no split in the Armenian public opinion as the initial prerequisite for Armenia's participation in the Eurasian integrative project concerning the political and economic aspects. Another feature of the Armenian approach to the CSTO and the EAEU is the consideration of these projects in the general direction of Russian-Armenian relationship, rather than a scrutiny of multilateral cooperation.
Examining Russia-EU relations in terms of the forms and types of power tools they use, this book argues that the deteriorating relations between Russia and the EU lie in the deep differences in their preferences for the international status quo. These different approaches, combined with economic interdependence and geographic proximity, means both parties experience significant difficulties in shaping strategy and formulating agendas with regards to each other. The Russian leadership is well aware of the EU’s “authority orientation” but fails to reliably predict foreign policy at the EU level, whilst the EU realizes Russia’s “coercive orientation” in general, but cannot predict when and where coercive tools will be used next. Russia is gradually realizing the importance of authority, while the EU sees the necessity of coercion tools for coping with certain challenges. The learning process is ongoing but the basic distinction remains unchanged and so their approaches cannot be reconciled as long as both actors exist in their current form. Using a theoretical framework and case studies including Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine, Busygina examines the possibilities and constraints that arise when the “power of authority” and the “power of coercion” interact with each other, and how this interaction affects third parties.
The present contribution explores the evolution of the Eurasian initiative against the background of a more distant integration project, namely the Russia-Belarus Union State. It demonstrates that in spite of the Eurasian integration project’s more solid economic foundation and constant engagement from Moscow, the former has demonstrated a persistent similarity to the latter. The article looks into the divergence of interests of the Eurasian project participants, which has been exacerbated by the Ukraine crisis. Contrary to the main idea underpinning both the Russia–Belarus and the Eurasian initiatives, their evolution has not led to a full abolition of borders and these have demonstrated a persistent tendency to find their way back into existence. 50 free eprints available under: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/5BpY53NNFrXT7UxNtyub/full
This book devises a new conceptual framework of ‘moral power’ and applies it to the policy of the European Union (EU) towards the South Caucasian states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. It covers the period starting from the 1990s to the present and analyses policy domains (democracy promotion, conflict resolution, security, energy, trade) juxtaposing the policy of EU/member states with those of the United States (US), Russia, Turkey, Iran, as well as inter-governmental and regional organizations. ‘Morality’ is unpacked as composed of seven parameters: consequentialism; coherence; consistency; normative solidity; balance between values and interests; inclusiveness; and external legitimacy. ‘Power’ is branched into ‘potential’, ‘actual’ and ‘actualized’ types. ‘Moral power’ is consequently developed as an objective and neutral framework to capture the foreign policy of an international actor in any geographic area and policy sphere. The book will be useful for students and scholars of International Relations and EU Studies, policy-makers and practitioners.
Syuzanna Vasilyan is Research Fellow at the Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium (since 2015) and Visiting Professor at Sciences Po Paris, France (2016). She was Assistant Professor and Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies at the American University of Armenia (2011-2015) and Visiting Professor at Central European University, Hungary (2010-2011).
This article delves into the external legitimacy of the European Union (EU) in the South Caucasus by analysing the perceptions of the EU's image and role as held by the Armenian, Azeri, and Georgian governments, the public, and political parties. It tests the academic claims regarding the EU's 'difference' by scrutinizing key official documents, drawing on surveys, and relying on in-depth semi-structured interviews. Consequently, it reveals the variations among the three South Caucasian states in terms of their current and potential future visions of the EU. By showing that the Union is seen as comparable to others, like the United States and Russia or intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe (CoE), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), this article ponders on the potential future perception of the Union provided the needs, interests, demands, and aspirations of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Most importantly, it probes into the proportionality of the EU's policy in the South Caucasus, ponders on its ramifications as a result of the boost in its external relations foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty, and offers policy advice for the Union to meet the expectations of its 'neighbours'.
The literature on the European Union influence's in its Eastern neighbourhood has tended to focus on EU-level policies and prioritize EU-related variables. This book seeks to overcome this EU-centric approach by connecting EU policy transfer to the domestic and regional environment in which it unfolds. It looks at the way in which the EU seeks to influence domestic change in the post-Soviet countries participating in the European Neighbourhood Policy/Eastern Partnership and domestic receptivity to EU policies and templates. It seeks to disentangle the various dynamics behind domestic change (or lack thereof) in Eastern Partnership countries, including EU policy mechanisms, domestic elites' preferences and strategies, regional interdependences and Russia's policies. Based upon extensive empirical investigation on EU policies in four countries; Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine - and in two pivotal policy sectors - the book provides systematic and nuanced understanding of complex forces at work in the policy transfer process.
One of the outstanding features of Eurasian regional integration is the fact that it had started even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The discussion of a new treaty that would set up a new set of relations between the Soviet republics was launched in 1990. This treaty, known as the ‘Novo-Ogarevo process’, was designed to create a loose federal system of the Union of Sovereign States instead of the centralized Soviet model. The leadership of 9 out of 15 Soviet republics participated in the drafting committee. The signature of the treaty was torpedoed by the August coup in Moscow, but a trend for reintegration remained.